Espuelas vs People

G.R. No. L-2990

December 17, 1951

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies
of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News,
the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the
Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and
administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and
Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill
of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe
accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of
sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what
with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is
failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading
the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply
and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional
guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure
but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only
all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least
to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives
dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the
conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and

tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence
from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance
of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to
resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to
repress the evils which press upon their minds.

A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC

July 29, 2002

IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN

THE PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
KAPUNAN, J.:
On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent
Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for
uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the case involving the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080)1 which was then pending
resolution:

Quoted hereunder are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty.
Leonard De Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending
before the Court. The statements are italicized for ready identification:
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for
its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from
Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality
of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely
to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant
groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the
justices ---considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted
power grab that May-will most likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the
Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, " the group said.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
xxx
"People are getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged." Said lawyer
Leonard de Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of
the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder
law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than
those that led to People Power II.
xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People
Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.
"People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically
wrong. Sovereignty must prevail."
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for
contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.2
In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer that
he "suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and
reports" that "the Court would vote in favor of or against the validity of the Plunder Law" to
protect the credibility of the Court.3 He explained therein:
(4) In short, the integrity of the Court, including the names of the Honorable Members
who were being unfairly dragged and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one
side of the issue, was being viciously attacked. To remain silent at this time when the
Honorable Court was under siege by what appeared to be an organized effort to influence
the court in their decision would and could lend credence to these reports coming from
anonymous sources.4
Respondent admitted further to "having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it
would vote in favor of a petition by [former President Joseph] Estradas lawyers to declare the
plunder [law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness" because he and his group were
"greatly disturbed" by such rumors.5
Anent the November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having said that the
people were "getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged," pending the courts
resolution on the petition filed by former President Estrada assailing the validity of the Plunder
Law, respondent claimed that such statement was "factually accurate."6 He also argued that he
was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said
that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional "would trigger mass
actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II."7
Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that "the people wouldnt just swallow
any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong" as an expression of his opinion and as
"historically correct," citing the ouster of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos through people
power in 1986, and the resignation of former President Estrada from office as a result of pressure
from the people who gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be stopped for
being a farce, and that Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate of the Filipino
people.8

While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made
the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.9
After a careful consideration of respondents arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law.
The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of
wrongs for the violation of said rights10 must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of
outside influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of
democracy, as well as of peace and order in society. Further, maintaining the dignity of courts
and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of
justice.11
Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for
criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of
the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.12
Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors that it
would declare the Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such
was basically wrong and would not be accepted by the peopleas utterances protected by his
right to freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and
interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice.13
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein.14 It is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from every
extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them.15 The court has previously
held that-xxx As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This
Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This
right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an

individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal.16
In People vs. Godoy,17 this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the
proceedings and decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express his
opinions on the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which
they perform the important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade
the court, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught
its orders, judgments and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of
speech and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and wellbeing in society by obstructing the course of justice.18
Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law or risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as
falling within the ambit of constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are not fair
criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made against it to force the
Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such
statements show disrespect not only for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole,
tend to promote distrust and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the
impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right of
the parties to have their case tried fairly by an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public
clamor and other extraneous influences.19
It is respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts
and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice20 and in the Supreme Court as the
last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondents utterances as quoted above, while the case
of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his protestation of
good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Decision.

Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the publications seized and later
burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. After his
injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with
SC, invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. Issue: W/N the search and
seizure was illegal HELD: YES. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a
judicial warrant , otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v
Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the

serach of the premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason
of a defective warrant.
There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of
a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no
different from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene".
The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge , if in their
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action. The judge must determine WON the same are indeed
"obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound
discretion. If probable cause exist, a search warrant will issue.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the
Decision [1] dated August 29, 1997 and Resolution [2] dated January 7, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39878, affirming the Resolutions [3] of
respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioners guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the service and imposing a penalty of six-(6) months suspension
without pay.
1

Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in Metro Manila. On various
dates in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and
instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang
Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their
grievances.
On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals that petitioners
participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with the return-to-work order
issued on September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), petitioners were administratively charged with
such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service
1

law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the
investigations conducted by the DECS Investigating Committees, Secretary Cario
found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the
service. [4]
4

Petitioners appealed the orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems

Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the CSC. In 1995, the CSC modified the
said orders of Secretary Cario as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Everdina Acosta guilty of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She is hereby
meted out the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay.
Considering the period of time she was out of service, she is automatically
reinstated to her former positions (sic). [5]
5

Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned

the matter before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition
for certiorari and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION THAT WRONGLY PENALIZED PETITIONERS WHOSE
ONLY "OFFENSE" WAS TO EXERCISE THEIR CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.
RESPONDENT COYRT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION THAT WRONGLY DENIED PETITIONERS THEIR RIGHT
TO BACKWAGES.
This petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioners do not deny their absence from work nor the fact that said absences
were due to their participation in the mass actions at the Liwasang Bonifacio.
However, they contend that their participation in the mass actions was an
4

exercise of their constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the

government for redress of grievances. Petitioners likewise maintain that they
never went on strike because they never sought to secure changes or
modification of the terms and conditions of their employment.
Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass
actions which they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early
as 1990 in Manila Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr. [6]
wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a
strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons." [7] In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, [8] we added
that:
6

It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that

petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their
services. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the
striking employees to describe their common course of action is
inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the
absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in
concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not
because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for
redress of grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and
unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students
for whose education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners
definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the
petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which
6

resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and

classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are
efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of
grievances."
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary,
will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why
the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded
that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging
the "mass actions," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice
of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize
an illegal work stoppage. [9]
9

In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, [10] De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, [11] and Alipat v.
Court of Appeals, [12] we upheld our rulings in MPSTA and Bangalisan.
Considering the factual circumstances of this case and the doctrine of stare
decisis to which we consistently adhere, we find no compelling reason to deviate
from our earlier rulings in these related cases.
10

11

12

Anent the second issue, petitioners invoke our statement in Bangalisan that
payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which
caused his suspension and if his suspension is unjustified. Petitioners cite CSC
Resolution No. 93-162 and contend that the determination of the CSC therein
that not an iota of evidence was given to substantiate the conclusion that they
participated in a "teacher's strike" amounted to a finding that they were innocent
of the charges filed against them.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he
has not rendered any service. [13] While there are recognized instances when
13

10

11

12

13

backwages may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official who is

later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in citing Bangalisan, the factual
circumstances of the case at bar impel us to rule otherwise.
Petitioners' reliance on CSC Resolution No. 93-162 is misplaced. Said CSC
resolution disposed of the appeals of Fely Ilarina, Adelaida Dela Cruz, Alicia
Galvo, Nenita Albios and Nerissa Abellanda. Petitioners were never parties to
their appeals and, therefore, cannot cite CSC Resolution No. 93-162 in support
of their contention. Petitioners also overlook the fact that although no evidence
was presented to prove that Ilarina, et al. participated in the mass actions, the
CSC explained that the deficiency was cured by their admissions during the
hearings before the MSPB. [14] More importantly, however, herein petitioners'
claim of exoneration is belied by the determination of the CSC that their
participation in the mass actions constituted conduct prejudicial to the service.
Being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration. [15]
14

15

Petitioners also point out that from the issuance of the orders of dismissal by
Secretary Cario to the modification thereof by the CSC, almost five (5) years
elapsed. Petitioners argue that the period in excess of their preventive
suspension and penalty of six (6) months suspension amounted to unjustified
suspension for which an award of backwages was proper pursuant to our rulings
in Bautista v. Peralta [16] and Abellera v. City of Baguio. [17]
16

17

We disagree. It will be recalled that in Jacinto, we upheld the legality of the

immediate execution of the dismissal orders issued by Secretary Cario on the
ground that under Section 47(2), [18] Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, the decision of a
18

14

15

16

17

18

department secretary confirming the dismissal of an employee under his

jurisdiction is executory even pending appeal thereof. [19] Since dismissal orders
remain valid and effective until modified or set aside, the intervening period
during which an employee is not permitted to work cannot be argued as
amounting to unjustified suspension. In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, [20] we further
explained that:
19

20

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not

a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct
an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension
pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated
with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) states that
respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during
the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his
conviction is affirmed, i.e. if he is not exonerated, the period of his
suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
21

[21]

Petitioners' reliance on Fabella v. Court of Appeals [22] is likewise unavailing. In

that case, the petitioners therein immediately went to court to seek injunctive
relief against the DECS administrative proceedings on the ground that they were
deprived of due process. The trial court declared the administrative proceedings
void and ordered the payment of backwages to the petitioners therein. The Court
of Appeals then upheld the order of the trial court. In affirming both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, we stated therein that:
22

x x x Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case are

void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is
baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be reinstated
19

20

21

22

and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during
the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. x x x [23]
23

On the other hand, in the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged
non-observance of due process by the DECS Investigating Committees only
upon appeal to the MSPB. Significantly, however, it has been our consistent
ruling that an appeal is curative of any supposed denial of due process. [24] Thus,
after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and CSC, and later on before
the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process to
justify their claim for backwages.
24

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

23

24