Annaliza G.

Bendal
COL1A
G.R. No. L-99

November 16, 1945

PIO DURAN, petitioner,

vs.
SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, Judge of People's Court, respondent.
Marciano Almario for petitioner.
Judge Salvador Abad Santos of People's Court in his own behalf.
Facts: Petitioner Pio Duran is a Filipino political prisoner undet the custody of the Director of
Prisons in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa Rizal for not less than three months without any
information having filed against him. He filed a petition for his release on bail with the People's
Court. Solicitor General recommended that the petitioner be provisionally release on P35, 000.00
bail. After hearing the statements of Special Prosecutor V.D. Carpio, in representation of the
Solicitor General and Atty. Marciano Almario, counsel for the petitioner, Judge Salvador Abad
Santos denied the petition for bail on October 12, 1945 and refused to reconsider his order
although not stating any reason on the issued on October 15, 1945.
The denial of the petition is a flagrant violation of the Constitution of the Philippines and of
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 and that the judge has committed grave abuse of
discretion for which petitioner has no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary course
of law.
The respondent judge denies abuse of discretion and stated the reason for denying the petition for
bail on his order on October 15, 1945 and the grounds are the detainee's adherence to the enemy
as manifested by his utterances and activities during the Japanese domination historical facts of
contemporary history and of public knowledge which the petitioner cannot deny makes the case
against him quite serious and may the necessitate the imposition of the capital punishment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion for denying the
petitioners petition to bail as pursuant to section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682?
Held: No.
Petitioner was charged for treason which is "the highest of all crimes".
As pursuant to section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682
. . . Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
the aforesaid political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People's Court, after due
notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail, even prior to
the presentation of the corresponding information, unless the Court, finds that there is
strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense . . .
The recital by the special prosecutor of the supposed acts committed by the petitioner and
referred to by the respondent judge in his order of October 15, 1945, above quoted which acts
were not rebutted by counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on the petition for bail, supports the
conclusion and ruling of the People's Court.
The petitioner denied the imputation that the petitioner was the Executive General of the
"Makapili," but he openly admitted that at the hearing before the People's Court he did not make
any effort to deny or disprove the said imputation or the others appearing in Appendix E of the

petition. In view thereof, how can we expect the People's Court not to take into consideration
what had been stated then, appearing in said Appendix E?
Counsel's contention that there was strong have presented evidence to prove that there was strong
evidence of the commission of a capital offense before People's Court could deny bail in this
case was substantially complied with, although the information charging the commission of the
crime of treason had not as yet been filed. We are of the opinion and so hold that hearing set and
held for the purpose was amply sufficient for the People's Court to be informed and to determine
whether there was strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be stated that the petitioner has been deprived of his liberty
without due process of law, because his petition for bail had been set for hearing and he was
given an opportunity to be heard when the above circumstances were submitted to the People's
Court, where it was made to appear satisfactorily that he was being detained due to highly
treasonable activities against the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States, which
activities would be charged in the information for a capital offense and punishable by death, and
that the evidence in the case strong.
Philosophical Reference:
Judge Gregorio Perfecto made big impression in quoting the words the outstanding philosopherjurist Jhering wrote in his little big book, "The Struggle for Law
The essay clearly refers to I crave the law the poet's description in the relation of law in the
subject, in the objective and sense of the term meaning of the struggle for law. Shylock, on the
other hand was a Jew who has suffered endless discrimination at the hands of his enemy,
Antonio, asks why he should not be allowed to exact his revenge now that he has been given the
chance. He describes the struggle of every man in any level whose sentiment of legal right in
strongest and most ideal when the imperfection of legal institution refuses him satisfaction on
decision rendered on him. He stated the struggle against the law, the feeling of legal right left in
loiter by the power which should protect it. At the present case, Pio Duran being charged with
treason in which known for highest of all crimes bears the weight of proving his right to bail, a
struggle in which he believed he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law, like
Shylock, whose claim of question for law has changed in the law of Venice. Law may be harsh
but that is the law, is the maxim I can relate to his current situation. We refer to laws favorable
for the accused, however, under circumstances, in which he is in, the law is not absolute and it
may have exception.

