READING MATERIAL

(Liberal Interpretation)
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia,
GR No. 148311
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his
surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and
ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed
to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia)
as her middle name. The lower court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use
the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for
all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of
the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA
8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.

This is consistent with the intention of the members

of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father.
G.R. No. 116695 June 20, 1997VICTORIA G.
GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA,
petitioners,vs.HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA,
JR.,
FACTS:A complaint for forcible entry was filed
by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against
Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon
and Alex Guevara before the MTCC of Iloilo City.
Summons was served on and received by
petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to
file an answer within the reglementary period of
10days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time;
hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over
him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with
the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to
file an answer. On September 7, 1993, the MTCC
denied the motion on the ground that it was a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. On September 8, 1993, or more than
ten days from their receipt of the summons,
petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for
the admission of their answer, which was attached
thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another
motion pleading for the admission of an amended
answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied
the motions and considered the case submitted for
resolution. On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also
denied the petitioners 'motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC
issued a decision resolving the complaint for
forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and injunction before the
RTC of Iloilo City praying mainly that the MTCC be
ordered to admit the amended answer and
to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for
forcible entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining
order was issued by the RTC. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the assailed Decision dismissing the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rule on Summary
Procedure may be liberally construed.

RULING: No.As a general principle, rules

prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their
very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory. 25The Rule on Summary Procedure, in
particular, was promulgated for the purpose of
achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases." 26 For this reason, the
Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether
the filing of motions for extension of time.
Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the
Rule which allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a
defendant to file an answer within the reglementary
period. Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on

Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court
to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in
cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure
shall be "non-extendible." 27It is clear that the
use of the word "shall" in the Rule on Summary
Procedure underscores the mandatory character of
the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a
directory application would subvert the nature of
the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its
objective of expediting the adjudication of
suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners
suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers
the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress.