Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40527 June 30, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HERMOGENES MARIANO and HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael P. Pano, Jr.,
Solicitor Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Provincial P.C. Kliachko and Assistant Provincial Fiscal C. G.
Perfecto for petitioner.
Eustaquio Evangelista for respondent Hermogenes Mariano.

MUOZ PALMA, J:
This petition for certiorari postulates a ruling on the question of whether or not civil courts
and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods
valued at not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a civilian. 1
On December 18, 1974, the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information
(Criminal Case No. SM-649) accusing private respondent herein Hermogenes Mariano
of estafa alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8, 1971, in the municipality of
San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being then appointed as Liaison
Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf
of the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and authorized to receive and be
receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said municipality,
received from the said USAID/NEC the following items, to wit:
150 ft. electric cable valued
at $15 or P100.50
525 ft. cable power valued at
$577-50 or P3,859.35
250 ft. electric cable at
$125.00 or P837.50
with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of making delivery of said
items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in
possession of the said items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and in
spite of repeated demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
grave abuse of confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to the
said USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said sum of $717,50
or P4,797.35. (pp. rollo).
On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel Filed a motion to quash the
Information on the following grounds:

1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the person
of the defendant;
2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification.
(p. 19, rollo)
In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the
Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco of San
Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, was indicted before a Military Commission under a
charge of malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had been found
guilty and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for ten (10) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months with perpetual disqualification plus a fine of
P19,646.15 (see pp. 23-24, rollo), and that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had
already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had lost
jurisdiction over the case against him. (pp. 19-20, Ibid)
On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to quash on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows:
Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation
case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction
with this Court, the case involving the subject properties had already been heard and
decided by a competent tribunal, the Military Commission, and as such this Court is without
jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Judge did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion to quash.
The people now seeks a review of the aforesaid Order and presents the sole issue of
jurisdiction of respondent Court over the estafa case filed against respondent Mariano.
"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. 2 The word "jurisdiction" is
derived from two Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak by the law" which means
fundamentally the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain,
hear, and determine certain controversies. 3 Bouvier's own definition of the term
"jurisdiction" has found judicial acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to
pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him, acquired through due process
of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases." 4
In Herrera vs. Barretto, September 10, 1913, 25 Phil. 245, 251, this Court, in the words of
Justice Moreland, invoking American jurisprudence, defined "jurisdiction" simply as the
authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. "Jurisdiction" has also
been aptly described as the right to put the wheels of justice in notionand to proceed to the
final determination of a cause upon the pleadings and evidence. 5
"Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and
impose the punishment for it. 6
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from
the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent
Court of First Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of the law or
statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948
where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided:
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos, (emphasis supplied)

The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four
(4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 7 By reason of the penalty
imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been
committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of
courts of first instance.
The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims in his Order is that
his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military commission and because the
latter tribunal was the first to take cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court lost
jurisdiction over it .That statement of respondent court is incorrect.
In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, categorically reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 8 In the case at bar,
it is rightly contended by the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM649 was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that was December 18, 1974, the
law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular
provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any Presidential issuances
under Martial Law. General Order No. 49 dated October 4, 1974, which repeals General
Order No. 12 and the latter's amendments and related General Orders inconsistent with the
former, redefines the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain offense, and estafa and
malversation are not among those enumerated therein. 9 In other words the Military
Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. 9*
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over
the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge
against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two
separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one is different
from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that We do not have here a
situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime
so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case
acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other. 10 The Military Commission as stated
earlier is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular offense charged
against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent jurisdiction between it and
respondent court to speak of. Estafa as described in the Information filed in Criminal Case
No. SM-649 falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14, 1975, is set aside and
respondent Judge is directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. SM- 649 without
further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.
[G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999]
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E.
MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRASSULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C.
MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486
created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,[1] the most recent of which were effected
through Republic Act Nos. 7975[2] and 8249.[3] Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these
laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors
accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019[4] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code[5] is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001,
21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay
down in the Binay cases.
The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three
separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code,[6] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.[7] The
informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that
the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioners incumbency as
Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year
delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988
to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994
constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in
abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to
quash. Petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the
prosecutions opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion
and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The
court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was
charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 [8] and the informations
containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the
motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,[9] to set aside the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the
Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the
prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the
motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan
to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued
a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating
the order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on
May 16, 1995.[10]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to
the proper court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated
June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the
subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioners
motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade 27 under the
compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of
the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under
Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation
that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade 27,
because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which
merits a grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses
were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was
not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the Act
was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer,
whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his
classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the
accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the
offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal
Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay
had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28 under
the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational
Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position classification
system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade 27. [11]
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and
21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June
6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the

RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the
suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among
others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of
alternative reliefs), praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same
on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman
prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that,
moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save
for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays co-petitioners are officials of the
same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas,
charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also
officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint
charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR
Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This was
docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla
recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S.
Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting
Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the
information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court. [12]
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against
petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995
Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A.
Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information
with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas
filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido
Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the
overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed
as OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos
recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended with proper court. The resolution, which was
recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and
approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the
resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this
time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17,
1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged
essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was
docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had

no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two
informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to
double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to quash in a Resolution
dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the
Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the
Binay petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer
the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No.
7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the
RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since
the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed
their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the
case for arraignment.Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996
Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent
respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor
after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information
for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue
of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from
filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of
the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the
same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on
duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be
dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of
forum shopping?[13]
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay
petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common question
of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
I

The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,[14] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,
[15]
the pertinent provisions of which state:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been
arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect
when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the
RTC of Batangas City.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx.
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A. No.
8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per
Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on
February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
he time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of he Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
heir office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal
mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:
xxx. The new laws consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an
intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and
the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The
essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.[16]
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification[17] from the City Personnel Officer of Makati
stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from March
1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A.
No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification [18] from the Municipal
Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San
Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25,
Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary
constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May
1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.

The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.
The Constitution[19] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, Congress shall take into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions, thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758[20] provides in Section 2 thereof that differences in
pay are to be based upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions. In short, the nature of an officials position should
be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law
but dictated by logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the grade defined in
Presidential Decree No. 985[21] as including
xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of
work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions
within one range of basic compensation.[22]
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of ones position -- the level of difficulty,
responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another
position. It is the officials Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government officials salary may be less than that prescribed for his
Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her
respective local government unit.[23] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the officials
grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate
President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives,
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing
officials, where applicable and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a
set of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare
the Index of Occupational Services guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9
and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not
determinative. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which the
Court must take judicial notice.[24]
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are local
officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are [o]fficials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. [25]

B
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section
4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio
alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials
are excluded from the Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and
unambiguous.[26] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning
rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It
is not. The phrase specifically including after [o]fficials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 necessarily conveys the very idea
of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive,[27]or where the enumeration is by way of example only.
[28]
In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the
Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was necessary for it would be impractical, if not
impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to
grades 27 and above. The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section
4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of
Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to
Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing
guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Courts Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration, we treated the above provision as confirmatory of the Salary Grade
assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors.
C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills[29] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the
Sandiganbayans exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those from
the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this
case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio
unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo,
165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]).The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear,
it is not susceptible to interpretation.It must be applied regardless of who may be affected,
even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even
granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus,

where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to
the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). [30]
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and San
Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A.
No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its
intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with
Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court
is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the Court
has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means who stand
trial for petty crimes, the so-called small fry -- the barangay officials, the municipal
officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like -- who are involved
with nickel-and-dime cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and
theft. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only
those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under the
jurisdiction of the court.[31]
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a
legislators opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular
legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator. [32] Such opinions do not
necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.[33]
D
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be
referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in
determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:[34]
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute
changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case
that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The
provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislatures intention to apply its
provisions on jurisdiction to criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan. To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.

Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in
other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. [35] There is no reason why Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
The term proper courts, as used in Section 7, means courts of competent jurisdiction, and
such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The
former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term proper courts as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to regular courts, but
includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer
all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed
the term proper regular courts or regular courts instead of proper courts. Accordingly, the
law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975, uses the term regular courts, not proper courts:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final
judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying
positions lower than salary grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the case shall be referred to the
Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to the
regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval
of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislatures intent and in any event
should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al.,[36] The Court explained the purpose
of the foregoing provision.
x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayans] jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the
form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which
are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. x x x. Moreover, those cases where trial
had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new
law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction on
pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore,
deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court
retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the
provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort

already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other
hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases
the trials of which have not yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of
R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A.
No. 8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains
jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be
referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the
latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains
jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said
cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition has
been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the
Ombudsman.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. [37] Hence, under
the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.[38]
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, [39] is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried.[40] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a
case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay.[41] The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.[42]
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. [43] In
the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. [44]
In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of
the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The unexplained
inaction[46] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.

In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,[47] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to
speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in
existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in
changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting
agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and
the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[48] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused
to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim
to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEAs Administrator, [49] the Court, considering also the complexity of the
cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right
to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of
the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later
with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavitcomplaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson
Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio
Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the
following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of
Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e)
Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial findings and observations of the COA on
the examination of the cash and accounts covering transactions from April 1, 1987 to
January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the
Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA furnished the
Tanodbayan a copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was informed
that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet released since the Mayor of Makati
was given thirty days within which to explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject
to change or modification depending upon the explanation/clarification to be submitted by
the Mayor of Makati. Because of this information from the COA the preliminary investigation
was held in abeyance until the submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati was received by
the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes of the ensuring preliminary
investigation to the Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse findings, above
elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis of its findings
and preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report on Findings No.
1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the COA findings,
Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding
subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-affidavit
on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990,
Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August
27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November 22, 1990.

2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27, 1990, October
26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition for Certiorari in
G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme Court against
COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that
said petition is submitted to support Binays stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing allegations
incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan,
Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its
Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor, who
forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for review
and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter its
review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved some of the recommendations of the
Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing of the informations. [50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA);
it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause.Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA
findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus
justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw
findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination
of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than
the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team
members had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and
analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw reports, the cases must have involved
complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of time for
preliminary investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three (3) years from
the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the
fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In the aboveentitled cases, the preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely
two (2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April
30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his
suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not
valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no
delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy
disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid an petitioners
suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a
question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such

discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof. [52] Petitioner in this case has
failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the
following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging
the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan
considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before
the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of
information and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted
by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. [53] They claim that the filing of the
information in the Sandiganbayan was a subsequent happening or event which cannot oust
the RTC of its jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the
RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case
pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not by
the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel.[54] As a consequence of this
principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals[55] that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over
it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent
court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in
the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can
exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary
conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether
erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases[56] that estoppel prevents a party from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however,
remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law.
[57]
Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped
consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the
proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is
not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the
RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan,
which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no
consistent invocation of the RTCs jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the
filing of the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not
rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves
party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission
of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is
required to be brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. [58] Even then, the

doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.
[59]
Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, [60] is a public
offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal
actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of
estoppel.[61]
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy
even though they had already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in the
RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of
competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea
in a court that had no jurisdiction.[62] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move
for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double
jeopardy.[63] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in
the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[64]
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule
against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there
is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various
offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but
with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum
shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.[65] We discern no intent on the part of the
State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to gamble that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition.
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a
complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of
overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the
RTC. Another set of officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens
Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the
previous complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal
action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this
time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without
undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., joins J. Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurs with J. Panganibans separate opinion.