G.R. No. L-30773 February 18, 1970

FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA, petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and NEMESIO CERALDE, respondents.
V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Atienza, Tabora & del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo and Special
Counsel Perfecto V. Fernandez for respondents Salvador Lopez, et al.
Crispin D. Baizas for respondent Nemesio Ceralde.
Facts: Petitioner, a professor of English and Comparative Literature (formerly Dean of the UP
College in Baguio), was elected Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board

of Regents, on nomination of the UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a five year
term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights
and privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the position in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.
As far back as February 11, 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of
Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on
the general academic program and the physical plant and services, with a cluster of special
demands. In response, President Lopez created a committee composed of eight graduate
students, two undergraduate students, and four faculty members. This committee met 9 times
with Dean Sta. Maria in February and March 1969. On March 17, 1969, Dean Sta. Maria gave
President Lopez a written summary of the dialogues he had with the committee and enumerated
in connection with the demands, the steps taken, the steps being taken5 and the steps to be taken
in consultation with the faculty. He also recommended to the UP President the following: a more
adequate budget responsive to the needs of the college, taking into account its expanding
graduate program; improvement of the library service in terms of a better book collection and
more adequate space and reading rooms, particularly for graduate students; appointment of more
faculty members on the senior level to handle the large graduate program, and to meet the acute
need for more graduate advisers, critics, and committee members; improvement of the water
system of the college; improvement of the physical plant of the college, including its classrooms,
offices, toilets, sidewalks and surrounding landscape; and construction of a graduate students'
dormitory.
But the students were not to be appeased. For, Dean Sta. Maria, according to them, did not act on
some of their demands. Respondents herein have stressed that in the meetings of the education
graduate committee; Dean Sta. Maria neither included in the agenda nor consulted the faculty
about the students' demands on "foreign language proficiency examination" and on "research and
thesis writing pressures". They have brought out the fact that many members of the faculty
shared the students' grievances on the absence of definite standards and procedures on academic
work, including teaching load, administrative and committee assignments, faculty evaluation,
and favoritism and discrimination.
On July 16, 1969, Adelaida E. Masuhud, President of the UP Graduate Education Student
Organization., led a group who visited President Lopez and submitted to him a progress report on
the students' demands taken up with Sta. Maria since March 26, 1969. She acknowledged that
the dean had granted ten demands but deplored the fact that the dean had ignored the following;
submission to the faculty for decision, of the demand for abolition of foreign language
requirements and comprehensive examinations; fixing the criteria for selection, admission,
appointment and promotion of faculty members; formulation of clear-cut policies on thesis
advising, faculty teaching load, and faculty membership on standing committees; and
appointment of a permanent director for the Graduate Education Studies of the SPED Program.
She thus stated: "I appreciate the efforts of the Dean in acting On some of our demands.
However, the Dean has failed to take further action on the demands that have far reaching
implications for the students, faculty and the College as a whole. As a consequence problems,
confusion and demoralization of students and faculty have cropped up anew in the college."
The students threatened to boycott their classes the next day, July 17. President Lopez asked that
they desist, suggested that they instead attend a student-faculty meeting the next day in his office.
But on July 17, the Education Graduate Student Organization boycotted their classes just the
same. The President met the striking students' representatives and the faculty members of the
College of Education. Charges of favoritism were allegedly hurled by some of the faculty
members against Sta. Maria. On the other hand, the dean offered to sit down with the

students.The latter, however, refused to enter into a dialogue unless he (the dean) were first
ousted.
In a separate development, the faculty members of the College of Education convened in the
afternoon of July 22. They resolved, amongst others, to recognize the right of a college dean to
his position from which he cannot be removed unless for cause (44 in favor, 2 abstained), and not
to endorse the students' demand for the forced resignation of Sta. Maria (36 in favor, 5 against, 3
abstained).
The boycott fever infected other colleges. On July 22, 1969, the newly installed members of the
UP Student Council voted to support the education students' strike. The next day, July 23, the
main avenues leading to the university gates were barricaded, buses denied entrance, and
students cajoled into joining the strike. It was thus on that day that all academic activity in the
university came to a complete stand still. In the morning of July 23, at 10:00 o'clock, the UP
President called a meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present gave him a
vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.
Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, on the same day, July 23, 1969,
President Lopez issued the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. That order,
addressed to Dean Sta. Maria, reads:
President Lopez was to explain in a press statement of July 23, 1969 that he "cannot permit the
continued disruption of the academic life of the institution"; that the transfer order was made
"[i]n the interest of the service" and "as an emergency measure" because the meetings with the
faculty, students, Sta. Maria and the UP President had "proved fruitless in the face of the refusal
of the College of Education students to discuss any further their demands unless and until Dean
Sta. Maria resigns his position"; and that, therefore, "the complete shut-down of classes in the
Diliman campus has compelled" him to "transfer Dean Sta. Maria to other duties".
Having received the transfer order on the same day, July 23, Sta. Maria forthwith wrote a letter,
which he himself hand carried to President Lopez, requesting that "(a) a formal investigation be
conducted by the Board of Regents on the circumstances which led to the promulgation of the
above order, and on the basis thereof; and (b) said order be reconsidered and set aside for being
manifestly unjust, unfair, unconstitutional, and contrary to law, and, therefore, null and void."
The next day, July 24, Sta. Maria announced to the education students and faculty, through
Memorandum 17, that the transfer order "is now the subject of a pending request for
reconsideration ... and, for this reason, its effectivity is necessarily suspended", and that he shall
continue "to be the Dean ... pursuant to his appointment as such for the period from January 1,
1968 to May 15, 1972."
At President Lopez' request, a special meeting of the Board of Regents was held on July 25,
1969. President Lopez there reported Dean Sta. Maria's transfer and Professor Ceralde's ad
interim appointment as Acting Dean of the College of Education. He told the board that because
of "failure of leadership in the College of Education, a crisis of confidence emerged in that
institution"; that the ultimate result was the boycott of classes by the students "starting on July
17, 1969 in protest against the inaction of Dean Sta. Maria on their demands submitted months
ago"; and that this situation impelled him to issue Administrative Order 77 "as demanded by the
prevailing crisis."
The board confirmed Dean Sta. Maria's transfer and Professor Ceralde's appointment, considered
as premature Sta. Maria's Memorandum 17 heretofore mentioned, but gave due course to his plea
for reconsideration and granted him a chance to be heard at the next board meeting on July 29,
1969.

