Facts

impt facts court ruling defense plaintiff

The question of this case is about when the contract or relationship between
passengers and carriers cease to exist- answer is reasonable time

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20761

July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.
Ahmed Garcia for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano
Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter Raquel Beltran, plus
P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together
with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4
years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing
plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at
San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they
were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal
belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of
plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full
fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on
Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in
accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to
get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying
some of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife
and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left
pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which
he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed

by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus
waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its
seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading,
suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the
customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the
baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again
placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point
where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped
from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed
on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife
and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around
the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and
without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was
run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against
the defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000
to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained as a result thereof and
attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below rendered the judgment in
question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of
contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child
and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach
of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was
no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the
contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained
this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and
held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in accordance
with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the
petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to
P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding
it liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for
breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to
P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower
court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement
holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be
pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their
children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated
for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had
to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that

was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be no controversy that as far as
the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for hisbayong which was not
unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
remained subsisting.
For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the
latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in
removing his baggage from the car.1
The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the
father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her
safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.

It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and

passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises . And,
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks
along the station platform is considered still a passenger.2 So also, where a passenger
has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the
company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother,
a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging
in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the
protection of the railroad and company and its agents. 3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was
not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must
have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of
the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to
run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at
this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the
circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless
did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus
conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part
of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of
said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be
considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their
contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated,
herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court
of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint,
which reads

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their
agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasidelict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is
permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a
plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each
other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and
determined.4
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim
was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise
of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants
and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during
the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the
conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and
near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of
its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to
overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of
the child Raquel Beltran.
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of
Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass
upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs
did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on
P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as
appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the
inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a
clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general
rule.5 Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals committed error
in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently, meritorious.1wph1.t
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the
petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the
death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as actual damages. No
costs in this instance. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Facts

impt facts court ruling defense plaintiff

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
This case is about an accident somewhere in baguio. The court ruled that extraordinary
diligence with due regard of all the cricumstances must be observed. Accident caused
by cars/malfunctions is not causo fortuito.
The presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it acted negligently. The
presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carriers part that it observed extraordinary
diligence. It was rebutted by evidence- check up the day before BUT IT DOES NOT
APPEAR that the carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in connection with
the said inspection.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970

SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendantsappellants.
SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendantsappellants.
Gabriel A. Zabala for plaintiffs-appellees.
Vicente M. Erfe Law Office for defendants-appellants.

VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila ordering the defendants Pangasinan Transportation Co.
(PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. D-1468
(L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1470 (L-28015) the
sum of P3,500.00.
The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by the spouses
Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia
Landingin, respectively, for damages allegedly suffered by them in connection with the

death of their respective daughter, Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to the
alleged negligence of the defendants and/or breach of contract of carriage. In their
complaints, plaintiffs averred, among others,

that in the morning of April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned daughters were among the
passengers in the bus driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and
operated by defendant PANTRANCO on an excursion trip from Dagupan City to
Baguio City and back, that the bus was open on one side and enclosed on the other, in
gross violation of the rules of the Public Service Commission; that defendant
PANTRANCO acted with negligence, fraud and bad faith in pretending to have
previously secured a special permit for the trip when in truth it had not done so; that
upon reaching an uphill point at Camp 8, Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip,
defendant driver, through utter lack of foresight, experience and driving knowledge,
caused the bus to stall and stop for a few moments; that through the said defendant's
fault and mishandling, the motor ceased to function, causing the bus to slide back
unchecked; that when the said defendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus
toward the mountainside, Leonila and Estrella, together with several other
passengers, were thrown out of the bus through its open side unto the road,
suffering serious injuries as a result of which Leonila and Estrella died at the
hospital and the same day; and that in connection with the incident, defendant driver
had been charged with and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight physical
injuries on account of the death of Leonila and Estrella and of the injuries suffered by
four others, although it may be said, by way of parenthesis, that this case is now
pending appeal in a higher court. The plaintiffs prayed for awards of moral, actual and
exemplary damages in the total sum of P40,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1468, and in the
total sum of P25,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1470 as well as attorney's fees in the
amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively.
Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging, among others,
that at the time of the accident, defendant driver was driving the bus at, the slow speed
of about 10 kilometers per hour; that while the said defendant was steering his bus
toward the mountainside after hearing a sound coming from under the rear end of the
bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly, and in disobedience to his shouted warnings and
advice, jumped out of the bus causing their heads to hit the road or pavement; that the

bus was then being driven with extraordinary care, prudence and diligence;
that defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision
of its employees, particularly of defendant driver; and that the decision convicting the
said defendant was not yet final, the same having been appealed to the Court of
Appeals where it was still pending.
By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. On October 17, 1966, the
court a quo rendered its decision therein in which it made the following findings; that
upon reaching the fatal spot at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking of metal below
the floor of the bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped, rolling back a few
moments later; that as a result, some of the passengers jumped out of the bus, while
others stepped down; that defendant driver maneuvered the bus safely to and against
the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the safety of the

