When a bank accelerates the balance due under the Note/Mortgage, that starts the clock on the

running of the statute of limitations (five years in Florida see Fla. Stat. 95.11(2)(c)). If five
years pass after that acceleration, and the bank has not filed a lawsuit, the statute of limitations
bars foreclosure on that mortgage. That means, absent other liens or encumbrances on the
property, its a free house.
Sound too good to be true? Its not. Or, well, it shouldnt be. You see, the statute of limitations
bars relief in virtually any legal context imaginable. If anyone wants to file a civil lawsuit in
Florida and does so after the statute of limitations has run, the relief requested would be 100%
barred (so long as that defendant raises the statute of limitations as a defense). It doesnt matter
how righteous that plaintiffs cause, it doesnt matter how damaged/injured that plaintiff may be
the statute of limitations is a black-and-white rule which all judges lack discretion to ignore,
no matter how sympathetic the plaintiff. Breach of contract, fraud, negligence, virtually any
criminal case except murder you pursue it after the statute has run, youre out of luck.
The concept of a free house might turn some people off (particularly those who chose to keep
paying their mortgage during the Great Recession). I get that. But where the law works this way
in every other context preventing plaintiffs from obtaining relief when they waited too long to
file suit why should it be any different when it comes to a bank foreclosing on a mortgage? If
the bank doesnt file suit soon enough, then bank cant foreclose that mortgage, even if it means
the homeowner gets (or should get) to keep that house without fear of that mortgage being
foreclosed.
Lest you think this is purely an academic or hypothetical discussion, let me assure you its not.
I have procured free houses for clients via the statute of limitations. Not often, and no, I dont
want to start getting flooded with calls for this (for reasons which Ill explain more, below), but
Ive done it. It can work, at least in theory. In fact, it should work on a wide-scale basis
throughout Florida. You see, banks have been so, indescribably inept at prosecuting their own
cases, there are many hundreds, perhaps many thousands of foreclosure cases throughout Florida
for which the statute of limitations is (or should be) a defense. Yes, Im talking a complete bar to
foreclosure on thousands of properties. Perhaps many thousands.
You must think theres a catch. Sadly, there is (and Ill get to that), but there shouldnt be. Lets
go through the legal analysis.
Under Fla. Stat. 95.11(2)(c), the statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure is five years.
Thats simple enough, but what starts the running of that five year clock? Well, that depends on
whether the bank has accelerated the balance due under the Note/Mortgage. Acceleration
may sound like a complicated term, but its really not. Acceleration does *not* mean the date a
homeowner stopped paying the mortgage or the date the bank first sent a letter. Rather,
acceleration is where the mortgage holder took some clear and unequivocal action to declare
the full amount due under the Note/Mortgage. Typically, that means the date the bank fist filed
suit to foreclose that mortgage (as virtually every foreclosure complaint Ive ever seen includes
language reflecting the bank accelerated the balance due).

Lets back up a step. The payment obligations set forth in the Notes/Mortgages with which we
deal in foreclosure-world are called installment contracts. In an installment contract, the
borrower is obligated to pay not just one payment, but numerous payments on a regular and
ongoing basis the normal, monthly mortgage payments.
If the borrower defaults on payment(s) and the bank does not accelerate the balance due, then the
statute of limitations only operates to bar the monthly payments that should have been made
more than five years ago. Lets give an example. Suppose you stopped paying your mortgage in
February of 2008, but your bank is totally asleep at the wheel and has never done anything at all
to demand payment, file suit, or do anything else to accelerate the balance due. Unless your
Note/Mortgage has an automatic acceleration clause (possible, but rare), that means the statute of
limitations bars the bank from suing you for the February 15, 2008 payment and every payment
through May 15, 2009 (because five years from May 15, 2009 is May 15, 2014), but the
payments that were due on June 15, 2009 and thereafter are not barred (Im writing this blog on
June 1, 2014), nor are all payments thereafter. In fact, the five-year statute would not even have
begun for all payments due as of today through the maturity of the loan in 2034.