In the said meeting of July 29, Sta. Maria did not personally appear. He sent his counsel who
manifested that Sta. Maria was not recognizing the board's jurisdiction unless, without further
hearing, the board first revoke the transfer order. The board resolved: "... to take cognizance and
consider as a new petition of Dean Sta. Maria, submitted through counsel, his declaration that the
efficacy of the President's Administrative Order No. 77 transferring him should first be
suspended by the Board and held in abeyance as a prerequisite f or the hearing being prayed for.
In this connection, Dean Sta. Maria will be asked to file a Memorandum with the Board in
support of his new petition."
The foregoing had been the developments when Sta. Maria filed the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in this Court on July 31, 1969 against respondents
Salvador P. Lopez, the Board of Regents and Nemesio R. Ceralde.
Issue: Whether or not Sta. Maria shall be removed in his capacity as the Dean of UP College of
Education?
Held: No.
Not that the foregoing stand alone. The reasons advanced by respondents to justify such transfer
are quite revealing. They pictured Sta. Maria as a bungling administrator, incompetent,
inefficient, unworthy, a miscast. They averred that he did not act on the petitions and grievances
of graduate students; that he caused widespread dissatisfaction amongst faculty members and
students because of his "inaction", his "lack of sincerity and candor in dealing" with them, that
he was guilty of "inflexible arrogant attitude and actuation" as dean; that he miserably failed to
avert a boycott that was caused by a "crisis of confidence" and "failure of leadership" in his
college; that he abandoned his post when he was most needed; that he refused to accept solutions
even as he failed to advance his own to mitigate the crisis; that in sum, he was a miscast in the
College of Education.
It is because of all the foregoing that we are left under no doubt that petitioner Felixberto Sta.
Maria is entitled to be restored to his position as Dean of the College of Education.
Just as we are about to draw this opinion to a close, our attention is drawn to the alleged non
exhaustion of administrative remedies. A sufficient answer would be that Dean Sta. Maria asked
that he be restored to his position pending investigation of any charge against him. But the board
refused. Instead, it confirmed the ad interim appointment of respondent Prof. Nemesio Ceralde
as "acting Dean" in place of Sta. Maria. Virtually the door was closed. Nothing was left for Sta.
Maria to do but go to Court.
Of course, Sta. Maria stood pat on his right to keep his position as Dean. This is perfectly
understandable. Hindsight now reveals that further pursuit of administrative remedy before the
Board of Regents would be but an act of supererogation At any rate, there is no compelling
reason to resort to this remedy. Here, the claimed right is the constitutionally protected due
process. Mandamus will lie.
Philosophical Reference:
The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness:
The man who searches after both meaning and fulfillments beyond ambiguous fulfillments and
frustrations of history exist in a height of spirit which no historical process can completely
contain. While every aspects of life as its own height, a man on this selection, refers to his full
potential in search for meaning of his own ambiguity. And the full potential refers to the higher
possibility of justice that come to the community from this height of awareness. Meaning, the
justice came forth to the community in climax of everyone's awareness that there's such thing as

justice, that this height is destroyed by any community which seeks prematurely to cut off this
pinnacle of individuality in the interest of community's peace and order. For the maintenance of
peace and order, reaching the full potential in life to enjoy is being destroyed, in other words,
there's restriction. The community involved here is the students continued to strike until the
President of the University yielded to their demand. If the students who want to attend their
classes were being restricted so the role of police will enter. Police power is known to be the
protector of the state, and said to be solution for the problem not the removal of the petitioner. It
is concluded as the moral lesson to resolving issue is to always narrow down to the vindication
of a principle: the rational solution of any controversy.

