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Dmitri Trenin|iii
Contents
Summary 1
Introduction 3
From Change in Context to Change in Substance
Chinas Interests
11
12
16
19
Notes 20
Carnegie Moscow Center
22
Summary
The rupture between Russia and theWest stemming from the2014 crisis over
Ukraine has wide-ranging geopolitical implications. Russia has reverted to its
traditional position as aEurasian power sitting between theEast and theWest,
and it is tilting toward China intheface ofpolitical and economic pressure from
theUnited States and Europe. This does not presage anew Sino-Russian bloc, but
theepoch ofpost-communist Russias integration with theWest is over. Inthenew
epoch, Russia will seek to expand and deepen its relations with non-Western
nations, focusing onAsia. Western leaders need totake this shift seriously.
Russias Pivot toAsia
Russias pivot to Asia predates the Ukraine crisis, but it has become more
pronounced since then. This is inpart because China is thelargest economy
outside of the coalition that has imposed sanctions on Russia as a result
ofthecrisis.
What was originally Moscows marriage of convenience with Beijing has
turned into a much closer partnership that includes cooperation on energy
trade, infrastructure development, and defense.
Putins vision of a greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, made up
of the European Union and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, is
being replaced by agreater Asia from Shanghai toSt. Petersburg.
Russia is now more likely toback China inthesteadily growing competition
between Beijing and Washington, which will strengthen Chinas hand.
Takeaways for Western Leaders
Russias confrontation with theUnited States will help mitigate Sino-Russian
rivalries, mostly to Chinas advantage. But this doesnt mean Russia will be
dominated by ChinaMoscow is likely to find a way to craft a special
relationship with its partner.
With Chinas economic might and Russias great-power expertise, theBRICS
group (of which Russia is apart, along with Brazil, India, China, and South
1
Introduction
The Ukraine crisis that began in2014 has shifted thegeopolitical axis ofEurasia.
Russia, which during the previous quarter century had tried to integrate into
the West and become a full-fledged part of Europe, has moved back to its
traditional position as aEurasian power sitting between theEast and theWest.
Moreover, faced with political and economic pressure from theUnited States and
its allies, Russia has tilted toward China.
Moscow is now closer toBeijing than toBerlin. This does not presage anew
Sino-Russian bloc against theWest, but it carries implications for thecountries
ofboth Europe and Asia, as well as for theUnited States.
Russias current economic and financial predicament visibly diminishes
the impact of the shift. The country has been fraught with a combination
of growth that has been grinding to a halt; Western sanctions that are sharply
reducing Russian companies access totechnology, investment, and credit; and,
most disastrously, theplunge intheprice ofoil, which sent theruble into free fall.
This has resulted intheUnited States and theWest more broadly taking arelaxed,
if not dismissive, attitude toward Russias pivot toAsia. It is believed that Russia,
inits present state, will not make much ofadifference totheUnited States, whichever way it goes.
Knowledgeable Americansand those few among them who carelook
at the continuing Sino-Russian rapprochement with curiosity rather than
concern. Many Europeans wish theRussians good luck with theChinese, believing
that thenew closeness will soon lead toalienation and make Russia reverse, repent,
and return to its European roots. Yet, the Wests sangfroid notwithstanding,
theremaking ofEurasia is well under way and will leave few unaffected.
What is thesignificance ofthefundamental change inRussias foreign relations
for Moscows ties with Beijing? Russias confrontation with theUnited States and
the rupture with Europe have given Sino-Russian relations a wholly different
strategic context. Inthecoming years, those relations are likely toget appreciably
closer, tending toward a quasi-alliance and quasi-integration, with Beijing as
themore powerful member oftherelationship. This evolution, inturn, will lead
toa Eurasia more closely interlinked than atany time inmodern history, with
theexception ofthebrief Sino-Soviet alliance inthe1950s. Much ofcontinental
Asia will be drawn into the process of economic integration and political
3
alignment, and theEuropean Union (EU) will be faced with aneconomic space
from St. Petersburg to Shanghai. For China, peacefully gaining preeminence
inEurasia will bring it closer toassuming its rightful place intheworld. TheUnited
States, which even fifteen or twenty years ago could claim to be the Eurasian
hegemon, will be watching from thesidelines.
Dmitri Trenin|5
natural resources would have been linked toEuropean industries and technologies,
with Russia providing the EU a geopolitical and strategic channel to Asia and
thePacific. TheNord Stream and thenow-canceled South Stream toItaly pipelines
controlled by theRussian oil company Gazprom were tohave become thepillars
ofthenew construct. Moscow had intended toallow theEuropeansin theform
of asset swapsaccess to its natural resource base in exchange for access
totheEuropean retail gas market.
However, theidea ofsuch aunion with anauthoritarian Russia, attractive as
it was totheGerman business community, evoked much skepticism inGermanys
political class and themedia. Intheend, Chancellor Angela Merkel cold-shouldered it. A coalition of sorts was building against the relationship in Europe,
including not only Poland and theBaltic states, forever fearful ofanew version
of the infamous 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but also traditional
Russoskeptics inBritain, Sweden, and elsewhere. TheUnited States, which had
historically viewed any rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow with ameasure ofconcern, was also skeptical, often pointing toEuropes energy dependence
on Russia as a sign of its vulnerability. The Ukraine crisis put those concerns
torest by making Germany take atough stance vis--vis Russia.
Europes attitude toward Russias Ukraine policies dramatically hardened as
aresult ofthedowning oftheMalaysia Airlines passenger jet inJuly 2014. Rather
than continue being a reluctant follower of the U.S. campaign to put pressure
onMoscow, Europe, led by Berlin, turned into apersistent and implacable critic
of Russian behavior. The change in the German position may be explained by
Merkels bitter disappointment with Putin returning totheKremlin rather than
allowing former president Dmitry Medvedev torun again; by Germanys ambition
to become the sole leader of the EU, which has required winning the support
ofthePoles and others; and by theparticular sort ofmodern German moralism
that theRussian recourse torealpolitik had insulted.
As a result, the key relationship with Germany was broken. Since 1989
when then general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev put forward theidea ofacommon European home and then allowed Germanys reunificationRussia had
been moving toward some form of a loose association with Western Europe,
centered onGermany.7 But by 2014, it had become alienated from its principal
foreign partner.
U.S. President Barack Obamas administration originally hoped that China
would condemn Russias annexation of Crimea and its interference in eastern
Ukraine. Washington counted on Beijings strong support for the principles
oftheterritorial integrity ofstates and noninterference intheir domestic affairs.
This, however, turned out to be a miscalculation. China refused to publicly
condemn Russias actions. At theUnited Nations (UN) General Assembly vote
inMarch 2014, it chose toabstain, along with some 57 other member states.8
Apparently, this attitude was broadly analogous to Beijings reaction
toMoscows use offorce in2008 inresponse toGeorgias attack ontheRussian-
backed rebel province ofSouth Ossetia, which killed Russian peacekeepers and
provoked aninvasion ofGeorgia proper. China took anominally neutral stance
atthetime, refusing torecognize South Ossetias and Abkhazias independence
from Georgia, but it privately expressed its understanding for Russias action.
In 2014, however, with the U.S.-Russian confrontation turning into a fixture
ofinternational relations, thestakes had become much higher, and Beijing had
tomake aserious, carefully considered decision.
Chinas Interests
On theface ofit, Russias actions violated theprinciples ofBeijings foreign policy.
However, the Chinese leaders could not ignore the events in Kiev that had
precipitated Moscows reaction. To them, aWestern-supported color revolution,
like Ukraines Euromaidan protests, was a bigger threat to stability, including
potentially Chinas own, than Moscows response. For at least some Chinese
officials, Putins resolve in dealing with Crimea was something to be admired,
even emulated. Most importantly, confrontation between Russia and theUnited
States relieved China ofthepotential concern that Putins pragmatism might lead
Moscow to seek an understanding with Washington. It also severely narrowed
Russias international options, making thecountry more amenable topartnering
with China onconditions that favored Beijing.
