No.

03-3802
__________________________________________________________________

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
__________________________________________________________________

THE RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri
Hon. Carol E. Jackson, Chief United States District Judge
__________________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

__________________________________________________________________

Paul Glist Stephen B. Higgins

John D. Seiver Mark Sableman
Geoffrey C. Cook James W. Erwin
Cole, Raywid & Braverman, LLP Thompson Coburn LLP
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. One US Bank Plaza
Washington, D.C. 20006 St. Louis, Missouri 63101
202-659-9750 314-552-6000

Attorneys for Appellant Charter Communications, Inc.

2239480
 SUMMARY OF THE CASE

The resolution of this appeal will establish whether and how

copyright owners may use an unsupervised judicially aided subpoena

process to learn the identity of individuals suspected of copyright

infringement by sharing files over the Internet. The issue is whether

the Digital Millennium Copyright Act authorized the court clerk, on

request of Appellee, to issue subpoenas that were served on Appellant,

an Internet Service Provider (ISP), seeking personal information about

individual Internet users whom Appellee believed were trading

copyrighted works over the Internet using peer-to-peer file sharing

computer programs. The subpoenas were enforced without any evidence

of actual copyright infringement, and without an underlying suit, over

Appellant’s constitutional and statutory objections.

Appellant requests 30 minutes for oral argument because this case

presents important issues on (1) the nature and scope of the DMCA,

and (2) whether the special subpoena provision designed to aid in the

hunt for suspected copyright infringers, if it is constitutional, can

override pre-existing constitutional and statutory limitations on

disclosure by a cable ISP of its customers’ personal information.

2239480
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 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Charter Communications, Inc. has no parent corporation and no

publicly held company owns ten percent (10%) or more of its stock.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF THE CASE .......................................................................i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ...........................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... v

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ........................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .............. 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................... 7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................ 10

ARGUMENT............................................................................................ 13

I. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Of The Subject Matter

Because § 512(h) Applies Only To ISPs Engaged In Storing
Copyrighted Material And Not To ISPs, Such As Charter,
Who Are Engaged Solely As A Conduit For The Transmission
Of Information By Others ...............................................................14

II. A Judicial Subpoena Is a Court Order That Must Be

Supported by a Case or Controversy at the Time of its
Issuance...........................................................................................22

III. Enforcement of Subpoenas under § 512(h) Violates the .................28

A. The DMCA and the Communications Act Impose Directly

Conflicting Obligations on Cable Operators.................................28

B. Because Directly Conflicting Statutes Can Not Be Reconciled

the More Restrictive Statute Should Be Applied ..........................30

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 C. Because There Is No Valid Case or Controversy, The “Court
Order Exception” Under 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) Does Not
Operate To Allow The Disclosure Of Personal Information ......37\\

IV. Section 512(h) Violates The First Amendment Rights Of

Internet Users..................................................................................39

V. E-Mail Addresses Are Contact Information Outside The Scope

Of Information Sufficient To Identify Subscribers ........................44

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 48

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................ 52

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................. 53

ADDENDUM ........................................................................................... 1a
SEPARATE APPENDIX......................................................................... 1A

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) ..........................42

Barwood, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 202 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir.

2000) .....................................................................................................25

Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) ...................................................3, 41

Broadrick v. State of Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ........................3, 42

Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp., 991 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1993)...........14

Burrey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998) ............36

Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9

(1992) ....................................................................................................49

Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.Com, 185 F.R.D. 573

(N.D.Cal.1999) ......................................................................................42

Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe, 29 Media L. Rptr. 2265 (N.J.

Super Ct. July 11, 2001).......................................................................42

Doe v. 2TheMart.Com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (D.Wash. 2001) .................42

Doe v. School Bd. Of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir.
2001) .....................................................................................................27

Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F.Supp. 3d 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ..................19

Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1975) ...........25

Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. Appx. 697 (1864) ..............................24

Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792)......................................24, 26

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989) .....................24

Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of Comptroller of

Currency, 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)...................................... passim

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In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983)..........2, 14, 27

In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d),

36 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D. Mass. 1999)......................................................32

In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d at 257, rev’d

on other grounds, 2003 WL 22970995 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 2003) ........39

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)................................24

Melvin v. Doe, 29 Media L. Rptr. 1065 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas,

Allegheny Cty., Nov. 15, 2000).............................................................42

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., No. CV01-08541,

2003 WL 1989129 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 2003)...................................3, 40

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).......................................24

National Insulation Transp. Comm. v. I.C.C., 683 F.2d 533 (D.C.

Cir. 1982) ..............................................................................................35

National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Terra Industries, 346 F.3d

1160 (8th Cir. 2003)..............................................................................13

Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 233 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2000) .......13

Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon

Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir.,
Dec. 19, 2003) ............................................................................... passim

Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ...................21

Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)..................................................41

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) ..........................44

United Sates v. Peninsula Communications, Inc., 265 F.3d 1017

(9th Cir. 2001).......................................................................................13

United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights

Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988).......................................... passim

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United States v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., No. 3:03-
0553 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2003) ...........................................................34

United States v. Cox Cable Communications, 1998 WL 656574

(N.D. Fla. 1998) ................................................................................3, 33

United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000) .............31

United States v. Menache, 348 U.S. 528 (1995) ..................................3, 35

United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).............2, 3, 24, 25

V S Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, 235 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2000)........................................13

Yale Todd’s Case, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 52 (1851) .......................................24

Statutes

9 U.S.C. § 7 ..............................................................................................26

17 U.S.C. § 512 ....................................................................................8, 13

17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(3)................................................................................44

17 U.S.C. § 512(c) ........................................................................15, 20, 46

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) ................................................................... passim

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)........................................................................20

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).......................................................................20

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii)................................................................18, 20

17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D).......................................................................4, 45

17 U.S.C. § 512(h) ............................................................................ passim

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1)..........................................................................16, 28

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)................................................................................17

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(3)......................................................................4, 29, 44

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17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(4)................................................................................17

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5)....................................................................17, 28, 29

17 U.S.C. § 512(i) .....................................................................................19

17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii) .......................................................................19

18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) ..................................................................................34

18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) ..................................................................................34

18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)...................................................................................32

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq......................................................................3, 30

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................1

47 U.S.C. § 551 ................................................................................ passim

47 U.S.C. § 551(b) ....................................................................................37

47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(1)................................................................................37

47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1) ..........................................................................28, 37

47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2) ................................................................................28

47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) .........................................................28, 37, 38, 39

47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(D) ...........................................................................32

47 U.S.C. § 551(f).....................................................................................28

Rules

Rule 45(a)(2) ............................................................................................25

Rule 45(e) .................................................................................................25

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Constitutional Provisions

U.S. CONST., amend. I...................................................................... passim

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 .................................................................. passim

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 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri enforcing subpoenas directed to

Charter Communications, Inc. by The Recording Industry Association of

America, Inc. (“RIAA”). The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked

under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”),

17 U.S.C. § 512(h).

The order entered by the district court was a final order within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Charter invokes the jurisdiction of this

Court under that statute.

