15-72440 - 9 - Plaintiffs Opposition To Notice of Filing (Motion To Intervene)

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Case: 15-72440, 08/20/2015, ID: 9654838, DktEntry: 9-1, Page 1 of 16
No. 15-72440
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Maricopa
County, Arizona
Defendants/Petitioners
and GERARD A. SHERIDAN,
Specially appearing non-party/Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA,
Respondent Court
and MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA MELENDRES, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs/Real Parties in Interest.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
2:07-cv-02513-GMS
The Honorable G. Murray Snow
United States District Judge
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO NOTICE
OF FILING (MOTION TO INTERVENE)
Stanley Young
Michelle Morin
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 700
Redwood shores, CA 94065-1418
Telephone: (650) 632-4700
Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
syoung@cov.com
mmorin@cov.com
Tammy Albarran
One Front Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 591-7036
Facsimile: (415) 955-6566
talbarran@cov.com
(counsel continued on next page)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees

MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA MELENDRES, ET AL.
(2 of 52)
Dan Pochoda
ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
Facsimile: (602) 650-1376
dpochoda@acluaz.org
jlyall@acluaz.org
Jorge Martin Castillo

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND
634 South Spring Street, 11th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90014
Telephone: (213) 629-2512
Facsimile: (213) 629-0266
jcastillo@maldef.org
Cecillia D. Wang
ACLU FOUNDATION
IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS PROJECT
39 Drumm Street
Telephone: (415) 343-0775
Facsimile: (415) 395-0950
cwang@aclu.org
Anne Lai
401 E. Peltason Dr.
Law 4800-P
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
Telephone: (949) 824-9894
Facsimile: (949) 824-0066
alai@law.uci.edu
Andre Segura
ACLU FOUNDATION
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Telephone: (212) 549-2676
Facsimile: (212) 549-2654
asegura@aclu.org
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 2
I.
Montgomery Lacks Standing to Intervene in Arpaios and Sheridans

Mandamus Proceeding. .................................................................................. 2
II.
Montgomery May Not Raise Issues Unrelated to the Mandamus

Petition. ........................................................................................................... 5
III.
Montgomery Should Not Be Allowed to Preempt the District Court

and Avoid the Requirements for Intervention by Joining the
Mandamus Petition. ........................................................................................ 6
IV.
The Law of the Case Bars Montgomery from Seeking the Same
Relief, from the Same Court, in the Same Proceeding, Twice....................... 8
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 8
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 11
(4 of 52)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Arakaki v. Cayetano,
324 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (May 13, 2003) ........................... 6, 7
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) .......................................................................................... 2
Donnelly v. Glickman,
159 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................ 6
Geiger v. Kitzhaber,
No. 14-35427, 2014 WL 8628611 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................... 3
Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma,
12 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................. 8
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
393 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................ 3
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013) ....................................................................................... 2, 3
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) .............................................................................................. 3
Statutes
28 U.S.C. 144 .......................................................................................................... 5
Other Authorities
Fed. R. App. P. 27-1................................................................................................. 11
Fed. R. App. P. 27(d) ............................................................................................... 11
ii
(5 of 52)
INTRODUCTION
Montgomerys Notice of Filing (Dkt. 4) appears to request intervention into
the mandamus proceeding filed by Sheriff Arpaio and nonparty contemnor
Sheridan, who object to his motion. Dkt. 5. Montgomery may not intervene, and
these matters should not be consolidated, for four reasons. First, Montgomery does
not meet the standard for intervention, at least because Montgomery does not have
Article III standing.1 Second, Montgomery improperly seeks this Courts
consideration of issues not raised by Arpaios and Sheridans petition for a writ of
mandamus. Third, Montgomery is not a party in the district court proceedings, and
his request for intervention attempts to circumvent the authority of the district
court, which has not yet ruled on Montgomerys request to intervene on its merits
since he has not filed one through any attorney authorized to practice in the district.
Finally, Montgomery has already sought the very same relief he now seeks to
obtain by intervening in this matter (recusal), in a mandamus petition he filed last
May. He should not be heard on his repeat of the same motion, whether through
intervention into this matter or through any other vehicle. For any or all of these
reasons, the motion to intervene should be denied.
Plaintiffs intend to move to dismiss Montgomerys pending appeals, No. 1516440 and 15-16626.
(6 of 52)
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Montgomerys Emergency
Motion for Stay on Appeal, 9th Cir. No. 15-16440, and incorporate by reference
the Statement of Relevant Facts contained therein. See Exhibit 1. In short,
Montgomery is not a party to the district court proceedings and did not participate
in them. He was retained as a confidential informant by MCSO, as part of MCSOs
investigations into various matters, potentially including MCSOs attempt to prove
the existence of a conspiracy theory involving the district court and the Department
of Justices purported efforts to get Sheriff Arpaio. Montgomerys information
was ultimately discredited by MCSO, which nevertheless sought to obtain his work
product until the day before contempt hearings in the district court last April.
Testimony by Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) witnesses about Mr.
Montgomerys activity as a confidential informant for the MCSO, and documents
in MCSOs possession, allegedly originating from Montgomery, are
Montgomerys only connection to this case.
ARGUMENT
I.
Montgomery Lacks Standing to Intervene in Arpaios and Sheridans