China, ofcourse, did not want toback Russia outright. Siding with Moscow
would damage Beijings central relationship with Washington. It has highly valued its relationship with theUnited States, which it has worked totransform into
anew type ofgreat-power relationship, as Chinese President Xi Jinping terms it.
Beijing has envisioned bringing about a long period of close cooperation and
peaceful competition with Washington, hoping to eventually achieve equality
with it. At thesame time, aRussia that had torely more onChina would strengthen
Beijings hand inits complex interactions with theUnited States.
All things considered, China turned out tobe thebiggest beneficiary ofRussias
conflict with theWest.
In therapidly changed environment, Beijing came tobe seen by Moscow as
a source of money, investment, and even some technology. With Western
sanctions inplace, China was left as thelargest economy outside theanti-Russian
coalition. Inaddition, since 2009, China has been Russias number one trading
partner, with two-way trade reaching $95 billion in2014.9 InDecember 2014,
when theruble fell sharply against themajor currencies, Chinas finance ministry
promised tostand by Russia, if need be.
Three months after thestart oftheUkraine crisis, inMay 2014, Gazprom signed
adeal estimated at$400 billion tosupply natural gas toChina over athirty-year
period.10 Even though many details ofthedeal are undisclosed and doubts about its
implementation are not uncommon, it is clearly ahistoric turning point inRussias
energy geopolitics. Thegas opening toChina can only be compared toMoscows
Dmitri Trenin|7
Dmitri Trenin|9
tomove theNATO alliance closer toRussia and tofoil Moscows own Eurasian
integration plans, such as those inUkraine.
There is animportant distinction, however: based onits growing power, China
is seeking torestore its natural historical position ofpreeminence inAsia, and
eventually globally, while Russia, which is no longer in the running for world
primacy, is seeking toestablish itself as acenter ofpower inEurasia and amember
ofaglobal concert ofpowers. Inthelong run, Sino-Russian relations will depend
onhow thetwo concepts interact inpractical terms inEurasia.
Amid thecontinuing clash between Russia and theWest over Ukraine, Beijing
has chosen tostand by Russia, even as it formally sticks toneutrality. Inview ofits
geopolitics and its history, China does not approve ofsecessionism, annexations,
or foreign military interventionsunless, of course, Beijing feels the need
to intervene itself. Also, Putin probably did not consult Xi before making his
fateful decisions on Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Yet, Beijing sees the larger
picture and formulates its position interms ofChinas interests as it defines them,
not just abstract principles.
And China has no geopolitical, economic, or security interest in seeing
Moscows will broken by Washington, or Russia itself broken and falling apart.
Apro-Western or, more likely, chaotic Russia would be amajor security hazard
to China. Beijing also interprets Washingtons pressure on Moscow as not just
anattempt tobreak Russias will and make it obey U.S. rules, but also as awarning
to other non-Western competitors, above all China. Exemplary punishment
ofRussia, inthat view, is toserve as ameans todeter China. TheChinese do not
expect Russia tobe defeated by theUnited States, and they wish it tostay united
internally, which fully conforms totheir national interest.
While theRussians and theChinese expect theUnited States tocontinue tobe
themost powerful nation intheworld for several more decades, they see its grip
ontherest oftheworld rapidly loosening. Both Moscow and Beijing see theworld
going through anepochal change away from U.S. domination and toward afreer
global order that would give China more prominence and Russia more freedom
ofaction. They also see theprocess ofchange gaining speed. According toaleading Russian foreign policy thinker, the last dozen years [since thefall ofBaghdad
during the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq] have witnessed the quickest weakening
ofthehegemon inhistory.13
There is also a clear personal affinity between Presidents Xi Jinping and
Vladimir Putin, something that did not really exist between Putin and thetwo
previous Chinese presidents with which he dealt, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
And for first time since former chairman Deng Xiaoping, China again has
a paramount leader who can act as a sovereign rather than just a committee
chairman. InRussia, after thesomewhat awkward four-year Medvedev interlude,
thecountrys real leader is again theformal number one. Thus, Vladimir Putins
return totheKremlin in2012 and theelevation inthesame year ofXi Jinping
toparty and state leadership inChina have provided new structural elements and
Dmitri Trenin|11
personal glue to make the Sino-Russian connection stronger at the very top.14
Both Putin and Xi expect to stay in power into the 2020s, thus giving
therelationship awelcome cadre stability, as one diplomat put it.15
Dmitri Trenin|13
theregions principal trade and investment partner, even as Russia seeks tointegrate theformer Soviet republics economically, politically, and militarily within
such bodies as theEEU and theCollective Security Treaty Organization.
