Persons and Family Relations Law

chapter 4
Conjugal Partnership pf Gains
Section 1. General Provisions
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements
that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be
supplementary application. (n)
The provision of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already stablished between the spouses before the effectivity of this
Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in the
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws as provided in Article 256.(n)
Article 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their seperate properties and those acquired by either
or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolutio of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by
either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless
otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS. In case the spouses agree upon the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains, they shall place in a common fund the fruits
of their separate properties and the income from their work or industry. Thus, it has
been held that fruits of parapheral properties, which is the term used under the Civil
Code to describe the separate property of the wife, from part of the assets of the
conjugal partnership and are therefore subject to the payment of the debts and
expenses of the spouses, but not to the payment of the personal bligation f the
husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some
benefits to the family (Quitos v. Sheriff of Manila, 64 Phil. 115). When the law
likewise refers to those acquired by either or both of the spouses through their
efforts or chance, the word "effort" connotes an acvity or undertaking which may or
may not be rewarded and the word "chance" includes activity like gambling or
betting ( See Minutes of the 173rd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees held on February 21, 1987, page 15).
No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character if a
conjugal property. The conjugal nature of the property is determined by law and not
by the will of one of the spouses. The proof of acquisition of the property during the
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption of conjugality to attach( Go v.
Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006, 489SCRA 107).

Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the net gains or the benefit obtained
shall be divided equally between the spouses unless they have stipulated another
proportion in their marriage settlement.
In the event that prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
the spouses were already under conjugal partnership of gains, the property regime
shall continue after August 3, 1988 but it shall now be governed by the provisions
on the conjugal partnership of gains under the Family Code unless vested rights
have already been acquired under the Civil Code or any other law. Thus, the
conjugal partnership property regime of particular marriage cannot be considered to
have been automatically converted to the absolute community property upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 ( Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R.
No. 164201, December 10, 2012).
In Heirs of Protacio Go v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011,
where the spouses where married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and the
wife died in 1987 leaving the husband and the children as heirs and where some
portions of the undivided properties where sold prior to the liquidation, the Supreme
Court ruled that Article 130 of the Family Code making the totality of the sale void
prior to liquidation was not applicable considering that upon the death of the wife
prior to the efeectivity of the Family Code , the heirs had already a vested right on
their respective shares of the property left corresponding to the shared of the
deceased wife for inheritance. The applicable rule that should apply, according to
the Supreme Court was the Civil Code which states that the sale is not totally null
and void and the only rights affected are those of the selling-heirs with respect to
their individual shares. the supreme Court said that the remedy of the aggrieved
heirs was to file an action for partition so that the properties will be finally liquidated
and distributed. The specific properties that will be adjudicated corresponding to the
selling-heirs will be the ones retained by the buyer who, while the case was
pending, held the whole property as trustee.
Article 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to
conjugal partnership of gains. (n)
WHEN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP SHALL COMMENCE. Should the spouse
agree upon the conjugal partnership of gains, its application shall commence at the
precise moment when the marriage ceremony is celebrated. What considered is the
hour and not the date of the marriage.
PROHIBITION OF WAIVER. As in the case of the absolute community
regime, no waiver or rights, interests, shares, and effect of the conjugal partnership
of gains can be made during the marriage except upon judicial separation of
property. The rationale appliesto avoid undue pressure and influence exerted upon
the weaker spouse who may be persuaded or coerced into parting with his or her
interests in the conjugal partnership.

Article 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of the
contract of partnership in all that is not conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. (147a)
SPECIAL TYPE OF PARTNERSHIP. Unlike the absolute community of property
wherein the rules of co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules of the contract of partnership in all that
are not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements. In case of conflict between the Civil Code on
the rules of partnership and the provisions of the Family Code on the conjugal
partnership of gains, the latter shall prevail (Homeowners Savings & Loan bank v.
Dalio G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2015, 453 SCRA 283). For instance, just like in a
normal partnership governed by title IX of the civil Code, any stipulated which
excludes the partners from any share of the profits and losses of the partnership is
void (Article 1799 of the Civil code). A partner is a co-owner with his other partner
of specific partnership property (Article 1811 of the Civil Code). Every partner must
account to the partnership for any benefits, and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him without the consent of the other partner from any transaction
connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any
use by him or her of its property (Article 1807). With the other consent of the other
partner, a partner cannot assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on
the assignees promise to pay the debts of the partnership, confess a judgment,
enter into a compromise concerning a partnership claim or liability, submit a
partnership claim or liability to arbitration and renounce the claim of the
partnership. No act of the property contravention of a restriction on authority shall
bind the partnership to person having knowledge of the restriction (SEE Article 1818
of the Civil Code). Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with authority of his copartner, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same
extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act (Article 1822 of the Civil Code).
In Carandang v. Heirs of Aquino A. De Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November
29, 2006, 508 SCRA 569, where the right of one spouse to bring an action was
assailed on the ground that the other spouse should have been made a party in the
action, the Supreme Court said:
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of the contract
of partnership in all that is not conflict with what is expressly determined in
this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.