2239480
 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law when it

enforced subpoenas under 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) that did not and could not

comply with the express terms of the DMCA.

Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet

Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 2003)

United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,

Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988)

In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983)

17 U.S.C. §§ 512(h), 512(c)(3)(A) & 512(a)

2. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law when it

enforced the RIAA’s subpoenas in the absence of a case or controversy

sufficient to support that exercise of judicial power.

United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,

Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988)

Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of Comptroller of Currency,

86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2nd Cir. 1983)

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2

2239480
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 3. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law when it

enforced the subpoenas in contravention of the privacy requirements

applicable to cable operators in the Communications Act of 1934.

United States v. Cox Cable Communications, 1998 WL 656574 (N.D.

Fla. 1998)

United States v. Menache, 348 U.S. 528 (1995)

United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,

Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988)

Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of Comptroller of Currency,

86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

47 U.S.C. § 551(c)

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)

4. Whether the district court erred as a matter of law when it

enforced the subpoenas in violation of the First Amendment.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., No. CV01-08541,

2003 WL 1989129 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 2003)

Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971)

Broadrick v. State of Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)

U.S. CONST., amend. I

17 U.S.C. §§ 512(h) & 512(c)(3)(A)(v)

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 5. Whether the district court erred when it ordered Charter to

provide the RIAA e-mail addresses of its subscribers.

17 U.S.C. §§ 512(h)(3), 512(c)(3)(A)(iv) & 512(g)(3)(D)

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 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was initiated by the RIAA’s request to the clerk of the

district court under 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) for the issuance of subpoenas to

Charter in its capacity as an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”). These

subpoenas sought the names, physical addresses, telephone numbers

and e-mail addresses for approximately 200 of Charter’s subscribers

who allegedly shared material over the Internet in violation of RIAA

members’ copyrights. See Separate Appendix (“SA”) 7A. The clerk

issued the subpoenas, which were served on Charter on September 23,

2003.

On October 3, Charter filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. SA

290A. On November 17, 2003, the district court held a hearing at which

argument was presented by counsel. See Transcript 15. No evidence was

offered other than the parties’ respective supporting affidavits.

The court denied Charter’s motion in all respects, except that it held

that Charter should not provide the subscribers’ telephone numbers. SA

316A. The court directed Charter to provide the names, addresses, and

e-mail addresses of 150 subscribers by November 21, 2003, and to

2239480
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provide the same information for an additional 50-70 subscribers by

December 1, 2003.

Charter filed its notice of appeal on November 20, 2003. Charter also

sought an emergency stay of the order in the district court and this

Court. The district court declined to rule on the motion for stay and this

Court denied Charter’s motion on November 21. Later, the district court

denied Charter’s motion as moot. Charter turned over the information

on its subscribers to the RIAA as directed.

2239480
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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case concerns the issue of whether the Digital Millennium

Copyright Act, specifically 17 U.S.C. § 512(h), permits copyright owners

and their representatives to obtain and serve subpoenas on ISPs to

obtain information about the ISPs’ subscribers, such as names,

addresses, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and other data, who are

alleged to be trading copyrighted works through the Internet using so-

called “peer-to-peer” or “P2P” file sharing computer programs. Many

people in this country and around the world share digital files using

P2P computer programs with names such as KaZaA, Morpheus, and

Grokster. Unlike centralized file-sharing programs, such as Napster,

that rely upon a single facility for storing files, P2P file sharing

programs allow an individual Internet user to access through the

Internet the files located on other individuals’ own computers.

In recent years, the RIAA has sought to identify individuals whom it

claims are trading copyrighted works of music through P2P file sharing

programs. As part of its effort to identify computer users it believes are

infringing copyrights, the RIAA has employed tracking programs to

identify the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of computer users

2239480
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suspected of trading copyrighted music files. With an IP address, the

RIAA can identify the ISP providing Internet access to an alleged

infringing party. Only the ISP, however, can link a particular IP

address with an individual’s name and physical address. The RIAA does

not claim that Charter itself is storing allegedly infringing material on

its servers. Rather, at issue here is whether, under § 512(h), the RIAA

may simply suspect that infringing materials are being exchanged yet

obtain and serve subpoenas on ISPs requiring them to provide data

about those suspected subscribers when the ISP functions solely as a

conduit for the transmission of information by its subscribers.

In this case, the RIAA issued subpoenas to Charter, pursuant to

§ 512, to produce the names, physical addresses, telephone numbers,

and e-mail addresses of approximately 200 of Charter’s subscribers. SA

7A. On October 3, 2003, Charter filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas

on several grounds, including that “the DMCA does not authorize

issuance of subpoenas to service providers where the service providers

are involved solely in the transmission of peer-to-peer communications.”

SA 290A.

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 In a hearing held on November 17, 2003, the district court denied

Charter’s Motion to Quash. See Minute Order, (Nov. 17, 2003),

Addendum at 1a; SA 316A. The district court ordered Charter to give

the RIAA by November 21 the names, addresses, and e-mail addresses

of 150 subscribers who had received notice of the subpoenas, and to

produce the same information by December 1 for another 50 to 70

subscribers who had not yet received notice. See id. The district court

declined to order Charter to provide the telephone numbers of

subscribers. See id.

On November 20, 2003, Charter filed a Notice of Appeal and a

Motion to Stay the District Court’s Order. SA 317A. The district court

declined to act on the motion to stay its Order before the compliance

deadline of November 21, 2003. On November 21, 2003, Charter filed

with this Court its Emergency Motion to Stay Order of Enforcement of

Subpoena Pending Appeal. The Court denied a stay that same day. As a

result, Charter turned over the subpoenaed names and addresses of its

subscribers to the RIAA.

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 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Section 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)

authorizes the clerks of federal district courts to issue subpoenas to

copyright owners or their agents, without judicial supervision, for

service on Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) in order to obtain the

identity of subscribers alleged to be engaged in copyright infringement.

A condition for issuing these subpoenas under the DMCA is that the

copyright owners must also identify the allegedly infringing material so

as to permit the ISP to “locate” and “remove” it.

In this case, the RIAA suspects approximately 200 of Charter’s

subscribers of trading copyrighted music files over the Internet using

so-called “peer-to-peer” or “P2P” file sharing computer software. P2P file

sharing is accomplished without an ISP’s knowledge or the use of an

ISP’s computers; it is accomplished solely using a subscriber’s own

computer sending files over the Internet. Significantly, in the P2P

context, entities such as the RIAA have no evidence of an actual

infringement or where any infringement could have taken place, only

an unverifiable suspicion of infringement. As such, an ISP such as

Charter cannot verify the claims of infringement or even “locate” or

2239480
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“remove” any allegedly infringing materials, if indeed there are any

infringing materials. Yet the RIAA’s subpoenas require Charter to

produce personally identifying information on all these “suspicious”

subscribers. Because there is no evidence of infringement, and no way

for Charter to locate, verify or remove any files from a subscriber’s

computer, the RIAA’s subpoenas necessarily fail to meet the

requirements of the DMCA. Accordingly, the district court committed

reversible error when it enforced the RIAA’s subpoenas over Charter’s

objections.