G.R. No. L-1612

February 26, 1948

JORGE B. VARGAS, petitioner,

vs.
EMILIO RILLORAZA, JOSE BERNABE, MANUEL ESCUDERO, Judges of the People's
Court, and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Manuel Lim and Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona
for respondents.
Facts:Counsel for the defense, in a motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of
section 14 of the People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) upon the following grounds:
(a) It provides for qualification of members of the Supreme Court, other than those
provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
(b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess
the qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution.
(c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure
other than impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Philippine Constitution.
(d) It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional
prerogative to confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court.
(e) It creates two Supreme Courts.
(f) it impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to section 13, Article
VIII of the Philippine Constitution.
(g) It is a Bill of Attainder, for it punishes by disqualification members of the Supreme
Court who rendered said public service during the Japanese occupation.
(h) It denies equal protection of the laws.
(i) It is an ex post pacto legislation.
(j) It amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the
Philippine Constitution.
(k) It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the "packing" of the
Supreme Court in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and in support of his
opposition submits these propositions:
1. Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
2. Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not and is not intended to provide an
additional qualification for members of the Supreme Court, much less does it amend
section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
3. Qualifications of members of the Supreme Court prescribed in section 6, Article VIII
of the Constitution apply to permanent "appointees" not to temporary "designees."
4. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution is not applicable to temporary designations
under section 14, Commonwealth Act No. 682.
5. It does not remove but merely disqualifies the members of the Supreme Court affected
to sit and vote in the particular class of cases therein mentioned.
6. It does not create an additional "Special Supreme Court."
7. It does not impair the rule-making power of the Supreme Court but merely
supplements the Rules of Court.
8. It is not a bill of attainder.
9. It is not an ex post pacto law.
10. It does not deny equal protection of the laws either to the Justices of the Supreme
Court affected or the treason indicates concerned.
11. It does not amend any constitutional provision.
12. It does not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
This opposition is a reproduction by reference in the instant case of a similar pleading filed by
the Solicitor General in G.R. No. L-398, People vs. Sison, pursuant to the resolution of this Court
in the instant case dated October 30, 1947, granting the prayer of the Assistant Solicitor General
that in the consideration of petitioner's memorandum herein of September 27, 1947.
It will not be necessary for the purposes of this resolution to consider and decide all the legal
questions thus raised by these conflicting contentions of the parties.
Issue: Whether or not the section 14 of the People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) is
unconstitutional?
Held: Yes.
Such question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy to the constitution, however, arises in relation
to the disqualification of certain members of the Supreme Court provided for in section 14 of the
People's Court Act which says:
SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the
Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic
may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in
which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the

Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch,

instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or
disqualification of judges, in Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of
illness, absence of temporary disability the requisite number of Justices necessary to
constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may
designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance, or
Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof,
as may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justice of said Court, in order to form
a quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached.
For the foregoing consideration, it is declared and ordered: (a) that section 14 of the People's
Court Act is unconstitutional in the respects specified in the body of this resolution; and (b) that
this case be dealt with henceforward in pursuance of and in harmony with this resolution. So
ordered.
Philosophical Reference:
Thoughts and ideas bequeathed to us by great thinkers which remain fresh and young through the
ages and centuries. The ignorants and retrogades will never understand it, but it is a fact that in
the summit of his glorious career, Justice Holmes, the greatest Judge of modern times, continued
reading Aristotle. To free themselves from the sorrows they feel with the surrounding market of
vulgarity, where pygyms and riffraffs dominate, great minds seek enjoyment in the company of
their kind. Eagles will not be happy in the society of flies and mosquitoes. That explains the
calibre of the friends Rizal had in Europe. The relation of this philosophical reference in the
present case is the framers and lawmakers of the constitution: known to be the products of the
institution of knowledge which we can denotes great thinkers. The framers have created the
supreme law of the land and responsible for the limitations it bring. While, the judiciary
interprets the law and decides whether or not a law is unconstitutional does not solely depend on
the constitution. The decisions do not always adhere to the law, some court decisions refer to
philosophical principles.

