MARCOS vs.

HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS

under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil

service.

capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the economy
is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Does the President have the power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
Is this a political question?
Has the President made a finding that the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger
to national security, public safety or public health?
case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall
the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
"within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation
to that effect.
international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the
issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable.
According to the Solicitor General:
question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode.
Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without
reference to attendant circumstances.
the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at
this time in the face of the determination by the President that such
return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is
not a political question as it involves merely a determination of what
the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether
the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental
right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question
becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to
national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite
Article II of the Constitution,
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,

the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be

limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that
effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution
will have to be awaited.
the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested
in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
not define what is meant by executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardon
by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific
powers and no other?
Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what
is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est
exclusio alterius
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as
well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds
it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of
the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power."
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words,
executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving
at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution
to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national
interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from
being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the
people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising
the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the
people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain

exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated

situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond
the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for
the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a
plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the
President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set
aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the
beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the
Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us
because the power is reserved to the people.
the question for the Court to determine is
I: whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be
said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely
abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist
factual bases for the President's decision..
will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State,
that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as
apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the
fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest
order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution
and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder
of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates
and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a
position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign
jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing
burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing
during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development
and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its
attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during
the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.

it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is

vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President
are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution
neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the
President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the
stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy,
the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should
not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which
provides:
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President
under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the
1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all,
Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not
implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of
the specific power of legislation.
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines.
FACTS:
(1) This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to order
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. This is
in response to Marcoss wish to return to the Philippines to die. The
petitioners case is founded on the following provisions in the Bill of
Rights:
Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
potection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
And other contentions including:
President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of
the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions

except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.

and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws,
cannot shirk from that responsibility.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own

country.

The case basically revolves around the series of events that

happened prior and subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II.
During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president and vice-president
respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began
when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and
released his expos that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal
as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of
different groups and many personalities had asked for the
resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene
Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres.
Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner
to make the supreme self-sacrifice. Respondent also resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and
also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic
advisers of the petitioner resigned and then Speaker Manny Villar,
together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker
Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the
senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the
impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The
impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a battle royal of
well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the
vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second
envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that the petitioner
had a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde
containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted
to the people going to the streets and the public prosecutors
withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff
Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and declared on behalf of
your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support
to this government. PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
together with some Cabinet members made the same
announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM,
negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power. But at
around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14th president of the
Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang.
He issued the following Press Statement:
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to
be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of
the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service
to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

(2) The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to

national security over individual rights, citing Article II
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil
service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.and the decision of other countries to ban deposed
dictators like Cuba (Fulgencio Batista), etc.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD:
Petition dismissed. President did not act with abuse of discretion in
determining the return of former President Marcos and his family at
the present time since it poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare.
RATIO:
(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the capacity to stir trouble to
the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers.
(2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country,
a totally distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel.
(3) "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in
important measure on who is
President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever
power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive.
(4) The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and
that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people.
(5) Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government.
The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty
is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed
the following letter:
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am
unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution
confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ
during the oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon, other
countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the
Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175
expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines. It also approved Resolution No. 176
expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the
assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as
a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the
Constitution.
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be
the vice president. On February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution
82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the
same day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as
follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A.
Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption;
(2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder,
forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government
Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft
Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo
Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public
funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation
of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4,
2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the
petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito
P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew
Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an
Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5,
petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any
further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755,
1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel,
petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto.
He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office
of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the

provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the

Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents to
comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001. On February 13, the Court ordered the
consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the
filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for
copies of resolution and press statement for Gag Order on
respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution
on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant
and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement
justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are
officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to
refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the
merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by
the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately
enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding
the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it
appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada
seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which
action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.
ISSUES:

I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy,
whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent
Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner
Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is
still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
DECISION:

I No. The case is legal not political.

II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a
non-sitting president, he is not entitled to immunity from criminal
prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman.
RATIO/REASON:
I. Whether or not the case involves a political question
Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a President through the People
power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also accepted by
other nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall serve as
political thicket which the Court cannot enter.
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by
our Court as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration
should be treated similarly with the Aquino administration.
Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino
administrations are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise.
The Court has made substantial distinctions which are the
following:
Aquino
Arroyo
Government was a result of a successful revolution