Yet again, theChinese have demonstrated enough tact todeal with Russian
sensibilities. Within the SCO, Russia enjoys an informal co-leadership role
alongside China. Beijing also respects Moscows redlines onestablishing political
alliances and military bases intheformer Soviet space. This contrasts starkly with
the Western policies of NATO and EU enlargement in the former Soviet
borderlands inEastern Europe.
Aware of its relative weakness vis--vis China, Russia will continue seeking
some kind ofbalance inits relations with major Asian countries, but it will find
this harder than before. Russia may try topromote RIC, aninformal consultative
arrangement with China and India that so far has been largely ceremonial. With
India formally joining theSCO in2015, theoretically, atriumvirate ofAsian great
powers may emerge within that body. Inreality, however, Moscow is more likely
tocontinue handling both relationships inparallel. Russia will have tobe careful.
It wants to keep its position as the principal supplier of arms and military
equipment totheIndian Armed Forces, which view China as themain potential
threat. At thesame time, Moscow may have toagree togive Beijing more advanced
weapons technology, which New Delhi may not appreciate.
After theimposition ofU.S.-led sanctions onRussia, which Tokyo has joined,
Moscow has had to lower its expectations of what it can achieve by means
ofastronger economic relationship with Japan. Beijing is definitely pleased with
this development. Publicly, it had long been skeptical about Moscow achieving its
goal of strengthening economic ties with Tokyo. Privately, the Chinese viewed
Russo-Japanese relations apprehensively, fearing that Putin could become thefirst
Russian leader tosuccessfully normalize political relations with Japan. TheChinese
have complained that theRussians do not know theJapanese well enough, how
aggressive and revanchist-minded they are.19 Now Beijing feels vindicated and
reassured. With thedanger ofRusso-Japanese rapprochement removed, atleast
for the foreseeable future, the Chinese want to pull Moscow closer to their
position ontheterritorial disputes intheEast China Sea.
How Moscow handles upcoming World War IIrelated events will indicate how
much ofBeijings agenda it has bought into. Xi Jinping was one ofthefirst world
leaders toindicate that he would travel toMoscow inMay 2015 tocelebrate theseventieth anniversary ofthevictory over Nazi Germany. This contrasts sharply with
theexpected refusals ofBarack Obama and most Western leaders toattend theevent,
which totheRussians symbolizes their greatest achievement inrecent history, and
perhaps also their greatest contribution toworld history. Xi, however, expects Putin
toreturn thefavor and come toBeijing inSeptember 2015 tomark theanniversary
ofthevictory over Japan. TheChinese are already calling ontheRussians tobuild
acommon front tostrengthen peace inNortheast Asia.20 They make no secret that
they see Tokyo as aprimary threat topeace intheregion today.
Dmitri Trenin|15
Russia will probably have to tread more lightly with Vietnam, which buys
Russian-made arms and allows Russian companies to drill for oil and gas
in the South China Sea, another disputed area near China. Any subtle change
inMoscows attitude toward themaritime disputes intheSouth China Sea will be
indicative ofhow much it needs topay China for notionally backing Russia inits
time ofgreat need.
The pro-Western elements inRussia that theChinese were concerned about
inthe1990s have long since lost their influence intheRussian government. Even
Vladimir Putins vaunted pragmatism, which inthepast allowed him toattempt
rapprochement with Washington and Tokyo, is constrained by the reality
of confrontation with the United States. With liberals and Westernizers
completely sidelined inRussia, and Putin assuming themantle ofthecountrys
top nationalist,21 China has less reason than ever toworry about its strategic rear.
