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SAMPLE MEMO #1

To:
Senator [name deleted]
From:
[Name Deleted]
Subject: Military Retirement Reform

1. Issue: Personnel costs have increased 66% from 2002 to 2016 requested amounts
while the number of active duty service members has actually decreased. DOD must
decrease future personnel spending by modifying the retirement system to provide
benefits to every service member who serves for at least 3 years while remaining
attractive to recruit and retain our nations best.
2. Background: Congress has attempted to modify military compensation in the past,
but the existing retirement system has received no material changes in over 30 years. The
recommendations from the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization
Commissions (MCRMC) released in February do address many of the shortcomings of
the current system. However, as the chart below depicts, their recommended pension,
career continuation pays and TSP contributions cost nearly as much as the current
system. General Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, has warned that at todays rate, the
Armys personnel costs will consume 80% of the services budget by 2020. A much
more dramatic cost savings benefit must be adopted to control personnel costs and
alleviate its strain on the defense budget.
The DOD can retain the status quo 20-year cliff-vesting system, adopt the MCRMCs
proposed pension combined with TSP option, or make a more material change and
transition to a pure defined-contribution plan. The current system provides a pension to
those who reach 20 years of service equal to 2.5 times the number of years served times
the average of the high 3 years of pay.
The MCRMC proposal lowers the retirement pay multiplier from 2.5 to 2,
automatically contributes 1% of base pay to the members TSP and matches the
members TSP contributions up to 3%. The proposal also provides continuation pay
equal to between 3 and 14 months base pay at the members 12th year of service, which is
assumed to be invested in their TSP.
The defined contribution plan would simply deposit a percentage of the members
base pay into TSP each month. The amount would vest between 3 and 15 years at 8.3%
each year. This is to encourage retention after the members initial 3-year commitment is
fulfilled. To make the benefit somewhat comparable to the current plan, 12% should be
contributed to their TSP.
3. Analysis: The table below highlights the costs of each plan to the government and the
potential benefit to the service member. While these costs are easily definable, the
impact on recruiting and retention is much more difficult to predict. However, it is

logical to assume the more generous the benefit to the service member, the more effective
it will be at retaining quality personnel. Given all services have met their recruiting and
retention goals for the past 8 years and active duty strength is being reduced, some risk
can be assumed in this area. No matter what modifications to the current retirement
system are adopted, Congress must honor the contractual obligations it made with current
military members, and institute these changes only for future service members.

Retirement Assets of a Retiring Active-Duty E7

Status Quo
Pros
- Most stable and guaranteed source of income for retirees
- Influence on recruiting and retention are known
- Administration of retirement system already in place
Cons
- As highlighted by the General Obierno, personnel costs are too high to maintain
- Perceived unfairness when only 17% of service members ever receive any amount of
retirement benefit
MCRMC Proposal
Pros
- Leverages TSP contributions to allow potential growth to a more generous benefit
- Alleviates some government financial burden (about 10K over estimated E7 retiree
payouts) by relying on TSP growth
- Service members TSP is fully vested after 3 years guaranteeing some benefit to all who
serve at least that long

Cons
- Pension, TSP match and continuation pay do not save the government enough money to
make a meaningful impact on the budget
- Market risk will influence returns in TSP account
- Full vesting occurs too soon to serve as a retention tool

Defined Contribution
Pros
- Substantial savings compared to other alternatives
- Phased vesting from 3 15 years (8.3% each year) serves as an effective retention tool
- Leverages TSP contributions to allow potential growth to a more generous benefit
Cons
- Provides a less generous benefit than MCRMC plan, but better than status quo which
could impact recruiting
- Market risk will influence returns in TSP account
4. Recommendation I recommend you not only oppose the MCRMC proposal, but
also draft and propose legislation to change the retirement system to a defined
contribution plan effective for all newly accessed service members beginning in FY
2018. This change will alleviate burden on the defense budget through eliminating
excessive personnel costs resulting in cost savings and flexibility for DOD to invest
taxpayer money in future materiel solutions to our nations defense.