In addition, the subpoenas should have been quashed because there

were no underlying “cases or controversies” involving these suspected

subscribers. All that has occurred is suspicious activity that RIAA

interprets as copyright infringement. But, without a genuine case or

controversy, and the necessary evidence of infringement to support a

case, the subpoenas are invalid and void. Also, because Charter is a

cable operator as well as an ISP, it has a separate statutory obligation

under the Cable Act to protect its subscribers’ privacy that cannot be

compromised by a DMCA subpoena where there is no underlying case

or controversy.

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 Moreover, these subpoenas implicate substantial First Amendment

rights of Internet users. Because there is no evidence of infringement at

all – only suspicion and speculation – identifying these individuals

necessarily chills expressive activities by stripping Internet users of

their anonymity and subjecting them to potentially invalid claims that

will result in intimidation and harassment.

Finally, the requirement that ISPs provide e-mail addresses of these

suspected infringers exceeds the terms of the DMCA and would allow

third parties to not only learn the identity of individuals they may

dislike, but also contactthose Internet users electronically and intrude

into their lives without legitimate basis or judicial supervision.

The subpoena power under the DMCA is necessarily constrained by

the constitutional and statutory rights of ISPs and Internet users. The

district court’s order trampled these rights and must be reversed.

Moreover, in order to preserve these rights, the RIAA should be ordered

to return the information supplied under the subpoenas and make no

further use of it.

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 ARGUMENT

Standard of Review

The district court’s Order, enforcing the RIAA’s subpoenas over

Charter’s objection, necessarily concluded that the subpoenas were

authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 512 and therefore constituted a ruling of law.

This Court reviews de novo a district court’s rulings on issues of law.

See, e.g., National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Terra Industries, 346

F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir. 2003).

The Court reviews the existence of subject matter jurisdiction de

novo. See V S Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Housing and Urban

Development, 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000); United Sates v.

Peninsula Communications, Inc., 265 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001);

Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Guthrie, 233 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2000).

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 I.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Of The Subject

Matter Because § 512(h) Applies Only To ISPs Engaged In
Storing Copyrighted Material And Not To ISPs, Such As
Charter, Who Are Engaged Solely As A Conduit For The
Transmission Of Information By Others

When a district court lacks the statutory authority to issue a

subpoena, it lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter in any enforcement

proceeding. See, e.g., In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 669

(2nd Cir. 1983)(“A federal court’s jurisdiction is not determined by its

power to issue a subpoena; its power to issue a subpoena is determined

by its jurisdiction.”) Even though there is no actual case or controversy

between the RIAA and Charter’s subscribers in the Article III sense, see

infra Part II, Charter may nevertheless raise the lack of subject matter

jurisdiction in a subpoena enforcement proceeding directed to it, even

on appeal. See United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights

Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988); Bueford v. Resolution Trust

Corp., 991 F.2d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 1993).

The question of whether § 512(h) authorizes the issuance of a

subpoena to an ISP such as Charter to obtain information about its

subscribers who are allegedly infringing RIAA members’ copyrights was

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recently decided by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in

Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet

Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 2003). There, the Court

held that § 512(h) only permits a copyright owner to obtain and serve a

subpoena on an ISP for identifying information about an alleged

infringer if the ISP is provided statutory notification under 17 U.S.C.

§ 512(c)(3)(A), which, in turn, requires that the ISP be able to both

locate and remove the allegedly infringing material. See id. at 1233-34.

These requirements are by no means technical, but fundamental: the

requirements of subsection (c)(3)(A) were based on the “notice and

takedown” provisions in subsection (c) because the premise is that an

ISP can respond to the subpoenas by accessing and verifying whether

material residing on its servers support or refute the allegations of

infringement.

However, when an ISP such as Charter is engaged solely as a

conduit for the transmission of material by others, as occurs with

subscribers using P2P file sharing software to exchange files stored on

their personal computers, the provisions governing the legal

consequences are contained in § 512(a), not (c). Recognizing that the

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ISP cannot verify the allegations of infringement under subsection (a),

the DMCA does not allow clerk-issued subpoenas to be handed out

when subsection (a) is implicated because the ISP cannot locate any

allegedly infringing material on, or remove it from, others’ computers.

Thus, the required notification under § 512(c)(3)(A) cannot take place,

and, because that notification is not a technical requirement but rather

is an essential element for valid clerk-issued subpoenas under

subsection (h), a subpoena may not be issued under § 512(h) to ISPs

when the underlying claim relates to P2P file exchanges. See id. at

1234-37.

The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion flows inexorably from the language

and structure of the DCMA provisions at issue. Section 512(h)(1)

provides:

A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner’s

behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court
to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an
alleged infringer in accordance with this subsection.

17 U.S.C. §512(h)(1).

However, a copyright owner may obtain a subpoena from the clerk

only if certain statutory requirements are met. One of those

requirements is that notification be provided to the ISP under

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§ 512(c)(3)(A). In particular, three distinct parts of subsection (h)

reference the § 512(c)(3)(A) notification requirement.

First, subsection (h)(2), entitled “Contents of request,” states, in

pertinent part, that “[t]he request may be made by filing with the clerk

– (A) a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A)”.

Second, subsection (h)(4), entitled “Basis for granting subpoena,”

authorizes the clerk to issue a subpoena if, inter alia, “the notification

filed satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(3)(A).”

Third, subsection (h)(5), entitled “Actions of service provider

receiving subpoena,” provides that an ISP is required to respond to a

clerk-issued subpoena that is “either accompanying or subsequent to

the receipt of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A).” Clearly, a

subpoena under § 512(h) may not be issued without meeting the

notification requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A).

Section 512(c)(3)(A) in turn requires notification to an ISP to include

identification of allegedly infringing material sufficient to permit the

ISP to “locate” and “remove” it. Specifically, (c)(3)(A) provides:

To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed

infringement must be a written communication provided to the
designated agent of a service provider that includes substantially
the following: . . . (iii) Identification of the material that is

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 claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity
and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to
locate the material.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(emphasis added).

Here, as in Verizon, the RIAA’s subpoenas fail to meet the

requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) because the P2P file sharing does not

involve the storage of infringing materials on an ISP’s own computers,

and therefore an ISP such as Charter or Verizon cannot “locate” or

“remove” such materials. The Verizon Court explained:

Infringing material obtained or distributed via P2P file sharing is

located in the computer (or in an off-line storage device, such as a
compact disc) of an individual user. No matter what information
the copyright owner may provide, the ISP can neither “remove”
nor “disable access to” the infringing material because that
material is not stored on the ISP’s servers. Verizon can not
remove or disable one user’s access to infringing material
resident on another user’s computer because Verizon does not
control the content on its subscribers’ computers.

