15 Tcas

Operational Liaison Meeting Fly-By-Wire
2004
A320 Family
A330/A340 Family
TCAS
Recommendations
Customer Services
Contents
Introduction
Resolution Advisory
Review of TCAS Events
Recurrent TCAS Questions
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Future TCAS Developments

Conclusion
TCAS - Recommendations
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 2
Introduction
Each year, numerous reports reveal that mid-air collisions are
avoided by a whisker.
Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events.

The onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
was developed to prevent mid-air collision, particularly
in case Air Traffic Controller guidance is incorrect.
TCAS II has become mandatory:

Since
1986, in the US
Since 2000, in Europe
TCAS II has a worldwide ICAO mandate as January 1st, 2003.

01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 3
Contents
Introduction
Resolution Advisory

Conclusion
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 4
Resolution Advisory
Background
TCAS calculates two types of

Resolution Advisories (RA):
Preventive
Advisory ( MONITOR
VERTICAL SPEED MONITOR):

Red sector appears on V/S scale, the
V/S needle is in the grey area.
The red square is displayed on the
Navigation Display.
No pilot action on the sidestick (maintain
the current vertical speed).
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 5
Resolution Advisory
Background
Corrective
Advisory:
The vertical speed needle is in the red

area.
The red square is displayed on the
Navigation Display
Follow
aural warnings.
Follow
vertical speed green

sector on the PFD.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 6
Resolution Advisory
Background
Corrective
Advisory (e.g. DESCENT, DESCENT):
TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:
Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with
0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached

V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.
Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within

5 seconds
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 7
Resolution Advisory
Background
Corrective
Advisory
TAU
TAU
Vertical miss distance

DESCENT, DESCENT
CPA
(Closest Point of
Approach)
Generally:
Deviation caused by a RA maneuver is between 300 and 500 ft
Vertical miss distance at the Closest Point of Approach is around 400 ft
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 8
Resolution Advisory
Background
Corrective
Advisory
TAU
TAU
Relative altitude
DESCENT, DESCENT
CPA
(Closest Point of
Approach)
Do not overreact
Do not disregard a weakening RA
It could create another conflict with another aircraft
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 9
Resolution Advisory
Background
Additional
Corrective Advisory (E.g.: INCREASE DESCENT,

INCREASE DESCENT)
TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:
Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with
0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached

V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.
Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 10
Resolution Advisory
Evolution of RA Alerts
The following diagram illustrates the number and
evolution of RA alerts since 1999 ( Based on Eurocontrol source) :
3500
3000
2500
2000
RAs alerts
1500
1000
500
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 11
Resolution Advisory
Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)
35 %
30
25
20
RAs repartition
15
10
5
0
takeoff
cruise
holding
final
approach
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 12
Resolution Advisory
Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)
followed RA in 95% of reported cases
Decision not to follow an RA was based on additional
information:
Intruder visually acquired
Traffic information and/or ATC avoidance being issued by
ATC.
Pilots
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 13
Contents
Introduction
TCAS Presentation
Resolution Advisory

Conclusion
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 14

Event N 1
FL 70
CLIMB,
CLIMB
RA
AIRCRAFT 1
DESCEND,
DESCEND
RA
AIRCRAFT 2
INCREASE DESCENT,
INCREASE DESCENT
RA
AIRCRAFT 3
FL 50
Simultaneous
vertical and horizontal
crossing at less than 1 NM
AIRCRAFT 2
descend
FL 60.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 15

FCOM Update
The FCOM has been slightly revised to further emphasize

the fact that pilots must follow the TCAS order:
The previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:
New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 16

Event N2
CLIMB,
CLIMB
RA
FL 270
AIRCRAFT 2
AIRCRAFT 1
ADJUST
VERTICAL SPEED,
ADJUST RA
FL 260
Minimum crossing margin:

300 feet, 0.8 NM
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 17

FCOM Update
Following this event, the FCOM has been revised to further
clarify the ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA:
Previous FCOM 1.34.80 page:
Next FCOM 1.34.80 page (December Revision):

vertical speed or descent
vertical speed
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 18