G.R. No. L-49

November 12, 1945

WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
William F. Peralta in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Taada for respondent.
City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae.
Facts: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic
of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of

Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional
rights of the accused.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Whether or not the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. Whether or not by principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from
the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth?
Held:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid
since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No.
65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be
valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a
crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

Philosophical Reference:
After the decision was rendered to him before the court, and conviction to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, he was indeed, entitled as a matter of absolute right, to be immediately
released, so that he can see how his life went in the most innocent way, which is the for the lawabiding citizens of our country, and of which he was unjustly deprived through means most
abhorrent to human conscience. The petitioner was undergoing an unjust imprisonment, when he
was not supposed to be. This just shows how justice system can be viewed to be unfair and
unjust. And the only way we can protect ourselves from this treatment is to wipe out their
poisonous effects in our political, social and cultural patrimony. This means changing the system
in such a way that it should not be affect by our political, social and cultural patrimony.
We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay, this could
mean reboot in our democratic institution which are pride of our people and country, under
which we are enjoying the blessings of freedom, which we hope to assure the well-being and
happiness of the unending generations who will abide the law and never have to undergone the
storm of the vestiges, who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures accumulated by a
bountiful nature in this Pearl of the Orient.

A.M. No. P-02-1651

June 22, 2006
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P)
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,
vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.
Facts: Soledad S. Escritor, a court interpreter, admittedly while still married to another, cohabited
to Luciano Quilapio, Jr. since 1980, who was himself married to another. Escritor and Quilapio
had a nineteen-year old son. Alejandro Estrada, the private complainant herein, was not

personally related to Escritor nor did he personally know her. However, he wanted the Court to
declare the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio as immoral in consonance with the pertinent
provision of the Administrative Code. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the rules of
the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious sect of whom she is a member, the act of signing a
Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be
classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor and Quilapio's declarations are recorded in the
Watch Tower Central office. They were executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by
the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society which was lifted from the article, "Maintaining
Marriage in Honor Before God and Men," in the March 15, 1977 issue of the Watch Tower
magazine, entitled The Watchtower. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the foregoing rules,
she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness in 1991, and by virtue of such
act, they are for all purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the religious denomination of
which they are devout adherents. Although in 1998 Escritor was widowed, thereby lifting the
legal impediment to marry on her part, her mate is still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their
declarations remain valid. Once all legal impediments for both are lifted, the couple can already
register their marriage with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases. The
elders in the congregations can then solemnize their marriage as authorized by Philippine law. In
sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the
conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing
in the congregation.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.

Held:
While Escritor's cohabitation with Quilapio conforms to the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, the cohabitation violates Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code. The State cannot
interfere with the religious beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in the same way that the Jehovah's
Witnesses cannot interfere with the State's prohibition on concubinage. The free exercise of
religion protects practices based on religious grounds provided such practices do not violate
existing laws enacted in the reasonable exercise of the State's police power. Under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, one of the grounds for disciplinary action is "conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service." The penalty for a first offense is suspension of six months and
one day to one year. A second offense is punishable with dismissal from the service. Escritor,
however, deserves the same compassionate treatment accorded to a similarly situated court
employee in De Dios v. Alejo if Escritor should end her unlawful relationship with Quilapio. In
De Dios, the Court, in deciding not to dismiss an employee because he finally terminated his
cohabitation with another woman Given the circumstances, it would deem unduly harsh to
penalize Escritor for cohabiting for the last 23 years with a man she believes is her husband and
she knows is the father of her son. No third party has claimed or suffered injury because of their
cohabitation. On the contrary, suspending or even dismissing her for her continued cohabitation
would only work hardship on her family. Accordingly, respondent Soledad S. Escritor is
suspended for six months and one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. However, the suspension shall be lifted immediately upon Escritor's manifestation to
this Court that she has ceased cohabiting with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent
Escritor is warned that her continued cohabitation with Quilapio, during or after her suspension
and while Quilapio's marriage with his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty of
dismissal from the service.