Theonly thing that Beijing may find troubling is therise ofthat Russian nationalism that focuses onimmigration, includingalthough not inthefirst instance
from China.
The Russians will be watching how the Chinese deal with them now that
Moscow has forfeited its European option, achieved only limited gains with its
Eurasian integration project, and found itself in the midst of its most serious
economic crisis since theturn ofthetwenty-first century. Even those expecting
theChinese leadership tocontinue toadhere tothegenerally respectful attitude
toward Russia are also pointing tothedisdain and disrespect for thecountry that
many inChinas business circles do not bother tohide.
Russias and Chinas relations with theUnited States will be avery important
factor for thebilateral Sino-Russian relationship. Thesituation is complicated by
thedifference between theforeign policy styles ofMoscow and Beijing. Whereas
the Russians do not shy away from confrontation and brusque in-your-face
methods, theChinese prefer Tai Chi gymnastics, with its many feints. Russian
tactics can scare theChinese; Chinese moves can confuse theRussians.
The Russians have been satisfied that Beijing has largely ignored theObama
administrations attempts to dissuade China from getting too close to Russia.
However, they are apprehensive that China and theUnited States, theworlds two
superpowersa G2might reach some kind of bilateral agreement at Russias
expense. Privately, they warn the Chinese not to entertain illusions that
theAmericans will ever agree togrant them equality and torespect their interests
intheway Beijing formulates them.22 Clearly, theRussians are speaking from their
own experience, both Soviet and post-Soviet.
The closer China and Russia become, themore important it will be for each
partner toaddress thesuspicions athome about theother. True, most Russians
today see China as a friendly country, and vice versa.23 Yet, nationalism is
ontherise not just inRussia but also inChina. InRussia, theold suspicions about
theChinese taking over thecountryeconomically and demographically, if not
militarilycould gain more currency,24 as Moscow has torely more heavily onits
Beijing connection. Serious Russian strategic analysts point toa high concentration
of Chinese land forces in the countrys north, which faces Russia.25 In China,
a surge in nationalism could reignite the talk about the unequal treaties, and
Russias general mismanagement oftheterritories it snatched away from China
inthenineteenth century. Thus, even atthelevel ofpractical cooperation between
thetwo countries, issues such as theuse ofChinese laborers for projects within
Russia will remain very controversial.
To build acloser relationship, thetwo countries elites must have amuch better
understanding of one another and deepen their interactions. At this point,
knowledge of each other is rather superficial. Even though, for example, 2.4
million Russians traveled toChina and 845,000 Chinese visited Russia in2011,
Russia is lacking inChina expertise.26 Inthepast, Russia boasted one oftheleading
schools ofSinology intheworld, but that is no longer thecase.27 Chinas Russian
studies are doing somewhat better incomparison, but thegeneration ofChinese
leaders who either studied intheSoviet Union or looked up toit has left thestage.
Future Implications
of theSino-Russian Entente
Eurasias center ofgravity is shifting. And that shift will have asignificant impact
not only on Russias and Chinas neighbors but also on the broader global
system.
With Moscow now politically closer toBeijing than toBerlin, China is emerging
as amuch bigger player inall ofEurasia, not just East Asia. It is inabetter position
than ever togain access toRussian resources, from hydrocarbons tofresh water, and
toextend its reach toEurope via Central Asia as well as across Russia and theArctic.
China has also gained not just anabsolutely safe rear inthenorth but also enormous
strategic depth. If and when this position becomes solidified, China will have made
amajor step inits slow but steady rise tocontinental preeminence.
