Case

Intelligence Advantage

1NC Intelligence Advantage

They cant solve for spy aircrafts and battlefield sensors
Irwin 12 [Sandra Irwin, Too Much Information, Not Enough Intelligence,
National Defense, May 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/7ty8gl8
The Defense Department over the last decade has built up an
inventory of billions of dollars worth of spy aircraft and battlefield
sensors . Those systems create avalanches of data that clog military
information networks and overwhelm analysts.
Intelligence experts say the military is drowning in data but not able
to convert that information into intelligible reports that break it
down and analyze it.
The challenge for users of intelligence is that all the different types
of information come in a stove-piped manner, says Michael W.
Isherwood, a defense analyst and former Air Force fighter pilot.
Intelligence feeds include electronic signals, satellite imagery, moving-target
data and full-motion video. How do you integrate this into a clear picture?
Isherwood asks. That is one of the enduring challenges in the ISR
[intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] arena for all the services.

The returnee threat is low

Zammit 15 Researcher @ Monash University's Global Terrorism Research
Centre [Andrew Zammit (PhD candidate @ University of
Melbourne)Australian foreign fighters: Risks and responses, Lowy Institute
for International Policy, April 2015
Despite the seriousness of the threat, it does not follow that most
foreign fighters attempt attacks on return. In fact, very few do. In
his study of foreign fighters, Hegghammer found that only up to one
in nine jihadist foreign fighters from Western countries later became
involved in terror plots within the West, and that even this was likely
to be an overestimate.18 Similarly, a study by Jeanine de Roy van
Zuijdewijn found that only a very small portion of Western jihadist
fighters returned to carry out attacks.19 This leaves governments with a
seemingly paradoxical problem: most foreign fighters do not prove a
threat on return , but those who do are highly dangerous and have been
involved in a substantial proportion of the domestic jihadist plots in the West,
including the most serious attacks such as the 2005 London bombings. This
raises the question of what distinguishes the many returned foreign fighters
who do not pose a domestic threat from the few who do. Pg. 4-5

No Saudi-Iran war
Khashoggi 15 - US-educated Saudi journalist, columnist, author and the
general manager and editor-in-chief of Al Arab News Channel [Jamal
3

Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia and Iran heading to war?, Al Arabiya News,

Monday, 8 June 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/pkajljf
Saudi Arabia does not want an open confrontation with Iran,
realizing the high cost of such a war. The same goes for Iran, which
knows that the military budget, especially for the air force, is not in its
favor. Moreover, Riyadh has alliances with a number of Arab and Islamic
countries willing to defend the Land of the Two Holy Mosques. Both
countries have enough arms to destroy each others capacities. It is
a binary threat and an important deterrence.

Iran is a model of internal stability

Saremi 15 - Strategic analyst w/ a PhD in International Relations [Dr.
Fariborz Saremi, Is Iran the Most Stable Country in Region?, Counter Punch,
January 30, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/pp6pywf
In the turbulent 35 years since the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged
overnight following revolution in that country, the balance of power in
Middle East has shifted. For much of that time Iran has been
hampered by internal power struggles , the imposition of sanctions, and
from ostracization due to its links with terrorism. Today, however, Iran is
emerging as a model of stability given that several of its neighbors have
fallen into utter turmoil. Some of them are still suffering the back-swell from
the Arab Spring, while others are under severe threat from violent extremists
such as ISIS. Finally, observers see a distinct possibility that Iran may
move towards meaningful rapprochement with its former enemies in
the west.

TURN: ISIS threat will reset US-Iran relations

Mohseni 14 Director of the Iran Project @ Harvard Kennedy Schools
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Fellow for Iran
Studies at the Kennedy School. [Payam Mohseni, Bad Move, ISIS: Why
America and Iran Should Work Together, The National Interest, October 6,
2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ph83pjx
While a threat to U.S. interests, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)
presents us with a unique opportunity to reset the Middle East
equationto actively transform regional relations, to abate the cold war
between Iran and Saudi Arabia and to forge a new working relationship with
Iran. As the United States moves to escalate its war against ISIS and forge a
coalition against the terrorist group, it is important that Iran be included in
the process. After all, U.S. and Iranian interests have increasingly
converged in the Middle East with the emergence of a common enemy,
and no power in the region is better suited to taking on ISIS than
Iran and its affiliated Shia militias in Iraq.
Just as importantly, Iran will have to be a key part of any meaningful
solution to regional instability and any effort to help sustain a new
unity government in Iraq. By formally acknowledging the role it can play in
4

the conflict, Iran can be guided into becoming a constructive

stakeholder in a more inclusive Middle East ordera goal that has
become increasingly salient as the possible success of the Iranian nuclear
negotiations forebodes a transformation of the Middle East status quo and
Irans role in the region.
Despite its public statements, Iran has already signaled its willingness
to cooperate on ISIS. Irans decision to remove its support from former
Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki was not primarily driven by fear or simply
a response to the grave threat posed by ISISas commonly perceived in the
Westbut rather a demonstration of its own flexibility and accommodation
with regional powers. Based on my conversations with the conservative elite
in Tehran during the summer, the Iranian leadership does not view ISIS as a
serious threat to the country, but rather an opportunity for further
empowermentnot just for Iran, but for the larger Shia community and the
popular militias in Iraq as they become entrenched as a consequence of the
conflict. Irans influence and leverage in Iraq has certainly expanded
with the ISIS offensive. By rapidly moving to support the Shia militias at
the very beginning of the conflict, Iran has effectively gained the support of
the Iraqi Shia as they have been pushed toward Iran as a source of
protection. Iranian influence has also increased over the Sunni Kurds as it has
helped them establish a buffer zone on its Western frontier.
Irans decision to facilitate Malikis removal signals the leaderships intent
and willingness to cooperate with regional countries and the United States in
search of a political solution instead. This intent is most clearly demonstrated
by the prominent role played by Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the chairman of
Irans Supreme National Security Council, when he traveled to Iraq to broker
an agreement on a new unity government. Shamkhanis role is important for
two reasons. First, not only is he a moderate in the Iranian political spectrum
appointed last year by President Rouhanibut he is also an Iranian of Arab
origin who is believed to be held in high esteem by the Saudi King. Both his
appointment and his recent visit to Iraq signal Irans desire to pursue
rapprochement with the Saudis and abate sectarianism.
Second, Shamkhanis role demonstrates that the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards work within the constitutional boundaries of the stateoperating
within, rather than outside, the Supreme National Security Council to discuss
and negotiate Irans role in Iraq. This development was particularly striking,
since the security files of Iraq and Syria belong to the Revolutionary Guards
and the position of the Guards has only strengthened with the escalation of
the ISIS conflict. By working within the Council, the Guards opened the space
and possibility for greater foreign cooperation, allowing the Iranian
government to influence and coordinate with the Guards based on
government discussions with the Iraqis and external powers.
These positive signals, however, seem to contravene Irans growing
declarations that it will not engage U.S. efforts against ISIS. It also begs the
question of why Iran would cooperate with the United States or an Arab
coalition if it perceives itself to be strengthened by the conflict and if it
5

considers ISIS to be a foreign conspiracy. Of course, it is not likely that Iran

will work with the United States openly, due to the historical relations
between the two countries, but it may do so within a regional framework
that formalizes Irans role and protects its interests in the Middle East. In
other words, Iran is looking at the larger picture and vision it has for the
future Middle East beyond ISIS and will base its foreign policies on two driving
considerations: Irans role in the security architecture of the region, including
in Syria, and the increasing sectarian nature of conflicts and politics in the
Middle East. If cooperation preserves Irans role in the region and
diminishes sectarian strife, Iran will cooperate . For Iran to do so
explicitly and publicly will depend on how it sees itself to be
accepted and incorporated as part of this processone from which it
sees itself largely excluded thus far.
By viewing ISIS as an opportunity to reset its working relation
with Iran in the region, the United States can help Iran become a
constructive player in the conflict and weaken the potential for it to
act as a spoiler or destabilizing force . Moreover, it will allow the United
States to make effective use of Iranian power and the Shia militias in
opposing ISIS, by far the best regional means of military boots on the ground.
To do so, the United States must not only clarify its own vision for the Middle
East, but also, just as importantly, persuade Saudi Arabia to cooperate and
work with the Iranians. Yes, engaging Iran and incorporating it as part of the
Middle East order will be a daunting task fraught with its own risks,
particularly at a time when the nuclear negotiations are taking place. But
not doing so will only further exacerbate the ongoing conflict in a
direction that will be worse not only for the entire Middle East, but
for U.S. interests as well.

Common ground prevents war

Duggan 15 Professor of history @ Georgetown University, [Dr. Michael F.
Duggan, The Persian Elephant in the Room: Revitalizing U.S.-Iran Relations
After the Iran Nuclear Deal, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, April
9, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ofngsf8
Deep down every specialist of the Middle East with a grounding in
history knows that in dealing with Iran there are only a handful of
options, and that all but one or two of them are likely to produce
constructive results. The others are likely to produce little more than
continued violence and instability in an already troubled region, and will
do nothing to prevent Iran from achieving its nuclear goals. It is
therefore mystifying as to why the United States and Israel have used
rhetoric that will be impossible to back up without catastrophic
consequences, and which will inflame an already difficult situation. In terms
of the United Statess general treatment of Iran, it would seem that the
options are fourfold. First, the United States could keep up its economic
sanctions in an attempt to generate Iranian compliance under threat
of further destabilizing the nations economy. The problem with this sort
6

of approachbeyond the very real violence it does to civiliansis that it

will do nothing to derail Irans nuclear program, and in fact signals
the exact sort of hostility that continues to justify the desire for and
pursuit of such weapons in Iranian eyes. Some Americans think that
because sanctions worked in Libya (over a period of more than two decades
and before a NATO air campaign), they will also work in Iran. But Gadaffis
Libya and present-day Iran are two fundamentally different cases. Whereas
Libya is a flat analog to Afghanistan, consisting of a number of mostly
disunified tribes with a territorial boundary drawn around them, Iran
historical Persiais a proud civilization with antecedents that date
back to before the time of the Ancient Greeks and Israelites. Iran is
more like pre-WWII Japan in the sense that its people are unlikely to
knuckle under to the pressure of external sanctions and embargoes.
Rather, it is quite possible that they will unify, radicalize, and
eventually fight. At the very least, continued U.S. sanctions will push Iran
closer to Russia. Irans relative social stability, its considerable natural
resources, and its potential for strengthened economic ties with Russia and
China will allow it to safely endure any sanctions imposed by the West.
A second option for the United States is to attack Iran outright. Over the
past half-decade, some American and Israeli leaders have talked openly
about pursuing this course of action. Doing so, however, would embroil the
United States in a war with a nation with more than twice the
population of Iraq, almost four times its land area, a far more varied
and difficult terrain, and a much more capable military. Considering
how its military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have gone to date, U.S.
leadership should probably err on the side of nonmilitary options vis--vis Iran
first. Attacking Iran directly would only destabilize the wider region in
a way that could potentially spell the eventual end of Israel and
bankrupt the United States in the process.
The third option is for the United States to contrive some way to divide and/or
isolate Iran, the worlds dominant Shiite Muslim nation, from the rest of the
(mostly Sunni) Islamic world. However, such a divide and conquer component
to a grand strategy primarily focused on economic sanctions would be
completely obvious to the great majority of the worlds Muslims. Moreover,
the very real and menacing conflict between Sunni and Shia in the greater
Muslim world that threatens to escalate into a regional conflagration
constitutes a further elephant in the room of U.S. strategic planning. Such a
strategy would also run afoul of the inconvenient truth that Iranian-backed
forces are currently shouldering a large portion of the ground war against ISIS
in Western Iraq, and are proving to be valuable assets there. Divide and
conquer strategiesusing mutual hatreds to play enemies off each otheris
a dirty and tricky game that can easily blow up in the faces of those who
initiate them (see the civil war in Ukraine).
This leaves only the fourth and most realistically promising approach
to the situation: the United States could try to find common ground
with Iran and bury the hatchet. After all, it is in the national interest of
7

the United States to be on good terms with regional powers and

soon-to-be nuclear states, and there is a slight chance that positive
relations may actually preclude the latter. Without overstating things,
Iran is now thedominant regional power of Southwest Asiaand it was the
United States removal of Iraq as a secular counterbalance that elevated Iran
to this status, or at least helped cement its claim. Moreover, the nuclear
genie was let out of the bottle when India, Israel, and Pakistan developed
bombs of their own, and there is nothing the United States can do to reverse
the process. Finally, in 2001, Iran allowed the United States passage through
Iranian air space in order to launch the latters invasion of Afghanistan, and it
is time we acknowledged this good faith accommodation with renewed talks
about the general security of the region.

Ext Zammit 15 No Returnee threat

They will go quiet upon return
Zammit 15 Researcher @ Monash University's Global Terrorism Research
Centre [Andrew Zammit (PhD candidate @ University of
Melbourne)Australian foreign fighters: Risks and responses, Lowy Institute
for International Policy, April 2015
Some research indicates that those who train with jihadist groups are more
likely to pose a terrorist threat on return than those who actually fight on the
frontlines. Van Zuijdewijns study of Western jihadist foreign fighters
involved in European terror plots found that two-thirds had trained,
while only one-third had actually engaged in combat. 32 A study by
Jonathan Githens-Mazer on UK foreign fighters supports this. His
research found that many jihadist combat veterans often went quiet
on return or actively discouraged others from becoming involved,
while some particularly dangerous returnees had not made it to the
frontlines.33 There are parallels with the involvement of former US
military personnel in far-right extremist groups. Research has found
that they tended to have had short-lived and unsuccessful military careers,
suggesting that those most likely to turn to violent extremism once back
home may be those who feel they have more to prove. 34 By contrast,
exposure to combat increases the likelihood of a foreign fighter
becoming disillusioned or indeed being injured or killed . Pg. 6

Ext Serami 15 Iran stable

It has a thriving economy. No internal backlash
Nair 15 Founder and CEO of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT)
[Chandran Nair, The Futility and Immorality of Iran Sanctions, Huffington
Post, Posted: 07/09/2015 12:06 pm EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nwyfrdz
Contrary to what many have come to believe, U.S. sanctions on Iran are not
as crippling as they are made out to be. Unlike many of its neighbors who
are almost entirely dependent on oil, Iran is a diversified economy with a
functioning manufacturing, agricultural and service sector, albeit
inefficient due to sanctions and inadequate investments. The World
Bank classifies it as an "upper middle income" country and despite
sanctions Iran, with a GDP of $415.3 billion, is still the second largest
economy in the Middle East and North Africa region. Average life
expectancy (74 years) is almost as good as any in the developed
world , and when it comes to primary school enrollment, Iran is
leagues ahead of its neighbors.
But, if anything, the Iranian people are resourceful and creative . They
get around the problem through ingenuity and enterprise. A thriving
currency market in the bazaars of Isfahan allowed me to exchange as much
cash as I wanted for my travel and shopping, and sellers were happy to
accept the Hong Kong dollar, renminbi and the yen. Carpet merchants,
hoteliers and even taxi drivers are ever ready to swap foreign currencies for
the riyal. Bank Melli Iran even issues pre-paid "cash cards" that allow tourists
to swipe transactions just as they would in Hong Kong or Singapore.

10

Ext Mohseni 15 Turn: US-Iran Relations

ISIS threat will force US-Iran to work together
Mekhennet 14 [Souad Mekhennet, ISIS is the best thing to happen to
Iran-U.S. relations in years, The Washington Post, June 19, 2014, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/q3suo99
TEHRANEven here, nobody is happy about Iraqs implosion. But Iranian
officials are preparing to make the best of it. In a raft of interviews this week
with government officials, a consensus has emerged: Iraq is a chance to
make amends with the United States. It may even be the beginning
of a beautiful friendship .
Already, the question both here and in Washington is not if Tehran
and Washington should work together to combat the advance of the
Islamist insurgency ISIS, but how. We are open to any
constructive process here that could minimize the violence, hold Iraq
together the integrity of the country and eliminate the presence of
outside terrorist forces that are ripping it apart, Secretary of State
John Kerry said in Washington Monday. President Obama added today
that Iran can play a constructive role.
Iran is moving to cast itself as a U.S. ally in the fight against
terrorism (despite its official sponsorship of Hezbollah). In meetings here
over the last week, part of the Bergedorf Round Table the session was
called Stability in the Middle East: Prospects for Cooperation between Iran
and the West Iranian officials repeatedly said things like this: Like the
U.S. and Europe, we are fighting terrorism. They also stressed common
interests with the West. (My trip, like the conference, was sponsored by the
Krber Foundation, a nonpartisan group devoted to social development.)

ISIS threat fuels US-Iran cooperation

Milani 14 Professor of Politics and the Executive Director of the Center for
Strategic and Diplomatic Studies @ University of South Florida [Mohsen
Milani, This is What Dtente Looks Like, Foreign Affairs, August 27, 2014,
pg. http://tinyurl.com/os9l9t9
Tehran and Washington find themselves on the same side in the fight
against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also called the Islamic
State (IS), and there are already signs that they have been
cooperating against the extremist groups advance through Iraq. Although
there is no guarantee that this will last for the duration of the war, such
cooperation is clearly a positive step.
The United States and Iran both view ISIS as a significant threat to
their own interests. An ISIS stronghold near the Iranian border would
be a profound and immediate security threat to Tehran. For one, the
Sunni jihadists of ISIS are openly disdainful of the Shia faith, the sect
of Islam that the overwhelming majority of Iranians and the majority of Iraqis
adhere to. The group is already in a sectarian war in Syria and Iraq, and
11

Tehran must assume that it eventually plans on turning its attention

to Iran.
Washington, for its part, has also concluded that ISIS poses a
significant threat. If ISIS manages to create a safe haven in Iraq, it could
use the territory to plan operations against the West, undermine Western
allies in the region, and endanger oil shipments in the Persian Gulf. In the
meantime, the groups war against the Iraqi state also poses a danger to U.S.
interests. Over the past decade, Washington has paid a high price in blood
and treasure to create a stable and relatively friendly Iraq. The collapse of
that state would be a humiliating defeat.
Although the United States and Iran have different visions for the future of
Iraq, they share three major strategic goals there: protecting Iraqs
territorial integrity; preventing a sectarian civil war that could easily
metastasize into the entire region; and defeating ISIS. There is also a
precedent of tactical cooperation in Iraq between Tehran and
Washington: In 2001, the two cooperated to dislodge the Taliban from
Afghanistan.

ISIS threat is large enough to solidify cooperation with US

and solves their Iran-Saudi war impact
Milani 14 Professor of Politics and the Executive Director of the Center for
Strategic and Diplomatic Studies @ University of South Florida [Mohsen
Milani, This is What Dtente Looks Like, Foreign Affairs, August 27, 2014,
pg. http://tinyurl.com/os9l9t9
Despite these difficulties, cooperation between Washington and
Tehran is likely to deepen, rather than ebb, in the weeks ahead. ISIS is a
clear transnational threat that demands a transnational solution.
Iran has considerable experience fighting against ISIS in Syria and
Lebanon and can offer much assistance to those who seek to
eradicate the threat posed by the militant group. Indeed, the fight
against ISIS may even produce the previously unthinkable:
cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two countries that have
more or less fought an open proxy war for the past several years in
Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Now, both countries are threatened by
ISIS, which explains why Saudi Arabia openly welcomed Abadis nomination
to become prime minister.
Two weeks ago, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the Iranian parliaments
Foreign Policy and National Security Committee, correctly stated that Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States are the key players in Iraq. If
Washington and Tehran manage to cooperate to stabilize in Iraq, it
would not only be good news for the Iraqis -- it could also pave the way for
a final agreement in the ongoing nuclear negotiations. In that sense,
the two countries would have truly achieved significant
rapprochement, if not in the way that many observers originally
anticipated.
12

Ext Duggan 15 Iran War Impact

Goes nuclear
Avery, 13 --- Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen (11/6/2013,
John Scales Avery, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear
War, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all
reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in
Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack
might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic
consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we
should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from
what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an
attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle
East , entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.
The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the
revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side
of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict . Russia
and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in
the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region,
such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of
heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy . In the
dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran,
there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either
intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has
shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable
through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would
damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of
previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is
the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human
civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be
an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the
peoples of the world, US citizens included.

Iran war escalates

White 11, July/August 2011 (Jeffreydefense fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National
Interest, p. http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982)
A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United States
and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both willing and
not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding relationships,
the course of operations and other factors would place the United
States and Iran at the center of more or less structured coalitions of the
marginally willing. A Western coalition could consist of the United States
13

and most of its traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the
evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan
and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would
depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go along, which
would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian
and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially weaken its effects.
Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S.
government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the action, but it would also
constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity
of military operations. There would thus be tension between the desire for a
small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a
broader coalition that would include marginally useful allies to maximize
legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli
participation. But if Israel were directly attacked by Iran or its allies,
Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel outas it did during the 1991
Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition,
although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and
information operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the
fullest. Iran would have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular could
act at Irans behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its
asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand the conflict and
complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the
Hizballah-Israel conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in
particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian request for
assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to
its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed devastating to the point of
decisive. But their involvement would spread the conflict to the entire
eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S.
military operations and coalition diplomacy.

Extinction
Giribets 12 [Miguel Giribets, If US Attacks Iran, Human Survival May Be
at Risk (Part III), Argen Press, 10 January 2012, pg.
http://watchingamerica.com/News/141596/if-us-attacks-iran-human-survivalmay-be-at-risk-part-iii/]
The dangers of global war are clear. On one side, hundreds of Russian
technicians would die working on Iranian nuclear facilities, to which
Russia could not stand idly by. According to Chossudovsky: "Were Iran
to be the object of a "pre-emptive" aerial attack by allied forces, the
entire region, from the Eastern Mediterranean to China's Western frontier
with Afghanistan and Pakistan, would flare up, leading us potentially into a
World War III scenario. The war would also extend into Lebanon and
Syria. It is highly unlikely that the bombings, if they were to be implemented,
would be circumscribed to Iran's nuclear facilities as claimed by US-NATO
official statements. What is more probable is an all out air attack on
14

both military and civilian infrastructure, transport systems, factories,

public buildings.
"The issue of radioactive fallout and contamination, while casually
dismissed by US-NATO military analysts, would be devastating, potentially
affecting a large area of the broader Middle East (including Israel) and
Central Asian region." As an example, a few years ago Burma moved its
capital Rangoon to Pyinmana, because it believed that the effects of nuclear
radiation caused by an attack on Iran would be less there. Radiation and
nuclear winter could have uncontrollable consequences for humans.
Put plainly, the survival of the human race would be put at stake if the
U.S. attacks Iran.

