VILAVICENCIO v.

LUKBAN (Section 1)
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode
was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the
women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in
the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each,
plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the
person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other
municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that
he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity
in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni (Section 2)
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by
Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant
civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68

which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO
arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact
that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it
has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the
case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, andadopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague
Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence
considered as part of the law of the land.
AGUSTIN v. EDU (Section 2)
Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter
of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo
Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this. The letter was
promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce
accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars. The LTO was the issuer of the device at
the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. The triangular reflector plates were
set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection,
and due process/ 2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car
dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the
unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts. The Philippines was
also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the
petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.
Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?
Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or
less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty. The case also says that
police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property to promote the general welfare. Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general
welfare of the people. J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did
not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures
calculated to insure communal peace. There was no factual foundation on petitioner to
refute validity. Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in
overthrowing the statute. Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His
claims that the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not
expensive. SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the
driver is concerned. Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because
its installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car
allowing drivers to see clearly. There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the

law doesnt violate any constitutional provision. LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners
to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety. The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both
recommended enforcement for installation of ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying
rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution. On the unlawful delegation of
legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ (Section 2)
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that
it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the
equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180.
The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls
in the Pasay city market.
GONZALEZ v. HECHANOVA (Section 2)
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice
and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of
the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative

enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through
an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point
of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but,
also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to
an act of Congress.
In Re: Garcia 2 (Section 2)
Facts:Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others
that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato
Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of
the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the
phils.
Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.
Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic
degrees between the republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the
applicant. said treaty was intende to govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the
executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.
PEOPLE v. LAGMAN (Section 4)
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to
do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to
kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service.

AGLIPAY v. RUIZ (Section 6)

The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Churchtook
place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz,
initiated the production of certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a
chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were
produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production
and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative
to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution
which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any
church or denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as
being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public
money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident
thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the
manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. The
fact that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts
and under his discretion. On religious freedom The Supreme Court noted however that the
elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our
preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government.
If should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an
inhibition of profound reverence to religion.
CALALANG v. WILLIAMS (Section 10 & 11)
Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of
theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?
Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said
law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to
the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
ALMEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS (Section 10 & 11)
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial
court due to it being filed five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and
subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration. Respondent court dismissed the petition
contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was not only mandatory
but jurisdictional such that the petitioners failure to comply therewith had the effect of
rendering the judgment final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for reconsideration and is
denied. Also, it was found that there was lack of merit in the petitioners reason for the late
filing of the notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an
appeal within reglementary period would render a judgment final and executory.
HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by
statute, particularly Sec 39 of BP 129, which provides:Sec.39 . Appeals. The period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,

judgment, or decision appealed fromThe right to appeal is a statutory right and one who
seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial
business. Due to petitioners negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is no recourse
but to deny the petition thus making the judgment of the trial court final and executory.
ONDOY v. IGNACIO (Section 10 & 11)
Facts: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio.
According tothechief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the
workforce. He was invited byfriends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter
was found dead. Therefore, Estrella wasaskingfor compensation from the death of her son
while in the respondents employ. However, thestatementgiven by the chief engineer and
oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and thereforedismissed the claimfor lack of merit.
Even when a motion for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the Secretaryof
Labor for the same reason, that is, lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is
social justiceapplicablein this case?
Ruling: Yes.Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor.
It merelydisregardedthe statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the
principle of social justiceapplied inthis case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court
recognized the right of the petitioner to theclaim of compensation because her son
was shown to have died while in the actual performanceof hiswork. To strengthen the
constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, TheCourtquoted another
case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, whohasresources
to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the
strictercompliance.
SALONGA v. FARRALES
Facts: Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased. Prior to
the acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land, Salonga was already a lessee of some
portion of the land. She had built aa house and paid rentals thereon. Sometime prior to
November 1968, Farrales files ejectment case (one of the old forms of action for recovery of
the possession of real property) for non-payment of rentals against Salonga. The lower court
rendered a decision in favor of Farrales and order Salonga and the other lessees. (Pascual et
al.) to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorneys fees and
costs. Even before the rendition of the decision of the lower court. Farrales sold to Pascual et
Al. (The other lessess of Farrales) the areas occupied by them. Salonga offered to purchase
from Farrales the portion of land that Salonga was leasing Farrales persistently refused the
offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case. Hence, if
Salongas offer to purchase was persistently refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no
meeting of the minds took place and no contract was perfected between them. It was
revealed that Farrales wanted the payment of the land under consideration to be in cash but
Salonga did not have any money for that purpose that is why Farrales persisitenly refused to
sell the portion of the leased land to the lessee.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of Salonga on the ground that
no legal contract exists between Farrales and Salonga.
Held: Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of the perfection. In the case at bar,
Farrales rejected and did not accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land in question. There
being no consent there is, therefore, no contract to sell to speak of. In the case of other

