Application of the Doctrine

Abueva vs. Wood

to the provisions of the local law concerning

his entry into and his presence in the
territory of each State.

It is stated that a writ of mandamus cannot

be imposed upon the chief executive to
compel him to produce certain vouchers
relative to the expenses of an official
mission.

Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco

Severino vs. Governor-General

The Court stated that no one can be held

legally responsible in damages for doing in a
legal matter what he had authority, under
the law, to do. If the Governor-General had
the authority to deport the defendants and
the circumstances justifying the deportation
and method carrying it out are left to him
then he cannot be held liable in damages for
the exercise of his power.

He (chief executive) also cannot be

compelled through a writ of mandamus to
call a special election though this duty was
imposed to him by the law in mandatory
language.
In the above stated case, the Court held that
the powers involved were executive in nature
thus not subject to judicial compulsion.
In re Dick
The Supreme Court also interpreted as
discretionary the power of the GovernorGeneral to ascertain the necessity for the
expulsion of an alien for the protection of the
national interest.
The expulsion of an alien (deportation) is a
political question.
In re Patterson
The court announced that the GovernorGeneral could act without interference on the
part of the judicial power.
The expulsion of foreigners is a political
measure and that the executive power may
expel without appeal any person whose
presence tend to disturb the public peace.
But the privilege of foreigners to enter the
territory of a State for the purpose of
travelling through or remaining therein being
recognized on principle, we must also
recognize the right of the State under
exceptional circumstances to limit the
aforementioned privilege upon the ground of
public policy, and in all case to preserve the
obligations of the foreigner to subject himself

The Court dismissed an action for damages

against the Governor-General for deporting
certain undesirable aliens.

Moreover, if the Courts are without authority

to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of
controlling or interfering with the exercise of
the political powers vested in the chief
executive authority of the government, then
it must follow that the courts cannot
intervene for the purpose of declaring that
the Governor General is liable in damages for
the exercise of this authority.
Aytona vs. Castillo (Midnight Appointees)
The conflict between the outgoing and the
incoming Presidents of the Philippines
involved the exercise of the appointing
power, the SC refused to assume jurisdiction
due to separation of powers.
Javellana
vs.
Executive
(Ratification Cases)

Secretary

Several justices of the SC expressed the view

that
they
were
concluded
by
the
ascertainment made by the President of the
Philippines, in the exercise of his political
prerogatives, that the people had acquiesced
in or accepted the1973 Constitution.
De la Llana vs. COMELEC
The SC refused to restrain the holding of a
referendum, ruling that the calling thereof

lay in the exclusive discretion of President

Marcos.
NOTE: The declaration of Martial Law is a
political question.

Custodio vs. Senate President

A taxpayer challenged the validity of a
provision in the general appropriations law
that compensated the members of the
Congress for services supposedly rendered
by them during the Japanese Occupation. It
was held that the question submitted was
political, affecting as it did the wisdom or
propriety of the law. Hence, the only remedy
that may be sought by the petitioner was to
resort not to the courts but to the bar of
public opinion.
Alejandrino vs. Quezon
Osmena
vs.
Pendatun
Representatives)

(Senate)
(House

&
of

When the House of Representatives and the

Senate both suspended a member for
disorderly behaviour (improper conduct) the
SC refused to interfere even if in the former
case it declared that the suspension was
illegal because the seat remains filled but
the occupant is silenced.
Vera vs. Avelino
Three (3) Senators-elect who had been
prevented from taking their oaths of office by
resolution of the Senate went to the SC and
alleged that only the Electoral Tribunal had
jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election, returns, and qualifications. The SC
refused to intervene, holding that the case
was not a contest, and affirmed the
inherent right of the legislature to determine
who shall be admitted to its membership.
Arnault vs. Balagtas

The petitioner raised the question regarding

the legality of his detention by the order of
the Senate for his refusal to answer the
questions put to him by one of its
investigating committees.
The SC refused to order his release and
deferred to the discretionary authority of the
legislative body to punish contumacious
(stubbornly
disobedient)
witnesses
for
contempt.
Hacienda
Luisita
Inc.
Industrial Park Corp.

vs.