Id. at 1235.

Indeed, there is absolutely no evidence at all that any infringement

has occurred. Indeed, all anybody knows is that the RIAA suspects an

infringement occurred and that the allegedly infringing files may be

“located” on an individual subscriber’s computer. The RIAA also knows

that Charter, like any ISP, has no control over what is on a subscriber’s

2239480
18
computer or sent by him or her over the Internet. For example, ISPs

such as Charter cannot view the index of subscribers’ files stored on

their hard drives, cannot see what files may contain music, nor

otherwise examine the contents of subscribers’ computers.

Significantly, the D.C. Circuit rejected the RIAA’s argument that its

subpoenas for the identities of alleged P2P infringers should

nevertheless be issued and enforced under § 512(h). The RIAA argued

that the ISP could “disable access” to infringing material by terminating

an offending subscriber’s Internet account. See id. at 1235. In response,

the D.C. Circuit pointed out that, where Congress wanted to authorize

the termination of subscriber accounts, it had done so explicitly, for

example, in § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii), and that such an extreme remedy was not

contemplated by § 512(c)(3)(A)’s reference to removing or disabling

access to particular infringing material. Id. at 1235-36.1

1
Indeed, terminating a subscriber’s entire account is a much broader
sanction than merely removing specific material alleged to infringe a
copyright. Moreover, ISPs follow different standards under § 512(i) for
implementing a policy that provides for termination of subscriber
accounts of subscribers who are “repeat infringers.” See Ellison v.
Robertson, 189 F.Supp. 3d 1051, 1056-57 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The DMCA
does not provide for termination based on unverifiable allegations or
speculation of infringement. This is pointed out by the RIAA’s own

2239480
19
 The RIAA also argued that a notification could be “effective” under

§ 512(c)(3)(A) if it substantially met the requirements of (A)(i)-(ii) and

(A)(iv)-(vi), even if it did not meet the requirements of subsection

(A)(iii). Id. The Court also rejected this contention, finding that

[t]he defect in the RIAA’s notification is not a mere technical

error; nor could it be thought ‘insubstantial’ even under a more
forgiving standard. The RIAA’s notification identifies absolutely
no material Verizon could remove or access to which it could
disable, which indicates to us that § 512(c)(3)(A) concerns means
of infringement other than P2P file sharing.

Id. at 1236.

The Court found unpersuasive RIAA’s suggestion that the subpoena

authority of § 512(h) was not limited to ISP’s engaged in storing

copyrighted material. The D.C. Circuit instead agreed with Verizon that

The presence in § 512(h) of three separate references to § 512(c)

and the absence of any reference to § 512(a) [involving
“transitory” communications] suggests the subpoena power of
§ 512(h) applies only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted
material and not to those engaged solely in transmitting it on
behalf of others.

actions: they have served more than 2000 subpoenas directed at

identifying suspected infringers, but have brought less than 400
lawsuits. See http://rss.com.com/2100-1027_3-5129687.html?part=rss
(Court: RIAA lawsuit strategy illegal) and
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/TechTV/RIAA_ruling_fallout_tec
htv_031224.html (The Lawsuit Beat Goes On).

2239480
20
Id. at 1236-37.

Finally, the D.C. Circuit found that the RIAA’s general references to

legislative intent underlying the DMCA could not serve as a basis to

contradict the text of the statute itself. Noting that “P2P software was

‘not even a glimmer in anyone’s eye when the DMCA was enacted,’ ” the

court emphasized that it was the province of Congress, not of the courts,

to decide whether to rewrite the DMCA “in order to make it fit a new

and unforeseen [I]nternet architecture” and “accommodate fully the

varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably

implicated by such new technology.” Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal

Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)).

The D.C. Circuit’s conclusions that “any notice to an ISP concerning

its activity as a mere conduit does not satisfy the condition of

§ 512(c)(3)(A) and is therefore ineffective” and that “§ 512(h) does not by

its terms authorize the subpoenas issued [by the RIAA],” id. at 1236,

apply with equal force to the RIAA’s subpoenas obtained from the clerk

and served on Charter in this case. Just like Verizon, Charter is an ISP

that provides Internet access to its customers but does not have access

to any of its subscribers’ own computer files and does not have the

2239480
21
capability of searching its subscribers’ computers. Just like Verizon,

Charter cannot “locate” or “remove” allegedly infringing material on its

subscribers’ own computers. See id. at 1235. Here, none of the RIAA’s

subpoenas satisfy the statutory notification requirement of

§ 512(c)(3)(A). Unless and until Congress amends the DMCA, the RIAA

may not obtain subpoenas from the clerk and the court may not enforce

them when the allegations implicate P2P file sharing. Accordingly, the

clerk of the district court lacked the authority to issue the subpoenas.

Without supporting statutory authority to issue the subpoenas, the

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce them.

II.

A Judicial Subpoena Is a Court Order That Must Be Supported

by a Case or Controversy at the Time of its Issuance

If the Court finds that § 512(h) does not authorize the issuance of a

subpoena for subscriber information to Charter because it does not store

allegedly infringing materials on its servers, then that is the end of the

matter. If, however, the Court disagrees, then it must face the second,

constitutional jurisdictional question – is there an Article III case or

controversy here that allows the federal courts to exercise their judicial

power?

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22
 The Verizon court did not address the issue in detail, except to

suggest in a footnote that the application for a subpoena opposed by the

party to whom it is issued is a sufficient case or controversy to give the

court subject matter jurisdiction in the constitutional sense. See

Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231, first footnote *.

However, for the reasons discussed below, there is no case or

controversy sufficient to satisfy Article III. There is no existing case or

controversy at all between the RIAA – only the possibility of one.2 The

present dispute between the RIAA and Charter cannot be used to

bootstrap that lacunae into a reason why the federal courts have power

to decide whether to enforce what is, after all, a method of harnessing

the judicial power to serve the ends of a private party looking for a

reason to sue but lacking a defendant.

There is little doubt that the federal courts are not “free floating

investigative bodies” to discover facts unconnected to the adjudication of

actual cases or controversies. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408

2
For example, the RIAA has filed less than 400 cases although it has
served at least 2000 subpoenas (see note 1, supra), demonstrating that
there would not be a valid case underlying more than 75% of the clerk-
issued subpoenas the RIAA has served on Charter and other ISPs.

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23
(1792); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171-72 (1803);

United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851); Yale Todd’s Case,

printed at 54 U.S. (13 How.) 52 (1851); Gordon v. United States, 117

U.S. Appx. 697, 699-706 (1864); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,

353-63 (1911); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-42

(1950); United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights

Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988); Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v.

Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 174 (1989).

