Professional Documents
Culture Documents
February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was
filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died
during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his
surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon
situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff
was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto
Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein.
Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's
property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and
Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia
Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic
Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there
are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter
wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street.
Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The
second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's
to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some
pain and suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must
be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. 12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may happen
in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or
property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does
not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2)
The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. 15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes
in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway
is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their
favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have
been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in
a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When the
owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can
complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie, 20 although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's
favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to
achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of
the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
FELICIANO, J.:p
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying
passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union,
bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the
highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the
side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers,
including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital
at San Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner
was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead, specifically
described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left;
abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left. 1
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim,
wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in
going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated,
among other things:
That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73 and
victims after the said Thames met an accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte,
Bauang, La Union while passing through the National Highway No. 3;
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the accident due to
mechanical defect and went off the road and turned turtle to the east canal of
the road into a creek causing physical injuries to us;
xxx xxx xxx
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an
accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
xxx xxx xxx 2
(Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First
Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral
damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap
had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead,
generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she
had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She also alleged that the scar
diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed
for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for
the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead; P30,000.00 for moral
damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and
that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any
action against him (private respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed
the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner
Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal
or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there
had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim
for damages:
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint, although we conform to the trial court's disposition
of the case its dismissal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there being no error
committed by the lower court in dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint,
the judgment of dismissal is hereby affirmed.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner assails the decision of
the Court of Appeals and ask this Court to award her actual or compensatory damages as
well as moral damages.
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her
cause of action had been made by petitioner. The relevant language of the Joint Affidavit
may be quoted again:
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and ownerof the said Thames, because it was an accident and
the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of
helping us to be treated upon our injuries. (Emphasis supplied)
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 4 A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when
the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated
in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit (supra), where the Court in reading and
rejecting a purported waiver said:
Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by majority vote held
that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of action, should have awarded her actual
or compensatory and moral damages as a matter of course.
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the
safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a
statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." 8 In fact, because of this statutory presumption, it has been held that a
court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The
standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary
diligence,i.e., the diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations between members of society. A common
carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances". 11
Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private respondent has
successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap
involving his mini-bus. The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that
respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously,
respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he
had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate
himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But
allegation is not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his defense
of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to
passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that
the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it
was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the
injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. InServando v. Philippine Steam Navigation
Company, 12 the Court summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting with approval from the Enciclopedia
Juridica Espaola:
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate
cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability non-performance. The
Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso
fortuito" as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robber.
In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola says: 'In legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a "caso fortuito" presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso
fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the
part of respondent common carrier. In her direct examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated
that shortly before the vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was
suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried out,
"What happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied, nonchalantly,
"That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the
same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only
mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was
causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten
accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the
bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the
roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the
mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one
of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers,
and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim relates to revenue
which petitioner said she failed to realize because of the effects of the vehicular mishap.
Petitioner maintains that on the day that the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed
to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job
which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The Court of Appeals, however,
found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since,
being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of her employment status as such,
the Court of Appeals held that she could not be said to have in fact lost any employment
after and by reason of the accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a finding entitled to due
respect from this Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may not be awarded
damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture.14
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity
is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly
as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the
face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily
integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is
relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be
expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., 15 this Court
awarded actual or compensatory damages for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who had
been injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there held:
We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court
for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not
more than P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and
something like an inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological
condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the court below
overlooked the clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative
process taking place in the mandible and restore the injured boy to a nearly
normal condition, surgical intervention was needed, for which the doctor's
charges would amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization fees,
expenses and medicines.Furthermore, the operation, according to Dr. Dio,
would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure,
while removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic surgery.
xxx xxx xxx
The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as
possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for. The damage to
the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical
facts that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be
treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is
undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed
to prejudice the son who has no control over the parent's action nor impair his
right to a full indemnity.
. . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to
fully repair the damage;the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings of
inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the
voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair,
however, skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state, we are
of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be
increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed was somewhere
between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by
petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be between P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that a
considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very
probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not
unreasonable.
Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule is that moral
damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is
shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded that respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with
the bus mishap which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife,
to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled
to such moral damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries
including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for
P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more modest. 19
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980, as well as the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of La Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda
Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages to cover
the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2)
P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate amount
to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this
decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
February 9, 2011
On 9 December 1997, Barretto apprised Oceaneering of the supposed fact that the mishap
was caused by the incompetence and negligence of the latters personnel in loading the
cargo and that it was going to proceed with the salvage, refloating and repair of the
barge.13 In turn contending that the barge tilted because of the water which seeped through
a hole in its hull, Oceaneering caused its counsel to serve Barretto a letter dated 12 March
1998, demanding the return of the unused portion of the charter payment amounting
to P224,400.00 as well as the expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 it purportedly incurred in
salvaging its construction materials.14 In a letter dated 25 March 1998, however, Barrettos
counsel informed Oceaneering that its unused charter payment was withheld by his client
who was likewise seeking reimbursement for the P836,425.00 he expended in salvaging,
refloating and repairing the barge.15 In response to Barrettos 29 June 1998 formal demand
for the payment of the same expenses,16 Oceaneering reiterated its demand for the return of
the unused charter payment and the reimbursement of its salvaging expenses as
aforesaid.17
On 6 October 1998, Barretto commenced the instant suit with the filing of his complaint for
damages against Oceaneering, which was docketed as Civil Case No. LP-98-0244 before
Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Contending that the
accident was attributable to the incompetence and negligence which attended the loading of
the cargo by Oceaneerings hired employees, Barretto sought indemnities for expenses
incurred and lost income in the aggregate sum of P2,750,792.50 and attorneys fees
equivalent to 25% of said sum.18 Specifically denying the material allegations of the
foregoing complaint in its 26 January 1999 answer, Oceaneering, on the other hand,
averred that the accident was caused by the negligence of Barrettos employees and the
dilapidated hull of the barge which rendered it unseaworthy. As a consequence,
Oceaneering prayed for the grant of its counterclaims for the value of its cargo in the sum
of P4,055,700.00, salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.19
The issues thus joined and the mandatory pre-trial conference subsequently terminated
upon the agreement of the parties,20 the RTC proceeded to try the case on the merits. In
support of his complaint, Barretto took the witness stand to prove the seaworthiness of the
barge as well as the alleged negligent loading of the cargo by Oceaneerings
employees.21 Barretto also presented the following witnesses: (a) Toribio Barretto II, Vice
President for Operations of N.B.B. Lighterage, who primarily testified on the effort exerted to
salvage the barge;22and, (b) Manuel Velasco, who testified on his participation in the
execution of the Time Charter Agreement as well as the circumstances before and after the
sinking of the barge.23 By way of defense evidence, Oceaneering in turn presented the
testimonies of the following witnesses: (a) Engr. Wenifredo Oracion, its Operations
Manager, to prove, among other matters, the value of the cargo and the salvage operation it
conducted in the premises;24and, (b) Maria Flores Escao, Accounting Staff at Castillo
Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose Law Offices, to prove its claim for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.25
1avvphi1
To disprove the rough sea supposedly encountered by the barge as well as the negligence
imputed against its employees, Oceaneering further adduced the testimonies of the
following witnesses: (a) Rosa Barba, a Senior Weather Specialist at the Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA); 26 (b) Cmdr.
Herbert Catapang, Officer-in-Charge of the Hydrographic Division at the National Mapping
Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA);27 and, (c) Engr. Carlos Gigante, a freelance
marine surveyor and licensed naval architect. 28 Recalled as a rebuttal witness, Toribio
Barretto II, in turn, asserted that the hull of the barge was not damaged and that the sinking
of said vessel was attributable to the improper loading of Oceaneerings construction
materials.29 Upon the formal offer respectively made by the parties, the pieces of
documentary evidence identified and marked in the course of the testimonies of the above
named witnesses30were, accordingly, admitted by the RTC.31
On 27 December 2005, the RTC rendered a decision, dismissing both Barrettos complaint
and Oceaneerings counterclaims for lack of merit. While finding that Barretto failed to
adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove that the accident was due to the
negligence of Oceaneerings employees, the RTC nevertheless brushed aside the latters
claim that the barge was not seaworthy as acknowledged in the Time Charter Agreement.
Alongside its claim for reimbursement of the sums expended for the salvage operation it
conducted which was denied for lack of evidence to prove the same, Oceaneerings claim
for the value of its cargo was likewise denied on the ground, among other matters, that the
same was not included in the demand letters it served Barretto; and, that it has no one but
itself to blame for failing to insure its cargo against all risks, as provided in the parties
agreement. With its claims for exemplary damages and attorneys fees further denied for
lack of showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, 32 Oceaneering filed the motion for partial
reconsideration of the foregoing decision33which was denied for lack of merit in the RTCs 28
April 2006 order.34
Dissatisfied, Oceaneering perfected its appeal from the aforesaid 27 December 2005
decision on the ground that the RTC reversibly erred in not finding that the accident was
caused by the unseaworthy condition of the barge and in denying its counterclaims for
actual and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Docketed
before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 87168,35 the appeal was partially granted in the herein
assailed 12 December 2007 decision upon the finding, among others, that the agreement
executed by the parties, by its express terms, was a time charter where the possession and
control of the barge was retained by Barretto; that the latter is, therefore, a common carrier
legally charged with extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
him; and, that the sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or
unseaworthiness which Barretto failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for
Oceaneerings lost cargo despite the latters failure to insure the same. Applying the rule,
however, that actual damages should be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, the
CA denied Oceaneerings claim for the value of its lost cargo and merely ordered the refund
of the P306,000.00 it paid for the time charter, with indemnity for attorneys fees in the sum
of P30,000.36
Alongside that interposed by Barretto, the motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision filed by Oceaneerings37 was denied for lack of merit in the CAs resolution dated 11
August 2008,38 hence, this petition.
The Issues
Oceaneering urges the reversal of the assailed 12 December 2007 decision and 11 August
2008 resolution on the ground that the CA erred in the following wise:
I. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WERE NO VALID DOCUMENTS SHOWING THE
REAL VALUE OF THE MATERIALS LOST AND THOSE ACTUALLY RECOVERED.
II. IN DENYING OCEANEERINGS COUNTERCLAIMS FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES
AMOUNTING TO (A)P3,704,700.00 REPRESENTING THE VALUE OF THE
MATERIALS IT LOST DUE TO THE SINKING OF [BARRETOS] BARGE; AND
(b) P125,000.00 REPRESENTING THE EXPENSES IT INCURRED FOR
SALVAGING ITS CARGO.
III. IN AWARDING OCEANEERINGS COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF P30,000.00 ONLY.39
The Courts Ruling
We find the modification of the assailed decision in order.
Oceaneering argues that, having determined Barrettos liability for presumed negligence as
a common carrier, the CA erred in disallowing its counterclaims for the value of the
construction materials which were lost as a consequence of the sinking of the barge.
Alongside the testimony elicited from its Operations Manager, Engr. Winifredo Oracion,
Oceaneering calls attention to the same witness inventory which pegged the value of said
construction materials at P4,055,700.00, as well as the various sales receipts, order slips,
cash vouchers and invoices which were formally offered before and admitted in evidence by
the RTC. Considering that it was able to salvage only nine steel pipes amounting
to P351,000.00, Oceaneering insists that it should be indemnified the sum of P3,703,700.00
for the value of the lost cargo, with legal interest at 12% per annum, from the date of
demand until fully paid. In addition, Oceaneering maintains that Barretto should be held
liable to refund theP306,000.00 it paid as consideration for the Time Charter Agreement and
to pay the P125,000.00 it incurred by way of salvaging expenses as well as its claim for
attorneys fees in the sum of P750,000.00.
In finding Oceaneerings petition impressed with partial merit, uppermost in our mind is the
fact that actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured party is
entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received when none were
intended.40 Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement,41 they are intended to put the injured party in the position in
which he was before he was injured.42 Insofar as actual or compensatory damages are
concerned, Article 2199 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides as follows:
answer, Oceaneerings claim for salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 cannot,
likewise, be granted for lack of credible evidence to support the same.
Tested alongside the twin requirements of pleading and proof for the grant of actual
damages, on the other hand, we find that the CA also erred in awarding the full amount
of P306,000.00 in favor of Oceaneering, as and by way of refund of the consideration it paid
Barretto for the Time Charter Agreement. Aside from not being clearly pleaded in the
answer it filed a quo, said refund was claimed in Oceaneerings demand letters only to the
extent of the unused charter payment in the reduced sum of P224,400.0063 which, to our
mind, should be the correct measure of the award. Having breached an obligation which did
not constitute a loan or forbearance of money, moreover, Barretto can only be held liable for
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on said amount as well as theP2,226,620.00 value of
the lost cargo instead of the 12% urged by Oceaneering. Although the lost cargo was not
included in the demand letters the latter served the former, said interest rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed from the time of the filing of the complaint which is equivalent to a
judicial demand.64 Upon the finality of this decision, said sums shall earn a further interest of
12% per annum until full payment in accordance with the following pronouncements handed
down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 65 to wit:
"2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount of finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit."
For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we find that the CA, finally,
erred in granting Oceaneerings claim for attorneys fees, albeit in the much reduced sum
of P30,000.00. In the absence of stipulation, after all, the rule is settled that there can be no
recovery of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs except in the
instances enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 66 Being the exception rather
than the rule,67 attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit, 68 in view
of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 69 Even when a
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights,
still attorneys fees may not be awarded where, as here, no sufficient showing of bad faith
can be reflected in the partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of
the righteousness of his cause.70
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the
assailed 12 December 2007 Decision is, accordingly, MODIFIED: (a) to GRANT
Oceaneerings claim for the value of its lost cargo in the sum of P2,226,620.00 with 6%
interest per annum computed from the filing of the complaint and to earn further interest at
the rate of 12% per annum from finality of the decision until full payment; (b) to REDUCE
the refund of the consideration for the Time Charter Agreement from P306,000.00
to P224,400.00, with 6% interest per annum computed from 12 March 1998, likewise to
earn further interest at the rate of 12% per annum from finality of this decision; and, (c) to
DELETE the CAs award of salvaging expenses and attorneys fees, for lack of factual and
legal basis. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
ROMERO, J.:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered
and duly proved. 1Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. 2 The claimant is dutybound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are
borne. 3 A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount
of damages 4 as well as hearsay 5 or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. 6 Such are the
jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was
navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas,
Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault.
Based on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, 7 private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos
(P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00). 8 In particular, private respondent prayed for
an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV,with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought
to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel. 9
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground
that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V
Maria Efigenia XV. 10 Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent averred that M/V
Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also
alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement
value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable
determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven. 11
15
rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil Case No.
C-9457 as follows:
del Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned
by private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine
Coast Guard showing that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in
1965 with 128.23 gross tonnage. According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then
carrying 1,060 tubs (baeras) of assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also
lost with the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and
compass. He further added that with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of
fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid
P10,000 to handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for commencing
suit for damages in the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the
following pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of
ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by
Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a
result of the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a
hole at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo of
1,050 baerasvalued at P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer
trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong
Engineering and Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing that construction of such trawler would cost
P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued
by E.D. Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20,
1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS
Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would
cost P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc.
on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of
Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost
P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder,
Model FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two units
would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales,
Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2)
rolls of nylon rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two
(2) rolls of nylon rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1)
assuming that plaintiff was entitled to damages, the lower court erred in awarding an
amount greater than that prayed for in the second amended complaint; and (3) the lower
court erred when it failed to resolve the issues it had raised in its memorandum. 16 Petitioner
likewise filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay the prescribed
docket fee. 17
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of merit.
18
Apparently
not having received the order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for leave
to file a reply to private respondent's opposition to said motion. 19 Hence, on February 12, 1990, the lower
court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance of the order of
January 25, 1990, said motion had become moot and academic. 20
Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992. 21 On petitioner's
assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible
evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness
because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and
determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary
evidence presented as in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and
price lists, the Court of Appeals held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with
evidence which appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should
declare in favor of admissibility rather than of non-admissibility (The Collector
of Palakadhari, 124 [1899], p. 13, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court,
Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial courts are enjoined to
observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence which crystallized
through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in
the search for truth and for the effective administration of justice. But in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter found
relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or
ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31,
1950; cited in Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily
rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate
court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that
its own witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff
is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially
similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the
period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning
chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a
going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending
engagements, . . .
