NAVARRA VS. COMELEC (GR No.

205728; January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.

NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents
GR No. 205728; January 21, 2015
The Philippines is a democratic and Republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. Art. II, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution
Ponente: Justice Marivic M.V.F. Leonen
Nature of the case: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65
Facts:

On February 21, 2013, the Diocese of Bacolod (represented by Bishop Navarra) posted 2
tarpaulins within a private compound housing of the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately 6 feet by 10 feet in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contained the message IBASURA RH Law.
The second tarpaulin contained the heading Conscience Vote and listed the candidates
as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark. The electoral candidates were categorized according to their vote on the adoption of
the RA No. 10354 or the RH Law.
During the oral arguments, the COMELEC conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
On February 22, 2013, Atty. Mavil Majarucon (Election Officer of Bacolod City) issued a
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to Bishop Navarra. She ordered the
tarpaulins removal within 3 days from receipt for being oversized, in violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 which limits the size requirement to 2 feet by 3 feet.
Bishop Navarra requested that a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department be given with
respect to the tarpaulin and pending this, that it be allowed to remain.
On Feb. 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against
petitioners.
Petitioners initiated this case, since they were concerned of the imminent threat of
prosecution for their exercise of free speech.
The Supreme Court issued a TRO enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing the challenged
notice and letter.

Issues:
A. Procedural Issues:
1. Can the question of the validity of the letter and notice issued by an Election Officer and
the COMELEC Law Department, respectively, be brought directly to the Supreme Court
through a Rule 65 Petition?
2. Did petitioners violate the hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules
governing appeals from COMELEC decisions?
3. Did petitioners violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

NAVARRA VS. COMELEC (GR No. 205728; January 21, 2015

B. Substantive Issues:
1. Does the COMELEC have legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens?
2. Does Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution apply to the assailed letter and notice?
3. Is the expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin a political speech or a
commercial speech?
4. Do the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate petitioners right to
freedom of speech and expression?
5. Is the tarpaulin considered election propaganda/ paraphernalia, hence, subject to the
regulatory power of the COMELEC?
6. Is the order for removal of the tarpaulin a content-neutral regulation?
7. Assuming that the acts of the COMELEC are content-neutral, would they meet the
requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech?
8. Do the assailed notice and order for the tarpaulins removal violate the right to property of
petitioners?
9. Do the assailed letter and notice violate the petitioners right to the free exercise of their
religion?
RULING ON THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
1. Can the question of the validity of the letter and notice issued by an Election
Officer and the COMELEC Law Department, respectively, be brought directly to the
Supreme Court through a Rule 65 Petition?
COMELECs contention: The challenged letter and notice are not subject to review by the
Supreme Court whose power to review is limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of
the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory power. Instead, these are
reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Art. IX- C, Sec. 2 (3) of the Constitution on
COMELECs power to decide all questions affecting elections. Several cases were also cited by
COMELEC in support of its argument.
Ruling: Yes, the assailed letter and notice issued by an Election Officer and the COMELEC
Law Department can be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court through this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

COMELECs reliance on the aforesaid provision is misplaced. The Supreme Court

elaborated: We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in
its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are confronted with the question of
whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent
criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech. The subject matter of
the controversy is the effect of COMELECs notice and letter on free speech. This is not
covered by Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(3) of the Constitution. The word affecting in this
provision does not mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and all
questions that arise during elections.
The Supreme Court has the original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and
prohibition under Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (1) and Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. A
breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC
is within this courts power of review. Moreover, it is the Supreme Courts constitutional
mandate to protect the people against governments infringement of this fundamental
right.
Direct resort to the Supreme Court is also necessary to avoid the chilling effect
that could affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issued during elections.

NAVARRA VS. COMELEC (GR No. 205728; January 21, 2015

(Chilling effect is the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of natural

and legal rights by the threat of legal sanction.)
In addition, the jurisprudence relied upon by the respondent involve election protests
filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate. While in the present case,
petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert
their fundamental right to expression.

2. Did petitioners violate the hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules
governing appeals from COMELEC decisions?
Ruling: No, petitioners did not violate the hierarchy of courts doctrine. The Supreme Courts
role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become
exigent should not be emasculated by this doctrine. This has never been the purpose of such
doctrine.
The following are the exceptions to the hierarchy of courts doctrine:
a. When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time;
In this case, the issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.
b. When the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote, but
also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general.
c. Cases of first impression;
The Supreme Court finds this case one of first impression, as it involves the issue of
whether the right of suffrage includes the right to freedom of expression.
d.
e.
f.
g.