Iran prolif escalates global prolif nuke wars

everywhere
Edelman, 11 Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
(Eric, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment, Foreign
Affairs, 2011, proquest)
FROM ISLAMABAD TO RIYADH The reports of the Congressional Commission
on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the
Prevention ofWeapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well
as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran
could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if
Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal.Notably, Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates- all
signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)-have recently
announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these
states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and
although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in
nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as
hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from
developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their
own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium
from spent nuclear fuel.Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to
accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium-the very
loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and
difficult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and
especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states' access to
critical materials and technology.Without external support, it is unlikely that
any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a
decade. There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant
outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate
throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and
ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some
form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and
15

subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading
nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a
nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to
nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to
accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the
1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their
growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several
dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani
government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell
Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough
to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that
Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons,
nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could
develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational
nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could
provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support
they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years,
as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such
support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors
for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to
extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might
accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a
substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer
an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear
weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the
United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement
could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would
allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would
not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from
Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because
stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind
of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops.
Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by
deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against
its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues,
perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target
Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear
weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability
during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's
reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons,
by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the
incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of
their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining
barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear
weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method
of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. N-PLAYER
COMPETITION Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East
16

would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is
unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most
analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during
the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or
more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and
escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United
States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an
attack from the other.Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less
stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the
balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important,
emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly
steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear
exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the
knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no
state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its
opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging
nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable
capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased
nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states
in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the
region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to " launch on
warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces
preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority
to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of
miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not
integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an
unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without
sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be
unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the
leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to
accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty,
when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a
significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party,
potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers
have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use:
from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety
measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before
the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear
powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a
significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or
nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items.
Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for
instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single
intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or
theft.
17

18

Ext Duggan 15 Iran Solves the Case

Only US-Iran cooperation can resolve the ISIS threat
Milani 15 Professor of Politics and the Executive Director of the Center for
Strategic and Diplomatic Studies @ University of South Florida [Mohsen
Milani, What are the Prospects for US-Iran Cooperation Against ISIS?, Iran
Matters, May 20, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/q3jo3ac
As the situation stands now, the United States is faced with a dilemma:
If we dont put boots on the ground to fight ISIS, who will? It is unlikely
that Arab states like Saudi Arabia, other GCC countries, Egypt, and Jordan
will have the desire to muster an army to fight a force that is
primarily Sunni. The Iraqi Security Forces, despite U.S. training, have
proved incapable of single handedly defeating the jihadist threat.
The Turkish military has the strength, but the government is determined
to overthrow the Assad regime and therefore is unlikely to engage in
any military operations against ISIS at this time. Nor does the Shia
dominated government in Iraq have any interest to invite Sunni armies to
interfere in Iraqs internal affairs. The Kurdish Peshmerga have the desire,
willingness and the manpower to fight ISIS, but they cannot single handedly
defeat ISIS or expel them from Iraq.
Iran has the willingness and the determination to fight against ISIS
by helping the Iraqi government. Moreover, Iranian trained Iraqi
militias have had a good record of fighting against ISIS. Should there
be a nuclear agreement between six global powers and Iran, there is a
reasonable possibility that the hostile relations between Iran and
the U.S. can change and the two countries can join together to
undermine ISIS and address other areas of common interest.

19

Turn Leaks Decrease Coop

Turn: Leaks undermine intel cooperation
Walsh 15 - Professor of political science @ University of North Carolina Charlotte. [James Igoe Walsh, How the latest leak hurts intelligence
cooperation, The Washington Post, February 25, 2015, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/pleau7m
The leak is likely to have important implications for the willingness of
intelligence agencies to share information in the future. At its heart,
intelligence sharing involves the exchange of not simply information,
but information that must be kept secret from others. States that
share secrets worry that their partners will divulge them,
deliberately or inadvertently. The current leak is the latest case, after
Wikileaks and the Edward Snowden revelations, where an intelligence
insider has broken this promise of secrecy.
States reaction to this leak will have important consequences for their own
security. Greater limits on intelligence sharing might restrict states
ability to counter transnational terrorist groups and other threats to
peace and stability. Leaks by insiders have fast become the biggest
challenge to the current intelligence sharing regime. To some extent,
these leaks are a public good. They have provided a lot of information about
intrusions on civil liberties and human rights by intelligence agencies around
the world.
Intelligence agencies are likely to want to share less after this document leak.
It makes sense to share only with those whom you trust to keep information
secret. Insider leaks may lead states to update their assessments of
the trustworthiness of their partners. But limiting sharing to only the
most trustworthy states imposes quite serious costs. Only a handful
of countries have foreign intelligence services of any size, and none
comes close to matching the United States. For smaller countries, this
means there are relatively few partners who can provide intelligence on a
wide range of issues. After the Wikileaks and Snowden revelations, many
commentators suggested that foreign intelligence services would limit
sharing with the United States, but it is not clear that this has actually
happened.
But cooperating with only the most trustworthy states is not the only way to
share intelligence. As I discuss in my book, International Politics of
Intelligence Sharing, cooperating states can construct institutions and
practices that limit their vulnerability to exploitation by their partners. The
United States, for example, provides funding and technical support to the
intelligence agencies of a number of smaller states. This not only builds
partner states capacity to develop mutually useful intelligence, but also
provides the United States with leverage it can use to punish partners who
violate sharing agreements.
This and earlier insider threats suggest it is becoming increasingly
difficult for intelligence services to keep their secrets secret.
Although we do not yet know the motives of the leaker or leakers in the South
20

African case, many of the previous leakers were unhappy about their
governments willingness to aggressively exploit their growing capacity to
monitor communications, even when doing so threatens civil liberties.

21

1NC Squo Solves

Status quo solves US-Saudi intelligence sharing
Hosenball et al. 4/10

(MARK HOSENBALL, PHIL STEWART AND WARREN STROBEL, 2015,

Reuters, Exclusive: U.S. expands intelligence sharing with Saudis in Yemen operation,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/11/us-usa-saudi-yemen-exclusive-idUSKBN0N129W20150411)//RTF

The United States is expanding its intelligence-sharing with Saudi

Arabia to provide more information about potential targets in the
kingdom's air campaign against Houthi militias in Yemen , U.S. officials told
Reuters. The stepped-up assistance comes as two weeks of relentless air
strikes by the Saudis and other Gulf Arab allies have largely failed to
halt advances by the Iran-linked Houthi forces. The U.S. officials said the
expanded assistance includes sensitive intelligence data that will
allow the Saudis to better review the kingdom's targets in fighting that has
killed hundreds and displaced tens of thousands since March. "We have opened up the
aperture a bit wider with what we are sharing with our Saudi
partners," said one U.S. official. "We are helping them get a better sense of
the battlefield and the state of play with the Houthi forces. We are
also helping identify 'no strike' areas they should avoid" to minimize
any civilian casualties, the official said. U.S. ally Saudi Arabia is concerned that the
violence could spill over the border it shares with Yemen, and is also worried about the influence of Shi'ite
Iran, which has denied Saudi allegations it has provided direct military support to the Houthis. The United
States, whose fight against al Qaeda militants in Yemen has been dealt a heavy setback by the Houthi
takeover of the capital Sanaa and ousting of the previous government, has avoided a direct role in the
worsening conflict. It will still stop short of picking targets for the Saudis, said the four U.S. officials, who
spoke on condition of anonymity. But Washington has come under pressure to do more to assist the
alliance led by Saudi Arabia, which fears the Houthi advance is expanding the influence of arch foe Iran to
its border. Saudi concerns of growing Iranian influence have also been heightened by nuclear talks
between Tehran and world powers that could result in a deal by June 30 removing punishing sanctions on
the country. A senior U.S. diplomat said earlier this week that Washington was speeding up arms supplies
and bolstering intelligence sharing with the Saudi-led alliance. The Pentagon has said it is beginning aerial

Until recent days, U.S.

intelligence support was limited to examining Saudi targeting
information to try to affirm its accuracy , U.S. and Saudi officials said. The U.S.
role has now expanded in size and scope, involving more detailed
vetting of targeting information prepared by the Saudis, with a
particular interest in helping the Saudis to avoid civilian casualties,
according to the U.S. officials. The White House and Pentagon would not comment
refueling of Arab coalition jets although outside Yemeni airspace.

specifically when asked about expanded intelligence-sharing. "The United States is providing our partners
with necessary and timely intelligence to defend Saudi Arabia and respond to other efforts to support the
legitimate government of Yemen," said Alistair Baskey, a White House spokesman. LEGAL BARRIERS Aid
groups have said the Saudi strikes, which began March 25, have caused many civilian deaths, including a
March 30 attack on a Houthi-controlled refugee camp in northern Yemen that the International
Organization for Migration said killed 40 people. Senior Saudi officials have blamed such incidents on the
Houthis themselves. The Saudi-led air campaign is aimed at rolling back territorial gains by the Houthis
and reinstalling Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who has fled the country. While the White
House announced U.S. intelligence support soon after the operation began, American officials said that
data sharing had been extremely minimal in the campaign's early days. That is partly due to legal barriers,
the officials said. While the United States has used lethal force against an al Qaeda offshoot in Yemen, it
does not consider itself at war with the Houthis. Some officials said the U.S. administration's analysis is
that it lacks the ability under international and U.S. law to collaborate with the Saudis in an offensive
against the Houthis. Baskey said that U.S. actions were "fully consistent with applicable domestic and
international legal requirements." Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke in general terms about
the expanded cooperation during a Monday visit to Riyadh, without disclosing specifics. "Saudi Arabia is
sending a strong message to the Houthis and their allies that they cannot overrun Yemen by force," Blinken

22

said. "As part of that effort, we have expedited weapons deliveries, we have increased our intelligence
sharing, and we have established a joint coordination planning cell in the Saudi operation center," he
added. The United States has sent a 20-member military coordination team to interact with the Gulf allies,
led by Marine Major General Carl Mundy. Assigning a two-star general will facilitate interactions with other
high-ranking officials from other nations, U.S. officials said. The United States this week started daily air-toair refueling flights of fighter jets from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But even with its
refueling flights, the United States is exhibiting caution -- carrying out the flights outside Yemeni airspace
and requesting financial reimbursement from allies. It is still unclear how the United States plans to
accelerate the delivery of bombs and guidance kits to its allies. One person familiar with the matter,
speaking on condition of anonymity, said the United States might accelerate shipments to the United Arab
Emirates, which could then also help resupply Saudi Arabia.

Squo solves- countries are already taking measures to

mitigate the threat and intel sharing is taking place
Zelin and Prohov 14

(Aaron and Jonathan, May 18th, Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow at
The Washington Institute and the Rena and Sami David Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation. He also runs the website Jihadology.net. Jonathan Prohov is a research assistant at the
Institute, Proactive Measures: Countering the Returnee, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/proactive-measures-countering-the-returnee-threat)//RTF

Fears that foreign fighters traveling to Syria might return home once
the conflict is over and engage in terrorism have prompted an
unprecedented level of proactive measures by countries around the
world. In the past, many countries only changed their laws after an attack occurred, but this time
around many states are trying to get ahead of the issue. Compared to the number of foreigners who fought
against the United States in Iraq or the Soviets in Afghanistan, the number of foreigners fighting in Syria
has exceeded both of those cases -- and in less than half the time. Around 9,000 individuals from more
than 80 countries have joined the fight against the Asad regime, with the majority coming from the Arab
world and Western Europe. U.S. intelligence officials told the Los Angeles Times in February that at least 50
Americans had joined the fight in Syria, and FBI director James Comey recently stated that the number of
Americans who had either traveled to Syria or tried to do so had grown by a few dozen since the beginning
of 2014. The United States was one of the first to designate Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda's branch in Syria, as
a terrorist organization. Some European Union (EU) countries, as well as Canada, Australia, and Britain,

The United States has also used sting operations to stop

individuals from joining the fight. Australia has used laws already on
the books that allow it to revoke individuals' passports to prevent its
citizens from going to fight in Syria in the first place and to prevent
those who have already gone from getting back into the country. In
the EU, the Netherlands has banned certain individuals from
returning home, used ankle bracelets to track those who have
returned from Syria, and ruled that preparing to travel to Syria to
participate in jihad is a crime. In Germany, three different Salafist
organizations have been banned for providing recruitment networks
for groups fighting in Syria, and one German official has proposed
setting up a network of telephone hotlines and counseling centers to
enable friends and relatives to report radicalized young men as a
sort of early warning system. Some EU countries have also discussed cutting off
have followed suit.

individuals' access to government benefits such as healthcare and other social services if they've

Britain has tried to combat the

recruitment of its citizens is by removing recruitment material from
the Internet. Between January and March 2014, Britain had 8,000
"takedowns" of online content -- a sudden and dramatic increase,
considering there were only 21,000 takedowns conducted over the
previous four years combined. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office
has also been putting money into a social media program aimed at
participated in the jihad in Syria. One way

23

deterring British citizens from traveling to Syria to fight . In addition, the

British police recently announced that they will be partnering with
charitable organizations in a campaign to prevent young people from
going to Syria. As reported by the New York Times, "Officers plan to hand out leaflets at British
ports warning of the risks of traveling to Syria, and officers plan to advise people who want to support
humanitarian efforts in Syria to avoid traveling there and to donate to nonprofit organizations instead." Just
last week, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee issued a detailed report recommending a
number of new policy initiatives aimed at dealing with the returnee threat; these included revoking the
passports of British citizens fighting in Syria, sending "spotters" to countries that border Syria to identify
British citizens at risk of crossing the border to fight (a program currently used to track soccer hooligans in
foreign countries), and coordinating with mental health practitioners to help returning fighters cope with
the violence they've experienced. And according to the New York Times, the House of Lords on Monday
"passed legislation that allows the government to strip terrorism suspects of their citizenship even if it
renders them stateless." Britain's counterparts in France launched a new counter-radicalization program in
October 2013, and they recently announced an expansion of the program with 20 additional measures,
including a plan to stop minors from leaving France without parental consent; increased surveillance of
Islamist websites that recruit fighters; and, similar to the program proposed in Germany, a system to
encourage parents to identify and report suspicious behavior in their children. Smaller countries like
Bosnia, Finland, and Azerbaijan are also considering strengthening their anti-terrorism laws. Bosnia
recently passed a law that imposes a sentence of up to ten years for any citizen who fights or recruits
others to fight in a conflict abroad. Finland's parliament has begun to debate strengthening their terrorism
laws to include making it a criminal offense to receive training to commit acts of terror. In Azerbaijan, an
amendment has been introduced to increase penalties for involvement in international terrorism, financing

Most countries in the Arab

world are also concerned and are taking steps in anticipation of
potential problems. Saudi Arabia has done this before, opening a
rehabilitation center in Riyadh in 2007 for all Al Qaeda members
serving prison sentences. Beyond opening additional rehabilitation centers to serve those
who fight in Syria, the Saudis have increased preventive measures in
several other ways: in early February 2014, the government issued a
royal order declaring that any citizen who fights in conflicts abroad
will face between three and twenty years in jail. A month later, the
Saudis released a royal decree designating Jabhat al-Nusra and Al
Qaeda in Iraq (better known these days as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) as
terrorist organizations. To help deter further recruitment of Saudi citizens by groups in Syria,
of terrorism, and using any form of media for extremist purposes.

the Saudis also promoted a disillusioned returned Saudi fighter, Sulayman Sa'ud Subai'i, on the television
program Humumana ("Our Concerns"). In the show, Subai'i explained that the Syrian jihad is not as
glamorous as it is portrayed in the media and online and decried a number of offensive practices he saw
various rebel groups in Syria engaged in, including what he referred to as "the weaponization of takfir"
among the different rebel groups. (Takfir is an Islamic term that refers to the act of labelling another

In
Kuwait, where much of the financing for extremists in Syria has originated or been routed through,
members of parliament passed a bill in early April 2014 to combat
money laundering and funding of terror groups that carries a
potential sentence of up to 20 years in prison. Similarly, Turkey passed
an anti-terrorism finance law in February 2013 in order to maintain
compliance as a member of the Financial Action Task Force , a moneylaundering watchdog organization comprised of 36 members. The new law allows the state
to freeze the financial assets of terrorists without a court order ;
Muslim as a non-Muslim, which in this context then implies that one can now kill that person.)

however, Turkey's enforcement of these laws remains very poor. More recently -- and perhaps more

Turkey also changed its policy related to issuing tourist

visas. Starting in mid-April 2014, tourists wanting to travel to Turkey must
obtain a visa ahead of time and cannot simply get one at the airport
effectively --

24

once they arrive in Turkey. Turkey has also administratively

authorized a no-entry list for over 3000 individuals based on
information received from Interpol, other countries, and individuals'
families. In addition, the country has started building a fence along parts of its border with Syria. Major
fighting along Jordan's borders since the conflict in Syria began combined with the fact that a number
of Jordanians have gone to fight in Syria prompted Jordan to update its 2006 AntiTerrorism Law: amendments include a clause that criminalizes the
act of joining or attempting to join jihadi groups abroad and
recruiting or attempting to recruit for these groups. The law also
explicitly criminalizes using "information technology, the Internet or
any means of publication or media, or the creation of a website, to
facilitate terrorist acts or back groups that promote, support or fund
terrorism." In Lebanon, where violence has spiked tremendously due to the spillover effects of
the Syrian conflict raging next door (including several bombing incidents carried out by Al Qaeda-affiliated
groups), laws have remained unchanged thanks to a 10-month period of political deadlock that has

law enforcement personnel have

beefed up their domestic enforcement efforts, including dramatically
increasing the number of arrests and preemptively detonating cars
they suspect of being rigged with explosives. Taking a less bellicose approach,
the Tunisian government has established a mechanism for
individuals who have gone to Syria but have not killed anyone to be
integrated back into society through an amnesty program. Ridha Sfar, a
deputy minister in Tunisia's interior ministry, described it as "a forgiveness and
repentance law which was previously enacted in countries like Algeria and Italy," and said that
the policy applied to "[a]ny Tunisian who does not have blood on his
hands." Morocco is also looking into a reintegration process for
those who do not pose a security risk. Currently, the Moroccan
government is using administrative powers to delay the issuance of
passports to those it suspects intend to travel to Syria to fight;
however, this measure is unlikely to be successful since of the
Moroccans that have traveled to Syria, 81% were previously
unknown to Moroccan security forces. Broader multilateral
approaches are also being taken to mitigate this issue. In February 2014,
the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) -- an international
organization created by the United States and Turkey in 2011 with
30 member countries and partnerships with several other
international organizations -- launched the "Foreign Terrorist
Fighters" Initiative. Led by the Netherlands and Morocco, the
Initiative "will include two expert meetings and the development of
good practices that could be adopted by the GCTF at the ministerial
level." At the opening meeting, participants discussed the challenges posed
by foreign fighters and the ways different countries and
organizations are already dealing with the issue. For instance, some
states have begun utilizing Interpol yellow notices -- designed to
locate missing persons -- to disseminate information about
suspected foreign fighters. Only time will tell how effective all of these policies will prove to
prevented the formation of a government. Instead,

be at mitigating the threat of foreign fighters returning home from Syria. The fact that countries across the
region and far beyond are already making such changes indicates the seriousness of the threat posed by

25

the proliferation of violence well beyond Syria's borders. Foreign fighters present such a complex problem

Multilateral counterterrorism mechanisms

instituted after 9/11 mean that the United States and the
international community do not have to build capabilities and
relationships from scratch. Yet even as additional programs and policies are implemented
that prospects for failure are likely.

and strengthened, the fact remains that it only takes one successful attack for these policies to be deemed
insufficient. Attacks have already occurred in the Middle East, where security is precarious due to domestic

The United
States must remain vigilant at home and continue to take a
leadership role abroad, encouraging best practices and helping
foreign governments craft policies to address the threat. In particular, the
instability, and attacks have quietly been thwarted in western countries as well.

United States needs to apply further pressure on certain key countries, such as Turkey, which is the main
point of entry into Syria for foreign fighters and whose borders are still notoriously easy for fighters to
cross, and Kuwait, which remains the "epicenter of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria." Meanwhile, the
source of the problem -- the Syrian conflict itself -- has become what the Economist describes as a "bloody
stalemate" with no end in sight.

26

2NC Squo Solves

Status quo intel sharing solves
Nielsen 1/19

(Nikolaj, 2015, Danish-American journalist working for EUobserver in Brussels. He won

a King Baudouin Foundation grant for investigative journalism in 2010, EU to increase intelligence sharing
with Arab states, https://euobserver.com/foreign/127283)//RTF

The EU wants to step up security and intelligence co-operation with

neighbouring countries to counter terrorist threats. The plan is part
of a broader effort discussed on Monday (19 January) by EU foreign
ministers to reduce the risk of militant attacks by getting national
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to share data and to
communicate better with each other and their counterparts in
Turkey, north Africa, and Asia. An EU source said it could involve a future proposal by the
EUs counter-terrorism chief Gilles de Kerchove to rebuild dismantled intelligence agencies in post-Arab

Federica Mogherini, the EUs foreign policy

chief, told reporters in Brussels she wants "security attaches" posted in EU delegations to help liaise
spring countries, such as Tunisia.

with the host countrys authorities. She also wants to reach out to Arab-speaking populations by
"improving our capacity to speak Arabic, read Arabic" and "listen to the messages coming from the Arab

in a separate meeting with Arab League secretary

general Nabil El Arabi, agreed to work closer together on counterterrorism threat and announced that projects would be launched in
the coming weeks with Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, the Gulf
countries and some African nations. We know very well that the first victims of
world". Mogherini,

terrorists and terrorist attacks are Muslims and Arab countries, she said. Mondays meeting, marked by a

A meeting in
Brussels is also planned in the next few days with experts from the
EU, US, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and
UN agencies to figure out how to cut the funding schemes that
bankroll militant groups in Iraq and Syria. The aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo
sense of urgency, outlined plans with formal decisions set to be taken on 12 February.

murders, which left 17 dead, has seen national governments trying to fast track security measures
provisionally announced last October. These includes, among others, stepping up external border checks
and blocking, with the help of Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft, online content that glorifies the
violence perpetrated by Islamic militants. But concerns are mounting that additional security calls made by
national governments, such as confiscating passports, pose a threat to civil liberties and may result in
unanticipated adverse affects.

Squo solves intel coop

Born 07

(Hans, October 6th, Senior Fellow, DCAF, Geneva, International Intelligence Cooperation: The
Need for Networking accountability,
http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/37081/529379/version/1/file/born-international-intelligencecooperation-networking-accountability-071006.pdf)//RTF

International intelligence cooperation takes many forms, from ad

hoc information sharing to the institutionalized exchange of
intelligence between states. Cooperation may occur: Bilaterally; Multilaterally within
specific arrangements for intelligence sharing such as the Club of Bern, UKUSA and the Alliance Base
Counterterrorist Intelligence Center near Paris;3 Intelligence cooperation (or the lack thereof) takes place
within the context of international organizations such as NATO and the EU. There can be little doubt that

the events of 11 September 2001

and subsequent terrorist attacks in Bali, Beslan, London and Madrid
have driven states to cooperate more intensively and on a broader
range of issues than ever before. This increased cooperation has not
only developed between traditional international partners in the
states have for long shared intelligence. However,

27

West, but has also extended to a range of states that were not
previously considered to be traditional allies in security matters
principally in the Middle East, Central Asia and Southeast Asia.
Cooperation with these non-traditional partners has generated significant problems, largely because the
collection and use of intelligence may not be subject to the same human rights safeguards as applied in
NATO member states. As many of you may be aware, international intelligence cooperation as part of the
so-called war on terror has generated a series of high profile controversies to name just two examples
the alleged CIA secret detention centres in Europe and the case of Maher Arar in Canada. These practices
have been exposed through inquiries, however, the fact these events took place is in part the result of a
lack of accountability of intelligence cooperation, I will now discuss this accountability gap more fully.