G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988

ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
De la Cruz, De Loso and Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
seeks to set aside the Order dated 9 September 1977 issued by respondent Municipal Court
Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in Criminal Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the Philippines,
plaintiff vs. Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused") denying petitioner's Motion to Transfer said case
to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for trial on the merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, with
homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, through reckless
imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a cargo truck which had collided with a Volkswagen
automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one (1) person and
physical injuries to four (4) other people. The Amended Complaint against petitioner read as
follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M., at the MacArthur Highway,
barrio San Isidro, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a truck
bearing plate No. V 139 T Filipinos 1977, willfully and unlawfully drive and operate the same
in a negligent, imprudent and careless manner, and without due regard to traffic laws, rules
and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person
and damage to property, causing by such negligence, imprudence and carelessness, the
said truck driven and operated by him bumped and hit a Volkswagen car bearing plate no. E
604 Filipinos 1977, then driven by Antonio M. Concepcion, as a result of which one of the
occupants of the said car, Victoriana Miranda Concepcion died in the said accident, and the

other occupants namely: Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili, Renee Ann Capili and
Lourdes Concepcion sustained serious physical injuries, and the said car suffered damages
in the amount of P18,000.00, belonging to Antonio Concepcion, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After arraignment, respondent
Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16 September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September 1977 a " Motion to
Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance for Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over
the case on the part of the Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument was that the amended
criminal complaint alleged that the Volkswagen car involved in the accident had suffered
damages amounting to P18,000.00, and that under paragraph 3, Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime with which he was charged would carry a fine in an amount ranging
from the amount of the damage to three (3) times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00 or P54,000.00). Petitioner urged in his Motion that because under Section 87 (e)
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended (Republic Act No. 296 as amended), the respondent
Municipal Court of the Provincial Capital of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses
punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00, the case had to be transferred to the Court of
First Instance. On the same date, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the trial of
the case relying on the same grounds set out in his Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court
of First Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the respondent Municipal
judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977 denying the Motion to transfer the Case to
the Court of First Instance and set the trial of the case for 5 October 1977. A verbal Motion
for Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of the respondent court to
try the criminal case against petitioner on the merits.
By a Resolution dated 26 September 1977, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the respondent Municipal Court from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 77-1848.
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated 27 October 1977, agreed with and adopted the
position taken by petitioner that respondent Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try
Criminal Case No. 77-1848. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical
injuries and damage to property, resulting from reckless imprudence. Under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, in a prosecution for a complex crime constituted by two (2) or more
grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime is to be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. In the present case, one might, as respondent
Municipal Judge did, look only at the acts which constitute the offenses comprising the
complex crime here involved. One is likely to do so through eyes which are culturally
conditioned and so is likely to assume, as did respondent Municipal Judge, that the most
serious offense of which petitioner is accused is homicide through reckless imprudence.
Under paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable upon
petitioner, should he be found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would
be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the automobile law, the death
of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendants shall be punished
by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner before the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, such Municipal Court in the capital of the Province of
Pampanga had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine not exceeding P6,000. 00 or both. The applicable provision was the fourth
paragraph of Article 87 (c) of Republic Act No. 296 as amended which provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts
shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law
does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the district judge, shall have
like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of homicide through
reckless imprudence and damage to property through reckless imprudence were correct, the
respondent Municipal Judge would have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal
charges against petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of offenses is determined
by the seriousness of the penalties attached by the law to the several offenses. It was noted
earlier that the imposable penalty in case of homicide through reckless imprudence
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., a correctional penalty in the
scale of penalties set up in Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon the other hand, the
penalty for damage to property through reckless imprudence is provided for in the third
paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of paid damages to three-times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than P25.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty (i.e., if it exceeds
P6,000.00) or a correctional penalty (i.e., if it is P200.00 or more but does not exceed
P6,000.00). The offense so penalized with a fine may be a grave felony (i.e. if the imposable
fine is afflictive in nature) or a less grave felony (i.e., if the imposable fine is merely
correctional). 1 In the instant case, the maximum fine which may be imposed upon petitioner
is P54,000.00 (3 x P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive penalty and hence, in the scheme of
the Revised Penal Code, more serious than the penalty imposable for homicide through
reckless imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense carries with it an
afflictive penalty while the other or other constitutive offenses carry with them only a
correctional or even a light penalty. Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically
be lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most serious
penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex crime. A complex crime must
be prosecuted integrally, as it were, and not split into its component offenses and the latter
made the subject of multiple informations possibly brought in different courts. This is the
thrust of our case law on the matter.

In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal with a criminal
information against one Domingo Mejia before the Court of First Instance of Manila, charging
him with the crime of damage to property in the sum of P654.22 and with less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, committed, in one single act. There, the
respondent Court of First Instance dismissed the criminal information upon the ground that
the penalty prescribed by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code was only arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court. The prosecution then invited attention to the fact that the fine which could
be imposed by the respondent court on account of the damage to property through reckless
imprudence was a sum ranging from P654.22 to P1,962.66 (P654.22 x 3) which amount was
beyond the jurisdiction of a Municipal Court to impose as fine. In setting aside the order of
dismissal by the respondent Court of First Instance and remanding the case to the trial court
further proceedings, the Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code] simply means that if there is
only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there, should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot
be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, for
both the injuries and the damage committed were caused by one single act of the
defendant and constitute what may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and
damage to property. It is clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the court of first instance. 3(Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of the case
must be determined, not by the penalty for the physical injuries charged but by the fine
imposable for the damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Damage to
property through reckless imprudence need not be a lighter offense than less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Because the maximum fine (P1,962.66)
imposable upon the accused in the Angeles case was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court of Manila to impose, the criminal case fell within the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles. In Villanueva, the accused was
charged before the Justice of Peace Court of Batangas, Batangas with the crime of serious
and less serious physical injuries, with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,
through reckless imprudence. The Justice of Peace Court subsequently declared itself
without jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded the same to the Court of First Instance.
The latter court then declared itself similarly without jurisdiction over the complex crime
charged in the information, upon the ground that the penalty for the graver offense of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was only arresto mayor in its, maximum and
medium periods which penalty, even if applied in its maximum degree (in view of the
complex -nature of the crime), would remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace
Court. Upon appeal by the prosecution, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complex crime there involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely under the rule laid down by us
inAngeles, et al. v. ,rose, et al. [96 Phil. 151 (1954)],, wherein we held that.
xxx xxx xxx
Consider that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the
only offense that resulted from appellant's imprudence were the damage to property in the
amount of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and
less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless
imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace court. The presumption is
against absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to
avoid absurd results. Our system of apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the
various trial courts proceeds on the basic theory that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First
Instance are more serious than those triable injustice of the peace or municipal courts.

Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution may not be able to prove all
the supposed offenses constituting the complex crime charge. Were we to hold that it is the
justice of the Peace court that has jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail
to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property
in the amount of P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself without jurisdiction to impose
the fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine can not be less than the
amount of the damage. Again, it is to avoid this further absurdity that we must hold that the
jurisdiction lies in the court of first instance in this case. 5
The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an inferior court on the one
hand and the Regional Trial Court on the other, in respect of complex crimes involving
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, was
summarized by Mr. Justice Barrera in People v. Malabanan: 6
It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-6382, March 30,1954 (40 O.G. 18 supp.), in imposing the corresponding penalty, to the
quasi-offense of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. However, there may be cases, as the
one at bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical injuries charged would come within
the jurisdiction of the municipal or justice of the peace court while the fine, for the damage
to property, would fall on the Court of First Instance. As the information cannot be split into
two, one for damages and another for the physical injuries, the jurisdiction of the court to
take cognizance of the case must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for the
physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting
from the reckless imprudence. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently in effect, we would
have to reach the same result: i.e., that the criminal case against petitioner falls within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they should have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)
Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and the maximum
imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through reckless imprudence) is six (6) years,
clearly, the criminal charge involved falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
and consequently within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9 September 1977 is hereby
SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 26
September 1977 is hereby made PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the
respondent Municipal Court are null and void, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to
file a new information against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO and VILLA SURATOS, respondents.
Marallag & Marallag for Alma Aggabao.
Josefin De Alban Law Office for private respondents.
RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch
22, dismissing the criminal information for concubinage filed against private respondents, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The antecedent facts are as follows:
Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan, Isabela
filed on July 25, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an
information against private respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of
concubinage [Annex "A" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.] allegedly committed in September
1983. Upon being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty [Annex "B" to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 19]. The complainant was represented before the trial court by a
private prosecutor. During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court, and not of the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion
contending that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage
because destierro, the imposable penalty on the concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has a duration of
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC]. The trial court sustained
private respondent's position and granted the motion to dismiss.
Private prosecutor, together with the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, filed
on June 16, 1989 the instant petition assailing the order of the trial court granting the
motion to dismiss the criminal information against private respondents. In a resolution dated
July 17, 1989, this Court denied the petition due to late payment of docket and legal
research fees and for lack of merit. The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the Court denying the petition. Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed a
separate motion for reconsideration. In these motions, the Solicitor General and the private
prosecutor submitted additional arguments to support their position that the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.
At the outset, it must be stated that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by the private prosecutor and the assistant provincial
prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, with the offended party, Alma T. Aggabao, being named copetitioner of the People of the Philippines. The Court has already ruled that while it is the
fiscal who represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the
trial courts, when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People of the Philippines,
not the fiscal [City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, G.R. No. 83996, October 21, 1988, 166 SCRA
614] nor the private prosecutor, even with the conformity of the assistant provincial
prosecutor [People v. Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989]. Nevertheless,
considering that the Solicitor General has intervened in this case by filing a motion for
reconsideration of the Court resolution dated July 17, 1989 denying the petition, the Court

has decided to forego technicalities and to resolve the issues raised. Moreover, since it is
now apparent that the only petitioner in this case is the People of the Philippines as
represented by the Solicitor General, payment of the legal fees is not necessary in
accordance with Rule 141, Sec. 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner first contends that private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction after the prosecution has rested its case and the defense has started to present
its evidence. Furthermore, petitioner complains that "it took two (2) years and six (6) months
before anyone to take (sic) notice of the jurisdictional infirmity [Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12].
Hence, according to petitioner, private respondents are barred from raising the issue of
jurisdiction, estoppel having already set in.
The contention is without merit. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings [Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure; U.S. v. Castanares, 18 Phil. 210 (1911)]. It is true that in Vera v. People, G.R. No.
L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711 and in People v. Munar, G.R. No. L-37642, October
22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278, cases cited by the Solicitor General and private prosecutor in their
pleadings, the Court held that jurisdiction cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
However, these cases can readily be distinguished from the case at bar by the fact that the
issue of jurisdiction was raised only on appeal. In the instant case, the private respondents
made the jurisdictional challenge pending the trial and before the trial court has rendered
any judgment on the merits.
Moreover, the ruling in Vera v. People and People v. Munar that jurisdiction may not be
raised for the first time on appeal, is the exception rather than the general rule.
The doctrine in those cases was first enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450,
April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, where the Court stated that:
. . . a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject- matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the meats, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court ... And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said
that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399 [See also Dy v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 68544, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 211], the Court held that the ruling
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated
further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches.
The Court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein.
The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,

instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for
being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.
The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No
judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. And as soon as the accused
discovered the jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion
to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Court holds that
the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v. People and People v. Munar does not control the
present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, must apply. Private respondents are not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court will now proceed with the main issue of
whether or not the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage.
The crime of concubinage is penalized by Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as
follows:
Art. 334. Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not
his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place shall be punished by prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to Sec. 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(hereinafter referred to as the inferior courts) shall exercise "[e]xclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months,
or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof . . ." On the other hand, the "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or
body. . ." [Sec. 20. B.P. Blg. 129].
The penalty imposable on the husband who commits concubinage is prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months. Hence, as regards the husband, there is no question that
concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The problem
concerns the concubine upon whom the imposable penalty is destierro.
The Solicitor General and the private prosecutor point out that the duration
of destierro, which is between six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27, RPC],
is beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to impose. Thus, they conclude that either (1)
the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the crime
of concubinage [Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11; Rollo, p. 521; or (2) the
Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have "split jurisdiction," the latter having