Mandamus Proceeding.
Anyone seeking to invoke the power of the federal courts, including when
intervening to seek appellate review, must have Article III standing. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (citing Arizonans for Official English v.
2
(7 of 52)
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)). Article III standing requires injury in fact, a
causal connection between the injury and the challenged action, and a likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Additionally, in the Ninth Circuit, a
nonparty has standing to appeal only in exceptional circumstances, when the
appellant participated in the district court proceedings as a nonparty, has a
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation discernible from the record, and
the equities of the case weigh in favor of hearing the appeal. Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 393 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2004).
Montgomery lacks Article III standing and does not meet the Ninth Circuit
standard for a nonparty appeal.2 He was not ordered to do or refrain from doing
anything by the district court, and no judgment has been entered against
Montgomery by the district court. He is not an MCSO employee and has no direct
interest in the issues raised by the petition for a writ of mandamus, nor in the
district courts ongoing contempt proceeding. He therefore does not possess a
personal and direct stake in the outcome of the case sufficient to establish
standing to participate in appeal proceedings. Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2662.
See also Geiger v. Kitzhaber, No. 14-35427, 2014 WL 8628611, at *1 (9th Cir.
2
See 15-16440, Plaintiffs Opposition to Montgomerys Emergency Motion for

Stay on Appeal, Statement of Relevant Facts and Section I, incorporated herein by
reference.
(8 of 52)
2014) (putative appellate intervenor must both prevail in its appeal of the district
courts denial of its motion to intervene, and demonstrate Article III standing to
challenge the district courts final judgment).
Montgomery asserts that he has unspecified legal and property rights but
fails to link these rights to the requested relief.3 It is far from clear that recusal
would change the ownership or discoverability status of any documents provided
by Montgomery to MCSO. He has therefore failed to show any causal connection
between the alleged injury to these property rights and the challenged order (the
district courts refusal to recuse itself).
Montgomery also has failed to demonstrate a likelihood that his alleged
injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court. As explained
more fully below, the only rulings made by the district court that relate to
Montgomerys motions were denials of pro hac vice applications filed by
Montgomerys counsel.4 Recusal is no guarantee that a new district court judge
would not make precisely the same findings that this judge made, nor that a new
judge would allow Montgomery to intervene.
For these reasons alone, Montgomerys motion should be denied.
Id., Section I.
Id.
(9 of 52)
II.
Montgomery May Not Raise Issues Unrelated to the Mandamus

Petition.
Though both Montgomerys requested relief (recusal of the district court)
and the relief requested by the petition for a writ of mandamus are, according to
Montgomery, virtually identical, Montgomerys proposed intervention to
protect his legal and property rights would needlessly interject a number of new
issues into this courts consideration of the mandamus petition: first, whether
Montgomery has a right to be heard on the recusal issue; second, whether
Montgomery has any legally cognizable property rights that have been violated
by the district court contempt proceedings; and third, whether the district court
properly exercised its discretion to deny the pro hac vice applications of
Montgomerys counsel. In addition, Montgomery states that his request that the
Ninth Circuit also vacate the orders issued by the district court, and his affidavit
under 28 U.S.C. 144 (No. CV07-2513, Dkt. No. 1067, Exhibit 2) are the only
differences between these motions, but he is mistaken. A disqualification of the
judge (as sought by both Sheriff Arpaio and Sheridan, and Montgomery) would not
automatically result in the vacating of all of the district courts prior orders. Arpaio
and Sheridan allege that the grounds for disqualification arose only in April.
Accordingly, no basis for vacating prior orders would exist even if the judge were
now removed from the case, as Arpaio and Sheridan request. Montgomerys
(10 of 52)
intervention would require this Court to consider the merits of Montgomerys

additional requests to vacate.
The request to consolidate (intervene) should be denied because these are
not the issues raised in Arpaios and Sheridans petition for a writ of mandamus.
See, e.g., Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended
(May 13, 2003) (putative intervenor is not permitted to inject new, unrelated issues
into pending litigation); Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409-10 (9th Cir.
1998) (denying intervention on the grounds that putative intervenors interests
were unrelated to the underlying litigation).
To the extent Montgomery wishes to be heard only on the same issue raised
in the mandamus petition, Montgomery has not overcome the presumption that the
existing parties will adequately represent his interests. Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 108687 (where parties share the same ultimate objective, differences in litigation
strategy do not justify intervention). Furthermore, such an appeal would be barred
by the law of the case. Infra, Section IV.
III.
Montgomery Should Not Be Allowed to Preempt the District Court and

Avoid the Requirements for Intervention by Joining the Mandamus
Petition.
With respect to Montgomery, the district court has only ruled on (and
denied) the pro hac vice applications of Montgomerys counsel. The district court
has declined to consider the merits of motions filed without leave by attorneys not
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admitted to practice in the District of Arizonaincluding Montgomerys motion to

intervene. The consolidation of appeals Montgomery seeks is not the proper
vehicle for requesting appellate reconsideration of the district courts decisions
regarding these pro hac vice motions.
Had the district court had occasion to rule on Montgomerys motion to
intervene on its merits, that motion surely would have been denied. A party
seeking to intervene as of right, as Montgomery did, must meet four requirements:
(1) the applicant must timely move to intervene; (2) the applicant must have a
significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be situated such that the disposition of
the action may impair or impede the partys ability to protect that interest; and (4)
the applicants interest must not be adequately represented by existing parties.
Arakaki, 324 F.3d at 1083. Montgomery did not meet these requirements. He had
no constitutional standing to raise any issue in the district court, he demonstrated
no legally cognizable interest relating to the subjects of the district court action (the
violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights by Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO, and the
determination of the scope of and appropriate remedies to address the defendants
civil contempt of the courts orders), and disposition of the district courts
contempt proceedings would have no effect on Montgomerys claim to property
rights, which are not at issue in that proceeding.
(12 of 52)
Yet Montgomery asks this Court to allow him to be heard now, on the issue
of the district courts authority to conduct the contempt proceedings. This notice
of motion is nothing more than an attempted end-run around the district courts
authority to rule on Montgomerys request to intervene in the first instance. For
this reason as well, the motion should be denied.
IV.
The Law of the Case Bars Montgomery from Seeking the Same Relief,
from the Same Court, in the Same Proceeding, Twice.
This is not the first time Montgomery has sought this Courts assistance in
bringing the district court proceedings to a halt. He filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in May of this year, seeking the very same relief (disqualification of the
district court). No relevant facts have changed since May. See 15-16440, Plaintiffs
Opposition to the Emergency Motion for Stay on Appeal, Statement of Facts and
Section III. Under the law of the case doctrine, he should not be heard on this same
request twice. Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 12 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)
(The law of the case doctrine states that the decision of an appellate court on a
legal issue must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case.)
(quotation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, Montgomerys request to consolidate or intervene
should be denied.
(13 of 52)
Dated: August 20, 2015
By /s/ Stanley Young