28

Alt Causes
Alt Causes to Intel Sharing:
1. Personal data
McGill and Gray 12

(Anna-Katherine Staser and David H, Summer, School of Graduate and

Continuing Studies in Diplomacy and Campbell University, Challenges to International Counterterrorism
Intelligence Sharing, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McGill%20Intel%20Share.pdf)//RTF

Personal data is critical to counterterrorism efforts because it often

provide[s] the only evidence of connections between members of
terrorist groups and the types of activities that they are conducting
(Bensehal 48). However, Europe has shown resistance to freely sharing this
type of information with its American counterparts since many of the
USs European allies have much more stringent views on the
protection of personal data. In the EU, there are safeguards at the national and regional
level that regulate the storage and sharing of personal data information. These laws are a
product of Europes historical experience with fascism and thus its
sensitivity to the abuse of such information as travel records or
communications (Bensahel, 48). In The Counterterror Coalitions: Europe, NATO, and the
European Union Nora Bensahel explains by contrast, the United States protects
personal information through legal precedents and procedures
rather than [unified] legislation which the Europeans find
insufficient (48). The EUs concerns over the USs protection of
personal data caused them to withhold information from the US and
created a substantial challenge to their combined counterterrorism
efforts. Following 9/11 the heightened political will to overcome such issues enabled the US and the EU
to compromise on this issue but there are lingering limits to EU willingness to
share personal data with the US. In the wake of the attacks, the US and Europol signed
an agreement to permit the sharing of personal data. Although it increased operational effectiveness and
intelligence sharing this agreement is limited to law enforcement operations which excludes personal data

provisions in the agreement state that

personal information can be used only for the specific investigation
for which it was requested (Bensahel, 48). If the suspect is being investigated for murder
found in commercial activities. Furthermore,

and is discovered to have ties to a smuggling ring the US must submit a separate request to use the
murder information in the case regarding the smuggling activities.

2. Extraordinary Rendition
McGill and Gray 12

(Anna-Katherine Staser and David H, Summer, School of Graduate and

Continuing Studies in Diplomacy and Campbell University, Challenges to International Counterterrorism
Intelligence Sharing, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McGill%20Intel%20Share.pdf)//RTF

The US and the EU have also had substantial disagreements on the

treatment and punishment of accused terrorists. This tension hinges on
such issues as the use of the death penalty and extraordinary
rendition. Fortunately, the death penalty issue was resolved with the passage of an multilateral
treaty on extradition however the US has not fully recovered from the backlash
of criticism and mistrust from its practice of extraordinary
rendition. Prior to a May 2002 summit, the US and EU were at a disagreement over the death
penalty. The EUs aversion to capital punishment led it to not only hesitate from sharing information but
deny requests for extradition unless the US would guarantee that the individual in question would not face
the death penalty. The 2002 summit did however bring both the US and EU to at least agree in principle to

29

a treaty on extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) and both parties ratified the treaties in
2003. The extradition treaty allowed for a blanket policy for European nations to grant extradition on the
condition that the death penalty will not be imposed and the MLAT provided enhanced capability to

The CIAs use of extraordinary

rendition, the practice of transporting a suspect to a third country
for interrogation, has also stoked the ire of many traditional allies.
Critics charge that this tactic quite simply allows the CIA to sidestep
international laws and obligations by conducting interrogations in
nations with poor human-rights records. In 2003, an Italian magistrate formally
gather and exchange information (Bensahel 49).

indicted 13 CIA agents for allegedly kidnapping an Italian resident and transporting him to a third country
for interrogation. Ultimately 22 CIA agents and one US military officer were convicted in absentia of crimes

The case not only heightened criticism of

the US in Italy but challenged U.S. strategic communications aimed
at reducing anti-Americanism worldwide (Reveron 462). According to Julianne Smith,
connected to the abduction (Stewart, 1).

director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),

[extraordinary rendition] makes it extremely difficult [for European

governments] to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S. (Heller 1). In
2002 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage testified that increased counterterrorism collection and
sharing results not just from collective revulsion at the nature of the attacks, but also the common
recognition that such groups present a risk to any nation with an investment in the rule of law (qtd in
Reveron, 455). Indeed, increased political will on both ends has greatly improved intelligence sharing
between the US and its allies. Yet, as demonstrated in the previous section, bonding over the catastrophic
events of 9/11 cannot settle all disputes even with the closest of friends. It is even more difficult as
commonalities and shared interests are limited at best, as is the case with many of the USs new allies. As
will be discussed in the following section, extraordinary rendition is just one of the ways the US is currently
challenged by its relationships with new allies.

3. Anti-Americanism
McGill and Gray 12

(Anna-Katherine Staser and David H, Summer, School of Graduate

and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy and Campbell University, Challenges to International
Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McGill%20Intel
%20Share.pdf)//RTF

Non-traditional relationships with Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia

and Pakistan have been critical to the crackdown on terrorism
financing and the ongoing operations against terrorists and
insurgents in both Afghanistan and Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Yet the
domestic populations of these nations put strains on cooperation
with the US. In Saudi Arabia, the ultra conservative Wahhabi culture
prevented the Saudi royal family from taking decisive action against
terrorism facilitation within its boundaries years after it openly
agreed to multilateral anti-terrorism treaties. Though it would stand to reason
that the Saudi royals had a vested interest in undermining groups like al Qaeda who considered Saudi

it could not risk inciting public

outrage by cracking down on donations to these groups. The intermingling
Arabia to be an apostate regime and therefore a target,

of nave benevolence toward seemingly legitimate charities, those hiding behind the veil of religious duty,
and sympathy for al Qaedas cause against the West made enforcement of counterterrorism measures in
Saudi Arabia highly unlikely. It wasnt until the 2003-2004 Riyadh terrorist attacks did the Saudis jump into
action. Since then they have been an extremely helpful ally for the US and yet domestic support for Islamic
extremists remain and will continue to cause strains for US-Saudi CT cooperation in the future. The USSaudi relationship was able to weather the storm of domestic anti-Americanism in large part to the long
history of their alliance. Though traditional by no means this arrangement hinged on the trade of oil for
security and the US dependence on Saudi oil prevented it from abandoning its relationship despite the feet
dragging on CT issues. Had the Saudis not made an about face following the Riyadh attacks, it is

The USs relationship with

Pakistan, however, does not enjoy the same benefits of a longquestionable if this relationship would have survived.

30

nurtured and ingrained alliance. Over the past half-century the relationship
has been marked with highs and lows and though the US is heavily
reliant on Pakistan for CT operations in Central Asia now, recent
developments threaten to dismantle their alliance. Pakistan is home to many Islamic
radicals and militants including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, responsible for the attempted Time
Square bombing, and Lashkar-e Toiba, responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. These extremist
groups, Lashkar-e Toiba in particular, enjoy a considerable amount of
influence amongst the populace and antiAmericanism is a
cornerstone of the message it wishes to impart on the Pakistani
people. The recent crisis over the arrest Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor accused of killing two
Pakistani men in Lahore, highlights this tension and threatens Pakistani support of the war on terrorism as
well as its own domestic stability. Upon the arrest of Davis, the US demanded his release on the grounds of
diplomatic immunity. The location of the shooting, the city of Lahore in the Punjab region of Pakistan
happens to be a hotbed of anti-American sentiment and a stronghold of many Pakistan based militant
groups. Despite American pressure, and possibly pressure from the government of Pakistan, the Lahore
courts have denied Daviss diplomatic immunity. For the past month multiple demonstrations organized by
extremists groups like Lashkar-e Toiba and Jammat-i-Islami have called for the execution of Davis and
accused the Pakistani government of being Washingtons agents (Hindustan Times). Demonstrators were
also seen carrying signs with messages like Friends of America are traitors (Arnoldy 1). As a result of the
public outcry against US demands for Daviss release the Government of Pakistan has officially stated that
it will not make a determination on Daviss diplomatic immunity until March 14th. The US, in response,
cancelled Secretary of State Hillary Clintons meeting with Pakistans Foreign Minister and a trilateral
meeting with Afghanistan and Pakistan officials in Washington (Crilly 1; Arnoldy 1). Adding to the political
pressure against the Government of Pakistan, President Obama himself spoke out on the matter shortly
after the crisis began to urge the Pakistanis to release Davis on the conditions of diplomatic immunity and
to emphasize that the case was a priority for the US government (Tapper & Farren 1). He further
emphasized the importance of this matter by stating that the arrest and detention of foreign diplomats is a
violation of the Vienna Convention and sets a dangerous precedent. If the Pakistanis chose to detain Davis
they risk losing US aid and if Pakistans anti-American sentiments are further incited, and possibly
exploited by Pakistani extremist groups, the US may lose a key ally in its CT and counterinsurgency
operations in Afghanistan and the FATA.

31

1NC Turns Iran-Saudi

ISIS conflict key to Iran-Saudi bilateral relations
preserves broader stability in Mideastspecifically
resolves proxy wars. Even if that fails, ISIS doesnt
collapse Iran.
Daily Star 14 Lebanese paper of record, 2014-09-06, ISIS Brings Saudi
Arabia and Iran Closer, http://www.aina.org/news/20140905213005.htm
Beirut -- The ISIS threat has brought Saudi Arabia and Iran closer together,
and convinced the two rivals of the need to cooperate in order to
face an "existential and strategic" menace to their countries, analysts and experts
said. They also emphasized that Saudi-Iranian cooperation is crucial to confront the mounting threat posed
by ISIS. The jihadist group has sent shockwaves across the entire world over the past few months following
its significant military advances in Iraq and Syria, coupled with its brutal practices, namely the execution of

A long-awaited
rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran is a key tool to defuse
sectarian tensions and long-simmering conflicts in the region ,
particularly in Syria and Iraq, analysts said. "The ISIS threat has brought Iran and Saudi Arabia closer
together and convinced them to engage in diplomacy in order to resolve
lingering issues," Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of
Beirut, told The Daily Star. "I think Saudi-Iranian cooperation is very important in
the battle to defeat ISIS. In order for them to successfully eliminate the ISIS threat, they need to
agree on lingering regional issues, such as the situation in Yemen,
Iraq and Syria," he said. "For Saudi Arabia, ISIS poses an existential threat, while ISIS poses a
strategic threat for Iran in the region," Khashan added. " ISIS can have an appeal to a
segment of the Saudi population, but it does not have such an appeal within the Iranian
population." Sami Nader, a professor of economics and international relations at the Universite St.
its prisoners and the beheading of two American journalists.

Joseph, echoed a similar view. "A Saudi-Iranian rapprochement is fundamental to confront the Daesh threat
in the region," Nader told The Daily Star, using the Arabic acronym for ISIS. "For Saudi Arabia, ISIS poses
an existential threat, while the militant group poses a strategic threat for Iran." " Both

countries
have shown a great deal of pragmatism in the attempt to cooperate to face the
Daesh threat," said Nader, also the director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs (LISA), a Beirutbased think-tank. " A

Saudi-Iranian rapprochement is a master key to

defuse conflicts in the region , namely in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain." Nader

said that strained Saudi-Iranian ties were going through "detente" that could lead to the beginning of a
rapprochement. "For now, [the] dtente is based on a single subject, which is a common threat posed by

Both countries are facing the Daesh threat . This is why the
confrontation by their proxies in the region has calmed down ," he said.
Signs of a thaw in strained Saudi-Iranian relations emerged last
month when Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held an
ice-breaking meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal in the
Saudi city Jeddah. Abdollahian described the talks, which also covered the ISIS threat, as "positive
and constructive." "Both sides emphasized the need to open a new page of
political relations between the two countries," he said after meeting Prince Saud. Abdollahian is
ISIS.

expected to visit Beirut next week as part of a tour that will also take him to Syria to brief officials in both
countries on the new climate of understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a political source told The
Daily Star. Prince Saud has said he had invited his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif to visit Saudi
Arabia and was awaiting a reply. He said Iran is a neighboring country which can contribute to stability in
the region. Zarif said he was ready to visit Saudi Arabia and welcome Prince Saud in Tehran. Speaking at a

32

news conference in Tehran Aug. 31, Zarif, commenting on Abdollahian's talks in Jeddah, said: " Iran is
always eager to establish good relations with neighboring states and Saudi Arabia is the most important of
these states. It is an important country at the Islamic world level and enjoys a wide role and influence." He
said Iran and Saudi Arabia have "common interests and are facing common threats. "Extremism, violence
and terrorism are the most important dangers facing the Islamic world," he added. Since he was elected as

Rouhani has said he would make it a top

priority to mend frayed relations with Saudi Arabia. The imminent dtente between
Iran's president last year, Hassan

Riyadh and Tehran comes as U.S. President Barack Obama, with his NATO allies, is struggling to establish
an international coalition to confront the ISIS threat. The United States said Friday that it was forming a
"core coalition" to battle ISIS militants in Iraq. Obama sought to use a NATO summit in Wales to enlist allied
support in fighting the Islamist militants, but it is unclear how many nations might join the United States in

A Saudi-Iranian rapprochement would have ramifications

across the Middle East, potentially cooling political and military
struggles in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen . Saudi Arabia has long
the battle.

been suspicious of Iran's influence in the region. Riyadh and other Gulf states have also been apprehensive
of Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Saudi-Iranian relations have been further strained by policy differences,
particularly over the war in Syria, where the two countries support opposing sides. Saudi Arabia and its
Gulf neighbors back rebels fighting to topple President Bashar Assad's government, which is supported by
Tehran. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iran also support opposing sides. While Saudi Arabia backs the Future
Movement-led March 14 coalition, Iran supports the Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance. Speaker Nabih Berri
and rival Lebanese politicians have said that improved Iranian-Saudi relations would result in

renewal of
talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran would ward off terrorism
threats facing the region. "I am counting on the Saudi-Iranian meeting to fight off the danger
breakthroughs in Lebanon and the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Berri expressed hope that

facing the region," Berri was quoted as saying by lawmakers last week. Shafik Masri, a professor of
international law at the Lebanese University and the American University of Beirut, agreed that a Saudi-

rapprochement has
not materialized yet . But there are intentions driven by an
understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran," Masri told The Daily Star. " The SaudiIranian understanding is seeking to address the region's problems, beginning with
the ISIS threat."
Iranian dtente is pivotal to confronting the ISIS threat. "A Saudi-Iranian

33

1NC Russia Relations

ISIS threat isnt existentialbut protracted fight rebuilds
US-Russia relationsoverwhelms Ukraine
Naumkin and Kramer 14 Mark Kramer, Professor, Director of the Cold
War Studies Program at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian
Studies, Vitaly Naumkin, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), editor-in-chief of Vostok (ORIENS)
journal, member of the Science Council at the Russian Foreign Ministry and
the Russian Security Council, Will the ISIS threat help to reset US-Russia antiterrorism cooperation? Aug 19, 2014, http://www.russiadirect.org/debates/will-isis-threat-help-reset-us-russia-anti-terrorismcooperation
The new round of limited airstrikes carried out by the U.S. against the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater
Syria (ISIS) indicates that U.S. President Barack Obama is very concerned about the increasingly unstable
situation in northern Iraq. Likewise, UK Prime Minister David Cameron makes no bones about his readiness
and resolve to provide diplomatic and military aid to help prevent ISIS which he called a "monstrous

Obama and Cameron are hesitant

they may use all the assets
we have our diplomacy, our political relationships, our aid, the
military prowess and expertise we have to help others, as Cameron told
BBC1's Breakfast program on Monday. Likewise, Russia is still trying to figure out
what to do about the potential threat that ISIS and religious
radicalism pose for the region. On July 22, Russias Foreign Ministry expressed concerns
organization" - from expanding further. Even though both

about putting boots on the ground and sending their troops,

about ISIS persecuting and oppressing representatives of religious minorities, including Christians, forcing
them to flee the country. It regarded such aggressive and systematic actions as absolutely
unacceptable and criminal. ISIS has become a sort of bogeyman for a reason. Its religious fanaticism,
severe discipline and brutality can overshadow even Al-Qaedas. Its military advance and expanding turf in

its ambitions to establish a caliphate

throughout the Middle East and Europe looks like an exaggeration and a surreal
fantasy. In July, Russias Foreign Ministry called all the worlds
stakeholders to do their utmost to prevent the ethnic and
religious hatred that may have very grave implications for the world. Yet this call seems to be
Iraq is become more obvious, even though

futile. On one hand, there is the increasing confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine and
lingering distrust toward the Kremlin, and on the other hand, skepticism about the true scale of the ISIS
threat. Indeed, naysayers would posit that the ISIS threat is highly exaggerated. Does
ISIS really pose a threat to Russia and the U.S.? Can this Islamic organization really succeeded in
expanding its influence globally? Should the world really take seriously the declarations from ISIS about
their geopolitical ambitions and a global caliphate? ISIS

is surely a major problem for

Iraq, and its tactics and strategy are abhorrent, such as its use of crucifixions and its genocidal attacks
on the small Yazidi minority, reads CNNs website. But that doesn't mean it is a
serious threat to the American homeland. Yet some experts admit that despite the looming
threat from ISIS, so far it is not included in Russias international agenda. Jack Goldstone, political expert
and professor at George Mason University, argues that Russia might not be interested in dealing with ISIS
as much as NATO and the Persian Gulf countries are. While ISIS is both a threat to Russian interests and to
Russian clients (Bashar Assad in Syria), Ukraine is far more important to Russia, he said. So I do not
expect Russia to change its behavior. It will focus on Ukraine first, and the Middle East second." Most
importantly, the sanctions war between Russia and the West triggered by the Ukrainian crisis might put at
stake Russian-American counter-terrorism cooperation. Putting Russian security chiefs on the EU sanctions
list formalizes the end of anti-terrorist cooperation between Russia and the West, wrote Carnegie Moscow
Centers Dmitri Trenin in his Facebook post on July 22. Nevertheless,

the looming threat of

34

ISIS and international terrorism for Russia, the U.S., and Europe
seems like it has the potential to bring them closer together and
forget about (or at least ignore) their differences over Ukraine .
Although such a scenario is unlikely (at least while ISIS doesnt pose a more serious
existential threat for all stakeholders), the question of how to minimize Russia-West
confrontation over Ukraine to deal with ISIS together remains open. Russia Direct interviewed experts to
find out if ISIS poses a real threat for Washington and Moscow and if they can overcome their differences
over Ukraine and find ways to collaborate despite the beginnings of a new Cold War? Mark Kramer,
Professor, Director of the Cold War Studies Program at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian

the United States and Russia still have

important common interests, which they can pursue cooperatively . In
particular, the two countries have a lot to gain by working together on some counterterrorism issues, including efforts to neutralize the Islamic State (formerly known as
Studies Despite severe tensions over Ukraine,

ISIS). Because of glaring blunders committed by the Obama administration in its dealings with Iraq, the
brutal terrorists in the Islamic State were able to gain a foothold and spread their influence. Obama's weak
and indecisive response to the disaster in Syria has further strengthened the Islamic State and other
radical Islamist terrorists who are using Syria as a training ground. Russia has not made as many foolish
blunders, but it has not done enough to try to combat the Islamic State. U.S.-Russian cooperation against
the Islamic State might inspire other countries to do more, including counter-terrorism offensives that
would take the fight to ISIS, seeking to destroy it. U.S.-Russian cooperation [in the region] might prove
difficult in some respects the Russian authorities will want to solidify Bashar al-Assad's regime, whereas
the United States has sought to replace Assad but these problems are not so severe that they will stymie

Cooperation against the Islamic State might have the

further important benefit of getting U.S. and Russian officials to
begin to ease the confrontational stance they have taken against
each other. Tensions will persist for a long while to come, but the shrill rhetoric of recent months has
been needlessly antagonistic. Cooperation against radical Islamic terrorists
might help to turn things around at least a bit. Vitaly Naumkin, director of the Institute
cooperation altogether.

of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), editor-in-chief of Vostok (ORIENS) journal,
member of the Science Council at the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Security Council No doubt,

sanctions list further complicates Russia West

counter-terrorist cooperation, but cannot completely destroy it given the
size of the threat emanating from terrorism and religious extremism
for both sides . One example: According to Guido Steinberg from Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
putting Russian security chiefs on the EU

Chechen jihadist fighters in Syria represent a domestic security problem for Europe and Turkey because
many of them come from the diaspora Georgia, Turkey, and dozens from Austria and France and rather
fewer from Belgium, Scandinavia and Germany. What will be their agenda when they come back home
and who are they going to fight against? Without meaningful cooperation, well be not able to deter this
threat. Another example: ISIS leaders declare that they will be killing Americans everywhere in the world.
Doesnt the U.S. need cooperation with all partners including Russia to obstruct terrorists from inflicting
damage to U.S. citizens inside and outside the U.S.? Russia, in turn, also needs international support in its

we can overcome our

disagreements over the Ukrainian crisis however serious they are and at least
preserve what is left from the cooperation between Russia and the West in the field of
security, which is becoming more and more indispensable for them in this
struggle against terrorism and extremism. I do believe that

era of hyper-globalization.

Relations prevent nuclear war93% of the worlds

arsenals
Shukla 5/21/15 Vikas is a reporter and value investor. He has an MBA in
finance and a deep interest in tech, science and politics. How Russia And
35

The US Can Avert A Nuclear War ,

http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/04/russia-us-can-avert-a-nuclear-war/
While Russia and the U.S. agreed in 2010 to reduce their nuclear arsenal to about 1,500 warheads each,

The U.S. and Russia

together have 93% of the world's nuclear stockpile. Ukraine crisis
has brought down the relations between Moscow and Washington to
historic lows. Russia US Russia and the U.S. still practice Cold War-era nuclear doctrine In a
column published in The The New York Times Company (NYSE:NYT), the former US Marine Corps
General James E. Cartwright and former Russian Major General Vladimir
Dvorkin said that a nuclear war was a serious and real threat. They believe
that rising tensions between the two countries, modern technologies, and Cold War-era nuclear
doctrines all point to the possibility of a nuclear war. Last month, reports surfaced that
Russian President Vladimir Putin had put nuclear warheads on alert during the
Crimea crisis last year. Cartwright and Dvorkin say that the Cold War-era nuclear
doctrine is still practiced by the U.S. and Russia. It dictates three strategic
options: first strike, post-attack retaliation and launch on warning . Of them, launch on warning is
the riskiest scenario. Under this strategy, a country fires its nuclear missiles upon
detecting the launch of enemy rockets. It relies on ground radar and early-warning
the two countries are aggressively upgrading their nuclear weapons.

satellites for information about the launch of enemy missiles. Russia and U.S. should eliminate launch on

the
target country has only a few minutes to decide whether to launch
after detection of an apparent attack. Due to the emergence of cyber-warface, there is
warning from their strategies Strategic missiles have a flight time of about 15-30 minutes, so

a significantly high potential for false alerts from early warning systems. So, there is a likelihood of error
and the opportunities for ill-considered decisions are quite real. Cartwright and Dvorkin said that the
presidents of Russia and the United States should discuss and eliminate the launch on warning option from

two countries should restart military-to-military

talks, which were suspended due to the Ukraine crisis , "to pursue this standtheir nuclear strategies. The

down as an urgent priority." A joint decision on this will not affect either country's nuclear deterrence, they

Once the Russia-U.S. relations are restored, they can explore

detailed verification measures .

said.