In Morton Salt, the Supreme Court made clear that “[t]he judicial

subpoena power not only is subject to specific constitutional limitations

. . . but also is subject to those limitations inherent in the body that

issues them because of the provisions of the Judiciary Article of the

Constitution.” 338 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court

reaffirmed this principle in Catholic Conference, holding that “if a

district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the

underlying action, and the process was not issued in aid of determining

that jurisdiction, then the process is void and an order of civil contempt

based on refusal to honor it must be reversed.” 487 U.S. at 76 (quoting

Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642) (emphasis added).

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24
 The D.C. Circuit, relying upon both Catholic Conference and Morton

Salt, held in Houston Business Journal, Inc. v. Office of Comptroller of

Currency, 86 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996), that a district court is “without

power to issue a subpoena when the underlying action is not even

asserted to be within federal court jurisdiction.” Id. at 1213 (emphasis

added); accord Barwood, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 294-

95 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The question here is: What is the “underlying action . . . within

federal court jurisdiction”? There is none, and thus there is no Article

III jurisdiction to support issuance or enforcement of the subpoenas. A

subpoena issued by a federal district court is not just a piece of paper

that Charter could acknowledge or ignore at its leisure. It is an order of

the court that must be obeyed, or the recipient is at peril of being held

in contempt of court. See, e.g., Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526

F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1975) (“A subpoena is a lawfully issued

mandate of the court issued by the clerk thereof.”); Rule 45(e).

But in order to issue or enforce a subpoena, there must be a case or

controversy within the federal court’s jurisdiction pending somewhere.

It may be a case in another district, see Rule 45(a)(2), or may be in aid

2239480
25
of another entity such as an arbitral panel, see 9 U.S.C. § 7.

Nonetheless, there must be a case or controversy in the Article III sense

that supports the issuance of a subpoena.

The case or controversy requirement cannot be relaxed or modified

by the Congress. In Hayburn’s Case, for example, the Court concluded

that a law assigning federal judges the role of making recommendations

to the Secretary of War on pension applications imposed duties “not of a

judicial nature.” 22 U.S. at 410-14. Similarly, in Ferreira, the Supreme

Court struck down a law that assigned to district court judges in

Florida the adjustment of claims by Spanish inhabitants under a treaty.

54 U.S. 40. The Court found that the role assigned by statute was not

judicial in nature:

For there is to be no suit; no parties in the legal acceptance of

the term, are to be made–no process to issue; and no one is
authorized to appear on behalf of the United States, or to
summon witnesses in the case. The proceeding is altogether ex
parte; and all that the judge is required to do, is to receive the
claim when the party presents it, and to adjust it upon such
evidence as he may have before him, or be able himself to
obtain. But neither the evidence, nor his award, are to be filed
in the court in which he presides, nor recorded there.

Id. at 46-47.

2239480
26
 The D.C. Circuit’s suggestion that subsequent litigation can supply

the necessary “case” or “controversy” for purposes of Article III, see

Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1231, is not correct. As the Second Circuit has held,

“A federal court’s jurisdiction is not determined by its power to issue a

subpoena; its power to issue a subpoena is determined by its

jurisdiction.” In re Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 669. Both Catholic Conference

and Houston Business Journal make clear that the subsequent dispute

over the legality of the subpoenas does not create the requisite federal

case or controversy to support their issuance in the first place. Instead

an existing live controversy is required – not just the expectation of one

in the future – for the court to issue or enforce a subpoena. That is all

the more so here because there is no evidence of infringement by any of

Charter’s subscribers, only speculation and suspicion, neither of which

have supported the commencement of litigation and thus provide no

foundation for finding even a future Article III controversy. See, e.g.,

Doe v. School Bd. Of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2001).

2239480
27
 III.

Enforcement of Subpoenas under § 512(h) Violates the

Privacy Protections For Cable Subscribers In The
Communications Act

A. The DMCA and the Communications Act Impose Directly

Conflicting Obligations on Cable Operators.

Section 551(c)(1) of Title VI of the Communications Act of 1934

(“Cable Act”) states that a cable operator shall not disclose personally

identifiable information concerning any subscriber without the prior

written or electronic consent of the subscriber, and that the cable

operator shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent

unauthorized access to such information by a person other than the

subscriber or cable operator. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1).3 Cable operators that

violate § 551 are subject to civil liability under 47 U.S.C. § 551(f).

At the same time, § 512(h)(5) of the DMCA requires an online service

provider, upon receipt of a subpoena issued pursuant to § 512(h)(1), to

3
Although there are certain exceptions to this broad prohibition against
disclosure, see § 551(c)(2), none are relevant to the issues raised in this
proceeding. One of those exceptions allows for disclosure by court order
if the subscriber is notified of such order by the person to whom the
order is directed. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B). Because there is no
underlying case or controversy, however, this exception does not apply.
See infra, Part III.C.

2239480
28
“expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or person authorized by

the copyright owner the information required by the subpoena . . .”

17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5). The information required by the subpoena is

“information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer of the material

described in the notification to the extent such information is available

to the service provider.” Id. § 512(h)(3).

Consequently, where a copyright owner uses § 512(h) to subpoena

from a cable operator (that offers both cable video and Internet services)

information sufficient to identify an alleged infringer of copyrighted

material, the cable operator faces an untenable situation. A cable

operator’s compliance with the subpoena request would violate the

direct prohibition under § 551(c) of the Cable Act – which explicitly

prohibits the release of personal information absent the consent of the

subscriber or proper notice.4 However, if the cable operator chooses to

comply with the prohibition on disclosure under the Cable Act it would

lose its safe harbor rights under the DMCA, and possibly face a court

4
Moreover, this section of the Cable Act imposes an affirmative duty on
the cable operator to “take such actions as are necessary to prevent
unauthorized access to such information by a person other than the
subscriber or cable operator.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(c).

2239480
29
order or sanctions for failure to comply with the terms of a subpoena

issued under the DMCA.

Thus, two federal statutes, the Cable Act and the DMCA, impose two

directly conflicting burdens on cable operators. On the one hand, the

Cable Act clearly states that a cable operator shall not disclose

personally identifiable information about any subscriber absent that

subscriber’s consent. On the other hand, in order for a cable operator to

enjoy the benefits of the safe harbor provisions under the DMCA, the

cable operator must affirmatively disclose such personal information to

a third party, the copyright owner, without the subscriber’s consent.

B. Because Directly Conflicting Statutes Can Not Be

Reconciled the More Restrictive Statute Should Be
Applied.

Courts have faced the question of how the strict prohibitions under

the Cable Act should operate when such provisions directly conflict with

another federal statute. Another statute governing access to

information used in the provision of online communications, the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et

seq., imposes certain duties on cable operators that provide Internet

services. While the Cable Act governs the production of records

2239480
30
pertaining to cable services, the ECPA generally governs the

interception and production of records and communications generated

by subscribers of Internet services.

Until 2001, however, these statutes provided inconsistent and

conflicting procedures regarding the manner in which the government

could obtain records of cable subscribers receiving both cable and

Internet service. By way of example, governmental entities (such as the

FBI or local law enforcement agencies) often serve cable providers with

subpoenas seeking information about Internet access subscribers.