Stanley Young
Michelle Morin
syoung@cov.com
mmorin@cov.com
Redwood Shores, CA 94065-1418
Telephone: (650) 632-4700
Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
Tammy Albarran
talbarran@cov.com
1 Front Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-5356
Telephone: (415) 591-7066
Facsimile: (415) 955-6566
Dan Pochoda
dpochoda@acluaz.org
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
ARIZONA
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
Facsimile: (602) 650-1376
Cecillia D. Wang
cwang@aclu.org
ACLU FOUNDATION
Immigrants Rights Project
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, California 94111
Telephone: (415) 343-0775
Facsimile: (415) 395-0950
Andre Segura
asegura@aclu.org
ACLU FOUNDATION
9
(14 of 52)

New York, NY 10004
Telephone: (212) 549-2676
Facsimile: (212) 549-2654
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL
FUND
Los Angeles, California 90014
Telephone: (213) 629-2512
Facsimile: (213) 629-0266
Anne Lai
alai@law.uci.edu
401 E. Peltason, Suite 3500
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
Telephone: (949) 824-9894
Facsimile: (949) 824-0066
10
(15 of 52)
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 27-1, the attached brief is in
compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 27(d) and does not exceed 20 pages.
Date: August 20, 2015
/s/ Stanley Young

STANLEY YOUNG
11
(16 of 52)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 20, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by
the appellate CM/ECF system.
/s/ Stanley Young

STANLEY YOUNG
12
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EXHIBIT 1
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No. 15-16440
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA MELENDRES, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
JOSEPH M. ARPAIO,
Defendant-Appellant
and
DENNIS L. MONTGOMERY,
Putative Intervenor.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
2:07-cv-02513-GMS
The Honorable G. Murray Snow
United States District Judge
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY ON APPEAL
Stanley Young
Michelle L. Morin
Redwood shores, CA 94065-1418
Telephone: (650) 632-4700
Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
syoung@cov.com
mmorin@cov.com
Rebecca A. Jacobs
One Front Street
Telephone: (415) 591-7036
Facsimile: (415) 955-6566
rjacobs@cov.com
(counsel continued on next page)

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Priscilla Dodson
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001-4956
Telephone: (202) 662-5996
Facsimile: (202) 778-5996
pdodson@cov.com
Andre Segura
ACLU FOUNDATION
New York, NY 10004
Telephone: (212) 549-2676
Facsimile: (212) 549-2654
asegura@aclu.org
Dan Pochoda
ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
Facsimile: (602) 650-1376
dpochoda@acluaz.org
jlyall@acluaz.org

MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND
Los Angeles, CA 90014
Telephone: (213) 629-2512
Facsimile: (213) 629-0266
Cecillia D. Wang
ACLU FOUNDATION
39 Drumm Street
Telephone: (415) 343-0775
Facsimile: (415) 395-0950
cwang@aclu.org
Anne Lai
401 E. Peltason Dr.
Law 4800-P
Irvine, CA 92697-8000
Telephone: (949) 824-9894
Facsimile: (949) 824-0066
alai@law.uci.edu

ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ................................................................. 1
1.
Selected Procedural History ................................................................. 1
2.
Testimony and Documents Produced Regarding MCSOs

Investigation ......................................................................................... 2
3.
Montgomerys Previous Motions to Intervene and to Recuse the

District Court ........................................................................................ 4
4.
Sheriff Arpaios Motions Seeking Recusal and Stay ........................... 7
5.
Order on Discoverability of MCSO Documents Allegedly

Provided by Montgomery..................................................................... 7
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 9
I.
The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because

Montgomery Lacks Standing to Intervene in Either the District
Court or the Appellate Proceedings. .................................................... 9
II.
The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because

Montgomery Seeks Review of Matters Not Yet Considered by
the District Court. ............................................................................... 14
III.
The Emergency Motion Duplicates Other Pending and

Resolved Motions, Yet Cites No Changed Circumstances
Warranting Separate Consideration. .................................................. 14
IV.
The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because The

Weight of the Nken Factors Does Not Warrant a Stay. ..................... 15
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 20
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43 (1997) .............................................................................................. 13
Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma,
12 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................ 15
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
393 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 13
Hilton v. Braunskill,
481 U.S. 770 (1987) ............................................................................................ 16
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) ..................................................................................10, 13
Lair v. Bullock,
697 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 15
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................................................................ 10
Melendres v. Arpaio,
784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) .............................................................................. 1
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ............................................................................................ 15
Turner v. Rogers,
131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) ......................................................................................... 16
United States v. Ensign,
491 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 16
United States v. Ries,
100 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 18
ii
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Other Authorities
Fed. R. App. P. 27-1................................................................................................. 23
Fed. R. App. P. 27(d) ............................................................................................... 23
LRCiv. 83.1(b) ......................................................................................................... 16
iii
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Putative intervenor Dennis Montgomery (Montgomery), through his