jurisdiction over the crime as regards the husband and the former as regards the concubine
[Private Prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3; Rollo, p. 58].
These propositions are both untenable. It has already been held by the Court in Uy Chin Hua
v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617 (1950) and People v. Santos, 87 Phil. 687 (1950) that a crime
punishable with the penalty of destierro is within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This is
so because in the scale of penalties outlined in Art. 71, destierrocomes after arresto
mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Republic Act No. 296], crimes punishable
with arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows that crimes
punishable with destierro are also within the jurisdiction of such courts. In explaining its
conclusion that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and therefore cognizable by the
inferior courts, the Court, in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, supra at p. 619, stated the following:
Destierro is not a higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or
complete deprivation of liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition
from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a
specified length of time. The respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must not
be judged by the duration of each of these penalties, but by the degree of deprivati n of
liberty involved. Penologists have always considered destierro lighter than arresto
mayor. Such criterion is reflected both in the old Spanish Penal Code and in our Revised
Penal Code. In the graduated scale of article 71 the lawmaker has placed destierro
below arresto mayor. There is, therefore, no basis in fact or in law for holding
that destierro is a higher penalty than arresto mayor and that an offense penalized
withdestierro falls under the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.
The Court is well-aware of the fact that Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos were
decided under the Judiciary Act of 1948 pursuant to which justices of the peace and judges
of municipal courts of chartered cities had original jurisdiction over "all offenses in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six months" [Sec. 87 (b)] while
Courts of First Instance had original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months" [Sec. 44 (f)]. There being no
mention in said Act of crimes for which the penalty is not imprisonment, these aforecited
cases were decided on the premise that "there exists a gap in the law as to which court shall
have original jurisdiction over offenses penalized withdestierro or banishment" [Uy Chin Hua
v. Dinglasan, supra, at p. 620].
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the Regional Trial Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction" in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body" [Sec. 20]. Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B. P. Blg. 129
would grant to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable
with destierro, such as concubinage, since destierro is not an offense punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months. However, the Court, after
a careful reading of B.P. Blg. 129, is of the considered opinion that there was no intention to
overturn the doctrine laid down in Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan and People v. Santos. It is quite
evident that among the important factors considered in the allocation of jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts are the gravity of both the offense and the
imposable penalty. It is not, therefore unreasonable to state that the legislature granted to
the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes whose penalties are harsher than those
vested in the inferior courts. And since it is already a settled rule that destierro,by its nature,
is a lighter penalty than imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows that
even under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over crimes punishable
with destierro is vested not in the Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts.
More particularly in this case, the crime of concubinage has two penalties, one for the
husband and another for the concubine. The penalty for the husband, prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months, is unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts.
Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]he offended party [in the

crime of concubinage] cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties," it is clearly in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that the concubine
be tried with the erring husband before the inferior courts. The legislature could not have
intended to allow the absurd situation wherein the inferior court has jurisdiction over the
crime of concubinage only as regards the husband while the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the same crime with respect to the concubine.
In fine, the Court, after a careful consideration of the pertinent laws, as well as the
jurisprudence on the matter, holds that the crime of concubinage is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The Regional Trial Courts have no original
jurisdiction over the said crime. Hence, the court a quo committed no reversible error in
dismissing the criminal information against private respondents. At any rate, considering
that the dismissal of the case by the court a quo on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is not a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7, Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure] and considering further that the crime has not yet prescribed [See Art.
90, RPC], the offended wife is not precluded from initiating the filing of another criminal
information against private respondents before the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit. The reimbursement
of the legal fees paid by the private prosecutor for the filing of this petition is hereby
ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF

QUEZON CITY, Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the Metropolitan Trial Court or other first level court
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal actions of libel, is the issue raised by
the People of the Philippines, as petitioner in the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus at bar. The fairly simple facts from which the issue has arisen are hereunder
briefly narrated.

On January 30, 1995 an information for libel was filed against Isah V. Red in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The case thereby initiated was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9560134 and raffled to Branch 82.
Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction of
the offense. The Judge found merit in the motion and by an Order dated March 29, 1995,
remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City for proper
action/disposition in the premises. His Honor declared that (u)nder Section 2 of R.A. No.
7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years, irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof is vested in the Municipal Trial Court. ** . The case was accordingly
transferred to the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court where it was docketed as Case No.
43-00548 and raffled to Branch 43.
Thereafter, the private prosecutor, under the control and supervision of the Fiscal, filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Remand dated August 1, 1995 praying that the case be
returned to the RTC. The movant invoked Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which pertinently provides that:[1]
*** *** ***
The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First
Instanceof the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense *** ,
and argued that
** . Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court (such as the Court of Tax
Appeals) are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law. (De
Joya vs. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893). Moreover, a general law cannot repeal or amend by
implication a specific provision or a special law. Otherwise stated: a subsequent statute,
general in character as to its terms and operation, is not to be construed as repealing a
special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifested. This is
so, even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set
forth in the special act. (Philippine Railway Co. vs. CIR, 91 Phil. 35; Villegas vs. Subido, 41
SCRA 190; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 207 SCRA 487).
The MetroTC denied the motion by Order dated August 14, 1995. It opined that Rep. Act. No.
7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, would partake of the nature of amodern law which
impliedly repeals an ancient law (the Revised Penal Code) which is of 1932 vintage, which is
inconsistent with the later law ** ; (and that) if the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the
new law, the new law shall be applied.[2] Later, the MetroTC also denied the private
prosecutors motion for reconsideration, by Order dated September 7, 1995. Still later, in an
Order dated October 18, 1995, it denied another motion by the same counsel reiterating the
plea to remand the case back to the RTC, and further directed the prosecution to present **
(its) next witness, trial having in the meantime commenced.
Now, in this proceeding, the Stated prays for judgment: (1) declaring the questioned Orders
dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 as null and void for
having been issued by the respondent court acting without jurisdiction; (2) enjoining the
respondent court from further conducting trials in Criminal Case No. 43-00548; and (3)
commanding the respondent court to remand Criminal Case No. 43-00548 to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition. It cites Jalandoni v.
Endaya (55 SCRA 261 [1974]), where this Court (a) drew attention to the categorical
language of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code to the effect that it is a court of first
instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case, and (b) indicated thirteen (13)

cases, from People v. Topacio, 59 Phil. 356 (1934) to Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303
(1971), wherein this ** Court ruled that municipal courts do not have jurisdiction over libel
cases.[3] It further argues that in light of Jalandoni, and Berces v. Guingona (241 SCRA 539
[1995]) -- to the effect that a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and
application, is not to be construed as repealing special or specific enactment unless the
legislative purpose to do so is manifest or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exists between them -- Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code may not be deemed to have
been superseded by Republic Act No. 7691.
This Court has already had occasion to resolve the issue, substantially in line with the
position taken by the People, account having been taken of substantially the same
arguments adduced by the opposing parties in this case. In G.R. No. 122126 entitled Lydia
Caro vs. Court of Appeals and Violeta Sarigumba, involving the same jurisdictional issue as
that specifically presented in the case at bar, this Court promulgated a Resolution on June
19, 1996 pertinently reading as follows:
Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public
respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. No. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of
jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment
of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code)
which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A.
No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law, however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court
of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive jurisdiction
over the libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior
courts cannot be applied to libel cases.
Moreover, Administrative Order No. 104-96 -- treating of the subject: ** DESIGNATION OF
SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES
AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES -- issued on October 21, 1996 by the Chief Justice upon the
advice and consent of the Court En Banc, inter alia provides, in categorical acknowledgment
of the validity of the doctrine just adverted to, that LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.
The proposition is hereby reaffirmed, the Court perceiving no argument advanced by
respondents justifying its abrogation or modification.
Concerning respondents contention that the challenged orders are now immutable, having
become final and executory for failure of the prosecution to take an appeal therefrom, it
suffices to advert to the familiar and uniformly applied axiom that only final orders -- i.e.,
those that finally dispose of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the court respecting
the merits of a case -- can become final and executory -- in the sense of becoming
unalterable through an appeal or review proceeding. [4] Interlocutory orders, on the other
hand -- i.e., those which resolve incidental motions or collateral matters but do not put an
end to the case -- never become final in the sense of becoming unchangeable and
impervious to impugnation after expiration of the period prescribed for taking an appeal
from a final judgment.[5]
Respecting respondents claim that venue is merely procedural, suffice it to point out that
unlike in civil cases, in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional. [6]
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR.
and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in
the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned
in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized
as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants

and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants
are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants,
if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards
the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences
of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail
the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is
clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional
rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had
not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus
vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786,
789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding

question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is
not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the

explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized

be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to
be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At

the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right
to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always
been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the
exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an
essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission
of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized
that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is,
therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend
its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to
which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for
the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents
of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of
the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the
party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House
No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners

and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which
they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the
United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other
words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit
the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then,
too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion
for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views
therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be,
as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-45358

January 29, 1937

NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY
BOARD, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondents Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of

certain accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated
in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of
the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and
prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information,
the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the
chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best
of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of
the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said
warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence
at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the
following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two
journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two
memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of
copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one
bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many
documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory
notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The
search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who
stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge
who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8,
1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately
to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be
declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the
court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within
twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of five (5) days
within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On June
10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying
that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be
authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary
investigation. The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging
that, notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board
had failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a search warrant be
issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and deposit of the
Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex
parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited some documents
and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly
verified by oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together
with the affidavit it presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings
taken by him; and prayed that said agent be directed to filed the documents in question
immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L.
Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the
proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the
articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the petitioner filed another petition
alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet been returned to
date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said
warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to
the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and

that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the court
issued an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with
the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and
that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be
exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any,
within the unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why all
the articles seized appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the
petitioner. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a
motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained
for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law
committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the petitioner, the
court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the time
needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be
retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the
assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10)
days to comply with the order of September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to
return to him all the documents and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in
an order of October 2d of said year, granted him the additional period of ten(10) days and
ordered the clerk of court to send him a copy of the inventory. On October 10th, said official
again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to examine the
documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by
Nos. 5, 1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying
that he be granted said period of sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th, the court
granted him the period of sixty (60) days to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The
petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the respondents, that these nineteen
(19)documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest having been returned to said
petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95,
General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a
citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and
papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32
Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S.,
29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize
is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government
(People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of
the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be
given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by
them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac.,
373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing
searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28
Fed., [2d], 189; Leonardvs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88;
Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has
been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that
he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of
the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a
person whom he considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for applying for
this search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to
me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises,
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his

activities as a money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and
in attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent states that
he found them to be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides
that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place top be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of
General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands
the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the
person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In
re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs.State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W.,
468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U.
S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S.vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of
an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused
(State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs.Quartier, 236 Pac.,
746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace
against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable
search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is
said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been
defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful
ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any
particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law.
ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70
Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs.Bateman, 278 Fed., 231;
Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective
by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that
the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the
petitioner was subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared
illegal and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by
the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued
unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be
presented necessity by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides
that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, before
issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach
the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that
the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit
made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of
imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as
the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts
was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of
one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the
complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if
the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of
the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of
the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search
warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night.
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is
positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued
exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and
that the search could not legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant
was issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be
seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General
Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for
determining whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must
contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S.,
24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U.
S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605;
People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 4125); but where, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue
(People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles
given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in
said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in
violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given,
particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The
description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of
the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify
the articles, which he did.
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant
was obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board
might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might
be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the
case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really

been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or
some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that
may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in
whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs.Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886;
Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs.Madden, 297 Fed.,
679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing
that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using
them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for
violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the
documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the
validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof,
because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he
agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or
proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the
petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there
was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the
Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the
petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but
such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his
protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie
because he can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of
his petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will
not issue when there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an appeal from said orders would have to lapse
before he recovers possession of the documents and before the rights, of which he has been
unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil., 426;
Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14
Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and
seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain
the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict
the enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the
individual, they should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the
warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal
knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the
sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that
might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in
the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place
indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the
applicant or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts,
when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether
probable cause exists;

6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be
seized is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description
must be rather general, but is not required that a technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue;
7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise
or settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the
search and seizure; and
8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be
an effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently,
the petition for mandamusfiled by him, lies.
For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the
orders of the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are
declared illegal and are set aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas direct the immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19)
documents designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30,
31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-34038 June 18, 1976
Customhouse, Pasay City, petitioner,
vs.
District, stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and CESAR T. MAKAPUGAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34243 June 18, 1976
NICANOR MARCELO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial
District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and SALVADOR T. MASCARDO, as Collector of
Customs stationed at the MIA Airport Customhouse, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36376 June 18, 1976
CALIXTO D. ENRIQUEZ, REYNALDO REYES AND LUCILA ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, GREGORIO CONDE AND ANASTACIA
TORILLO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38688 June 18, 1976
FRANCISCO P. FELIX, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and FELIX C. HALMAO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39525 June 18, 1976
PEDRO E. NIEVA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
7th Judicial District, JOSE ARELLANO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40031 June 18, 1976
PEDRO E. NIEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
7th Judicial District, JOSE ARELLANO and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:p
G.R. No. L-34038
On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T.
Makapugay, a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for
violation of: (a) Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4713, (b) Central Bank Circular No. 265, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No.
265, otherwise known as The Central Bank Act, and (c) Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic
Act No. 1937, in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act, claiming that
Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully
and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem
cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the
necessary permit from the proper authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage
Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. The Customs Examiner assigned
further asked him if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative.
And in utter disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars particularly C.B. Circular 265, as
amended, the respondent brought into the country various Philippine Money in the amount
of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00) Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the pieces
of baggage examined by the assigned customs examiner, without any prior permit from the
Central Bank authorities. ... " (p. 11, rec.).
Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary
investigation, and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with
prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent the amount of P2,280.00, his
passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only,
as well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five
(5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).
Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the
articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior
institution of seizure proceedings thereon." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to
file a complaint for "Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before
the City Fiscal of Pasay City.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside
the order dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order
the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation
thereon, and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure
proceedings before Customs authorities.
In due time, respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and subsequently
both parties submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
G. R. No. L-34243
On June 22, 1971, respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter- complaint with respondent
Judge against petitioner Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of Section 3602 in relation
to Section 2505 of Republic Act 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code,
supposed to have been committed in the following manner:
... Mr. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a Philippine Air Lines
plane, Flight 307, on June 22, 1971, criminally, feloniously, and with intention to defraud the
government did not declare the contents of his pieces of baggage in the Baggage
declaration Entry nor with the assigned Customs Examiner. ... When his pieces of baggage
were examined, instead of personal effects as declared in the Baggage Declaration Entry,
what were found were various assorted Watches, Bags, Montagut shirts and Dress materials
which are highly taxable.

