The Geo-Politics of Central Asia: A Primer

July 2015
William Joce
x5586
william.joce@parliament.uk
This background note is for MPs serving on the FCO, Defence and DfID Select
Committees and members of any APPGs with an interest in the Central Asia
region. It will be of further interest to any MP following developments in policy
towards China, Russia and the relationship between them.

Introduction:
GDP as of 1st July 2015
Global
Ranking

Economy

49

Kazakhstan

73

Uzbekistan

86

Turkmenistan

140

Tajikistan

(millions of
US
dollars)

GDP per
capita,
2014

212,248

12,276.40

62,644

2,037.70

47,932

9,031.50

9,242

1,099.00

Chessboard of the Great Game in the

nineteenth century, opaque Soviet
hinterland for most of the twentieth,
today the vast region of Central Asia
defies homogenous description as the
five former component republics of the
USSR follow different paths of internal
development and external engagement.

With 30m inhabitants, Uzbekistan is by

far the most populous country in the
region but with an economy unable to support such numbers. Kazakhstan, by contrast has a
population of 17m but a GDP per capita six times that of Uzbekistan1.
147

Kyrgyz Republic

7,404

1,269.10

These statistics hint at the primary reason for such differentiation between countries in the
Central Asian region: the presence or absence of natural resources. Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan have built economies with much larger GDP per capita than their neighbours
by relying on exports of oil and gas from their respective parts of the Caspian Basin. Bereft of
such assets, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have had to export their only other easily accessible
resource, people.
For a decade after the 9/11 attacks on New York, Central Asia played host to a new Great
Game as China, Russia and the US vied for influence in the region. As American forces have
withdrawn from Afghanistan their supply bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have been
closed, leaving Russia and China variously competing and cooperating for access to and
control over resources in their respective backyards.
This paper will examine the growing distinctions between the energy exporters (Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan) and the labour exporters (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Uzbekistans
squandered potential means that, while it could and should have been in the first group, it has
become part of the second.
We shall further discuss a series of trans-border problems affecting the region including
environmental degradation, border delineation, drug smuggling and the lack of governance
seen across Central Asia, the main symptom of which is deeply ingrained and debilitating
corruption.
As a conclusion we will briefly examine UK engagement in Central Asia and look at
foreseeable developments in the geopolitics of the region as Russias influence declines
relative to Chinas emergence as an Asian economic superpower.
Energy:
1 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21647667-democracy-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistanmanaged-affair-without-clear-rules-succession-no
2

Kazakhstan long considered itself to be the unofficial leader of the Central Asian states. This
has now gone even further with some Kazakhs believing that their level of economic
development has lifted them beyond comparison with their poorer and more backward
neighbours. There is some truth to this. Kazakhstan has enjoyed a hydrocarbon boom similar
to that of its northern neighbour Russia and this funded a national awakening and desire to
throw off memories of foreign domination. A shiny new capital city, Astana, was built in the
desert near the centre of the country leaving Almaty, on the southern border, as the main
centre of finance and commerce. More recently the fall in the global oil price and a
subsequent depreciation of the national currency (Tenge) has brought a sense of uneasiness2.
Kazakhstan is a founder member of Putins customs union, which it sees as a partnership of
equals rather than a form of
Russian domination. At the
same time Kazakhstan has
been developing its relations
with
China,
built
substantially on providing its
economy with energy.

Turkmenistan is an enigmatic
and introverted state. Its two
leaders since independence
have both been eccentric and
at the centre of absurd personality cults. Ashgabat is apparently content to receive payment
for its gas exports while remaining politically outside the orbits of its three major customers,
Iran, Russia and China.
The gas revenue that isnt wasted funds general
investment across the Turkmen economy resulting
in a standard of living for its people considerably
higher than its immediate neighbours in the region.
An unwritten social contact expects the Turkmen
people to accept the limited benefits of their
countrys resource wealth while remaining
politically passive.
The recent slowing of Chinas economic growth
and delays in a pipeline project opening lucrative European markets for Turkmen gas have
brought a sudden sense of economic instability. The Manat has been devalued with further
downward movement expected.
2
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Kazakhstan_oil_and_gas_tax_guide_2014/$FIL
E/EY-Kazakhstan_oil_and_gas_tax_guide_2014.pdf
3

Labour:
In 2013 Tajikistan officially passed the psychologically important
threshold of relying on remittances sent home by migrant workers for
more than half of the countrys GDP. Wracked by civil war for most of
the first decade of independence, as long dormant ethnic conflicts were
Uzbekistan
16 reanimated in the absence of Soviet power, Tajikistan lacks natural
resources or a domestic industrial base. To underscore the sensitivity of remittance data, after
the figure reached 52% of GDP the Tajik statistics agency announced that it would no longer
publish the information3.
Remittances as
% of GDP
Tajikistan
52
Kyrgyzstan
31