Luisita

It has further been ruled that the wisdom of

Congress in allowing an SDP (Stock
Distribution Plan) through a corporation as
an alternative mode of implementing
agrarian
reform
is
not
for
judicial
determination.
Philippine
Coconut
Federation vs. Republic

Producers

The Supreme Court explained that the

decision on whether to proceed with the
conversion or defer action thereon until final
adjudication of the issue of ownership over
the sequestered shares properly pertains to
the executive branch, represented by the
PCGG.
The Court added that corollary to the
principle of separation of powers is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the
courts will defer to the decisions of the
administrative offices and agencies by
reason of their expertise and experience in
the matters assigned to them.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
The calling of the snap presidential
elections on February 7, 1986, by the
Batasang Pambansa was held by the SC to
be a political question resoluble only by the
sovereign electorate.
De Castro vs. Committee on Justice

The SC was asked to reverse a decision of

the respondent dismissing impeachment
charges against President Marcos after
deliberating thereon for only six hours and to
compel the said committee to give due
course to such charges. The petition for
certiorari and mandamus was dismissed, on
the ground inter alia that the issues raised
were political in nature and could be resolved
only by the legislators themselves in the
exercise of their discretion.
The Court ruled that the dismissal of the
charges was within the ambit of the powers
vested exclusively in the Batasan by express
provisions of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution and it is not within the
competence of this Court to inquire whether
in the exercise of said powers the Batasan
acted wisely.
Romulo vs. Yniquez
The petitioners asked for the recall of the
impeachment resolution so it could be
considered
directly
by
the
Batasang
Pambansa, the Court, citing its ruling in the
antecedent case, dismissed the petition on
the ground of powers.
NOTE: The Constitution now requires the
proper committee
of
the
House
of
Representatives to submit its report on an
impeachment complaint, together with its
corresponding resolution, to the House within
sixty (60) days from its referral to the same,
and said resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten (10)
session days from its receipt thereof. A vote
of at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment, or override its contrary
resolution.
Avelino vs. Cuenco (Presidency of the
Senate)
The incumbent Senate President was
deposed and replaced. He questioned his

successors title, arguing that the latter had

been elected without a quorum.
The petition was at first dismissed on the
ground that the selection of the presiding
officer of the Senate was an internal matter
that could not be reviewed by the judiciary.
ON the motion for reconsideration, however,
the SC decided that it could assume
jurisdiction in the light of subsequent events
which justified its intervention and, among
the other reasons, because there was a
quorum.
Barcelon vs. Baker & Montenegro vs.
Castaneda
It was held that the power to determine the
existence of the grounds specified in the
Constitution for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
discretionary and therefore not justiciable, on
the justification of the superior competence
of the commander-in-chief to assess the
peace and order condition of the country.
But, this doctrine was reversed in Lansang
vs. Garcia where the SC asserted the right
to inquire into the factual basis of the
suspension and to annul the same if it
appeared from its own investigations that
the grounds invoked by the President were
not actually existing.
In a complete about-face, however, this
decision was itself later abandoned in
Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile where the original
rule announced in the Barcelon and
Montenegro Cases was reinstated to make
the
questioned
power
once
again
discretionary in the President. It is no longer
so, however, under Article VII, Section 18, of
the present Constitution, to be discussed in
Chapter 11.
Noblejas vs. Teehankee
The administrative investigation of an
executive official should be undertaken by
the President of the Philippines and not the
SC even if it is provided by law that such

official had the rank and privileges of a judge

of the CFI. Neither may the SC be compelled
by law to act as a mere board of arbitrators,
an essentially executive body, particularly
because whatever decisions it might make in
the discharge of its administrative functions
would ultimately have to be reviewed by the
same members in the exercise of their
judicial powers.
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution
provides that the Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
Endencia vs. David
The powers that belong to the judiciary may
not be assumed by other departments.
The legislative provided into law that the
imposition of income taxes upon the salaries
of judges should not be interpreted as an
unconstitutional diminution of their salary.
The
Supreme
Court
ruled
that
the
interpretation of the provision in question
was the exclusive function of the judiciary.
Political Question
Constitution