The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said articles in the
Baggage Declaration Entry, and before the Customs Examiner despite inquiries made,
constitute a criminal offense within the meaning of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines. ... (p. 19, rec.).
The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-854-P.C., the respondent
Judge assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioners counsel, conducted the
preliminary examination and investigation, simultaneously in the manner provided for by
Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, and thereafter on October 6, 1971 issued the
following order:
WHEREFORE, there being a preliminary investigation and examination conducted by the
Court and considering that the respondent was given a chance to defend himself let a
Warrant of Arrest be issued for his apprehension. The respondent is hereby ordered to post a
bond in the amount of P5,000.00 for his provisional release.
Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 113
thereto, the City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to file the corresponding information
against the respondent before this court of competent jurisdiction within FORTY EIGHT (48)
HOURS from receipt hereof (p. 23, rec.)
Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with preliminary injunction,
impugning the validity of the order of respondent Judge dated October 6, 1971, on the same
ground as the petition in G.R. No. L-34038.
On October 20, 1971, the Supreme Court adopted resolution requiring respondents to rile an
answer and likewise issued a writ of preliminary injunction, "restraining respondent Judge,
his representatives, assigns or persons acting upon his orders, place or stead, from
executing, enforcing and implementing his order of October 6, 1971 ... "(p. 32, rec.)
In compliance therewith, respondent Judge filed a petition for admission of answer on
November 29, 1971 (pp. 43-44, rec.), which was granted by this Court in its December 13,
1971 resolution (p. 62, rec.).
On the other hand, respondent Collector of Customs, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation on February 1, 1972, adopting as his answer to the petition, the legal grounds
averred in the original petition in G.R. No. , Collector of Customs, etc. versus Hon. Onofre A.
Villaluz, etc., et al (p. 72, rec.).
On June 13, 1972, the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to consider the case submitted
for decision after noting the failure of petitioner to file his memorandum (p. 94, rec.).
G. R. No. L-36376
On February 22, 1973, private respondents Gregorio Conde and Anastacia Torillo, filed a
complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court, indicting petitioners with violations of the
Anti-Graft Law.
The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day (February 22, 1973),
respondent Judge forthwith issued an order of the following tenor:
Considering that the complaint filed ... sufficient in form and substance, the same having
been filed in accordance with Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, and pursuant
to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of "Mateo vs. Villaluz," let the
preliminary investigation of this case be set on February 24, 1973 at 8:00 o'clock in the
morning (p. 22, rec.).
On the day set, petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge who proceeded to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. The same was reset on February 26, 1973.
Immediately before the hearing of February 26, 1973, petitioners, through counsel, filed an
"Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" contesting the power of the

respondent Judge to conduct the preliminary examination and investigation (p. 23, rec.),
which was denied by respondent Judge in his order dated February 27, 1973 (p. 31, rec.).
Counsel for petitioners then asked for time to raise the issue before this Court, which
respondent Judge granted by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief
from this Tribunal.
Accordingly, herein petitioners filed this petition.
On March 2, 1973, this Court required respondents to answer the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge from ... causing and effecting the
arrest of petitioners herein" (p. 39, rec.).
In his answer filed on March 14, 1973, respondent Judge, invoking the same arguments in
G.R. No. L-34243, held on to the view that the Circuit Criminal Courts are vested with the
power and authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
G. R. No. L-38688
On May 23, 1974, private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint directly with
the Circuit Criminal Court presided over by respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with
alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. Prel. Inv. 116-Rizal.
At the hearing of May 27, 1974, petitioner, through counsel, filed an "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Preliminary Investigation" (p. 9, rec.) based on the ground that respondent Judge
has no authority to conduct the same.
After arguments by counsels for both parties, the respondent Judge denied petitioner's
motion. An oral motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp. 14-15, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
On May 31, 1974, this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition and issued a
restraining order, "enjoining respondent Judge, his agents, representatives, and/or any
person or persons acting upon his orders or in his place or stead from proceeding further
with the preliminary investigation ... " (p. 24, rec.)
On June 17, 1974, it appearing that the case involved in the petition is criminal in nature, the
Court required herein petitioner to IMPLEAD the People of the Philippines as partyrespondent (p. 26, rec.). In conformity thereto, petitioner through counsel, filed on June 28,
1974 an amended petition impleading The People (pp. 49-50, rec.).
Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of the Philippines, respondents
in answer, frontally met the averments of petitioner.
G. R. No. L-39625
On October 24, 1974, petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any preliminary
investigation conducted by respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv. No. 72-Rizal, Circuit Criminal
Court, 7th Judicial District, as well as the warrant, if any, that may be issued for the arrest
and imprisonment of petitioner" and to enjoin permanently respondent Judge from
conducting preliminary investigations and from ordering petitioner's arrest.
On October 30, 1974, the Court required the respondents to file their answer within ten (10)
days from notice thereof and issued, effective immediately, a temporary restraining order
against respondent Judge (p. 64, rec.).
On November 13, 1974, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation requesting to be excused
from filing an answer considering that in three other cases (The Collector of Customs v. Hon.
Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34038; Nicanor Marcelo v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L34243; and Francisco Felix v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-38688) which involve the
same legal issue, his office maintains that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct a

preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act
No. 5179 (p. 81, rec.).
On November 20, 1974, private respondent filed his answer (pp. 87-104, rec.).
Petitioner, on January 22, 1975, filed a motion praying that the instant case be consolidated
and decided jointly with G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 as they involve
the same issue; and that the memoranda filed for petitioners in said four cases be
reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for petitioner in this case, which should be
deemed submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (pp. 122-124, rec.).
Said motion was granted in the resolution of February 10, 1975 (p. 129, rec.).
In his pleading dated February 5, 1975, private respondent (pp. 130-132, rec.) stated that he
joins the petitioner in his plea for the consolidation of the instant case with cases Nos. L34038, L-36376 and L-38688 and prayed that the memorandum filed by respondent in L38688 be considered reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for private respondent
in this case, in addition to the affirmative defenses and arguments contained in private
respondent's answer to the petition, and that this case be submitted for decision together
with the aforementioned cases (p. 137, rec.).
The records disclosed the following antecedent facts.
On January 11, 1974, herein private respondent Jose Arellano filed a complaint against Pedro
E. Nieva, Jr., herein petitioner, together with his wife Pacita and daughter Patricia N. with the
Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) in connection with the P230,000.00 industrial loan
obtained by the Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company headed by the complainant, Jose
Arellano, from the Development Bank of the Philippines, where herein petitioner holds the
Position of Auditor. The cm was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel. Inv. CCC-VII-72 Rizal
(pp. 1-2, 90-91, pp. 14-16 [Annex "A"] rec.).
On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court, respondent Judge issued an
order that reads:
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to the doctrine laid
down by the Supreme Court in the mu of "Mateo versus Villaluz", Assistant City Fiscal
Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to conduct the preliminary investigation of the aboveentitled case within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to file the necessary information in
a court of competent jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants.
... (pp. 2, 91 [Annex "B"], pp. 21-22, rec.).
On May 22, 1974, investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos endorsed the records of the case
back to respondent Judge, because
... (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this instant suit is the
same set of first and circumstances and involving the same parties in a case of ESTAFA
THRU FALSIFICATION now pending preliminary investigation and also before this Honorable
Court. Hence, this endorsement in order to avoid duplication of effort and time in' the
resolution and disposition of the same incident.
In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24, 1974 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court
pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Joint Circular of the Department of Justice and the
Department of National Defense dated April 29, 1974, herein private respondent prayed that
the endorsement of Fiscal Santos be given due course and that the preliminary investigation
be conducted by the respondent Judge (pp. 3, 92, 104 [Annex "I"], rec.).
Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1, 1974 (p. 3, pp. 40-49 [Annex
"F"], rec.), which was amplified in another pleading dated September 24, 1974 (pp. 3, 50-59
[Annex "G"], rec.).

Under date of June 18, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to strike out herein
petitioner's opposition to complainant's ex parte urgent motion for preliminary investigation
in view of the failure of herein petitioner's counsel to comply with the order of the Court to
furnish a copy of his opposition to complainant Jose Arellano (pp. 93, 105-106 [Annex "2"],
rec.).
On September 24, 1974, herein petitioner filed his opposition to the motion to strike out
herein respondent's opposition (pp. 7, 55-59 [Annex "G"], rec.). On the same day, a hearing
was conducted by the respondent Judge on the urgent motion for preliminary investigation
and immediately thereafter, he denied said opposition of herein petitioner (Annex "H", p. 62,
pp. 3, 93, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
G. R. No. L-40031
On November 2, 1973, Jose Arellano, private respondent herein, filed with the Circuit
Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, a complaint charging herein petitioner with estafa, allegedly
committed under the circumstances provided for in paragraph 4 1(b) Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (p. 12, rec.). Said complaint was subsequently docketed as CCC Case
No. Prel. Inv. -65-Rizal. Thereupon, respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary
investigation in question. After the termination of the proceedings, respondent Judge issued
on May 31, 1974 the challenged resolution which reads:
Wherefore, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, Assistant City Fiscal
Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to file the necessary information for the crime of Estafa
against respondent Pacita Nieva, in a court of competent jurisdiction, within forty-eight (48)
hours from receipt hereof.
Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of respondent Mrs. Pacita
Nieva, and for her provisional liberty, she is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of
P20,000.00. (p. 24, rec.).
On July 26, 1974, petitioner's counsel filed an urgent motion to declare the preliminary
investigation proceedings null and void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
court. to conduct the same, re-echoing the arguments invoked by petitioners in G. R. Nos. L34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 (p. 14, rec.).
In an order dated August 8, 1974, respondent Judge denied the same (p. 22, rec.).
On January 28, 1975, this Court by resolution required respondents to file an answer to the
petition and not to move for the dismissal of the same. The Court further' resolved to
consolidate the case with Cases Nos. L-38688, L-34038, L-34243, and L-36376 (p. 26, rec.).
In a manifestation filed on February 10, 1975, the Solicitor General requested that he be
excused from filing an answer on the ground that in three cases (G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243
and L-38688), which involve the same legal issue, the counsel for the People has taken the
position that respondent Judge has no authority or jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No. 5179.
Private respondent, on the other hand, through the Citizens Legal Assistance Office of the
Department of Justice, filed his answer on February 20, 1975, maintaining that respondent
Judge has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation invoking particularly Section 13,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sections 1, 3 and 6 of Republic Act No.
5179.
The one common legal issue posed by these six cases is whether a Circuit Criminal Court
possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigations. Neither the explanatory note to
House Bill No. 9801 (now R.A. No. 5179,) nor the available Congressional debates intimate
that Circuit Criminal Courts are clothed with the authority to conduct preliminary
examinations and investigations (Congressional Records of House, March 28, 1967, pp. 4145; May 15, 1967).

WE therefore examine the law.