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case
virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that
value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued
without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its
profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus
assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it was
unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the
"capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract
but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of course, taking into
account considerations which were too remote at the time of the
loss. 27 [Emphasis supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory
damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 28 The burden of
proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced
by one side is superior to that of the other. 29 In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in
making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne. 30
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private
respondent's general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for
Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September
1977 value when the collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by
private respondent with respect to items and equipment lost show similar items and
equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the
collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for
valuation of the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence,
petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del
Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was
he an expert on the subjects thereof. 31 Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the
lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the award of
P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private
respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear
in the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the
price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court
should have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario
could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was
the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price
quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can
testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total
amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that,
because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence.
Moreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation 32 whatever testimony
he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in
the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence 33 considering his
familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment,
cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. 34We must, therefore, examine the
documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. 35 Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that
the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. 36 On this point, we believe that the
exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130. 37
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the
like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the
Court of Appeals considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added,
however, that these exhibits should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the
Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of
evidence" because "the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as
evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule 130,
however, would show that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at.
This rule states:
under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned." 40 The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations
issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones
lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other
compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the
purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation." 41 These are simply letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take for example Exhibit D which reads:
V
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r
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y
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,
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.
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.
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.
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.
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To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however,
subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary
evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering an
allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been completed, was
not a "price current" or "commercial list" within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence
of the value of the article specified therein. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a "commercial
list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the letter in due course of business
upon instructions of the dealer. 43
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those
letters or communications when it held that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent," evidence should better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful or
technical grounds," 44 the same pieces of evidence, however, should not have been given probative
weight. This is a distinction we wish to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. 45 On the other hand, the probative
value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. 46 Thus, a letter may be
offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the
rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated,
hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus:
confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality
remain the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy
the mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter
always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of
incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the
rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same
does not give such evidence any probative value. But admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not has no probative value. 47
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence. 48
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives
private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa
German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is "entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered." [Emphasis
supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasicontracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded. 50 Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of
nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as
between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are
allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition
of the existence of a technical injury. 51However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages
shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the
concept and purpose of such damages. 52 The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also
depend on certain special reasons extant in the case. 53
Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's
vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the
amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that
sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged
that the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the
amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00.
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel
quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally
related to the loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such
allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a
fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. 54 Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case
when private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original
complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower
court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v.
Asuncion, 55 the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private
respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on
the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the
second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco
North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 56 participation in all stages of the case before the trial
court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second
amended complaint on April 16, 1985, 57 petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was
only on December 29, 1989 58 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that
petitioner raised the question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to
raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary
bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury
but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has
dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) 59 in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163212
ART. 194. DEATH. (a) Under such regulations as the Commission may approve, the
System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of the covered employee
under this Title an amount equivalent to his monthly income benefit, plus ten percent thereof
for each dependent child, but not exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and without
substitution, except as provided for in paragraph (j) of Article 167 hereof; Provided,
however, That the monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five years: Provided,
further, That if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay to his secondary
beneficiaries the monthly income benefit not to exceed sixty months; Provided, finally, That
the minimum monthly death benefit shall not be less that fifteen thousand pesos.
In a Resolution16 issued on 1 April 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Candano Shipping for failure to offer any justifiable ground to
modify, reverse or reconsider the questioned decision.
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Candano Shipping raising the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FORMULA FOR FIXING THE AMOUNT OF DEATH
COMPENSATION IN ARTICLE 194 OF THE LABOR CODE APPLIES IN
DETERMINING THE COMPENSATION CLAIMED BY THE HEIR OF THE
DECEASED EMPLOYEE AGAINST THE EMPLOYER UNDER ARTICLE 1711?
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS PERMITTED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS, ON
ORDINARY APPEAL, TO APPLY ART. 194 OF THE LABOR CODE ON A CLAIM
FOR DEATH COMPENSATION OF AN EMPLOYEE AGAINST THE EMPLOYER
FILED AND TRIED BEFORE THE REGULAR COURTS ON THE BASIS OF
ARTICLE 1711 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN THE
VILLA REY TRANSIT CASE?
WHETHER OR NOT APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 194 OF THE LABOR CODE ON
THE CLAIM FOR DEATH COMPENSATION OF RESPONDENT OUSTS THE
REGULAR COURTS, INCLUDING THE COURT OF APPEALS OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE?
IN THE EVENT THAT THE SUPREME COURT RULES THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 194 OF THE LABOR CODE IN THIS CASE
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE, IS RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DEATH
COMPENSATION FROM PETITIONER IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER THEORY OF
THE CASE AS ALLEGED, ARGUED AND TRIED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.17
Since the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the non-recovery of
Melquiades body for the period of four (4) years from 27 March 1996 creates a presumption
that he is already dead and that his death was caused by a fortuitous event, were already
settled, and considering that these findings were not controverted by the parties in this
instant petition, we find no compelling reason to disturb the same. Henceforth, we will limit
our discussion to the computation of the amount of indemnification.
In its Petition, Candano Shipping argues that the application of the measure stipulated
under Article 194 of the Labor Code is erroneous since it applies only to death
compensation to be paid by the Social Security System to the beneficiaries of a deceased
member, to which proposition Florentina concedes. We agree. The remedy availed by
Sugata-on in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been validly recognized by the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
In the case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company,18 we declared that the employees may
invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject
to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy.
The exception is where the claimant who had already been paid under the Workmens
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.19
Stated differently, save for the recognized exception, an employee cannot pursue both
remedies simultaneously but has the option to proceed by interposing one remedy and
waiving his right over the other. As we have explained in Floresca, this doctrinal rule is
rooted on the theory that the basis of the compensation under the Workmens
Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code,
thus:
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act differs
from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a
theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the
acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is
given to mitigate harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family.
Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by
law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of
the employer (99 D.J.S. 36).
In other words, under compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation
benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or
work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo v.
Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication
of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has
sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of
another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The principle underscored in the case of Floresca was further affirmed in the later case
of Ysmael Maritime Corporation v. Avelino,20 wherein we emphasized that once the claimant
had already exercised his choice to pursue his right under one remedy, he is barred from
proceeding with an alternative remedy. As eloquently laid down by Chief Justice Marcelo
Fernan:
It is therefore clear that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they
had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a
person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits
thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option."Having staked his
fortunes on a particular remedy, (he) is precluded from pursuing the alternate course,
at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission."
In the case at bar, Florentina was forced to institute a civil suit for indemnity under the New
Civil Code, after Candano Shipping refused to compensate her husbands death.
The pertinent provision of the New Civil Code reads:
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation
for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even
though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if
the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The employer is
also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or diseases caused by
such employment or as the result of the nature of employment. If the mishap was due to the
employees own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall
not be liable for compensation. When the employees lack of due care contributed to his
death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
In the case of Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court validated the
strength of the aforementioned provision and made the employer liable for the injury
suffered by its employee in the course of employment. We thus ruled:
Having affirmed the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly the
plane to Daet on January 8, 1951 whose slow reaction and poor judgment was the cause of
the crash-landing of the plane which resulted in private respondent Samson hitting his head
against the windshield and causing him injuries for which reason PAL terminated his
services and employment as pilot after refusing to provide him with the necessary medical
treatment of respondents periodic spells, headache and general debility produced from said
injuries, We must necessarily affirm likewise the award of damages or compensation
under the provisions of Art. 1711 and Art. 1712 of the New Civil Code. x x x.
As early as the case of Valencia v. Manila Yacht Club, Inc.,22 this Court, speaking
through the renowned civilist, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, made a pronouncement that
Article 1711 of the Civil Code imposes upon the employer the obligation to
compensate the employee for injury or sickness occasioned by his employment, and
thus articulated:
>Appellants demand for compensation is predicated on employers liability for the sickness
of, or injury to, his employee imposed by Article 1711 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation
for the death x x x.
We find the abovequoted provision to be applicable and controlling in this case. The matter
of the amount of compensation and allowable medical expenses should be properly
determined by the Municipal Court after the parties are heard accordingly.
Given that the right of the claimant arose from the contract of employment and the
corresponding obligation imposed by the New Civil Code upon the employer to indemnify
the former for death and injury of the employee circumstanced by his employment,
necessarily, the provisions of the same code on damages shall govern the extent of the
employers liability.
The pertinent provision on damages under the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain.
In order to give breath to the aforestated provisions on damages of the New Civil Code,
they must be transformed into a more tangible and practical mathematical form, so that the
purpose of the law to indemnify the employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned
by his employment, as envisioned by the Article 1711 of the same code may be realized.
We deem it best to adopt the formula for loss of earning capacity enunciated in the case
ofVilla Rey v. Court of Appeals,23 in computing the amount of actual damages to be awarded
to the claimant under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code.
In Villa Rey, the common carrier was made liable for the death of its passenger on board a
passenger bus owned and operated by Villa Rey Transit, Inc. going to Manila from
Lingayen, Pangasinan. While the bus was nearing Sadsaran Bridge in Barrio Sto. Domingo,
Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of bull cart filled with hay and bamboo poles.
The protruding end of one bamboo pole, about eight feet long, penetrated through the glass
windshield of the bus and hit the face of Policarpio Quintos, Jr., who was then sitting at the
front row, causing his death.24
The obligation of the common carrier to indemnify its passenger or his heirs for injury or
death arose from the contract of carriage entered into by the common carrier and the
passenger.25 By the very nature of the obligation which is imbued with public interest, 26 in
contract of carriage the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport its passenger to
his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard to all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier and thus gives rise to the right of the
passenger or his heirs for indemnity.27
In the same breadth, the employer shall be liable for the death or personal injury of its
employees in the course of employment as sanctioned by Article 1711 of the New Civil
Code. The liability of the employer for death or personal injury of his employees arose from
the contract of employment entered into between the employer and his employee which is
likewise imbued with public interest.28 Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured
in the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer for indemnity, automatically
attaches. The indemnity may partake of the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be depending on the factual milieu of
the case and considering the criterion for the award of these damages as outlined by our
jurisprudence.29 In the case at bar, only the award of actual damages, specifically the award
for unearned income is warranted by the circumstances since it has been duly proven that
the cause of death of Melquiades is a fortuitous event for which Candano Shipping cannot
be faulted.
The formula for the computation of unearned income is:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary
living expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death]
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, shall be computed by
applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table
of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality.30
In the computation of the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by
the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the
creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. 31 The
loss is not equivalent to the entire earnings of the deceased, but only such portion that he
would have used to support his dependents or heirs. Hence, we deduct from his gross
earnings the necessary expenses supposed to be used by the deceased for his own
needs.32 The Court explained in Villa Rey:
1avvphi1
[(The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is)] concerned with the determination
of losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate
heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings,
but of the support they received or would have received from him had he not died in
consequence of negligence of petitioners agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we
must reckon with the necessary expenses of his own living, which should be deducted
from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element
of damages to ones estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning
capacity or his capacity to acquire money, less necessary expense for his own living.
Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not the loss of entire earning, but rather the
loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other
words, only net earnings, and not gross earnings are to be considered that is, the total of
the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less
living and other incidental expenses.33
In computing the third factor, the necessary living expense, a survey of more recent
jurisprudence shows that this Court consistently pegged the amount at 50% of the gross
annual income.34 We held in Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja,35 that when
there is no showing that the living expenses constituted the smaller percentage of the gross
income, we fix the living expenses at half of the gross income.
Applying the aforestated jurisprudential guidelines in the computation of the amount of
award for damages set out in Villa Rey, we now proceed to determining Melquiades life
expectancy, thus:
Life expectancy = 2 / 3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death]
2 /3 x [80 56]
2 / 3 x [24]
Life expectancy = 16
With 16 more years of life expectancy and a monthly income of P7,800.00, as evidenced by
the pay slips duly presented before the RTC, Melquiades earning capacity is computed as
follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary
living expenses).
= 16 x ( P93,600.00 P 46,800.00)
= 16 x ( P 46,800.00 )
Net Earning Capacity = P 748,800.00
The argument raised by Candano Shipping that the formula for determining the life
expectancy under Villa Reycannot be automatically applied without proof of the basis for the
expected length of life of a Filipino does not merit our consideration. The formula for life
expectancy has been repeatedly adopted in our jurisprudence in fixing the amount of
indemnity for the death of a party. This was adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality which was used by
insurers in determining the capital sum to be charged for annuity.36
Admittedly, in several cases, this Court reduced the life expectancy multiplier considering
the medical history such as when the deceased previously underwent a major surgery 37 or
when it was shown that he was treated for chest pains, backache or occasional feeling of
tiredness38 and the fact that the deceased has been consistently engaged in a dangerous
and risky activity tending to shorten his life. 39 Failing to prove, however, that any of these
circumstances is attendant in the case at bar, Candano Shipping cannot validly assert that
the standard life expectancy factor laid down in Villa Rey cannot be applied in this case.
Accordingly, Florentina is entitled to recover the amount of P748,800.00 as actual damages
for the death of her husband. The awards of moral and exemplary damages are deleted.
However, the award of costs of litigation and attorneys fees are proper.40
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision
dated 23 May 2003 as well as the Resolution dated 1 April 2004, rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70410, are hereby PARTIALLY AFFIRMED in so far as it finds
petitioner liable to respondent for damages.
Pursuant to the appropriate provisions of the New Civil Code and the prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner Candano Shipping Lines, Inc., is ORDERED to pay
the amount of P748,800.00, as actual damages, plus 10% of the amount awarded as
attorneys fee plus cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007
departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed
tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled
that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners
and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate
court found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was
neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil
Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review
on certiorari and alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE
PART OF RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK
FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET
AND PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS. 5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be
disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6 Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be
made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. 7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal
Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement,
no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's
finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has
no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable
to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that
the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where
the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such
State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the
applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this
Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that
flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of
carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an
award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not
allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before
the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed
ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating
private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has
sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage
amounts to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from
immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest
of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the
lower court's finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty a duty to
provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or
enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707
because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be
accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for the
sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers
who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad
faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage
even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have
incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its
passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or
would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were
written the name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a
notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not
offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that
Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los
Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the
same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane
ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given
priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of
boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad
faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether
or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of
carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did
it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the
overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in
booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of
respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them
when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as
passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed
its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such
conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages.
To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge
respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana
Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the
respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA
in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or
deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said
agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent TWA
agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines
tickets purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that
petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los
Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but
because respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which
was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana
was the consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with
petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation.
In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another
airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should
be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the
trial court's ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the
refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from
New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil
Code which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for moral damages
and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only
Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral
damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines
to pay damages to petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the
tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to
Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an upand-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part
and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed
appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of
[AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking
about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her
clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where
she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached [AAA]
and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did
not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared
that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating
sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came
to their house and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-anddown movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say anything. At that
time, [AAAs] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that:
(1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on
[AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result
of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health
officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said
medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical findings are as follows:
"negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish
vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for
introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in laymans language, that there was no
showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which
means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous
exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis. 17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan,
Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAAs] parents, because sometimes they go
to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His
father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in
the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of
Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio.
They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to
Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from
barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his
mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land.
Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they
transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to
1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about
4:00 oclock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play
basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doa Tomasa about 1 kilometer away
from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns
taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised
when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latters place
which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier,
grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and
for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the
docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him
stronger and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder
charge and two (2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly
committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan,
Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on
July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this
rape charge because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a
doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his
sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA
mothers] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the
lending of money by his father to the AAAs family as the motive for the latter to file the rape
case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay,
testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against
Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said
rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits
relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution
was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the
testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was
confused as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year
delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they filed the said case was "to
help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by said
Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAAs father in filing the
said case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that
he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant
harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by
Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means
that there was no showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAAs
and her cousins testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at
the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accusedappellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that
when she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the
latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAAs testimony that when accused-appellant was
inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin
returned to AAA after telling the latters mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA,
she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited
the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other children were playing at the
time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them who were playing at
that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect
faculties or senses.19 The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to
overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses
were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive,
candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accusedappellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA
was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and
11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their
inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit
mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young
witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is
more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the incident in
1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an
indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a
witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place
of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already
held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the
crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it
appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the
proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided
it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing
of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when
the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In
previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until
October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and
sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense crossexamination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and
date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAAs] sworn statement mention
the month and date but only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against
accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellants claim that the only
reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of
this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of
her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the
charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for
fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been
sexually abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the
long history of rape by the victims father as understandable and not enough to render
incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other
circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the
failure of AAAs parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the
complainants father in the latters testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your
wife told you that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this
case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that
during that time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When
we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the case. 26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no
proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA.
Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether
"carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since
none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence
of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve. 27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as
follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language,
that there was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the
presence of lacerations in the victims sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of
rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable
in a prosecution for rape.28 What is important is that AAAs testimony meets the test of
credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have
ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and
consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants defense of denial and
alibi.29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of
raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this
score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAAs family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAAs] parents finally decided to file the rape case
because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that
what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually
ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that
the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is
improbable for a girl of complainants age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and
her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At
any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly
impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true. 30 Parents would not
sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and
humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have
their daughters transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that
no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we
discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 32 was the
governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the
said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below
seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time
the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the
presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the
death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot
agree with the CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in
1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have
taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to
prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime
of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the
attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding
his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil
Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that
"in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the
award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the
offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in
order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is
included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential damages
shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or
by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended
party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v.
Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from
other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil
law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated
and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes
that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the
same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized
by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount
of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis
Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed tocompensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
(25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her
family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the
offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and
extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the
circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at
the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and
the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no
justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the
case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity
and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario, 39 a
case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time,
the damages amounted toP75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral
damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree,
because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for
increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity
for the victim shall P75,000.00 Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without
the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial courts award ofP50,000.00
as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence
on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have
suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without
proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition
in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the
ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the
award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure
of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character
of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter
of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be
imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimants right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may
be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the compensatory damages,
such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is
committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages
should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary
damages be likewise increased to the amount ofP30,000.00 based on the latest
jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly
awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is increased toP75,000.0044 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
likewise increased to P30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision
were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation
of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not
suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 46 and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is
now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail
at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13,
2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and
who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense
for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With
more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall
apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is
found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed
by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. 48 The said
P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would
not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38
of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. 49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does
not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another
who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and
should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who
has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations 50 on
Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the
pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or
may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the
child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed
Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)
1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still
be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the
said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had
been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of
Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. 51 However,
accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the
appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law. 52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; 53 and (2) accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 andP30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00
is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
FELICIANO, J.:p
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying
passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union,
bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the
highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the
side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers,
including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital
at San Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner
was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead, specifically
described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left;
abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left. 1
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim,
wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in
going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated,
among other things:
That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73 and
victims after the said Thames met an accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte,
Bauang, La Union while passing through the National Highway No. 3;
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the accident due to
mechanical defect and went off the road and turned turtle to the east canal of
the road into a creek causing physical injuries to us;
xxx xxx xxx
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an
accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
xxx xxx xxx 2
(Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First
Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral
damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap
had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead,
generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she
had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She also alleged that the scar
diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed
for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for
the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead; P30,000.00 for moral
damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and
that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any
action against him (private respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed
the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner
Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal
or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there
had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim
for damages:
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint, although we conform to the trial court's disposition
of the case its dismissal.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there being no error
committed by the lower court in dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint,
the judgment of dismissal is hereby affirmed.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 3
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner assails the decision of
the Court of Appeals and ask this Court to award her actual or compensatory damages as
well as moral damages.
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her
cause of action had been made by petitioner. The relevant language of the Joint Affidavit
may be quoted again:
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and ownerof the said Thames, because it was an accident and
the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of
helping us to be treated upon our injuries. (Emphasis supplied)
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 4 A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when
the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated
in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit (supra), where the Court in reading and
rejecting a purported waiver said:
. . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital,
appellees were asked to sign as, in fact, they signed the document Exhibit I
wherein they stated that "in consideration of the expenses which said
operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper medical treatment, we
hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims against the operator of
the Samar Express Transit."
xxx xxx xxx
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily
show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from
appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All
that said document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the
waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their
right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 8, 1887)
which is not the case of the one relied upon in this appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that
the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver
cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the
Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner
testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having
been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the
Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she
experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered
injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial
doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared
by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually
intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to
law, morals, public policy or good
customs. 5 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and
hence to render that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by majority vote held
that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of action, should have awarded her actual
or compensatory and moral damages as a matter of course.
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the
safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a
statutory presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." 8 In fact, because of this statutory presumption, it has been held that a
court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The
standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary
diligence,i.e., the diligence of a good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations between members of society. A common
carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances". 11
Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private respondent has
successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap
involving his mini-bus. The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that
respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously,
respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo, to prove that he
had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate
himself from liability by alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But
allegation is not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his defense
of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to
passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that
the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it
was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in the occurrence of the
injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. InServando v. Philippine Steam Navigation
Company, 12 the Court summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting with approval from the Enciclopedia
Juridica Espaola:
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate
cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability non-performance. The
Partidas, the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines "caso
fortuito" as 'an event that takes place by accident and could not have been
foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robber.
In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola says: 'In legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a "caso fortuito" presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso
fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the
part of respondent common carrier. In her direct examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated
that shortly before the vehicle went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was
suddenly heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried out,
"What happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied, nonchalantly,
"That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the
same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only
mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was
causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten
accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the
bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the
roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the
mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one
of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers,
and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim relates to revenue
which petitioner said she failed to realize because of the effects of the vehicular mishap.
Petitioner maintains that on the day that the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed
to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job
which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The Court of Appeals, however,
found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since,
being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of her employment status as such,
the Court of Appeals held that she could not be said to have in fact lost any employment
after and by reason of the accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a finding entitled to due
respect from this Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may not be awarded
damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture.14
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity
is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly
as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the
face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily
integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is
relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be
expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., 15 this Court
awarded actual or compensatory damages for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who had
been injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there held:
We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court
for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not
more than P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and
something like an inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological
condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the court below
overlooked the clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative
process taking place in the mandible and restore the injured boy to a nearly
normal condition, surgical intervention was needed, for which the doctor's
charges would amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization fees,
expenses and medicines.Furthermore, the operation, according to Dr. Dio,
would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure,
while removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic surgery.
xxx xxx xxx
The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as
possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for. The damage to
the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical
facts that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be
treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is
undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed
to prejudice the son who has no control over the parent's action nor impair his
right to a full indemnity.
. . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to
fully repair the damage;the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings of
inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the
voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair,
however, skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state, we are
of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be
increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed was somewhere
between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by
petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be between P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that a
considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very
probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not
unreasonable.
Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule is that moral
damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is
shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded that respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with
the bus mishap which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife,
to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled
to such moral damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries
including the permanent scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for
P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more modest. 19
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October 1980, as well as the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of La Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda
Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages to cover
the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2)
P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate amount
to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this
decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
83981, dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006, respectively which affirmed with
modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, dated
September 29, 2004. The trial court found petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents damages for the injuries sustained by respondent Stephen Huang, son of
respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang.
First, the facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a sixwheeler 1990 Mitsubishi Truck with plate number PRE 641 (truck). It has in its employ
petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen
Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla
GLI Sedan with plate number PTT 775 (car).
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m.
within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent Stephen Huang was driving the
car, weighing 1,450 kg., while petitioner Del Rosario was driving the truck, weighing 14,058
kg. Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction
of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was
on the next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into
the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a
lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran
over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR).
His drivers license had been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for
reckless driving.
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained
massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations,
respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires
continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was
respondent Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to petitioner Del Rosario, he was
driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped the trucks front right tire. The truck
then swerved to the left, smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and
stopped on the other side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center island
and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug claims that it
exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of all its
employees.
The trial court, in its Decision dated September 29, 2004, found petitioners Mercury Drug
and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual, compensatory, moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding defendants Mercury Drug Corporation, Inc.
and Rolando del Rosario, jointly and severally liable to pay plaintiffs Spouses Richard Y.
Huang and Carmen G. Huang, and Stephen Huang the following amounts:
1. Two Million Nine Hundred Seventy Three Thousand Pesos (P2,973,000.00) actual
damages;
2. As compensatory damages:
a. Twenty Three Million Four Hundred Sixty One Thousand, and Sixty-Two Pesos
(P23,461,062.00) for life care cost of Stephen;
b. Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as and for lost or impaired earning capacity of
Stephen;
3. Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as moral damages;
4. Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
5. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees and litigation expense. 4
On February 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but
reduced the award of moral damages to P1,000,000.00. The appellate court also denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners cite the following grounds for their appeal:
1. That the subject Decision which dismissed the appeal of petitioners herein but
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64,
Makati City, in that the award of moral damages was reduced to P1,000,000.00 and its
Resolution dated March 30, 2006, which dismissed outright the Motion for Reconsideration
must be set aside because the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error:
3. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to
90 kilometers per hour;
4. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at
its right.
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right
front portion of the heavier vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact
would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the other way around. The truck, he
opined, is more difficult to move as it is heavier. It is the car, the lighter vehicle, which would
move to the right of, and away from the truck. Thus, there is very little chance that the car
will move towards the opposite side, i.e., to the left of the truck.
Dr. Daza also gave a further study on the basis of the same assumptions except that the car
is on the left side of the truck, in accordance with the testimony of respondent Stephen
Huang. Dr. Daza concluded that the general direction of the car after impact would be to the
left of the truck. In this situation, the middle island against which the car was pinned would
slow down the car, and enable the truck to catch up and hit the car again, before running
over it.8
To support their thesis, petitioners tried to show the damages that the truck sustained at its
front right side. The attempt does not impress. The photographs presented were taken a
month after the accident, and Rogelio Pantua, the automechanic who repaired the truck and
authenticated the photographs, admitted that there were damages also on the left side of
the truck.9
Worse still, petitioner Del Rosario further admitted that after the impact, he lost control of
the truck and failed to apply his brakes. Considering that the car was smaller and lighter
than the six-wheeler truck, the impact allegedly caused by the car when it hit the truck could
not possibly be so great to cause petitioner to lose all control that he failed to even step on
the brakes. He testified, as follows:
ATTY. DIAZ:
May I proceed, Your Honor. You were able to apply the brakes, were you sir?
WITNESS:
No more, sir, because I went over the island.
ATTY. DIAZ:
Because as you said you lost control, correct sir?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DIAZ:
In other words, sir from the time your truck was hit according to you up to the time you
rested on the shoulder, you traveled fifty meters?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir, about that distance.
ATTY. DIAZ:
And this was despite the fact that you were only traveling at the speed of seventy five
kilometers per hour, jumped over the island, hit the lamppost, and traveled the three lanes
of the opposite lane of C-5 highway, is that what you want to impress upon this court?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.10
We therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosarios negligence as the direct and
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del
Rosario failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done under the
circumstances.
We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del Rosario. Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxx
The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of
insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. 11
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of
the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the
employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.12 With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. 13
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Recruitment and Training Manager of
petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests,
and psychological examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for
the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. Mrs.
Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle,
instead of a truck during the driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor
skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police clearances were
also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars on
June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended
before the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long
trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more
than thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of
any company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips. 14
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the
supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner
Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was
not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against
petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
We now consider the damages which respondents should recover from the petitioners.
The trial court awarded the following amounts:
University of Sto. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but the
accident prevented him from attending the basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an
exceptional student. He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular undertakings. He
is intelligent and motivated, a go-getter, as testified by Francisco Lopez, respondent
Stephen Huangs godfather and a bank executive.18 Had the accident not happened, he had
a rosy future ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a banking career, get married and
raise children. Taking into account his outstanding abilities, he would have enjoyed a
successful professional career in banking. But, as Mr. Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for
someone like respondent to ever secure a job in a bank. To his knowledge, no bank has
ever hired a person suffering with
the kind of disability as Stephen Huangs.19
We likewise uphold the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
"The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante."20 Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate in
some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate
to the suffering inflicted.21 The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the
wealth or means of the offender.
In the instant case, respondent Stephen Huang and respondent spouses Richard and
Carmen Huang testified to the intense suffering they continue to experience as a result of
the accident. Stephen recounted the nightmares and traumas he suffers almost every night
when he relives the accident. He also gets depression when he thinks of his bleak future.
He feels frustration and embarrassment in needing to be helped with almost everything and
in his inability to do simple things he used to do. Similarly, respondent spouses and the rest
of the family undergo their own private suffering. They live with the day-to-day uncertainty of
respondent Stephen Huangs condition. They know that the chance of full recovery is nil.
Moreover, respondent Stephen Huangs paralysis has made him prone to many other
illnesses. His family, especially respondent spouses, have to make themselves available for
Stephen twenty-four hours a day. They have patterned their daily life around taking care of
him, ministering to his daily needs, altering the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed.
Respondent Carmen Huangs brother testified on the insensitivity of petitioner Mercury Drug
towards the plight of respondent. Stephen, viz.:
Maybe words cannot describe the anger that we feel towards the defendants. All the time
that we were going through the crisis, there was none (sic) a single sign of nor offer of help,
any consolation or anything whatsoever. It is funny because, you know, I have many
colleagues, business associates, people even as far as United States, Japan, that I
probably met only once, when they found out, they make a call, they sent card, they write
small notes, but from the defendant, absolute silence. They didnt care, and worst, you
know, this is a company that have (sic) all the resources to help us. They were (sic) on our
part, it was doubly painful because we have no choice but to go back to them and buy the
medicines that we need for Stephen. So, I dont know how someone will really have no
sense of decency at all to at least find out what happened to my son, what is his condition,
or if there is anything that they can do to help us. 22
On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of
quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The records show that at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was
driving without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The
evidence also shows that he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had
petitioner Del Rosario done so, the injuries which respondent Stephen sustained could have
been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that committed by petitioner Del Rosario need
be suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury Drug should be more circumspect in
the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The
award of exemplary damages in favor of the respondents is therefore justified.
With the award of exemplary damages, we also affirm the grant of attorneys fees to
respondents.23 In addition, attorneys fees may be granted when a party is compelled to
litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
party.24
Cost against petitioners.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 16, 2006 and March 30, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
83981, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
motive can be attributed to Acibar to conclude that he would falsely testify against Lopez.
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the trial court that the testimonies of the defense
witnesses were vague. The Court of Appeals added that Lopezs alibi is a weak defense
and can easily be fabricated.
On the award of damages, the Court of Appeals reduced the award of actual damages
from P40,000 to P33,000, the latter amount having been substantiated by receipts. As to the
loss of income, the Court of Appeals
noted that there was no accurate way to determine Melendres earnings since the
certification issued by Tanod Publishing did not reflect a fixed amount but only a salary
range. However, the Court of Appeals held that the heirs of Melendres are still entitled to a
reasonable amount as a result of Melendres loss of earning capacity and deemed it proper
to increase the award from P45,420 to P200,000.
1avvphi1
the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages,
funeral and interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the
motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The
bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by
Margarito Avila.
In its Answer,4 petitioner denied liability for the vehicular accident, alleging that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of
Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of its employees, including Margarito Avila.