Event N3
FL 370
CLIMB,
CLIMB RA
DESCEND,
DESCEND
RA
AIRCRAFT 2
Order
incorrectly
interpreted by
AIRCRAFT 1
AIRCRAFT 1
AIRCRAFT 2
Descend
to FL 350.
AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below

AIRCRAFT 2, with no lateral
separation !!!
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 19

FCOM Update
For TCAS RA orders, the FCOM 3.04.34 was revised to delete
the visual acquisition of the intruder line.
Previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:
New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):
For RA Alerts, the FCOM 3.02.34 and QRH TCAS

procedures were also revised by deleting the
Attempt to see reported traffic line.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 20
Previous FCOM 3.02.34 page

New FCOM 3.02.34 page

01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 21

Additional information
ATC versus TCAS information:
ATC Radar:
An
update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10).

Altitude data in 100-foot increments.
Sudden vertical maneuvers are not immediately displayed.
TCAS:
Interrogates
all surrounded transponders every second.

Mode S-equipped aircraft provide TCAS information in 25-foot
increments.
TCAS Information is:
- Updated 4 to 10 times faster
- 4 times more accurate
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 22

Additional information
Visual acquisition limitations:
At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess:

The
range
The heading
The relative height
At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess :

Whether
the aircraft is climbing or descending.
The traffic in contact MAY NOT BE the one that causes

the RA to trigger.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 23

Conclusions
Other, more or less, serious events have occurred due to
the fact that the crew did not follow TCAS orders.
All such events emphasize the importance of the following:
- Always follow TCAS RA orders:
- In the correct direction
- Even if it is in contradiction the ATC
instruction
- Even at max ceiling altitude
- Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to
the green sector.
- Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in
case of RA orders.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 24
Contents
Introduction
Resolution Advisory

Conclusion
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 25

Background
As of today, the following cases require TA mode selection:
Engine
failure
Dispatch with landing gear down
Known nearby traffic, which is in visual contact
Closely-spaced runways, converging runways,
low terrain along the final approach
Recurring questions concerning TA mode selection:

Emergency
descent
Engine failure
Aircraft at its maximum ceiling altitude
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 26

Emergency Descent
Most often due to rapid decompression.

Performing an emergency descent in a busy airspace
increases the risk of generating traffic conflict.
A CLIMB, CLIMB RA order is not always requested:

An
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA

can be triggered (decrease the V/S).
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 27

Emergency Descent
ADJUST
VERTICAL
SPEED,
ADJUST
DESCEND,
DESCEND
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 28
Emergency Descent
In case of an emergency descent,

Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 29

Engine Failure
In case one engine fails, the TCAS must be set to TA
mode to comply with AC 20-131:
After an engine failure, aircraft performance is degraded.

When TA is selected:
Affected
aircraft is not requested to perform an RA maneuver.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 30

Engine Failure
Some operators consider that TA mode is too restrictive, in
particular for the A340-500/600, which is a:
Powerful aircraft

Fly-by-wire aircraft, not subject to stall in normal law.
Airbus recommend selecting TA in case of an engine failure:
To
avoid entering in angle of attack protection at low altitude. In

addition, subsequent loss of altitude could lead to reversal RA
orders.
To have a common procedure for all aircraft
If the intruder is TCAS-equipped:
The intruder TCAS will detect that you are in TA mode.
The intruder TCAS will perform an RA maneuver.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 31

Engine Failure
In addition:
ECAMs ENG SHUT DOWN Procedure requests the crew to
select TA TCAS mode.
The
Airworthiness
Authorities have approved this TA mode

selection, in case of an engine failure.
Airbus recommends the selection of TA mode,
in case of an engine failure.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 32

Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude
AC 20-131A defines the maneuvers that the

aircraft must be able to perform.
In particular, the aircraft must prove that it can
respond to a TCAS RA CLIMB order, even when

it is at its maximum altitude.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 33

Speed (knots)
Time (s)
Time (s)
V/S (feet/minute)
Time (s)
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 34

These graphs show that the aircraft can follow:
A
CLIMB, CLIMB TCAS RA order (1500 feet/minute)

An INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB TCAS RA order
(2500 feet/minute).
Always below VMO/MMO and above VLS:

aircraft, at 41000 feet, initial speed is M 0.82 (243 knots)
The maximum weight is 177 tons.
The Final Speed is 228 knots
(Buffet Speed is 212 knots at 42000 feet)
A330
RA climb orders can be followed.

Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode,
when the aircraft is at its maximum ceiling altitude.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 35
Contents
Introduction
Resolution Advisory

Conclusion
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 36

Background
Overreaction:
vertical deviations for each aircraft (following a
TCAS RA order) are often greater than 300 feet.
Most
Very large altitude changes often lead to conflict

with other aircraft in a busy airspace.
Due to excessive pilot reaction, uncomfortable

load factors are reached.
Cases of reaction in the wrong sense.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 37

Developments status
Keep
the current Vertical Speed indicator
Allow to check the result of pilot action on V/S raw data

Constitute a back up indication
Display
must be reactive enough to avoid any over-reaction
Fast interpretation is necessary
RA
order with AP engaged
Procedure should be intuitive
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 38

Developments status
Concept: new AFS TCAS RA longitudinal mode that would allow an
automatic reaction.
Symbology: no specific symbology (except new mode on FMA), the FD

follows the TCAS order and the pilot cross-checks the VSI raw data.
SPEED
TCAS V/S
HDG
AP1
1FD2
A/THR
Law: new AFS TCAS law, based on V/S law with increased authority
TCAS
Computer
Computation
of the V/S
target
V/S target
Outer loop
TCAS law
NZ
Inner
loop
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Control
surfaces
deflection
orders
Page 39

AP/FD behaviour in case of TCAS RA alert:
If
AP/FD not engaged:
Automatic engagement of FD in TCAS mode

If
AP Off but FD already engaged:
Automatic reversion of FD to TCAS mode
If
AP already engaged:
Automatic reversion of AP to TCAS mode
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 40
Expected definition for flight test by second half of 2005
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 41
Contents
Introduction
TCAS Presentation
Resolution Advisory

Conclusion
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 42
Conclusion
if the number of TCAS alerts decreases,
there are still missed mid-air collisions each year.
Pilots must always follow TCAS RA orders.
Some improvements are envisaged and are being
developed to further assist pilots in effectively
responding to TCAS warnings.
Even
- Always follow TCAS RA orders:

- In the correct direction
- Even if it is in contradiction the ATC
instruction
- Even at max ceiling altitude
- Do not overreact: Set the vertical speed to
the green sector.
- Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in
case of RA orders.
01/01/2004 AIRBUS
Page 43
This document and all information contained herein is the sole

property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are
granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of
its content. This document shall not be reproduced or
disclosed to a third party without the express written consent
of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be
used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.
The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They
are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed
in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these
statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to
explain the basis thereof.
AN EADS JOINT COMPANY

WITH BAE SYSTEMS

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Operational Liaison Meeting Fly-By-Wire

Future TCAS Developments

Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events.

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

TCAS II has become mandatory:

TCAS II has a worldwide ICAO mandate as January 1st, 2003.

Future TCAS Developments

TCAS calculates two types of

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

VERTICAL SPEED MONITOR):

The vertical speed needle is in the red

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

vertical speed green

Advisory (e.g. DESCENT, DESCENT):

TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:

Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached

Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within

Vertical miss distance

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Corrective Advisory (E.g.: INCREASE DESCENT,

Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached

Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Recurrent TCAS Questions

Review of TCAS Events

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Review of TCAS Events

The FCOM has been slightly revised to further emphasize

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

The previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:

New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):

Review of TCAS Events

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Minimum crossing margin:

Review of TCAS Events

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Previous FCOM 1.34.80 page:

Next FCOM 1.34.80 page (December Revision):

Review of TCAS Events

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below

Review of TCAS Events

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):

For RA Alerts, the FCOM 3.02.34 and QRH TCAS

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Review of TCAS Events

Previous FCOM 3.02.34 page

New FCOM 3.02.34 page

Review of TCAS Events

update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10).

all surrounded transponders every second.

Review of TCAS Events

At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess:

At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess :

the aircraft is climbing or descending.