36

1NC Assad Tradeoff

Eliminating ISIS causes Assad fill-inreestablishes his
power
CNN 9/24/14 Obama's Syria dilemma: Does hurting ISIS help al-Assad?
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/24/world/meast/syria-isis-airstrikesassad/index.html
The United States has inflicted damage on one enemy in Syria with the airstrikes it launched
against ISIS. But it may also be helping another foe: the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.
Rewind a year, and it was al-Assad's forces, not Islamic militants, against which President Barack Obama
was weighing military action. Those strikes never happened, due in large part to a timely diplomatic
intervention from Russia. Now, warplanes from the U.S. and Arab nations are pummeling the stronghold of
ISIS, a group that has gained global notoriety for its brutal tactics and ruthless treatment of people who

ISIS, which controls broad areas of northern Syria and Iraq,

has also been racking up military victories against al-Assad's troops.
The Syrian regime may end up as "the real winner" from the
expanded campaign against ISIS , said CNN Political Commentator Peter Beinhart. First
don't follow its extremist version of Islam. But

tweet of the Syrian airstrikes First tweet of the Syrian airstrikes 01:08 PLAY VIDEO Who is Khorasan? Who is
Khorasan? 03:02 PLAY VIDEO Iraqi PM: Happy Arab nations joined U.S. Iraqi PM: Happy Arab nations joined
U.S. 01:09 PLAY VIDEO The potential benefits to al-Assad from the airstrikes "may be the most dangerous
and morally troubling consequence of President Obama's decision to cross the Syrian border to fight the
Islamic State," The New York Times warned in an editorial Tuesday. To try to prevent that, the Obama
administration has to delicately navigate this minefield. Here are the challenges it faces: 1. Distance itself
from al-Assad The White House has been at pains to stress that the airstrikes took place without any
cooperation with al-Assad's government, which has been fighting against rebel groups for more than three
years in a vicious conflict that has killed around 200,000 people. "I want to be very clear ... that we did not
coordinate with them, we did not provide them advance notice of the timing or of targets that the U.S. was
going to strike. In fact, we warned them to not pose a threat to our aircraft," Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy
national security adviser for strategic communications said Tuesday. The only contact, he said, was U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power telling her Syrian counterpart that direct action was to
be taken. U.S. officials are also playing down the advantages of the airstrikes to the Syrian regime,
although not very convincingly. Map: Airstrikes in Syria EXPAND IMAGE "I wouldn't characterize the effects
we had last night as benefiting Assad," said Lt. Gen. William Mayville, director of operations for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. 2. Quickly bolster moderate rebels The big question is that if the airstrikes weaken ISIS' grip

Obama
emphasized intensified U.S. efforts to train and equip more moderate Syrian
rebels as "the best counterweight" to both ISIS and al-Assad. But many analysts are
skeptical that the rebels will be in a position to make major inroads
on northern Syria, who will step in and take that territory. In his address Tuesday,

anytime soon. Congress only approved Obama's request to arm and train "appropriately vetted" rebel
groups last week. U.S., Arab nations attack ISIS in Syria 13 photos 01 isis airstrikes 092502 isis airstrikes
092505 isis airstrikes03 isis airstrikes 092507 Syria attack obama 092302 syria attack 092303 syria attack
092305 syria attack 092304 syria attack 092301 syria attack 092306 syria attack10 syria attack 092311
syria attack 0914 EXPAND GALLERY What life is like inside ISIS stronghold What life is like inside ISIS
stronghold 02:40 PLAY VIDEO What weapons are U.S. using? What weapons are U.S. using? 01:23 PLAY
VIDEO Pentagon: ISIS fight will take years Pentagon: ISIS fight will take years 04:23 PLAY VIDEO Turning
those groups into a force that can take on ISIS' feared fighters and al-Assad's military will take time. But
the strikes against ISIS are happening now. 3. Manage a fragmented opposition Experts say that the rebels
fighting for the Western-backed Free Syrian Army ( FSA) lack a unified leadership. "Syria is
a fragmented country, and most of these militias have a very town-centric quality. They're based on clan
structures and regional structures," Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the
University of Oklahoma, said in an interview with WBEZ earlier this month. "None of them have really
developed a national scope, except for the Islamist ones, like al Qaeda and ISIS," he said. The sheer
number of different militias across Syria -- estimated in the hundreds -- runs the risk of turning Syria into a
patchwork of warlord fiefdoms. "If you just give them money without unifying them, you're going to get
Somalia," said Landis. 4. Juggle unaligned objectives

Keeping the rebels on board with

37

American military objectives is also fraught with difficulty . The initial

reaction from Syrian activists to the airstrikes Tuesday was a sense of relief that the U.S. had taken action
against ISIS, CNN's Arwa Damon reported. But that was before it emerged that the strikes had also hit
members of the al-Nusra Front, a terrorist organization that was nonetheless among the rebel groups
resisting ISIS. That news, along with reports of civilian casualties, soured the mood among the activists,
Damon reported, with apprehension growing on the ground about what intentions of the U.S. and its allies
have for Syria. The focus on defeating ISIS may also be hard to stomach for many rebels. "We have to
remember, the FSA wants to destroy Assad, not ISIS," Landis said. "They will destroy ISIS if America makes

If
their only object is to kill ISIS, many of them feel the revolution will
be dead."
it contingent -- they don't like ISIS. But their goal, from the beginning, has been to fulfill this revolution.

Fall of Assad is coming in the squothat destroys

Hezbollah power projection and influence
Yacoubian 11 Hezbollah After Assad, Aug 20, 2014, Mona Yacoubian
serves as Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle East Bureau
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-12-01/hezbollahafter-assad
Hezbollah faces a moment of reckoning. The increasingly likely
demise of Bashar al-Assads regime in Damascus would deprive the
militant Lebanese Shia organization of one of its main patrons and
could constrain its ability to play an active role in regional politics .
Moreover, by offering up unbridled support for Syria, Hezbollah has placed itself at odds
with the popular revolts that are unseating autocratic rulers across
the Arab world, undermining the narratives of resistance and justice
for the oppressed that it has long espoused. Facing the loss of a key ally and with
its credibility compromised, an off-balance Hezbollah could turn inward, deepening its
involvement in Lebanese politics in order to consolidate its power. Together with Iran, Hezbollah stands to
lose the most from the fall of the Syrian regime. Over the years, the organization and the Assad regime
have nurtured strong ties due to their often overlapping interests in Lebanon, a proxy arena for Western
confrontation with Iran and Syria. The relationship deepened following Syrias 2005 withdrawal from
Lebanon, which forced Damascus to rely more heavily on Hezbollah to extend its influence in the country.

Assad has reportedly supplied Hezbollah with training and access to

sophisticated weapons systems, including long-range Scud missiles,
on Syrian soil. Beyond its bilateral ties to Hezbollah, Damascus has also served as an important
conduit for Iranian arms and played a bridging role between the Persian power and its Lebanese acolytes.
Bound together by their shared hostility toward Israel, these three allies, together with Hamas, have
formed a so-called axis of resistance to serve as a counterweight to more moderate forces in the region.
Although Hezbollahs relationship with Iran would endure without Assad, the alliance would lose an
important center of gravity. Moreover, the instability in Syria has deepened sectarian divisions in Lebanon,
which could further challenge Hezbollah. Lebanons Sunnis overwhelmingly support the Syrian opposition
and have publicly demonstrated their outrage at Damascus repression; the ruling March 8 bloc,
comprising Hezbollah, the Shia party Amal, and their Christian allies, has sided with Assad. Rival pro- and
anti-Syrian rallies regularly occur in Beirut and in the northern city of Tripoli, where Sunni-Alawi clashes in
June left several dead and required the Lebanese army to quell the violence. Although Hezbollahs military
predominance in Lebanon minimizes the prospects for renewed civil war, a surge in sectarian violence
would significantly undermine its position. Hezbollahs steadfast support for Assad has already dealt its
credibility a severe blow, in Lebanon and across the region. Its pro-regime declarations stand in marked
contrast to the groups boisterous encouragement of every other popular uprising during the Arab Spring.
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollahs charismatic leader, was once a hero across the Arab world but now appears
increasingly tone deaf as he struggles to defend Damascus against a growing chorus of Arab and Muslim
condemnation. Established media outlets, such as al Jazeera, as well as Arab youth using social media
sites, charge Nasrallah with hypocrisy and double standards. The revolt against Assad has put Iran and
Hezbollah on the wrong side of Arab history, and has compromised their mantle as champions of the
oppressed. No matter what happens in Syria, Hezbollah will retain its preeminent military and political role

38

But the likely end of the Assad regime poses an existential

dilemma for the organization, accentuating the divide between its
regional objectives of resisting the West and Israel and its local role
in Lebanon as the representative of a once marginalized Shia
community. The organization may need to recalibrate its priorities, choosing either to double down
in Lebanon.

on its military objectives or evolve into a wholly political force and further develop as a grassroots
movement with a vast political and social network. If Hezbollah goes with the first option, it would likely
move quickly to consolidate its control over Lebanon, possibly using military force. Such a move might be
precipitated by emboldened Sunni aggression toward Hezbollah or by other circumstances that threaten
the organization and its weapons. But Hezbollahs probable triumph in an armed struggle would be a
pyrrhic victory, dramatically undermining its popular credibility in Lebanon and leaving the country highly

Hezbollah might also choose to direct its militancy toward

Israel. This could come as part of a broader struggle between Israel
and Iran or as a result of escalating tensions between Israel and
Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not likely to intentionally provoke another war with Israel; both sides have
unstable.

acknowledged that a third Israel-Lebanon war would be far more brutal, and encompass far more territory,
than the one in 2006. But if either Israel or Hezbollah miscalculated and provoked a conflict, Hezbollah
would be at a strategic disadvantage without a Syrian supply line and safe haven. War with Israel could
rejuvenate Hezbollahs resistance narrative, particularly if Israel used excessive force that produced
massive civilian casualties. But Hezbollah would pay a significant price internally, particularly with its warweary Shia constituency.

39

AT Hurts Privacy
The program itself is incredibly reasonable and has built
in safeguards to prevent widespread paranoia and civil
liberties violations
USDA, 2014, (USDA Insider Threat Program, Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Coordination (OHSEC), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, June 30, 2014,
http://www.ocio.usda.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012/DR%204600003%20Insider%20Threat.htm)//erg
The purpose of this directive is to set forth the U.S. Department of Agricultures
(USDA) roles and responsibilities for an Insider Threat Program, as
directed by Executive Order (EO) 13587 dated October 7, 2011, titled, Structural
Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of
Classified Information and the National Insider Threat Policy and the Minimum Standards issued in

mandated to
develop and implement an Insider Threat Program with the primary
mission to prevent, deter and detect compromises of classified
information by malicious insiders. Although EO 13587 applies only to
the safeguarding and sharing of classified national security
information , the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) recognizes that an agency may possess
November 2012. 2. BACKGROUND The Secretary of Agriculture, under EO 13587, is

information that it considers sensitive but that is not classified. As stated in the NITTFs Guide to
Accompany the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards, issued in November 2013, the
policies and standards under EO 13587 can be applied generally to protect the sensitive but unclassified
environment. The National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards require that the USDA addresses

Establish a program for deterring,

detecting, and mitigating insider threat;, security, information
assurance, and other relevant functions and resources to identify
and counter the insider threat; b. Establish an integrated capability
to monitor and audit information for insider threat detection and
mitigation. Critical program requirements include but are not limited to: (1) monitoring user
activity on classified computer networks controlled by the Federal Government; (2)
evaluation of personnel security information; (3) employee awareness
training of the insider threat and employees' reporting
responsibilities; and (4) gathering information for a centralized
analysis, reporting, and response capability. c. Develop and implement sharing
key components to be implemented: a.

policies and procedures whereby the organization's insider threat program accesses, shares, and
integrates information and data derived from offices across the organization, including security,
information assurance, and human resources offices. d. Designate a senior official(s) with authority to
provide management, accountability, and oversight of the organization's insider threat program and make

Consult with records

management, legal counsel, and civil liberties and privacy officials to ensure
any legal, privacy, civil rights , or civil liberties issues (including use of personally

resource recommendations to the appropriate agency official. e.

identifiable information) are appropriately addressed. f. Promulgate additional department and agency
guidance, if needed, to reflect unique mission requirements, but not inhibit meeting the minimum
standards issued by the NITTF pursuant to this policy. g. Perform self-assessments of compliance with
insider threat policies and standards; the results of which shall be reported to the Senior Information
Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee (hereinafter Steering Committee). h. Enable independent

40

assessments, in accordance with Section 2.1 (d) of Executive Order 13587, of compliance with established
insider threat policy and standards by providing information and access to personnel of the NITTF.

They exaggeratethe program itself protects liberties

FAS No Date, (National Insider Threat Policy,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/insider.pdf)//erg
Executive Order 13587 directs United States Government executive
branch departments and agencies (departments and agencies) to
establish, implement, monitor, and report on the effectiveness of
insider threat programs to protect classified national security
information (as defined in Executive Order 13526; hereinafter classified information), and requires
the development ofan executive branch program for the deterrence, detection, and mitigation of insider
threats, including the safeguarding o f classified information from exploitation, compromise, or other
unauthorized disclosure. Executive Order 12968 promulgates classified information access eligibility policy
and establishes a uniform Federal personnel security program for employees considered for initial or
continued access to classified information. Consistent with Executive Orders 13587 and 12968, this policy
is applicable to all executive branch departments and agencies with access to classified information, or

all employees with access to

classified information, including classified computer networks (and
that operate or access classified computer networks;

including contractors and others who access classified information, or operate or access classified
computer networks controlled by the federal government); and all classified information on those

This policy leverages existing federal laws, statutes,

authorities, policies, programs, systems, architectures and
resources in order to counter the threat of those insiders who may
use their authorized access to compromise classified information .
Insider threat programs shall employ risk management principles, tailored to
meet the distinct needs, mission, and systems of individual
agencies, and shall include appropriate protections for privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties .
networks.

The Insider Threat Program has checks built into it to

balance b/w preserving civil liberties and national security
protects whistleblowers, privacy and rights
NCSC, 14, (National Insider Threat Task Force Mission Fact Sheet, NCSC,
Aug 15, 2014,
http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/National_Insider_Threat_Task_Force_Fact_Sheet
.pdf)//erg
Insider threat
programs are developed and operated in coordination with an agencys
records management office, legal counsel, and civil liberties and privacy officials to
build in protections against infringing upon employees civil
liberties/civil rights, privacy or whistleblower protections.
Departments and agencies are required to provide training in these
areas to program personnel, as well as the general workforce .
Is this insider threat emphasis going to infringe on anyones civil rights?

Department and agency heads also have a responsibility to ensure these protections are maintained
through oversight of their insider threat programs.

Insider threat programs target

41

anomalous activities, not individuals. Additionally, government employees who handle

classified information understand that, to hold a security clearance, they accept
additional oversight of their workplace activities. Employees sign
authorizations for the conduct of investigations to obtain and retain security
clearances and there are warning banners on computers and in certain areas of facilities
that alert people that they have less expectation of privacy. What harm
can someone do to our government based on the unauthorized release of classified information? When
classified information is divulged in an unauthorized manner outside the confines of the U.S. Government

that information can create situations that are

harmful to U.S. interests and, in some cases, could be lifethreatening . Classified information in the wrong hands can provide a unique and
potentially dangerous advantage to those states and non-state
actors whose interests are opposed to those of the United States. For
example, the unauthorized release of classified information could: provide details about
weapons systems we rely on to defend our country; expose our
overseas intelligence operations and personnel; and identify critical
vulnerabilities in the U.S. national infrastructure which, if exploited,
could damage internal U.S. defense, transportation, health,
financial, and/or communications capabilities.
(USG) national security structure,

The Insider Threat programs protects employees best

interests
NCSC, 14, (National Insider Threat Task Force Mission Fact Sheet, NCSC,
Aug 15, 2014,
http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/National_Insider_Threat_Task_Force_Fact_Sheet
.pdf)//erg
It is critically important to
recognize that an individual may have no malicious intent, but is in
need of help. We have invested a tremendous amount in our national security workforce and it is
in everyones best interests to help someone who may wrongly feel
he or she has no other option than to commit an egregious act
such as espionage, unauthorized disclosure, suicide, workplace
violence, or sabotage. Intervention prior to the act can save an
employees career, save lives and protect national security
information. There are also unwitting insiders who can be exploited by others. Our
adversaries have become increasingly sophisticated in targeting U.S.
interests, and an individual may be deceived into advancing our
adversaries objectives without knowingly doing so. Is every agency required
Do all insider threats involve malicious individuals?

to implement the new minimum standards? Yes, taken together, the E.O. and the national policy mandate
that every executive branch agency with access to classified information establish an insider threat

there is a recognition of
differing levels of riskand, therefore, differing levels of protection
required based on such things as size of cleared population, extent of access to classified computer

program in line withstandardsandguidancefromtheNITTF. However,

systems, and amount of classified information maintained by the D/A. The national insider threat policy
directs heads of D/As to developtheirprogramsusingriskmanagementprinciples.

42

TheNITTFisworkingwithD/As,as well as the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding Office in the
office of the Program Manager--Information Sharing Executive, to assess the extent of applicability of the
minimum standards to each of the 70+ executive branch D/As with access to classified information based
on associated risk.

Observation and behavioral analysis dont produce

modern day Salem
Winkler and Manke, 14, (Ira, Irari Report, Secure Mentem, Internet
Security Advisors Group and Samantha, Executive Vice President of Secure
Mentem, How to create awareness of the insider threat, CSO, Apr 15, 2014,
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2142603/security-leadership/how-to-createawareness-of-the-insider-threat.html)//erg
You must however avoid manifesting a modern day Salem . The focus of
your guidance should be telling employees to look for behaviors that are
clear violations of policies and procedures. Examples include
observing people looking through other peoples desks, asking for
passwords, being in areas that they do not belong, and attempting
to access other peoples computer accounts. There are also financial and other
wrongdoings related to job roles and industry sector. A more delicate, but just as important, aspect of
awareness is for people to be comfortable reporting uncomfortable feelings. This is admittedly vague, but
uncomfortable feelings have resulted in catching malicious insiders in a variety of incidents. In one case

an employee felt uncomfortable that one of her

coworkers was speaking Chinese a lot on the telephone at work, and
they did not work with any Chinese people. The woman reported the
incident and an FBI investigation uncovered that the employee in
question was funneling information to Chinese intelligence
operatives. Everyone violates policies and procedures at some point in time, without malicious
intent. However, people need to know that some of the most harmful incidents were
stopped because of observant employees. Again though, the focus is on reporting
we are personally familiar with,

of incidents, and not of the individuals committing the violations. This is important for a wide variety of
reasons. The action that employees need to take is to simply report the questionable incidents to Human

you need to remember to

allow for anonymous reporting and have strong measures in place to
protect the identity of the employee reporting the incident . Reporting
Resources, their management or the security team. However,

another employee can clearly result in negative consequences for all involved. The anonymity is critical

The goal is to
detect incidents and stop the loss. Most organizations should already have an
even if it potentially means that it is impossible to gather criminal evidence.

established incident reporting structure. Those that do not should consult with the legal and human
resources departments to create one. Clearly, when trying to motivate employees to inform the
organization about the violations of other employees, you should get the Human Resources and Legal
departments involved in at least approving the awareness materials that are distributed. They very likely
will be able to provide guidance on how to best implement other aspects of the program as well. [Insider
threats and how they can be mitigated] Snowden's activities triggered an interest in organizations to
examine what technological controls that they can put in place to stop their own Snowden. Yet much like

Snowdens coworkers should have detected his crimes,

all organizations must proactively strengthen their non-technical
security measures, including especially awareness. Snowdens coworkers
NSA realized that

should have been able to more effectively detect his actions than any technical countermeasure could

companies that are truly interested in preventing the

insider threat should focus on making their employees the primary

have. Therefore,

43

detectors of insider abuse . The insider threat is too important a subject to shy away from,
no matter how sensitive the implications may be. Unfortunately, history has shown us that
the risk is too great.

Agencies are focusing on collecting electronic datano

workplace impact/overwhelmed filers
Davenport, 14, (Christian, has served as an editor on the Metro desk
and as a reporter covering military affairs, Post author, Federal agencies
embrace new technology and strategies to find the enemy within,
Washington Post, March 7, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-agenciesembrace-new-technology-and-strategies-to-find-the-enemywithin/2014/03/07/22ce335e-9d87-11e3-9ba6800d1192d08b_story.html)//erg
After years of focusing on outside threats,

the federal government and its

contractors are turning inward, aiming a range of new technologies
and counterintelligence strategies at their own employees to root
out spies, terrorists or leakers. Agencies are now monitoring their
computer networks with unprecedented scrutiny, in some cases down to the
keystroke, and tracking employee behavior for signs of deviation from
routine. At the Pentagon, new rules are being written requiring contractors to institute programs
against insider threats, a remarkable cultural change in which even workers with the highest security
clearances face increased surveillance. The if you see something, say something mind-set of the post9/11 world has fully arrived in the workplace, with new urgency following high-profile leaks such as the
revelations of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. Peoples sensitivity to this
has changed substantially, said Lynn Dugle, president of a Raytheon business unit that markets an insider
threat detection system called SureView. I can tell you five years ago, when we were talking to agencies
or companies about insider threat, we would normally be talking to (chief information officers) who were
under budget stress. ... And that was a very tough sell. Now we see boards of directors and CEOs really

In response to
the breach by former Army intelligence analyst Pfc. Bradley
Manning, President Obama in 2011 issued an executive order that
established a National Insider Threat Task Force and required all federal
understanding what the threat can mean to them, and the risk it poses to them.

agencies that handle classified material to institute programs designed to seek out saboteurs and spies.
While corporate security has long been part of Beltway culture, the heightened focus and the emergence
of new monitoring technology touched off a burgeoning industry. In addition to Raytheon, Lockheed Martin
has developed an insider-threat detection service, as have several start-ups in the Washington area. Even
Booz Allen Hamilton, which faced national embarrassment when Snowden, one of its employees, walked
off with some of the countrys most guarded secrets, counsels its clients on how to detect rogue
employees. A recent job posting said the company was looking for an insider threat analyst, which
required a security clearance and more than five years of experience in counterintelligence. The posting
spread on the Web and sparked ridicule over the notion that the company that employed Snowden was
now looking to help turn the historic breach into a profitable lesson learned. Raytheons SureView program
allows agencies to create all sorts of internal alerts indicating when something may be amiss. A company
could, for example, program the software to detect whenever a file containing the words top secret or

Once
that wire is tripped, an alert almost immediately pops up on a
security analysts monitor, along with a digital recording of the
employees screen. All the employees actions the cursor scrolling over to open the secure
proprietary is downloaded, e-mailed or moved from one location on the system to another.

file, the file being copied and renamed can be watched and replayed, even in slow motion. Its the cyber
equivalent of the security camera that records robbers sticking up a convenience store. Lockheed Martin
provides a service called Wisdom, which acts as your eyes and ears on the Web, according to a company

44

the service can monitor mountains of data on the

Web Facebook, Twitter, news sites or blogs to help predict everything from a foreign
coup or riot to political elections. But it can also be turned inward, at employees
online habits, to predict who within the organization might go rogue.
Counterintelligence officials use Wisdom to evaluate employee behavior
patterns, flagging individuals who exhibit high risk characteristics ,
the company says in a brochure. I like to think of it as a digital intuition that is
being developed, said Jason OConnor, Lockheeds vice president for analysis and mission
official. At its broadest use,

solutions. A trade-off for companies The market is much broader than the defense and intelligence
industries. It extends to hospitals, which need to protect patients information; retailers, which hold
customers credit card numbers; and financial institutions. Some worry that the programs are an
overreaction to a relatively rare threat that will do more to hinder the free flow of information than to deter
crime, while creating repressive working environments. Despite the soon-to-come federal mandate, many
defense contractors have already implemented fairly imposing controls to minimize the unauthorized use
of data, said Loren Thompson, a defense industry consultant who has worked with Lockheed Martin and
other contractors. But he warned that this clearly is a trade-off in which values like efficiency and
collaboration will be sacrificed in order to reduce the likelihood of internal wrongdoers from succeeding.

After Sept. 11, many agencies were criticized for not sharing
sensitive information that could have prevented the attacks, so
steps were taken to consolidate data within the government. Thompson
fears the current climate of worry about Snowden-like leaks could lead to a return to the old habits, with
key information once again compartmentalized. Insider threats are a real problem, but mandating a
particular standard for all contractors will cost huge amounts of money and quite possibly result in the
wrong steps being taken, he said. In addition to the cases that have made headlines worldwide, there are
an untold number of incidents in the broader corporate world where insiders wreak havoc from the
systems administrator at what was then UBS Paine Webber who planted a logic bomb on the companys
network, to the Chinese national who was convicted of stealing trade secrets from Ford Motor Co.