Emergency Motion for Stay on Appeal (the Emergency Motion, Dkt. 5), again
seeks the district courts recusal, and further asks this Court to stay the district
court proceedings pending reconsideration of his request. Yet the district court has
issued no orders regarding Montgomery himself, nor has the Court ordered any
property in Montgomerys possession seized or disclosed, nor has the district court
entered any judgment against Montgomery. For these and the additional reasons
set forth herein, the motion should be denied.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1
1.
Selected Procedural History
This cases lengthy procedural history includes the district courts ruling that
Sheriff Arpaio and the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the Plaintiff class, the courts entry of
orders for various associated injunctive relief measures, and the courts
appointment of a Monitor to supervise and assess Defendants implementation of
and compliance with the injunction. See, e.g., No. CV07-2513 (D. Ariz.), Dkt.
1164 (Attached as Ex. 13).
The facts of this case may be found in greater detail in a number of opinions of
this Court and the district court. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th
Cir. 2015). Only the facts relevant to the present motion are set forth herein.
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In February 2015, on a motion by Plaintiffs, the Court ordered MCSO,

Sheriff Arpaio, Chief Deputy Sheriff Sheridan, and others in MCSO to show cause
why they should not be held in civil contempt for violating several court orders,
including the December 23, 2011 preliminary injunction and the courts discovery
orders. Id. at 3-4 (discussing Dkt. 880 (Attached as Ex. 1)). Arpaio and Sheridan
admitted to civil contempt, and a show-cause hearing was held in April 2015,
during which Plaintiffs put on evidence as to the facts underlying the contempt,
including whether Arpaios admitted contempt was an isolated incident or reflected
a pattern of resistance on his part or by MCSO to the courts directives. The Court
indicated that this latter issue was important from a remedial perspective. Id. at 6
(citing No. CV07-2513, Apr. 23, 2015 Tr. 635:12-18 (Attached as Ex. 21)).
2.
Testimony and Documents Produced Regarding MCSOs

Investigation
During the April hearing, the Court and Defendants counsel questioned
Arpaio and Sheridan about an article by Stephen Lemons published in the Phoenix
New Times on June 4, 2014. The Lemons article alleged that MCSO was paying a
confidential informant, (Putative Intervenor/Appellant) Dennis L. Montgomery, to
investigate possible collusion between the district court and the U.S. Department of
Justice. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1164 (Attached as Ex. 13) at 7; Dkt. 1166 (Attached
as Ex. 14) at 1, 5-13 (Declaration of Cecillia Wang, attaching a copy of the article
as Exhibit A). The Lemons article also reported that Arpaio was purportedly
2
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convinced by Montgomery that the Department of Justice and the district court had
conspired to get Arpaio. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1166 (Attached as Ex. 14) at 8.
During his testimony at the April hearing, Arpaio confirmed that MCSO was
conducting an investigation, using the Maricopa County Sheriffs Cold Case Posse
and Montgomery, a computer consultant based out of the Seattle, Washington area.
No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1164 (Attached as Ex. 13) at 7-8 (citing Apr. 23, 2015 Tr.
642:3-647:12 (Attached as Ex. 21)). Arpaio also confirmed that Montgomery was
given the status of confidential informant for MCSO. Id. at 8 (citing Apr. 24, 2015
Tr. 998:12-14, 1006:10-16 (Attached as Ex. 22)).
Because the district court determined that MCSOs investigation of the
district court was relevant to the district courts efforts to ensure Defendants
compliance with its orders, the district court has ordered MCSO to produce,
subject to a protective order, documents and information regarding the MCSO
investigations. The documents produced thus far falsely assert the existence of
telephone calls between the district court and agents of the Department of Justice
and appear to imply that the district court authorized a wiretap on MCSO. No.
CV07-2513, Dkt. 1164 (Attached as Ex. 13) at 9-10; Dkt. 1166 (Attached as Ex.
14) at 27-46. The information Montgomery provided MCSO also included
approximately 50 hard drives of information, which Montgomery represented
contained classified information he obtained while working as a CIA contractor.
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No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1166 (Attached as Ex. 14) at 17 (email from MCSO
Detective Brian Mackiewicz discussing 50 hard drives of information provided by
Montgomery); No. CV07-2513, Apr. 24, 2015 Tr. 998:3-1008:6 (Attached as Ex.
22).
MCSO reviewed these documents, and apparently concluded by November
2014 that Montgomerys claims about the documents that he provided were
fraudulent. For example, an email from MCSO Detective Brian Mackiewicz stated
that our experts examined the information contained on [Montgomerys] drives
and concluded that they contained data dumps . . . hours of[] video feeds for Al
Jazeera news feed and that Montgomery deliberately [compiled] massive
amounts of data on these drives for the purpose of obfuscating the fact the data
itself contained no evidence to support [his] claims. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1166
(Attached as Ex. 14) at 17. Arpaio testified that he became aware that the informer
was giving him junk. No. CV07-2513, Apr. 23, 2015 Tr. 650:20-25 (Attached as
Ex. 21). Yet MCSO continued to press Montgomery for work product until the day
before the April 2015 contempt hearing. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1164 (Attached as
Ex. 13) at 10; Dkt. 1166 (Attached as Ex. 14) at 17-26.
3.
Montgomerys Previous Motions to Intervene and to Recuse the