under

the

New

It is noteworthy that under the new

Constitution the scope of the political
question appears to have been constricted
because of the new definition of judicial
power, which now includes the duty to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
The language suggests clearly that the
above mentioned duty (power) is available
even against the executive and the
legislative
departments,
including
the
President and the Congress, in the exercise
of their discretionary powers.
Estrada vs. Desierto

The 1987 Constitution narrowed the reach of

political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court. The
judiciary has focused on the thou shall
nots of the Constitution directed against
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can to do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. There are
also other provisions in the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket.
Note: Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the
Executive Branch of the government, or to
substitute their own judgments for that of
the Executive Department.
Galicto vs. Aquino
The court declared that the issuance of an
Executive Order is not a judicial, quasijudicial or mandatory act. Accordingly, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court may not be availed
of
by
any
party
to
question
its
constitutionality.
The
proper
recourse,
according to the Court, would be a petition
for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, which should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC
The Court is sworn to uphold the 1987
Constitution, apply it and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. The present
petition should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC has
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the petitioners but because the
petitioners may qualify to participate i
n the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.

In Re: COA Opinion on the Computation

of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased
by
the
Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court
The Court defended or confirmed its
authority to determine or fix the appraised
value of the properties purchased by the
retired members of said Court, as against the
findings of the Commission on Audit on the
same, on the strength of the principle of
separation of powers, stressing its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy, and
citing its unique circumstances, declaring
that the judicial branch as a whole should
work in the discharge of its constitutional
functions free of restraints and influence
from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself.
ADDITIONAL CASES:
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General

This case is consolidated with Consolidated

with Bayan Muna vs Ermita

In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was

passed. This law sought to harmonize and
streamline the countrys id system. Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned
groups sought to enjoin the Director-General
from implementing the EO because they
allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for
it infringes upon the right to privacy of the
people and that the same is a usurpation of
legislative power by the president.

ISSUE: Whether or
unconstitutional.

not

the

said

EO

is

HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these

government entities to adopt a unified
multi-purpose
ID
system.
Thus,
all
government entities that issue IDs as part of
their functions under existing laws are
required to adopt a uniform data collection
and format for their IDs.

Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the

purposes of the uniform data collection and
format. The President may by executive or
administrative order direct the government
entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and
format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution provides that the President
shall
have
control
of
all
executive
departments, bureaus and offices. The
same Section also mandates the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Certainly,
under
this
constitutional power of control the President
can direct all government entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing
laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection
and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to
the public.

The Presidents constitutional power of

control is self-executing and does not need
any implementing legislation. Of course, the
Presidents power of control is limited to the
Executive branch of government and does
not extend to the Judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary,
or to the COMELEC which under existing laws
is also authorized to issue voters ID cards.
This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because
legislation is needed to establish a single ID
system that is compulsory for all branches of
government.

Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous
transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the
department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need
immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO
464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department

heads,
Senior
officials
of
executive
departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the
executive privilege; Generals and flag
officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by
the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials
who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing
in such hearings conducted by Congress
without first securing the presidents
approval.

The department heads and the military

officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled
hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were relieved from their military
posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on
the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.

ISSUE: Whether
constitutional.

or

not

EO

464

is

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is

constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section
22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Although there is no provision
in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative

body does not itself possess the requisite

information which is not infrequently true
recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.

Section 22 on the other hand provides for the

Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in
effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers
only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that
matter, may be summoned and if he refuses,
he can be held in contempt of the House. A
distinction was thus made between inquiries
in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance
of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal

branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for
information. When Congress exercises its

power of inquiry, the only way for

department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this
power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances
in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary
on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed

on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to
such information is not as imperative as that
of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with
the separation of powers, states that
Congress
may
only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance
is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault.