When the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Supreme Court;
When the time element cannot be ignored;
When the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
When petitioners rightly claim that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available;
h. When the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy or the orders complained of were patent nullities.
These exceptions apply in the present case.
3. Did petitioners violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Respondents contention: The case should have first been brought to the COMELEC En Banc or
any of its divisions.
Ruling: No, petitioners did not violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Petitioners exercise of their right to speech had
understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing
of an election offense is already an actionable infringement of this right. Hence, exhaustion of
administrative remedies prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech. Furthermore, this

NAVARRA VS. COMELEC (GR No. 205728; January 21, 2015

involves a purely legal question and the circumstances of the case indicate the urgency of judicial
intervention.
RULING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. Does the COMELEC have legal basis to regulate expressions made by private
citizens?
Ruling: No, the COMELEC does not have legal basis to regulate said expressions because all
the Constitutional provisions, laws and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin pertain to candidates and political parties. Herein petitioners are not
candidates nor do they belong to any political party.
Basis of COMELEC
Art. IX-C, Sec. 4, Constitution
The Commission may, during election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation... in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
Art. IX-C, Sec. 2 (7) of the Constitution
The COMELEC shall have the power to recommend to the
Congress measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials
are posted and... to penalize election offenses.
Sec.9 of the Fair Election Act (posting of campaign
materials)
Sec. 17 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (posting
of campaign materials)

Supreme Courts ruling

Petitioners in this case are
neither franchise holders nor
candidates.

This provision only affects

candidates.

This provision only mentions

parties and candidates.
This provision only affects
candidates or political parties

THEORIES/SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT THAT STREGTHEN THE NEED TO PROTECT FREEDOM

OF EXPRESSION:
1. This relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to
criticize government actions. Deliberative democracy theory submits that substantial,
open and ethical dialogue is a critical and defining feature of a good polity.
2. Free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
3. Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
4. Expression is a marker for group identity.
5. The Bill of Rights is supposed to protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian
abuses.
6. Free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory (provides that nonviolent
manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence).
2. . Does Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution apply to the assailed letter and notice?
Ruling: Yes, they are covered by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, which provides: No law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. While it is
true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department,
the Supreme Court has applied Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.

NAVARRA VS. COMELEC (GR No. 205728; January 21, 2015

3. Is the expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin a political speech or a
commercial speech?
Ruling: The expression from the content of the tarpaulin is a political speech.
Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation. Whereas,
commercial speech is a speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction.
Speech with political consequences, like the content of the tarpaulin herein, is at the core of the
freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.
4. Do the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate petitioners right
to freedom of speech and expression?
Ruling:

YES.

Art. III, Sec. 4 of Constitution provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Contained in the tarpaulin are opinion expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression
protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate,
and hopefully, persuade. What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms:
expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate about contemporary
issues. It is a substantive content of the right to suffrage.
5. Is the tarpaulin considered election propaganda, hence, subject to the regulatory power of
the COMELEC?
Petitioners contention: They invoke their constitutional right to communicate their opinions and
views about issues and candidates.
Ruling: No. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean that is an election propaganda. The tarpaulin was
not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any candidates, political party or part-list
group. Petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. Furthermore,
Sec. 1 (4) of COMELEC Res. No. 9615 does not include personal opinions in its definition of
election propaganda.
6. Is the order for the removal of the tarpaulin a content-neutral regulation?
COMELECS Contention: Said order is content-neutral as it was made simply because the
maximum size limitation for lawful election propaganda was not complied with.
Bishop Navarra and the Dioceses contention: It is content-based as it applies only to political
speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech.
Ruling: No, said order is not a content-neutral regulation. Instead, it is generally contentbased. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based restraint restrictions based
on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.

Content-neutral regulation- controls merely

on the incidents of the speech, i.e. time, place,
or manner of the speech.

NAVARRA VS. COMELEC (GR No. 205728; January 21, 2015

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the
clear and present danger rule. Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
In this case, there is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulins to justify the curtailment of the right to freedom of expression.
7. Assuming that the acts of the COMELEC are content-neutral, would they meet the
requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech?
Requisites for a content-neutral regulation to be justified:
(1) If it furthers the constitutional power of the Government;
It is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin.
This is a protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates.
(2) If it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
The governmental interest must also be compelling.
(3) If the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
The size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the
maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners message and
violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
(4) If the incident restriction on alleged freedom of speech is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
8. Do the assailed notice and order for the tarpaulins removal violate the right to property of
petitioners?
Ruling: YES.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, it still remains in the private property
of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
9. Do the assailed letter and notice violate the petitioners right to the free exercise of their
religion?
Petitioners contention: Their right to the free exercise of their religion was violated.
Ruling: NO. Said tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech. As aptly argued by
COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as
speech with political consequences and note religious speech. Moreover, the definition of
ecclesiastical affair in Austria v. NLRC cited by petitioners finds no application in this case. The
posting of tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of
civil courts, such as proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, and other
activities with attached religious significance. Hence, petitioners right to the free exercise of
their religion is not violated.
______________________________________________________________________________
Prepared by:
Mary Grace Mendoza Alemania
Fourth Year
Political Law Review (SY 2015-2016, First Semester)