On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued a Pre-trial Order 5 stating that the parties
manifested that there was no possibility of amicable settlement between them. However,
they agreed to stipulate on the following facts:
1. On March 17, 1991, in Bgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, plaintiff Vivian Lee
Tan and her husband Silvino Tan, while on board a motorcycle with [P]late No. DA5480 driven by the latter, and a Metro Bus with [P]late No. NXR-262 driven by
Margarito Avila, were involved in an accident;
2. As a result of the accident, Silvino Tan died on the spot while plaintiff Vivian Lee
Tan suffered physical injuries which necessitated medical attention and
hospitalization;
3. The deceased Silvino Tan is survived by his wife, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and four
children, three of whom are now residents of the United States; and
4. Defendant Margarito Avila is an employee of defendant Philippine Hawk. 6
The parties also agreed on the following issues:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident causing physical injuries upon
the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and resulting in the death of the latters husband was the
recklessness and negligence of Margarito Avila or the deceased Silvino Tan; and
2. Whether or not defendant Philippine Hawk Transport Corporation exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its driver
Margarito Avila.7
Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem
with her husband, who was on the wheel, at a place after a Caltex gasoline station in
Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon on the way to Lopez, Quezon. They came from
the Pasumbal Machine Shop, where they inquired about the repair of their tanker. They
were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they were about to make a
turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep
parked on the roadside, and their motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was
brought to the hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where she was confined for a week. She was
later transferred to St. Lukes Hospital in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered a fracture on
her left chest, her left arm became swollen, she felt pain in her bones, and had high blood
pressure.8
Respondents husband died due to the vehicular accident. The immediate cause of his
death was massive cerebral hemorrhage.9
Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing 10 and operating a Caltex gasoline
station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one million pesos a year in revenue. They also had
a copra business, which gave them an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a
year.11
Ernest Ovial, the driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident, testified that in the
afternoon of March 17, 1991, his jeep was parked on the left side of the highway near the
Pasumbal Machine Shop. He did not notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw
the bus dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus bumped his jeep and
sped away.12
For the defense, Margarito Avila, the driver of petitioners bus, testified that on March 17,
1999, at about 4:30 p.m., he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the Maharlika
Highway. When they were at Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, a motorcycle ran
from his left side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed the
path of the bus, and so he turned the bus to the right. He heard a loud banging sound. From
his side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to
help out of fear for his life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he
bumped the motorcycle.13
Avila further testified that he had previously been involved in sideswiping incidents, but he
forgot how many times.14
Rodolfo Ilagan, the bus conductor, testified that the motorcycle bumped the left side of the
bus that was running at 40 kilometers per hour.15
Domingo S. Sisperes, operations officer of petitioner, testified that, like their other drivers,
Avila was subjected to and passed the following requirements:
(1) Submission of NBI clearance;
(2) Certification from his previous employer that he had no bad record;
(3) Physical examination to determine his fitness to drive;
(4) Test of his driving ability, particularly his defensive skill; and
(5) Review of his driving skill every six months. 16
Efren Delantar, a Barangay Kagawad in Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, testified that the
bus was running on the highway on a straight path when a motorcycle, with a woman
behind its driver, suddenly emerged from the left side of the road from a machine shop. The
motorcycle crossed the highway in a zigzag manner and bumped the side of the bus. 17
In its Decision dated March 16, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner
and defendant Margarito Avila, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, MARGARITO AVILA is adjudged guilty of simple negligence, and judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and h[er] husbands heirs ordering
the defendants Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila to pay them jointly and
solidarily the sum of P745,575.00 representing loss of earnings and actual damages
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.18
The trial court found that before the collision, the motorcycle was on the left side of the road,
just as the passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle was in a running
position moving toward the right side of the highway. The trial court agreed with the bus
driver that the motorcycle was moving ahead of the bus from the left side of the road toward
the right side of the road, but disagreed that the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus
while the bus was running on the right side of the road. 19
The trial court held that if the bus were on the right side of the highway, and Margarito Avila
turned his bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the motorcyle, then the bus would
not have hit the passenger jeep, which was then parked on the left side of the road. The fact
that the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed that the bus must have been running from
the right lane to the left lane of the highway, which caused the collision with the motorcycle
and the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road. The trial court stated that since
Avila saw the motorcycle before the collision, he should have stepped on the brakes and
slowed down, but he just maintained his speed and veered to the left. 20 The trial court found
Margarito Avila guilty of simple negligence.
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having failed to sufficiently
inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. 21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification in
the award of damages. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed
decision dated March 16, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants
Philippine Hawk and Avila are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally appellee the
following amount: (a) P168,019.55 as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as temperate
damages; (c) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P590,000.00 as unearned income; and
(e)P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.22
Petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals was mistaken in stating that the bus driver
saw respondents motorcycle "about 15 meters away" before the collision, because the said
distance, as testified to by its witness Efren Delantar Ong, was Ongs distance from the bus,
and not the distance of the bus from the motorcycle. Petitioner asserts that this mistaken
assumption of the Court of Appeals made it conclude that the bus driver, Margarito Avila,
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, which was the basis for the conclusion that
Avila was guilty of simple negligence.
A review of the records showed that it was petitioners witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who
was about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular
accident.26 Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the finding of the trial court that petitioners
bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate
court. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. 27 To be negligent, a defendant
must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have
realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general
but definite class of risks.28
In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the
motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the
necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the
passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in
veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. 29 To avoid liability for a quasidelict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee. 30
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is
liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently
inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests were
concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that
Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
As regards the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that it was the only one
that appealed the decision of the trial court with respect to the award of actual and moral
damages; hence, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of
respondent, who did not appeal from the trial courts decision.
Petitioners contention is unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings
therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass
upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Philippine National Bank v. Rabat31 cited the book32 of Justice Florenz D. Regalado to
explain the section above, thus:
In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section, thus:
1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes
some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural
rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the
court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception
has now been added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his
assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now be considered by the
court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court
of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held
that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely related to an
error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which
the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error
(Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs.
Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983).
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is
authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the
appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would be
sacrificing substance for technicalities.33
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded respondent the sum
of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity (P590,000.00) and actual damages
(P155,575.00 for funeral expenses), plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as error the award of damages by the trial court on the
ground that it was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not the admissions made by
respondent during the trial.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual damages,
although the amount of the latter award was modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of
the Civil Code.34Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss
of capacity to earn money.35
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity.36 By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the
deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 37
In this case, the records show that respondents husband was leasing and operating a
Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned
an annual income of one million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of
Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, 38 which showed that
respondents husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to
use the Certificate and respondents testimony as bases for fixing the gross annual income
of the deceased at one million pesos before respondents husband died on March 17, 1999.
However, no documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived from their
copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such income cannot be
considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to
be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of
such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses. 39 In the absence of
documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and
operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses
at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Net Earning
=
Capacity
Life Expectancy
[2/3 (80-age at the
time of death)]
Gross Annual
Income (GAI)
Reasonable and
Necessary Expenses
(80% of GAI)
[2/3 (80-65)]
P1,000,000.00
P800,000.00
2/3 (15)
P200,000.00
P100,000.00(Living
Expenses)
30/3
P100,000.00
10
P100,000.00
P1,000,000.00
The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection
with the death, wake, and interment of respondents husband in the amount of P154,575.30,
and the medical expenses of respondent in the amount of P168,019.55.
severally respondent Vivian Lee Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of One Hundred Twenty-Seven
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos and Eighty-Five Centavos ( P127,192.85); (c)
moral damages in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for
loss of earning capacity in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e)
temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The facts, established during trial and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:
At approximately 11:30 a.m. of May 16, 1995, PRBL Bus No. 1539, with Plate No.
CVD 556, driven by petitioner Pleyto, was traveling along MacArthur Highway in
Gerona, Tarlac bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur. It was drizzling that morning and the
macadam road was wet. Right in front of the bus, headed north, was the tricycle with
Plate No. CX 7844, owned and driven by one Rodolfo Esguerra.
According to Rolly Orpilla, a witness and one of the bus passengers, Pleyto tried to
overtake Esguerras tricycle but hit it instead. Pleyto then swerved into the left opposite
lane. Coming down the lane, some fifty meters away, was a southbound Mitsubishi Lancer
car, with Plate No. PRS 941, driven by Arnulfo Asuncion. The car was headed for Manila
with some passengers. Seated beside Arnulfo was his brother-in-law, Ricardo Lomboy,
while in the back seat were Ricardos 18-year old daughter Carmela and her friend, one
Rhino Daba. PRBL Bus No. 1539 smashed head-on the car, killing Arnulfo and Ricardo
instantly. Carmela and Rhino suffered injuries, but only Carmela required hospitalization.
In their Answer, petitioners PRBL and Ernesto Pleyto both claimed that the bus was running
slowly at the time of the accident. They pointed out that Bus No. 1539 had been inspected
by driver Pleyto and examined by a mechanic prior to the trip, in accordance with the
companys standard operating procedure. It was found in good working condition. Pleyto
claimed that while cruising along the highway at Gerona, Tarlac, he noticed Esguerras
tricycle and followed it at a safe distance after he was unable to overtake it. Suddenly and
without warning, the tricycle stopped in the middle of the road. Pleyto stepped on the brakes
and the bus lost speed. But, since it skidded towards the direction of the tricycle, he
swerved the bus to the other lane to avoid hitting it, only to collide with the Manila-bound
Mitsubishi car.
On June 26, 1998, the trial court decided Civil Case No. 95-00724-D as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the defendants to pay solidarily the
plaintiffs the following amounts:
1) P50,000.00 as indemnification for the death of Ricardo Lomboy;
2) P1,642,521.00 for lost earnings of Ricardo Lomboy;
3) P59,550.00 as actual damages for the funeral, wake, religious services
and prayer for the soul of the departed;
4) P52,000.00 for the medical treatment and medicine of Carmela Lomboy;
5) P500,000.00 as moral damages for the wife and children excluding
Carmela Lomboy;
6) P50,000.00 as moral damages for Carmela Lomboy; and
7) To pay costs.
The filing fee the plaintiffs should have paid is hereby ordered to be paid by the
plaintiffs to the Clerk of Court of this Court upon satisfaction of the foregoing
amounts to the plaintiffs by the defendants.
SO ORDERED.4
In ruling for respondents, the RTC found Pleyto negligent and lacking in precaution when he
overtook the tricycle with complete disregard of the approaching car in the other lane. It
found the testimony of Rolly Orpilla credible and persuasive as against Pleytos self-serving
and unbelievable testimony. The court found that Pleyto should have been more prudent in
overtaking a tricycle, considering that it was drizzling, the road was slippery, and another
vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction. The RTC found that Pleyto had clearly
violated traffic rules and regulations, and thus was negligent under Article 2185 5 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines because petitioner Pleyto failed to present any proof to rebut the
presumption. The lower court likewise held co-petitioner PRBL equally liable under Article
21806 of the Civil Code for its failure to show that it had maintained proper supervision of its
employees notwithstanding strict standards in employee selection.
Petitioners appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61300. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court, with
modification in the award of damages, thus:
Wherefore, with the MODIFICATION that the award for actual damages is reduced
to P39,550.00 for funeral and religious services and P27,000.00 for medical
expenses of Carmela Lomboy; and the award for loss of earning capacity is
accordingly corrected to P1,152,000.00, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to Pleytos fault and
negligence. The appellate court noted that this was evident in his overtaking Esguerras
tricycle despite the drizzle, the slippery road, and an oncoming car a mere fifty meters away.
The court reasoned that the bus must have been speeding since despite braking, the bus
still hit the tricycle, and then rammed the car in the opposite lane with such force as to throw
the car off the road. The appellate court also found petitioner PRBL liable as owner of the
bus and as employer of Pleyto pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its failure to
observe the required diligence in its supervision of its employees and the safe maintenance
of its buses. In modifying the award of damages, the appellate court took note of the
amounts that were duly supported by receipts only.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it.
Hence, the instant petition, premised on the following grounds:
A. THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS, NAMELY, THAT THE PRBL BUS OVERTOOK A TRICYCLE
The Court of Appeals found PRBL liable for Pleytos negligence pursuant to Article 2180 in
relation to Article 217614 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption
may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.15
In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.16 Thus,
in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must
be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. 17
In the present case, petitioners presented several documents 18 in evidence to show the
various tests and pre-qualification requirements imposed upon petitioner Pleyto before his
hiring as a driver by PRBL. However, no documentary evidence was presented to prove that
petitioner PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees, including
Pleyto. Citing precedents, the Court of Appeals opined,
"in order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough for the employer
to emptily invoke the existence of company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it
has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures
and supervisory policies without anything more is decidedly not sufficient to
overcome such presumption. (Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs. CA (223 SCRA 521).
The trial court ratiocinated:
...
Indeed, the testimony of the said two witnesses of the PRBL would impress
one to believe that the PRBL has always exercised the strictest standard of
selecting its employees and of maintaining its vehicles to avoid injury or
damage to the life and limb of people on the road whether of its own
passengers or pedestrians or occupants or other vehicles. It has not however,
shown to the satisfaction of the Court that it has maintained proper
supervision of its employees, especially drivers while in the actual operation
of its buses. While it has a list of procedures and testing when it comes to
recruitment and another list of what should be done with its buses before they
are allowed to run on the road, it has no list of procedures and duties to be
followed by a driver while he is operating a vehicle to prevent injury to
persons and damage to property. Neither has it proved to the Court that there
Petitioners claim that no substantial proof was presented to prove Ricardo Lomboys gross
income lacks merit. Failure to present documentary evidence to support a claim for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. Testimonial evidence
suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of
the loss of earning capacity.23 Hence, the testimony of respondent Maria Lomboy, Ricardos
widow, that her husband was earning a monthly income of P8,000 is sufficient to establish a
basis for an estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the factors that should be taken into account in
determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for
which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs
of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor,i.e., life expectancy, is
computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to
the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of
the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is
ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. 24 Thus, the formula used by
this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80
age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living
expenses)].25
It was established that Ricardo Lomboy was 44 years old at the time of his death and is
earning a monthly income of P8,000 or a gross annual income (GAI) of P96,000.26 Using the
cited formula, the Court of Appeals correctly computed the Loss of Net Earning Capacity
as P1,152,000, net of and after considering a reasonable and necessary living expenses of
50% of the gross annual income or P48,000. A detailed computation is as follows:
NET
EARNING
CAPACITY
(X)
LIFE
GROSS
EXPECTANCY
ANNUAL
=
x
[2/3 (80-age at the
INCOME
time of death)]
(GAI)
LIVING
EXPENSES
(50% of GAI)
= [2/3 (80-44)]
x [P96,000
= [2/3 (36)]
x [P96,000
48,000]
= 24
x 48,000
= P 1,152,000.00
(50%
xP96,000)
Thus, no reversible error may be attributed to the court a quo in fixing the loss of earning
capacity at said amount.
We likewise sustain the reduction of the award of actual damages from P59,550 for funeral
and burial expenses of Ricardo and P52,000 for medical expenses of Carmela Lomboy
to P39,55027 and P27,000, respectively, as only these latter amounts were duly supported
by receipts.28 To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the
actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts.29
However, while the award of P50,000 as moral damages to Carmela Lomboy is sustained,
the award for moral damages of P500,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy should be
reduced for being excessive.
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. 30However, we must stress that moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich
complainant at the expense of defendant. 31 Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its
award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 32 Under the circumstances of this case, an
award of P100,000 to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy would be justified and in keeping with
the purpose of the law and jurisprudence in allowing moral damages. 33
The indemnification award of P50,000 is also sustained.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61300
is AFFIRMED, with the sole MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to the heirs
of Ricardo Lomboy is reduced fromP500,000.00 to P100,000.00. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
June 8, 2007
to P50,000.00; and ordering the appellant to pay the victim exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00.
An Information3 dated 3 January 2000 was filed against appellant Astrologo charging him
with the crime of rape committed against his own daughter, AAA. 4 The Information reads as
follows:
The undersigned upon prior sworn complaint filed by AAA, assisted by Aida
Zipagan5 accuses [NORBERTO] ASTROLOGO Y DE DIOS of the crime of Rape, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of December, 1999, in xxx City, Philippines, the said accused,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and
feloniously and at knife point have sexual intercourse with said AAA, his own daughter
inside their residence located at Phase xxx, Purok xxx, xxx, Bgy. xxx, 6 this City, against her
will and without her consent.7
On 1 March 1999, the appellant was arraigned, in which he entered a plea of NOT GUILTY
to the crime charged against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: AAA, the victim, Aida Zepadan (Aida),
Mauricio Cabrera (Mauricio), and Dr. Francisco Supe, Jr. (Dr. Supe, Jr.).
AAA testified that she is the daughter of the appellant. She stated that before the incident,
she used to live with her grandmother in Montalban. But, on 23 December 1999, she was
fetched by the appellant at her grandmothers house to live with him and his family. On 28
December 1999, at around 10:00 p.m., she went home after watching television from their
neighbors house. Shortly thereafter, she slept beside her two siblings, namely: BBB, nine
years old; and CCC, seven years old. At around 11:00 p.m., while she was sleeping inside a
room in their house located in Phase XXX, Purok XXX, XXX, Barangay XXX, XXX City, she
woke up when she felt someone kissing her lips. She opened her eyes and recognized that
it was her father, herein appellant. She struggled in refusal. She noticed then that her polo
shirt was already open. The appellant started mashing her breasts, and when she resisted,
he pointed a knife at her. Then, the appellant touched her vagina, lifted her skirt and
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina despite her continuing refusal, thereby
causing her so much pain. After satisfying his lust, the appellant fell asleep. AAA
immediately dressed up and proceeded to their neighbors (Aida) house. Aida brought AAA
to her stepmother, who was at another neighbors house that time. AAA narrated to her
stepmother how the appellant sexually abused her. Subsequently, Aida brought AAA to the
Barangay authorities, particularly to Mauricio who is a Barangay Security and Development
Officer (BSDO) of Barangay XXX, to report the incident.