References
Levinson, R., Shah, S., Connor, P. K. (2011). Bloomberg Government Study Impact of
Defense Spending: A State-by-State Analysis. Bloomberg Government.
Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission. (2015). Final Report
of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission.
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. (2014). 2013 Demographics Profile
of the Military Community. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2001). National Defense Budget
Estimates for FY 2002. Retrieved from
http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetMaterials.aspx.
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2015). National Defense Budget
Estimates for FY 2016. Retrieved from
http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetMaterials.aspx.

SAMPLE MEMO #2
TO: Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security
FROM: [Name Deleted]
SUBJ: REFORMING SOCIAL SECURITY TO MAINTAIN SOLVENCY

Issue:
The Trustees of the Social Security Trust Fund estimate that the Old Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund will be insolvent by 2034 as projected costs outpace income. Once
insolvent, the program will be unable to meet its obligated benefits, resulting in beneficiaries
receiving either delayed full payments or timely reduced payments. An immediate reform to the
Social Security program is required in order to maintain immediate solvency, provide sufficient
benefits to beneficiaries near the poverty line, and ensure the programs sustainable solvency for
future generations.
Background:
Social Securitys insolvency problem stems from an ageing baby boomer generation and
a comparatively smaller working population. The countrys recent economic recession has
reduced program income, yet simultaneously increased outlay need. As costs of living and life
expectancy rates increase, more retired Americans depend on Social Security benefits to avoid
falling below the poverty line.
The OASI trust funds pending insolvency presents a financial and legal roadblock due to
the conflict between the Social Security Act and the Antideficiency Act. The juxtaposition of
these two laws requires the trust fund to maintain its own solvency in order to outlay full benefits
to beneficiaries.
In 1982, the OASI trust fund faced immediate insolvency, and Congress allowed the
program to borrow $17.5 billion from the Disability Insurance and the Medicare Hospital
Insurance trust funds. This loan maintained the OASI funds solvency and resulted in
amendments that lowered benefits and increased the payroll tax rate. These amendments not only
maintained OASI solvency, but also yielded a program surplus for 22 years.
If the OASI fund reaches insolvency, scheduled benefits must be cut over 20%, or the tax
rate must increase more than 16.2%. However, if reforms are implemented now, the changes will
be less drastic, and citizens will have more time to adjust their private retirement funds to
compensate for any benefit reductions.

The graphs below demonstrate the effects on the trust fund ratio if reforms are delayed.

Analysis:
Possible solutions to maintain Social Securitys solvency include reducing benefits,
increasing the tax rate and/or base, and changing beneficiary eligibility requirements. Although
most proposals suggest a combination of these solutions, this analysis will discuss the pros and
cons of each solution individually below. 1
Reducing Benefits
One method of reducing benefits is to reduce the Primary Insurance Amount factors by
indexing initial benefits off of prices, rather than prices and earnings. Currently, the PIA formula
is progressive, favoring people with lower average earnings. Often referred to as price
indexing, this option would calculate average initial benefits for retirees based off of prices
alone. As real earnings grow, initial benefits will decrease for all beneficiaries compared to
current projected benefits. This options outlay savings will increase over time as prices rise
1

Little existing research analyzes the long-term solvency of the OASI and DI trust funds individually. Therefore,
this analysis will consider the two funds as one combined fund, referenced as the Social Security trust fund.

slower than real earnings. This solution is the only option that results in long-term sustainable
solvency for the Social Security trust fund.
In order to protect the lowest-earners from being disproportionately impacted by these
benefit reductions, a new poverty-related minimum benefit could be introduced. Based on each
years poverty guideline, this minimum benefit would only apply to beneficiaries with over 10
years of earnings. This option would increase outlays, but not significantly change the trust
funds solvency.
Increasing the Tax Rate/Base
One tax option is to increase the payroll tax rate by 2 percentage points over 20 years to a
final rate of 14.4%. This solution extends the trust fund exhaustion date to approximately 2083
and would affect people of all earning-levels equally.
Another option is to eliminate the taxable maximum, effectively increasing the payroll
tax base. Currently, only earnings up to $118,500 are taxed. Eliminating this maximum will
extend trust fund solvency to approximately 2083. This option would negatively impact societys
highest earners.
Changing Eligibility Requirements
The primary way to change eligibility for Social Security involves raising the full
retirement age (FRA). Gradually increasing the FRA from the current age of 67 to age 70 would
roughly mirror recent increases in life expectancy, and would reduce program spending by 13%
by 2060. Raising the FRA to 70 effectively decreases beneficiaries lifetime benefits, yet fails to
significantly change the trust fund insolvency date.
The graphs below illustrate the effects each option would have on Social Securitys
finances, represented as a percentage of GDP.