If the bank accelerates the balance due, however, that totally changes the analysis. When
the bank accelerates the balance due under the Note/Mortgage, that is the banks way of
saying you have defaulted, and we arent waiting for the future payment deadlines to
demand payment. Instead, we are declaring all amounts that would have been owed in the
future, i.e. all amounts that would have been paid through 2034, to be due *right now*.
That act of acceleration is what triggers the banks attempt to foreclose.
Lets use that same example (i.e. you stopped paying your mortgage in February of 2008), but
instead of the bank sitting by and doing nothing, suppose it accelerated the balance due on May
15, 2008, then did not file suit in the ensuing five years. On that fact pattern, based on what I
believe is a very simple application of the statute of limitations under basic case law, any
attempts by the bank to foreclose that mortgage should be barred by the statute of limitations.
Unlike the prior example, where the bank could take the position that more payments were due
in the future, there are no more payments due after May 15, 2008 because the bank accelerated
all future payments and declared them due on that date. It doesnt matter that the Note/Mortgage
had payment obligations running through the year 2034 when the bank accelerated the balance
due on May 15, 2008, it declared all of the future sums due as of May 15, 2008. So when five
years passed after May 15, 2008 without the bank filing suit, the statute of limitations should bar
foreclosure of that mortgage. In other words, the acceleration of the balance due acts to move
up (or accelerate) the maturity date of the Mortgage.
(Significant aside the statute of limitations does not require a lawsuit to be finished within the
operative time period, merely filed.)
Up to this point, Ive given this argument without any case citations because, frankly, I think the
law is just that clear. In my view, its not even reasonably debatable. Unfortunately, this is a
highly politicized judicial climate in which we now live. If youve read this blog previously, you
know Ive lamented this concept in the past, i.e. how a small number of uber-wealthy investors
associated with Fannie Mae (people like Bill Clinton) are essentially controlling the manner in

which foreclosure cases are handled on the ground level by pressuring the Florida Supreme
Court and Florida legislature (which, in turn, pressure our circuit court judges) to push through
foreclosure cases as quickly as possible so those investors can buy foreclosed houses in bulk for
15-20 cents on the dollar. Anyway, the climate being what it is, banks arent going to lie down
on the statute of limitations and lose the ability to foreclose on thousands of mortgages without a
fight. So they crafted an argument contrary to that set forth above.
Before I get to the banks argument, I want you to read all of the case law on the issue. Thats
where I became convinced I was right not just from Florida law, but from all of the case law
from all of the jurisdictions showing how the statute of limitations works in this context.
Under a long line of Florida cases, once a bank accelerates the balance due on a Note/Mortgage,
that triggers the running of the five-year statute of limitations in Fla. Stat. 95.11(2)(c), which
statute bars foreclosure if suit is not filed in the ensuing five years. See Travis Co. v. Mayes, 160
Fla. 375 (Fla. 1948) (The rule is also settled that when a mortgage in terms declares the
indebtedness due upon default of certain of its provisions or within a reasonable time thereafter,
the Statute of Limitations begins to run immediately after the default takes place or the time
intervenes.); American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. 2275 West Corp., 905 So. 2d 189
(Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing foreclosure judgment and remanding with instructions to grant
judgment for homeowners based on the statute of limitations); Central Home Trust Company of
Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (The statute of limitations may
commence running earlier on an installment note for payments not yet due, if the holder
exercises his right to accelerate the total debt because of a default or other reason. To
constitute an acceleration after default, where the holder has the option to accelerate, the holder
or payee of the note must take some clear and unequivocal action indicating its intent to
accelerate all payments under the note, and such action should apprise the maker of the fact that
the option to accelerate has been exercised. Examples of acceleration are a creditors sending
written notice to the debtor, making an oral demand, and alleging acceleration in a pleading filed
in a suit on the debt.); USX Corp. v. Schilbe, 535 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (foreclosure
of the mortgage is time barred by section 95.11(2)(c) and the enforceable life of the mortgage
lien ended by operation of section 95.281 prior to the commencement of their action); Greene v.
Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (Where the installment contract contains an
optional acceleration clause, the statute of limitations may commence running earlier on
payments not yet due if the holder exercises his right to accelerate the total debt because of a
default.); Locke v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (It has
been held that the statute of limitations on a mortgage foreclosure action does not begin to run
until the last payment is due unless the mortgage contains an acceleration clause. In the instant
case, the mortgage, which provides for installment payments with the last payment due in May,
2008, contains an optional acceleration clause. In such a case no acceleration occurs until the
holder of the mortgage exercises his right to accelerate.); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla.
2d DCA 1993) (The statute of limitations on a mortgage foreclosure action does not begin to
run until the last payment is due unless the mortgage contains an acceleration clause. Mrs.
Tipton did not exercise her right to accelerate until she demanded the total principal balance and
interest by letter dated March 12, 1991, less than two months prior to filing suit.); Spencer v.
EMC Mortg. Corp., 97 So. 3d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (The complaint alleges that the full
unpaid principal amount was due by virtue of a default on July 1, 1997. [The banks] officer

swore in his affidavit that default occurred on July 1, 1997, and the then title holder to the Note
accelerated payment of the entire amount due and owing on the Note and Mortgage. It appears
on the face of the existing record, then, that acceleration likely occurred over five years before
this lawsuit was filed in late November 2002.).
As if those Florida cases were not clear enough, under the jurisprudence of virtually every state
in America (or every state where Ive found case law, anyway), where an installment contract has
an acceleration clause, and that acceleration takes place, the statute of limitations begins to run at
that point. (Yes, I realize this string-cite is obnoxiously long, but thats the point.) See Smith v.
FDIC, 61 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1995) (Under Florida law, when promissory note secured by
mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, foreclosure cause of action accrues, and
statute of limitations begins to run, on date acceleration clause is invoked or on stated date of
maturity, whichever is earlier.); Wheel Estate Corp. v. Webb, 679 P.2d 529 (Ariz. 1983) (statute
of limitations barred suit on installment contract); Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jones, 930 P.2d
1007 (Ariz. 1996) (exercise of optional acceleration clause barred claim under statute of
limitations); In re. Bennett, 292 B.R. 476 (N.D. N.Y. 2003) (Under New York law, statute of
limitations on claim for breach of installment note which contained optional acceleration clause
began to run when lender elected to exercise the acceleration clause, rather than upon the earlier,
initial default on an installment payment.); City of Lincoln v. Herschberger, 725 N.W. 2d 787
(Neb. 2007) (We conclude that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the
acceleration clause was exercised. Because the Citys petition was filed less than 5 years after the
City exercised its right to acceleration, the Citys claim against the Hershbergers is not barred by
the statute of limitations.); Sparta State Bank v. Covell, 495 N.W. 2d 817 (Mich. 1993) (when
an installment contract does not contain an acceleration clause, claims based upon a breach of the
installment contract accrue, and the statute of limitations begins to run, as each separate
installment falls due. In the absence of an acceleration clause, claims on an installment contract
do not accrue until the installment becomes due. However, a different result is reached when an
installment contract contains an acceleration clause and the acceleration clause is exercised.);
Cadle Co. v. Prodoti, 716 A.2d 965 (Conn. 1998) (It is undoubtedly true that the statute of
limitations clock begins to run irreversibly when an optional acceleration clause is exercised by a
demand of full payment before all installments become due.); Clayton Natl, Inc. v. Guldi, 307
A.D. 2d 982 (N.Y. 2003) (statute of limitations barred foreclosure suit filed in 2000 where prior
suit filed in 1992); Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W. 3d 562 (Tex. 2001)
(Promissory note holders agreement that predecessor had accelerated note and that the statute
of limitations began to run on that date amounted to a judicial admission of the acceleration date
in a response to a summary judgment motion and in a counter-motion for summary judgment.);
Loiacono v. Goldberg, 240 A.D. 2d 476 (N.Y. 1997) (Once mortgage debt is accelerated, entire
amount is due, and statute of limitations begins to run on entire mortgage debt.); Ferrari v.