District Court
On May 8, 2015, Montgomery, through his counsel Mr. Moseley and Mr.
Klayman, filed a motion to intervene in the district court proceedings, as well as a
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motion to disqualify the district court from further involvement with the case. No.
CV07-2513, Dkt. 1057 (Attached as Ex. 2), Dkt. 1067 (Attached as Ex. 4). Neither
Mr. Moseley nor Mr. Klayman are members of the State Bar of Arizona;
accordingly, each attorney (first Mr. Montgomery and then, after his application
was denied, Mr. Klayman) sought to be admitted pro hac vice. See, e.g., No.
CV07-2513, Dkt. 1060 (Attached as Ex. 3), 1093 (Attached as Ex. 6), 1080
(Attached as Ex. 5). Both applications were denied for reasons including the
conflict of interest between the attorneys current representation of Arpaio in
another action and their proposed representation of Montgomery in the district
court. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1093 (Attached as Ex. 6) at 2; Aug. 11, 2015 Tr.
11:14-15:13 (Attached as Ex. 26) (oral order denying Klayman application). Mr.
Moseley and Mr. Klaymans firm, Freedom Watch, represents the Sheriff in
another action in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
challenging President Obamas executive action on immigration. No. CV07-2513,
Dkt. 1167 (Attached as Ex. 15) at 3-4. Yet in the district court action and pursuant
to the courts discovery orders, Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO have produced certain
materials in which Montgomery claims a property interest, and Sheriff Arpaio and
MCSO witnesses have testified (and are expected to further testify) that
Montgomery defrauded MCSO by providing junk information and that they do not
agree with certain positions taken by Montgomery. Id.; see also No. CV07-2513,
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Dkt. 1145 (Attached as Ex. 10) at 2; Apr. 23, 2015 Tr. 650:20-25 (Attached as Ex.
21).
In addition, one attorney, Mr. Klayman, could be a potential witness in the
district court matter, as the documents produced in the litigation included
nonprivileged correspondence between Klayman and MCSO employees regarding
Montgomerys work and other matters. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1166 (Attached as
Ex. 14) at 17-19, 23-26; Dkt. 1198-2 (Attached as Ex. 19) at 2-4. One such email
correspondence included a communication from Sheriff Arpaio to Mr. Klayman
clarifying that Klayman does not represent Sheriff Arpaio in this litigation. No.
CV07-2513, Dkt. 1198-2 (Attached as Ex. 19) at 3.
As a result of the denial of his attorneys pro hac vice motion,
Montgomerys motions to intervene and disqualify were stricken, and not
considered. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1093 (Attached as Ex. 6) at 2. Montgomery filed
a motion for reconsideration in the district court. This was also denied. No. CV072513, Dkt. 1167 (Attached as Ex. 15). On May 11, 2015, Montgomery filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus, asking this Court to compel the district courts
recusal, and further demanding that the district courts orders be vacated and that
Montgomerys documents, information, and intellectual property be returned to
him. That petition was summarily denied. In re Dennis L. Montgomery, No. 1571443, Dkt. 2 (9th Cir. May 12, 2015) (Attached as Ex. 23).
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4.
Sheriff Arpaios Motions Seeking Recusal and Stay
Defendant Sheriff Arpaio and non-party contemnor Gerard Sheridan also

filed a motion to recuse the district court. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1117 (Attached as
Ex. 8). That motion was denied, as was a motion to stay pending Ninth Circuit
appeal of the order. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1164 (Attached as Ex. 13); July 20, 2015
Tr. 9:20-15:8 (Attached as Ex. 24) (denying Dkt. 1171 (Attached as Ex. 17),
Sheriff Arpaios motion to stay); see also Dkt. 1175 (Attached as Ex. 18)
(plaintiffs opposition to motion to stay). On August 6, 2015, Sheriff Arpaio and
Sheridan filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, requesting that the
district court be compelled to recuse himself from further proceedings. No. 1572440. That petition is pending, and Montgomery has filed a notice of filing
suggesting he desires to intervene in that matter. No. 15-72440, Dkt. 4 (Attached as
Ex. 25).
5.
Order on Discoverability of MCSO Documents Allegedly Provided

by Montgomery
The district court has continued to hold status conferences on a variety of

discovery issues, in anticipation of the continued contempt hearing scheduled to
proceed on September 22, 2015. One such issue has been the discoverability of
certain materials in MCSOs possession relating to Montgomerys investigations
while employed as MCSOs confidential informant. Montgomerys statements to
the MCSO had raised the possibility that the information he provided to MCSO
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included classified or sensitive information, or information that should have

remained the property of the U.S. Government. No. CV07-2513, July 20, 2015 Tr.
42:14-45:14 (Attached as Ex. 24). When this issue came to light in the district
court, the documents and information at issue were in the MCSOs possession and
controlnot Montgomerys. The district court determined that the information
was discoverablerelevant, at minimum, to the ongoing contempt proceedings
and specifically to the appropriate remedy for civil contempt by the Defendants,
which has already been admitted. A central concern at the remedy stage is to
ensure defendants future compliance with the district courts orders, taking into
account a long record of recalcitrant conduct. Notably, Defendants investigation
into ways to undermine the courts authority with spurious claims of conspiracy is
inconsistent with such compliance. And any disclosure of any information that
actually warrants confidential treatment will be pursuant to a protective order
prohibiting sharing the information with anyone outside the context of the
litigation.
Because of the potentially classified status of the documents, a
representative of the U.S. Government was notified, and the documents provided
by Montgomery to MCSO were made available to the U.S. Government for a
determination of whether the documents were in fact classified or otherwise the
property of the United States. Id. This disclosure for government inspection was
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subject to the district courts order that the documents not be disclosed to anyone,
other than as necessary to conduct the review. Id. See also No. CV07-2513, July
20, 2015 Tr. 42:10-44:18 (Attached as Ex. 24). The government chose to first
inspect one hard drive and two bankers boxes of documents. Aug. 11, 2015 Tr.
35:4-41:14 (Attached as Ex. 26).
Testimony regarding Montgomerys confidential informant work for MCSO,
and the disclosure of documents and information he provided to MCSO, are
Montgomerys only connection to the district court proceedings. He is not a
defendant in the civil case, nor (upon information and belief) is he currently
employed by MCSO in any capacity, nor is he presently accused of committing
criminal violations in connection with the district court proceedings. The district
court has issued no orders regarding Montgomery himself, nor has the Court
ordered any property in Montgomerys possession seized or disclosed, nor has the
district court entered any judgment against Montgomery.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because Montgomery