Mauricio affirmed that between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight of 28 December 1999 or
almost 29 December 1999, while he was at a Christmas Party, AAA, together with a
neighbor, approached him to seek his assistance as she was raped by her father earlier that
night. Thereafter, he and the rest of the BSDO went to appellants house but the latter had
already left the premises. The group spread out to search for the appellant and when they
saw him, they chased him for some distance until he was overran and caught by SPO3
David Laciste. They brought the appellant to the police station at around 1:00 a.m. on 29
December 1999. Also on 29 December 1999, AAA, assisted by some barangay officials,
reported the incident to the police authorities where she executed an Affidavit 8 on what had
happened. AAA was also subjected to a physical examination at Camp Crame conducted by
Dr. Supe, Jr. on the basis of the complaint filed by her against her own father.
During Dr. Supe, Jr.s testimony in court, he declared that AAA suffered a deep fresh
hymenal laceration at six and seven oclock positions. Such declaration affirmed his findings
as stated in Medico-Legal Report No. M-3479-A-99 9 that AAA suffered a "compatible loss of
virginity," which loss could have occurred within 24 hours before the examination.
On the other hand, the defense merely presented the lone testimony of the appellant. The
appellant denied having committed the crime of rape against his own daughter, AAA. This
Court will quote the defenses own version of the facts of the case according to the
testimony of the appellant as summarized by the RTC and the appellate court. ThusOn [23 December 1999], [herein appellants] mother instructed him to fetch [AAA] because
his daughter was frequently meeting her boyfriend late in the evening at the back of her
grandmothers house and that this would happen about twice or thrice in one evening. [The
appellant] then fetched his daughter and brought her to his house in [Barangay] XXX, XXX
City.
On [26 December 1999], herein [appellant] celebrated his birthday. The next day, a friend
came to his house to continue the birthday celebration. The [appellant] and his friends
started the party at about 10:30 [a.m.], about four (4) blocks from his house. At around
10:30 [p.m.], the [appellant] went home from the party. On his way home, he passed by his
daughter who was still out in the street. He ordered her to go home as it was getting late. At
around 12:30 o clock past midnight, or early morning of [28 December 1999], he went out
of his house for some fresh air. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested [for allegedly raping his
daughter (AAA) and brought to Police Station 6 where he was detained. 10
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 10 March 2003, finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape. 11 The RTC did not give credence to
the defense offered by the appellant which consisted merely of his bare denial. The decretal
portion of the aforesaid Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the [appellant] Norberto Astrologo y
De Dios GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized
under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
The [appellant] is likewise ordered to pay [AAA] the following amounts:
(1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
First, the prosecution has to show the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable
doubt or that degree of proof that, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction. Second,
unless there are special reasons, the findings of trial courts, especially regarding the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
Third, the disposition of rape cases is governed by the following guidelines: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.18
In the present case, appellant contends that the court a quo erred in disregarding the
appellants defense of denial. According to appellant, he could not have raped the victim as
he was arrested during the early hours of 28 December 1999, while the rape incident
allegedly committed by him happened in the evening of the same day at around 10:00 p.m.
Therefore, he was arrested even before the commission of the crime. This Court finds this
contention indefensible.
This Court has consistently held that when the victim says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, and if her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
This is all the more true where the complainant is the daughter of the accused 19 because a
daughter would not concoct a story of defloration against her father, accused him of so
grave a crime as rape, allow an examination of her private parts, submit herself to public
humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if she were not truly aggrieved or her sordid tale
was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.20 It is likewise against human nature for a girl to fabricate a story that would
expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, especially when her charge
could mean the death or a lifetime in prison of her own father.21
In this case, when AAA testified before the trial court, she described in detail the horrible
experience she suffered at the hands of her own father on that fateful night of 28 December
1999. Her testimony can be characterized as categorical and unqualified. She gave a vivid
and clear account on how the appellant raped her. She also made a positive identification of
the person who raped her and she declared in an unequivocal manner that it was her father,
herein appellant, who raped her. It is worthy to note that after she was raped, she took effort
to report that incident to their neighbor, but since she could not utter a word, her neighbor
brought her to her stepmother to whom she narrated how the appellant raped her and
subsequently, sought the help of the barangay officials to report what had happened as
affirmed by Mauricio, one of the prosecutions witnesses. Mauricio averred that indeed,
between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight of 28 December 1999, or almost 29 December
1999, AAA, together with a neighbor, approached him asking for assistance as she was
raped by her father. He then informed the Barangay Chairman of XXX, Barangay XXX, and
the latter ordered the barangay tanods to apprehend the appellant. Mauricio testified that it
was already 1:00 a.m. of 29 December 1999 and not 28 December 1999, as alleged by the
appellant, when the latter was arrested and brought to Police Station 6.
The testimony of AAA as to the fact of rape was corroborated by the medical findings
conducted on 29 December 1999 by Dr. Supe, Jr. of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. In his testimony, he declared to have found a deep fresh
hymenal laceration at six and seven oclock positions, which means AAA suffered a
"compatible loss of virginity." He avowed that such loss of virginity could have occurred
within 24 hours before the examination, which coincides with the date the rape incident
happened, which was 28 December 1999. It has been said that when the testimony of a
rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, sufficient basis exists to warrant a
conclusion that the essential requisite of carnal knowledge has thereby been
established.22Thus, such testimony of Dr. Supe, Jr. strengthens the charge of rape against
appellant.
As compared to the aforesaid evidence of the prosecution, the defense of bare denial
offered by the appellant cannot hold water.
The defense of denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.23 It is merely a negative and self-serving
allegation that cannot be given any weight on the scale of justice. 24 And although denial is a
legitimate defense in rape cases, mere bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the
positive, straightforward, unequivocal and categorical testimony of the victim. It is an
established rule that an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony,
especially so when it comes from a credible witness. 25 Likewise, it is hornbook doctrine that
such positive and categorical testimony of a rape victim-daughter, identifying her own father
as the one who sexually attacked her, prevails over his bare denial because no daughter
will charge a father, especially a good father, with rape. The charge is not only
embarrassing to the victim and the family. It means death to the head of the family. A father
so charged cannot exculpate himself by a bare-bone denial. 26
In the case at bar, the appellant repeatedly denied having committed the crime of rape as
charged against him because he was arrested even before its commission. Such defense of
denial offered by the appellant must be rejected. It is a well-settled doctrine that denial
being a weak defense must be substantiated by a clear and convincing evidence to merit
credibility.27 In this case, the defense merely relied on the lone testimony of the appellant.
The appellant did not bother to present other evidence to prove his contention that on the
early hours of 28 December 1999, he was already arrested and brought to Police Station 6
where he was detained thereby making it impossible for him to have committed the offense
charged. The appellant could have presented the records or the logbook of the Police
Station where he was detained to establish the truthfulness of his assertion that he was
already confined in prison when the alleged rape incident happened. In stark contrast,
Mauricio, the BSDO of the Barangay, categorically stated that it was 1:00 a.m. of 29
December 1999 when appellant was arrested.
Q: Where were you on [28 December 1999] at around 11:00 p.m., Mr. Witness?
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and distinct from
civil indemnity.31 The reduction of civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and moral damages
to P50,000.00 is proper because the crime committed by the appellant is only simple rape.
The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to AAA is likewise proper in order to deter
other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviors from sexually abusing
their own daughters.32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 0013 dated 29 April 2005 finding appellant Norberto Astrologo y De Dios guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed against his own daughter, AAA, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
force, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
his own daughter, the herein offended party, [AAA], a minor woman below 12 years of age
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (Emphasis in the original.)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 10173
That sometime in the year 2002, in the evening[,] in the Municipality of Peablanca,
Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
JUANITO APATTAD[,] father of the offended party, [AAA], a minor below 12 years of age,
thus have moral ascendancy over the complainant, with lewd design and by the use of
force, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
his own daughter, the herein offended party, [AAA], a minor woman below 12 years of age
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 (Emphasis in the original.)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 10174
That on or about June 10, 2003, in the Municipality of Peablanca, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, JUANITO APATTAD[,]
father of the offended party, [AAA], a minor below 12 years of age, thus have moral
ascendancy over the complainant, with lewd design and by the use of force, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, the
herein offended party, [AAA], a minor woman below 12 years of age against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis in the original.)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 10175
That on or about June 11, 2003, in the Municipality of Peablanca, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, JUANITO APATTAD[,]
father of the offended party, [AAA], a minor below 12 years of age, thus have moral
ascendancy over the complainant, with lewd design and by the use of force, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, the
herein offended party, [AAA], a minor woman below 12 years of age against her will
CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Emphasis in the original.)
On June 1, 2004, the accused, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to all
the charges against him.8 Subsequently, on June 8, 2004, pre-trial conference was held and
was terminated on the same day, with the parties stipulating on the following:
(a) The identities of the accused and AAA;
mother would tell her to do, AAA answered in the affirmative. 25 However, on re-direct
examination, AAA clarified that her mother did not teach her to claim that she was raped
and that she was only telling the truth. 26
Dr. Simangan, the prosecutions other witness, testified that on June 16, 2003, she
conducted a physical examination on AAA and discovered that the latter had a healed
hymen laceration at 4 and 7 oclock positions, and that her vagina admitted the tip of the
fifth finger easily.27 She stated that the laceration could have been caused by a blunt
object.28 She also testified that after conducting the physical examination, she interviewed
AAA and the latter gave her the name of the person who raped her.29 However, Dr.
Simangan admitted that she can no longer remember the name that was mentioned by
AAA.30 Dr. Simangan also identified the Medico-Legal Report that she prepared. 31
Version of the Defense
The accused denied the accusation of rape hurled against him and claimed that his wife
was the one who initiated the criminal complaint against him because she thinks that he has
a mistress.32
The other defense witness, Louie Calimag (Calimag), testified that from June 3, 2003 until
July 8, 2003, he employed the services of the accused to help him in the operation of the
chainsaw.33 As part of their routine, he and the accused would saw logs in the forest from
7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., go back to his house, and sleep there at night. 34 Calimag further
testified that when the accused was arrested by the police in the forest on July 8, 2003, he
was also with him.35 Thus, when he found out that the accused was arrested for rape
allegedly committed on June 10 and 11, 2003, Calimag claimed that he did not believe this
because the accused stayed in his house on those days. 36
Calimag likewise added that after the accused was arrested, he saw AAA, who admitted to
him that she was not raped by the accused and that it was her mother who instructed her to
give false information. AAA allegedly told him that her parents had a fight due to her fathers
illicit relationship with another woman. 37
On cross-examination, Calimag admitted that the house of the accused was only three (3)
kilometers away from his house and that the accuseds house may be reached by jeepney
in an hour and by foot in four (4) hours.38
Ruling of the Trial Court
Between the two versions of the incident, the trial court gave credence to the version of the
prosecution and rendered its Decision dated October 24, 2007, finding the accused guilty of
three (3) counts of rape. The decretal portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds accused JUANITO APATTAD GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape for three (3) counts in Criminal Cases Nos. 10172, 10174 and
10175 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each
case. He is further ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P150,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity.
Accused is acquitted in Criminal Case No. 10173 for lack of sufficient evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.39
On December 19, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal40 of the Decision dated
October 24, 2007 rendered by the trial court. On April 15, 2008, the CA, where the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 03173, issued a notice to file brief to the parties. 41
On September 5, 2008, accused-appellant filed his Brief for the Accused-Appellant,42 while
the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief for
the Plaintiff-Appellee43 on March 27, 2009.
Ruling of the Appellate Court
As stated above, the CA, in its Decision44 dated August 28, 2009, affirmed with modification
the judgment of conviction by the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City in Criminal Case Nos.
10172, 10174 and 10175 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the civil
indemnity awarded should be P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In addition, moral
damages and exemplary damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 and Php25,000.00
respectively, for each count of rape are hereby awarded.
SO ORDERED.45
On September 22, 2009, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal46 from the CA
Decision dated August 28, 2009.
In Our Resolution dated October 4, 2010, We notified the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs. Both parties manifested that they are no longer filing
supplemental briefs and they are adopting their respective main briefs before the CA.
The Issues
Accused-appellant contends in his Brief47 that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Courts Ruling
kilometers does not make it physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed. 58 Calimag himself admitted during crossexamination that the house of accused-appellant may be reached by jeepney in an hour.
Significantly, even if accused-appellant indeed stayed in Calimags house on the dates that
he committed rape, it was still not physically impossible for accused-appellant to go home
and commit the said crime at the time it was said to have been committed.
Also, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by credible
and disinterested witnesses. In this regard, it should be noted that alibi becomes unworthy
of merit not only because accused-appellant was positively identified by AAA but also in
cases where it is established mainly by the accused himself, his relatives, friends and
comrades-in-arms,59 and not by credible persons.60
Finally, as mentioned in Estoya, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of
witnesses, and that the assessment made by the trial court must be accepted unless it is
patently and clearly inconsistent.
Indeed, "it is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying."61 In People v. Lusabio, Jr., this Court held:
All in all, we find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by
accused-appellant. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence
properly.62(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Since accused-appellant failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness
on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, these findings deserve great weight
and are deemed conclusive and binding.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been
established beyond reasonable doubt
After a careful examination of the records of this case, this Court is satisfied that the
prosecutions evidence established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In reviewing the evidence in rape cases, the following considerations should be made: (1)
an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.63Nonetheless, it also bears stressing that rape is essentially
committed in relative isolation or secrecy; thus, it is most often only the victim who can
testify with regard to the fact of forced coitus. 64
Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of rape is
committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) through force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 65
In People v. Orillosa,66 this Court held that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or
intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father
would suffice.67 Thus, in order for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of statutory
rape in this jurisdiction, only two (2) elements must concur: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that the victim is below twelve (12) years old. 68
In the present case, it is undisputed that the victim, AAA, was below twelve (12) years old
when the crime was committed. A copy of AAAs birth certificate to prove her age was duly
presented in evidence by the prosecution, indicating that she was indeed born on October
14, 1994.69 Concomitantly, AAA was only seven (7) years old when the crime of rape was
first committed against her in 2001, and was only nine (9) years old when the accused once
again succeeded in committing the same crime in 2003. 70 Also, it is undisputed that
accused-appellant is the father of AAA, as stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial
conference and as also indicated in AAAs birth certificate. 71 Thus, what only remains to be
proved is the fact of carnal knowledge by the accused of the victim.
Verily, the prosecution has sufficiently established the foregoing element, thus proving that
accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape.
1avvphi1
When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of how she was
sexually molested by her father, which narration is difficult, if not improbable, for a 10-yearold girl to concoct. As aptly observed by the CA, "[AAA] was able to describe in detail how
her father carried her through the window, laid her down the floor, tied her mouth, removed
her clothes and inserted his penis inside her vagina. She even described that she felt pain
while her father was performing the carnal act against her." 72
Pertinently, "it is settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight
and credence, considering that when a woman, specially a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." 73
Moreover, the fact that AAAs testimony was able to withstand scrutiny during crossexamination bolsters her credibility and makes her statements more credible. 74
Further, it should be noted that the findings in the medical examination of Dr. Simangan
corroborate the testimony of AAA. In this regard, while a medical examination of the victim
is not indispensable in the prosecution of a rape case, and no law requires a medical
examination for its successful prosecution, the medical examination conducted and the
medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative evidence, which strongly bolster AAAs
testimony.75
In addition, this Court is not convinced that a child of a tender age would concoct a story as
sordid as in the instant case due to her mothers alleged ill motive. In People v. Padilla, We
held that accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the victims mother for being jealous
of another woman is clearly unmeritorious, for no mother in her right mind would possibly
wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows the crime of rape only because she is
consumed with hatred and revenge. Specifically:
Appellant, nonetheless, imputes ill-motive on Laiza and her mother Elisa in charging him
with rape contending that the latter was jealous when she found that he was courting a
woman in their place.
Again, appellants excuse is simply too frail to cause resentment and ill will on the part of
Laiza and her mother against him. Though one may be consumed with much hatred and
revenge, it takes nothing less than psychological depravity for a mother to concoct a story
too damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter. Certainly, no mother in her
right mind would possibly wish to stamp her child with the stigma that follows a despicable
crime of rape. We are convinced that the victim and her mother boldly initiated the present
case to seek justice for the abominable act committed by appellant. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
All told, We accordingly sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Award of Damages
The Decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified.
In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim, the imposable penalty is
death.76 However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now
prohibited.77 In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
RPC.78
Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to
impose reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal consideration for the award of
damages is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."