Maintains
Immediate
Solvency
Index Initial
Benefits to Prices
Index Initial
Benefits to Prices,
and Institute a
Poverty-Related
Minimum Benefit
Increase Tax Rate
Increase Tax Base

Raise FRA to 70

Protects LowEarning
Beneficiaries

Creates
Sustainable
Solvency

Secondary Effects

Impacts all beneficiaries

Negatively impacts all


beneficiaries above poverty
line; positively impacts
beneficiaries below poverty
line
Negatively impacts all earning
levels
Negatively impacts only
highest earners
Impacts all beneficiaries, but
has greatest negative impact
on lower-earning beneficiaries
who depend on benefits
sooner in life

Based on the above analysis, the only appropriate option of Social Security reform is to
reduce benefits by enacting price indexing, while simultaneously instituting a new minimum
poverty-based benefit.
Recommendation:
In order to implement these reforms, you should first commission a CBO analysis of the
potential financial benefits from combining price indexing with a minimum benefit. Pending a
positive analysis, you should then meet with the SSA leadership to address restructuring the
current Social Security benefits formula.

References
CBO. (2014, July 11). Answers to Question from Senator Hatch About Various Options for
Payroll Taxes and Social Security. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45519-QFR_Hatch.pdf
CBO. (2014, November 20). Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2015-2024. Retrieved March 1,
2015 from http://www.cbo.gov:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49638-BudgetOptions.pdf
CBO. (2012, January 10). Raising the Ages of Eligibility for Medicare and Social Security.
Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/01-10-2012Medicare_SS_EligibilityAgesBrief.pdf
CBO. (2015, January 26). Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance Baseline
Projections. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43889-2015-01Social_Security.pdf
CBO. (2010, July 1). Social Security Policy Options. Retrieved March 1, 2015
from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/07-01ssoptions_forweb.pdf
CBO. (2013, December 17). The 2013 Long-Term Projections for Social Security Additional
Information. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://www.cbo.gov:
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44972-SocialSecurity.pdf
CBO. (2014, July 15). The 2014 Long-Term Budget Outlook. Retrieved March 1, 2015,
from http://www.cbo.gov: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/45471-LongTermBudgetOutlook_7-29.pdf
Hungerford, T. (2013, February 5). Increasing the Social Secuirty Payroll Tax Base: Options
and Effects on Tax Burdens. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1,
2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33943.pdf
Lanza, E., and Nicola, T. (2014, September 17). Social Security Reform: Legal Analysis of Social
Security Benefit Entitlement Issues. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved
March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32822.pdf
Meyerson, N. (2014, June 23). Social Security: Minimum Benefits. Congressional Research
Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015
from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43615.pdf

Meyerson, N. (2014, August 28). Social Security: What Would Happen if the Trust Funds Ran
Out? Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015
from https://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33514.pdf
Meyerson, N. (2015, February 4). How Social Security Benefits Are Computed: In Brief.
Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015
from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43542.pdf
Nuschler, D. (2013, June 17). Social Security Primer. Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Retrieved March 1, 2015 from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42035.pdf
Nuschler, D., and Sidor, G. (2014, July 31). Social Security: The Trust Fund. Congressional
Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015
from http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33028.pdf
Sidor, G. (2013, January 24). Fact Sheet: The Social Security Retirement Age. Congressional
Research Service (CRS). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from
http://fas.org: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41962.pdf
The 2014 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund. July 28, 2014. U.S. Government
Printing Office.