Lacks Standing to Intervene in Either the District Court or the
Appellate Proceedings.
Montgomerys motion should be denied because he lacks Article III
standing to intervene in the district court proceedings, and therefore should not be
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heard on his request to stay those proceedings.2 To have standing, a litigant must
seek relief for an injury that affects him in a personal and individual way.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). He must possess a direct stake in the
outcome of the case, id., and must demonstrate injury in fact, causal connection
between that injury and the challenged action, and a likelihood that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
Montgomery concedes that he lacks standing to intervene in the matters
being addressed by the district court, and that he has no stake in the outcome of
this case. See Dkt. 5 at 8-9 (Montgomery has nothing to do with immigration,
immigration enforcement or law enforcement. He has had no involvement with,
role in, knowledge of, or experience in those topics. Montgomery has no position
on the proper way to conduct traffic stops, find probable cause, or the like.). He
appeared to concede the same in his motion for reconsideration of the district
courts orders denying his his attorneys pro hac vice motions. No. CV07-2513,
Dkt. 1112 (Attached as Ex. 7) at 3 (In addition, Dennis Montgomery is not
seeking to take any position with regard [to] any other issues remaining in the post-
Plaintiffs refer to and incorporate by reference the arguments in the Opposition to

Montgomerys Notice of Filing (Motion to Intervene). Plaintiffs intend to move
to dismiss Montgomerys pending appeals, No. 15-16440 and 15-16626, as well.
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judgment proceedings in this case or testimony involving the allegations of

contempt of the Courts injunction brought by the Plaintiffs.). He is not a
contemnor, nor (upon information and belief) a defendant in any related criminal
case. The district court has made no findings against Montgomery, and its denial of
Arpaios and Sheridans recusal motion does not cause Montgomery any personal
or individual injury. He claims to desire to intervene to protect his property rights,
but no property in Montgomerys possession has been ordered seized or
confiscated, and all the information or documents in MCSOs possession and
allegedly provided by Montgomery have been ordered produced subject to orders
to all recipients regarding preservation of those documents confidentiality.
Montgomerys alleged property interests relating to this case appear to be
premised upon his status as the source of discoverable documents and
electronically-stored information he placed in MCSOs possession. But at the July
20, 2015 status conference, his counsel Mr. Klayman was unable to define any
property interest in the information being disclosed, other than by citing rulings by
a Nevada district court that held Montgomery had certain property interests in
documents at issue in the Nevada litigation. No. CV07-2513, July 20, 2015 Tr.
49:13-51:18 (Attached as Ex. 24); see also Dkt. 5 at v-vi (identifying Nevada
Orders). But, as the district court pointed out at the July 20 status hearing, the
Nevada orders issued in 2006 or 2007, before Montgomery allegedly collected the
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information at issue in this case in 2009-2010 and provided it to MCSO in 2014,

and therefore do not relate to the documents in MCSOs possession, that have been
ordered produced in this case. No. CV07-2513, July 20, 2015 Tr. 50:14-51:18
(Attached as Ex. 24). Mr. Klayman offered no response. Id. at 51:5-8 (I dont
have that information, Your Honor. I dont have it. But we want an opportunity to,
in a systematic way, put forward a brief to this Court on that issue.). Despite again
being offered the opportunity to offer a response in his reply in support of Mr.
Klaymans motion for admission pro hac vice, Montgomery did not do so, and has
not offered any brief to the district court on this issue. His brief seeking an
emergency stay from this Court does no better. Dkt. 5 at v-vi.
None of these theoretical property interests confer upon Montgomery the
constitutional standing to intervene as to the contempt proceedings in the district
court. The documents ordered produced in this case are MCSO documents that are
part of an investigation that MCSO commissioned and paid for. They have been in
MCSOs possession for months. Montgomery has not claimed that he lent them to
MCSO or that MCSO has any obligation to give them back. If these materials are
indeed Montgomerys property, he should sue the MCSO to get them back, rather
than trying to force his (and his attorneys) way into this lawsuit. See, e.g., No.
CV07-2513, Dkt. 1223 (Attached as Ex. 20), Reply of Larry Klayman to
Opposition of Plaintiffs to Counsels Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice at 4
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(complaining that Arpaios current attorney frankly has not represented the
Sheriff zealously and within the bounds of the law). In light of Montgomerys
lack of standing in the district court and the circumstances of this case, neither
recusal nor a stay is appropriate.
Nor does Montgomery have standing to intervene at the appellate level.
Constitutional standing must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it
must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance, because such
appellants seek to invoke the power of the federal courts. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct.
at 2661 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64
(1997)). A nonparty has standing to appeal only in exceptional circumstances,
where the nonparty has participated in the district court proceedings and the
equities weigh in favor of hearing the appeal. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 393 F.3d
987, 992 (9th Cir. 2004). Montgomery seeks to bring to a halt a years-long effort to
remedy constitutional violations by MCSO and Sheriff Arpaio against an entire
class of plaintiffs simply because he desires to prevent further unflattering
testimony about his work by MCSO witnesses, and to assert property rights over
material he previously provided to MCSO. These are not exceptional
circumstances and the equities do not favor either intervention or stay.
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II.
The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because Montgomery

Seeks Review of Matters Not Yet Considered by the District Court.
The only issue the district court has decided against Montgomery is the
discretionary denial of pro hac vice applications filed by Montgomerys attorneys,

who are not admitted to practice in the District of Arizona. Though Montgomery
might have standing to contest these collateral pro hac vice determinations, he is
unlikely to prevail. See infra, Section IV. Furthermore, his appeal of those orders is
no emergency warranting stay of the entire district court litigation. This Courts
consideration of Montgomerys appeal should not encompass substantive review of
Montgomerys motion to intervene in the district court proceedings, as the district
court has not yet ruled on that question. Granting Montgomerys motion to stay the
district court proceedings would prematurely decide this matter, preempting the
authority of the district court to rule on this issue in the first instance.
III.
The Emergency Motion Duplicates Other Pending and Resolved

