Pilar vs.

Comelec
G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995
FACTS:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 932654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594
dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the
COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution
dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a non-candidate, having
withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits
that it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political
contest, and should have either won or lost under Section 14 of R.A. 7166 entitled
An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already
withdrew their candidacy for election.
HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether
the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every
candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his
campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth
paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, it is provided that [t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy
shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate
may have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his
liability for the administrative fine.

Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez

G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 1961
FACTS:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials
such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated
calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of
the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these materials,
the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax
on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other
charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly
known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three
applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of the
Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-inCharge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers
and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term stabilizer and flavors
mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).
HELD:
YES. The decision under review was reversed. General and special terms. The ruling
of the Auditor General that the term stabilizer and flavors as used in the law
refers only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of
food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory
construction that general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result
that the general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates
the statutes object and purpose. The rule, however, is applicable only to cases
where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall
under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true that the

term stabilizer and flavors is preceded by a number of articles that may be

classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items
immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited
by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the
rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the
intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of
construction.