Citation Securities, Inc., 2000 WL 329068 (Tex. 2000) (If a lender accelerates a note, the statute
of limitations begins to run from the date of an effective acceleration.); Lavin v. Elmakiss, 302
A.D. 2d 638 (N.Y. 2003); Ryerson v. Hemar Ins. Corp. of America, 200 S.W. 3d 170 (Missouri
2006) (Lenders assignees cause of action for payment on an installment note accrued, and tenyear statute of limitations began to run, when borrower defaulted and lender accelerated
payments due on the note, effectively causing the last installment payment due and owing.);
Oaklawn Bank v. Alford, 845 S.W. 2d 22 (Ark. 2000) (After appellee defaulted and appellant
accelerated the debt, appellants cause of action on the debt evidenced by the note did not depend

upon any further contingency or condition precedent. We, therefore, agree with the circuit
judge in his finding that the statute of limitations began to run when appellant accelerated the
debt and that it barred appellants complaint.); Burney v. Citigroup Global Markets Realty
Corp., 244 S.W. 3d 900 (Tex. 2008) (statute of limitations began to accrue upon acceleration,
barred foreclosure); Hassler v. Account Brokers of Larrimer County, 274 P.3d 547 (Col. 2012) (
if an obligation that is to be repaid in installments is accelerated either automatically by the terms
of the agreement or by the election of the creditor pursuant to an optional acceleration clause
the entire remaining balance of the loan becomes due immediately and the statute of limitations
is triggered for all installments that had not previously become due); American Mut. Building &
Loan Co. v. Kesler, 137 P.2d 960 (Idaho 1943) (Where mortgagee availed itself of benefits of
acceleration clause in mortgage, future installments were immediately matured for all purposes,
and statute of limitations then began to run against unmatured installments and continued to run
against past due installments.); Evans v. Kilgore, 21 So. 2d 842 (Ala. 1945) (A mortgagees
election to mature entire indebtedness, evidenced by notes secured by mortgage, as of date on
which first of notes became due, matured all notes for all purposes on such date, so that action
for balance due thereon was barred by statute of limitations six years thereafter.); Uland v. Natl
City Bank of Evansville, 447 N.E. 2d 1124 (Ind. 1983) (Where note contained optional
acceleration clause and bank, by virtue of letter sent to maker, who was in default in monthly
note payments, exercised option to accelerate payments, but parties thereafter entered into
agreements to reinstate note, initial exercise of option to accelerate was thereby revoked, and tenyear statute of limitations commenced to run only at time note was due, rather than on earlier
date of exercise of option to accelerate.); EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Patella, 279 A.D. 2d 604 (N.Y.
2001) (Six-year limitations period applicable to foreclosure action brought by original
mortgagee started to run when mortgagee notified mortgagors that their debt was being
accelerated, and continued to run when that action was dismissed, so that subsequent foreclosure
action brought by mortgages assignee was untimely, where original mortgagee did not revoke its
election to accelerate.); Driessen-Rieke v. Steckman, 409 N.W. 2d 50 (Minn. 1987) (Creditors
call on debentures, as provided under debenture agreement, advanced maturity date on
underlying debts secured by debentures; thus, statute of limitations for foreclosure on mortgage
that had been issued by debtor when call was made, in return for creditors forbearance for 45
days, began to run from date of mortgage plus 45-day grace period, and creditors subsequent
foreclosure action was time barred); Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Morgan, 2007 WL 949251
(Mich. 2007) (If an acceleration clause is exercised, the entire unpaid balance under the contract
becomes due, and the statute of limitations period no longer runs separately after each
installment becomes due.); Baseline Financial Services v. Madison, 278 P.3d 321 (Ariz. 2012)
(When an installment contract contains an optional acceleration clause, an action as to future
installments does not accrue until the holder exercises the option to accelerate.); Koeppel v.
Carlandia Corp., 21 A.D. 3d 884 (N.Y. 2005) (We agree with the Supreme Court that this action
is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to an action to foreclose a mortgage.
The six-year statute of limitations began to run upon the acceleration of the mortgage debt.);
U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Everett, Creech, Hancock & Herzig, 363 S.E. 2d 665 (N.C. 1988) (A
cause of action for breach of contract accrues at time of breach which gives rise to right of action
for purposes of applying limitations period, and, in case of obligation payable by installments,
statute of limitation runs against each installment individually from time it becomes due, unless
creditor exercises a contractual option to accelerate debt in which case statute begins to run from
date acceleration clause is invoked.).