Tech systems protect against privacy violations while

monitoring sensitive databases
Davenport, 14, (Christian, has served as an editor on the Metro desk
and as a reporter covering military affairs, Post author, Federal agencies
embrace new technology and strategies to find the enemy within,
Washington Post, March 7, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-agenciesembrace-new-technology-and-strategies-to-find-the-enemywithin/2014/03/07/22ce335e-9d87-11e3-9ba6800d1192d08b_story.html)//erg
Looking at the patterns Chris Kauffman, the founder and chief executive of Personam, a McLean company

programs can assess insider

threatening behaviors without breaching the employees privacy.
Theres always the concern of the Orwellian overseers watching
everything were doing. But were very sensitive to that , he said. We
evaluate the activities and the transactions over the networks . Which
that focuses entirely on insider threats, said

Web sites they go to, which file servers they go to. But what we dont do is absorb the content of that
data.

We dont read e-mails or chats or texts. Or even the content of the Web sites
they go to. Were looking at the patterns they use. MITRE, a not-for-profit research and
45

development company, did a study in 2009 where it asked some of its own employees to try to access
sensitive information on its own network. In addition to assessing the networks strength, the company
wanted to study evasiveness, said Deanna Caputo, MITREs principal behavioral psychologist. We
wanted to see what good guys gone bad would look like. Working under a grant from the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Pentagons research arm, Georgia Tech computer scientists have
worked to develop software that can detect a rogue employee even before he or she has broken bad.
When a soldier in good mental health becomes homicidal or a government employee abuses access
privileges to share classified information, we often wonder why no one saw it coming, said a Georgia Tech
news release. All this corporate scrutiny doesnt necessarily bother groups that advocate for privacy
protections. When it comes to using a government or corporate network, employees often do not have
expectations of privacy, especially if they are dealing with classified information, said Ginger McCall, an
associate director at the Electronic Privacy Information Center. I

think there is an
important distinction between monitoring a persons personal emails and monitoring access to sensitive databases , she said. And since
so much information about ordinary Americans is contained on
government and corporate databases, there are benefits to making
sure they are protected and under constant surveillance. We would
want to know if someone at the FBI is accessing a database on a
person when they shouldnt be, she said. Michael Crouse, Raytheons director of insider
threat strategies, said such programs help agencies trust but verify. We trust our privileged users, he
said. But what were seeing is that you can verify that they are doing the work that is assigned to their
role. Its sort of like a big factory, he said, where the foreman is looking down on the factory floor making
sure everyone is doing their job.

46

Groupthink Advantage

47

1NC Groupthink Advantage

No nuclear war
Shukla 15 - Vikas is a reporter and value investor. He has an MBA in
finance and a deep interest in tech, science and politics (Vikas, Russia-US
Tension Over Ukraine Wont Lead To Nuclear War, valuewalk.com, May 15,
2015, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/05/russia-us-tension-nuclear-war/) JC
In February, Russia was rated among the most unfavorable countries by
Americans in a Gallup poll. Tensions between the U.S. and Russia have
escalated over the Ukraine crisis. The United States as accused Russia of
backing separatists in eastern Ukraine. But there is no threat of a nuclear
war between Moscow and Washington, says a senior U.S. State
Department official.
In an interview with Russias Kommersant newspaper, Rose Gottemoeller, the
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
for the US State Department, said that the White House did not
believe the Ukrainian conflict would trigger a nuclear crisis. Though
the two countries have different opinions regarding the Ukraine
crisis, neither Russia nor the U.S. desire to use nuclear weapons to
back up their arguments.
Gottemoeller told the Russian newspaper that the two countries have a
" stable relationship " on nuclear issues. The State Department
official added that the two countries have taken a series of steps
over the past few decades to reduce their nuclear arsenal.
Gottemoeller's statement comes as many other security experts have
proclaimed that Russia and the U.S. are heading towards a nuclear war.

Obama resists groupthink

Hughes 14 [Brian Hughes, Obama warns against 'groupthink' in
government, Washington Examiner, 9/24/14 6:26 PM, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/oq3q6mm
President Obama at a government transparency meeting at the United
Nations General Assembly Wednesday advised fellow world leaders to
heed the criticisms of their citizens to avoid groupthink in
government.
All governments think theyre doing whats right and dont like
criticism, Obama said at the Open Government Partnership Event in New
York City. Its shocking to say that all not criticism from civil society is always
fair. But, as leaders, making our governments more open does mean
that as a consequence of that criticism, theres self-reflection . It
means that questions were asked that might not have otherwise been
answered, and that groupthink doesnt develop inside a government.

48

Turn: Political resolve key to deterring Russia

Stephens 14 - Columnist on politics, global affairs and economics @
Financial Times [Philip Stephens, Europe needs a cold war lesson in
deterrence, Financial Times, July 24, 2014 5:51 pm, pg.
http://tinyurl.com/nr69amw
There is nothing to be gained from another cold war, even if it is evident that
Vladimir Putin wants to tear up the post-communist settlement in Europe.
There are, however, lessons to be rescued from the decades-long
confrontation with the Soviet Union. One of them is about
deterrence. Politicians sedated by hopes of a world organised around
international collaboration will have to wake up again to the dynamics of
great power rivalry.
Francis Fukuyama was half right in declaring the end of history. Capitalism
reigns supreme, but rising states such as China and declining ones such as
Russia have found a new political model. Authoritarian capitalism, as the
Harvard scholar Michael Ignatieff called it in this summers Ditchley
Foundation annual lecture, presents them with an alternative to liberal
democracy. As for a rules-based global system, these states prefer to dine
la carte. They take what they like and reject what is inconvenient.
Europeans have been slow to recognise the world as it is rather than as they
imagined. The reaction to Russias march into Ukraine has made this painfully
obvious. The reflex has been to seek to defuse the crisis. On one level
this is admirable war did not solve much in Iraq and Afghanistan. The snag
is that ceding ground to Mr Putin does not amount to de-escalation.
To the contrary, weakness stokes the Russian presidents
expansionism.
The wests priority and the downing by Russian-backed insurgents of
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 provides an opportunity should be to recover
the concept of deterrence. Not the nuclear deterrence of mutually assured
destruction but the traditional understanding that political resolve and
a readiness to deploy force can apply a brake. The mistake many
Europeans have made and, to a lesser degree, Barack Obamas White
House has done the same is to confuse deterrence with escalation. I
cannot count the times I have heard politicians and policy makers say they
must tread carefully for fear of provoking Mr Putin.
Some of these protestations are self-serving what these people really mean
is that they do not want to jeopardise economic relationships. But there
seems also to be a genuine misunderstanding about the purpose of
deterrence. Imposing sanctions on Moscow will not of itself persuade Mr
Putin to pull out of Ukraine. It might persuade him to think twice before
marching his army into other Russian-speaking territories.
To be effective, deterrence has above all to be credible. The
potential adversary has to believe that aggression will provoke
proportionate retaliation, whether economic or, as a last resort, military.
The sanctions imposed on Moscow by the EU have been anything but
49

credible. Washington has gone further, but not far enough to signal serious
intent. What Mr Putin has seen of a divided west tells him it is bluffing. He will
take sanctions seriously when he sees that those threatening them are ready
to bear the costs.

Turn: Perceived decline in our readiness to fight

encourages Russian aggression and escalation
Olson 14 Reporter for Stars and Stripes [Wyatt Olson, Militarys reduced
readiness seen as emboldening China, Russia, Stars and Stripes, Published:
May 20, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/n6vq7zr
The U.S. certainly retains an ability to project an awful lot of air and
sea power for more limited contingencies and do so very quickly,
said Anthony Cordesman, a defense expert at the bipartisan Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
And even if U.S. forces did become embroiled in Pacific confrontations such
as those unfolding in Vietnam and the Philippines, they arent the kind of
interventions that demand huge follow-up forces, he said.
Cordesman cautioned against equating these kinds of skirmishes with a
potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula because the U.S. is
prepared and willing to match escalation there, he said.
Youre not going to go to general war over an [exclusive economic zone] or a
reef somewhere in the Pacific, he said.
Still, Cordesman admitted, irrational behavior and miscalculations
by adversaries can quickly lead to escalation and the need for putting
many more follow-on forces in the field over time.
Some experts say that flagging readiness real or perceived actually
invites escalation by weakening Americas deterrent effect as
China and Russia continue beefing up their Pacific forces.
In congressional testimony, top-ranking military chiefs have already warned
that readiness is deteriorating, partly because of cuts from last years
sequester at a time the military is struggling to refit and retrain after a
decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, testified
before a Senate subcommittee in March that he was concerned about the
readiness of follow-on forces that would be required should the peninsula
enter crisis.
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. John Amos told the same committee last fall
that budget cuts leave fewer forces, arriving less-trained, arriving later in the
fight.
Reduced readiness cuts two ways , said Todd Harrison, a defense
expert with the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments in Washington, D.C.
I think this reduction in readiness that were looking at will reduce our
confidence in the ability of our military to intervene successfully if
called upon, he said. That may weaken the deterrent effect on
50

potential adversaries, but it could also create a situation where we

self-deter .
Dakota Wood, a defense expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation in
Washington, D.C., said that Americas current budget and readiness woes
do not go unnoticed by China and Russia.
Theres this deterrent value in being strongly forward, being strongly
postured and having the perception that not only are your forces
ready for action, but that the government in the U.S. is willing to press that
case if it comes to it.
When it comes to China, we are seeing increasing aggressiveness in
trying to push forward their territorial claims in the East and South
China Seas .
China is likely viewing this as a window of opportunity to
aggressively press its claims in these waters, and the U.S. is not well
postured to come to the assistance of friends and allies in the region.
Wood described this pattern of conduct as taking small bites of
an apple , which over time will consume it.
So each one of these little actions is below the threshold that would
invite a large-scale conventional military response, he said. But theyre
willing and able to take these small bites because they know the U.S., by this
series of incidents, is unwilling to press the case.
Terrence K. Kelly director of the Strategy and Resources Program at the
RAND Corporation, said that individual skirmishes such as these might
seem insignificant. But over time countries such as China and Russia
can achieve their goals by nibbling away with subresponse-level
aggression, Kelly said.
Its probably calculated to slowly over time achieve an effect that
wont elicit a military response from the U.S. or its allies, he said.
Cordesman said, however, that even a modest U.S. intervention could
lead to unintended escalation.
The problem is that the United States responding even if it solves one
small, short-term problem may lead to the other side responding
in ways that again produce a steady pattern of escalation ,
Cordesman said.

51

Ext Shukla No US Russia war

No war over Ukraine expert consensus proves
Koplowitz 15 - graduated from the SUNY-Albany, where he received a
bachelor's degree in political science and minored in journalism. And he
reports on crime and breaking news events for International Business Times
( Howard, US And Russia Going To War? Ukraine Crisis May Lead To Military
Conflict, Mikhail Gorbachev Warns, Others Not So Sure, ibtimes.com, January
29, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/us-russia-going-war-ukraine-crisis-maylead-military-conflict-mikhail-gorbachev-warns-1798992) JC
While Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's head of state from 1988 until its
dissolution in 1991, warned of war, most academics surveyed in a snap
poll released Sunday dont envision the U.S. and Russia going to war
in the next decade. On a scale of zero to 10, with zero meaning no
likelihood of going to war and 10 meaning high likelihood, a plurality
of scholars -- 23 percent -- rated the chance at 2. Nearly 20 percent rated
the chances as a 3, another 20 percent as a 1 and about 12 percent said
there was zero chance, according to the poll conducted by the Teaching,
Research and International Policy Project at the Institute for the Theory and
Practice of International Relations at the College of William & Mary in Virginia.
Only .14 percent of scholars rated the chances of war at a 10.
A plurality of scholars also disagreed that the U.S. and Russia were
heading back toward a new cold war. More than 48 percent, or 273
scholars, said that was the case, while 38 percent said the two countries are
heading back toward a cold war and about 13 percent werent sure.

The U.S wont go to war over Ukraine multiple warrants

prove
Peck 14 - contributing editor for Foreign Policy Magazine, a writer for the
War is Boring defense blog and of course a contributor at Forbes ( Michael, 7
Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine, forbes.com, March
5, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-whyamerica-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/) JC
America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact
means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether
Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to
occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war
with Russia.
This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter
or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten
to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never
smack Russia with a big stick:
Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active
nuclear warheads, according to the Federation of American
Scientists. Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals
couldnt inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the
52

U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses,

assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive
Russian strike.
For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But
they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central
Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces
almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither
Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that.
Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its
Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about
300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage),
according to the Military Balance 2014 from the International Institute for
Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171
ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraines coast.
U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform
impressively during the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. American troops would
enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better
weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be
trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian
military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or
a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80
tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch
multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles,
Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American
losses.
Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500
miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. Its much
easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the
U.S. to send them by sea or air.
The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, Americas
armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long
service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from
repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops
still fighting in Afghanistan.
The U.S. doesnt have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily
dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and
the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling
the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend
Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine
Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in
Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would
have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade
would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine.
Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S.
would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take
months to organize.
53

The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the
American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a
distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlains words during the 1938
Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is
that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here
because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom
we know nothing.
Americas allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American
campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent
troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost
inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the
streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the
regions sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop
exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldnt
evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And
Germans fighting Russians again? Lets not even go there.

54

Ext Hughes 14 No Obama groupthink

Their internal link is theoretically flawed
Badie 10 Dina Badie, Assistant Professor of Politics and International
Studies at Centre College KY and Ph.D. at the University of Connecticut,
expert in international relations and security and American foreign policy in
the Middle East and Asia, 2010 (Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror:
Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq, Foreign Policy Analysis Journal p.277296, 2010, Available online at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00113.x/pdf ,
accessed 7/7/15, J.L.)
Janis's work on groupthink incited much interest and criticism. The
original formulation failed to position groupthink within the sociopsychological literature, resulting in an incomplete explanation of its
emergence and its mechanism. Longley and G Pruitt (1980) recognized
this lack of determinacy. They argue that some of Janis's "symptoms"
were in fact antecedents and that a causal link could not be
established between groupthink and its preconditions. Longley and
Pruitt recognized that groups eventually bring an end to the
deliberative process in order to make a decision; a lack of deliberation
does not in itself indicate the presence of groupthink. They instead
argue that the timing of the end to deliberation depends on the nature
of the decision, whether a major foreign policy or a routine task.
Other critics of groupthink sought to offer alternative explanations to small
group dynamics that extended "beyond groupthink." Hoyt and Garrison
(1997) recognize that within the context of small groups, individuals can
"manipulate" the decision-making process on several levels. Manipulation can
take place in the traditional sense whereby individuals can alter procedural
norms, but can also take the form of structural manipulation through
deliberate inclusion and exclusion of individuals (1997:252). Additionally,
individuals can manipulate the deliberative process through direct influence;
the success of individual manipulation is determined by the individual's
likeability, acceptance of his/her authority, perception of expertise, or
recognition of the efficacy of the strategy (1997:258). As Hoyt and Garrison
propose, the effects of manipulation may, in some cases, offer an alternative
to groupthink.

Group think theory is flawed lack of studies

Griffin 91 Em Griffin, professor in the Communication department at
Wheaton College, author of A First Look, 1991 (CRITIQUE: AVOIDING
UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF GROUPTHINK, A First Look at Communication
Theory First Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1991, available online at
http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/dl/free/0073010189/228
359/groupthink2.html , accessed 7/10/15) JL
Janis calls for greater critical assessment of proposals lest they be adopted
for reasons other than merit. Since his description of groupthink has
55

received great popular approvalperhaps because were fascinated with

colossal failure, it seems only fair to note that efforts to validate the
theory have been sparse and not particularly successful.
Most students of groupthink pick a high-profile case of decision
making where things went terribly wrong and then use Janiss model
as a cookie cutter to analyze the disastermuch as Ive done with the
Challenger and New Era. They seem to take the existence of groupthink
for granted and employ the theory to warn against future folly or
suggest ways to avoid it. This kind of retrospective analysis is great
for theory construction, but provides no comparative basis for
accepting or rejecting the theory. For example, is the lack of evidence
that NASA managers formed a cohesive in-group when they approved the
Challenger launch a good reason to drop or revise the theory? Or does my
report of extensive "due diligence" of New Era invalidate the claim that
groupthink was a reason so many people fell for the fraud?
Janis thought it made sense to test the groupthink hypothesis in the
laboratory prior to trying to prove it in the field.19 His suggestion is
curious, however, because a minimal test of his theory that controls
for the antecedent conditions shown on the left side of Figure 18.2 would
require over 7000 willing participants.20 As it is, the few reported
groupthink experiments have tended to focus on cohesivenessa
quality thats hard to create in the laboratory. The results are mixed
at best. Janiss quantitative study of nineteen international crises is
problematic as well. When he and two co-authors linked positive
outcomes with high-quality decision-making procedures during
international crises, they never assessed the cohesiveness of the
groups in charge.21

56

Ext Olson 14 Readiness prevents war

US readiness is key to halt Russian attacks on Ukraine.
The entire architecture of European security is at risk
Stephens 14 Associate editor of the Financial Times [Philip Stephens
(Fulbright Fellow and winner of the 2002 David Watt Prize for outstanding
political journalism), Europe needs a cold war lesson in deterrence,
Financial Times, July 24, 2014 5:51 pm, pg. http://tinyurl.com/prfj6kq
Europeans have been slow to recognise the world as it is rather than as they
imagined. The reaction to Russias march into Ukraine has made this painfully
obvious. The reflex has been to seek to defuse the crisis. On one level this is
admirable war did not solve much in Iraq and Afghanistan. The snag is that
ceding ground to Mr Putin does not amount to de-escalation. To the
contrary, weakness stokes the Russian presidents expansionism.
The wests priority and the downing by Russian-backed insurgents of
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 provides an opportunity should be to
recover the concept of deterrence. Not the nuclear deterrence of
mutually assured destruction but the traditional understanding that
political resolve and a readiness to deploy force can apply a brake . The
mistake many Europeans have made and, to a lesser degree, Barack
Obamas White House has done the same is to confuse deterrence with
escalation. I cannot count the times I have heard politicians and policy
makers say they must tread carefully for fear of provoking Mr Putin.
Some of these protestations are self-serving what these people really mean
is that they do not want to jeopardise economic relationships. But there
seems also to be a genuine misunderstanding about the purpose of
deterrence. Imposing sanctions on Moscow will not of itself persuade Mr
Putin to pull out of Ukraine. It might persuade him to think twice before
marching his army into other Russian-speaking territories.
To be effective, deterrence has above all to be credible. The potential
adversary has to believe that aggression will provoke proportionate
retaliation, whether economic or, as a last resort, military. The sanctions
imposed on Moscow by the EU have been anything but credible. Washington
has gone further, but not far enough to signal serious intent. What Mr Putin
has seen of a divided west tells him it is bluffing. He will take sanctions
seriously when he sees that those threatening them are ready to bear the
costs.
European hesitation has ceded to the Kremlin control of the public
debate. The annexation of Crimea overturned the cardinal pillar of
European security since 1945: states cannot extend their territory
by force of arms. As such, Russias action represents a profound
threat to the security of the continent. Yet to listen to the discussion in
some European capitals is to wonder if Mr Putin is not among the victims.
Nato has a chance to remedy this when its leaders hold a summit in Newport,
Wales, in September. The gathering had been intended as a stocktaking
exercise after the alliances planned withdrawal from Afghanistan. The
57

imperative now is to restore NATO as a solid guardian of the post-1945

security order.
Many of the things the alliance needs to do are practical. They are set out
persuasively in a report published this week by the think-tank Chatham
House. Nato needs to find ways of working in groupings smaller than the full
membership of 28. The alliance should extend the interoperability of forces
and improve planning and burden-sharing. Governments badly need to reexplain to their electorates why Nato is vital for their security. Jihadis are not
the only threat.
The big danger, though, lies in the credibility deficit. Seen from Moscow, Nato
looks like two-tier alliance. No one doubts its resolve to defend, say,
Germany, but does the Article 5 guarantee of collective security apply equally
to the states that joined after the collapse of communism? Would the US or
Britain, France, or Italy really resist if Mr Putin turned his attention to
protecting the Russian-speaking people of the Baltics? If the answer is no,
the alliance is worthless.
The best way to make sure the commitment is never tested is to
make it credible. That can be done by stationing sufficient tripwire forces
in the east to persuade Mr Putin that a robust response to aggression would
be unavoidable.
The heavy lifting, as ever, will have to be done by the US. Europe has
depended since 1945 on Washingtons security guarantee and
events in Ukraine suggest that is not about to change. But Europeans
cannot forever be reluctant partners in their own defence. The way to avoid
war is to deter aggressors .

58

No Groupthink
Organization electronic detection protocols check and
prevent groupthink
Lewellen et al 13, (Todd Lewellen, George J. Silowash, Daniel Costa,
Insider Threat Control: Using Plagiarism Detection Algorithms to Prevent
Data Exfiltration in Near Real Time, Software Engineering Institute, October
2013,
http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/TechnicalNote/2013_004_001_64688.
pdf)//erg
We define a malicious insider as a current or former employee,
contractor, or business partner with all three of the following
attributes: has or had authorized access to an organizations network,
system, or data intentionally exceeded or misused that access
negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organizations
information or information systems Malicious insiders are able to act
within an organization by taking advantage of weaknesses they find
in systems. Organizations must be aware of such weaknesses and how an insider may exploit them.
Organizations must also be aware of the many ways in which
weaknesses are introduced. For example, an organization may have relaxed or nonexistent
acceptable-use policies for internet access. In other cases, a lack of situational awareness introduces
weaknesses that malicious insiders can exploit. Additionally, an organization that allows its employees to
use web-based services, such as email, increases the potential for data leakage. Establishing proper
auditing policies and technical controls, as discussed in this technical note, mitigates some of these risks.

most malicious insider crimes fit into one of

three categories: information technology sabotage, theft of
intellectual property (IP), and fraud . This technical note focuses on the theft of
Our research has revealed that

information using web-based services, in particular, email accessed through a web browser using the HTTP

The tools and techniques presented in this technical note

represent only a subset of practices an organization could implement to
mitigate insider threats. For example, organizations may wish to deploy
commercially available software to prevent data loss. These tools
and methods can be used by organizations of any size. We
intentionally selected open source and public-domain tools since
they are freely available to the public. 2.1 TheMan-in-TheMiddle(MiTM)Proxy This report builds on the previously published technical note, Detecting and
protocol and encrypted with SSL.

Preventing Data Exfiltration Through Encrypted Web Sessions via Traffic Inspection [Silowash 2012]. Those
wishing to implement the capabilities discussed in this report will need to be familiar with the prior
technical note and will need to have configured their environment accordingly. This technical note will
leverage the existing work by implementing an additional ICAP server to perform additional content
scanning of attachments and text entered into web pages to determine if IP is being exfiltrated. 2.2

TheInspectionProcess In the prior technical note, Detecting and Preventing Data Exfiltration
Through Encrypted Web Sessions via Traffic Inspection, a Squid proxy server, C-ICAP, and ClamAV are used

clear text and encrypted web sessions for

the presence of documents that may contain keywords or are tagged
with hidden metadata [Silowash 2012]. Expanding on this, the CERT Insider Threat
Center developed an additional tool for inspecting documents . This tool
to inspect CMU/SEI-2013-TN-008 | 2 both

leverages the GreasySpoon ICAP server1 and Apache Lucene2. According to the Apache Software
Foundation, Apache LuceneTM is a high-performance, full-featured text search engine library written
entirely in Java. It is a technology suitable for nearly any application that requires full-text search,

59

The CERT Insider Threat Center

developed an agent that resides on the GreasySpoon ICAP server . This
especially cross-platform [Apache 2012].

agent is written in Java and monitors a given directory of IP. When a new file is created, updated, or
deleted, the agent reads the file and updates Lucenes index. When a user uploads a document to a webbased service such as Gmail, Yahoo Mail, or Facebook, or pastes text into an online form, the document or

If the document or text matches any of

the IP above an organizationally defined threshold, the connection is
blocked. Because Squid allows for the simultaneous use of multiple ICAP servers, this approach can be
text is compared to the indexed library of IP.

used with the document tagging and keyword detection capabilities discussed in the prior technical note.