Although the ECPA allows for disclosures to the government in such

circumstances, the Cable Act previously did not; it allowed disclosure

only pursuant to a court order and continues to do so for civil cases. In

addition, the Cable Act would have required advance notice to the cable

Internet subscriber, while the ECPA does not. Thus, cable providers

were unsure of how to respond to governmental requests for

information when the government had not secured a court order. A

number of federal courts have recognized that these two statutes

imposed conflicting obligations on cable operators. See United States v.

Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that

2239480
31
statutory conflict was an issue of first impression); and In re United

States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), 36 F. Supp. 2d 430

(D. Mass. 1999)(recognizing statutory conflict but dismissing case due

to lack of ripeness).

This conflict was resolved only after Congress recognized the

problems raised by imposing diametrically conflicting obligations on

cable operators. Thus, in 2001 Congress amended the Cable Act, via the

USA PATRIOT Act,5 to resolve this conflict between the Cable Act and

the ECPA. Congress resolved this conflict by allowing cable Internet

providers to share their subscribers’ personally identifiable information

and other records not only upon receipt of a court order, but also in

response to subpoenas and search warrants on behalf of law

enforcement and governmental agencies.6 Civil cases, however, are still

governed by the Cable Act’s restrictions on disclosure.

5
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56 (October 26, 2001).
6
See 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(D); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).

2239480
32
 In other circumstances, where Congress has not reconciled

conflicting obligations on cable operators, courts have found that the

obligations imposed by the Cable Act should control. For example, in

United States v. Cox Cable Communications, 1998 WL 656574 (N.D.

Fla. 1998), a federal district court faced the question of whether a cable

operator served with a summons issued pursuant to the summons

authority of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) could be forced to

reveal subscriber information in contravention of the prohibition under

§ 551(c). In analyzing the conflicting duties imposed on the cable

operator the court noted that the general rule in a summons

enforcement proceeding is that “the [IRS’s] summons authority should

be upheld absent express statutory prohibition [or] unambiguous

directions from Congress.” Id. at 3. However, noting that the plain

language of § 551 contains no exclusionary provision the court found

that the Cable Act was the controlling authority.7 Id. See also, United

States v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., No. 3:03-0553 (M.D.

7
The court later considered the information sought under the test
established under § 551 and concluded that the IRS was entitled to the
information because it had satisfied that test. Id.

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33
Tenn. Aug. 4, 2003) (denying motion to enforce IRS summons after

finding that information sought in summons was personally identifiable

information subject to § 551).

This approach is consistent with the approach preferred by

Congress. The legislative history of ECPA clearly indicates that

Congress intended that if ECPA’s disclosure provisions conflict with

more restrictive provisions in another statute, the more restrictive

statute should control:

The application of sections 2701(a) and 2511(3) is limited to

providers of wire or electronic communications services.
There are instances, however, in which a person or entity
both acts a provider of such services and also offers other
services to the public. In some such situations, the bill may
allow disclosure while another federal requirement,
applicable to the person or entity in another of its roles,
prohibits disclosure. The Committee intends that such
instances be analyzed as though the communication services
and the other services were provided by distinct entities.
Where a combined entity in its non-provider role would not
be allowed to disclose, the appropriate outcome would be
non-disclosure.

H.R. REP. NO. 99-647 at 65 (1986). This approach should guide the

resolution of the conflict between the DMCA and the (more restrictive)

Cable Act as well.

2239480
34
 Charter provides both electronic communications service (Internet

service) and cable television programming service. In its role as a

provider of cable television programming, Charter is prohibited under

the Cable Act from disclosing personally identifiable information about

its cable television subscribers to a governmental entity without a court

order or consent of the subscriber. In its role as an Internet service

provider Charter is subject to the subpoena process under the DMCA.

Given that Charter operates as a “combined entity” and is not allowed

to disclose personal information as a cable operator entity, the

appropriate outcome, as described by Congress, is to find that Charter

is not required to disclose such information.

Any other interpretation of these two statutes would render the

Cable Act’s privacy protections superfluous. Courts repeatedly have

held that statutes must be construed so as to give meaning to the entire

statute and to avoid rendering particular language superfluous. See

United States v. Menache, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1995)(holding that “it is

our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a

statute”); National Insulation Transp. Comm. v. I.C.C., 683 F.2d 533,

537 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(“[s]tatutes will not be interpreted as though

2239480
35
Congress enacted superfluous provisions.”); Burrey v. Pacific Gas &

Elec. Co., 159 F.3d 388, 394 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[i]n interpreting a

statutory provision, we must avoid any construction that renders some

of its language superfluous.”)

Had Congress intended to require cable operators to disclose

subscriber information to copyright owners in all circumstances, even to

private parties like the RIAA when the subscriber at issue is a cable

television subscriber, it would have so stated when it enacted the

DMCA. Instead, Congress amended § 551 via the USA PATRIOT Act, to

work in conjunction with ECPA so that cable operators providing

cable modem and cable telephony services would be on an equal footing

with other Internet and telephone providers when responding to

subpoenas from law enforcement or governmental agencies. Short of a

similar amendment governing civil subpoenas to ensure that § 551

works in conjunction with the DMCA as well, this court should not force

Charter to engage in unlawful activity under the Cable Act by forcing it

to reveal the subscriber information sought by the RIAA.

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36
 C. Because There Is No Valid Case or Controversy, The “Court
Order Exception” Under 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B) Does Not
Operate To Allow The Disclosure Of Personal Information

Sections 551(b) and (c) of the Cable Act broadly prohibit the use or

disclosure of a subscriber’s personally identifiable information without

the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber. 47 U.S.C.

§ 551(b)(1), (c)(1). Section 551 does, however, include several exceptions

to the broad prohibition against disclosure of personally identifiable

information. One exception allows a cable operator to disclose

personally identifiable information if the disclosure is “made pursuant

to a court order authorizing such disclosure . . .” 47 U.S.C.

§ 551(c)(2)(B). On its face, this exception would seem to satisfy the

circumstances surrounding the RIAA’s attempts to enforce the

subpoenas at issues in this proceeding. However, at the time this “court

order” exception was enacted in the cable privacy provisions, there were

no clerk-issued subpoenas and no proceedings based on speculation,

only legitimate, court-filed civil and criminal suits. Congress was

careful when amending the cable privacy provisions by way of the

Patriot Act to keep the treatment for civil suits the same and not relax

disclosure conditions as it did for ECPA and other governmental

2239480
37
disclosures. There has been no indication, in the legislative history or

otherwise, that Congress intended to open a civil loophole for disclosing

subscriber information pursuant to clerk-issued subpoenas based

entirely on speculation and unverifiable factual allegations.

Accordingly, the Cable Act’s “court order” exception should not be

construed as operative where, as here, there is no underlying case or

controversy within the meaning of Article III. The existence of a valid

Article III case or controversy serves to establish the requisite

jurisdictional basis for federal courts to exercise their authority,

including the power to issue subpoenas. See Catholic Conference, 487

U.S. at 76; Houston Business Journal, 86 F.3d at 1213.

