Professional Documents
Culture Documents
COMMITTED TO IDEALISM?
There are several ways one can make an appraisal of Husserl's turn to
transcendental phenomenology. One way would be to look at some of the
implications of this turn, such as, whether Husserl is thereby prevented
from answering certain philosophical questions. Taking this course here,
I treat one of the implications that appears when one critically examines
the transcendental turn, namely that Husserl's philosophy is idealistic. This
is an implication that many critics of transcendental phenomenology have
alleged is philosophically intolerable and requires modification or abandonment of Husserl's transcendental turn. Important to this task is the distinction between what I shall call "epistemological idealism" and "metaphysical
idealism". As I detail later, epistemological idealism can be characterized as
the thesis that consciousness is the sole medium of access to whatever is seen
as actually or possibly existing and "metaphysical idealism" can be characterized as including the additional thesis that consciousness creates whatever
actually or possibly exists and what exists is dependent on it. It is my contention that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which he labels transcendental idealism, is epistemologically idealistic but metaphysically neutral.
Also I contend that metaphysical neutrality is not a deficiency of his philosophy but that such is the necessary conclusion of any philosophy that successfully adheres to the policy of describing, explicating and accepting all
objectivities only as they present themselves to the consciousness of them,
and in terms of the consciousness of them.
There are several reasons why I think it important to treat this question
about Husserl's idealism. One is that Husserl never developed a systematic
account of the kind of idealism to which transcendental phenomenology
is committed. There are scattered brief discussions, some of which I examine
below, but there is no extensive treatment of the question. Another reason
is that it may seem to anyone who is trying to understand Husserl's phenomenology that he has worked himself into an idealistic corner and that,
whether or not he wanted this result, he is committed to maintaining that
consciousness creates all that exists and what exists is dependent on it.
Also, many writers within the area of phenomenology have been unwilling
to accept Husserl's transcendental phenomenology because, they argue, he
99
is thereby committed to a metaphysical idealism; that he has made an unjustified metaphysical decision that rules out the possibility of the existence
of the real world. Finally, I believe that this discussion will bring out some
important points about the nature of the transcendental phenomenological
reduction.
1. Some Criticisms of Husserl's Idealism
Before proceeding, I will detail some of the criticisms. This description
is not meant to encompass all objections to transcendental phenomenology
with respect to its kind of idealism, rather I want only to indicate some
representatives of the types of objections that have been made, thereby
determining why many philosophers, even followers of Husserl, cannot
accept, or have serious reservations about, his transcendental turn.1
Theodor Celms, a student of Husserl in Freiburg, wrote a monograph
on Husserl's phenomenological idealism in which he developed the claim that
Husserl's idealism is metaphysical and spiritualistic.2 Celms claimed that
Husserl dissolves the reality of the world into the reality of consciousness;
that is, he dissolves transcendent temporal existence into immanent temporal
existence.3 Also he said that Husserl's problem of immanent constitution
is the problem of metaphysical constitution.4 Celms is basically concerned
about the fact that Husserl cannot avoid giving metaphysical answers to
problems, even the problems of the constitution of various senses of objects
in immanent temporality. In effect he is saying that Husserl at least retains
the metaphysical presupposition that consciousness itself is an absolute, that
it exists, and that thereby Husserl, in investigating constitution in the immanent realm is really investigating the metaphysical origins of all being.
Celms thinks that Husserl cannot avoid saying that the consciousness which
remains after the phenomenological reduction is a metaphysically posited
entity and that he cannot specify the relation between this consciousness and
consciousness as in the world, or that he can do so only in terms of the
metaphysical priority of the former. In short, Celms believes it impossible
to make the transcendental turn and remain metaphysically neutral.
Roman Ingarden, also a student of Husserl, has written many important
and original works in the field of phenomenology. Also, he is one of
Husserl's major critics with respect to Husserl's transcendental idealism.5
Some specific criticisms are given in an appendix to the Cartesianische
Meditatiorten,6 in which he states that Husserl equates without justification
the natural existence of the world and the world which is grasped by me.