Pertinently, as early as July 9, 1998, this Court has held that when the circumstances
surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA
9346, the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP 75,000, 79 racionating
that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over
the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." 80
1avvphi1
Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000 is warranted, 81 without
need of pleading or proving them.82 In rape cases, it is recognized that the victims injury is
concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages.83
Further, the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000, despite
the lack of any aggravating circumstances, 84 to deter others from committing similar acts or
for correction for the public good.85
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03173 finding accused-appellant Juanito Apattad guilty of rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As thus modified, accused-appellant is ordered to
pay AAA for each count of rape, PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral
damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Reynaldo Sahor Baago was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of October, 1993, in the municipality of Marilao,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge to (sic) said Dolores C. Jaurigue,
against her will and without her consent. 1
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 2 Hence, trial proceeded in due course.
The prosecution presented the testimony of the thirteen-year-old victim, Dolores Jaurigue.
She testified that on October 15, 1993, she visited her sister, Dorotea Jaurigue-Mejico, who
was staying with her husband at the bodega of Bauer Company in Marilao, Bulacan. That
evening, she was left alone in the bodega as her sister attended a party. She went to bed at
around seven o'clock. She was later roused from her sleep when she felt someone
embracing her. It turned out to be accused-appellant. Accused-appellant poked a gun at her
and started to remove her short pants and underwear. She tried to shout but accusedappellant slapped her twice. Then, he took off his pants and underwear and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of Dolores. He admonished her not to tell anybody about the
incident. Thereafter, accused-appellant put on his pants and left the room. 3
When Dorotea arrived from the party, she saw accused-appellant coming out of the bodega
zipping his pants. Dorotea asked Dolores what happened but she did not answer. 4
The following day, Dorotea again asked Dolores what happened the previous night. Dolores
told her sister that accused-appellant raped her. Afraid of what accused-appellant might do
to them, Dolores and Dorotea kept the incident to themselves. 5
It was only on March 18, 1994 that Dolores had the courage to tell her aunt, Lourdes
Corcuera, about the assault on her womanhood. Lourdes tried to talk to accused-appellant
but nothing happened. 6
During an altercation with Dolores' mother, Antonina Jaurigue, Lourdes divulged that
Dolores was no longer a virgin. Shocked about the revelation, Antonina sought for an
explanation. Dolores was compelled to tell her mother about the rape incident. 7
Antonina brought Dolores to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for physical
examination on March 29, 1994. The medico-legal report executed by Dr. Jesusa N.
Vergara of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory revealed that Dolores was "in
non-virgin state physically" and that "there (were) no signs of recent application of any form
of violence." 8
On July 14, 1994, Dolores, assisted by her mother, filed a criminal complaint for rape
against accused-appellant.
For their part, the defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellant and Delfin
Castillo.
Accused-appellant testified that he was a welder at Bauer Company. In the afternoon of
October 15, 1993, he, together with Delfin Castillo and Rolando Pambico, went to the office
of their employer, Mr. Mariano Takbas, in Quezon City to get their salary. They left the office
at about six o'clock in the evening and then they went home to Marilao, Bulacan. They
reached Marilao at about eight o'clock in the evening. Accused-appellant proceeded to his
First, the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court
unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstances of weight and substance that would
have affected the result of the case;
Second, the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and
Third, a witness who testified in a categorical straightforward, spontaneous
and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness. 13
We find no reason in the case at bar to disturb the findings of the trial court regarding
private complainant's credibility. A reading of the transcript of the trial shows that private
complainant, young and innocent as she was, was able to recount clearly and candidly
before the court how accused-appellant ravished her on the evening of October 15, 1993.
Her testimony must be given full weight, especially since it is supported by the medical
report submitted by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. As a rule, testimonies
of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no
young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public
trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. 14 Hence, we affirm accused-appellant's conviction.
We likewise affirm the award of moral damages to private complainant. In rape cases, the
court may, in its discretion, award moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof. We held inPeople vs. Prades 15 that "the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal
prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed
wherein such allegations can be made." As the fact of rape has been sufficiently proved in this case, we
find the award of moral damages proper and correct.
We note, however, that the trial court failed to award civil indemnity to private complainant.
Time and again, we have held that moral damages is separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to rape victims. The moral damages cannot take the place of the civil
indemnity. While the award of moral damages is discretionary on the part of the court, the
civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. 16 Hence, in addition to the P50,000.00 moral
damages, accused appellant is ordered to pay private complainant the amount of P75,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIIFICATION
that in addition to the P50,000.00 moral damages, accused-appellant is also ordered to pay
private complainant P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
August 3, 2010
unlawfully and feloniously [have] carnal knowledge or rape his own daughter, [BBB], against
the latters will, to the damage and prejudice of said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27, 1998.5
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon sometime in the month of March 1994, at
Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123], Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd and unchaste designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape [his] daughter [BBB], 16 years old, against the
latters will, to the damage and prejudice of the said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27, 1998.6
Upon arraignment on May 4, 1999, Bartolini pleaded not guilty to all the three (3) charges
filed against him.7 The three (3) criminal cases were thereafter tried jointly.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: AAA; BBB; CCC,
appellants wife and mother of both victims; and Dr. Emelie S. Viola, the Municipal Health
Officer of Hinatuan District Hospital who conducted the physical examination of both
victims.
Below are the facts established by their testimonies.
Bartolini is married to CCC.8 They begot six (6) children, the eldest being BBB who was
born on January 14, 1978,9 followed by AAA who was born on June 16, 1980.10
Sometime in March 1994, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, while BBB was weeding the
grass on their vegetable garden with her father, the latter suddenly pulled her to the ground
and forced her to lie down. Bartolini then lifted BBBs skirt, removed her panty and
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. As BBB struggled, appellant punched her
and hit her at her back. Afterwards, appellant put back his clothes and left. When BBB went
inside their house, appellant, who was waiting for her, warned her not to tell CCC about the
incident. Despite the warning, BBB reported the incident to her mother, but the latter told her
to just keep quiet.11
After the said incident, appellant repeatedly had sexual intercourse with BBB, the last of
which happened on March 2, 1998 at about 8:00 in the morning inside their house while her
mother was away selling fish and while all her siblings were attending school. That morning,
appellant ordered BBB to get his clothes for him. Appellant then followed BBB to the room,
took off her clothes and raped her.12
It also appears that sometime in March 1995, at about 6:30 in the morning, while having
breakfast, appellant instructed his second eldest daughter, AAA, to burn the dried leaves in
their garden. Dutifully, AAA went to the garden at around 7:00 that morning and met her
father there. To her surprise, appellant immediately pulled her and brought her near a big
fallen tree while threatening to kill her and all the members of their family if she would not
acquiesce to his demands. Appellant told her to remove her panties, but since AAA was
crying and pushing her father away, appellant himself took off AAAs panties, laid her on the
ground and placed one (1) of her feet on top of the fallen tree. Afterwards, appellant
removed his pants and raped her. After having sexual intercourse with AAA, appellant put
back his pants and went to the barangay hall to report for duty as appellant was a
barangaykagawad at that time. Like her sister, AAA also told the incident to their mother, but
the latter told her to keep silent for fear that appellant would fulfill his threats. Consequently,
AAA was repeatedly raped by appellant until sometime in October 1998, a month before
she gave birth to appellants child.13
When CCC discovered that AAA was pregnant, she confided the matter to her sister-in-law,
DDD, who, in turn, reported the incident to the barangay captain and to a representative of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Butuan City. On November
19, 1998, while under the custody of the DSWD, AAA gave birth to her child. 14
During the trial, CCC testified that sometime in March 1994, her daughter BBB confided to
her that she was raped by appellant. She just kept silent about the incident for fear that her
husband will maul her when confronted. AAA also reported to her that she was raped by her
father sometime in 1995. In one (1) instance, CCC even saw appellant touching AAAs
vagina while the two (2) were inside their kitchen. She got angry and told her parents-in-law
about the incident, but the latter replied that she has no other evidence to prove her
accusation. CCC also testified that appellant, despite being an elected barangay kagawad,
was a drunkard, violent and an irresponsible individual. She added that she had received a
letter from appellant threatening to kill them.
Dr. Emelie S. Viola, Municipal Health Officer of Hinatuan District Hospital, testified that
sometime in October 1998, BBB and AAA were brought to her clinic for physical
examination. Although there were no visible signs of physical trauma, Dr. Viola found that
BBB had deep healed hymenal lacerations at the 6 and 7 oclock positions, as well as
superficial healed hymenal laceration at the 10 oclock position, which indicate that there
was a penetration of an object or a male reproductive organ at BBBs female genitalia. 15
Dr. Viola also examined AAA and found that the latter had deep healed lacerations at the 12
oclock position and superficial healed hymenal lacerations at the 3, 9 and 10 oclock
positions, also indicating penetration of an object or a male reproductive organ at AAAs
vagina. AAA was also pregnant.16
The defense, on the other hand, presented its lone witness, appellant Bartolini, who
interposed the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have raped BBB
in the morning of March 2, 1998 because he has been out of their house from 4:00 a.m. that
day to deliver shrimps, prawns, and crabs to a certain Benjamin Castaas who resides in
Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur. Appellant claims that he arrived at Castaass house at around
4:20 a.m. and stayed there for breakfast upon the latters invitation. After getting paid, he left
for home at around 10:00 a.m. and reached his house fifteen (15) minutes later.17
On September 4, 2000, a subpoena was issued for Benjamin Castaas to appear as
witness for the defense.18Castaas, however, failed to appear before the trial court. A
warrant of arrest was thereafter issued against him, 19 but to no avail. Thus, on July 24,
2002, the trial court issued another subpoena to Castaas. 20 When Castaas still failed to
appear, the trial court issued an order declaring the case submitted for decision. 21
On September 18, 2002, the RTC promulgated its decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape committed against AAA and BBB. The fallo
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused RUSTICO BARTOLINI Y AMPIS, forty-four (44) years of
age, a fisherman and a resident of [ABC, 123,] Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Section 11, Republic Act No. 7659, paragraph (1), this Court hereby
sentences him:
1. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2083-H, to suffer the penalty of Death by Lethal
Injection. To pay Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2084-H, to suffer the penalty of Death by Lethal
Injection. To pay Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and to pay the costs; [and]
3. In Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2085-H, to suffer the penalty of Death by Lethal
Injection. To pay Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity and
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages and to pay the costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED.22
At the CA, Bartolini argued that he should not have been convicted of the crime of qualified
rape since the information in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H was defective because it failed
to allege that the act was committed by force or intimidation as required by law, while there
was no allegation of minority of the victim in the information for Criminal Case No. 99-1-
2084-H. Bartolini also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.23
After an extensive discussion on the issues raised by Bartolini, the appellate court found no
compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court. Nevertheless, the CA
modified the penalties by reducing the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua following the
abolition of the death penalty and by modifying the monetary award in favor of the victims.
The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads,
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 18, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 29, Bislig City, in Criminal Case Nos. [99-1-]2083-H, [99-1-]2084-H
and [99-1-]2085-H finding appellant Rustico Bartolini y Ampis guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for three counts of rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) in Criminal Case Nos. [99-1-]2083-H and [99-1-]2085-H, the penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua; and to pay the amount of seventy-five thousand
pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as
moral damages and twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages for each count; and
(b) in Criminal Case No. [99-1-]2084-H, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages, and twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
(c) with costs.
SO ORDERED.24
On August 30, 2007, the records of the case were forwarded to this Court for automatic
review.25 The Court accepted the appeal and directed the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both the Office of the Solicitor General, for
the appellee, and the appellant submitted manifestations 26stating that they replead and
adopt the arguments raised in their respective briefs 27 before the CA.
Appellant raises the following issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant;
II. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 99-12085-H despite the fact that the information therein was allegedly defective; and
III. Whether the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty upon the appellant
after finding him guilty in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H considering the failure of
the information to allege minority.28
We shall first discuss the second and third issues raised by the appellant, i.e., whether the
element of force and intimidation was correctly alleged in the information in Criminal Case
No. 99-1-2085-H and whether the penalty of death was properly imposed upon the
appellant in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H.
The appellants arguments are partially meritorious.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under 12 years of age. 29
A perusal of the information used as basis for Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H readily
reveals the allegation that appellant employed force and intimidation in raping BBB. We
reproduce the contents of the information below:
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2085-H:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon sometime in the month of March 1994, at
Sitio [ABC], Barangay [123], Municipality of Hinatuan, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with lewd and unchaste designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape [his] daughter [BBB], 16 years old, against the
latters will, to the damage and prejudice of the said [BBB].
CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.
Bislig, Surigao del Sur, November 27, 1998.30
The same allegation was proven during the trial. We quote BBBs testimony during her
direct examination:
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened on March 1994, while you
were still residing at [Sitio ABC], [123], Lingig, Surigao del Sur, together with your
parents?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident all about?
A: We were weeding grasses, sir.
Q: Where were you [weeding] grasses?
A: We were weeding grasses near to our house, sir.
Q: Were you alone while you were weeding grasses at [Sitio ABC], [123], Lingig,
Surigao del Sur?
A: We were two, me and my father, sir.
Q: What time was that?
A: Afternoon, sir.
Q: Now, while you were weeding grasses near your house in the afternoon of March
1994, with your father, what happened if any?
A: He pulled me, sir.
Q: Where did he bring you?
A: At the place where we were weeding grasses, sir.
Q: What happened next after you[r] father brought you near the place where you
were weeding grasses?
A: He made me lie down, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father made you lie down?
A: He lift[ed] my skirt and took up my panty, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father pulled you[r] panty?
A: I pushed aside his hands, sir.
Q: What did your father do next?
A: He made me lie down, sir.
Q: Afterward[s], what happened next?
A: He also took [off] his brief and his pant[s], sir.
Q: You want to tell this Honorable Court that you were already [lying] down when
your father removed his brief and his pant[s]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In relation to you[,] where was your father situated when he removed his brief and
pant[s]?
Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H since the age of the victim was not specifically alleged in
the information.32
Our disquisition in People v. Tagud, Sr.33 succinctly explains the matter. There, we said:
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the single special qualifying
circumstance of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must be
specifically alleged in the Information and proven during the trial. x x x
xxxx
Even under the old Rules of Criminal Procedure, jurisprudence already required that
qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information to be appreciated as
such.
xxxx
Notably, the amended Information merely stated that appellant had carnal knowledge of his
minor daughter without stating Arwins actual age. In a rape case where the very life of the
accused is at stake, such an inexact allegation of the age of the victim is insufficient to
qualify the rape and raise the penalty to death. The sufficiency of the Information is held to a
higher standard when the only imposable penalty is death. The constitutional right of the
accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
assumes the greatest importance when the only imposable penalty in case of conviction is
death.34
Similar to Tagud, the qualifying circumstance of relationship of BBB to appellant was
specifically alleged and proven during the trial. Notably absent in the information, however,
is a specific averment of the victims age at the time the offense against her was committed.
Such an omission committed by the prosecutor is fatal in the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death against the offender. It must be borne in mind that the requirement for
complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the
accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may
adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to the constitutional requirement on due
process,35 specially so if the case involves the imposition of the death penalty in case the
accused is convicted. Thus, even if the victim is below eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is her parent, but these facts are not alleged in the information, or if only one (1) is
so alleged such as what happened in the instant case, their proof as such by evidence
offered during trial cannot sanction the imposition of the death penalty.36
Appellant also argues that both the trial court and the CA committed reversible errors when
he was found guilty for the three (3) counts of rape even if his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In particular, appellant attacks AAAs credibility by arguing that it would
have been physically impossible for him to rape said victim on top of a log as claimed by
AAA in her testimony. Appellant also questions the motive of both victims saying that it is
unnatural for both to report the abuses made on them only after the lapse of several years.
requirements imposed by Sections 841 and 942 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the requirements should affect only the criminal liability of the
accused, which is the States concern, and should not affect the civil liability of the accused,
which is for the benefit of the injured party. Where the special qualifying circumstances of
age and relationship, although not alleged in the information, are nonetheless established
during the trial, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in a conviction for simple
rape should equal the award of civil indemnity and moral damages in convictions for
qualified rape. Truly, BBBs moral suffering is just as great as when her father who raped
her is convicted for qualified rape as when he is convicted only for simple rape due to a
technicality.
