Desierto vs Heirs of Margarita Ventura

Facts:
Heirs of Margarita Ventura ( the Heirs) filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for Falsification of Public
Documents and violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang.
Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to investigate the claims of the Heirs agaist her former husband
Edilberto. Celerina supported the report with public documents which she falsified and Palacio issed a recommendation
based on that report to award the landholding in dispute to Edilberto.
The DARAB recommended that the charged against the respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The CA
then took cognizance of the case and granted the provisional dismissal the complaint against respondent for violation of
Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 but denied the dismissal of the complaint for falsification of public documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or
non-administrative cases.
That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the
case is void.

Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS
On April 3, 2003, the Ofce of the Ombudsman submitted three Amended Informations to the Sandiganbayan against
Virginio Villamor (Municipal Mayor) and Dinah Barriga (Municipal Accountant) of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. The
First Amended Information charged Barriga and Villamor with Malversation of Public Funds. The facts of this information
stated that on or about January 1996, the said acccused had in their possession and custody public funds amounting to
P23,047.20 intended for the payment of 5 rolls of Polyethelene pipesto be used in the Corte-Canumong Water System
Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. Being public ofcers, they were held accountable for the funds. However, by
this same capacity, the said accused misappropriated, took, embezzled, and converted the said amount for their own
personal use and benet.The second and third Amended Informations charged Villamor and Barriga with Illegal Use of
Public Funds
The facts of the Second Information stated that on or about November 1995, the said accused had in their possession
and control public funds amounting to P1305.00, representing a portion of the CVWSP Fundintended and appropriated
for the Construction of Deep Well and Spring Box (Level I projects) and Water Works System (Level II projects) of
specic brgy beneciaries and recipients. By reason of the duties of their ofce, they are held accountable for the said
funds. However, by such capacity, they connived, confederated and helped each other to disburse the said amount for
the Spring Box of Brgy. Natimo-an, Carmen, Cebu. - abrgy not included as a recipient of the CVWSP Trust Fund. Thus,
the accused used the said fund to a public purpose different from which it was intended or appropriated. The facts of the
Third Information stated that on or about January 1997, the accused had in their possessionP267, 537.96 from the
CVWSP Fund intended for the same purpose as that in the 2nd Information. However, the accused disbursed the said
amount for the construction & expansion of Brgy. Cantucong Water System, a level II project, thus the public funds were
used for a public purpose different from that which it was intended or appropriated.
ISSUES:
1.WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crimes charged.
2.If the court has jurisdiction, WON Barriga should also be held liable:
A. Despite the Amended Informations' failure to show the intimate relations between the crimes charged and her ofcial
duties?
B. Despite being only of SG 24?
C. Despite the fact that she is not an accountable ofcer since, as Municipal Accountant, the funds in theAmended
Informations were not under her control of administration?
HELD:
1.Yes. Based on the allegations in the Amended Informations and RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan hasoriginal jurisdiction
over the crimes of Malversation and Illegal Use of Public Funds.
RA 8249 -SB has orig jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public ofcers and employees,at least one of
whom belongs to any of the ve categories thereunder enumerated at the time of thecommission of such crimes.
2 classes of public ofce-related crimes under Sec.4(b), RA 8249:
a. Public ofce is constituent element - offense cannot exist without ofce
b. Intimately connected with public ofce - perpetrated by p.o./employee while in exercise of functions
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and feloniesunder the rst classication.
The Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies committed by the
public ofcers and employees enumerated in Section(a)(1) to (5) under the second classication if the Information
contains specic factual allegations showing the intimate connection between the offense charged and the public ofce of
the accused, and the discharge of his ofcial duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.
The public ofce of the accused Municipal Mayor Virginio Villamor is a constituent element ofmalversation and illegal use
of public funds or property. Accused mayors position is classied as SG 27.Since the Amended Informations alleged that
the petitioner conspired with her co-accused in committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal

accountant is classied as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable ofcer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her.
2.Yes.
A. Considering that the public ofce of the accused is by statute a constituent element of thecrime charged, there is no
need for the Prosecutor to state in the Information specic factual allegations of the intimacy between the ofce and the
crime charged, or that the accused committed thecrime in the performance of his duties.
B. The classication of the petitioners position as SG 24 is of no moment. The determinative fact is that the position of
her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is classied as SG 27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, if the position of one of the principal accused is classied as SG27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.
D. Under Section 474 of the Local Government Code, she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she
obligated to account for the same; hence, she is not an accountable ofcer within the context of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Under the said article, an accountable public ofcer is one who has actual control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his ofce.
Even then, it cannot thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for
malversation under the Revised Penal Code.
The name or relative importance of the ofce or employment is not the controlling factor. The nature of the duties of the
public ofcer or employee is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public
ofcer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if
he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
It must be stressed that a public ofcer who is not in charge of public funds/ property by virtue ofher ofcial position, or
even a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public
ofcer/private individual conspires with an accountable public ofcer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds
or property.
The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six counts of malversation is
also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a private person conspiring with an accountable public ofcer
in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation.

Lilia Organo vs Sandiganbayan

320 SCRA 684 Criminal Law Crimes Committed by Public Officers Plunder; Jurisdiction
Remedial Law Jurisdiction of Courts Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
In 1996, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Lilia Organo for the crime of plunder as it was alleged
that she and some other government officials stole P193 million from the government.
Organo filed a motion to quash alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8249 which provides that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over government employees who do not belong
to Salary Grade 27. Organo was able to prove that her position in the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not belong to
Salary Grade 27.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion. It insisted that under the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080, as amended), the
Sandiganbayan was vested with the jurisdiction over plunder cases and since RA 8249 is a general law and that RA 7080
is a special law, RA 7080 should prevail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can try plunder cases where the accused is below Salary Grade 27.
HELD: No. The Plunder Law itself provides:
Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan only had provisional jurisdiction over all plunder cases. In 1997, when RA 8249 was passed which
further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, there is already no question as to which plunder cases are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The said law finally prescribed that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over government employees which are below Salary Grade 27. RA 8249 is a special law the intention of
which was to declog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan. As such, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Organo. The
case should be filed in the appropriate court.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included
in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel
found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as
principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal
accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal
accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to
the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is
too shallow to deserve merit.
No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made
by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument,
the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of

the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a
penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts
that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

October 26, 2012 1 Comment

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate
ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice
Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time
to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government
must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local
state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative
action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute
and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of
the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Doctrine:

The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious
conduct with a child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

Facts:
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual
intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a mutual understanding and became
sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had
sexual intercourse.

Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.

The petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned. Hence, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial
court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. The trail court rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty and sentenced him to reclusion temporal and to pay an indemnity of Php. 75,000 and
damages of Php. 50,000.

Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. The CA modified the decision of the trial court. The appellate
court affirmed his conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in awarding Php. 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA
as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was
authorized by law.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds that there was no rape committed since their
sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their sweetheart relationship

Held:
No. The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious
conduct with a child who is subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.