Ingarden says that Husserl now is prevented from making judgments about
100
RICHARD H. HOLMES
whether the world has any other being apart from that which is "seen"
by me. Thus, Husserl is making a
metaphysical decision . . . which is equivalent to a categorical thesis about
something which is not an element of transcendental subjectivity.7
His basic contention is similar to Celms's, that is, Husserl has, in spite of
his saying the contrary, made metaphysical decisions regarding what actually
exists, in particular he is committed to the actual existence of consciousness
and the nonactual existence of a world which is autonomous and is independent of consciousness.
One of the most outstanding contemporary French phenomenologists,
Paul Ricoeur, maintains that Husserl, particularly in the Cartesian Meditations, ignores the difference and vacillates between the two senses of the
objective world as existing for me (fur mich), and as existing from me
(aus mir). He quotes the following sentences to show this vacillation:
The objective world which exists for me (fur mich), which has existed
or will exist for me, this objective world with all of its objects in me, draws
from me (aus mir selbst) all of its sense and all of the existential status
that it has for me.8
Ricoeur says that by not differentiating these two senses of the world Husserl
has made a "metaphysical" decision.
This decision consists in saying that there is no other dimension of the
being of the world than the dimension of its being for me, and there is no
other set of problems than the transcendental one.9
The basic concern of Ricoeur, and many others, is that by making the
transcendental turn Husserl has made it impossible to adequately and accurately describe and explicate the character of the world as existing independently of any consciousness of it. A metaphysical decision appears to
have been made which prevents Husserl from ever explicating any other
dimension of the being of the world, which means that Husserl is stuck
with a metaphysical idealism. Implicit in this, and in most critcisms of
Husserl in this respect, is the belief that when one tries to determine whether
objects and the world actually exist independently of any consciousness
of them, or even give a complete account of this existential sense, the
answer will already be predetermined by having made the transcendental
turn. Or, to put it another way, if one makes the transcendental turn, and
does so consistently and permanently he is thereby committed to a certain
metaphysical position.
101
However, I believe it can be shown that within transcendental phenomenology, Husserl does not and could not answer such metaphysical questions
about the actual metaphysical status of various entities, and that he was not
interested in doing so. Moreover, I think that metaphysics, in this sense
of determining what exists independently of consciousness, is not only
outside of the realm of transcendental phenomenology but must remain so,
and that the criticisms made of Husserl about his idealism miss the whole
point of his phenomenology. Before I elaborate this contention and also try
to determine whether Husserl can and does maintain such metaphysical
neutrality, I first examine some of Husserl's various writings on idealism
to determine his avowed position.
In what follows I do not address myself to the question of whether
metaphysical idealism is an untenable position or implies absurd consequences. Since my contention is that Husserl's transcendental turn does not
imply metaphysical idealism, I do not treat this question. Also, epistemological
idealism, as it is developed below, does not need to be defended as a tenable
position independently of showing it, as I believe I do, to be nothing
more than the systematic explication of what is presented in experience as
presented. In other words, a consistent and systematic development of the
theory of intentionality and the methodological principle of accepting only
that which is presented as it itself, "in person," yields a philosophy which
is epistemologically idealistic. All that is meant here by "idealism" is that
objectivities are studied as presented, and only as presented, to the consciousness of them. Moreover, it is not clear what one would mean by
a phenomenology that was epistemologically realistic while being metaphysically neutral. Such a phenomenology could not be different from
what is here called epistemological idealism without rejecting the basic
principles of phenomenology. Thus, I am not concerned with showing that
epistemological idealism in Husserl's sense is tenable, but with showing
that Husserl's phenomenology is only epistemologically idealistic, and is
metaphysically neutral. This does not mean that I have justified the underlying presupposition of phenomenology, and perhaps that of philosophy
in general, namely that the task is to describe and explicate all objectivities,
in the broadest sense of "objectivities."