This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it

superseded:

Article 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on

the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that [a]
partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.
Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to
finance the four check used to pay for petitioners stocks subscriptions, and
with the presumption that the credit themselves are part of conjugal funds,
Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged
credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros De Guzman
may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent
cases of Baloloy v. Hularand Adlawan v. Adlawan, [the Court] held that, in a
co-ownership, co-owners may bring an action for the recovery of co-owned
property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit presume to have been filed for the benefit of his coowners. In the latter case and in that De Guia v. Court of Appeals, [It] also held
that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-owners
may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action for the recovery
of possession.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for
the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners ,
namely the co-owner who filed suit for the recovery of the co-owned property,
is an indispensable parties thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable
property. They are even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit presumed
to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
[The Court] therefore hold[s] that Milagros De Guzman is not
indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loan money
to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said
suit, and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party
thereto.

Section 2. EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF EACH SPOUSE

ARTICLE 109. The following shall be the exclusive
property of each spouse:
1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her
own;
2) That which each acquires during the marriage by
gratuitous title;

3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by

barter or by exchange with property belonging to
only one of the spouse; and
4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the
wife or of the husband.(148a)
PROPERTIES BROUGHT INTO MARRIAGE. Under the conjugal partnership
regime, all properties brought into marriage by the contracting parties belong
to each of them exclusively. The partnership does not produce the merger of
the properties of each spouse (National Bank v. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370). Hence,
they can exercise all rights of dominion of ownership over these exclusive
properties. The properties cannot be encumbered, alienate nor disposed of by
the other spouse without the consent of the owner-spouse. The nature of the
property as a separate property shall remain unless the contrary is proved by
positive and convincing evidence. Thus, in Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 97
SCRA 373, the Supreme Court observed and ruled:
The testimony of Marcela Bernal, which was wholly corroborated by
Simplicio Dantes and Valentina San Andres x x x, anent the sale of the
questioned property to Isidra in 1920 1921 when the latter was then single,

it having been admitted that Agripino married Isidra only in February

1924, appears to be unrebutted by private respondents. They place
reliance mainly on the deed of sale executed by Simplicio Dantes and
his wife in favor of Isidra Dela Cruz, when the latter was already
married and wherein said deed, no mention was made about the sale
by the original owners to Isidra. They lose sight of the fact, however,
that this deed was executed only for the purpose of recognizing or
confirming the verbal sale made by the original owners to Isidra in
1920 or 1921, long before her marriage to Agripino on February 1927.
This is the very reason why Agripino had to sign in said deed of sale,
declaring that, the money with which Lot No. 1189-C was purchased
from the spouses Simplicio Dantes and Emilia Rivera is her own
money, and does not belong to our conjugal property, and therefore,
the said Lot No. 1189-C is hers, Isidras property. The declaration
aforeqouted is of the highest evidentiary value being one against the
declarants interest. It may well presumed that Agripino would not
have made the said declaration unless he believed the same to be
true, prejudicial as it is to his childrens interests as his heirs with his
first wife. Good faith is always to be presumed and a person always
takes ordinary care of his concerns. Against these presumptions, the
contrary must clearly established and proven by sufficient evidence,
which is clearly wanting in the instant case. No explanation was given
by the aforesaid declaration should should not be given due weight. It
is significant to note that the same was made on 28 February 1941 or
more than six (6) years prior to Agripinos death on 23 December 1947

without his having repudiated the same. Neither did the private
respondents, as heirs, question said declaration. Agripino was,
therefore, clearly in stoppel to deny his declaration. As such, he can lay
no claim nor interest in the questioned properly, nor can the private
respondents do so, for the person from whom they claim to have
succeeded to the property had no title thereto. Estoppel is effective
even on successors-in-interest.
Moreover, when the question is exclusively between husband
and wife, or between husband and wife, or between one of them and
heirs of the other, the admission or acknowledgment of one person
that the money used to purchase the property came from the other
spouse, is evidence against the party making the admission or his
heirs. Likewise, where the husband has been a party to an act of
purchase of immovable property in the name of his wife, which recited
that the purchase was made with the paraphernal property, neither he
nor his heirs can be permitted to go behind the dead and contest the
wifes title property by claiming that it is conjugal. Since the property is
the paraphernal property of Isidra, the same having acquired