Strung together in this manner, the weight of these cases is overwhelming. Florida. Arizona.
New York. Texas. Connecticut. North Carolina. Michigan. Minnesota. Alabama. Idaho.
Colorado. Everywhere I looked, courts were applying the statute of limitations in the same way I
described above. Perhaps more powerful than sheer volume of these cases, though and the
number of different jurisdictions from which they emanate was the absence of *any* case law
to the contrary. No court in any state was allowing foreclosure in the face of the statute of
limitations where a bank accelerated and five years passed (or however many years under that
states statute) without the bank filing suit. None.
I found this argument so powerful, with the cases listed out in this format, thats exactly how I
presented the argument when the bank argued against the statute of limitations in a recent quiet
title lawsuit I filed in federal court.
In the face of all of these authorities numerous, long-standing cases from across the country
bank lawyers in Florida have begun arguing the statute of limitations does not apply in the
manner Ive described. They rely principally on a case called Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882
So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004). Though that case might appear persuasive at first blush since it comes
from the Florida Supreme Court, the obvious problem is that the decision does not even mention
the statute of limitations! Yes, bank lawyers throughout Florida have been trying to prevent the
statute of limitations from operating in the way Ive described above in the face of all of these
case authorities by relying on a case that does not even mention the statute of limitations.
Singleton stands for the proposition that a bank can file suit for foreclosure even where a prior
suit was dismissed with prejudice because the payment obligations under the Note/Mortgage are
continuing obligations. That sounds contrary to our standard beliefs about dismissals with
prejudice because it is. Typically, when a plaintiffs lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice, that
means the plaintiff cant sue again. Whats different about foreclosure cases, though, is the
nature of an installment contracts. Using my example above, if the homeowner stopped paying
in February of 2008, the bank accelerated the balance due in May of 2008 and filed suit, if that
suit is dismissed with prejudice that same month, then the bank is prevented from ever obtaining
relief regarding the non-payments in February, March, April, and May of 2008. However, the
monthly payment obligations continue through 2034, and, under Singleton, nothing stops the
bank from filing another suit regarding those, future payments (if not made).
Confronted with the possibility of losing hundreds if not thousands of mortgages due to
application of the statute of limitations, bank lawyers started arguing Singleton did not bar suit
even when more than five years passed after the bank accelerated the balance due under the
Note/Mortgage. In other words, the banksters wanted Florida courts to treat the statute of
limitations as if it did not exist. Acceleration? Five years passed? Pfft. We can still sue under
Singleton because the dismissal of the foreclosure suit operated to nullify the acceleration or
de-celerate the balance due.
I think this argument is total hogwash and completely devoid of any merit whatsoever. Again,
the only case the banksters rely upon for this position Singleton did not even mention the
statute of limitations. Any lawyer knows there is an enormous difference between being able to
sue again after a dismissal with prejudice (particularly when filing suit less than five years post-

acceleration) and being able to sue after passage of the statute of limitations. In other words, the
doctrine of res judicata (the legal concept when a case is dismissed with prejudice) is totally
different than the statute of limitations. Thats why, again, banks could cite *NO CASE*
supporting this position in the context of the statute of limitations not just from Florida, but
anywhere.
A few weeks ago, that all changed. In U.S. Bank v. Bartram, Floridas Fifth DCA applied
Singleton in the statute of limitations context, ruling the statute of limitations did not bar
mortgage foreclosure even where the bank accelerated the balance due, then did not file suit in
the ensuing, five-year period. Candidly, I find this analysis so distorted, and so contrary to
established law (above) that its hard to know where to begin. But lets start with a concept
youve all heard me talk about many times paragraph 22.
You know about paragraph 22 of the standard, Fannie Mae mortgage because I have blogged
about the banks obligation to give this notice many times. But paragraph 22 does more than
require this notice thats the paragraph of the mortgage which allows acceleration and
foreclosure in the first place. You see, if an installment contract had no right to accelerate, the
banks could not accelerate the balance due they could only sue for the monthly payments not
made. Its only because paragraph 22 sets forth the right to accelerate and foreclose that the
banks can accelerate the balance due, i.e. declare future payments immediately due and payable.