Petitioners, in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such power, rest their claim on
Section I of Republic Act No. 5179, which provides:
In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently constituted,
there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the
regular Court of First Instance, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:
a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and crimes. against property
as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complex with
other crimes;
b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, ... ;
c. Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections
174, 175 and 345 of the National Internal Revenue Code. (emphasis supplied).
Petitioners argue that said courts, having been conferred limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise
such power of preliminary investigation, the same not being embraced and contemplated
within its given function to "try and decide" specific criminal cases.
What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be tried by
Circuit Criminal Courts.
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because they cannot try and decide all
criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of
general jurisdiction. They can only take cognizance of cages expressly specified in Section 1
of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 126. Nevertheless, they
have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First Instance
necessary to effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction. This is plain and
evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic law, Republic Act No. 5179:
Section 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the
Courts of First Instance and the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein
shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. ... Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Circuit Criminal Courts
shall have the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court
upon regular Courts of First Instance, insofar as may be necessary to carry their jurisdiction
into effect.
Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the authority to
conduct preliminary examination and investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court:
Section 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First
Instance. Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous
preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge thereof shall
either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace referred to in the second paragraph of
Section 2, hereof - for preliminary examination and investigation, or himself conduct both
preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the
preceding sections, and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has
committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer
the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information. (emphasis supplied).

Section 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by state
attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Except where an investigation
has been conducted by a judge of first instance, justice of the peace or other officer in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections no information for an offense
cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal, or state
attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation
conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. ...
The power of preliminary examination and investigation, which may be exercised by judges
of the Circuit Criminal Courts, is without doubt, "not inconsistent with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 5179," and likewise, "necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect."
Moreover, Congress further confirmed that the Court of First Instance has the power to
conduct preliminary investigation by approving on September 8, 1967 Republic Act No.
5180, prescribing a uniform system of preliminary investigation by all government
prosecutors, which provides:
Sec. 1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an
investigation has been conducted by a Judge of First Instance, city or municipal judge or
other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the Philippines, no information
for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city
fiscal or any of his assistants, or by a state attorney or his assistants, without first giving the
amused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him by issuing a
corresponding subpoena. ...
Sec. 2. The provisions of Section fifteen, Rule 112, of the New Rules of Court Of the
Philippines, shall be observed in the investigations of persons in custody.
From the abovequoted Provisions, Republic Act No. 5180 likewise continues the procedure
prescribed in the Revised Rules of court of 1964, Particularly Rule 112 thereof.
The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180 was not modified by the
amendatory Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 issued respectively on December 6, 1972
and March 23, 1976.
More decisively, the 1935 as well as 1973 Constitution vests this essential power in all courts
to first determineprobable cause before ordering the arrest of those charged with a criminal
offense (Section 1[3], Art. III, 1935 Constitution; See. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The
determination of "Probable cause" is the sole object of preliminary examinations. Surely,
congress could not have possibly intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such
constitutional prerogative, which is part of the basic constitutional right of an individual
whose person cannot be legally seized without prior preliminary examination by a judge.
WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is for the purpose
of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of first Instance and to accelarate the
disposition of criminal cases pending to be filed therein(People vs. Gutierrez, etc., et al., 36
SCRA 172; Osmea vs. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. L-32033, Sept 30, 1971, 199) or to contribute
to the speedy resolution of criminal cases and help curb the progress of criminality in the
country (Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 13s). As opined by Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in the Gutierrez case, supra, "... Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional
branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts ..." , which he
reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmea case, thus:
My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that I cannot find any
justification for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have any part at all in the distribution or
assignment of cases among the different branches of any Court of First Instance, of which
the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court is one. I took this view in my concurring opinion in
the case of People v. Gutierrez, cited in the main opinion of Justice Villamor, and I cannot see
why I must opine differently now. ... (41 SCRA 211).

If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of
the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as
well as stem the tide of criminality, it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges
of the Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. Otherwise, the
Courts of First Instance would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary.
investigations in those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and
consequently delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts
of First Instance.
That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 5179 clearly intended, by Sections 3 and 6
thereof, to clothe the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of
First Instance including the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and
investigations, is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, otherwise known as
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44, Section 39 of which
confers on Circuit Criminal Courts, Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder and
expressly directs that the "preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be
terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date-of their filing." Before the
amendment, the law required only seven (7) days from the date of the commencement of
the preliminary investigation. Section 39, as amended, reads:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court and Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving
offenses punishable under this Act: Provided, that in cities or provinces where there are
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of
cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period
of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a prima
facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twentyfour (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is
conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist, the corresponding information
shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of
receipt of the records of the case.
Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than ninety (90)
days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered
within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case.
It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 6425 affirms the
power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary examination and investigation in
all the cases falling under their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the period for preliminary
investigation, the filing of the information and the rendition of decisions in all offenses
penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Under the amendment, the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has exclusive, but still retains
concurrent, jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Its authority to conduct preliminary examination and
investigation granted under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 5179, remains intact and
undiminished; because the amendatory decree expressly directs that "If the preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist, the
corresponding information should be filed by the proper prosecuting officer ... " There is
nothing in the amendatory decree from which it can be reasonably inferred that since the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act is no
longer exclusive, Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer possess the authority to conduct
preliminary examination and investigation.
Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts, including the Courts of First Instance, to
conduct preliminary examination, other special laws specifically vest such authority

exclusively in the Court of First Instance in case of violation of the Revised Election Code
(Sec. 187, 1947 Revised Election Code, as amended; Sec. 234, 1971 Rev. Election Code) and
of the Anti-subversion Act when the penalty imposable for the offense is prision mayor to
death (Sec. 16, Rep. Act No. 1700).
It is urged that the word "judge" in the above-quoted section of Presidential Decree No. 44
(and also in the. 1935 and 1973 Constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance
Judge nor the Circuit Criminal Court Judge but the municipal judge. As heretofore stated, it is
an elementary precept in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, WE
should not distinguish (Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Gimenez, L-14787, Jan. 28,
1961, 1 SCRA 267). The Statute cannot give a restricted meaning to the generic term
"judge", used in the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Furthermore, in People versus Manantan (L-14129, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 684), a justice of
the peace, accuse of violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that the law refers merely to a justice, judge, or fiscal and that
being a justice of the peace, he is beyond the coverage of the said Code. The Supreme Court
in denying such contention, held that there was no need of including justices of the peace in
the enumeration in said section because the legislature had availed itself of the more
generic term "judge". The term "judge", not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to
comprehend all kinds of judges, including justices of the peace.
The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya versus Tiro (41 SCRA 137)
involved not the power of the Circuit Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation, but
its jurisdiction to try and decide certain They do not at all reveal an iota of any further
restriction on the limited jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court other than those delineated
in existing laws.
Thus, in the Paderna case, supra, involving a violation of Section 174 of the Tax Code, Mr.
Chief Justice Castro, then Associate Justice, speaking for the Supreme Court in ruling that the
Circuit Criminal Court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, stated:
... [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed "blue seal cigarettes" of an appraised
value of less than P500.00 ... and the penalty provided under Republic Act 4713 is a fine of
not less than P50.00 nor more than P200.00 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more
than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500.00, this case falls
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court. ...
... Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8, 1967, provides in part
that circuit criminal courts shall have limited jurisdiction concurrent with the regular court of
first instance, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the latter.
xxx xxx xxx
The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of cases
but also on the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the City Court, it cannot, even if it involves a
violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by circuit criminal courts,
the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first instance where the latter's
jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro case, supra, involving
indirect bribery committed by a public officer. In passing upon the issue of the Circuit
Criminal Court's limited jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes,
held:
... The law (R.A. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts (which is even
made concurrent with the courts of first instance) to crimes committed by public
officers; ... only where they are falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
court of first instance. In short, circuit criminal courts' jurisdiction was limited merely to

cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, for which
the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 3 year (or 6 years in proper
cases), or fine of more than 3 years (or 6 years in proper cases), or fine of more than
P3,00.00 (or P6,000.00 as the case may be), or both such fine and imprisonment (sec. 44[f]
in relation to Sec. 87[c], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25922, June
30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596; Mangila vs. Lantin, L-24735, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 81; People
vs. Tapayan , L-36885, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 529; Andico vs. Roan, L-26563, April
16, 1968, 23 SCRA 93).
Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months, suspension and public censure (Art. 211, RPC), the case is
clearly removed from the competence of the circuit criminal court to pass upon. It is not
denied that the crime of indirect bribery is essentially one committed by public officers.
Jurisdiction of the court, however, is determined not only by nature of the offense charged in
the information, but also by the penalty imposable thereto. ... (emphasis supplied).
In these two cases, it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal Court to acquire
jurisdiction, the offense must not only be one of those enumerated under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 5179; it should also be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular Courts of First Instance. In the aforesaid cases, the Circuit Criminal Court was clearly
without jurisdiction to hear and decide the offenses involved, by command of the specific
provisions of its charter, the Judiciary Act and the Revised Penal code; and not by a directive
of the Supreme Court, which merely applied in said cited cases the statutory prescriptions.
The Supreme Court cannot legally define additional restrictions, which is the sole prerogative
of the law-making authority.
The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court, being a rule of procedure, the same should be rendered inoperative
by reason of the fact that the Supreme Court cannot, by promulgating a rule of procedure,
arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower courts.
It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer jurisdiction to hear and
decide certain cases. But equally true is the fact that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
expressly delegated to the Supreme Court the rule-making authority the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure and to amend the existing laws
thereon. The law or rule of preliminary investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure.
The 1935 Constitution states:
The Supreme court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
inform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify,
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines (Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution).
The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to
Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repeated,
altered, or supplemented by the National Assembly. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade. and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights (Sec. 5[5], Art,
X, 1973 Constitution).
Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely implement Section 3 of
Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 3 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution).
Section 13 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court was not an innovation as it merely

restated Section 13 of General Order No. 58, Section 37 of Act No. 1627, and Sections 2 and
4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, in obedience to its rule-making authority under
Section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. Rule 112 does not modify substantive rights
but continues the procedure already operative prior to the 1935 Constitution.
WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which is the predecessor of Rule
112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is an adjective or procedural rule (Bustos vs. Lucero,
81 Phil. 640).
While admitting that Court of First Instance were previously clothed with the power of
preliminary investigation by virtue of Section 37 of Act 1627, nevertheless, it is argued that
this same section was amended when the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted since under
Section 99 of said Judiciary Act, "All laws and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act' were repealed. the inconsistency, it is claimed, lies in the fact that while the authority of
municipal courts and city courts to conduct preliminary investigation was reiterated in said
Judiciary Act, there was no mention therein whether Courts of First Instance Judges are still
possessed of such authority.
If such repeal was intended, it is unconstitutional; because the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973 vest in the Judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest or search warrant after
conducting a preliminary investigation or examination. Congress could not divest the court
of such authority as the Constitution does not permit it, for the constitutional guarantee on
arrest or search warrant is not qualified by some such phrase as "unless otherwise provided
by law." For a clearer appreciation, the Constitutional guarantee on arrest and search
warrant reads:
(3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized (Art. III, 1935
Constitution, emphasis supplied).
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated,and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and
the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized (Art. IV, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution that until now only the
judge can determine the existence of probable cause and can issue the warrant of arrest. No
law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a
particular "responsible officer." Hence, the 1973 Constitution, which was ratified and took
effect on January 17, 1973, should govern the last four cases, namely, Nos. L-36376, L38688, L-39525 and L-40031, which arose after January 17, 1973.
But even under the 1935 Constitution, the term seizures or seized comprehends arrest.
Thus, in Vivo versus Montesa (July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155), reiterating the doctrines in the
cases of Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation Board (L-20280, Sept. 30, 1963) and Morano
vs. Vivo (L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 162), WE ruled unanimously through Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes:
Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order
of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of
our Constitution, providing:
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but

upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, 1773
Constitution, emphasis supplied).
It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited
by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in previous organic laws and the
Federal Constitution of the United States that left undetermined which public officials could
determine the existence of probable cause. And in Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation
Board, L-20280, promulgated on September 30, 1963, this Court pointed out that Executive
Order No. 69, of July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure for
deportation of aliens, only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation, but
did not authorize his arrest.
Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of
administrative warrants of arrest, this Court said in the same case:
xxx xxx xxx
Under the express terms of our Constitution it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest
of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is
merely to determine the existence of probable cause, leading to an administrative
investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a
judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding
of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the
purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only
on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order
of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
The(n) contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry
into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an
order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the president obviously has the
power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not
indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order
of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.
Following the same trend of thought, this Court, in Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196, 30 June 1967,
20 SCRA, 562; Phil. 1967-B, page 741), distinguished between administrative arrest in the
execution of a final deportation order and arrest as preliminary to further administrative
proceedings. The Court remarked in said case:
Section 1 (3), Article Ill of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law.
The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power
as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or
administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
competent official, such as a legal order of deportation issued Commissioner of Immigration,
in circumstance of legislation (L-24576, pp. 161-1621).
The foregoing doctrine was last reiterate in Ang, et al. versus Galang, etc. (L-21426, Oct. 22,
1975).
Under the American Constitution, the aforesaid terms include not only arrest but also
invitations for police interview or interrogation as well as stop-and-frisk measures. In the
1968 case of Terry versus Ohio, the United States Supreme Court enunciated:

... It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime "arrests" in traditional
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accounts an individual and
restrain his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person (392 U.S. 1, 16 88 S.C.T.
1868, 20 L.E.D. 2d 889; 903 [1968].)
That the aforesaid terms seizures and seized signify arrest was deliberately intended by the
founding fathers of the 1935 Constitution, which words are likewise employed in the 1973
Constitution, Delegate Miguel Cuaderno categorically recounted:
An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search warrant, to the effect
that in each case the order must be supported by the testimony of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, made before the judge, and also an amendment providing that
prisoners charged with capital offenses shall be bailable before conviction unless the
evidence of guilt is strong, were approved upon the initiative of Delegates Francisco. It was
the prevailing opinion among many delegate that one courts had been rather easy in the
issuance of order of arrest or search warrants,and charged with capital offenses (Cuaderno,
the Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 65, Emphasis supplied).
Delegate Jose Aruego added:
During the debates on the draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment being the
insertion of the words, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The Idea in the Francisco
amendment was not new in the Philippines; for it was provided for in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of the Philippines. The signification of the Idea into a constitutional provision was
zealously insisted upon, in order to make the principle more sacred to the judges and to
prosecuting pointed out in the debates, causes by the issuance of search warrants, which
were generally found afterwards to be false (Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
Vol. I, p.160).
The term "judge" employed in both Constitutions cannot be so limited to "municipal judge"
as to exclude the judge of the Court of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Court (People vs.
Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 690-695). WE are not justified to create a distinction where the
Constitution does not make any.
In general, "judge" is a term employed to designate a public officer selected to preside and
to administer the law in a court of justice (Ark. School Dist. No. 18 vs. Grubbs Special
School Dist., 43 S.W. 2d 765, 766, 184 Ark. 863, 48 CJS 946).
According to intent or context, the term "judge" may include an assistant judge (N.H. City
Bank v. Young, 43 N.H. 457); a country or court justice (Mo. State v. O'Gorman, 75 Mo. 370);
a justice of the peace (N.Y. People v. Mann 97 N.Y. 530, 49 Am. R.556).
The term "a judge", in Gen. St. C. 47, Art. 1 & 22, providing that "a judge" may cause any
house or building to be searched for the protection of gambling tables, etc., is equivalent to
"any judge" and comprehends an entire class, and cannot, without disturbing its meaning,
be restricted in its applications to judges of county, city and police courts and therefore the
judge of the Louisville Law and equity court has authority to issue a warrant for such a
research (Com. v. Watzel, 2 S.W. 123, 125, 84 KY 537).
Admittedly, Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing clause which provides: "All
laws and rulesinconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." The question
may now be asked: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to Identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to
be repealed (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, [1934], Vol. 1, p. 467). Rather, it is a clause
which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial and an
irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding
implied repeals apply ex propio vigore, for repeals and amendments by implication are not
favored (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261, 265-6; Villegas vs.

Subido, L-31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190; Quimseng vs. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182). Indeed,
the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws; so that, if a repeal is intended, the
proper step is to so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. vs. Simpson, 8
F[2d] 439; Webb vs. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P[2d] 832; State vs. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521,
199 S.E. 876). The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not
to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between the terms of the new and of the
old statutes (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377).
Here, there is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different persons
and different methods applicable under different circumstances. Thus, while Section 87 of
the Judiciary Act provides that municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct
preliminary investigation for arty offense alleged to have been committed within their
respective municipalities and cities ... ; Section 37 of Act 1627 reads in part that such power
of "every justice of the peace including the justice of Manila, ... shall not exclude the proper
judge of the Court of First Instance ... from exercising such jurisdiction."
WE should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and
unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest from the language of
Section 99 of the Judiciary Act, apart from the fact that Congress by itself alone had no
power to amend the Constitution.
The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our courts to conduct preliminary
investigation could be traced to the Constitution, adding that the Charter of Manila and other
cities confer upon the respective fiscals of said cities the power to conduct preliminary
investigations.
The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the conferment of such a
power to conduct preliminary examination or investigation on quasi-judicial officers like the
city fiscals of chartered cities (see the instructions of President McKinley to First Philippine
Commission, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of 1916, and the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917).
But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals and City
Attorneys of other chartered cities) to conduct preliminary investigations did not and does
not include the authority to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants, which warrants the
courts alone can issue then as now. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures under the 1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a
search warrant or warrant of arrest after he has by himself personally determined the
existence of probable cause upon his examination under oath of the complainant and his
witnesses; although as ruled in one case, he may rely on the investigation conducted by the
fiscal or prosecutor (Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 741-42).
It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution, only the "judge" is directed to conduct a
preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by express constitutional
conferment.
But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to grant the power to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary
examination to "other responsible officer." Until such a law is enacted by the National
Assembly, only the judge can validly conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest or search warrant.
Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation, only the judge
can validly issue the warrant of arrest. This is confirmed by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, which directs the judge to issue the warrant of arrest when he is
"satisfied from the preliminary. examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer
(referring to the fiscal or the municipal mayor under Sec. 5) that the offense complained of
has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has
committed it, ... ."

Thus, the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and
investigation (minus the authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely
statutory. On the other hand, the judge derives his authority not only from the Rules of
Court, but also and originally from the fundamental law to which all other laws are
subordinate. If an objection must be raised, it should be against the authority of the fiscal to
exercise such power of preliminary investigation, which, as has been stated, is merely
statutory. No less than the Constitution confers upon the judge the power to conduct such
examination and investigation.
The case of Albano versus Alvarez (December 22, 1965, 15 SCRA 518) is authority for the
proposition that Sec. 13 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court contains an
innovation, which requires that, when the Court of First Instance itself conducts the
preliminary investigation, it must not only conduct the preliminary examination proper but
the preliminary investigation as well since Section 13 commands the Court of First Instance
to conduct both the preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously (523-524).
Said Albano case does not negate but recognizes the authority of the judge of the Court of
First Instance to conduct such preliminary investigation.
It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that under the charters of the cities of
Manila, Bacolod and Cebu, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is exclusively
lodged in the city prosecutor (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 868-869, May 12, 1948;
Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 45 OG 196; Montelibano vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, June 23, 1955; and
Balite vs. People, 18 SCRA 280, 285-286, Sept. 30, 1966). But the charters of the cities of
Manila, Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such grant of power to city
prosecutors exclusive of the courts (Kapunan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd Edition, 1960), which
cannot be deprived of such authority to conduct preliminary examination because said
prerogative of the courts emanates from the Constitution itself. Unless the Constitution is
amended, the judge cannot be divested of such a power, which is an essential element of
the cardinal right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the present
city charters conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the power to issue warrants of
arrest it would be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935 Constitution. As
heretofore intimated, the present practice or rule of court authorizing the judge to issue
warrants of arrest based on the preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal, seems
to violate the 1935 Constitution, which requires the judge himself to conduct the preliminary
examination. Neither the judge nor the law can delegate such an authority to another public
officer without trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges cannot exercise
the power of preliminary examination and investigation, and that as a necessary
consequence, they cannot also issue warrants of arrest, obviously collides with the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
Moreover, the theory tolerates an unthinkable because anomalous situation wherein
the Court of First Instance and the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and
courts inferior to them to conduct the preliminary examination and/or to issue the needed
warrants of arrest before they could effectively exercise their power to try and decide the
cases falling under their respective jurisdiction. This situation would make the Courts of First
Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts totally dependent upon state prosecutors and municipal
courts, which are inferior to them, for their proper functioning. The possibility that the
administration of criminal justice might stand still will not be very remote.
The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were created was to alleviate the
burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases
filed therein (Osmea vs. Secretary of Justice, supra; People vs. Gutierrez, supra). Such being
the admitted purpose, the power to conduct preliminary examination must necessarily
attach to the duties of a Circuit Criminal Court Judge; for aside from being one of the
instruments by which a case may be accelerated and disposed of, it is a duty which trully
lies within the scope of the office, essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for
which the office was created (Sec. 3, Art III, 1935 Constitution; Sec 3, Art. IV, 1973

Constitution), even if regarded as incidental and collateral, is germane to and serves to

promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose (Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635).
WE RULE that both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution provide the source of the
power of all Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine
probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and therefore sustain the
proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing
of the corresponding information.
II
It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law on criminal procedure.
During the Spanish regime, the rules of criminal procedure were found in the Provisional Law
on Criminal Procedure which accompanied the Spanish Penal Code. The two laws were
published in the Official Gazette in Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887 and became effective
four (4) months thereafter(U.S. vs. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 32-33; Francisco, Criminal Procedure,
1969, ed., p. 8).
While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided or governadorcillo, it did not
require any preliminary examination or investigation before trial. The sumario was abolished
by General Order No. 58 (U.S. vs. Tamparong, supra; Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed.,
pp. 171, 174; Revilla, Vol. 2. Philippine Penal Code and Procedure, 1930 ed., pp. 1134-35).
When the Philippine came under American sovereignty General Order No. 58 was
promulgated by the U.S. Military Governor in the exercise of his legislative powers as
commander-in-chief of the occupation army and took effect on April 13, 1900. General Order
No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No.
590 of January 9, 1903, Act No. 1627 of July 1, 1907, the Jones Law of 1916, Section 2474 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, and Act No. 4178
of December 5, 1934.
General Order No. 58 amended (Sec.1) the Criminal Code of Procedure enforced during the
Spanish regime and vested in the magistrate "the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation (Sec. 13) for the issuance of the warrant of arrest" and authorized "a judge or a
justice of the peace" to issue a search warrant upon his determination of the existence of
probable cause therefor "particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized" (Secs. 95 and 97). The term "magistrate" comprehended the court of
First Instance (Temporosa vs. Yatco, 79 Phil. 225, 226 [1947]; Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96,
104-107 [1939]; People vs. Red, 55 Phil. 706, 710 [1931]; People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443 441
[1925]; Navarro Criminal Procedure, 960 ed., 1973; Padilla, Criminal Procedure, 1965 ed., p.
270).
A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with a public offense. People vs. Swain, 90 P. 720, 722 5 Cal. App. 421 citing Pen.
Code, S807.
A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with the commission of a crime. The arrest of a person charge with the commission
of a crime. The following persons are magistrates:
(1) the justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) the judges of the Circuit Court;
(3) the county judges and justices of the peace;
(4) all municipal officers authorized to exercise the power and perform the duties of a justice
of the peace. Wallowa County v. Oakes, 78 P. 892, 46 Or. 33 (26 Words and Phrases, pp. 44,
45).

Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901 amended General Order No. 58 by empowering "every
justice of the peace ... to make preliminary investigation of any crime allege to have been
committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now
vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance" (emphasis supplied).
The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No. 194 is that before its
passage, the justice of the peace had no power to conduct preliminary investigation of any
offense triable by the Court of First Instance, which alone can conduct such preliminary
investigation of a crime under its original jurisdiction pursuant to General Order No. 58. But
its enactment did not divest the Court of First Instance of such authority.
In the 1939 case of Marcos, et al. versus Cruz, the Supreme Court, through Justice Imperial,
sustained the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations
under Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 58 (68 Phil. 96, 106-107), which was
impliedly followed in the 1947 case of Temporosa versus Yatco, et al., supra.
While General Order No. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate, a generic term which
includes judges of the Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace; Section 1 of Act No.
194 is less categorical by employing the clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is
by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance."
The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained such authority when it
merely provided that the "Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the
power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal
courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the
Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as maybe
hereafter enacted by law; ... " (Sec. 9, emphasis supplied).
Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903 further amended Act No. 194 by extending the power to
conduct preliminary investigation to the justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of
the town wherein the provincial jail is situated of crimes committed anywhere within the
province but again utilized the equivocal clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is
by law now vested in the Court's of First Instance; ... (Sec. 7, Act 590, emphasis supplied).
Act No. 1627 of July 1 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when if authorized expressly
every justice of the peace, including the justice of the peace of Manila, to "conduct
preliminary investigation of all crimes and offenses alleged to have been comitted within his
municipality and cognizable by Court of First Instance, but this shall not exclude the proper
judge of the Court of First Instance of a municipal court from or of a municipality in which the
provincial jail is located, when directed by an order from the judge of First Instance, shall
have jurisdiction to conduct investigation at the expense of the municipality wherein the
crime or offense was committed although alleged to have been committed anywhere within
the province, to issue orders of arrest, ... (Sec. 37, Act No. 1627, emphasis supplied).
The Jones Law of 1916, like the Philippine Bill of 1902, merely provides "that the Supreme
Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisidiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be
prescribed by law" (Sec. 26, Jones Law).
Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 re-affirms the power of the Court of
First Instance of Manila to conduct preliminary examination
Sec. 2474. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court.
Preliminary examination in municipal court and Court of First Instance. Every person
arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be brought before the municipal court, or the
Court of First Instance for preliminary hearing,release on bail, or trial. In cases triable in the
municipal court the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination,
except a summary one to enable the court to fix the bail, in any case where the prosecution
announces itself and is ready for trial within three days, not including Sundays, after the

request for an examination is presented. In cases triable only in the Court of First Instance
the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case
where the fiscal of the city, after a due investigating of the facts, shall have presented an
information against him in proper form. But the Court of Firs Instance may make such
summary investigation into the case as it may necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to
determine whether the offense is bailable. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear that both the Manila Court of First Instance and municipal court can conduct a
preliminary hearing or examination. Section 2474 aforequoted, adds, however, that the City
Fiscal impliedly may conduct such preliminary examination; because it provides that in
"cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of
right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city, after a due
investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in proper form. It
will be noted, however, that it is only after the City Fiscal has conducted a preliminary
examination that the accused ceases to "be entitled as of right" to a preliminary
examination by the Judge of the Court of Firs Instance who, however, retains inferentially the
discretion to conduct another preliminary investigation because the Court of First Instance
Judge is not foreclosed by the preliminary examination conducted by the City Fiscal. But,
when the City Fiscal has not conducted any preliminary examination, the Court of First
Instance Judge himself certainly can proceed with such preliminary examination, which the
defendant can demand as a matter of right.
Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, while amending Section 13 of General Order No. 58, restates the power of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest.
Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934 further amended Section 13 of General Order No. 58 but
still retained the authority of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination. As
herefofore stated, Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 58, as amended, were applied by
the Supreme Court in Marcos, et al. versus Cruz (68 Phil. 96, 106-107).
Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution, the preliminary investigation
before the justice of the peace or muncipal court consisted of two stages, namely,
preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest where only the
complainant and his witnesses are heard by the justice of the peace; and the second stage
where the accused and his witnesses are heard. The Judge of the Court of First Instance
conducts only the first stage, that is, preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of
the warrant of arrest, to be followed by the actual trial (Marcos, vs. Cruz, supra; People vs.
Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555 [1946]).
The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary
examination or investigation from May 14, 1935 to January 17, 1973, is paragraph 3 of
Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution, which guarantees "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures ... and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing ... the persons ... to be seized." Construing the foregoing constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court, through then Chief Justice
Ricardo Paras, pronounced that the determination of the existence of "probable cause must
depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge ... issuing the warrant. ... His
conclusion as to whether "probable cause" existed or not is final and conclusive. If he is
satisfied that "probable cause" exists from the facts stated in the complaint, made upon the
investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to
issue a warrant of arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as he
may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. ... There is no law which prohibits him from
reaching the conclusion that "probable cause" exists from the statement of the prosecuting
attorney alone, or any other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the
opinion of the judge ... The preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioner (Provincial
Fiscal) under Republic Act No. 732 ... does not, as correctly contended by the respondent
Judge, dispense with the latter's duty to exercise his judicial power of determining, before

issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.
The Constitution vests such power in the respondent judge who, however, may rely on the
facts stated in the prosecuting attorney" (Amarga vs. Abbas, March 28, 195l, 98 Phil. 739,
741-742).
While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be delegated by law to
government prosecutors, only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest under the 1935
Constitution and prior thereto (Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, et al. 80 Phil. 859; Lino vs.
Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933; Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest. Arrest
without a warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or private individual a)
when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit
an offense in his presence; b) when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1964
Revised Rules of Court).
In all other cases, there must be a valid warrant of arrest. When the seizure of a person is
made without a warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is not based on a
determination by the judge of the existence of probable cause, the arrest becomes
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly confer on the municipal or
city judge, the City Final and the Judge of the Court of First Instance the power to conduct
preliminary examination or investigation.
On June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, was
approved. The proviso of Section 5 thereof expressly provides that the preliminary
investigation of offenses defined and penalized therein by prision mayor to death shall be
conducted by the proper Court of First Instance. This grant obviously is exclusive of the
provincial or city fiscal or other government prosecutors whose power to conduct preliminary
investigation in all other cases is affirmed in the first clause of Section 5 thereof.
Sections 13 and 14 of the 196.4 Revised Rules of Court re-state Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108
of the 1940 Rules of Court.
As aforestated, aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179 creating
the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act 5180 was approved on September 8, 1967, which
affirms the prerogative of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation of
offenses punishable by said courts.
Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on December 6, 1972 and
March 23, 1976. amending Republic Act No. 5180, did not modify the opening clause of
Section 1 of said Republic Act 5180 affirming the power of the Court of First Instance to
conduct preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of Court.
Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6388,
vests in the Court of First Instance "exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary
investigations, issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal case or proceeding
for violation of" the Election Law. This provision was a reiteration of the previous election
laws (Act No. 1582 of 1907; Com. Act No. 357 of 1938; and Republic Act No. 180 of 1947, as
amended).
After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, the source of the
authority of the judge to conduct preliminary examination for purposes of issuing a warrant
of arrest, is still the Constitution, this time the 1973 Constitution, which likewise guarantees
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures for
whatever nature and for any purpose ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall

issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing ... the
persons ... to be seized" (Sec. 3 of Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The 1973 Constitution, instead
of employing the generic term warrants to comprehend both search warrants and warrants
of arrest, as did the 1935 Constitution, expressly specifies "search warrants or warrants of
arrest." The purpose of such specification was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor in the Amarrga case, supra, that the 1935
Constitution merely guarantees against unreasonable searches but not against unreasonable
arrests, despite the fact that the constitutional guarantee expressly affirms "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures ... and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the persons ... to be seized" (Par.
3, See. 1, Art. III, 1935 Constitution).
In passing, the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case seems to deny equal, if
not greater, importance to individual freedom from illegal arrest or arbitrary detention vis-avis property rights and right against self-incrimination. It will also likewise be noted that the
1973 Constitution also authorizes the law-making authority to empower other responsible
officers to conduct such preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. As enunciated in the Amarga case and in U.S. versus Ocampo (18 Phil. 1, 41-42), the
government prosecutors may be authorized to conduct such preliminary examination and
their determination of the existence of probable cause may be relied upon by the , 23 SCRA
judge, who may, as a consequence, issue the warrant of arrest; although the judge himself is
not precluded from conducting his own preliminary examination despite the conclusion of
the prosecuting attorney as to the existence or non-existence of probable cause.
III
1. The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G.R. No. L-34038
(Collector of Customs, etc. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.) dismissed the criminal complaint
filed by petitioners therein against private respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning
that the case may not be refiled without exposing the accused to double jeopardy. The
respondent Judge seriously erred in so issuing said order, contravening as it does a basic
legal principle on double jeopardy, and committing thereby a grave abuse of discretion. The
constitutional right against double jeopardy exists, not after the first preliminary
examination or investigation, but only after the first trial which results either in conviction or
acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the
accused by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or information and after
the accused had pleaded to the charge (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; Taladua vs.
Ochotorena, et al. L-25595, February 15, 1974; Republic vs. Agoncillo, L-27257, August 31,
1971, 40 SCRA 579; People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249; People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioner's counsel, "dismissal at preliminary
investigation is never with prejudice. Re-filing of the same is allowed if evidence has become
sufficient to warrant conviction of private respondent." There has been no deviation from
such established jurisprudence exemplified in People vs. Bagsican (6 SCRA 400), Wherein
the Court held that "the finding in the preliminary investigation that no prima facie case
existed against the accused does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction. Such
finding is not final acquittal as would preclude further proceedings" (Emphasis supplied).
2. Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the law, respondent Judge also
directed through the same order the return of the articles allegedly seized from the person
of respondent Makapugay. This portion of the question order is fraught with undesirable
consequences.
As stated heretofore, the dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of
preliminary investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the
evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible. For the
enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of

the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the private
respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the customs official.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods
are actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of
seizure had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure
and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such
imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to
the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court (Section 2205 and 2303,
Tariff and Customs Code; Papa, et al. vs. Mago, et al., Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857; Virata, et
al. vs. Aquino, et al. Sept 30, 1973, 53 SCRA, 24; see also Vierneza vs. Commissioner, July
30, 1968, 24 SCRA 394; Farm Implement & Machinery vs. Commissioner, August 30, 1968,
24 SCRA 905; Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, SCRA 1016; Asaali, et al. vs.
Commissioner, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA 382; Sare Enterprises vs. Commissioner, Aug.
28, 1969, 29 SCRA 112; Geotina, etc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., August 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 362; Commissioner vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., January 31, 1972; Lopez vs.
Commissioner, et al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 327; Geotina vs. Broadway, etc., et al.,
January 30, 1971, 37, SCRA 410; Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., September 12,
1974, 59 SCRA 110; and Pacis, et al., vs. Pamaran, etc., et al., March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 16).
Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit
Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter (Enrile, et al. vs. Venuya, et
al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin
properties subject to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code (Diosamito, et al. vs. Balanque, et al., July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 836; Seares
vs. Frias, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533); because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods
illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty (Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July
30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1016).
Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure proceeding was never brought to
his attention (p. 038, rec.) and that he could not have foreseen the possibility that petitioner
would be instituting seizure proceedings ... and besides, it is understood that the order of
the court commanding the release of the subject articles was on a premise that herein
petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other lawful reason (p.39, rec.).
The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and contains no intimation that the
"release ... was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same
for some other lawful reason." On the contrary, the tenor of the order is so absolute and so
emphatic that it really leaves no alternative for petitioner Collector of Customs except to
return the articles.
The records of the case, moreover, reveal that a report of seizure (p. 14, rec.) and warrant of
seizure and detention (p. 15, rec.) were made by petitioner Collector of Customs on June 30,
1971 and on July 9, 1971 respectively. It is patent that respondent Judge knew actually of the
existence at least of the report of seizure of June 30, 1971, which is six days prior to his
order of dismissal dated July 6, 1971. He should have anticipated that a warrant of seizure
and detention will logically be issued as in fact it was issued on July 9, 1971, because it was
the petitioner Collector of Customs who filed the criminal complaint directly with him on July
1, 1971. Respondent Judge chose to ignore the presence of the report of seizure dated June
30, 1971, six days before his order of dismissal and the filing of the criminal complaint on
July 1, 1971. Prudence should have counselled him, so as not to frustrate the petitioner
Collector of Customs in enforcing the tariff and customs laws, against ordering the release of
the seized articles without first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of Customs
whether the latter intended to institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.
As aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Barredo in his Concurring Opinion in People vs.
Gutierrez, supra, "It is not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of
acting in good faith, it is equally important that no circumstance attendant to the
proceedings should mar that quality of trust worthiness." We have enjoined judges to apply