2. Husserl's Conception of His Idealism
Primarily I will be characterizing what I call the epistemological idealism
of Husserl, differentiating it from metaphysical idealism on the basis of an
exposition of some of his writings on idealism. At the same time I will
102
RICHARD H. HOLMES
103
104
RICHARD H. HOLMES
ever, I think that "acceptance with genuine right" must be read as a sense
of the world. The world is accepted by everyone as actually existing and
they do so with genuine right because of the nature of their experience of it.
The next sentence indicates some further aspects of this experience.
In the third sentence Husserl spells out what he takes to be the presented
sense of the world which is not doubted. The world is presented as an existing universe throughout any experience of it, and these experiences are
continuous and coherent with each other. By this Husserl means both that
any individual's experiences are continuous and coherent, and that the experiences of all consciousnesses are continuous and coherent taken as a whole;
they "fit together in universal consonance." This does not mean that we all
agree on whether or not each and every part or aspect of this world exists.
Rather, Husserl means that the general background of the world, and the
world in which we find ourselves, the world-about-us, is believed in and
accepted as existing. This world is not only a world of facts, or natural
objects, but a world of values, of cultural objects, of practical objects as
well. The specifics of this world may change, or we may change our minds
about what we accept of them, but the world in general remains this
world-about-us which we unquestionably believe to exist and to which we
belong. Thus, there is corresponding to the continuous and coherent experience of the world a world which is presented with the sense of being
coherent and above all as actually existing.
In the fourth sentence Husserl points out that his task, of sense clarification, is something different from providing justification for the beliefs
and acceptances, that is, different from proving that an acceptance of the
world as actually existing is metaphysically justified. Transcendental phenomenology cannot enter into such discussions of justification since the
transcendental turn is a suspension of the natural belief that the world and
its objects exist. Whether or not such metaphysical neutrality always can
and must be maintained is another question, one which I discuss later, but
for now it is enough to see that transcendental phenomenology is metaphysically neutral. The problem for Husserl is to clarify this justification,
which means to determine how the experiences of the world and the presented senses of this world fit together to form an experience of the world
which has the sense of actually existing.
It is in the next sentence, the fifth, that the crucial statements are made.
Here Husserl is saying that the nonexistence, meaning the actual metaphysical
nonexistence, of the world is thinkable even though the continuous and
coherent experiences are believed in and accepted as experiences of an actually
105
existing world. This is 'so because the experiences are experiences of something which is believqd and accepted as existing, but this does not prove
that what is accepted as existing, and so believed to exist, does actually
exist, in the sense of existing independently of any actual or possible experience of it. The belief that the world exists is legitimate insofar as it is based
on a continuous and coherent set of experiences, but that does not tell us
whether this belief is true in the sense that the world actually exists.
Whether or not the world actually exists is not in question for the
phenomenologist since he has made the transcendental turn and is suspending, or putting out of action, the general thesis of the natural attitude. He
has taken an attitude of neutrality to the metaphysical question about the
existence or nonexistence of the world, either in the past, present or future.
Instead his task is to determine the status of this sense of existence with
which the world is presented.
It should be noted that Husserl is not involved in saying that there
are any existents other than the intentional conscious occurrences and their
objects as intended. In fact, he does not even say that these occurrences
and their objects exist, meaning that there is an identification of actual
metaphysical existence with the existence of these processes and their objects.
It is in the sixth long sentence that the results of this phenomenological
clarification of the sense of existence of the world are indicated. The phenomenologist finds that all objects in the broadest sense which includes the
intentional conscious occurrences as in the world, are relative to the consciousness of them, to the transcendental consciousness or subjectivity.
"Relative to" could mean that the objects are dependent on consciousness of
them in that they are created by, or owe whatever existence they have, to
transcendental consciousness. Given this interpretation it is easy to see how
Husserl could be thought to be a metaphysical idealist. He would be claiming that all that actually or possibly exists is relative to and dependent upon,
consciousness. However, to interpret "relative to" in this way would be
to forget that this claim was made after having taken the transcendental
turn. After taking this turn claims about the existence of something are no
longer believed and accepted, rather these claims are explicated as claims.