So its obviously important that the parties contract spell out this right. Yet guess where the
banks right to de-celerate the balance due (or to nullify the acceleration) is contained in the
mortgage? Nowhere! The contract, i.e. the Note/Mortgage, say nothing about de-celeration
because it doesnt exist. Its a made-up term, made up by the banksters and their lawyers to try
to frivolously avoid losing a bunch of mortgages to the statute of limitations. Theres nothing in
the Note/Mortgage about giving notice to the homeowner about de-celeration, either (or the
right to resume making normal, monthly payments that would come with de-celeration) because,
again, the concept does not exist.
Sadly, even though this entire concept does not exist either in case law or the parties contract
the Bartram court let these banks get away with it. With respect to anyone who disagrees, I find
it terribly wrong just WRONG for anyone to suggest a bank can make up a contractual term
literally, just make it up (and for a court to allow them to get away with it) simply to create the
result that it wants to create, i.e. being able to ignore the statute of limitations and foreclose. If
that sounds harsh, re-read all of those cases. And show me something to the contrary go ahead,
I dare you. (In fairness, there is one scenario under the law where de-celeration can take place
where the homeowner resumes making monthly mortgage payments and the banks allow it.
Thats how any contract works if the parties agree to resume making monthly payments, then
its their contract, so they can. Absent that, however, the acceleration remains in place.)
Ahh, yes, say the banksters but when that first suit is de-celerated, its not the bank trying to
de-celerate, its the court doing so (by dismissing the case). Again, thats wrong. There no case
law saying that a court dismissing a case operates to de-celerate the balance due and prevent the
running of the statute of limitations. In fact, the cases hold precisely the opposite. Quite simply,
where the balance due is accelerated by filing suit and that suit is then dismissed, the statute of
limitations runs from when that suit was first filed. See Wood v. Fitz-Simmons, 2009 WL

580784 (Ariz. 2009) (An affirmative act by the lender is necessary to revoke the acceleration of
a debt once that option has been exercised. And, where a debt has been accelerated by the filing
of a lawsuit, a trial courts dismissal of the action is not by itself sufficient to revoke the
acceleration and extend the limitations period.); Federal Natl Mortg. Assn v. Mebane, 208
A.D. 2d 892 (N.Y. 1994) (Contrary to Metmors contention, although a lender may revoke its
election to accelerate all sums due under an optional acceleration clause in a mortgage provided
that there is no change in the borrowers position in reliance thereon, the record is barren of any
affirmative act of revocation occurring within the six-year Statute of Limitations period
subsequent to the service of the complaint in the prior foreclosure action, wherein the holder of
the mortgage notified the borrowers of its election to accelerate. It cannot be said that a
dismissal by the court constituted an affirmative act by the lender to revoke its election to
accelerate.); Clayton Natl, Inc. v. Guldi, 307 A.D. 2d 982 (N.Y. 2003) (Contrary to the
plaintiffs contention, the dismissal of the 1992 action for lack of personal jurisdiction did not
constitute an affirmative act by the lender to revoke its election to accelerate.). Again, the banks
have no case law to the contrary, as none exists. But that didnt stop the Bartram court from
ruling how it did sigh.
The only good aspect of Bartram is that it certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court.
At least that way well get a decision, once and for all, from our highest court. For me, the
Florida Supreme Courts ruling in that case will be the ultimate litmus test for the integrity of our
entire judicial system. Is the system irretrievably broken? Is it so influenced by politics that the
Court wont follow well-established law existing for dozens of years throughout numerous
jurisdictions? Is the pressure/pull from the Fannie Mae cronies so great that a bank-oriented
result is going to happen regardless of case precedent? I suppose only time will tell. Regardless
of what happens, though, I know what the result should be, and so do the banksters. Again
heres the memo.
So what do I say to all of the homeowners in Florida who want to know if the statute of
limitations is a viable defense? Well, my confidence in how the statute applies is the same now
as high as it was before Bartram, but my confidence in our courts to rule that way is obviously
much less. I suppose well just have to see what happens.
Thank you to the colleague who helped me put this research/memo together. (You know who
you are.) Your fine work was appreciated.