Government was a result of a p

The
round
of negotiations
In the Freedom constitution, it was stated that the Aquino Arroyo took the oath
of second
the 1987
Constitution.
She is were about the consolidating of
the clauses
wereunder
proposed
by both sides. The second round
government was instilled directly by the people in
discharging the authority
of thewhich
president
the 1987
of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned.
defiance of the 1973 Constitution as amended.
constitution.
It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the
It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The
a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny
only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
loop. But this would not apply as the Court finds substantial
When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner
difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would show that
and ready to be faxed by Angara, the negotiator for the respondent,
there are differences between the 2 governments set up by EDSA I
Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the SC would allow
and II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2
respondent to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left
EDSA Revolutions.
Malacanang, he made a last statement.
EDSA I
EDSA II
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Extra-constitutional. Hence, Xxx IN Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal
DEFIANCE OF THE 1973
oath of the respondent as
minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the
CONSTITUTION, AS
President includes the protection
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do
AMENDEDcannot be subject of and upholding of the 1987
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and
judicial review
Constitution.resignation of
order in our civil society.
the President makes it subject to
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of
judicial review
the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to
exercise of the people power of
exercise of people power of
begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our
revolutionwhich overthrew the whole freedom of speech and freedom
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service
government
of assembly to petition the
to our people. I will not shrik from any future challenges that may
government for redress of
come ahead in the same service of our country.
grievances whichonly affected
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
the office of the President
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
Political question
Legal Question
solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not
MABUHAY!
political.
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the
following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President
as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to rethat respondent never wrote a letter of resignation before he left
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
the totality test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
relevance on the issue.
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The
come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners
Court knows the amount of stress that the petitioner had suffered.
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the legislative
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
when then Manny Villar and other Representatives had defected.
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes had already gone to
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
EDSA. PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking into the
give up the presidency.
Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the petitioner had suggested
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of
a snap election at May on which he would not be a candidate.
absence. This is evidenced by a letter which reads as follows:
Proposing a snap election in which he is not a candidate means that
Sir
he had intent to resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree but listened
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am
closely. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the
unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be
the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a
the Acting President.
matter of time.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter
of power. It was already implied that petitioner would resign. The
during the week long crisis. It would be very easy for him to say
negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the transition
before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to
period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the
govern, thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance,
guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the
however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the
the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President
petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then
says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red
significance.
tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name,
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is
then I will go. The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear
RA 3019 which states:
evidence that he has resigned.

Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire

pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
During the amendments, another section was inserted which states
that:
During the period of amendments, the following provision was
inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be
allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not
be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed
during his incumbency.
The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2nd paragraph
of section 15. Nonetheless, another similar bill was passed. Section
15 then became section 13. There is another reason why
petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the
records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001,
the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB
Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-001758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the
said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman
lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of
cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any
insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an
administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019,
bars him from resigning. The Court holds otherwise. The
impeachment proceeding may be arguable. However, even if the
impeachment proceeding is administrative, it cannot be considered
pending because the process had already broke down. There was
also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment
case. In fact, the proceeding was postponed indefinitely. In fact,
there was no impeachment case pending when he resigned.
III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act
as President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to
then Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate President Pimentel.
Petitioners contention is that he is a president on leave and that the
respondent is an acting president. This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on
leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to
the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to
the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is

unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the

Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the
powers and duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after
petitioner left Malacanang, it is very clear that the inability of the
petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is
whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim
of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise
the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The Court says that they
cannot, for such is an example of a political question, in which the
matter has solely been left to the legislative,
IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes,
what is the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed
against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be
prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
The immunity the petitioner points to is the principle of nonliability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive
may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the
consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official
duties. He is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his
power and authority that he cannot be said to have exercise
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act.
What is held here is that he will be protected from personal
liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority,
but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used
discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is
entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority.
If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of
his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified
for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if
the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not
honestly differ over its determination.
The Court rejects the petitioners argument that before he could be
prosecuted, he should be first convicted of impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted
because of the walking out of the prosecutors. This was then
formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which declared
the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the
Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, proper civil
and criminal cases may be filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by
petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a nonsitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity from
civil damages only covers official acts.
V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be

stopped from conducting an investigation of the cases filed against
him for he has already developed a bias against the petitioner. He
submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2)
principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal
with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and
trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with
the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English
courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an
accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the
potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to
a fair trial. During cases like such, the test of actual prejudice shall
be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof
that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is
not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines
to discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the
biasness of the Ombudsman. The petitioner alleges that there were
news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already
prejudged the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence
presented is insufficient. The Court also cannot adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines.
Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases
against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of
probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on
May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically
considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of
the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled
within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition
to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the

prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written

in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its
insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications
for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC
properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of
the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list
to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor
of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of

appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would

have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII,
most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or product is to be
included in the Essential Drugs List is valid

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG

MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER
ON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.35

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local

Governments and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)
* HELD:
A.
1. NO.
2. NO.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

3.
a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious

objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors;
and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious
freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy
the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest
test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion
and the right to free speech.42
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom
since it mandates the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause

6. NO.
7. NO.
8. NO.
B. NO.
C. NO.
* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes
the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction),
the traditional meaning of conception according to reputable
dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to
refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of
the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion.
By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily

induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers

womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains

even if he/she is employed in the government.

2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, nonabortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in
the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH
Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral
contraceptive pills.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least
intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The
Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the
right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The
Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of
Women).

Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives

per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921
be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With
RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to
ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public.
In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be
considered mandatory only after these devices and materials have
been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a)
is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious
sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care
and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of
a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article
VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and
penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH
procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of
religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure
compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over
the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors
(under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause.
There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and
their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is

Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state

interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is
no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the
limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to

attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law
does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom
to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of
spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The
RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and
endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing
a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7
of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal
guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is
invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived
of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation
and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. In addition, an exception may be made in lifethreatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of
the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual
case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of
the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is
superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding
provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH

program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their

sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.

8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono service.
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should
they do otherwise.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen

in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public
health service provider. The private health care institution cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health
care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
governments RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and
that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the
number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law
only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long

as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro
bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential
Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of
2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction
of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH
Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the
ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.