lessess (Pascual et al) who were able to buy the portion of land that they occupy, there was
an existing contract between them and Farrales, unlike Salonga who does not have the right
to buy the land in question because the contract between her and Farrales in non-existent.
Section 10 Article II states that The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development The aforementioned provision is applicable to the case at bar. The
social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who ar also
entitles for protection under our Constitution. The social justice consecrated in our
Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and giv them to another
who is not entitles thereto. The plea for social justice cannot nullify the on obligations and
contracts. Supreme Courts Deision: The appeals was dismissed for lack of merit and the
judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.
MEYER v. NEBRASKA ( Section 12)
Brief Fact Summary: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska
statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet
completed the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating
legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an
acceptable state objective
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the
eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.
Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of
the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily
restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English
language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the
protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a
fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German
language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference
is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively
regulate.
PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS (Section 12)
Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary
restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents
and guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or
guardians right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not
usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state
interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain
academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting
an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary
restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act.
The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a
public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the
state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of
the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and
guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education,
the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in
the mode in which their children are educated.
PEOPLE v. RITTER (Section 12)
FACTS: Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involvinga
young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because
aforeign object left inside her vaginal canal. When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not
Guilty".Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits. The trial court rendered a
decision convictingthe appellant of such crime.
ISSUE: Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court?
RULING: Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of
convictiononly if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it
behooves us to exertthe most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the
arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed
committed the criminal act. Before theconviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as
stated in the case of Urbanovs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
xxx The rule is that the death of thevictim must be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him bythe accused. And since we are dealing with
a criminal conviction, the proof that the accusedcaused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. xxxWe cannot convict on anything less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of theBill of Rights and our criminal justice system
are as much, if not more so, for the perverts andoutcasts of society as they are for normal,
decent, and law-abiding people. The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced
mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused didcommit the offense has not been
satisfied. The established facts do not entirely rule out thepossibility that the appellant could
have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. Thisobject may have caused her
death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person.However, the Court cannot
base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicionsand possibilities are not
evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused.(People v. Tolentino, supra)
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, goodcustoms, public order or
public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has abusedFilipino children, enticing
them with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws whichwilladequately protect
street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or
guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutoryrape and
other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of
pedophilestaking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of
our society. We have toacquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so.
We, however, express theCourt's concern about the problem of street children and the evils
committed against them.Something must be done about it.
HELD:

The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on grounds
of reasonable doubt.
Department of Education vs. San Diego (Section 12)
Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the
National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends
he may not, under its rule that- Astudent shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT.
After 3 successive failures, a student shall not beallowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS
Zoology. The petitionerclaims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many
times. When he applied to take it again, thepetitioner rejected his application on the basis of
the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela tocompel his admission to the
test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and qualityeducation. By agreement of the parties, the private
respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing
the above-cited rule. Theadditional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due
process and equalprotection.
Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit
the admission tomedical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence
and preparation for a medical education.
Ratio:While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. Thisis true of any other calling in which the public interest
is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge toone's ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are notdissipated or,
no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promotethe common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.The Court
feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of
theConstitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise. The privaterespondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainlymisplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is
intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressedthat a person who does not
qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation.The only
inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another
calling that hasnot excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least
lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely tosucceed and may even be outstanding. It is for
the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education forthe full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a
brilliantfuture. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who
should never have left the farmand engineers who should have studied banking and
teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeedthat the State took decisive
steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to thecourse
for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may
be "swampedwith mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in
intelligence but because we are anation of misfits
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest (Section 12)

Facts: On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for
the writ of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that
thepreliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was
auseless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meetthe
strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probablecause.
(2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted theprocedure
followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. (3) It was in
the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set beingimputed to petitioner. As
prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday,March
15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified theissuance of the
warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way thepreliminary
examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, heasserted that while
it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in
Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence
of probable cause was constitutionally deficient?
Ruling: The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the
terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.The Court issued the following
Resolution: Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the
Court Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17yearold minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his
parentsFrancisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty. Guillermo
B.Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further
proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law. This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare
Code. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring asum that is excessive
OPOSA v. FACTORAN (Section 16)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of
the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did
not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution
provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause. The Court held that the Timber License
Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by
the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is
SET ASIDE.