Absent a valid case or controversy the court lacks the necessary

jurisdictional basis to enforce a subpoena requesting such information.

Thus, Congress clearly expected that the court order exception under

§ 551(c)(2)(B) would apply only where there existed a valid case or

controversy, such that the court had full jurisdiction over the matter.

However, as set forth in Part II, there is no valid case or controversy

within the meaning of Article III. The RIAA has not filed suit against

any subscriber, nor has the RIAA attempted to invoke this court’s

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38
subject matter jurisdiction. Accord, In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,

257 F. Supp. 2d at 257, n. 12, rev’d on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229

(D.C. Cir., Dec. 19, 2003)(“at the time of issuance, a § 512(h) subpoena

will not necessarily be tethered to a present or even anticipated

‘adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical,

controversy’”).

The court order exception under the Cable Act, § 551(c)(2)(B), can

not be satisfied in this instance, and any order forcing Charter to

disclose subscribers’ personal information would result in a direct

violation of § 551(c).

IV.

Section 512(h) Violates The First Amendment Rights

Of Internet Users

Yet another problem the court must confront if it disagrees with the

D.C. Circuit’s decision in Verizon is whether the statutory procedure

violates the First Amendment rights of Charter subscribers. The RIAA

argues that the court must assume – based solely upon the assurances

of an interested party, the RIAA itself – that Charter subscribers whose

IP addresses have been identified have in fact infringed upon RIAA

members’ copyrights.

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39
 There are, however, many legal uses of the material that might have

been made by the subscribers. For example, a federal district court

recently held that distribution of the KaZaA software did not constitute

contributory or vicarious copyright infringement precisely because there

are many proper uses for this file-sharing technology. Metro-Goldwyn-

Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., No. CV01-08541, 2003 WL 1989129, *5

(C.D. Cal. April 25, 2003).

There is no First Amendment right to engage in copyright

infringement and Charter does not claim that there is. On the other

hand, at the time the subpoenas are issued, there has been no

determination – judicial or otherwise – that anyone has infringed any

copyright. Indeed, there could be no such determination because there

is only a suspicion based on filename similarity and no evidence that

there was any infringement, or even that the files shared were

copyrighted. Because a subpoena may be issued without any foundation

beyond speculation, § 512(h) provides no protection for expression that

may very well be, following more careful examination in court or

otherwise, found to be fully protected.

2239480
40
 Because § 512(h) is a procedure designed to strip Internet speakers

of their presumptively protected anonymity, “those procedures violate

the First Amendment unless they include built-in safeguards against

curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, for Government ‘is

not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with [illicit

content] without regard to the possible consequences for

constitutionally protected speech.’ ” Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416

(1971) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has repeatedly

“recognized that ‘the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed

and speech which may legitimately be regulated . . . is finely drawn,’ ”

and thus “ ‘[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls

for sensitive tools.’ ” Blount, 400 U.S. at 417 (quoting Speiser v.

Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).

Section 512(h) lacks these procedural safeguards. It strips Internet

users of their anonymity based upon no more than an ex parte, self-

proclaimed “good faith” assertion by anyone willing to assert he or she

is a copyright owner, or authorized to act on behalf of a copyright

owner, that copyright infringement might be occurring. See

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41
512(c)(3)(A)(v). It does not contemplate any adversarial proceedings

before destroying presumptively protected First Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “[t]he possible

harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go

unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of

others may be muted.” Broadrick v. State of Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,

612 (1973); see Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 254-55

(2002).8

8
With respect to subpoenas for the identity of anonymous Internet
users who have been alleged to have defamed others or committed other
content-based misconduct, courts have carefully scrutinized the
subpoenas to insure that they are proper and not abusive. Doe v.
2TheMart.Com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1092, 1097 (D.Wash. 2001)
(“discovery requests seeking to identify anonymous Internet users must
be subjected to careful scrutiny by the courts”; recognizing chilling
effect if Internet anonymity can be easily stripped away; "the
constitutional rights of Internet users, including the right to speak
anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded"); Columbia Ins. Co. v.
Seescandy.Com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D.Cal.1999) (recognizing
"legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums
anonymously or pseudonymously"); Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe,
29 Media L. Rptr. 2265 (N.J. Super Ct. July 11, 2001) (denying limited
discovery to determine identities of four individuals who posted online
messages about a software company using anonymous handles); Melvin
v. Doe, 29 Media L. Rptr. 1065 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Allegheny Cty.,
Nov. 15, 2000) (to uncover identity of Internet posters, plaintiffs must
make a preliminary showing of the merit of the case; even after
plaintiffs meet this burden, confidentiality order may be required). It

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 There is another alternative that would ensure identification and

punishment of most, if not all, of the unprotected speech RIAA wishes to

reach: The RIAA’s member whose copyright is at issue can file a John

Doe lawsuit against the alleged infringer. Or, if what RIAA wants to do

is simply “send a warning,” it can continue to do so through the very

warning campaign it instituted in April, see Amy Harmon, Music

Swappers Get a Message on PC Screens: Stop It Now, N.Y. Times, Apr.

30, 2003, at C1 (describing RIAA’s messaging campaign “which seek[s]

to turn a chat feature in popular file-trading software to the industry’s

benefit”). In this situation, as in all situations where First Amendment

rights are implicated, courts should require that litigants use less

restrictive and invasive means of pursuing their objectives. Accordingly,

makes little sense for courts to carefully safeguard the anonymity of

Internet users by close scrutiny of subpoenas in one context – alleged
content-based misuse – while permitting automatic breach of Internet
anonymity without any judicial supervision in another context, of
alleged copyright infringement. If the interests in protecting anonymity
deserve strong judicial protection in the case of content-based
misconduct, they certainly are entitled to some judicial protection –
something more than a requirement to obtain a clerk’s rubber stamp –
in the context here.

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issuance and enforcement of subpoenas for the identity of an ISP’s P2P

file sharing customers under § 512(h) cannot satisfy the narrow

tailoring requirement of the First Amendment. Thompson v. W. States

Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).

V.

E-Mail Addresses Are Contact Information Outside The

Scope Of “Information Sufficient To Identify” Subscribers

The subpoena provision of the DMCA does not require disclosure of

all “contact” information; rather, it states that only “information

sufficient to identify” the subscriber may be obtained. 17 U.S.C.

§ 512(h)(3) (emphasis added). The district court agreed with Charter

that the RIAA did not need telephone numbers to identify the

subscribers, but held that Charter must provide its subscribers’ e-mail

address. See SA 316A. However, giving up the subscribers’ names and

mailing or street addresses “identifies” them for purposes of § 512(h)(3),

and that is all the district court should have ordered.

Section 512(b)(3) contrasts sharply with § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv), which

deals with information that a copyright owner must provide to a service

provider. The latter requires “[i]nformation sufficient to permit the

service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address,

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telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address.”