This means that the sense of actually existing that the real world is presented
as having is not accepted either as evidence for or against the actual metaphysical status of the real world. The same is true of all objects including
conscious occurrences which are presented as in the world. Instead, these
existential senses are investigated as they present themselves to consciousness;
they are senses for a consciousness. These senses are relative to conscious-
106
RICHARD H. HOLMES
107
saying will be examined more closely after I consider several more of the
few passages which directly or indirectly indicate what kind of idealism
Husserl has in mind.
Consider the following passage from Ideas ( 1 9 1 3 ) :
The whole spatio-temporal world, to which man and the human Ego claims
to belong as subordinate singular realities, is according to its own meaning
mere intentional Being, a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary,
relative sense of a Being for a consciousness. It is a Being which consciousness in its own experiences (Erfahrungen) posits, and is, in principle,
intuitable and determinable only as the element common to the [harmoniously] motivated appearance-manifolds, but over and beyond this, is just
nothing at all.17
This quotation sets out quite strongly the rejection of realism as a
position which claims that there are entities which exist independently of
any actual or possible experience. Husserl is not saying that such a position
is logically impossible, rather that the world is according to the way it is
presented to consciousness, only experienceable and determinable as it is
intended and that it has the relative sense of a being for consciousness.
Having already made the phenomenological reduction Husserl finds that
what things are (the things about which alone we ever speak, and concerning
whose being, so being or not so being, we can alone contend and reach
rational decisions), they are as things of experience.16
This is a consequence of maintaining the phenomenological standard that
says we must accept nothing that is not itself presented and "in person" in
the consciousness of it. Thus Husserl is saying that not only must this
position of metaphysical realism be rejected but that what is to be explicated is the experienced being for consciousness, its sense of existing. It
is not that Husserl is claiming that metaphysical realism is wrong or right
as a matter of actual fact, rather he is saying that any such claim is outside
the domain of the phenomenologist.
That this rejection of realism also involves a rejection of any metaphysical
claim is not particularly clear in this quotation from the Ideas of 1913. It
is clearer in the following quotation from Formal and Transcendental Logic
(1929):
Such an affair as an object (even a physical object) draws the ontic sense
peculiar to it (by which it then signifies what it signifies in all possible
modes of consciousness) originally from the mental processes of experience
alone . . .
108
RICHARD H. HOLMES
109
what exists, and that it is nothing more than this, that it does not try to
make metaphysical claims against, and contest, a realism. There is the
puzzling statement that Nature, culture, the world as a whole are given
beforehand through experience, which might appear to be a realistic statement that such things have a metaphysical existence independently of our
consciousness. However, I think this must be read as a statement made
from the transcendental attitude and as a report on the presented senses
of Nature, culture and the world. They are presented as given beforehand
through experience, yet this sense, as any other, must also be explicated.
Again, Husserl is emphatically denying that the task of this idealism is to
investigate the actual existence of any object.
It should now be clear that by making the transcendental turn I find that
By my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting, I can
enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or
status (Sinn und Geltung) in and from me, myself.23
Therein lies Husserl's transcendental idealism; the task of transcendental
phenomenology is to describe and explicate the sense with which intentional
objects are presented and this explication requires, as the last sentence
from the quotation from Cartesian Meditations above24 says, an explication
of the constituting intentionalities themselves. Thus we are led to an epistemological idealism wherein we find that we must explicate all the sense of
all objects in terms of the intentional conscious processes in which they are
intended.
3. An Answer to Husserl's Critics
At this point, after having developed Husserl's position that transcendental idealism is metaphysically neutral, I think it appropriate to investigate
whether the transcendental turn can be made metaphysically neutral, or
whether this epistemological idealism retains certain metaphysical commitments, or rules out certain metaphysical theories, as Husserl's critics allege.
That Husserl's phenomenology is an epistemological idealism is, I believe,
quite evident as I have outlined above. He has repeatedly maintained that
the various senses of objects must be explicated and that to do so requires
going back to the intentional conscious occurrences to which they are presented.25 To call phenomenology an idealism of this kind is really nothing
more than to say that it does not, in order to perform its task, accept any
claims about actual being, nor make any such claims. Moreover, it finds that
110
RICHARD H. HOLMES
this world with all its Objects . . . derives its whole sense and its existential
status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental
Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with the transcendental-phenomenological epoche.28
It might be thought that Husserl has presupposed at least that his transcendental subjectivity exists, or that transcendental experiences and their
objects exist. If one means that he presupposes they actually exist then it is
quite obvious that Husserl is denying this when he takes the transcendental
turn. However, there is a sense in which Husserl does allow and makes
presuppositions. As Dorion Cairns points out,
Husserl himself emphasized the inevitability of starting, even in the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, by accepting some evidence and, in
this sense, making pre-suppositions which must eventually be suspended
and submitted to phenomenological analysis on a deeper level.27
And as Husserl says:
The investigations take on a painful and yet unavoidable relativity, a provisionalness, instead of definitiveness for which we are striving: Each
investigation, at its own level, overcomes some naivete or other, but is still
accompanied by the naivete of its levelwhich must then be overcome in
turn by more penetrating investigations of origins.28
These presuppositions are not made, they are found and revealed as
such as the phenomenologist proceeds in his investigations. Yet in no case
does he accept these as anything other than "prejudices" which need senseexplication.29 Everything presented to the phenomenologist with evidence,
as itself given, is accepted but only insofar as it is presented in his experience
of it. Thus my transcendental subjective life and the intentional objects are
accepted as they present themselves, but this does not mean I accept them as
actually being what they present themselves as being.
There is another sense in which Husserl might be seen to be committed
to a metaphysical idealism. By making the transcendental turn, and by maintaining that all objectivities must be described and explicated in terms of the
subjective conscious occurrences he may be said to be ruling out the possibility
of a metaphysical realism. That is, I may be prevented from ever deciding
that some objects or other actually exist independently of any consciousness
of them by starting with the commitment to a method which requires that I
explicate objectivities in terms of the consciousness of them. Given the nature
of the transcendental turn this claim cannot be sustained for two reasons,
first, no metaphysical claim is either entertained or defended, as metaphysical,
Ill
112
RICHARD H. HOLMES
113
that all questions, metaphysical or otherwise, arise and are explicable only
within consciousness. Of course, this does not mean that within transcendental
pheonomenology there are no problems. Rather, I am trying to show that
not only is transcendental phenomenology metaphysically neutral, but that
it can not become metaphysically committed to whether there is a realm of
existence independent of consciousness.
RICHARD H. HOLMES
UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO
CANADA
NOTES
1. In addition to those mentioned here there are many others who have written
critiques of Husserl's idealism, for example see: Rudolf Boehm, "Husserl und der
klassische Idealismus," Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phanomenologie (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1968); Joseph Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology
(Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1967), pp. 324ff.; Ludwig Landgrebe, Major
Problems in Contemporary European Philosophy (New York: F. Ungar Publishing
Co., 1966), pp. 54ff.; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (New
York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. viiiff.; Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Why is There
Something Rather than Nothing (The Netherlands: Van Gorcum and Co., 1966),
pp. 14-15.
2. Cf., Theodor Celms, Der Phanomenologische Idealismus Husserls (Riga, 1928),
pp. 251-439.
3. Cf., Ibid., p. 431.
4. Cf., Ibid., p. 433.
5. Ingarden's major work in this area is: Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt,
3 vols. (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1964-66).
6. "Kritische Bemerkungen von Prof. Dr. Roman Ingarden, Krakau," Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserliana I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), pp. 203ff.
7. Ibid., p. 210 (trans. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology,
trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1967), p. 89.
8. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns, (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, I960), p. 26.
9. Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, p. 89.
10. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans.
W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962).
11. Cf., Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl in England," Journal of the British Society
for Phenomenology, 1 (1970): 11.
12. Husserl, "Nachwort," Ideas III (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), pp.
152-53 (my translation; I have numbered the sentences to facilitate references in the
following analysis).
13. Cf., Ideas, p. 194.
114
RICHARD H. HOLMES