LLDA v. CA (Section 16)

Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development
so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown
that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further
defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns,
cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region. Upon
implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters
since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant
fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore Big
fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish
cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current
environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. The LLDA then served notice
to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered
with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be
subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of
RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners
of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues: 1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held: 1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of
EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said
region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority
to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna
de Bay and the lake region. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general statute.The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not
favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general
law by mere implication. The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for
revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens,
fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating &
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It
partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most
demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of
the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. 2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and

desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and
other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand
the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
GARCIA v. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS (Section 19)
FACTS:The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation,
applied for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of
Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an amended application
to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site, Congressman Enrique
Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPCs original and amended
application documents. The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC
had declined to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that
Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these documents
absent consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the amended application without
holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a
petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes
of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcias Constitutional right to have access to
information on matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The
Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an interest in the establishment of the
petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not
only their economic life, but even the air they breathe The Court also ruled that BPCs
amended application was in fact a second application that required a new public notice to be
filed and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that all applications and
their supporting documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be
disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the applicant, the Court emphasized
that Article 81 provides for disclosure on the orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application, amended
application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain
exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, the Constitution
does not open every door to any and all information because the law may exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny. Thus it excluded the trade secrets and
confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security from its order. The Court did not provide a test for what
information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor
did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold under its ruling.
ASSOC OF SMALL LAND OWNERS V. DAR (Sec tion 21)
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land
Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes
a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted
in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P.
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later,
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988.
This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program
and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated
due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.
HELD:1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class
exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial

distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
The CITY GOV of BAGUIO CITY v. ATTY MASWENG (Section 22)
Facts:In pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206, petitioner issued the subject
demolition advicesfor the enforcement of Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 against
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.et.al; Demolition Order No. 83, Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen,
Sr., et.al, all in Busol Watershed,Baguio City. As it is, the aforesaid individuals filed a petition
for injunction (Case No. 31-CAR-09)while Magdalena Gumangan, et al. filed a petition for
identification, delineation and recognition ofancestral land claims with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction(Case No. 29-CAR-09).Respondent in his
capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the National Commission on IndigenousPeoples,
Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued the following separate
temporaryrestraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:(1) 72Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ
ofPreliminary Injunction4 in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09; and(2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining
Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction7 in
NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09.Hence, this petition asserting that the restraining orders and writs
of preliminary injunction wereissued in willful disregard, disobedience, def
iance and resistance of this Courts Decision in G.R. No.180206 which dismissed the previous
injunction case. Petitioner contends that respondents act of
enjoining the execution of the demolition orders and demolition advices is tantamount to
allowingforum shopping since the implementation of the demolition orders over the
structures in the BusolForest Reservation had already been adjudicated and affirmed by this
Court.Respondent claims that he issued the restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction in NCIPCase Nos. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his jurisdiction was called
upon to protect andpreserve the rights of the petitioners (in the NCIP cases) who were
undoubtedly members of theindigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples. In
addition, he maintains that the orders andwrits he issued did not disregard the earlier ruling
of this Court in G.R. No. 180206 because the Courthas in fact affirmed the power of the NCIP
to issue temporary restraining orders and writs ofinjunction without any prohibition against
the issuance of said writs when the main action is forinjunction.