60

AT Russia Scenario
The US is gearing up to fight Russia now the aff cant resolve this
Bandow 6/24 (Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President
Ronald Reagan, Washington Confronts Russia over Ukraine: Yet Europeans Wont Protect Themselves from
Vladimir Putin, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/washington-confronts-russia-over-ukraineyet-europeans-wont-protect)//RTF

Europe is at risk, we are told. Russias assault on Ukraine threatens the post-Cold War
order. Moscow may follow up with similar attacks on Moldova and even such NATO members as Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. But no one in Europe seems to care. Even the countries
supposedly in Vladimir Putins gun sites arent much concerned. No one is bolstering their military. And the

Unfortunately, the
Ukraine crisis is likely to continue for some time. The allies hope sanctions will
European people oppose taking any military risks to help their neighbors.

bring Moscow to heel, but the Pew Research Center found that 88 percent of Russians backed Vladimir

Putin, though no
friend of the West, is no fool. He recently opined: only an insane person and only
in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO.
But if Putin changes his mind, the Europeans dont plan on
defending themselves. Instead, virtually everyone expects America
to save them, if necessary. Washington is being played for a sucker as usual. Defense
Secretary Ashton Carter is visiting Europe this week. On Monday while
observing exercises by NATOs new rapid response force he announced that the U.S. will
contribute aircraft, weapons, and personnel to the Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force. Americans will provide intelligence,
logistics, reconnaissance, and surveillance support. Thats not all. Separately,
the Obama administration plans to pre-position tanks and other
equipment for a combat brigade in seven nations in Eastern Europe .
Putins foreign policy, the highest number since Pew started polling in 2003. At least

James Stavidis, a former NATO commander, now dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts, said this provides a

Washington was acting

because the United States is deeply committed to the defense of
Europe, as we have for decades. America is more committed to Europe than
are Europeans. We are moving forward together, with new capabilities, he said. What does he
reasonable level of reassurance to jittery allies. Carter explained that

mean by we? Washington again will do the heavy lifting. You can nearly hear the sigh of relief in
Europe, said Heather Conley of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in learning that the U.S.
again would bail out its allies. The Europeans scrimp on the military while funding their generous welfare
state. They promise Washington whatever it desiresto increase outlays, hit the two percent of GDP level,
improve international coordination, and more. Then they will go back to doing what they do best, depend
on America. Washington is being played for a sucker as usual. NATO always stood for North America and
the Others. During the Cold War the allied states shamelessly took a very cheap ride on the U.S. That
made sense in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but by the 1960s Europe had recovered and
should have spent amounts commensurate with the Soviet threat. However, Europeans correctly gauged
that Washington wouldnt leave, despite periodically upbraiding them for their meager efforts. Cato
Institute forum on future of NATO The problem has gotten worse in recent years .

The U.S.
accounts for three-quarters of NATO outlays even though Europe has
a larger GDP than America. Because of European cutbacks, overall outlays are down 1.5
percent this year. Of 28 members only the U.S., Britain, and Greecemostly because of its confrontation
with fellow alliance member Turkeytypically broke the officially recommended level of two percent of
GDP. Estonia has become a member of that exclusive club, but not Latvia and Lithuania, despite being on
the front line. After frenetically demanding that the U.S. do more, Poland only hit that mark this year. But
several members have been cutting outlays, despite the continents embarrassing showing against Libya
(running out of missiles, for instance) and limited capacity to aid the Baltics (little more than nil) let alone
defend a nation like Ukraine. Of the five largest European defense budgets, only Frances will increase.
Those of Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy will continue to decline. None of these countries will hit
the recommended two percent of GDP level in 2015. Only Britain and France exceed 1.5 percent. Canada

61

barely makes one percent. (At the G-7 Summit President Barack Obama essentially begged the British to
spend more; London has responded by considering whether reclassifying intelligence and foreign aid
outlays as military would allow Britain to technically meet the standard.) Those NATO members spending
more this yearEstonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Netherlands, Norway, and Romaniacollectively have
outlays only half that of Britain. Cooperation is poor even among those most at risk. Add Poland to the
three Baltic and five Nordic states and the group enjoys a GDP about a third larger than that of Russia.
However, their military outlays are only about 40 percent of Moscows. Moreover, complains Edward Lucas
of the Center for European Policy Analysis, they are divided and suffer from strategic incoherence.
Never mind the events of the last year. Ukraine has not served as Thomas Jeffersons famed fire bell in
the night, despite the supposedly terrible threat posed to the peace and stability of Europe. It is much
more business as usual, said British defense analyst Ian Kearns. As of 2013 the Europeans devoted just
3.6 percent of their governments budgets to the military, compared to a fifth of U.S. government
spending. Americas per capita military outlays are five times that of the alliances Cold War members and
eight times that of those states which joined later. Total military spending by NATOs European members
was less in real terms in 2014 than in 1997and there are 12 more member states in NATO today,

From the
onset of the crisis with Russia a number of American analysts have
proposed deploying U.S. forces to Ukraine, treating the latter as if it
was a NATO ally. No Europeans have volunteered to follow. The U.S. House has
approved legislation to arm Kievs forces, and a similar measure is
being pushed by ever warlike Senate Armed Services Committee
Chairman John McCain. Most European governments have resisted the idea. Make no mistake:
observed my Cato Institute colleague Chris Preble. The issue is more than just money.

we will defend our allies, declared Carter. But will the Europeans defend anyone, even themselves? A new
poll suggests not. The Pew Foundation recently surveyed eight leading NATO countries: If Russia got into a
conflict with another member of NATO, should your country use military force in the victims defense? A
majority of French, Germans, and Italians said no. (The Germans were particularly emphatic, with 58
percent rejecting war. German support for NATO has dropped by 18 percent in just six years.) Only
pluralities said yes in Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. (Yet Poland is insisting that everyone else
defend it!) The highest European support level was in Britain, at 49 percent. Only in America, naturally,
and Canada did a majority say yes (56 and 53 percent, respectively). Ivo Daalder, a former U.S.
ambassador to NATO, said it will take a serious effort by the alliance to convince its public of the need to
prepare for, deter and, if necessary, respond to a Russian attack. Yet why should they take action as long
as they believe they can count on Washington to save them? According to Pew, two-thirds of Europeans
were convinced the Americans would come rushing over to do what they would not do for themselves. Its
time to change that. Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe asked why Washington allowed itself to be used in
this way: Europe is prosperous. It should be confident enough both to take care of its own security and to
contribute to a greater role in burden sharing. It will not do so as long as U.S. policymakers insist that
Americans do the job instead. The Cold War is over. Moscow is an unpleasant regional actor, not a global
threat. Europe has a much larger GDP and population than Russia and even with its current anemic level of
military outlays devotes more to defense. The U.S. government is essentially bankrupt, with far greater
unfunded liabilities than the Europeans, despite Greeces travails. Instead of pouring more resources into
NATO, Washington should be disengaging militarily, turning leadership of the alliance and responsibility for
defending the continent over to Europe. Americans shouldnt be expected to protect their rich cousins
even if the latter were devoted to protecting each other. That the Europeans expect the U.S. to do their job
is yet another reason for Americans to say no more.

The impacts inevitable- congress already wants to arm

Ukraine
Wong 15

(Kristina, 2/5/15, The Hill, Lawmakers to Obama: Arm Ukraine now,

http://thehill.com/policy/defense/231874-senators-to-obama-arm-ukraine-now)//RTF

The White House came under bipartisan pressure from both sides of
the Capitol to provide weapons to Ukraine Thursday. Republicans and
Democrats on the Senate Armed Services Committee made a big
push on the issue, while a bipartisan group of House members called
for the same course of action in a letter. "The United States must act
with urgency to provide defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine," said
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. "Russia's
62

invasion of sovereign territory of Ukraine, which has continued

unabated in the face of political and economic sanctions, is the
gravest threat to European security in decades," he said. In an unusual
display of bipartisan agreement, McCain was joined at the press conference by
the committee's ranking member, Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), and Sens.
James Inhofe (R-Okla.), Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Richard
Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.), Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.), Joni Ernst (RIowa), Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska).
Meanwhile, the group of House lawmakers said that the administration
needed to provide weapons to Ukraine to deter further Russian
aggression. "We are calling on the Administration to increase its
support for Ukraine. Tighter sanctions and greater humanitarian
assistance should be part of that support, but now, more than ever,
the U.S. must supply Ukraine with the means to defend itself," they
said in their letter. Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), ranking member on
the House Intelligence committee, was the lead signatory on the
letter. He was joined by more than 30 Republicans and Democrats.
The U.S. and Western allies slapped economic sanctions on Moscow after it invaded Ukraine and annexed
its peninsula of Crimea last March, but the country has continued to arm and train pro-Russian rebels in

Secretary of State John Kerry said while visiting Ukraine

on Thursday that President Obama is "reviewing all his options."
"Among those options obviously is the possibility of providing
defensive systems to Ukraine," he said, according to the Associated
Press. However, he added, "We are not interested in a proxy war. Our objective is to change Russia's
Eastern Ukraine.

behavior." The White House has so far turned down Ukraine's requests for weapons out of fear it would
further provoke Russia, but has provided nearly $122 million in non-lethal military equipment to Ukrainian

The senators said the time has

come to provide weapons as well, given gains by rebels in recent
weeks and Russian President Vladimir Putin's violation of a ceasefire
agreement. "Blankets don't do very well against tanks," said McCain. Providing arms "will raise the
forces, such as blankets, body armor and meal packets.

risk and costs Russia must incur to continue its offensive," he said. McCain said that since April, Russianbacked separatists in Ukraine have killed 5,358 Ukrainian forces, wounded 12,235 others and killed 224

Reed said Ukrainian forces have fought courageously. "We

must help Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression," he
said. "We cannot let Vladimir Putin get away with invading another
sovereign country. ... This is what we should do, lethal assistance,"
Nelson added. "We should always be on the side of struggling democracies," Graham said.
"Helping a friend somewhere makes friends of America everywhere feel better." Blumenthal
called Putin "a thug." "He has not responded to sanctions. Sanctions are not
working," he said. "He is the schoolyard bully," added Ayotte. "I am so
glad we've come together on a bipartisan basis to do this ." Donnelly
calle Ukraine a "friend" of the United States and said providing arms
"is the least that we can do." Meanwhile, the letter from the House
members urged the administration to provide "a substantial amount
of military assistance as soon as possible in 2015," and in the
following years. That assistance should include non-lethal aid such as counterbattery radars,
civilians.

drones, electronic counter-measures against Russian drones, secure communications capabilities, armored
Humvees and medical equipment, they said. Lethal aid should include light anti-armor missiles, "given the
large numbers of armored vehicles that the Russians have deployed in Donetsk and Luhansk and the

63

abysmal condition of the Ukrainian militarys light anti-armor weapons," the letter said. The letter was also
signed by Reps. Steny Hoyer (D-Md), Michael Burgess (R-Texas), Gerry Connolly (D-Va), Steve Chabot (ROhio), Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.), Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), Michael Fitzpatrick (R-Penn.), Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.),
Steve Israel (D-N.Y.), David Jolly (R-Fla.), Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio), Mike Kelly (R-Penn.), John Larson (D-Conn.),
Sander Levin (D-Mich.), Daniel Lipinsky (D-Ill.), Thomas Marino (R-Penn.), Michael McCaul (R-Texas), Tom
McClintock (R-Calif.), Tim Murphy (R-Penn.), Mike Quigley (D-Ill.), Bill Pascrell (D-N.J.), Robert Pittenger (RN.C.), Ted Poe (R-Texas), Reid Ribble (R-Wisc.), Thomas Rooney (R-Fla.), Peter Roskam (R-Ill.), David
Schweikert (R-Ariz.), John Shimkus (R-Ill.), Adam Smith (D-Wash.), Steve Stivers (R-Ohio), and Michael
Turner (R-Ohio). The non-voting member from Guam, Del. Madeleine Bordallo (D), also signed. "We know
that a resolution to the Ukrainian crisis will ultimate require a diplomatic, not military, solution," the letter
said. "But Russia is feeling emboldened, and Ukraine is economically stretched to its breaking point. It is
time to provide the Ukrainiain government with the tools to keep the separatists at bay and to make the
conflict too costly for their Russians patrons to continue." Separately, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) urged President Obama in a letter Thursday to fully implement a law passed
last year, which requires him to report to Congress by Feb. 15 on plans to provide weapons to Ukraine. We
hope the administration will submit a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later this month
that clearly states your readiness to supply appropriate lethal assistance to the Ukrainian government and
provides details of the specific weapons to be delivered, said Corker, a co-author of the bill.

Republican Congress makes the impact inevitable

Jensen 14

(Donald, November 18th, resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the
Nitze School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Republican Congress to Push Harder
Russia Line, http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2085-republican-congress-to-push-harder-russialine)//RTF

The United States recent midterm elections tipped the balance of

power away from president Barack Obama and will greatly complicate his remaining
two years in office, not just in terms of domestic policy, but foreign policy as well. Riding a wave of popular
discontent, the Republican Party gained eight seats (which could increase by one after Louisiana holds a
runoff in December). The GOP also increased its majority in the House of Representatives and performed

The Republican capture of the Senate will force Obama

to scale back his legislative agenda and limit his ambitions to either
executive actions that do not require legislative approval, or issues
that have bipartisan support. But the Republicans, hoping to win the White House in 2016,
well in state races.

will also be under pressure to show the electorate that they are capable of governing after drawing scorn
for shutting down the government last year and allegedly demonizing the president. The presidents
supporters and the national media, in turn, are also guilty of exaggeration: they are fond of caricaturing
the GOP as being held hostage to an extremist Tea Party base. Many of these critics expect (and hope)
that Republican unity will be difficult to achieve. The day after the midterm elections, President Obama
promised to work with Republicans, but warned that he was also prepared to make more use of his
executive powers. Foreign policy is rarely a primary concern of U.S. voters. Indeed, surveys suggest that
those who went to the polls this November were primarily concerned with the state of the economy,
partisan gridlock in Washington, and Obamas leadership. In September, according to a Pew Research
Center poll, 64 percent of respondents said foreign policy would be an important factor in their midterm
election vote. In an October poll, by a margin of 43 to 37 percent, voters believed Republicans would do a
better job of handing foreign affairs than Democrats. It appears such sentiments have much to do with the
publics view that Obama has demonstrated poor leadership on international issues. Setting aside
individual debates about individual policy choices, David Rothkopf recently wrote for Foreign Policy, the

public wants America and its leaders to appear strong. In recent

weeks, the opinions of the Washington elite on how to deal with
Russia, like public sentiment more generally, have been marked by
an uneasy balance. Earlier this year, views were divided. One point of view maintained that
Russias meddling in Ukraine was mostly a defensive action against the threat of NATO enlargement and
Ukraines disintegration; the other accused Russian president Vladimir Putin of directly challenging
Europes political and security structures and Western values, and argued that he needed to be countered.
The shoot-down of Malaysian Flight MH17 in July and subsequent abundant evidence of Russias extensive
military involvement in the incident yielded a consensus behind the latter view. Yet there remained
disagreements over how far Putin would go and how the U.S. should push back. The Obama Administration
expressed warm words of support for Ukraine, but was strongly against arming Kiev. It argued that doing
so would provoke Russia into greater intervention; that Ukraines armed forces could not absorb hightech equipment; that there exists no military solution to the crisis; and that Ukraine would be better able to

64

In Congress,
however, where sympathy for Ukraine was strong (and bipartisan),
there was firm support for providing arms. This debate took place, as Standard
withstand Russian aggression if it focused on political and economic reform.

Bank analyst Tim Ash wrote in October, amid widespread uncertainty about what Putin would do next and
general agreement that Western sanctions on Russia are working. Although they may have done little to
directly discourage Russian military activity, sanctions have extracted a heavy price from Russia and the
elites around Putin. Two bills that would provide Ukraine with defensive but lethal weapons are likely to be

With a GOP
majority in both houses of Congressincluding in the crucial Senate
Armed Services and Foreign Affairs CommitteesRepublican leaders
are now likely to step up the pressure on the weakened president,
already a lame duck, to be tougher on Russia and provide weapons
to Ukraine. Senator John McCain, the incoming chairman of the Senate Armed Service
Committee, said in an interview on November 5 that he has already discussed a new
national security agenda with fellow Republicans Bob Corker and
Richard Burr, who are likely to be chairmen of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
respectively. McCain promised to raise the issue of military
assistance. Two bills that would provide Ukraine with defensive but lethal weapons are likely to be
taken up by the new Republican Senate majority, despite the presidents wishes.

taken up by the new Republican Senate majority, despite the presidents wishes. The first of these bills, the
Ukraine Security Assistance Act of 2014, would help Ukraine neutralize the military-support advantage
that separatist rebels are using to target civilian and military aircraft in in eastern Ukraine and would
authorize President Obama to provide adequate and necessary assistance to protect Ukrainian democracy
and sovereignty. The second, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, calls for military and security
assistance to Ukraine, designates it as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), and imposes further sanctions on
the Russian Federation. MNNA is a designation given by the United States government to close allies
(including Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea) who have strategic working relationships with
U.S. armed forces but are not members of NATO. While the MNNA status does not automatically establish a
mutual defense pact with the United States, it does confer a variety of military and financial advantages
that otherwise are not obtainable by non-NATO countries. Moreover, codifying U.S. sanctions against
Russia into legislation would make it far more difficult to end them than is currently the case, thereby
immunizing the sanctions against actions by the White House. It is unclear whether Obama will veto either

The White Houses rationale that arming Kiev would

provoke Moscow grows ever weaker, as Russia has stepped up its
military support of the eastern breakaway republics in recent days . An
bill should they pass.

Obama veto would also put him at odds with powerful congressional leaders in both parties, now
emboldened by the elections to take a tougher line on an issue that appears secondary to the rest of the

In the past, Obama has stood his ground in the face of

congressional opposition when he believed he was right, but
according to sources in Congress, he has not yet indicated what he
would do if a Ukraine bill were to reach his desk. Putins intentions, as ever,
presidents agenda.

remain uncertain. On the one hand, the Kremlin has little incentive to escalate its military presence in
Ukraine, regardless of any military assistance the U.S. might provide Ukraine (though such aid would
certainly give Putin pause). Russian public opinion does not support an invasion: Kremlin authorities made
great efforts during the fighting of August and September to restrict media coverage of Russian military
casualties. The economic costs of rebuilding the Ukrainian east or funding additional sustained major
military operations are likely prohibitive, given the downturn in the Russian economy. On the other hand,
Putins current stepped-up support for separatist forces, in violation of the Minsk agreement and despite
Western threats, suggests that he could go further no matter the economic cost or Western reaction. For
example, he could carry out a quick strike to establish a land bridge to Crimea. The Obama Administration
also continues to seek Russian cooperation on Iran and the Middle East, showing Putin there are limits to
Washingtons willingness to push back over Ukraine. In the end, therefore, the dispute in Washington over
military assistance to Ukraine may have more to do with the power struggle between Congress and the
administration than the realities of the military situation on the ground.

65

Republicans are pushing for it

Coca 6/24

(Onan, 2015, writing for Eagles Rising, John McCain says It's "Shameful" Not to Send Arms
to Ukraine!, http://eaglerising.com/20010/john-mccain-says-its-shameful-not-to-send-arms-toukraine/#TKxhbSzXdKLiqT4d.99)//RTF

John McCain spoke at a Saturday press conference during his

trip to Ukraine and lambasted the U.S. for refusing to provide
weapons to Ukrainian forces. According to McCain, Ukraine has shown
repeatedly that its willing to fight for freedom, making it shameful
to deny the country much-needed military assistance against wellarmed separatists in the eastern region, The Associated Press reports. For
McCain, the 300 paratroopers sent as advisers in April arent sufficient. A lack of weapons
only cedes more ground to Russian President Vladimir Putins
designs to pull Ukraine away from NATO and other western
countries, he says. Observers allege that the reason separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk are able to
GOP Sen.

keep fighting is because Russian support lurks behind the scenes. Putin steadfastly denies any and all such
accusations. This

is shameful that we will not provide [the Ukrainians]

with weapons to defend themselves. They are fighting with 20thcentury weapons against Russias 21st-century weapons. Thats not
a fair fight, McCain said, after meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and other
officials. Since Russia annexed Crimea last year, McCain has been one of
the most vocal proponents of shipping military gear to Ukraine. We
need to give long-term military assistance because God knows
what Vladimir Putin will do next, McCain said in March 2014.
Accompanying McCain was Republican Sen. Tom Cotton, who argued
that sending weapons is a necessity, as Putin has repeatedly refused
de-escalation attempts. The National Defense Authorization Act
includes $300 million for military assistance to Ukraine, but the
defense budget bill still needs to make it through Congress and the
White House first. Recent back-and-forth disputes between the Republican-dominated legislature
and the Obama administration threaten the bills passage. Russia meanwhile opposes any attempt from
the U.S. to send military assistance, saying that any military aid will out increase instability. Putin has also
warned Israel in April not to sell weapons. Shortly after the press conference, Lithuanias ambassador to
Ukraine, Marius Yanukonis, said that Lithuania is preparing to ship arms to Ukrainian forces, in an effort to
persuade other NATO member countries to follow suit.

A bill providing military supports already passed the

senate
AP 6/20 (Associated Press, 2015, US Senator McCain slams European stance
on Ukraine, http://news.yahoo.com/us-senator-mccain-slams-europeanstance-ukraine-172844262.html)//RTF
KIEV, Ukraine (AP) U.S. Sen. John McCain has said during a visit to
Ukraine that it is shameful that Washington's European allies have
not done more to assist Ukrainian forces in their quest to defeat
Russian-backed separatists in the east. McCain was part of a
delegation of U.S. senators that met Saturday with senior Ukrainian
officials, including President Petro Poroshenko, after visiting troops and volunteers
working on the front line. The U.S. Senate this week approved a bill
that includes provisions to supply Ukraine with $300 million worth of
defensive military equipment. Approval from Congress and the
66

White House is still pending.

European countries have favored a diplomatic settlement as

a way out of the conflict. Russia condemns U.S. military aid to Ukraine and says it will foment instability.

67

Solvency

68

Noncompliance
The Navy needs their ITP program they wont stop
Lombardo 13
(Tony -Staff writer, SECNAV launches plan to battle 'insider threats', Sep. 7,
2013,
http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20130907/NEWS/309070005/SECNAVlaunches-plan-battle-insider-threats-, JZG)
The Navy has a new plan to confront insider threats in the Navy
and Marine Corps, and it will involve more scrutiny, better training
and a team of top leaders to oversee its implementation. Navy Secretary
Ray Mabus issued an instruction in August that creates the Department of
the Navy Insider Threat Program. The goal is to prevent cases like
the data leaks by Army Pfc. Bradley Manning and former National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden, and violence like Army Maj. Nidal Hasans shooting
rampage at Fort Hood, Texas. With this instruction, Secretary Mabus has given
the Department of the Navy its marching orders, said Vice Adm. Michael
Rogers, head of Fleet Cyber Command. We need to do all we can to be aware of
the threat, and take those actions necessary to reduce that threat.
As head of the Navys cybersecurity arm, Rogers team of cyber warriors plays a critical role in fighting
insider threats. But Rogers insists the threat is an all hands issue. All who
serve within the Navy active, reserve, officer, enlisted, civilian employees and contract support
personnel are put at risk by this threat, and all can help diminish that threat, said Rogers, who
responded to Navy Times questions via email.