Philosophical Reference:

The law and morals are closely intertwined as a traditionally held belief. But one must
understand that a law without morality as not law at all but naked power and that human beings
not only have a legal but also the moral obligation to obey the law. It suggests that where law
clashes with morality, it can impose no obligation, moral or otherwise, upon anyone to obey it,
one may actually be morally bound to disobey the law. Law and morality man has come to know
of his law and morals through human soul, human conscience and the human mind. The selection
has clearly stated the implications of law and morals to each other, even through absence of one
of it. While not all laws are morally right or of morals, as stated above, impose no obligation or
moral to anyone who obey it, it is safe to say that one may actually be morally bound to disobey
the law. This clash comes when the law such as death penalty arises, morally speaking, it is
wrong to kill someone, but the conflict grows even more if the offense committed involves rape
and murder, so is the judgment rendered to end someones life on the stated offenses valid? If
not, will the victim gets justice if the offender suffers life imprisonment? Such a good
challenging question that has strong moral views in life. But I believe even if it is morally or
legally wrong there will be an exception. Take the case of Richard Parker the cabin boy, who was
eaten by his fellow in order to survive the hunger in the middle of the ocean. The argument rises
on this case is, the consent given by the victim will acquit the offenders in this case? This can
really be hard to answer as we cant find any moral principles that will germane to the issue. In
order to fully decide on the morality of every action, think of it as if the simple things mean
anything to you, in a way that you weigh which of one of these has many right or wrong?
[G.R. No. 136351. July 28, 1999]
JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

Facts:On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela,
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998
elections.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course
to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No.
98-019. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp.
36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for
his father, Jose Pempe Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat,
with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only
20, 336 votes.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which
was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioners certificate of
candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda,
whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
On May 16, 1998, Comelecs First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61,
Rollo). Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998,
the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the
motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his
father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City.
On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Courts intercession via a petition for certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On
December 11, 1998, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order and to require
respondents to comment on the petition. On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his
Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-234, Rollo) and on February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its

counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required
petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days from notice, but petitioner twice asked for
an extension of the period. Without granting the motions for extension of time to file
consolidated reply, the Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of petitioner.
Issue:Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was issued without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
Held:The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the
annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner.
On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Comelec.
On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the
Comelecs action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty
post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.
Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private
respondent. As earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998
resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the
election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it
is not, still, this supposed error does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be
annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari.

Philosophical Reference:
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. has aptly said, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience", he pointed out the problem with majority's position is that it totally terminates
the result of the election for the position of mayor and instead unceremoniously installs the
elected vice mayor to the said position. There is no doubt that the petitioner was the people's
choice for mayor. He garnered the highest number of votes in the election for mayor in the City
of Santiago. Why should this Court, in the name of hair-splitting logic, obliterate the popular will
and impose upon the electorate person whom nobody voted for the position of mayor?
Experience and common sense rebel against this proposition. Sometimes we find the ruling or
judgement rendered on the case opposed to what we believe was right. We contemplate that there
cant be anyone who will inflicts damage or injury in favoring the right thing that we believe.
But under circumstances, court decision isnt like that. So on what the court has experience since
it existence; the decision has been made even before the trial has started? The thing is, Justice
Holmes Jr. was right and I couldnt agree more to his statement. It can be disheartening
sometimes but what we must learn is that the thinking like a judge, taking no sides unless the
contrary is proven sufficiently and that conviction to suffer penalty is proper as to the weight of
offense.

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh

Facts: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the
Japanese).

Issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that
all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts
could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Held: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported
by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed
by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of
insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any
other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial
proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then
it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in
violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal
words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that
judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use
by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the
Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and
courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE
OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the
laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that
the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before
the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case
no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even
during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and

control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the
rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Philosophical Reference:
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat in the Supreme Court
of the United States, the following: When the words in their literal sense have a plain meaning,
courts must be very cautious in allowing their imagination to give them a different one. Upon
questions of construction when arbitrary rule is involved, it is always more important to consider
the words and the circumstances than even strong analogies decisions. The successive neglect of
a series of small distinctions, in the effort to follow precedent, is very liable to end in perverting
instruments from their plain meaning. In no other branch of the law (trusts) is so much discretion
required in dealing with authority... There is a strong presumption in favor of giving them words
their natural meaning, and against reading them as if they said something else, which they are not
fitted to express. The Justice Holmes, has explained it further of how the courts must be alarmed
in allowing their imagination to give a different meaning as opposed the established sense of the
words used. The question to construction about the involvement of arbitrary rule, in which is the
negative view of the judge who based his rulings on whim instead of justice; the importance of
words and the circumstances than even strong analogies decisions, means that words and
circumstances compares to the connection of strong decisions is important. The following
neglects in small distinction in effort to follow the precedent are very liable to end in perverting
instruments from their plain meaning. The line was explained in unambiguous terms that the
meaning naturally arises upon reading. Even the last line that the in no other branch of the law, is
so much discretion required in dealing with authority There is a strong presumption in favor of
giving them words their natural meaning, and against reading them as if they said something
else, which they are not fitted to express. And with that very much said, the Justice Holmes has
explained it in a way that the natural meaning arises.
REGALA ET AL. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 105938, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996