1avvphi1
REGALADO, J.:
This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the judgment' 1 of the former Intermediate Appellate
Court promulgated on November 6, 1985 in AC-G.R. No. SP-03640, 2 which found the petition
for certiorari therein meritorious, thus:
Firstly, there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or
may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total
amount of damages given by the respondent Judge. Hence the award of
damages confirmed in the two assailed Orders may be premature. Secondly,
assuming that the grant of damages to the family is eventually ratified, the
alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and should not adversely affect
the non-signatories thereto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the grave abuse of discretion (amounting to lack of
jurisdiction) committed by the respondent Judge, We hereby SET ASIDE his
questioned orders of March 20, 1984 and May 25, 1984. The restraining order
previously issued is made permanent. 3
The challenged decision of respondent court succinctly sets out the factual origin of this
case as follows:
... Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a
building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine American
General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for
GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the
contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru his counsel,
Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN before the
Court of first Instance of Manila, now the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO for
indemnification. The RTC rendered a decision dated October 16, 1981. ... 4
In said decision, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract;
ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount
of P129,430.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P40,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00; ordering Guerrero
alone to pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December 15, 1978 to July 16,
1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond
equivalent to P120,000.00. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by PHILAMGEN was denied by the
trial court on November 4, 1982. 6
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the
same was not given due course because it was allegedly filed out of time. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ of execution. 7
A petition was filed in AC-G.R. No. 00202 with the Intermediate Appellate Court for the
quashal of the writ of execution and to compel the trial court to give due course to the
appeal. The petition was dismissed on May 4, 1983 8 so the case was elevated to this Court in
G.R. No. 64334. 9 In the meantime, on November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and
several children as survivors. 10
On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement between
him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was
allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two
daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner
avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as follows:
A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the
undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall
be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante
Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation in an order dated March 20, 1984,
despite an opposition thereto. It also denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of
confirmation in its second order dated May 25, 1984. 11
These are the two orders which are assailed in this case.
Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the
very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If
the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were
less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory
that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of
counsel have been rendered ." 12 It also rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a
certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule against
multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved. 13
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from
attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his
counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution. 14 Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services,
with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims
in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we
agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. As it
correctly pointed out, the petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court
(G.R. No. 64834) "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family
of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. This especially true in the light of
subsequent developments in G.R. No. 64334. In a decision promulgated on May 21, 1987,
the Court rendered judgment setting aside the decision of May 4, 1983 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 00202 and ordering the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila to certify the appeal of PHILAMGEN from said trial court's decision in Civil Case No.
122920 to the Court of Appeal. Said decision of the Court became final and executory on
June 25, 1987.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet
become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should
be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the
remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of
only when something is due to the client. Thus, it was ruled that:
... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has
been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court.
The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been
recovered from which the fee is to be paid. 15
It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their
fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. It
is subject to the condition that the fee shall be P30,000.00 in case of recovery of the
P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case the award is in excess of said
P120,000.00 bond, on the sharing basis hereinbefore stated.
With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the
heirs of the deceased. We are of the considered view that the orderly administration of
justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it
also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and
assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The court
below will be in a better position, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated, inclusive
of any liability of PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs of Dr. Casasola
in the award, to determine with evidentiary support such matters like the basis for the
entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz and as to whether the agreement allegedly
entered into with the late Dr. Casasola would be binding on all his heirs, as contended by
petitioner Quirante.
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent
court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect
the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to
the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding
may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for
consideration by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject
of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
August 3, 2010
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses and found that petitioners house was
undoubtedly built on Lot No. 2-R. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads
as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, let judgment be rendered declaring, to wit:
1. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2-R of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-147392
at Vergonville Subdivision, No. 10, Las Pias, Metro Manila covered by TCT No.
62181 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City on which defendants have constructed
their house;
2. Defendants, jointly and severally, are ordered to demolish their house and vacate
the premises and return the possession of the portion of Lot No. 2-R as abovedescribed to plaintiffs within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, or in the
alternative, plaintiffs should be compensated by defendants, jointly and severally, by
the payment of the prevailing price of the lot involved as Lot No. 2-R with an area of
325 square meters which should not be less than P1,500.00 per square meter, in
consideration of the fact that prices of real estate properties in the area concerned
have increased rapidly;
3. Defendants, jointly and severally, pay to plaintiffs for moral damages with plaintiffs
plans and dreams of building their own house on their own lot being severely
shattered and frustrated due to defendants incursion as interlopers of Lot No. 2-R in
the sum of P50,000.00;
4. Defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs in the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and,
5. to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Defendants counterclaim against plaintiffs is dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause
of action.
Defendants third-party complaint against third-party defendant Vergonville Realty and
Investments Corporation is likewise ordered dismissed for lack of cause of action and
evidently without merit.
On the other hand, defendants, jointly and severally, are liable for the litigation expenses
incurred by Vergonville Realty by way of counterclaim, which is also proven by the latter
with a mere preponderance of evidence, and are hereby ordered to pay the sum
of P20,000.00 as compensatory damage; and attorneys fees in the sum ofP10,000.00
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs finding that the lot upon which petitioners built their
house was not the one (1) which Vergon sold to them. Based on the documentary evidence,
such as the titles of the two (2) lots, the contracts to sell, and the survey report made by the
geodetic engineer, petitioners house was built on the lot of the respondent-spouses. 6 There
was no basis to presume that the error was Vergons fault. Also the warranty against
eviction under Article 1548 of the Civil Code was not applicable as there was no deprivation
of property: the lot on which petitioners built their house was not the lot sold to them by
Vergon, which remained vacant and ready for occupation. 7 The CA further ruled that
petitioners cannot use the defense of allegedly being a purchaser in good faith for wrongful
occupation of land.8
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate
court.9 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING PETITIONERS TO DEMOLISH THEIR
ONLY HOUSE AND VACATE THE LOT AND TO PAY MORAL AND COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEYS FEE IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF PS[P] 110,000;
AND
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF THE LOWER COURT
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO
CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.10
In the main, it is petitioners position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners
insist that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergons agents when
they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon, Felix Gonzales,
consented to the construction of the house when he signed the building permit. 11 Also,
petitioners are builders in good faith.12
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, we note that petitioners raise factual issues, which are beyond the scope of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. Well settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to the review of errors of law. The Court is not bound to
weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the parties, particularly where the findings of
both the trial court and the appellate court coincide. The resolution of factual issues is a
function of the trial court whose findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on
this Court, more so where these have been affirmed by the CA. 13 We note that the CA and
RTC did not overlook or fail to appreciate any material circumstance which, when properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case. Indeed, it is beyond cavil that
petitioners mistakenly constructed their house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot
No. 2-S.
However, the conclusiveness of the factual findings notwithstanding, we find that the trial
court nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to
pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527 14 of
the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was
done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in
good faith.
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil
Code governs. Said article provides,
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. 15 The builder
in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building
to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value
is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the
improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. 17
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful
expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished
the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does
not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the
subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners
to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the
structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,18 this case must be remanded to the RTC which shall
conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement
and of the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of
the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.
As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show
negligence on Vergons part. Petitioners claim is obviously one (1) for tort, governed by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis ours.)
Under this provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1)
the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. 19 This the petitioners failed to
do. The President of Vergon signed the building permit as a precondition for its approval by
the local government, but it did not guarantee that petitioners were constructing the
structure within the metes and bounds of petitioners lot. The signature of the President of
Vergon on the building permit merely proved that petitioners were authorized to make
constructions within the subdivision project of Vergon. And while petitioners acted in good
faith in building their house on Lot No. 2-R, petitioners did not show by what authority the
agents or employees of Vergon were acting when they pointed to the lot where the
construction was made nor was petitioners claim on this matter corroborated by sufficient
evidence.
One (1) last note on the award of damages. Considering that petitioners acted in good faith
in building their house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis
for the award of moral damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the
award to Vergon of compensatory damages and attorneys fees for the litigation expenses
Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its Answer to
petitioners third-party complaint. Under Article 2208 20 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral
damages nor judicial costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed foras was not done
in this caseand may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for "such other
relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable." 21 It must also be noted that
aside from the following, the body of the trial courts decision was devoid of any statement
regarding attorneys fees. In Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,22 we reiterated that attorneys fees are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the
decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorneys fees.
1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 48109 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages in favor
of respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal and the award of compensatory damages
and attorneys fees to respondent Vergon Realty Investments Corporation
are DELETED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
135, for further proceedings consistent with the proper application of Articles 448, 546 and
548 of the Civil Code, as follows:
1. The trial court shall determine:
a. the present fair price of the respondent-spouses lot;
b. the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of their
house;
c. the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by
reason thereof; and
d. whether the value of said land is considerably more than that of the house
built thereon.
2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the
Regional Trial Court shall render judgment, as follows:
a. The trial court shall grant the respondent-spouses a period of fifteen (15)
days within which to exercise their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code,
whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying to petitioners either
the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of the house,
or the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired
by reason thereof, or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of said land. The
amounts to be respectively paid by the respondent-spouses and petitioners,
in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other
party and to the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days
from such notice of the option by tendering the amount to the Court in favor of
the party entitled to receive it;
b. The trial court shall further order that if the respondent-spouses exercises
the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land but the latter
rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial court, the value of the
land is considerably more than that of the house, petitioners shall give written
notice of such rejection to the respondent-spouses and to the Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the respondent-spouses option to sell the
land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of fifteen (15) days from
such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease,
and give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If
no agreement is reached by the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days
from and after the termination of the said period fixed for negotiation, shall
then fix the terms of the lease, payable within the first five (5) days of each
calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two
(2) years, counted from the finality of the judgment, considering the long
period of time since petitioners have occupied the subject area. The rental
thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the
forced lease. Petitioners shall not make any further constructions or
improvements on the house. Upon expiration of the two (2)-year period, or
upon default by petitioners in the payment of rentals for two (2) consecutive
months, the respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced
lease, to recover their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or
at the latters expense. The rentals herein provided shall be tendered by
petitioners to the Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such
tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made
within the period fixed by the Court.
c. In any event, petitioners shall pay the respondent-spouses reasonable
compensation for the occupancy of the respondent-spouses land for the
period counted from the year petitioners occupied the subject area, up to the
commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding
paragraph;
d. The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its Decision shall be
inextendible, and upon failure of the party obliged to tender to the trial court
the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such payment shall be
entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the
amount due and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by
the prestation due the obligee.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
April 4, 2007
same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00 given to the FIRST PARTY BY
THE SECOND PARTY shall be paid to the latter including interest based on
prevailing compounded bank interest plus the amount of the sale in excess
of P7,000,000.00 should the property be sold at a price more than P7 million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first six months from
the execution of this contract, no interest shall be charged by the SECOND PARTY
on the P3 million however, in the event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY
would decide not to purchase the aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a
period of another six months within which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos
provided that the said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for the last six
months only. Under this circumstance, the amount of P3 million given by the
SECOND PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the property shall be considered as
the security for the mortgage which can be enforced in accordance with law.
x x x x.6
Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos in cash and one million pesos in a
post-dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered said check
stale.7 Petitioner then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of IMRDC and the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified petitioner through a
letter8 dated March 20, 1991, which petitioner received only on June 11, 1991, 9 reminding
petitioner of their agreement that the amount of two million pesos which petitioner received
from respondent should be considered as a loan payable within six months. Petitioner
subsequently failed to pay respondent the amount of two million pesos.
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a
complaint10 for sum of money with preliminary attachment against petitioner. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30. Respondent alleged the
foregoing facts and in addition thereto averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the
security for the loan by making a false report 11 of the loss of her owners copy of TCT No.
168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3, 1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by
filing a petition12 for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of said title with the RTC
of Makati, Branch 142; that the petition was granted in an Order 13 dated August 31, 1991;
that said Order was subsequently set aside in an Order dated April 10, 1992 14 where the
RTC Makati granted respondents petition for relief from judgment due to the fact that
respondent is in possession of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered
the provincial public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of petitioner for perjury and false
testimony. Respondent prayed for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
and payment of two million pesos with interest at 36% per annum from December 7,
1991, P100,000.00 moral, corrective and exemplary damages and P200,000.00 for
attorneys fees.
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a writ of
preliminary attachment upon the filing of a bond in the amount of two million pesos. 15
Petitioner filed an Amended Answer16 alleging that the Memorandum of Agreement was
conceived and arranged by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada, who is also respondents
lawyer; that she was asked to sign the agreement without being given the chance to read
the same; that the title to the property and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC
were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for safekeeping and were never turned over to respondent
as there was no consummated sale yet; that out of the two million pesos cash paid, Atty.
Lozada took the one million pesos which has not been returned, thus petitioner had filed a
civil case against her; that she was never informed of respondents decision not to purchase
the property within the six month period fixed in the agreement; that when she demanded
the return of TCT No. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC from Atty.
Lozada, the latter gave her these documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991 which
her secretary placed in her attache case; that the envelope together with her other personal
things were lost when her car was forcibly opened the following day; that she sought the
help of Atty. Lozada who advised her to secure a police report, to execute an affidavit of loss
and to get the services of another lawyer to file a petition for the issuance of an owners
duplicate copy; that the petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy was filed
on her behalf without her knowledge and neither did she sign the petition nor testify in court
as falsely claimed for she was abroad; that she was a victim of the manipulations of Atty.
Lozada and respondent as shown by the filing of criminal charges for perjury and false
testimony against her; that no interest could be due as there was no valid mortgage over
the property as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud and deception. She prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint, counter-claim for damages and attorneys fees.
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996, the RTC issued a decision, 17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2 Million plus interest thereon at
the rate of thirty two (32%) per cent per annum beginning December 7, 1991 until
fully paid.
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00 representing premiums
paid by plaintiff on the attachment bond with legal interest thereon counted from the
date of this decision until fully paid.
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral,
corrective and exemplary damages.
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees of P100,000.00 plus cost of
litigation.18
The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation to pay respondent the amount of two
million pesos with compounded interest pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement; that
the fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to
her loaned money when petitioner executed an affidavit of loss and instituted a petition for
the issuance of an owners duplicate title knowing the same was in respondents
possession, entitled respondent to moral damages; and that petitioners bare denial cannot
be accorded credence because her testimony and that of her witness did not appear to be
credible.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that she received from respondent the two
million pesos in cash but the fact that petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada
was without respondents knowledge thus it is not binding on respondent; that respondent
had also proven that in 1993, she initially paid the sum ofP30,000.00 as premium for the
issuance of the attachment bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, andP20,000.00 for the
renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff should be reimbursed considering that she was compelled to
go to court and ask for a writ of preliminary attachment to protect her rights under the
agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a Decision dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision with modification, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense
that the rate of interest is reduced from 32% to 25% per annum, effective June 7, 1991 until
fully paid.19
The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as her
commission and partly as a loan; respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated check of
one million pesos because she had decided not to buy the property and petitioner knew of
her decision as early as April 1991; the award of moral damages was warranted since even
granting petitioner had no hand in the filing of the petition for the issuance of an owners
copy, she executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No. 168173 when she knew all along that
said title was in respondents possession; petitioners claim that she thought the title was
lost when the brown envelope given to her by Atty. Lozada was stolen from her car was
hollow; that such deceitful conduct caused respondent serious anxiety and emotional
distress.
The CA concluded that there was no basis for petitioner to say that the interest should be
charged for six months only and no more; that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is
not a loan; that interest should commence on June 7, 1991 20 with compounded bank interest
prevailing at the time the two million was considered as a loan which was in June 1991; that
the bank interest rate for loans secured by a real estate mortgage in 1991 ranged from 25%
to 32% per annum as certified to by Prudential Bank, 21 that in fairness to petitioner, the rate
to be charged should be 25% only.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
September 11, 2002.
Hence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner raising the following
issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED BANK INTEREST SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO SIX (6) MONTHS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL
DAMAGES.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER EVEN IF NOT MENTIONED IN
THE TEXT OF THE DECISION.22
Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at 32% per annum awarded by the trial court
or at 25% per annum as modified by the CA which should run from June 7, 1991 until fully
paid, is contrary to the parties Memorandum of Agreement; that the agreement provides
that if respondent would decide not to purchase the property, petitioner has the period of
another six months to pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the last six months
only; that the CAs ruling that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan is
contrary to Art. 1956 of the New Civil Code which provides that no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
We are not persuaded.
While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan, is
flawed since a simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest, 23 we find
no error committed by the CA in awarding a 25% interest per annum on the two-million peso
loan even beyond the second six months stipulated period.