(emphasis added). Similarly, still other portions of the DMCA – those

setting forth the “counter notification” procedure – explicitly require

that a counter-notification from a subscriber provide: “The subscriber’s

name, address, and telephone number, and a statement that the

subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of Federal District Court for the

judicial district in which the address is located. . . .” 17 U.S.C.

§ 512(g)(3)(D).

Congress’ choice not to include or “electronic mail addresses” in the

subpoena provision clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to

require ISPs to disclose e-mail addresses in response to subpoenas. The

only reason that copyright holders are permitted to obtain any

information from an ISP is that the identity of a subscriber cannot be

ascertained from the IP address alone. Conversely, once a copyright

holder has obtained a name and mailing or street address through a

proper DMCA subpoena, then the copyright holder may avail itself of

ordinary methods to obtain a telephone number or e-mail address if it

so desires. Even if all the RIAA wants to do is “contact” the alleged

infringer, letters will still reliably be delivered to mailing or street

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addresses. The DMCA was never designed to transform ISPs into a

copyright holder’s personal information hotline.

The extent of information disclosed under § 512(h) – that is, how

deeply the § 512(h) subpoena intrudes into Internet users’ homes – is

not inconsequential. Whether it is applied solely to material subject to

the § 512(c) notice-and-takedown provisions, or extended as well to P2P

activities such as are involved here, the § 512(h) subpoena clearly

intrudes into Internet users’ lives and activities, without any judicial

supervision. The subpoena process is available not only to trade

associates like RIAA but also to aggressive and extremist entities that

own copyrights and object to others’ use (or suspected use) of their

copyrighted materials. For example, a political or other group may, on

its own bare claim of suspected infringement, learn the identities of its

anonymous critics who use that group’s materials in their criticism

(possibly in ways wholly permissible as fair use). Extremist publishers

may use the subpoena power to harass those who critically quote or use

their materials. Pornographers, who are copyright owners, may obtain

potentially embarrassing information about persons who view or

download their photographs. Owners of children-oriented materials like

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games may – at least if e-mail addresses are revealed – get direct access

to their under-age target customers through these automatic

unsupervised subpoenas.

For such an unusual, unsupervised and intrusive tool as a § 512(h)

subpoena, courts should strictly adhere to the limited statutory

requirement of providing basic identifying information (names and

addresses) only. As the district court properly recognized, telephone

numbers carry with them a greater expectation of privacy. They also

carry a greater potential for abuse, misunderstanding and taking

advantage of less sophisticated persons – for example, if a legally

sophisticated copyright owner calls an unaware and unsophisticated

Internet user, making legal threats and demands. These same

considerations apply to e-mail addresses. E-mail addresses, like

telephone numbers, are often private and unpublished. Like telephone

calls, e-mail messages may catch an Internet user by surprise. A

threatening or legalistic e-mail message from a sophisticated copyright

owner may prompt an immediate and less than fully considered reply

from a teenage P2P user, or even an unsophisticated adult Internet

user. Limiting copyright owners to the basic statutory requirement of

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sufficient identifying information – names and addresses – will protect

Internet users from such misuses of the more intrusive telephone and

e-mail means of communications.

That the alleged “illegal conduct” occurs “in cyberspace” is of no

moment. All conduct addressed by DMCA subpoenas necessarily must

occur in cyberspace; yet Congress chose not to include “electronic mail

addresses” as part of the identifying information required to be

disclosed, even though Congress explicitly required it elsewhere in the

Act.

In short, the district court’s enforcement of the subpoenas to require

the production of e-mail addresses is an unwarranted invasion of a

subscriber’s privacy. The Court should limit the information required to

be provided to a subscriber’s name and mailing or street address.

CONCLUSION

Charter has already produced confidential personal information

about its subscribers (including home and e-mail addresses) in

compliance with the district court’s order. Charter therefore requests

that the Court not only reverse the district court’s order with directions

to grant Charter’s Motion to Quash, but also to order the clerk not to

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issue any further subpoenas to Charter for the RIAA under § 512(h).

Charter further requests the Court to direct the RIAA to return all

subpoenaed subscriber data to Charter immediately and to make no

further use of such subscriber data.

Charter has a distinct interest in not only protecting its subscribers’

privacy at the outset of the subpoena process, but also retrieving

personal data that was obtained by an unlawful subpoena or court

order. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506

U.S. 9, 13 (1992) (“Even though it is now too late to prevent, or to

provide a fully satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of privacy that

occurred . . . a court does have the power to effectuate a partial remedy

by ordering the [party that obtained personal records] to destroy or

return any and all copies it may have in its possession.”)

These instructions are also especially vital because personally

identifiable subscriber information is protected under the

Communications Act, and Charter is required to notify its subscribers

about the nature, frequency, and purpose of any disclosure of such

information. See 47 U.S.C. § 551. Even if the RIAA has begun to make

use of subscriber data provided by Charter, it should not be allowed to

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continue doing so, since it is clear, as illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s

Verizon ruling, that the RIAA had no valid basis under the DMCA to

obtain or enforce the subpoenas it served on Charter.

For the foregoing reasons, Charter Communications, Inc. requests

the Court to enter its judgment reversing the order of the district court,

giving the directions specified above, and granting such other relief as

the Court deems proper in the circumstances.

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 Respectfully submitted,

THOMPSON COBURN LLP

By /s/ Mark Sableman

Stephen B. Higgins
Mark Sableman
James W. Erwin
One US Bank Plaza
St. Louis, Missouri 63101
314-552-6000
FAX 314-552-7000

COLE, RAYWID & BRAVERMAN, LLP

Paul Glist
John D. Seiver
Geoffrey C. Cook
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 200
Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: 202-659-9750
Fax: 202-452-0067

Counsel For Appellant Charter

Communications, Inc.

Dated: January 15, 2004

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 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that this brief complies with Fed. R.

App. P. 28(d)(2); 28(d)(3); 32(a)(7)(B); 32(a)(5); 32(a)(6); 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

It contains 9,294 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted; has

been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word

2000 in 14 pt. Century Schoolbook font; and includes a virus free 3.5”

floppy disk in PDF format.

/s/ Mark Sableman

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of Appellant’s

Brief and one copy of the Separate Appendix were served on this 15th
day of January, 2004, in the manner and upon each of the persons
indicated below.

(Via Hand Delivery)

K. Lee Marshall, Esq.
Bryan Cave, LLP
One Metropolitan Square
211 North Broadway, Suite 3600
St. Louis, MO 63102

(By Federal Express)

Yvette Molinaro, Esq.
Patricia H. Benson, Esq.
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP
Trident Center
11977 West Olympic Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90064

(By Federal Express)

Thomas J. Perrelli, Esq.
Steven B. Fabrizio, Esq.
Jenner & Block, LLC
601 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 1200 South
Washington, DC 20005

/s/ Mark Sableman

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 ADDENDUM

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