SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154798 : February 12, 2007]

CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., AND/OR A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, PETITIONERS VS. DEO
P. NATIVIDAD, RESPONDENT.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Special First Division of this
Court datedFebruary 12, 2007.
G.R. 154798 - (CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., and/or A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN,
petitioners versus DEO P. NATIVIDAD, respondent)
In this Motion for Reconsideration,[1] petitioner Crystal Shipping, Inc. and/or A/S Stein Line
Bergen seek a reversal of this Court's Decision[2] dated October 20, 2005 which affirmed the
resolutions dated July 2, 2002, and August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals. Said resolutions
affirmed the resolution dated April 9, 2002 of the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC NCR CA No. 23333-2000 which ordered petitioners to pay respondent US$60,000.00
representing total disability benefits.
Petitioners contend that the Court committed serious and grave errors since:
I.
Respondent's claims for disability benefits are governed by the POEA Contract and not the
labor Code.
II.
Since the company-designated doctors [have] assessed respondent's disability to be Grade 9,
respondent is only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to [G]rade 9, pursuant to the POEA
Contract.
III.
The Court of Appeals and the Honorable Court have rendered nugatory the explicit provisions
of the POEA Contract providing for the assessment of the [c]ompany-designated [physician] as
determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.[3]
We note that the parties have executed, on January 12, 2006, a Compromise
Agreement[4] whereby petitioners paid respondent the amount of US$63,000 or P3,294,900, as
full satisfaction of our decision dated October 20, 2005. With that, the matter should have
been laid to rest. Nevertheless, we shall take time to explain the issues raised in this Motion if
only to clear any lingering doubt on the matter.
Concerning the first ground, petitioners argue that the Court erred in defining permanent
disability as inability to work for mote than 120 days based on decisions applying the
provisions of the Labor Code. Petitioners add that such provisions apply only to disability

benefit claims under the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security
System. Petitioners further contend that there was no provision in the POEA Contact providing
that disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days shall be deemed total and
permanent.
Petitioners misread our decision, which we quote in part:
In resolving the merits of the case, we find pertinent Section 30 of the POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 55, Series of 1996, which provides the schedule of disability or impediment for
injuries suffered ad illness contracted. The particular illness of the respondent is not within
those enumerated. But, the same provision supplies us with the guideline that any
item in the schedule classified under grade 1 constitutes total and permanent
disability.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the
records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the
least, or mote than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his
disability was permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean
absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated,
but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
Although the company-designated doctors and respondent's physician differ in their
assessments of the degree of respondent's disability, both found that respondent was unfit for
sea-duty due to respondent's need for regular medical check-ups and treatment which would
not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that respondent's disability
was total.[5] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that any item in the schedule of disability or impediment for
injuries suffered and illness contracted classified under Grade 1 necessarily constitutes total
and permanent disability.
Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 does not measure disability in
terms of number of days but by gradings only. Since respondent's physician classified his
disability as Grade 1, the same was necessarily total and permanent regardless of the number
of days he was disabled.
However, if only to bolster respondent physician's grading and its concomitant classification as
total and permanent disability, this Court noted that responden's inability to work lasted from
August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, or for more than 120 days. Even without this
observation though, we would have reached the same conclusion since respondent's physician
classified his disability as Grade 1[6]while the company-designated physicians declared him
"disabled permanently."[7] More importantly, these findings were fully supported by the Labor
Arbiter [8] and the NLRC[9] which both concluded that respondent's disability was total and
permanent.
The second and third grounds are interrelated and we shall discuss them jointly. Petitioners
aver that since the company-designated physicians had assessed respondent's disability as
Grade 9, respondent was only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to Grade 9 pursuant to
the POEA Contract. Petitioners also contend that by relying on the classification made by
respondent's physician, this Court rendered nugatory the explicit provisions of the POEA
Contract providing that assessments made by company-designated physicians are
determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.
These arguments had already been passed upon and found to be without merit by the NLRC.
In its Resolution[10] dated April 9, 2002, the NLRC declared that medical certificates issued by
company-designated physicians are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of the company
who sought their services and therefore should not be given evidentiary weight and value.

This pronouncement finds significance when viewed in the light of the company-designated
physician's conclusion that respondent could no longer go back to sea-duty and hence, was
disabled permanently. Yet, such company-designated physician and the two others who
subsequently examined respondent gave the latter a partial impediment Grade 9 classification.
In effect, they declared respondent's disability as partial and permanent.
As borne out by the records, respondent became unfit for sea-duty due to his need for regular
check-up and treatment which would otherwise be unavailable if he were at sea. More
specifically, respondent was unable to work as chief mate for almost three years. As we have
said, permanent total disability is the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same
kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or
any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. [11]
Having said that, the findings of respondent's physician was more attuned to respondent's
actual physical state which led not only this Court but also the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to
conclude that the findings of the company-designated physicians could not be given
evidentiary weight and value.
As a final note, we reiterate that the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is
designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seaman in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and
applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be
fully carried into effect.[12]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration is hereby DENIED with
definite finality. No further pleadings will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.