69

Counterplans

70

Reform ITP CP

71

1NC
CP Text: The United States federal government should
update the ITP program to include a common definition of
what an insider threat is and realign insider threat
training to focus toward preventing threats.
Common definitions solves cohesion
Porter 14 -Master in Security Studies
(Michael Lawrence, COMBATING INSIDER THREATS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT
UNITED STATES INSIDER THREAT POLICIES AND NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS,
May 2014, http://repositories.tdl.org/asuir/bitstream/handle/2346.1/30135/PORTER-THESIS-2014.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y, JZG)
The first improvement that is needed is the establishment of a
common definition of an insider threat. Currently, there are over 15
different definitions as outlined in the NCIXs Official Terms & Definitions of Interest List122.
Such a broad list of definitions leaves many questions in the minds
of the different IC agencies as to what an insider threat is, and who
has jurisdiction regarding collection, analysis, and apprehension. Most
importantly, the definition in the 2012 National Policy lacks any sort of tie to a foreign nexus123. This
vague language creates confusion as to who has jurisdiction over
potential insiders. According to the policy definition, CI would have been responsible for
identifying and handling any threat, to include domestic law enforcement cases. The problem is
that if these threats are American citizens, not working for extremist
organizations or foreign nations, then CI does not have jurisdiction
as assigned in EO 12333 . This current lack of specificity can cause
confusion when it comes to handling insider threats , because over utilization
of CI and LE on areas outside of their jurisdiction leaves them both over-exerted and stretched thin125.
Furthermore, establishing a definition will be difficult with as many different and divergent definitions as
we already have throughout the government. As was mentioned,

consensus is important

and right now there is none. Changing this will require the NITTF to build common ground
and push past the differences. The important thing to remember is that words have meanings and, as the
2009 NIS states, insider threats are the priority for CI126. An open-ended definition will tax a stressed
organization. Specificity allows work to be spread across the spectrum of CI and Law Enforcement cases

Chapter 1 of this paper outlined the

authors definition of an insider threat as an individual with
placement and access to critical infrastructures, military units, and
the government and their supporting agencies who have allegedly
turned against and targeted their parent organization, thus aiding a
foreign power or international terrorist organization. This definition
is based on a conglomeration of multiple different definitions used across
the IC. It encompasses all of the critical elements of the threat and
leaves no question in the minds of the different agencies as to who
has jurisdiction. Simply adopting a new definition does not mean that jurisdiction battles will be
and thus increase the amount of success.

solved. Inherent to any definition is the constant need for cooperation amongst the different organizations
of CI and in the case of uncertainty, to allow for joint investigations and the sharing of potentially valuable
information between the different disciplines127 Evaluation will be more than just the success or failure of

72

a standard definition. The definition itself will be tied to a broader evaluation of the National Threat Policy.
Accordingly, the ITAG and the JITTF would be primarily responsible for the evaluation of current policies. In
order to do this, an evaluation of classified and unclassified reporting and investigations, at the national
level, will identify increases in reporting, opening of investigations, opening of joint investigations,
prosecutions, and operations conducted. An increase in these numbers would be a strong indication that
programs are working, at least in the short-term. This data would be compiled and presented by the NCIX
to the DNI and policy makers as an indicator of the change that is occurring with new policies. Granted this
information would not be shown to all policy makers, but there are representatives in Congress and the
White House that would be privy to this information, and that serve as representatives for the broader
policy community128.

Adding threat prevention training solves

Porter 14 -Master in Security Studies
(Michael Lawrence, COMBATING INSIDER THREATS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT
UNITED STATES INSIDER THREAT POLICIES AND NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS,
May 2014, http://repositories.tdl.org/asuir/bitstream/handle/2346.1/30135/PORTER-THESIS-2014.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y, JZG)
The second improvement needed is that the CI Community should
realign insider threat training to focus toward preventing threats,
not simply identifying them. The National Insider Threat Policy includes a set of Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs. These minimum standards are
the current guidelines promulgated by the executive branch , the NCIX,
and the JITTF regarding Insider Threat Programs129. The programs standards have
addressed many of the issues relating to insider threats except one
key issue: prevention. The minimum standards read more like a list of training for identification
of a current threat, and less like a set of preventative measures. Identifying threats is
useful, but the problem with insider threats is that they are often
unidentifiable; more is needed in the form of prevention. The major
problem with passing changes such as these is, once again, the problem of time. As previously stated,
policy makers like to see fast results. Preventative measures will not get nearly the same results as fast as
identification. Focusing training on identification can give quantifiable numbers to policy makers about how
successful a program has been by catching bad guys. One can hope that politics is not all that is at play
when it comes to determining how these programs are organized, but these changes will need to be made

Not
much needs to be added to current CI training, but an understanding
of the basic threat psychology, as addressed in Chapter 2, should be a part of
the Minimum Standards. A key element of this preventative
measure is the provision of information regarding where
developing threats can seek assistance, how coworkers can report
suspected problems for assistance, and how supervisors can refer to
assistance. These insights would be crucial both for impacting the
potential downward spiral and the apprehension of an individual . The
quickly because the longer they wait the longer the system goes without preventative measures.

one major outlet that exists is in Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs). As stated in EO 12968, all
individuals working for agencies with access to classified information are eligible to use EAPs for
assistance concerning issues that may affect their eligibility for access to classified information, such as
financial matters, mental health, or substance abuse. Essentially EAPs are counseling services for those in
the IC who need an extra support structure to get personal help130. The problem is that often there is a
stigma placed on anyone for using these services. The proper use of these programs is crucial for serving
this preventative measure and should be included in training as a healthy outlet free of judgment or
damage to ones career. One thing that the Spy cycle and the Radicalization cycle both underscored was
that in the earliest stages of the development of an insider threat, there was a need for help. The spy
found that help in the solace of a foreign intelligence service, while the future violent extremist found it in

73

the support network of an international terrorist organization. By focusing training on identification at the
later stages of development, we are skipping an important step in the progression of an insider threat.
Ignoring the early stages does nothing to prevent those potential future threats sitting on the edge of right

By adding to the current training a focus of

earlier detection then the potential to remove the future insiders
from their support structure and offer them a healthy outlet is
possible. Additionally, teaching this training to everyone will turn
personnel into sensors for future threats, not just current ones 131
and wrong from making bad choices.

74

2NC
Reform to the ITP is necessary
Porter 14 -Master in Security Studies
(Michael Lawrence, COMBATING INSIDER THREATS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT
UNITED STATES INSIDER THREAT POLICIES AND NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS,
May 2014, http://repositories.tdl.org/asuir/bitstream/handle/2346.1/30135/PORTER-THESIS-2014.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y, JZG)
Chapter 4: The Reform Process Given the many insider threat-related
challenges the CI Community faces, the United States has done a great deal
to confront this dangerous enemy. Nonetheless, the CI Community must
make additional changes due to weaknesses in the current
legislative processes, organizational interactions , and other issues involved in
this effort 99. As addressed in Chapter 3, the structure of the CI Community has adapted over the years,
but the sad reality is that these changes happened largely as a result of failures in the system and
kneejerk reactions designed to address specific instances of failure100. Even then, the changes that do

The
ever-present threat posed by insiders means that the US CI
Community must routinely evaluate the process it operates under
and look to better itself. Our CI specialists must address a range of persistent vulnerabilities
occur often do not come easily and are the result of extensive reform processes throughout the IC.

to help strengthen the American security apparatus. The problem is that substantive reform is often very
difficult to accomplish in the IC, and subsequently the CI Community, for two reasons. First, intelligence
reform is usually more politically motivated than it is focused on, and motivated by, the need for
substantive change101. Second, since the IC is a tool of the policy makers, who ultimately oversee these
organizations, this often means that the people making decisions for the IC have little to no real
understanding of the Intelligence process102. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, there were multiple reforms
over the past 20 years that have helped mold the CI Community into an organization that could fight the
insider threat. These changes however, were not the result of planned reform, they were reactionary
movements to larger community failures that allowed insiders like Ames, Hanssen, and Hassan to exist.
Politicians do not like huge failures for political reasons, so large high-profile events act as motivation for
change, and to show their constituents that they are making things better103

75

DOD CP

76

1NC
CP Text: The Department of Defense should enact new
efficiency standards and guidelines for their insider threat
program.
Reform through the GAO standards solves efficiency and
insider threats
Pomerleau 15
(Mark, DOD coming up short on insider threat safeguards, GAO says, Jun 04,
2015, http://defensesystems.com/Articles/2015/06/04/DOD-insider-threatgaps-GAO.aspx?Page=1, JZG)
While certain components of DODs insider-threat implementation
program have been incorporated, other major standards have been
neglected, according to a Government Accountability Office report. Specifically, the
department has not analyzed gaps or incorporated risk assessments
into the program. Going back to 2000, DOD issued an integrated process team report to guard
against insider threats to information systems. This issue came to a head in 2010 following massive
disclosures of classified information by then-Army soldier Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning. (The report
refers to leaks by Manning and Edward Snowden, though not by name.) Congress in 2011 called for DOD to
establish an insider threat program while the White House issued an executive order establishing an
interagency task force, known as the National Insider Threat Task Force. A 2012 presidential memorandum
directed agencies to create insider threat programs by May 2013 and identified six minimum standards for
the programs: (1) designation of senior official(s); (2) information integration, analysis, and response; (3)
insider-threat program personnel; (4) access to information; (5) monitoring user activity on networks; and
(6) employee training and awareness. GAO stated that DOD and the six selected DOD components it
reviewed have begun incorporating the minimum standards, they have not done so consistently. GAOs
report, which was originally issued in a classified setting in April, notes that around that same time, DOD
made a particular point to highlight the need to mitigate insider threats in its newly updated Cyber
Strategy, which said DOD was pursuing security against insider threats through continuous network
monitoring, improved cybersecurity training for the workforce, and improved methods for identifying,
reporting, and tracking suspicious behavior. The report continued: Mitigating

the insider
threat requires good leadership and accountability throughout the
workforce. Beyond implementing policies and protocols, leaders will
strive to create a culture of awareness to anticipate, detect, and
respond to insider threats before they have an impact. Although DOD is
required to complete a continuing analysis of gaps in security measures, DOD officials reported in 2014
that this survey had been suspended due to financial and personnel limitations. This survey would have
allowed DOD to define existing insider-threat program capabilities; identify gaps in security measures; and
advocate for the technology, policies, and processes necessary to increase capabilities in the future, GAO
wrote. Without that information, the department will not know whether their capabilities for insider-threat

GAO starkly
pointed out that it found DOD had not incorporated risk assessment
s into insider threat programs. Risk assessments, GAO pointed out,
provide a basis for establishing appropriate policies and selecting
cost-effective techniques to implement these policies. Risk
assessments generally include the tasks of identifying threats and
vulnerabilities, and determining consequences. Despite the fact that some
detection and analysis are adequate and fully address the statutory requirements.

DOD officials said insider threats are included in other risk assessments, these assessments are technical
in nature and focus on the vulnerabilities of individual systems and do not provide insider-threat program
officials with complete information to make informed risk and resource decisions about how to align
cybersecurity protections. Further compounding this issue, GAO continued, is that officials in the Office of

77

the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence do not view the results of the National Security Agency
assessments or Command Cyber Readiness Inspection reports, meaning a senior-level official does not
know which specific types of risk the department is incurring. Aside from the two major flaws mentioned

GAO also picked up on a lack of guidance from the top level

of DOD. DOD officials stated that they would need supplemental planning guidance that helps them
at the outset,

identify actions, such as the key elements, beyond the minimum standards that they should take to
enhance their insider-threat programs, according to the report. The

current DOD directive

does not contain additional guidance for implementing key elements
of an insider-threat program beyond the minimum standards. A draft
implementation plan provides guidance on minimum standards but not recommended elements. DOD was
expected to release a supplemental guidance in January 2015.

78

2NC
The insider threat program has a ton of data now new
guidelines and effectiveness measures are critical to
success
Tucker 7-19
(Patrick -Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. Hes also the
author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your
Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The
Futurist for nine years. Tucker has written about emerging technology in
Slate, The Sun, MIT Technology Review, Wilson Quarterly, The American
Legion Magazine, BBC News Magazine, Utne Reader, and elsewhere, To
Prevent Insider Threats, DOD Must First Define Normal, JULY 19, 2015,
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/07/insider-threat-preventioncomplicated-automated/118099/, JZG)
Imagine your job is to anticipate when that sort of thing might occur
by using digital data produced by and about soldiers like Hasan. The
task before you is enormous. There were around 65,000 people
personnel stationed at Fort Hood at the time of Hasans rampage. If you were to scan
every piece of electronic communication between those soldiers, and their contacts, for hints of future

14,950,000 different nodespeople, devices,

and other communication pointsand up to 4,680,000,000 messages,
violence, your graph would include

according to a paper published after the incident by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or

Nevertheless, predicting such insider attacks on the basis of

digital clues is something the Defense Department is committed to
doing. Following the 2011 leak of classified documents by Army Pvt. First Class Bradley
(now Chelsea) Manning, President Obama signed Executive Order 13587,
establishing the National Insider Threat Task Force. The Defense Department and
DARPA.

the Task Force have since taken various steps to predict and prevent insider attacks. But the ultimate goal
a continuous and automated understanding of every potential threat posed by everyone with any

DOD is working to meet one

of the Task Forces key recommendations: establish a center to
coordinate its insider threat efforts, codify best practices, and
monitor the most important cases. This Defense Insider Threat Management and
connection to the defense establishment remains elusive.

Analysis Center, or DITMAC, slated to reach initial capability this fall, is meant to be able to analyze and
fuse insider threat data that it gets from different components. Full operational capability will come in 2018
or 2019. Insider threat detection, as specified by DOD requirements, will also become standard for any
defense contractor with top-secret clearance, according to forthcoming changes in the National Industrial

Key to DoDs these efforts is whats called

continuous evaluation, a method to continuously monitor personnel with important clearances
Security Program Operational Manual.

or access for changes that Department believes could make them insider threats, like credit problems,
family issues, arrests, etc. But DoD would like to be able to subject all personnel to that sort of
examination. A recent quarterly report of the Insider Threat program suggested that 225,000 personnel
would be subject to continuous evaluation by one of the CE pilot programs by the end of 2015, and 1

The DoD CE
program will automatically and continuously check records using
data from the government, commercial sources to insure to look for
warning signs. As it matures, the CE capability will continuously ingest and
million by 2017. But, as recent GAO reports make clear, progress has been uneven.

79

filter data as it becomes available and provide relevant

information to appropriate security entities for action, Mark Nehmer, who is
leading that effort as the DITMAC teams deputy chief for implementation, told Defense One in an email.

That means developing software to detect threat signals, bad credit,

unusual travel, arms purchases, etc. the second that that information becomes available.
The usefulness of continuous evaluation will depend on DODs ability
to tell normal behavior from abnormal on a department-wide scale
and do so automatically. A few years ago, DARPA funded a program called Anomaly Detection
at Multiple Scales, or ADAMS. The goal was to create, adapt and apply technology to the problem of
anomaly characterization and detection in massive data setsThe focus is on malevolent insiders that
started out as good guys. The specific goal of ADAMS is to detect anomalous behaviors before or shortly
after they turn. That set the stage for many current research efforts. Were

working through
a number of different efforts right now, behavioral analytics, to
actually try and figure out [for] all of these different known insider
threats that weve seen, what the characteristics have been of those
individuals, what are the behaviors that theyve exhibited, said Nehmer.
Where were they in their work life? Where were they in their social life? Were doing as deep a dive as we
can get on individuals that have actually exhibited insider threat behavior, Nehmer said at a recent
Defense One event. That seems straightforward enough but it presents a technical challenge as big as
big data. Consider Hasan, on whom the Army had an abundance of data. They knew that he had become
withdrawn after receiving abuse from other soldiers and that he wanted out of the military. In the summer
of 2009, they knew that Hasan had begun to buy non-issue guns. The military looks for those behaviors
among many others, as indicators of potential insider attacks. This 2011 guide to characterizing so-called
indicators of potential insider attackers lists a few of them. Socially withdraws on some occasions,
strange habits, and lacks positive identity with unit or country are Category I indicators that could
apply to every American teenager. The Category III indicators include takes unusual travel, Exhibits
sudden interest in partner nation headquarters or individual living quarters, and Stores or collects
ammunition or other items that could be used to injure or kill multiple personnel. But these clues can

The thing about normal behavior is that its

definition depends entirely on context. Normal for one person in one
job is abnormal for another. There is no normal across a department, says Nehmer,
present themselves too late.

There is no normal across a command Weve been doing some machine learning in the department and
theyve been looking at what normal behavior looks like by a single position. You go to a particular
component, you go to a sub unit in that component, and then you look at a position. We know what that
should look like. Thats where weve done the homework. For instance, say you have someone who is an
administrative assistant. And this assistant is spending a lot of time looking at foreign military websites.
And theyre downloading things off the Internet and sending emails to a foreign email address. So
someone looks into that and finds that the person is actually putting together travel for one of the flags
[flag officers], in that particular country. Nehmer says that that sort of behavior should be automatically
flagged by a user activity monitoring, or UAM, system, prompting a closer inspection by a human analyst
within the insiders component. It shouldnt necessarily trigger high institutional concern. Developing
software to automatically flag and possibly mitigate concerns as they come up will involve training

As
continuous evaluation rolls out, a higher level of surveillance is
going to become the norm across the Defense Department . Patricia
Larsen, co-director of the National Insider Threat Task Force, said that while continuous
evaluation might feel intrusive for DOD employees, it doesnt
actually represent a fundamental change from types of screening
and vetting procedures that the Department undertakes now.
Analysts looking for insider threats today can use a tool called the
Automated Continuous Evaluation System, or ACES, to run queries
about an individual across different databases. Its Google for instant background
programs on massive amounts of anonymized data related to emails, texts, and messages.

checks, not truly automatic. ACES has been running for 20 years, Larsen said. So we have been looking
at you as a person. But its been a slow, methodical and sometimes painstaking way of doing it. What
were saying is that theres a lot of information about you thats already out there. We want to put it

80

together in one place so we can short-circuit the information gathering point and get to the analysis of you
faster and be able to look at you more proactively. Carrie Wibben, director security policy and oversight
division for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) likened the new level of scrutiny to a
routine lie-detector test. I dont like that, she said, but I feel better knowing that everyone alongside me
had to go through the same polygraphic examinations that I had. Of course, continuous evaluation will be
a great deal more intrusive than a one-time polygraph session. It will, among other things, collect every
DOD workers public posts on social media along with all other communication that the Department can
legally collect. Such data could be used, as far as possible, to monitor not just credit and life changes but
each individuals current emotional state. A machine could monitor that and get a contextual feel for a
persons mood. I think thats in the future. But we have to sift through the volumes that were talking
about and you have to get a baseline for people, said Nehmer. Deriving a sense of mood or sentiment
from textual clues, perhaps in real time, is a fast-growing area of machine learning research. Consider this
paper by Chris Poulin in which he and his fellow researchers tried to use subtle language clues harvested
from social media to predict which veterans might attempt suicide. They found indicators that allowed
them to predict with better than than 65% accuracy. Then theres another worry: the data thats left off the
table. Asked how her office was looking into deep web or dark web content for insider threat indicators,
Wibben answered, Were not looking to that at all. We have to stay within the bounds of the [Standard
Form 86] consent form, so things that individuals put out there publicly, thats what were looking at right
now. If you protect it behind a password, were not looking at it at least not on the background
investigation, continuous evaluation side. All the data that DOD can obtain, legally but at no small
inconvenience to those who soldiers who create it, may still not be enough to prevent future insider
attacks from taking place.

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All Agencies are in ITP

The DOD is part of XO 13587
NCSC.gov No Date
(NATIONAL INSIDER THREAT TASK FORCE MISSION FACT SHEET,
http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/National_Insider_Threat_Task_Force_Fact_Sheet
.pdf, JZG)
Who runs the task force, and which agencies are involved? Under Executive
Order (E.O.) 13587, the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) is co-chaired by
the U.S. Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI). They, in turn, designated the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to co-direct the daily activities of the NITTF. The NITTF comprises
employees and contractors from a variety of federal departments and agencies (D/A), and its work impacts
more than 70 federal D/As that handle classified material. Currently, the following departments and
agencies have representatives on the NITTF: FBI, Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
(ONCIX), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Veterans Administration (VA), and Department of Justice (DOJ).
The NITTF responds directly to the Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee,

The Steering Committee comprises

representatives from largely Intelligence Community agencies with extensive
access to classified networks and materials, including the Departments of State,
Energy, Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security, CIA, FBI, ODNI,
ONCIX, NSA, DIA, the Program Manager--Information Sharing
Environment, Office of Management and Budget, the National
Security Council Staff, and the Information Security Oversight Office .
which was also established under E.O. 13587.

All agencies are included

NCSC.gov No Date
(NATIONAL INSIDER THREAT TASK FORCE MISSION FACT SHEET,
http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/National_Insider_Threat_Task_Force_Fact_Sheet
.pdf, JZG)
Is every agency required to implement the new minimum standards?
Yes, taken together, the E.O. and the national policy mandate that
every executive branch agency with access to classified information
establish an insider threat program in line with standards and
guidance from the NITTF. However, there is a recognition of differing levels of riskand,
therefore, differing levels of protection requiredbased on such things as size of cleared population, extent
of access to classified computer systems, and amount of classified information maintained by the D/A. The
national insider threat policy directs heads of D/As to develop their programs using risk management
principles. The NITTF is working with D/As, as well as the Classified Information Sharing and Safeguarding
Office in the office of the Program Manager--Information Sharing Executive, to assess the extent of
applicability of the minimum standards to each of the 70+ executive branch D/As with access to classified
information based on associated risk.

82

Coast Guard CP

83

1NC
CP Text: The Coast Guard should implement reforms to its
insider threat program.
Coast Guard insider threat prevention needs to be
reformed to solve
McDermott 15
(Ryan -Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets, G: Coast
Guard taking steps to reduce insider threats, but more needs to be done,
April 9, 2015, http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/ig-coast-guardtaking-steps-reduce-insider-threats-more-needs-be-done/2015-04-09, JZG)
Although the Coast Guard has taken steps to reduce insider threats,
there's still more to do, including training Coast Guard employees
about insider threat awareness, says a March 27 Homeland Security Department
inspector general report. The IG reviewed the efforts of the Coast Guard's progress toward protecting its
information technology assets from threats posed by its employees, especially those with trusted or
elevated access to sensitive but unclassified information systems or data.