Motions, Yet Cites No Changed Circumstances Warranting Separate
Consideration.
Montgomerys motion should be denied for the additional reason that it is
duplicative of matters already decided by this Court, which constitute the law of
the case with respect to the relief Montgomery now seeks. This is not the first time
Montgomery has called upon this Court to disqualify the district courthe made a
virtually identical request in his May 2015 petition for a writ of mandamus. He
now adds an emergency request for a stay, even though no relevant facts have
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changed since May, and nothing about the ongoing procedures in the case below
warrants reconsideration of this Courts previous rulings. Nor have any facts or
circumstances changed warranting reconsideration of the district courts rulings on
these issues. Montgomerys motion should be dismissed under the law of the
case doctrine. Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 12 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)
(A court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue previously decided by
the same court).
IV.
The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because The Weight of the

Nken Factors Does Not Warrant a Stay.
Even if Montgomery had standing to request a stay of the district court
proceedings, which he does not, his request to stay should be denied because the
factors considered in weighing a request for a stay do not favor a stay in this case.
A stay is not a matter of right.... It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion
. . . [that] is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. Lair v.
Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 433 (2009)). Four factors guide the courts analysis: (1) whether the stay
applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (citing
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Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). Montgomery fails to demonstrate
that any of these factors are present here.
Montgomery is unlikely to succeed on the merits for three reasons.
First, as set forth above, Montgomery has no standing to contest the district
courts orders (other than perhaps the denials of Montgomerys attorneys pro hac
vice motions), nor to seek the courts recusal, either in the district court or on
appeal. Montgomery has not demonstrated that he has any direct interest in these
proceedings, and the district court has not even ruled on the merits of his motion to
intervene, but only on the merits of his attorneys pro hac vice applications.
Second, Montgomery has not shown that he is likely to prevail in
challenging the district courts orders denying his attorneys pro hac vice
applications. Montgomery relies on law relating to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for defendants in criminal cases (Dkt. 5 at 6-7), when Montgomery is not a
criminal defendant, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not govern
civil cases such as this one. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011). In any
event, the district court has discretion to deny pro hac vice motions such as these.
United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007); LRCiv. 83.1(b). The
district court clearly stated in its written orders regarding Mr. Moseley and in its
oral order regarding Mr. Klayman that these decisions were based on the Courts
concerns that admitting these attorneys would create a conflict of interest and in
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other ways disrupt the conduct of the case. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1093 (Attached
as Ex. 6), 1167 (Attached as Ex. 15); Aug. 11, 2015 Tr. 11:14-15:13 (Attached as
Ex. 26). The district court cited, for example, the actual and potential conflicts of
interest resulting from Klaymans representation of Sheriff Arpaio in one matter,
and Montgomery in this matter; Mr. Klaymans failure to address these conflicts in
his reply brief in support of his pro hac vice application; Mr. Klaymans potential
status as a witness in this matter; acts by Mr. Klayman suggesting he will infuse
invective and unrelated issues into the case; and past disciplinary issues of Mr.
Klayman). The district court found that Mr. Moseley also could not represent
Montgomery due to actual and potential conflicts of interest resulting from Mr.
Moseleys representation of Sheriff Arpaio in another matter, and that Mr.
Moseleys representation of Montgomery would impede the orderly administration
of justice. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1167 (Attached as Ex. 15) at 4-5 (citing several
examples of Mr. Moseleys misleading disclosures and ethical problems). Mr.
Moseley was also given the opportunity to be heard on the conflicts and other
issues, but he too failed to address the courts concerns, either orally or in his
written submissions, which included a Clarification of his motion and a Motion
for Reconsideration. See No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1093 (Attached as Ex. 6) at 2; Dkt.
1167 (Attached as Ex. 15) at 2-5. Where an out-of-state attorney strongly suggests
through his behavior that he will neither abide by the courts rules and practices
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thus impeding the orderly administration of Justicenor be readily answerable to

the court, denial of pro hac vice status is appropriate. United States v. Ries, 100
F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996).
Third, analysis of the harms factors counsels against a stay. Montgomery has
not shown that he will be irreparably injured absent a stay. His property in
MCSOs possession is subject to MCSOs discovery obligations and is being
handled extremely cautiously by the district court, which has ordered production of
these materials to be subject to clear restrictions against public dissemination by
any party. There is no reason to suggest that the protective orders in the district
court will be ineffective.
Moreover, Montgomery has failed to show that plaintiffs class will not be
harmed by a stay, or that the public interest favors a stay. This case has been active
for years. Defendants in the case below violated the constitutional rights of the
Plaintiffs class members and have admitted to civil contempt. The contempt
proceedings, which are focused on the particulars of how the contemnors violated
the district courts orders, and relatedly, on determining the proper remedy, have
revealed that Sheriff Arpaio and his subordinates paid no heed to numerous orders
of this Court, that MCSO has shown little interest in administering discipline to the
persons responsible, and that Defendants violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights in
ways beyond those shown at trial. According to the most recent Monitor report
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filed July 14, 2015, MCSO is in compliance with only 40.3% of the tracked
remedies for the policies and procedures phase of implementation and 24.7% of the
tracked remedies for the operational phase of implementation, and the Monitor
reported that MCSO made no appreciable gains in compliance during the most
recent reporting period. No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1170 (Attached as Ex. 16) at 3, 7.
Even if phrased narrowly, a stay of the litigation would further delay the
implementation of the Supplemental Permanent Injunction. Sheriff Arpaio applied
this very same delay tactic in the district court: after filing the recusal motion, he
initially took the position that compliance activities were stayed, contrary to the
terms of the Courts far more limited stay order. See No. CV07-2513, Dkt. 1150
(Attached as Ex. 11) at 17 (citing id. Dkt 1150-1, Ex. G (Attached as Ex. 12) and
Dkt. 1120 (Attached as Ex. 9)).
Additionally, a stay would delay the additional relief necessary to address
Defendants contempt of the district court. The public, and specifically the
Plaintiffs class, has an interest in seeing Sheriff Arpaio and MCSOs
constitutional violations remedied immediately, and in seeing that the authority of
the court to monitor and ensure Defendants compliance with its orders is
respected. It will be difficult to locate the numerous contempt victims, and the
more time that passes, the fewer victims are likely to be identified. With the
passage of time, people move, addresses and phone numbers on record become
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stale, and memories fade. For this reason as well, Montgomerys motion should be
denied.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Emergency Motion should be denied.
Montgomerys request to intervene in or consolidate this matter with No. 15-72240
should also be denied.
Dated: August 20, 2015
By /s/ Stanley Young