many passengers still inside the bus; that while defendant driver as steering the bus
towards the mountainside, he advised the passengers not to jump, but to remain
seated; that Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but that they panicked
and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of the motor resulted from the breakage of the
cross-joint; that there was no negligence on the part of either of the defendants; that
only the day before, the said cross-joint was duly inspected and found to be in order;
and that defendant PANTRANCO had exercised the requisite care in the selection and
supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver. The court concluded that
"the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some
extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees."
One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and conclusion of the trial
court, the defendants, instead of the plaintiffs, should come to this Court on appeal. The
answer lies in the dispositive portion of the decision, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
renders judgment: (a) Absolving the defendants from any liability on
account of negligence on their part and therefore dismissing the
complaints in these two cases; (b) However, as stated above, the Court
hereby orders the defendant Pantranco to pay to the plaintiffs spouses
Marcelo Tandingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 the
amount of P6,500.00; and the amount of P3,500.00 to the spouses Pedro
Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470, not in payment
of liability because of any negligence on the part of the defendants but as
an expression of sympathy and goodwill. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to what impelled the court below to include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its
decision, can be gathered from the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which reads:
However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of P8,500.00 in the
instant cases without any admission of fault or negligence had been made
by the defendant Pantranco and that actually in Civil Case No. D-1469 for
the death of Pacita Descalso, the other deceased passenger of the bus in
question, the heirs of the decease received P3,000.00 in addition to
hospital and medical bills and the coffin of the deceased for the dismissal
of the said case without Pantranco accepting liability. There was as a
matter of fact during the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing offer of
settlement on the part of the defendant Pantranco without accepting any
liability for such damages, and the Court understood that the Pantranco
would be willing still to pay said amounts even if these cases were to be
tried on the merits. It is well-known that the defendant Pantranco is
zealous in the preservation of its public relations. In the spirit therefore of
the offer of the defendant Pantranco aforesaid, to assuage the feelings of
the herein plaintiffs an award of P6,500.00 for the spouses Marcelo
Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 whose daughter
Leonila was, when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the Far
Eastern University, and P3,500.00 for the spouses Pedro Garcia and
Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470 whose daughter Estrella was
in the fourth year High at the Dagupan Colleges when she died, is hereby

made in their favor. This award is in addition to what Pantranco might

have spent to help the parents of both deceased after the accident.
Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be absolutely free from fault
or negligence, and having in fact dismissed the complaints against them, the court
should not have ordered them to assume any pecuniary liability. There would be merit in
his argument but for the fact that defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was guilty of
breach of contract of carriage. It will be noted that in each of the two complaints it is
averred that two buses including the one in which the two deceased girls were riding,
were hired to transport the excursionist passengers from Dagupan City to Baguio City,
and return, and that the said two passengers did not reach destination safely.
As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry
its passengers "safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances." (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did defendant-appellant PANTRANCO
measure up to the degree of care and foresight required it under the circumstances?
We think not. The court below found that the cross-joint of the bus in which the
deceased were riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in
turn resulted in panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which this
Court may not disturb. We are of the opinion, however, that the lower court's conclusion
drawn from that fact, i.e., that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act
of God brought about by some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of
the Pantranco or its employees," is in large measure conjectural and speculative, and
was arrived at without due regard to all the circumstances, as required by Article 1755.
In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this Court held that an accident caused by

defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's
liability is the fact that "the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the
carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the
carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75.)
When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common

carrier is at fault or that it acted negligently ( Article 1756). This presumption

is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the
"extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of
very cautious persons" required in Article 1755 (Article 1756).
In the instant case it appears that the court below considered the presumption
rebutted on the strength of defendants-appellants' evidence that only the day
before the incident, the crossjoint in question was duly inspected and found to be in
order. It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the
circumstances in connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the
deceased were riding was heavily laden with passengers, and it would be traversing
mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus, including its
mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under ordinary
circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently

and found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability

unless it is shown that the particular circumstances under which the

bus would travel were also considered.
In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards
made by the court should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of
contracts of carriage.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
modified as indicated above, and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO is ordered to pay
to plaintiffs-appellees the amounts stated in the judgment appealed from, as damages
for breach of contracts, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing
of the complaints. Costs against defendant-appellant PANTRANCO.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., is on leave.

Facts

impt facts court ruling defense plaintiff

Tire exploded creating a hole on the floor which resulted to the kid to fall and die

Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus; petitioners
were duty bound to transport them, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code). Therein they failed. The child died
because the floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the presumption that petitioners
had neglected to provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). Evidence of
the required extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the presumption.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16086

May 29, 1964

M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN BUENA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO MONSERRAT and MARTA
CONSIGNADO, respondents.
T. F. Cachero for petitioners.
Godofredo C. Montesines for respondents.