Thanks tothebacking from China, theworlds premier rising power, Russia
should not fear isolation atthehands oftheUnited States and its allies. Ifand
this is a very big ifMoscow uses the present crisis caused by the triple effect
oftheeconomic slowdown, Western sanctions, and thecollapse oftheprice ofoil
tocarry out structural reforms and launch astrategy ofeconomic development, it
will emerge much stronger than before. It is also quite possible that Moscow will
manage to protect its sovereignty and independence vis--vis Beijing while
growing much closer toChina politically and economically. This could happen
because Russias sense ofidentity is very strong, and its civilization and culture are
very distinct from Chinas, as the stark divide along the Sino-Russian border
visibly demonstrates.
This shift coincides with thecontinuing U.S. pullback from theEurasian heartlandAfghanistan and Central Asiaas well as its declining involvement
Dmitri Trenin|17
in the Middle East and its increasing focus instead on coastal Asia, from Japan
to Singapore, in an attempt to prevent Chinas domination of its neighbors.
Simultaneously, theUnited States is shoring up NATO inEurope and encouraging
its European allies tosupport Ukraine and other West-leaning post-Soviet states.
All this, however, is essentially a holding pattern. The twenty-year period
oftheUnited States dominating thegrand chessboard ofEurasia is over.28
The European Union faces theprospect oflong-term alienation from Russia.
Thenotion oftheEU and Russia forming some sort ofanassociation, or even
a symbiotic relationship, is moving out of reach for the foreseeable future.
Thesame holds for aGreater Europe composed oftheEU and thenew Russia-led
EEU. Instead, theEU and Russia are becoming competitors inanumber ofareas,
from geopolitics tovalues systems. As aresult, theEuropean Union has torely
even more heavily ontheUnited States and theNATO mechanism, and it has
to shelve any ideas of winning more autonomy from its transatlantic ally and
becoming afull-fledged strategic player.
Japan, similar toEurope, has lost theRussia option. Abes hopes ofbuilding
astrong relationship with Russia that would help balance therise ofChina have
been dashed after Tokyos decision tojoin theU.S.-led sanctions against Moscow.
Instead, Japan will have to brace itself for a further rapprochement between
Beijing and Moscow, with Russia potentially taking amore hostile attitude toward
Japanprecisely thescenario that Tokyo wanted toavoid. Like Europe, Japan will
have to strengthen its military and political alliance with the United States.
Inthecase ofaSino-Japanese clash over theSenkaku Islands (known as theDiaoyu
Islands in China), Russia will keep its formal neutrality. But in the future this
neutrality may be more sympathetic toBeijing.
For India, theSino-Russian entente represents adifferent kind ofchallenge.
India seeks to enhance its economic opportunities, and expanding trade links
to China is a key element of that strategy. At the same time, India continues
topurchase Russian-made weapons and keeps close political ties with Russia. New
Delhi has no real reason to fear Moscow becoming Beijings ally against it.
However, greater closeness between thetwo could spur New Delhi into playing
a more active role within the triangle of Asias three great continental powers,
intheSCO and RIC formats and beyond.
On theKorean Peninsula, China and Russia will continue towork inparallel
but not in lockstep. The idea, dear to some in the Peoples Liberation Army,
ofanorthern triangle ofChina, Russia, and North Korea opposing thesouthern triangle oftheUnited States, Japan, and South Koreaalmost inareplica
oftheNATOWarsaw Pact confrontation inCold War Europeis far-fetched.
Like Beijing, Moscow will pursue its own interests; thetwo do not collide but
do not completely overlap either. As an example, the Russian attitude
totheeventual reunification ofthepeninsula is more positive than theChinese
one. For their parts, Seoul and Pyongyang will keep their channels open toboth
China and Russia. Inacrisis between North Korea and South Korea or within
North Korea, however, China and Russia would coordinate their policies, and
Moscow would likely defer toBeijing, whose interests ontheKorean Peninsula
are greater than Russias.
Meanwhile, Moscow has consistently supported Beijings position onTaiwan,
even during thelong Sino-Soviet split. Taipeis current relations with Moscow are
strictly nonpolitical. After Russias incorporation of Crimea in 2014, and
inthespirit oftheSino-Russian entente, Moscow can be expected tosupport just
about any steps regarding Taiwan that Beijing might take inthefuture.
In theSouth China Sea, theimpact ofthat entente is likely tobe more nuanced.