The Memorandum of Agreement executed between the petitioner and respondent on
December 7, 1990 is the law between the parties. In resolving an issue based upon a
contract, we must first examine the contract itself, especially the provisions thereof which
are relevant to the controversy.24 The general rule is that if the terms of an agreement are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulations shall prevail.25 It is further required that the various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly.26
In this case, the phrase "for the last six months only" should be taken in the context of the
entire agreement. We agree with and adopt the CAs interpretation of the phrase in this
wise:
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six months each. The first six-month period
was given to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase
defendant-appellants (petitioner's) property. The second six-month period was given to
defendant-appellant to pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not
to buy the subject property in which case interest will be charged "for the last six months
only", referring to the second six-month period. This means that no interest will be charged
for the first six-month period while appellee was making up her mind whether to buy the
property, but only for the second period of six months after appellee had decided not to buy
the property. This is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six months only". Certainly, there
is nothing in their agreement that suggests that interest will be charged for six months only
even if it takes defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan. 27
The agreement that the amount given shall bear compounded bank interest for the last six
months only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period, does not mean that interest will
no longer be charged after the second six-month period since such stipulation was made on
the logical and reasonable expectation that such amount would be paid within the date
stipulated. Considering that petitioner failed to pay the amount given which under the
Memorandum of Agreement shall be considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the last
six months continued to accrue until actual payment of the loaned amount.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus,
until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue
since the debtor continues to use such principal amount. 28 It has been held that for a debtor
to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after
maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust
enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.29
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned amount shall earn compounded bank
interests, and per the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans in
1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum. The CA reduced the interest rate to 25% instead
of the 32% awarded by the trial court which petitioner no longer assailed.
1awphi1.nt
In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,30 we upheld the validity of a 21% per annum interest
on a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,31 we sustained the agreement of the
parties to a 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the interest rate of
25% per annum awarded by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and reasonable.
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that she
used a fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such
finding is baseless since petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony
filed by respondent against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. 32
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent
against her, those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with
damages filed by respondent against petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioners act of trying to
deprive respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title
and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded
in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the
nature of fraud.33
1a\^/phi1.net
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the event that respondent opts not to buy
the property, the money given by respondent to petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the
property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage. It was testified to by
respondent that after they executed the agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner gave
her the owners copy of the title to the property, the Deed of Sale between petitioner and
IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy, and the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who
signed the Deed of Sale.34 However, notwithstanding that all those documents were in
respondents possession, petitioner executed an affidavit of loss that the owners copy of
the title and the Deed of Sale were lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that
she was of the belief that since she had demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of the title,
she thought that the brown envelope with markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5,
1991 already contained the title and the Deed of Sale as those documents were in the same
brown envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with
respondent.35 Such statement remained a bare statement. It was not proven at all since Atty.
Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners own
witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to establish petitioner's claim that the title
was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's testimony that after the brown envelope
was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she placed it in petitioners attach
case36 and did not bother to look at the envelope.37
It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of the affidavit of loss became the basis of
the filing of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of new owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. 168173. Petitioners actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her
loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set
aside its previous order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral
damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary
damages is proper.38Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of
example or correction for the public good. 39 The RTC awarded the amount of P100,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages. While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an
aggregate amount may not be the usual way of awarding said damages, 40 no error has been
committed by CA. There is no question that respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding attorneys fees because the trial courts
decision did not explain the findings of facts and law to justify the award of attorneys fees
as the same was mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision.
We agree.
Article 220841 of the New Civil Code enumerates the instances where such may be awarded
and, in all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be
granted.42 Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at
the expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 43 The award
of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for
the trial court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the
exception and justify the grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees cannot be
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. 44 They must be clearly explained
and justified by the trial court in the body of its decision. On appeal, the CA is precluded
from supplementing the bases for awarding attorneys fees when the trial court failed to
discuss in its Decision the reasons for awarding the same. Consequently, the award of
attorney's fees should be deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the
Resolution dated September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated September 23, 2008
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98591, and the Resolution 2 dated October
9, 2009 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Petitioner Dario Nacar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against respondents Gallery
Frames (GF) and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 01-00519-97.
On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 3 in favor of petitioner and found
that he was dismissed from employment without a valid or just cause. Thus, petitioner was
awarded backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount
of P158,919.92. The dispositive portion of the decision, reads:
With the foregoing, we find and so rule that respondents failed to discharge the burden of
showing that complainant was dismissed from employment for a just or valid cause. All the
more, it is clear from the records that complainant was never afforded due process before
he was terminated. As such, we are perforce constrained to grant complainants prayer for
the payments of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement to his former position, considering
the strained relationship between the parties, and his apparent reluctance to be reinstated,
computed only up to promulgation of this decision as follows:
SEPARATION PAY
Date Hired
August 1990
Rate
P198/day
Date of Decision
Length of Service
P196.00
Date of Decisions
= P62,986.56
= P62,986.00
= P32,947.20
T O TAL
= P95.933.76
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents
guilty of constructive dismissal and are therefore, ordered:
To pay jointly and severally the complainant the amount of sixty-two thousand nine hundred
eighty-six pesos and 56/100 (P62,986.56) Pesos representing his separation pay;
To pay jointly and severally the complainant the amount of nine (sic) five thousand nine
hundred thirty-three and 36/100 (P95,933.36) representing his backwages; and
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondents appealed to the NLRC, but it was dismissed for lack of merit in the
Resolution5 dated February 29, 2000. Accordingly, the NLRC sustained the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. 6
Dissatisfied, respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the CA. On August
24, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied in a Resolution dated May 8, 2001. 7
Respondents then sought relief before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 151332.
Finding no reversible error on the part of the CA, this Court denied the petition in the
Resolution dated April 17, 2002.8
An Entry of Judgment was later issued certifying that the resolution became final and
executory on May 27, 2002.9 The case was, thereafter, referred back to the Labor Arbiter. A
pre-execution conference was consequently scheduled, but respondents failed to appear.10
On November 5, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Correct Computation, praying that his
backwages be computed from the date of his dismissal on January 24, 1997 up to the
finality of the Resolution of the Supreme Court on May 27, 2002. 11 Upon recomputation, the
Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC arrived at an updated amount in the sum
of P471,320.31.12
On December 2, 2002, a Writ of Execution13 was issued by the Labor Arbiter ordering the
Sheriff to collect from respondents the total amount of P471,320.31. Respondents filed a
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, arguing, among other things, that since the Labor Arbiter
awarded separation pay of P62,986.56 and limited backwages ofP95,933.36, no more
recomputation is required to be made of the said awards. They claimed that after the
decision becomes final and executory, the same cannot be altered or amended
anymore.14 On January 13, 2003, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order15 denying the motion.
Thus, an Alias Writ of Execution16 was issued on January 14, 2003.
Respondents again appealed before the NLRC, which on June 30, 2003 issued a
Resolution17 granting the appeal in favor of the respondents and ordered the recomputation
of the judgment award.
On August 20, 2003, an Entry of Judgment was issued declaring the Resolution of the
NLRC to be final and executory. Consequently, another pre-execution conference was held,
but respondents failed to appear on time. Meanwhile, petitioner moved that an Alias Writ of
Execution be issued to enforce the earlier recomputed judgment award in the sum
of P471,320.31.18
The records of the case were again forwarded to the Computation and Examination Unit for
recomputation, where the judgment award of petitioner was reassessed to be in the total
amount of only P147,560.19.
Petitioner then moved that a writ of execution be issued ordering respondents to pay him
the original amount as determined by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision dated October 15,
1998, pending the final computation of his backwages and separation pay.
On January 14, 2003, the Labor Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution to satisfy the
judgment award that was due to petitioner in the amount of P147,560.19, which petitioner
eventually received.
Petitioner then filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the re-computation of the
monetary award to include the appropriate interests. 19
On May 10, 2005, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order 20 granting the motion, but only up to the
amount ofP11,459.73. The Labor Arbiter reasoned that it is the October 15, 1998 Decision
that should be enforced considering that it was the one that became final and executory.
However, the Labor Arbiter reasoned that since the decision states that the separation pay
and backwages are computed only up to the promulgation of the said decision, it is the
amount of P158,919.92 that should be executed. Thus, since petitioner already
receivedP147,560.19, he is only entitled to the balance of P11,459.73.
Petitioner then appealed before the NLRC,21 which appeal was denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution22 dated September 27, 2006. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was likewise denied in the Resolution23dated January 31, 2007.
Aggrieved, petitioner then sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
98591.
On September 23, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision 24 denying the petition. The CA opined
that since petitioner no longer appealed the October 15, 1998 Decision of the Labor Arbiter,
which already became final and executory, a belated correction thereof is no longer allowed.
The CA stated that there is nothing left to be done except to enforce the said judgment.
Consequently, it can no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors
or mistakes.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution 25 dated
October 9, 2009.
Hence, the petition assigning the lone error:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DECIDED CONTRARY TO LAW IN
UPHOLDING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE NLRC WHICH, IN TURN,
SUSTAINED THE MAY 10, 2005 ORDER OF LABOR ARBITER MAGAT MAKING THE
DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE OCTOBER 15, 1998 DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER
LUSTRIA SUBSERVIENT TO AN OPINION EXPRESSED IN THE BODY OF THE SAME
DECISION.26
Petitioner argues that notwithstanding the fact that there was a computation of backwages
in the Labor Arbiters decision, the same is not final until reinstatement is made or until
finality of the decision, in case of an award of separation pay. Petitioner maintains that
considering that the October 15, 1998 decision of the Labor Arbiter did not become final and
executory until the April 17, 2002 Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 151332 was
entered in the Book of Entries on May 27, 2002, the reckoning point for the computation of
the backwages and separation pay should be on May 27, 2002 and not when the decision
of the Labor Arbiter was rendered on October 15, 1998. Further, petitioner posits that he is
also entitled to the payment of interest from the finality of the decision until full payment by
the respondents.
On their part, respondents assert that since only separation pay and limited backwages
were awarded to petitioner by the October 15, 1998 decision of the Labor Arbiter, no more
recomputation is required to be made of said awards. Respondents insist that since the
decision clearly stated that the separation pay and backwages are "computed only up to
[the] promulgation of this decision," and considering that petitioner no longer appealed the
decision, petitioner is only entitled to the award as computed by the Labor Arbiter in the total
amount ofP158,919.92. Respondents added that it was only during the execution
proceedings that the petitioner questioned the award, long after the decision had become
final and executory. Respondents contend that to allow the further recomputation of the
backwages to be awarded to petitioner at this point of the proceedings would substantially
vary the decision of the Labor Arbiter as it violates the rule on immutability of judgments.
The petition is meritorious.
The instant case is similar to the case of Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v.
Court of Appeals (Sixth Division),27 wherein the issue submitted to the Court for resolution
was the propriety of the computation of the awards made, and whether this violated the
principle of immutability of judgment. Like in the present case, it was a distinct feature of the
judgment of the Labor Arbiter in the above-cited case that the decision already provided for
the computation of the payable separation pay and backwages due and did not further order
the computation of the monetary awards up to the time of the finality of the judgment. Also
in Session Delights, the dismissed employee failed to appeal the decision of the labor
arbiter. The Court clarified, thus:
In concrete terms, the question is whether a re-computation in the course of execution of
the labor arbiter's original computation of the awards made, pegged as of the time the
decision was rendered and confirmed with modification by a final CA decision, is legally
proper. The question is posed, given that the petitioner did not immediately pay the awards
stated in the original labor arbiter's decision; it delayed payment because it continued with
the litigation until final judgment at the CA level.
A source of misunderstanding in implementing the final decision in this case proceeds from
the way the original labor arbiter framed his decision. The decision consists essentially of
two parts.
The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be disputed because it has been
confirmed with finality. This is the finding of the illegality of the dismissal and the awards of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, attorney's fees, and legal interests.
The second part is the computation of the awards made. On its face, the computation the
labor arbiter made shows that it was time-bound as can be seen from the figures used in
the computation. This part, being merely a computation of what the first part of the decision
established and declared, can, by its nature, be re-computed. This is the part, too, that the
petitioner now posits should no longer be re-computed because the computation is already
in the labor arbiter's decision that the CA had affirmed. The public and private respondents,
on the other hand, posit that a re-computation is necessary because the relief in an illegal
dismissal decision goes all the way up to reinstatement if reinstatement is to be made, or up
to the finality of the decision, if separation pay is to be given in lieu reinstatement.
That the labor arbiter's decision, at the same time that it found that an illegal dismissal had
taken place, also made a computation of the award, is understandable in light of Section 3,
Rule VIII of the then NLRC Rules of Procedure which requires that a computation be made.
This Section in part states:
[T]he Labor Arbiter of origin, in cases involving monetary awards and at all events, as far as
practicable, shall embody in any such decision or order the detailed and full amount
awarded.
Clearly implied from this original computation is its currency up to the finality of the labor
arbiter's decision. As we noted above, this implication is apparent from the terms of the
computation itself, and no question would have arisen had the parties terminated the case
and implemented the decision at that point.
However, the petitioner disagreed with the labor arbiter's findings on all counts - i.e., on the
finding of illegality as well as on all the consequent awards made. Hence, the petitioner
appealed the case to the NLRC which, in turn, affirmed the labor arbiter's decision. By law,
the NLRC decision is final, reviewable only by the CA on jurisdictional grounds.
The petitioner appropriately sought to nullify the NLRC decision on jurisdictional grounds
through a timely filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari. The CA decision, finding that NLRC
exceeded its authority in affirming the payment of 13th month pay and indemnity, lapsed to
finality and was subsequently returned to the labor arbiter of origin for execution.
It was at this point that the present case arose. Focusing on the core illegal dismissal
portion of the original labor arbiter's decision, the implementing labor arbiter ordered the
award re-computed; he apparently read the figures originally ordered to be paid to be the
computation due had the case been terminated and implemented at the labor arbiter's level.
Thus, the labor arbiter re-computed the award to include the separation pay and the
backwages due up to the finality of the CA decision that fully terminated the case on the
merits. Unfortunately, the labor arbiter's approved computation went beyond the finality of
the CA decision (July 29, 2003) and included as well the payment for awards the final CA
decision had deleted - specifically, the proportionate 13th month pay and the indemnity
awards. Hence, the CA issued the decision now questioned in the present petition.
We see no error in the CA decision confirming that a re-computation is necessary as it
essentially considered the labor arbiter's original decision in accordance with its basic
component parts as we discussed above. To reiterate, the first part contains the finding of
illegality and its monetary consequences; the second part is the computation of the awards
or monetary consequences of the illegal dismissal, computed as of the time of the labor
arbiter's original decision.28
Consequently, from the above disquisitions, under the terms of the decision which is sought
to be executed by the petitioner, no essential change is made by a recomputation as this
step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal
declared by the Labor Arbiter in that decision.29 A recomputation (or an original computation,
if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law specifically, Article 279 of
the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the
decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full
satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The recomputation of the
consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an
alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling
stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and
this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. 30
That the amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased is a consequence that it
cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against the
Labor Arbiter's decision. Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal in no
uncertain terms, qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation of when separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement is allowed. When that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal
decision becomes the reckoning point instead of the reinstatement that the law decrees. In
allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment
relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that
point.31
Finally, anent the payment of legal interest. In the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court laid down the guidelines regarding the manner of
computing legal interest, to wit:
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.33
Recently, however, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), in its
Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, approved the amendment of Section 2 34 of Circular
No. 905, Series of 1982 and, accordingly, issued Circular No. 799, 35 Series of 2013,
effective July 1, 2013, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts,
thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits
and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of
interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 36 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks
and Sections 4305Q.1,37 4305S.338 and 4303P.139 of the Manual of Regulations for NonBank Financial Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest
that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve
percent (12%) per annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines 40 and
Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3
and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its
amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - but will now be six percent (6%) per annum
effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be
applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per
annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of
six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when applicable.
Corollarily, in the recent case of Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and Eduardo B.
Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board,41 this Court affirmed the authority of the BSPMB to set interest rates and to issue and enforce Circulars when it ruled that "the BSP-MB
may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such as
consumer loans, as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar
credit institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum rate or
rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans
of financial intermediaries."
Nonetheless, with regard to those judgments that have become final and executory prior to
July 1, 2013, said judgments shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented
applying the rate of interest fixed therein.
1awp++i1
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern
Shipping Lines42 are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.
1wphi1
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court
is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall
be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July
1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of
interest fixed therein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 23, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98591, and the Resolution dated October 9, 2009 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are Ordered to Pay petitioner:
(1) backwages computed from the time petitioner was illegally dismissed on January
24, 1997 up to May 27, 2002, when the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 151332
became final and executory;
(2) separation pay computed from August 1990 up to May 27, 2002 at the rate of one
month pay per year of service; and
(3) interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards,
computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from
July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
The Labor Arbiter is hereby ORDERED to make another recomputation of the total
monetary benefits awarded and due to petitioner in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.