Most migrant workers from Central Asia go to Russia. While sustaining an economy by
remittances may be embarrassing, the real problems for the leaders of these Central Asian
states come when those men return home. This was demonstrated clearly during 2010 in
Kyrgyzstan. In 2009 Russia was hit by a recession as a result of the global economic crisis.
Unable to find work, waves of migrant workers returned home to poverty and unemployment.
This was one factor leading to escalating political unrest in Kyrgyzstan and, in April 2010,
revolution on the streets of the capital, Bishkek. The author of this article happened to be
working there at the time and witnessed firsthand the geopolitical implications of economic
blowback to Central Asian states reliant on remittance income. The corrupt leader of
Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiev, was toppled and had to flee the country.
In early 2015 the Russian economy was again in recession and migrant workers were once
more boarding packed trains and buses to go home. With an estimated 15% of its total
population4 on the move, there are early signs that those returning are bringing political
instability this time to Tajikistan, although thus far the authoritarian President Rakhmon has
avoided revolutionary redundancy.
Uzbekistan has distinct advantages insulating its economy from Russian recessionary
blowback. With the largest population in Central Asia it can send more young men to Russia
(between 3 and 6 million5) while being less reliant on the remittances they send home. The
country also has some oil gas, coal, copper, cotton and uranium, all of which should enable a
diversified economy with great potential for growth. Unfortunately the brutal and corrupt
regime of Islam Karimov has continuously wasted that potential.
Economic contraction in Russia as a result of western sanctions and a consistent oil price
slump could translate into pressure for its government to protect the domestic labour market.
Already taking in many fewer migrant workers than in previous years, if this were to become
widespread deportations of those already in Russia it would have serious political and
3 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68272
4 http://www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/Policy_Brief_21.pdf
5 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71471
4

economic consequences in the Central Asian states dependent on remittances. Politically this
would be most acute in Tajikistan, with serious economic consequences for Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbekistan alone looks able to ride out the storm with relatively minor consequences.
Cross-Border Regional Issues:
While their paths of economic development have diverged since independence, a number of
regional issues affect all the Central Asian states, most of them inter-related. The region is
among the most corrupt and least free in the world. Standards of governance have remained
abysmal in the period since the end of the
Soviet Union and in some cases (particularly
Uzbekistan) are actually getting worse. The
work of the OSCE6 in Central Asia notably
focused on governance in recognition that it is
a prerequisite for any meaningful attempt to
tackle the other serious problems facing the
7
region.
Two lasting parts of the Soviet legacy across
Central Asia remain intensely dangerous to this day. Attempts at industrial development in the
post-war period, in addition to nuclear testing and space programs, have left much of the
region scarred by serious environmental degradation. Uranium mining, chemical dumping
and numerous other problems contribute to clusters of cancers and other illnesses. Attempts
to manage environmental problems are hampered by the second Soviet legacy, borders that
have never been properly delineated.
Most of what we see today as the national borders of Central Asian states had never existed
before the region fell under the control of the USSR. Stalins approach was to draw lines on
the map with almost no regard for geography or demographics. In 1991, tribal areas and even
single villages found themselves divided and subject to distant capitals with which they had
little or no affinity. Border disputes remain a common feature of regional politics and
contribute to an intense lack of trust between national governments. This makes it yet more
difficult to build the consensus required to tackle cross-border problems.

6 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

7 http://www.cairn.info/revue-l-europe-en-formation-2014-4-page-77.htm
5

Most notable of these is drug

smuggling. Porous borders and
corrupt law-enforcement have
made the region one of the key
routes for Afghan heroin to reach
Europe. While smuggling gangs
and local counter-narcotics units
are frequently indistinguishable,
and with vast profits available,
there is little hope in sight that
these smuggling routes will be
closed in the near future.
Conclusion:
In 2011 the UK opened its first embassy in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, finally giving a
British diplomatic presence in all 5 Central Asian states. While our presence is heaviest in
Kazakhstan, reflecting the role of British companies in that countrys energy industry,
recognition of our interest in stability and security in the Central Asian states does not
correspond with power or influence. The days of the Great Game are long over and,
realistically, we are not a major player in this region.
Expansion of the Eurasian Customs Union is drawing both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan further
into Russias orbit, for now. The attraction of reducing restrictions on migrant workers is
obvious, although Russia will extract heavy and
For years Russia has treated the
continuing concessions. Meanwhile Chinas influence region as its exclusive province,
is growing across the region. Turkmenistan is already insisting on buying oil and gas at
the largest foreign supplier of natural gas to China 8 and below-market
rates
through
Renminbi are being heavily invested in the other Soviet-era pipelines, while reCentral Asian states. This is leading to some tensions. exporting it at a markup. The
Chinese labourers working on construction projects practice helped drive Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan, both with huge
contracted out by Central Asian governments
energy reserves, into Chinas
understandably stoke resentment in countries having to arms. The Economist 2013
send migrant workers abroad to find for work.
So far competition for influence in Central Asia between Russia, the former colonial master,
and China, the rising Asian superpower, has been without significant tension. If it is to remain
so in the future then it will be in large part because of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation. Providing a mechanism for the amicable settlement of disputes across political,
economic and military spheres, all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan are members, in
addition to China and Russia. India and Pakistan are due to join as full members in 2016.

8 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586304-vast-region-chinas-economic-clout-morematch-russias-rising-china-sinking
6

Russias recent split from the West and subsequent

pivot towards Asia had the practical effect of it
admitting de facto status as junior partner to China.
This suggests that the long term pattern will be a
relative decline of Russian power in Central Asia as
Chinas increases. But in the short to medium term
Russias use of migrant workers grants it considerable
influence in the region.
Any members with questions about the topics covered in this
briefing paper can contact the author for a discrete discussion of
these or any other issues within the Russia and FSU region.
For more detailed studies, the author is available to produce commissioned reports for private use or wider
publication.