SAMPLE MEMO #3
To:
USD(AT&L)
From: [Name Deleted]
Subj: Appropriation Reprogramming During Continuing Resolution

ISSUE
Temporary appropriations, or continuing resolutions (CR), have been required during
some portion of the fiscal year for 34 of the last 37 years. The formulaic and temporary nature of
CRs create a significant administrative burden for implementing agencies, but the fact that the
CR freezes a programs appropriation profile from the previous year can create the greatest
challenge, particularly for acquisition programs transitioning between major phases of the
acquisition process. CRs can leave program managers attempting to advance a program in a
procurement phase with RDT&E appropriations simply because last years budget required
RDT&E; this can only result in inefficiency at best and waste at worst.
BACKGROUND
Continuing Resolutions:
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse and directs that no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.
Continuing resolutions (CRs) are temporary spending measures passed by Congress in lieu of
annual appropriation and authorization bills. CRs are based on the prorated continuation of the
prior years budget; consequently, a government program is frozen in the prior years
budgetary configuration. This means that a program will be funded during a CR with the same
mix of appropriations as the previous years budget.
The other major difference between CR and normal appropriations concerns the amount
of funding and the time frame for which it can be used. Normal appropriation bills are for an
entire fiscal year, but CRs are budgetary stopgap measures which cover only a specified period
of time. In general, the CR will prorate the previous years budget based on the duration of the
CR, but the specific formula can vary. In some cases the amount appropriated in the CR may be
based on the Presidents Budget request, Congresss budget resolution or some other number
specified in the CR.
Reprogramming of Appropriations
The DoD Financial Management Regulations (DoD FMR) detail the procedures for
reprogramming of DoD appropriated funds, which allows transferring funds from one
appropriation type to another. Reprogramming actions can be divided into two general categories
which are separated by the reprogramming threshold; above threshold reprogramming (ATR)
actions require the prior approval of Congress while Congress can simply be notified of below
threshold reprogramming (BTR) actions.

ANALYSIS
Continuing resolutions come at a heavy cost. One of the most well understood effects is
the reduced efficiency of departments, but one of the more damaging impacts is only known
anecdotally. The frozen nature of the CR combined with the reprogramming thresholds means
that acquisition programs cannot transition from development to production or may not be able
to properly ramp to the required production rates. In addition to the general cost of CRs, a
program manager in this position is faced with the dilemma of either restructuring the program to
fit the same appropriations as last year or to find new, previously unplanned, avenues for the
funding contained in the CR. Either way the program will be executed in a sub-optimally. This
problem is well understood and frequently discussed in program management training material,
but the actual effects have not been studied or documented.
The challenge of a misaligned appropriation profile can be addressed in several ways.
The solution should seek a balance of program efficiency while respecting Congresss authority
and responsibility to appropriate funds.

Option 1: Status Quo - Modify each program to fit the appropriations.


Option 2: Request Congressional approval for reprogramming to fit the programs
appropriation profile, while staying within the CRs budgetary bounds.
Option 3: Implement a new policy lifting the reprogramming threshold during CRs
allowing programs to align appropriations with their planned appropriation profile.

The first two options respect Congresss budgetary authority, but are each inefficient and
wasteful in their own way. Option 1 wastes effort redesigning a program into a suboptimal
configuration to comport with the CRs appropriations. In some cases, a program may pursue
low priority or even wholly ancillary activities simply due to the alignment of the allocated
resources. Option 2 wastes effort in assembling, requesting and waiting for Congresss approval
to align appropriations to the program. The effort involved in assembling the reprogramming
request is significant, especially when one considers the fact that DoD typically attempts to
address all DoD programs with a single omnibus request.
Option 3 strikes a balance between respecting Congresss authority to set budgetary
limits and giving DoD the flexibility to execute programs efficiently. The amount of funding
appropriated in the CR will still be respected, but the already significant burden of temporary
funding measures will not be exacerbated by misaligned appropriation types.
RECOMMENDATION
1. Direct ASD(Acquisition) to conduct a study on the cost of misaligned
appropriations due to continuing resolutions over at least the past 10 years.
2. In coordination with USD(C)/CFO, contact OMB to draft a proposal that lifts the
Congressional authorization threshold for appropriation reprogramming during
continuing resolutions.