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and

Section 2a are valid. The rest are
invalid.

Silverio vs. Republic

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male
transsexual. Hes a biological male who feels
trapped in a male body. Being that, he
sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok,
Thailand. The procedure was successful he
(she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in
2002, he filed a petition for the change of his
first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his
sex (male to female) in his birth certificate.
He filed the petition before the Manila RTC.
He wanted to make these changes, among
others, so that he can marry his American
fianc.

The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC

ruled that it should be granted based on
equity; that Silverios misfortune to be
trapped in a mans body is not his own doing
and should not be in any way taken against
him; that there was no opposition to his
petition (even the OSG did not make any
basis for opposition at this point); that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of Silverio and [her]
fianc and the realization of their dreams.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the

OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining

to sex and first name in the birth certificate

may be changed on the ground of gender reassignment.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the

change of such entries finds no support in
existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name

In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT

AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL
ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF
FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL
ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it
should be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first
names and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is
concerned is procedurally infirm. Even
assuming that the petition filed properly, it
cannot be granted still because the ground
upon
which
it
is
based(gender
reassignment) is not one of those provided for
by the law. Under the law, a change of name
may only be grounded on the following:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or

nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of

the above, he merely alleged gender reassignment as the basis.

underscore the public policy in relation to

women which could be substantially affected
if Silverios petition were to be granted.

Issue on the change of sex

But the SC emphasized: If the legislature

intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege.

This entry cannot be changed either via a

petition before the regular courts or a
petition for the local civil registry. Not with
the courts because there is no law to support
it. And not with the civil registry because
there is no clerical error involved. Silverio
was born a male hence it was just but right
that the entry written in his birth certificate
is that he is a male. The sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing
sex
reassignment,
the
determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.

But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?

No. According to the SC, this amounts to

judicial legislation. To grant the changes
sought
by
Silverio
will
substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow
the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-tofemale post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions
of the Labor Code on employment of women,
certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws

Maria Araullo vs. Benigno Aquino III

When President Benigno Aquino III took
office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank
advised that the economy needed a stimulus
plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch
Abad then came up with a program called
the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up

the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from
slow moving projects to priority projects
instead
of
waiting
for
next
years
appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project
is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor
will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as
savings by the Executive and said funds
will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth
was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the

unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator

Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming
that he, and other Senators, received Php
50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad
claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of
the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it

turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that
some non-Executive projects were also
funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera
Peoples
Liberation
Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,

Chairperson
of
the Bagong
Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of
the DAP. Among their contentions was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it

violates the constitutional rule which
provides that no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based

on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec.
25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of
the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49
of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).

Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates
principle no money shall be paid out of
Treasury except in pursuance of
appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1),
VI, Constitution).

the
the
an
Art.

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can

be considered as impoundments by the
executive.

III.
Whether
or
not
the
DAP
realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not

unprogrammed funds
constitutional.

the sourcing
to the DAP

of
is

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative

Fact is applicable.

HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund
nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for

prioritizing government spending. As such, it

did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been
required.
Funds,
which
were
already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.

non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned

because no funds were appropriated to them
in the GAA. Although some of these projects
may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is
without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in

the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations
for
whatever
reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no
impoundment in the case at bar because
whats involved in the DAP was the transfer
of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP

were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made within their respective
offices.
Thus,
no
cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative
and
other
non-Executive
agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective

offices also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA.
Under the DAP, even though some projects
were within the Executive, these projects are

These DAP transfers are not savings

contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings
in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is
completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow
moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared
as savings by the Executive particularly by
the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA

cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only
be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification
was
secured
before
unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which

recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to

it being declared as unconstitutional by the

Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It
has funded numerous projects. If the
Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm
than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot
be asked to return what they received

especially so that they relied on the validity

of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the
authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative)
that they have not acted in good faith.