Facts: Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers regarding the financial
and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn,
petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of assignment
covering their client's shareholdings. Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
1. July 31, 1987 complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.,
(principal defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, i. e., shares of stocks in
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v. Cojuangco, et
al."
2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(ACCRA Law Firm).
3. ACCRA Law Firm acquired info on assets of clients, personal and business circumstances;
assisted in organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations (companies
listed in Civil Case 0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders
etc; delivered documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., (1) stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and (2) a

blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares; acted as nominees-stockholders of the
said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings (as office practice)
4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGGs "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and
"Third Amended Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33 because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.
5. Third Amended Complaint said defendants conspired in helping set up, through the use of
the coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20
other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares
6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the holder of approximately 15 million shares
(roughly 3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987; 44 among the
top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); a wholly-owned
investment arm
7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB
8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA said that is only in legitimate lawyering; became
holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest in
the said shares of stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation but for legitimate business purposes and already transferred shares
9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in the alleged illgotten wealth
10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of
ACCRA moving that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion
as parties-defendants) as accorded Roco.
11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely (PCGGs Comment): (a) the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and (c) deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares
12. PCGGs supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG
of his the counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation; (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c)
Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting the reinvestigation
and/or re-examination of evidence of PCGG against Roco
13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal identity of the
client, nor undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nomineestockholder.
14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated Resolution herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law of agency; absolutely no
evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a
substantial distinction for equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not holding
that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA
lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG; unreasonable or unjust
Issue: Privileged Information
Whether or not the lawyers fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the identity of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in the instant case

Held:
The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain
of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly
fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint. 1. A
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.
Reasons: 1. Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood. 2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney client relationship
has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. 3.
Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. 4. Due process
considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences 1. A strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception for freedom of consultation) 2. Disclosure would
open the client to civil liability. (case at bar) 3. Government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (case at bar
BAIRD EXCEPTION)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance
(case at bar)
5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity
which is intended to be confidential
3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of
their clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance the names of their clients in
exchange for exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG Mario
Ongkiko) - "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients)
4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients
as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities
and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.
5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of
locatioconductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed.
Their services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency)
wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all
that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him.
6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable a. Old Code of Civil Procedure
enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids counsel, without
authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment."
b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: An
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of
c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate
the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval.

d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability,"
7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven
application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven
application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment.
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against selfincrimination and subverts the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

Philosophical Reference:
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "as an exacting
goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." the Court, no less is not
prepared to accept respondents' position that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this
wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize that
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life so
share its passion its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? But that is not all.
What a subject is this in which we are united this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a
magic mirror; we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been.
When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our
mistress, we who are here to know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely
passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God. Justice
Holmes briefly explains the term calling as to pursuing law. That any calling is great when
greatly pursued, whatever calling it is, we can find it worthwhile if it is greatly pursued. Realize
the spontaneous energy of ones soul? Energy in which comes from sources, and here, the source
refers was God, he was ultimate source of spontaneous energy of ones soul. What other does
one plunge so deep in the stream of life so share its passion, its battles, its despairs, its triumphs,
both as witness and actor? This is an advice to do for having spontaneous energy of soul. We are
united in this abstraction called the law, wherein as in a magic mirror; we see reflected not only
in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been, and this part is what I believe so true. For
every case there are winners and losers, which both reflected in the magic mirror, we deemed
how a trial can change ones lives forever, whether he was convicted or not. Law is a jealous
mistress to be won with sustained and lonely passion.

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression
Facts: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to
compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on
Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public meeting.
However, the respondent refused to issue such permit because he found that there is a

reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions,
specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in
the duly peace and a disruption of public order. Respondent based his refusal to the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace
or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec.
1119, Free use of Public Place.
Issue: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.
Held: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights
of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not
absolute. They can be regulated under the states police power that they should not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or
society.
The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of
a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping,
to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to
authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for
the use of public places and not for the assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down. Fear of serious
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech
to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
Philosophical Reference:
Justice Holmes:
As representatives of the public it (legislature) may and does exercise control over the use which
the public may make of such places (public parks and streets)and it may and does delegate more
or less of such control to the city or town immediately concerned. For the legislature absolutely
or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of the member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his
house. When no proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of the public to
enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the
lesser step to limiting the public use to certain purposes. As explained by Justice Holmes,
legislature by the virtue of constitution may and does exercise control over which the public may
make such places like public parks and streets and it may and does delegate such control to the
city or town immediately concerned. For the legislature to absolutely forbid public speaking in a
highway or public park is considered no more violation of the rights of the member than the
owner of a private house. Legislature may end the right of the public in access to public place by
ending it. That it will take a lesser step to limiting the public use to certain purposes. Justice
Holmes has uncompromising philosophical views for matters concerning laws, morality, rights
of the people and even limiting the said rights of the people especially in public access and
public speaking in a private property or even in public place. It is important that the legislature

expressed the legislative intent in making this statute that will end the right of the public to enter
upon the public place.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada

vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Bellosillo

Facts:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act,
assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and
criminally by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum
in se.