Stanley Young
syoung@cov.com
Michelle L. Morin
mmorin@cov.com
Hyun S. Byun
hbyun@cov.com
Redwood Shores, CA 94065-1418
Telephone: (650) 632-4700
Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
Rebecca A. Jacobs
rjacobs@cov.com
1 Front Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-5356
Telephone: (415) 591-7036
Facsimile: (415) 955-6566
Priscilla G. Dodson
pdodson@cov.com
One City Center
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001-4956
Telephone: (202) 662-6000
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Facsimile: (202) 662-6291

Dan Pochoda
dpochoda@acluaz.org
ACLU FOUNDATION OF
ARIZONA
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
Facsimile: (602) 650-1376
Anne Lai
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401 E. Peltason, Suite 3500
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Telephone: (415) 343-0775
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New York, NY 10004
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MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL
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FUND
Los Angeles, California 90014
Telephone: (213) 629-2512
Facsimile: (213) 629-0266
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 27-1, the attached brief is in
compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 27(d) and does not exceed 20 pages.
/s/ Stanley Young

STANLEY YOUNG
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 20, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by
the appellate CM/ECF system.
/s/ Stanley Young

STANLEY YOUNG
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EXHIBIT 2
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Case
Case:
2:07-cv-02513-GMS
15-72440, 08/20/2015,
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Filed 05/07/15
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Filed 05/07/15
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Case:
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ID: 9654838,
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Filed 05/07/15
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Case:
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ID: 9654838,
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Filed 05/07/15
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Case:
2:07-cv-02513-GMS
15-72440, 08/20/2015,
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ID: 9654838,
1067 DktEntry:
Filed 05/07/15
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15-72440 - 9 - Plaintiffs Opposition To Notice of Filing (Motion To Intervene)

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15-72440 - 9 - Plaintiffs Opposition To Notice of Filing (Motion To Intervene)

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Case: 15-72440, 08/20/2015, ID: 9654838, DktEntry: 9-1, Page 1 of 16

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Jorge Martin Castillo

Montgomery Lacks Standing to Intervene in Arpaios and Sheridans

Montgomery May Not Raise Issues Unrelated to the Mandamus

Montgomery Should Not Be Allowed to Preempt the District Court

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

Montgomery Lacks Standing to Intervene in Arpaios and Sheridans

See 15-16440, Plaintiffs Opposition to Montgomerys Emergency Motion for

Montgomery May Not Raise Issues Unrelated to the Mandamus

intervention would require this Court to consider the merits of Montgomerys

Montgomery Should Not Be Allowed to Preempt the District Court and

admitted to practice in the District of Arizonaincluding Montgomerys motion to

Dated: August 20, 2015

By /s/ Stanley Young

Immigrants Rights Project

Date: August 20, 2015

/s/ Stanley Young

Date: August 20, 2015

/s/ Stanley Young

MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA MELENDRES, ET AL.,

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Jorge Martin Castillo

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Selected Procedural History ................................................................. 1

Testimony and Documents Produced Regarding MCSOs

Montgomerys Previous Motions to Intervene and to Recuse the

Sheriff Arpaios Motions Seeking Recusal and Stay ........................... 7

Order on Discoverability of MCSO Documents Allegedly

The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because

The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because

The Emergency Motion Duplicates Other Pending and

The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because The

Putative intervenor Dennis Montgomery (Montgomery), through his

Selected Procedural History

In February 2015, on a motion by Plaintiffs, the Court ordered MCSO,

Testimony and Documents Produced Regarding MCSOs

Montgomerys Previous Motions to Intervene and to Recuse the

Sheriff Arpaios Motions Seeking Recusal and Stay

Defendant Sheriff Arpaio and non-party contemnor Gerard Sheridan also

Order on Discoverability of MCSO Documents Allegedly Provided

The district court has continued to hold status conferences on a variety of

included classified or sensitive information, or information that should have

The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because Montgomery

Plaintiffs refer to and incorporate by reference the arguments in the Opposition to

judgment proceedings in this case or testimony involving the allegations of

information at issue in this case in 2009-2010 and provided it to MCSO in 2014,

The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because Montgomery

discretionary denial of pro hac vice applications filed by Montgomerys attorneys,

The Emergency Motion Duplicates Other Pending and Resolved

The Emergency Motion Should Be Denied Because The Weight of the

thus impeding the orderly administration of Justicenor be readily answerable to

Dated: August 20, 2015

By /s/ Stanley Young

Facsimile: (202) 662-6291

Date: August 20, 2015

/s/ Stanley Young

Date: August 20, 2015

/s/ Stanley Young

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