Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict;
Article 25 (3)(a)
within groups of refugees does not deprive those who are non-combatants of their protected
status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.
3. The perpetrator knew that the attack would cause incidental death or
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment and that such death, injury
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conflict.
A test was set out in order to determine whether the acts are systematic in nature. The main
elements are the existence of a political objective to weaken a community formulated by
high-level authorities, and the perpetration of a criminal act on a large scale.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Individual Criminal Responsibility:
Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe, (Appeals Chamber), July 7, 2006, paras.
333-34:
[T]he Trial Chamber defined the requirements for criminal responsibility for an omission as
a principal perpetrator:
(a) the accused must have had a duty to act mandated by a rule of criminal law;
(b) the accused must have had the ability to act; (c) the accused failed to act intending the
criminally sanctioned consequences or with awareness and consent that the consequences
would occur; and (d) the failure to act resulted in the commission of the crime.
It is not disputed by the parties that an accused can be held criminally responsible for
omissions under Article 6(1) of the Statute. Neither do they dispute that any criminal
responsibility for omissions requires an obligation to act. (Leaving unresolved whether the
obligation to act must stem from a rule of criminal law, or [whether] any legal obligation is
sufficient.)
Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Trial Chamber), May 21, 1999, para. 202:
The Chamber distinguished individual, from command responsibility, stating that individual
responsibility is based not on the duty to act, but from the encouragement and support that
might be afforded to the principals of the crime.
Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, (Appeals Chamber), November 28, 2007, para.
479:
The actus reus of planning requires that one or more persons design the criminal conduct
constituting one or more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.
Seromba, (Trial Chamber), December 13, 2006, para. 303:
Participation by planning presupposes that one or several persons contemplate designing
the commission of a crime at both the preparatory and execution phases. See also
Gacumbitsi, (Trial Chamber), June 17, 2004, para. 271 (similar)