ASEAN countries represent a third major area of Russias commercial interest
inAsia, after China and India. Moscow will not abandon Vietnam, its Cold War
ally and todays arms client, as well as animportant gateway totheregion. Russias
neutrality intheregional maritime disputes will probably be stricter than inthecase
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Russia showed its flag in the South Seas
in November 2014, when four Russian Navy ships sailed from Vladivostok
totheCoral Sea atthetime ofPutins visit totheG20 summit inAustralia,29 pointing toRussias desire tobe seen again as amajor military power inthePacific.
It is Inner AsiaAfghanistan, Mongolia, and the five post-Soviet states
ofCentral Asiathat is likely tosee themost impact from thedeepening ofSinoRussian integration. TheEEU will have tointeract closely with China onits development projects intheSilk Road Economic Belt area. What is likely toemerge is
atrade and investment zone covering all ofcentral, northern, and eastern Eurasia.
With China as its powerhouse, this area can be called Greater Asiafrom
Shanghai, its business center, toSt. Petersburg, its outpost atEuropes doorstep.
The SCO, meanwhile, can provide Greater Asia with aframework for policy
consultation and harmonization, joint economic development, financial support,
and security cooperation. Russia will continue to play a prominent role
intheSCO, but it is likely tobe inthesecond tier ofgreat powers there, next
toIndia, with China very much setting thepace and providing themost resources
for theorganization.
The geopolitical shift in Eurasia will impact strategic stability and reshape
theglobal strategic balance. Russia and China will not build amilitary alliance,
but each one will be facing the United States as a potential military adversary.
Thegrowth ofChinas nuclear capabilities will bring it closer totheUnited States
and Russias levels. In the 2020s, strategic arms control will have to include all
three powers tobe meaningful, but Beijings agreement tojoin theprocess will
only be possible if it expects togain inboth security and prestige. Inany event,
Moscows position as Washingtons sole counterpart in discussions of strategic
stability issues will be diluted.
On theissues ofglobal governance, China, with Russias backing, will probably
begin taking theinitiative rather than just following theUnited States or opposing
it. Beijing and Moscow will seek toprovide analternative totheexisting Westerndesigned systems governing global finance, regional security systems, and Internet
Dmitri Trenin|19
freedom. They may also seek tojoin forces, possibly with other BRICS countries,
to build a global media network that would compete with the Western media
ininfluencing global public opinion.
Notes
One might recall one ofPutins first visits in2000 as Russias President
toBlagoveshchensk, acity across theAmur River from China, where he publicly
wondered what language people inthat part ofthecountry would speak inthefuture.
See my Carnegie paper, Russias Breakout from thePost-Cold War Order: TheRoots
ofPutins Course, Carnegie Paper (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, December 2014).
Komu vershki, akomu i koreshki: analiz torgovli RF s ES i SShA [Who Rules, Over
Whom and Why: An Analysis ofRussian Trade with theEU and USA], Sputnik &
Pogrom, May 1, 2014, http://sputnikipogrom.com/economics/11467/russia-eu-us/#.
VPS-NtKsW8A.
Arthur Nelsen, Europes Dependency onRussian Gas May Be Cut Amid Energy
Efficient Focus, Guardian, September 8, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/sep/09/europe-dependency-russian-gas-energy-efficiency-eu.
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling Upon States Not toRecognize Changes
inStatus ofCrimea Region, United Nations General Assembly, March 27, 2014,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm.
10 Russia Signs 30-Year Gas Deal With China, BBC News, May 21, 2014, http://www.
bbc.com/news/business-27503017.
11 The Axis ofConvenience is thetitle ofabook onRusso-Chinese relations by former
Australian diplomat Bobo Lo.
12 At theShangri-La dialogue conference inSingapore inlate Mayearly June 2014,
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov highlighted color revolutions as
asecurity danger for theAsia-Pacific region. Most Asian delegates were confused, except
theChinese. A few weeks later, theOccupy Central pro-democracy movement seized
Hong Kong.
20
Dmitri Trenin|21
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