References
Sager, Michelle. Budget Issues: Effects of Budget Uncertainty from Continuing Resolutions on
Agency Operation. (GAO-13-464T). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2013. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-464T
Tollestroup, Jessica. FY2014 Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components. (CRS Report
No. R43405) Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
2014. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43405.pdf
Fantone, Denise M., Poling, Susan A. Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management
Options and Increased Workload in Selected Agencies. (GAO-09-879). Washington, DC:
Government Accountability Office, 2009. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-879
Wolf, Frederick D. Appropriations: Continuing Resolutions and an Assessment of Automatic
Funding Approaches. (GAO/AFMD-86-16). Washington, DC: Government Accountability
Office, 1986. http://gao.gov/assets/150/144084.pdf
Bowsher, Charles A. Updated Information Regarding Funding Gaps and Continuing
Resolutions. (GAO/PAD-83-13). Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office,
1982. http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/206129.pdf
DoD Financial Management Regulation, Vol.3, Ch. 6: Reprogramming of DOD Appropriated
Funds. August, 2000.
Candreva, Philip J. Automatic Continuing Resolutions: A Cure Worse Than the Ailment.
Monterey College of Law. (Provided on 30 Jan 2015.)
Candreva, Philip J. Defense Budgeting (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 26
Feb 2015).

SAMPLE MEMO #4
To:

General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

From: [Name Deleted]


Subj: Redefining Capability of National Nuclear Deterrent Requirement
Issue:
The use of the nuclear triad is an antiquated method of fighting using simple
spending, which succeded at the time, but times have changed. Our strategy needs to
evolve for future and therefore, we must redefine the capability of our national nuclear
deterrent requirement to the current political environment and the new threats in order to
be more cost and battle effective in the future.
Background:
Since the Cold War, U.S. has maintained a triad of nuclear deterrent composed of
nuclear bombers (N-Bombers), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (LB-ICBMs)
and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Each leg of the triad had its own advantages
and disadvantages.
At the time, the main agendas were Beating the Soviets by causing them to
over-spend and protection through Mutually Assured Destruction, but with the passing
of the Nuclear Nonprofileration Treaty in 1970, the agenda began to change into
Strategic Stability with a public desire to reduce arms. Now, the deterrent only needs to
ensure the capability of sufficient retaliation in the case of a pre-emptive strike, and
therefore, it can focus on quality over quantities to meet the demand with less cost.
However, the triad is out-of-date with technology from the 60s, and in order to
maintain Strategic Stability, funding has to be given to our forces for modernization.
Analysis:
The option for the future of the nuclear deterrence programs are to upgrade all
three or switch to any combination of a diad or monad nuclear deterrence. The capability
of each nuclear deterrence method is best seen by using a service level of effort analysis,
the priority list of future threats, and a total effectiveness comparison.

Service Level of Effort:

Air Force
o Maintenance: Low quality and insufficient frequency.
Compared to SSBNs, a greater life-cycle cost.
o Issues: Cheating scandals and drug alliegations among missile
personnel. Lack of formality in operations of nuclear weapons
including loss of nuclear weapons.
o Reactions: Multiple Defense Secreties have fired high ranking
officials including the Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff

Navy
o Maintenance:

CNO 1 - allocated 100% of the requested budget

Priority 1 - highest priority for repair and maintenance


parts

o Issues: Cheating scandal at prototype


o Reactions: Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, who reports
to the CNO, handled the investigation and legitimization of the
Navys process for qualifying nuclear operators.
Future Threats:

China is indicitive of the future threats that the U.S. will face because
of its raising economic and military prowess

China has displayed urgent modernization of their navy because of a


concern with a wide range of missions including nuclear deterrence
and protection of maritime forces. In particular, they have
apprehension about the U.S. submarines stationed at Guam.

China has a SSBN fleet that is close to the level of the U.S. Navys
quality and quantity. They have also exceeed the U.S. in the number of
fast attack submarines.

The triad meets the same capability of nuclear deterrence by providing the
maximum destruction; however, it is redundant to maintain all three for the same
capability, and due to fisical constraints, we should go with the most effective method,
SSBNs. They have an institutional commitment from the Navy, our threats see them as a
threat, and they have the greatest total effectiveness.
SSBNs can be set as a priority for the military with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS); however, Congress controls the authorization and appropiation of the budget. Due
to the 60-year history of nuclear deterrence, the triad has become imbedded into the U.S.
system, and it is unlikely to get budget approval for the re-allocation of funds between
services for a monad. The better approach is to give the Navy control of the triad since
the Navy has proven successful in this field. This will empahize sharing technology and

improving efficiency. The Navy will either get N-Bombers and LB-ICBMs up to
standards, or if they cannot comply, allow them to degrade to the point that Congress will
be forced to stop authorizing funds and reappropriate it to the Navy.
Recommendation:
1) Set a priority for SSBNs with the JCS.
2) Request that the Secretary of Defense designate the Navy as the Single
Manager for Nuclear Deterence under Ballistic Missle Defense Technology
and Advance Concept and Performance Assessment.
3) Direct the Air Force to coordinate all future RDT&E efforts with the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition.
4) Appoint a Nuclear Defense Program and Technology Board with
representatives from the all four services and with the a Navy Admiral as
chair of the board.