the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and not to dispose of a case according to their
personal views (Albert vs. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948).
IV
In G.R. No. L-36376 (Enriquez, et al. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.), the arbitrary denials
displayed by respondent Judge of motions presented before him likewise invite some
cautionary reminders from this Court.
In this case, petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within which to
elevate the matter before this Tribunal. But considering the novelty of the issue, a grant of
twenty-four hours to prepare a petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the motion. And
petitioners' motion for an extension of at least one (1) day was peremptorily brushed aside
by respondent Judge with one single word DENIED.
The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before the Supreme Court within
the constricted period of time granted them is beside the point. More important is the
consideration by this Court of the dangers posed by respondent Judge's peremptory denial of
a reasonable time.
Indeed, it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of cases pending before
them. But more commendable would be for judges to contribute their share in maintaining
the unswerving faith of litigants in the courts of justice. WE once again stress that "One
important judicial norm is that a judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of
impropriety" (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165).
V
But while w sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal to conduct preliminary examination (p.
36), pursuant to OUR constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts (Sec.
6, Art. X, 1973 Constitution) as a matter of policy, WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other
Circuit Criminal Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed
before their courts (see Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31, 1973). The primary
purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts of
First Instance, as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load of the Courts of First Instance
as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses specified in
Section I of Republic Act 5179, as amended. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore, should not
encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who in
turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary
examination and investigation. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request
the Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for the same purpose (See. 3, Republic
Act No. 5184).
Moreover, it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate time to hear and dispose
of the 34 criminal cases with detention prisoners pending in his sala, aside from the 479
pending cases of voluntary submission by drug addicts, as of January 31, 1975 (A.M. No.
230-CCC, Item 42, Agenda of March 13, 1975), as revealed by his letter dated February 26,
1975, wherein he requested the Supreme Court to renew the detail in his sala of Municipal
Judge Hermenegildo C. Cruz of Mandaluyong, Rizal, to assist him. This significant fact should
further dissuade him from actively conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal cases
directly filed with him.
Furthermore, Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose dockets permit, may be assigned
by the Supreme Court for a period not exceeding 6 months, unless with their consent, to
assist Judges of regular Courts of First Instance with clogged dockets (Sec. 5[3], Art. X, 1973
Constitution).
WHEREFORE, IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525, THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY
DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS
ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. No. L-40031, THE PETITION IS HEREBY

DISMISSED; AND IN G.R. NO. L-34038, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6,
1971 IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE
CRIMINAL CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE RETURN TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW
SUBJECT OF SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT. NO COSTS.
Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND,
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7,
1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be
issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief
Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City
Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute
or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition.
The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June
28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had
come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants
before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued
them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel
7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance
justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is
always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress
is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the
instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a
period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with
the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the
petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long
to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The
events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from
release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of
executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had
been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would
yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp.
123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We
find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they
had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the
charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the

logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he
can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them
as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search
warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places:
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 2082[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that
portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the
crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing
the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought
to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla
himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might
have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that
the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of
the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when
he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as
to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where
the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he
knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit,
And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official
court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his copetitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In
fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be
seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the
person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the
warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized
under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of
the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while
in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla
which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the
search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may
validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for
is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he
has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement
contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the
evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and
April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence
of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez
case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the
like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM"
newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and
that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute
dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore
invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order
to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein

to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of
the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted
authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by
the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by
the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less
than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the
property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon
City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further
confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February
10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm
over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo
stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities
to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the
Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental
law, we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in
the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of
history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject
had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage
from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their
number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We
are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past
despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son
returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and
seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be
used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their
admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant
was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one
Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant. 5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate
Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the
strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the
condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the
United States which served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on
the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following
a brief debate, approved by the Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance
with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken
of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is
correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses,
Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective
affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command
at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I

proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others,
if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same
before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit
only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because
"the application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not
have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was
submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing
and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona:

11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay
produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his
declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned
had already been taken by the undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis
of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a
prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to be false. His
application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
establish the apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses
and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary
or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses
Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows
that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except
that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent
judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of
the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming
election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should
have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible
misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they
saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was
supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the
house while he was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons
were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all,
or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering
that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they
were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted
and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the
Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who
practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a
possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with
the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the
petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the
manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given
the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an
intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets
seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the
military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was
violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be
taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was
not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right
thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered
the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize
the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind
of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search
warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have
just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without
bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates
that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the
weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without
warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a
warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person being
arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer.
Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and
contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and
aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their
mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25 The individual may
knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also
been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and
hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is
that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken.
Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is
that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected
by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973
Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion
observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's
justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know
that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case,
however, the said articles must remain incustodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion
for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal
procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is
hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August
6,1985, is made permanent. No costs. SO ORDERED.Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan,
Melencio-Herrera, CC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN,
MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG
HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI,
KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE
FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM
AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL
FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN
HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and
elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at
Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. 1
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike
the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the
people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing
them outright (although the last part is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst
of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and

deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the
situation aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued,
resulting in a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants
were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their
objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine
rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to
recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against
them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative
of their right against self-incrimination. 4
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the
articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of
the regional trial court, Zamboanga City. 5After receiving the testimonial and documentary
evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion
is based. 6
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they
were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by
the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident
in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) thatSec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify
their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. 8 There was also the
suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and
order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the
petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts
the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte
Milligan: 10
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with
the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did
not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it
could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners.

It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment
they received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious.
Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the
strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from
justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and
had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed
innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not
have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the
innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals.
What it does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor
of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary
punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest
criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still,
under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid,
they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was
incumbent on them, especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather
than undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant
case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to
determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises.
Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not
urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound
would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a
preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the
orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their
way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be
nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the
law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up
anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might
as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil
courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the
beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his
way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed,
even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule,
revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of
England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement. 13
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a
crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime?
There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must

have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos. 14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all
the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence
in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous
tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall
remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts
may decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners
deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of
his body as evidence when it may be material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain
in the past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial.
We must be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are
supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the
martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the
force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every
individual is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand
as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of
criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby
declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain
in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be
filed against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 91107

June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter
referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2)
days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus
stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused
planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his
flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline
bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco,
the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that
same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police
Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning
and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the
NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started
their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole
foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge
on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch
bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was
found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside
the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the
bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the
teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were
taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a
prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against
accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised
the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were
not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met
in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with
him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the
next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each
other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and
other Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was
hanging on his neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and
other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the
bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the
bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed
around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied
by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was
investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that
the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after
said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two
(2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as
amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV
of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made
without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during
the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search
is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful
arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus,
the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was
then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from

a plastic bag owned by the accused,10or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and
attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer
also received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had
prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on
his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs,
based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had
to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of
the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search
was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of
accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his
passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so,
only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his
identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the
authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused
was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose
a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal
effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said
bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags
containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances,
would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct
the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the
protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer,
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in
its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon,
a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in
cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway
at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and
for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also
claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket
authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation
of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had
been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se

illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners
who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action,
as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is
purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and
searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more,
i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right
against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not
all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light
therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units,"
not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness
and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is howeverreasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part
of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily
lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military
manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and
the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL.
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA
AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.
NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI
SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs.
Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without
warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing lawsto the factual situations
obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt
with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking
or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people not
the Court that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5
of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of
the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to
their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their

possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4Therefore, the
function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the
Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned
arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in
accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express
authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without
warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No.
81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested
for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership
penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia
vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle
for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the
day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as
part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given

another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents
or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion
(or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common"
offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition
of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting
officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as
supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the
person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted,
refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the
arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the
St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which
was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted
to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the
wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered
two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on
the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian,
Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said
hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City
by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital
records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a
gunshot wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his
address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality
Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their
immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in
their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting
officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually

received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the
directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith
by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested
Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers
are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting
officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear
that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without
warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in
authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case
No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro
custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before
this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple(G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or
ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified
their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without
warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them
within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition
fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he
had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied
by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information,
the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when
Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that
he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that,
at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live
ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on
13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening
of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns
were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12
May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the
head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the

court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that
the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by
Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for
their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were
probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to
effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person
named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and
found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at
the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or
subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in
the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their
former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances,
the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records
also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military
agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to
have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the
afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent
an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and
made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause
for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the
acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule
113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in
our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them.
Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof,
even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the
arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the
basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila,
Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other
things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant,
not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language
which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the
right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right
to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the
authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words
were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and
freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the
scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted
that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and
academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the
peace officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a
quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal
Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects
in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his
companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December
1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans
under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police
were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without
warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information
charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo
Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted
therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of
an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which
liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the
corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and
Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or
whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the
court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment
of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier.
On the other hand, in the case ofAmelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed
firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest,
belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed
by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the
arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e.
that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the
other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon
which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or
innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus.
It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same,
particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still
directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important
is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding.
This Court. will promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the
same the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of
Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee
shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall
not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may
be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the
suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these
petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress,
are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis
of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More
than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the
Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent
the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner
Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as
follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify
persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social
security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve
such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A
decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social
security providers is hereby established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee
(IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the
System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as
members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat
to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the
NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and
Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in
computer application designs of their respective systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in
coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other
concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination
campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and
the Social Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced
from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports
to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this
undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A
SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL
REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE
SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.

We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the
standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O.
No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules
yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves
have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a
notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All signals
from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not
wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the

dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as
its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power
is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." 8 The
Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary
power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or
common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. 14 The executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its
officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law
and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and

"embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the

people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and
General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of
Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V
on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on
Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the
organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for
the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The
Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization,
personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions
performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O.
No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to
get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying
his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes
no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative
legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative
legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the
public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold
v. Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of
privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a
right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
"in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that

privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right
of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications
though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual,
in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain
and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and
enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is expressly recognized in section 3
(1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may
be provided by law.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee
or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an
officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules
of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our
citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right
to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological
facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into
a broad category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's
identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic
such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. A behavioral
characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice print, signature
and keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin
number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the
individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a
fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a
biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of
identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be
scanned every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan.
Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the
retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another
biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the
unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest on the list
of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures
of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is seen. The different
densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat
signature." 53

In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions
are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to
identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in encoding any and
all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No.
308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the
banquest of options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens
the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308.
Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to
store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must
present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded
whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file
may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets
and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the
use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through
the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our
authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
address and other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even that hospitable
assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does
not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It
does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for
what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the
integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government
agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer
system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data
for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with
the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions"
by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what
can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier
on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of
the computer revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier
on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can

continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of
stored date is simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the
computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the
information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would
dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot
countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate
guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that
endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of biometrics technology as
it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on
a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The
factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices
of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of
biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances, the level of reasonably
expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The
security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file
but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so
widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless
of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and
regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the
IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data
furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161
prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74These laws, however,
apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be
applied to data with the other government agencies forming part of the National ID System.
The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment
should be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of
privacy by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No.
308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government services,
(2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for
development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right
to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the constitutionality
of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We
declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his
assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's
right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard
of honesty in the public service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not
an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on
what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN
the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot
pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the

integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law,
administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to
invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for
the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if
not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily
show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution
whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In
case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger
the rights protected by the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the
United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New
York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons
who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State
Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify parties obtaining
prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but
with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded
in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were
patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication
because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to public
disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs
alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of
the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional
violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws
designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement
was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation
by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover,
the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate
disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage
and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access the data. It
also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of
these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid
exercise of police power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per
se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to
improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both
government and private industry seek. Many information system in different countries make
use of the computer to facilitate important social objective, such as better law enforcement,
faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance
programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by
making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and
make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the
information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may
surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected
to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and welldefined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order

that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason
for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the
basic disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of
the individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All
the forces of a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society. 87
IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the wellworded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened
by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because
of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to
this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy
as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not
engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., I join Justices Kapunan and Mendoza in their dissents.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Davide, Jr., In the result and I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.
Melo, J., I join the dissents of Justices Kapunan and Mendoza.
Vitug, J., See separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., See dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Quisumbing, J., I join in dissenting opinion of JJ. Mendoza and Kapunan.
Purisima, J., I join in Justice Mendoza's dissenting.