Issue:Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject
temporaryrestraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.
Held:The court ruled in affirmative.The said orders clearly contravene the courts ruling in
G.R. No. 180206 that Elvin Gumangan, et.al.who are owners of houses and structures
covered by the demolition orders issued by petitioner arenot entitled to the injunctive relief
previously granted by respondent.The court finds that petitioners and private respondents
present the very same arguments andcounter-arguments with respect to the writ of
injunction against the fencing of the Busol WatershedReservation. The same legal issues are
thus being litigated in G.R. No.180206 and in the case at bar,except that different writs of
injunction are being assailed.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at
bar andG.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same
hearing officer),the court is constrained by the principle of stare decisis in granting the
instant petition.Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the demolition advices are
simply enforcing theprevious demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or
their agents and successors-in- interest, only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders
and writs issued by respondent.
Despite the Courts
pronouncement in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor ofthose
occupants or claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued
bypetitioner, and hence there remains no legal impediment to bar their implementation,
respondentstill issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction.
Respondent has willfully disregarded and defies the Courts ruling on a matter submitted for
the
second time before his office. Hence Atty. Masweng is guilty of indirect contempt under
Section 7 ofRule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 3(b) of
Rule 71 of the Rule.
BASCO v. PAGCOR (Section 25)
FACTS: Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for being allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward crony economy,
waiving the Manila City governments right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the
equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds
for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a
wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or
permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in
the City of Manila. LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being
a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over
local governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national
policies using the power to tax as a tool for regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed
to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by
Congress. The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it
simply means decentralization.

A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection
clause doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere
fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.
LIMBONAS v. MANGELIN (Section 25)
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of
Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there
shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays
that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still
the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a
resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom.
Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments
or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of
Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987),
Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national
government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts,
say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in
the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of
power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power
of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume

jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with
more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor
of autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It
is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be
suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter
whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for
the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not
appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that
instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.
LEGASPI v. CSC (Section28)
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi
against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request
for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed
the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil
service eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e.,
(a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This
question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has
the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of
public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed,
". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments
against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional

right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by
the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public
office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service
eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from
the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register
of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm
or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Mandamus, therefore lies
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA (Section 28)
Facts:1.Activated through LOI 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, the
NCRDistrict Command sought to conduct security operations within its area ofresponsibility
and peripheral areas for the purpose of establishing an effectiveterritorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphereconducive to the social,
economic and political development of the NCR. As part ofits duty to maintain peace and
order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in variousparts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.2.
Petitioner (Ricardo Valmonte), together with the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
Peoples Rights, contended that said checkpoints caused worries among the residents of
Valenzuela, including the possibility of getting harassed. Aside fromthe possibility of getting
harassed, residents worry of their safety due to thearbitrary, capricious and whimsical
disposition of the military manning thecheckpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles
are being subjected to regularsearches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of asearch warrant and/or court order.3.
On July 9, 1988, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan(Benjamin Parpon)
was gunned down (not killed) allegedly by members of theNCRDC manning the checkpoint
for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself tothe checkpoint and for continuing to speed
off in spite of warning shots fired in theair.4. Petitioners (Valmonte and ULAP) contended that
the said checkpoints give therespondents (De Villa) a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizureswithout search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution. Valmontehas claimed that he had gone thru said checkpoints where he was
stopped and hiscar subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Ruling:1.No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of
theirroutine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners right
against unlawfulsearches and seizures, or other rights. Petitioners general allegation that he
had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by themilitary manning the
checkpoints, without stating the details of the incidents whichamount to a violation of his
right against unlawful search and seizure, is notsufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmontes right against unlawful search and seizure.
2.The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personalright,
and could be invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed orthreatened to be
infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable searchand seizure in any particular

case is purely a judicial question, determinable from aconsideration of the circumstances

involved.
3.Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
notforbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but isto be
resolved according to the facts of each case. When the officer merely drawsaside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds orsimply looks into a vehicle
or flashes a light therein, these do not constituteunreasonable search.
4.Between the inherent right of the State to protect its existence and promote publicwelfare
and an individuals right against a warrantless search, which is reasonablyconducted, the
former shall prevail.
AQUINO-SARMIENTO v. MORATO (Section 28)
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be
allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the
individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on
the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's
request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the
members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an
executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In
said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting
records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without
clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to
examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that
respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and
personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual
person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD
1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence
is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual
acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and
acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the individual voting
slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official
functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in
character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry
by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVT OF THE R P PEACE PANEL
FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about
by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the

Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The
agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD
and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are
unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the
mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process. Article III (Bill of
Rights) Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access
to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Article II Sec.
28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No
project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and
approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department) Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate. Article X. (Local Government) Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall
be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas
voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making. ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR
REVISIONS) Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional
convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1

hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and
upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is
limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.