BENGZON, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the Laguna court of first instance, the spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta
Consignado sued M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc., and Martin Buena to recover damages
for the death of their four-year old daughter Victoria.
In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were paying passengers in a
bus of defendant transportation company driven by co-defendant Buena, bound for
Antipolo, Rizal. In Sta. Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a rear tire exploded,
blasting a hole in the very place where Victoria was standing in front of her mother. As a
result, the child fell through the hole, and died that same morning from injuries
sustained in the fall.1wph1.t
The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the accident
was not due to negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2) even if
negligence was attributable to defendants, their liability had been discharged, as
evidenced by Exhibits 2 and 3 quoted in the footnote. 1
On appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, upon the finding
that (1) defendants failed to prove the extraordinary diligence required of carriers;
and (2) Exhibits 2 and 3 did not effect a waiver of plaintiffs' right to damages. Said
appellate court, therefore, required defendants to pay plaintiffs P6,000.00 as indemnity
for the child's death; P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as attorney's fees, with
interest from the date of its decision, (minus the P150.00 that had been given to plaintiff
Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).
In their petition for review by certiorari, the carrier and the driver raise the following
issues: (1) whether in a contract of carriage breached by the passenger's death,
his parents may be granted moral damages; and (2) whether the sum of P6,000.00
may be awarded as death indemnity for a child passenger. In their brief, they pose the
following questions in addition to the above issues; (3) was there a contract of
carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation company; (4)
have petitioners rebutted the presumption that they have been negligent; (5) was
the bus crowded; (6) was the bus running fast when the tire exploded; (7) what caused
the bursting of the tire; (8) was the bus floor weak; (9) was the blow-out of the
tire caso fortuito; and (10) was petitioners' liability cancelled by Exhibits 2 and 3?

The alleged lack of a contract of carriage between the deceased child and
petitioner transportation company, if true, is a complete defense against
claimants' cause of action. However, the issue is now inarguable, it being partly
factual, on which the appellate court made its finding.

Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus;

petitioners were duty bound to transport them, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code). Therein they
failed. The child died because the floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the

presumption that petitioners had neglected to provide a safe conveyance (Art.

1756, New Civil Code). Evidence of the required extraordinary diligence was not
introduced to rebut the presumption.
On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and
overspeeding, and the floor thereof was weak persuasive indications of
negligence; and reasoned out that the tire exploded due to one or a combination of the
following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly
checked; the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have
overstrained the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could
have expanded the already compressed air therein." 2
Petitioners venture to guess that it was due either to accidental puncture by a sharp
instrument, as a nail, or to latent defect in the tire. Evidence should have been but
was not presented to establish such defense.
Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still hold the carrier
liable for failure to provide a safe floor in the bus.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to
claimants. What is expressed there is the latter's belief clearly erroneous that
petitioners are not liable to them and acknowledgment of the voluntary help extended by
petitioner transportation company. The belief is baseless. That respondents entertained
such an ill-founded impression is not to be wondered at. They are ignorant, illiterate,
indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibits 2 and 3, thoroughly confused and
distracted by the death of their child.
The minimum death indemnity is P3,0003, although this Court has in various instances
granted P6,000.00. As for moral damages, the carrier is liable therefor to the parents of
a child who meets death while a passenger in any of the carrier's vehicles (Arts. 2206
and 1764, New Civil Code). Since respondents are indigents, and have litigated as
paupers, they should be allowed attorney's fees of P500.00.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

Facts

impt facts court ruling defense plaintiff

Old cold vs new civil code

This involves a passenger who was killed by a driver. The company argues
that it is a causo fortuito because the driver exceeded from the responsibility
given to him and that it was beyond the control of the company.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22272

June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and
operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of
Appeals.1wph1.t
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to
recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver
by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was
a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages
against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From
this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking
for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of
the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p.
33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad
Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its
employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case
and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was
killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court
there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in
connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The

stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was
assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at
Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that
he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours
after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was
riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of
Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also
awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any
of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As
a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's
contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting
the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the
contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the
passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when
the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889
which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers
absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent
acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case
was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art.
1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art.
1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their
exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the
occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference
between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation
before Us, which further accounts for a different result in theGillaco case. Unlike
the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the
common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon
its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are new and were taken
from Anglo-American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat
superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the
passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the
act be within the course of employment only.4

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough
that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the
sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the
rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As
explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390,
and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the
carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection
afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter
alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but
above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's
safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to
passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the
performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating
therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by
law; and (3)

as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of
wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since
it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their
patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly
adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The
dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action
was predicated on breach of contract of carriage 7 and the cab driver was not a
party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was
convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable
under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract
results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this
minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the
lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing, 8 should not be
disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 awardmoral damages in addition to compensatory
damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish
they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty
to award moral damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the
circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages

afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiffappellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's
favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the
filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.