Work Cited
Brook, Tom Vanden. (2014, January 23). Hagel calls for Air Force Nuclear Missile
Review. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from USA
Today: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/23/hagel-nuclear-missilereview/4801951/
Friedman, Behamin H. (2012, May 18). How to Kill the Nuclear Triad. Retrieved March
1, 2015 from Congress Blog: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreignpolicy/228323-how-to-kill-the-nuclear-triad
GAO. (2014, December 11). Nuclear Weapons: DODs plan for Implementing Nuclear
Reductions Generally Addresses Statutory Requirements but Lacks Some Detail.
Retrieved March 1, 2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-89R
GAO. (2014, June 10). Nuclear Weapons: Ten-Year Budget Estimates for Modernization
Omit Key Efforts, and Assumptions and Limitations are Not Fully Transparent. Retrieved
March 1, 2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-373
GAO. (2014, May 15). National nuclear Security Administration: Agency Report to
congress on Potential efficiencies Does Not Include Key Information. Retrieved March 1,
2015 from GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-434
GAO. (2012, July 31). Strategic Weapons: changes in Nuclear Weapons Targeting
Process since 1991. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from
GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-786R
GAO. (2006, April 26). Nuclear Weapons: Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear
Weapons Complex Retrieved March 1,2015 from
GAO: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-606T
Harvey, ADM John C.. (2014 November). The independent Review of the Nuclear
Enterprise. (U.S. Naval Insititute). Retrieved March 1, 2015, from U.S Naval
Institute: http://blog.usni.org/2014/11/25/the-independent-review-of-the-nuclearenterprise
Hildreth Steven A., and Woolf, Amy F. (2010, May 25). Ballistic Missile Defense and
Offensive Arms Reduction: A review of Historical Record. (Congressional Research
Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research
Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41251.pdf
JFQ. (2008, July). Focus on Naval Power. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from
JFQ: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-50.pdf

Kimball, Daryl, and McKinzie, Matthew. (2015, February 23). Commentary: Nuclear
Dangers: Myth, Reality, Responses. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Defense
News: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/02/23/commentary
-nuclear-dangers-myth-reality-responses/23885837/
Medalia, Jonathan. (2010, June 4). Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials:
Science, Technnologies, Observations. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved
March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research
Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40154.pdf
Medalia, Jonathan, Belkin, Paul, Kan, Shirley A., Kerr, Paul K., Mix, Derek E., Nikitin,
Mary Beth, Zanotti, Jim. (2013, May 1). Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine
Nations. (Congressional Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional
Research Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40439.pdf
Montgomery, Evan B. (2013, December 5). The Future of Americas Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from
CSBA: http://csbaonline.org/publications/2013/12/the-future-of-americas-startegicnuclear-deterrent/
Raatz, Airman 1st Class Joseph. (2014, September 19). Modernization of US Nuclear
Forces not Optional. Retrieved March 1, 2015 from U.S. Air
Force: http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/499888/modernizationof-us-nuclear-forces-not-optional.aspx
Rinehart, Ian E., Hildreth, Steve A., and Lawrence, Susan V. (2013, June 2013). Ballistic
missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific region: Cooperation and Opposition. (Congressional
Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015, from Congressional Research
Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf
RT. (2010, October 28). Oops! US Air Force Loses 50 Nukes. Retrieved March 1, 2015
from JFQ: http://rt.com/usa/usa-lost-nukes-missiles/
Woolf, Amy F. (2015, Febuary 23). Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. (Congressional
Research Service). Retrieved March 1, 2015 from Congressional Research
Service: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf
Woolf, Amy F. (2015, Febuary 6). Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range
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