Philosophical Reference:
Holmes's test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the Law, Holmes said:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one,
who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it in the vaguer sanctions
of conscience. I do agree with his statements. I also think law is harsh, who only thinks of
punishments, penalties, compensatory damages, imprisonments, nullities, contempt, limitations,
and does not seek to be inviolable. Law may be a stern instrument of justice to secure the rights
of the people to ensure happiness in living a crimeless world. But whether or not the laws
provide vaguer sanctions of conscience, the law shall be remained inviolable.

Paulino and Lucena Padua v. Gregorio Robles, GR No. L-40486, Aug. 29, 1975
Facts:

The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of a young boy who was struck by the taxi
driven by Romeo N. Punzalan during the New Years Day of 1969. Gregorio N. Robles,
defendant, is the owner of the Bay Taxi Cab. Sps Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua filed up the
Court of First Instance of Zambales and sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab;
likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo filed up the same court, charged Punzalan of homicide
through reckless imprudence. There were two separate liabilities: the civil liability arising from
crime or culpa criminal and the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa
aquiliana.

Issue:
Whether or not the negligent act of Romeo N. Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and
independent liabilities.

Held:
It is by now settled beyond all cavil as the dispense with the citation of jurisprudence,
that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and
independent hinds up liabilities, 1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and 2)
the liability arising from civil negligence or the so called culpa aquiliana. Should there be
varying amounts avoided in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the
bigger amount. Thus, in the case at bar, in as much as Punzalan had already been sentenced to
pay therein petitioners the amounts stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be
adjudged to pay a higher amount.

Philosophical Reference:

The more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the law
and settled principles of adjudication may not clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely
either on an argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the
sociological school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to
indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision reached by us is in consonance with either
approach. With the natural law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on
moral justice, I am comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not insurmountable;
the decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice or social
control. I am moved by the way Prof. Ronald Dworkin explains this part. He made see how the
judge can render his decision and on which way he shall resolve the issue raised in the case. And
that decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice or social
control, in which I could not agree more. And I presumed that the philosophical principles
behind every court decision are deemed logically and practically correct. And

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Maj. General Josephus Ramas et al, GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003

Facts:
Private respondent, Danding Cojuangco, filed a case to compel the PCGG to allow him to
inspect corporate books of SMC and UCPB.

Issue:
Is this a suit against the state requiring the PCGG to allow Mr. Cojuangco to inspect the
books of corporations in which he has shares of being a stockholder.
Held:
This is not a suit against the state. This is only an exercise of his right as a stockholder.
The stocks or his shares of sticks which have been sequestered have not automatically become
stocks of the government. The test of suit against the state: If it requires an affirmative act on the
part of the state to disburse public funds or loss of government property. In this petition, these are
not attendant. Besides, in the corporate books, the stocks are still in the name of Cojuangco.

Philosophical Reference:
Lon Fuller also adopted a natural law analysis of law and wrote that there is a test that a law must
pass before something could be properly called law. Unlike traditional natural law theories,
however, the test be applies pertains to function rather than moral content. He identifies eight
requirements for a law to be called law, 1. laws should be general; 2.they should be promulgated,
that citizens might not know the standards to which they are being held; 3. retroactive rule
making and application should be minimized 4 laws should be understandable; 5. they should not
be contradictory; 6. laws should not require conduct beyond the abilities of those affected; 7.
they should remain relatively constant through time; 8. there should be a congruence between the
laws as announced and their actual administration. He referred to his theory as a procedural as
distinguished from a substantive natural law. Above all the 8 requirements of law in order to be
called law, number 6. Laws should not require conduct beyond the abilities of those affected
seemed to be notable to me. I absolutely agree with him, that these elements must be present in
subsisting form upon being written by the legislature. Especially the number 4 requirement that
says, laws should be understandable, in which I believe, the judge will take in part for
understanding the current situation and think of which principle he shall apply in the case.
Regardless of whatever principle the judge may have used, the law will remains in its form,
unless amended.