Coast Guard has

generally been doing a good job, the report (pdf) says. The service established an Insider
Threat Working Group designed to implement a program focused on the insider risk and has established
the Cyber Security Operations Center to monitor and respond to potential insider threat risks. They also
implemented a process to verify that system administrators have the appropriate level of access to

Coast Guard
still needs to implement software to protect against the
unauthorized removal of sensitive information through the use of
removable media devices, such as flash drives, and email accounts.
Coast Guard also should implement stronger physical security
controls to protect Coast Guard's information technology assets
from possible loss, theft, destruction or malicious actions, the IG says.
Employees at the Coast Guard all need better threat security
awareness training, says the report. Coast Guard agreed with all of the IG's recommendations.
information technology systems and networks to perform their assigned duties. But

84

2NC
Coast guard reform is needed prevents terrorism and
allows for an effective coast guard
Kimery 15
(Anthony, Insider Threats Continue To Pose Risks To USCG, IG Audit
Found 04/07/2015, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-newsanalysis/single-article/insider-threats-continue-to-pose-risks-to-uscg-ig-auditfound/b03b06fe2027f79bc68b50d296f5864e.html, JZG)
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General (IG) concluded in
a 29-page audit report that while the US Coast Guard (USCG) has taken steps
to address the risk of insider threats to its information systems and
data, is still needs to take additional steps to further address the
risks posed by so-called trusted insiders inside the Coast Guard. An internal
breach by a trusted employee could impact [the Coast Guards]
ability to protect the nations maritime interests and environment,
the IG disclosed. Specifically, the IG said the Coast Guard needs to implement
software to protect against the unauthorized removal of sensitive
information through the use of removable media devices and email
accounts; implementing stronger physical security controls to
protect USCGs information technology assets from possible loss,
theft, destruction or malicious actions; and providing insider threat
security awareness training for all Coast Guard employees. According to
the IGs audit report, the Coast Guard has taken some steps to address the risk of insider
threats to its information systems and data, such as establishing an Insider Threat Working
Group thats designed to implement a holistic program focused on the insider risk. In
addition, the IG stated, USCG implemented a process to verify that system administrators
have the appropriate level of access to information technology systems and networks to
perform their assigned duties. Further, USCG established the Cyber Security Operations Center
to monitor and respond to potential insider threat risks or incidents against USCG information

The Coast Guard concurred with all three of the

IGs recommendations, which, if implemented, should strengthen
USCGs management of the threat posed by trusted insiders , the IG
systems and networks.

stated. In its audit of Coast Guard efforts to address the risk posed by trusted insiders, the IG
determined the USCG has taken some steps to address the risk of insider threats, but that it
also discovered additional steps [that] are needed to further reduce the risk of insider
threats to information technology assets. The IG said its testing revealed potential
vulnerabilities in technical and physical security controls that could allow for: The
unauthorized data removal from USCG information systems; and The loss, theft or destruction
of information technology assets. In addition, the IG stated, insider threat security
awareness training is needed for USCG employees. The IGs audit report stated, Trusted

insiders could be given elevated access to mission-critical assets,

including personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks or
systems. Potential threats can include damage to the United States
through espionage, terrorism and unauthorized disclosure of
national security information. Continuing, the IG said, Trusted insiders may also
be aware of weaknesses in organizational policies and procedures, as well as physical and
technical vulnerabilities in computer networks and information systems. And this
institutional knowledge poses a continual risk to the organization, the IGs audit said,
emphasizing that, In

the wrong hands, insiders use this knowledge to

85

facilitate malicious attacks on their own or collude with external

attackers to carry out such attacks. According to Coast Guard officials
interviewed at length by the IG, a malicious insider could do the most harm
to the USCG mission by: Compromising sensitive and classified
information; Damaging operational infrastructure and resources;
and Causing loss of life through workplace violence .

86

ADAMS CP

87

1NC - Solvency
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency should
substantially increase its funding for the Anomaly
Detection at Multiple Scales program.
ADAMS is still in its infancybut success makes the ITP
more effectivedestroys false positives
Keating 13 Joshua E. Keating is an associate editor at Foreign Policy. JUNE
13, 2013, Type S for Suspicious, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/13/types-for-suspicious/
Government-funded trolls. Decoy documents. Software that identifies you by how you type. Those are just
a few of the methods the Pentagon has pursued in order to find the next Edward Snowden before he leaks.

every spot-theleaker solution creates almost as many headaches as its supposed

to resolve . With more than 1.4 million Americans holding top-secret clearance throughout a complex

The small problem, military-backed researchers tell Foreign Policy, is that

network of military, government, and private agencies, rooting out the next Snowden or Bradley Manning
is a daunting task. But even before last weeks National Security Agency (NSA) revelations, the
government was funding research to see whether there are telltale signs in the mountains of data that can
help detect internal threats in advance. In the months following the WikiLeaks revelations, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) the U.S. militarys far-out tech arm put out a number of
requests for research on methods to detect suspicious behavior in large datasets as a way to root out
rogue actors like Manning (or in more extreme cases, ones like Fort Hood shooter Nidal Malik Hasan.) The
most ambitious of these is known as Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS), a program that as an
October 2010 research request put it, is meant "to create, adapt and apply technology to the problem of

The hope is that ADAMS

would develop computers that could analyze a large set of usergenerated data the emails and data requests passing through an
NSA office in Honolulu for instance and learn to detect abnormal
behavior in the system. The tricky part of this kind of analysis is not so
anomaly characterization and detection in massive data sets."

much training a computer to detect aberrant behavior theres plenty of that going around on any large
network its training a computer what to ignore. "I like to use the example of learning
to recognize the difference between reindeer and elk," wrote Oregon State University computer scientist
Tom Dietterich, who worked on developing anomaly detection methods for ADAMS, in an email to Foreign
Policy. "If all I need to do is tell these species apart, I can focus on the size [of] their antlers and whether
the antlers have velvety fur, and I dont need to consider color. But if I only focus on these features, I wont
notice that Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer is anomalous, because Im ignoring color (and noses, for that

in an anomaly detection system, it is important to consider

any attribute (or behavior) that might possibly be relevant rather
than trying to focus on a very few specific characteristics." Over the past
matter). So

three years, DARPA has shelled out millions of dollars on efforts to learn how to root out Rudolphs from the
rest of the reindeer and find out exactly what these red noses look like. This includes a $9 million award to
Georgia Tech to coordinate research on developing anomaly detection algorithms. You can peruse much of
the research funded through ADAMS online. For instance, a proposal by the New York-based firm Allure
Security Technology, founded by a Columbia University computer science professor, calls for seeding
government systems with "honeypot servers" and decoy documents meant to entice potential leakers to
subversives. The files would alert administrators when accessed and allow the system to develop models
for suspicious behavior. The company cheekily refers to this technique as "fog computing." Another
ADAMS-funded paper by Carnegie Mellon University computer scientist Kevin Killourhy looks at systems to
"distinguish people based on their typing." For instance, Killourhy explains, when three typists are asked to
type the password ".tie5Roanl," the three users can be easily identified by how long they hold down the "t"
key. The paper suggests such

technologies "could revolutionize insider-threat

detection," though unfortunately even the best systems can have an error rate of up to 63 percent,
and detection can apparently be thrown off if the person just isnt a very good typist. (Note to prospective

88

whistle-blowers: Try two-finger typing.) Under the fairly obtuse title "Non-Negative Residual Matrix
Factorization with Application to Graph Anomaly Detection," two DARPA-supported IBM researchers
attempted to identify the kind of behaviors that might indicate suspicious behavior in a large network.
These included "a connection between two nodes which belong to two remotely connected communities,"
such as an author publishing a paper on a topic not normally associated with his or her research; "portscanning like behavior," which is when a particular IP address is receiving information from an unusually
high number of other addresses; and "collusion," such as a "group of users who always give good ratings
to another group of users in order to artificially boost the reputation of the target group." The thinking has
gone somewhat beyond the theoretical level. At a conference in May, researchers from defense firm SAIC
presented results from the PRODIGAL (Proactive Discovery of Insider Threats Using Graph Analysis and
Learning) research team part of the overall ADAMS initiative which tested a series of anomaly
detection methods on an organization of approximately 5,500 users over the course of two months. "Red
teams" were inserted into the data simulating characters such as a "saboteur," an intellectual property
thief, and a "rager" someone prone to "strong, vociferous, abusive, and threatening language in

Such
systems are clearly not yet up to the task of identifying a leaker
before he or she strikes, and Dietterich, the Oregon State computer scientist, was cautious
email/Webmail/instant messages." The detection methods varied widely in effectiveness.

when asked whether they ever would be. "Anything I would say here would just be speculation, and
artificial intelligence researchers have learned the painful lesson that we are very bad at predicting when,
if, or how the methods we develop will be useful," he stated.

ADAMS may still be in the

trial stage, but "insider threat" detection was clearly a major priority for the U.S. government even
before last week. In October 2011, for instance, President Barack Obama signed an executive order calling
for the creation of an interagency Insider Threat Task Force charged with the "safeguarding of classified
information from exploitation, compromise, or other unauthorized disclosure."

89

1NC PTX Net Benefit

Black budget means no link to politics
Wired 12 02.15.12, SEE FOR YOURSELF: THE PENTAGONS $51 BILLION
BLACK BUDGET http://www.wired.com/2012/02/pentagons-black-budget/
Because its not easy saying we have the complete number. The Pentagon likes to play a
little hide and seek with its black budget. Projects with code names like the Navys
RETRACT JUNIPER and LINK PLUMERIA are simple enough to find in the research development, testing
and evaluation budget (.pdf). As are many of the Armys TRACTOR projects: TRACTOR NAIL, TRACTOR
CAGE, and so on. But then comes along a project like TRACTOR DESK hiding in one of the Armys eight
research budget documents, while others find their way to the operations and maintenance and
procurement budgets. These projects are also where to go when searching for whats getting cut.
Something called the Classified Program USD(P), formerly valued around a respectable $100 million, had
its budget reduced to zero. TRACTOR JUTE is on life support and COBRA JUDY had the sting taken out of
it. Most other projects saw lesser cuts, however, and others like RETRACT MAPLE even saw minor gains.
This is also while the researcher at Darpa only received a slight trim. The Pentagon budget also sheds light
on the shadowy world of special operations forces and their new normal requirements in Afghanistan
and other locations like the Horn of Africa. According to SOCOMs operation and maintenance budget, an
estimated 11,500 special forces personnel are expected to be in Afghanistan next year, a drop from the
12,321 (or so) commandos financed for this year. SOCOM is also getting a $796 million shave, but some
budget wizardry should make up the difference. According to the budget, $889 million was shuffled from
SOCOMs overseas spending to baseline budgets with titles like contract services and contractor
logistics support. Yet, The overall amount of troops and missions within [Afghanistan] are projected to
increase, it says. This means the special forces will require additional resources to reposition personnel
and equipment as well as increase the number of missions executed, says the report (.pdf). Though to put

the Pentagon is still spending more on classified projects

than most nations spend on their entire military forces in year. And
it in perspective,

thats just the beginning. The budget for the Military Intelligence Program was released this week, adding
another $19.2 billion down from a record $27 billion in 2010. That also doesnt include the budget for
the National Intelligence Program, which oversees spy agencies like the CIA. Their budget hasnt been
released yet but prior budgets have shown it to hover in the $50 billion range. So we could be talking

The Pentagon has

another classified budget line with the money to show for it, but
the dollar-amounts dont match the individual projects. In other
words, the exact amount the Pentagon spends on its black projects
may, in fact, be a mystery even to itself.
about $120 billion or more in black accounts. Theres also a slight problem.

90

2NC - Solvency
ADAMS key to effective data analysis
Hemsoth 12 Nicole Hemsoth, Co-Editor at The Platform, August 15, 2012,
How DARPA Does Big Data,
http://www.datanami.com/2012/08/15/how_darpa_does_big_data/
DARPA, like other government agencies worldwide, is struggling to keep up with its
lava flow of hot military intellignce data. Research and public sector organizations
have become experts at finding new ways to create data, so the challenge has been keeping up with it
effectively running fast enough to stay just ahead of the heat with the hopes of being able to understand
its source before the stream hardens and becomes static, useless. As many are already aware, these
challenges were at the heart of the U.S. governments recent big data drive, where funding was doled out
to address barriers to making use of the flood of intelligence, research and military data. This week we
wanted to take a step back and look at how a defense-oriented intelligence and research organization is
trying to capture, handle and make the best use of its data flows by highlighting select projects. Without
further delay, lets begin with the first big intel data project NEXT Who Needs Precogs When You Have
ADAMS? >> Who Needs Precogs When You Have ADAMS? Its a sad but relatively commonplace surprise
when a solider or government agent whom others might have thought to be in good mental health
suddenly begins making bad decisionseither to the detriment of national security or those around him.
When this happens, the first reaction is often one of awe, how could something like this happenhow
couldnt someone know that there was a problem before it got to such a point? In other words, in the case
of a government that has some of the most sophisticated intelligence-gathering and analysis capabilities,
how could anything slip through the cracks? DARPA is seeking to snag this problem by understanding
operative and soldier patterns via network activity and large volumes of data with a $35 million project
that has been underway since late 2010. According to DARPA, the Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales
(ADAMS) program

has been designed to create, adapt and apply

technology to anomaly characterization and detection in massive
data sets. The agency says that triggers in the large data would tip them off to possible insider
threats in which malevolent (or possibly inadvertent) actions by a trusted individual are detected against
a background of everyday network activity. DARPA says that the importance of anomaly detection is
cemented in the fact that anomalies in data translate to significant, and often critical actionable
information. They claim that operators in the counter-intelligence community are the target end users for
ADAMS insider threat detection technology. While there are not many details about the actual algorithms
or systems used to handle this information, when the project was first announced the agency was seeking
an automated and integrated modeling, correlation, exploitation, prediction, and resource management
system to handle the needs. Researchers from Georgia Tech are among those who are helping DARPA with
its insider threat detection project. Under the leadership of computer scientist Dr. David Bader, the team
has been in the midst of a $9 million, 2-year project to create a suite of algorithms that can scan for such
anomalies across a diverse pool of data, including email, text messages, file transfers and other forms of
data. To develop new approaches for identifying insider threats before an incident occurs, Georgia Tech
researchers will have access to massive data sets collected from operational environments where
individuals have explicitly agreed to be monitored. The information will include electronically recorded

ADAMS system
will be capable of pulling these terabytes of data together and using
novel algorithms to quickly analyze the information to discover
anomalies. We need to bring together high-performance computing, algorithms and systems on an
activities, such as computer logins, emails, instant messages and file transfers. The

unprecedented scale because were collecting a massive amount of information in real time for a long
period of time, explained Bader. We

are further challenged because we are

capturing the information at different rates keystroke information
is collected at very rapid rates and other information, such as file
transfers, is collected at slower rates.

91

2NC S False Positives

CP solves false positivesthats the internal link to Intel
perception solves groupthink
Defense Systems 11 Henry Kenyon, contributing writer for Defense
Systems, Nov 17, 2011, DARPA program seeks early detection of insider
threats, http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/11/17/darpa-anomalydetection-at-multiple-scales.aspx
Usually the pattern of events that leads to a person becoming an insider threat is only discovered after the
fact. Now a team of researchers funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( DARPA)

is developing a set of algorithms to detect

anomalous activity before the damage is done. DARPAs Anomaly Detection at
Multiple Scales (ADAMS) program seeks to create a software-based approach
to track a person's online work activity everything from e-mail
messages to instant messages, file access, and Web traffic to
detect anomalous behavior, explained David Bader, the projects co-principal investigator
and the Army Research Office

and a professor at the Georgia Tech School of Computational Science and Engineering and the Georgia
Tech Research Institute. The project is led by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and
includes researchers from Oregon State University, the University of Massachusetts, and Carnegie Mellon
University. The project also seeks to determine how trusted insiders become radicalized; but doing so

sifting through terabytes of data. This is a big challenge, one

that requires powerful algorithms running on high performance
computers, Bader said. One of the ADAMS program's predictive aspects
will be to find and flag suspicious behavior before a security breach
occurs. Our system tries to find these individuals who have gone down that slippery slope, but before
theyve done any crime or anything illegal, he said. ADAMS will collect data and put
the pieces together for analysts by highlighting potential threats .
requires

Researchers want the system to boil down the number of anomalies to a short list for an analyst to

The
team is taking a different approach from traditional methods that
use pattern matching and profiling by working on algorithms to identify suspicious user
activities through change detection. Because an anomaly is an unexplained event
in the context of a person's work routine, the algorithms being
developed for ADAMS will allow analysts to understand a users
behavior. Unlike pattern matching , which has many false positives , were
using a different approach to understand humans within an
organization, he said.
investigate. Today an analyst is overwhelmed with thousands of anomalies per day, said Bader.

92

2NC No Link PTX

DARPA is getting a lot more moneyit can shift it to
ADAMS
UPI 14 Proposed 2015 budget means more funding for DARPA,March 6,
2014, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/SecurityIndustry/2014/03/06/Proposed-2015-budget-means-more-funding-forDARPA/36881394141291/
WASHINGTON, March 6 (UPI) -- The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency says the Defense Department's proposed 2015 budget will restore more
of its financial resources. Those resources, it said, will allow
promising "investments in new technology-driven ideas for the
United States." "We (the United States) are faced with huge uncertainties and shifting threats, but
we also have unparalleled opportunities to advance technologies in a way that can provide the nation with
dramatic new capabilities," said DARPA Director Arati Prabhakar. The proposed Defense Department

DARPA will receive

$2.915 billion in funding for 2015 if the current budget request is
passed. The fiscal year 2014 appropriation was $2.779 billion, which restored $199 million in previously
cut funding. DARPA said it lost 20 percent in real terms between fiscal 2009-2013. The new
amount would "enable DARPA to invest more in vital areas that will
improve U.S. national security by rethinking complex military
systems, capitalizing on information at scale, and advancing biology
as technology," Prabhakar said in a release. "It also would allow DARPA to
restore funding for its basic research portfolio so that we can
continue to create new technologies in support of future
capabilities."
budget is part of President Barack Obama's budget request to Congress.

93

Disadvantages

94

Terrorism

95

1NC Terrorism
Leaks risk terrorism
Clapper 15 - Director of National Intelligence [James R. Clapper,
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate
Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2015
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
We assess that the leading state intelligence threats to US interests
in 2015 will continue to be Russia and China, based on their capabilities,
intent, and broad operational scopes. Other states in South Asia, the
Near East, and East Asia will pose increasingly sophisticated local
and regional intelligence threats to US interests. For example, Irans
intelligence and security services continue to view the United States as a
primary threat and have stated publicly that they monitor and counter US
activities in the region.
Penetrating the US national decisionmaking apparatus and
Intelligence Community will remain primary objectives for foreign
intelligence entities. Additionally, the targeting of national security
information and proprietary information from US companies and research
institutions dealing with defense, energy, finance, dual-use technology, and
other areas will be a persistent threat to US interests.
Non-state entities, including transnational organized criminals and
terrorists , will continue to employ human, technical, and cyber
intelligence capabilities that present a significant counterintelligence
challenge. Like state intelligence services, these non-state entities
recruit sources and perform physical and technical surveillance to
facilitate their illegal activities and avoid detection and capture.
The internationalization of critical US supply chains and service infrastructure,
including for the ICT, civil infrastructure, and national security sectors,
increases the potential for subversion. This threat includes individuals, small
groups of hacktivists, commercial firms, and state intelligence services.
Trusted insiders who disclose sensitive US Government information
without authorization will remain a significant threat in 2015. The
technical sophistication and availability of information technology that
can be used for nefarious purposes exacerbates this threat. Pg. 2

96

Politics

97

1NC Politics Link

Massive congressional opposition to eliminating the
Insider Threat Program. National Defense Authorization
Act proves
Aftergood 14 - Directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. [Steven
Aftergood, Congress Tells DoD to Report on Leaks, Insider Threats, Federation
of American Scientist, Posted on Dec.08, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/o4tq4y9
For the next two years, Congress wants to receive quarterly reports
from the Department of Defense on how the Pentagon is responding to
leaks of classified information. The reporting requirement was included
in the pending National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015 (Sec.
1052).
Compromises of classified information cause indiscriminate and
long-lasting damage to United States national security and often have a
direct impact on the safety of warfighters, the Act states.
In 2010, hundreds of thousands of classified documents were illegally copied
and disclosed across the Internet, it says, presumably referring to the
WikiLeaks disclosures of that year.
In 2013, nearly 1,700,000 files were downloaded from United States
Government information systems, threatening the national security of the
United States and placing the lives of United States personnel at extreme
risk, the Act states, in a presumed reference to the Snowden disclosures.
The majority of the information compromised relates to the capabilities,
operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Armed Forces of the
United States, and is the single greatest quantitative compromise in the
history of the United States.
The Secretary of Defense will be required to report on changes in policy and
resource allocations that are adopted in response to significant compromises
of classified information.
The defense authorization act does not address irregularities in the
classification system, such as overclassification or failure to timely declassify
information.
It does call for additional reporting on the Department of Defense
insider threat program (Sec. 1628), and on the adoption of an
interim capability to continuously evaluate the security status of the
employees and contractors of the Department who have been
determined eligible for and granted access to classified
information.
By definition, this continuous evaluation approach does not focus on
suspicious individuals or activities, but rather is designed to monitor all
security-cleared personnel.

98

2NC/1NR Politics Links

Bipartisan support for the insider threat program
Sasso 13
(Brendan, Senators back NSA bill, target insider threats, 11/06/13,
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/189416-senate-panel-advancessurveillance-funding, JZG)
The Senate Intelligence Committee has advanced legislation to
reauthorize funding for the National Security Agency and surveillance
programs. The bill includes new funding for technology to combat
"insider threats" and leaks of classified information. The committee
approved the legislation in a 13-2 vote late Tuesday. The approval of the annual
funding measure comes after leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden earlier this year revealed

The bill
would empower the director of national intelligence to make
improvements to the government's process for investigating people
with security clearances, such as Snowden. Intelligence officials say the Snowden leaks have
controversial details about the scope of the government's secret surveillance programs.

damaged the ability of the U.S. to spy on terrorists and thwart attacks. The bill would create new
protections for "legitimate" whistle-blowers to bring their concerns to Congress or agency leaders, the
committee said. The measure would also make the NSA director and inspector general subject to Senate
confirmation. "We recognize that budget reductions and sequestration are impacting our intelligence
agencies, and Congress has a responsibility to ensure the [director of national intelligence] and other
intelligence leaders have the resources and flexibility they need to protect the nation, committee
Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said in a statement. The exact level of funding for the surveillance
programs is classified. According to documents leaked by Snowden to The Washington Post, the "black
budget" for intelligence operations in 2013 was $52.6 billion, including $10.8 billion for the NSA alone. The
funding reauthorization bill now heads to the Senate floor. The House Intelligence Committee has yet to
move companion legislation.

Both houses support the ITP

Abbott 13
(Maxwell, PR Watch, Bills in Congress Crack Down on Whistleblowers, 21
December 2013, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20777-bills-incongress-crackdown-on-whistleblowers#, JZG)
President Obama was elected on a platform that included promises for increased transparency and
openness in government. Despite this rhetoric, Obama has prosecuted more whistleblowers than any
administration in history and overseen the massive growth of the NSA's surveillance apparatus. In

the Senate (S. 1681) and House (H.R. 3381) Intelligence Committees
each released their own version of the "Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014." This was an opportunity for Congressional leadership to address one of the
November,

defining issues of our time and either take a stand for increased transparency or continue down an
Orwellian path of pervasive secrecy. A review of each chamber's proposed legislation demonstrates that

The bills contain provisions which will

intensify efforts to stop whistleblowers or "insider threats," no doubt
inspired by Edward Snowden and his release of sensitive NSA
documents. The House version of the funding bill provides $75
million of increased funding specifically for classified information protection. According to
"1984" is the future. Stopping "Insider Threats"

Tom Devine, Legal Director of the Government Accountability Project, "the 'insider threat' program is a
cover for a witch hunt of whistleblowers."

99

The media and both parties support being tough on

whistleblowers
Hanrahan 15 John Hanrahan is a former executive director of The Fund
for Investigative Journalism and reporter for The Washington Post, The
Washington Star, UPI and other news organizations. He also has extensive
experience as a legal investigator. Hanrahan is the author of Government by
Contract and co-author of Lost Frontier: The Marketing of Alaska. 6-25-2015
("War on Whistleblowers, After Obama,"consortium news, 6-25-2015,
Available Online at https://consortiumnews.com/2015/06/25/war-onwhistleblowers-after-obama/, Accessed 7-14-2015)
And heres another thing: With leaders of both political parties having
either kept silent or cheered on the Obama administrations
unprecedented crackdown on whistleblowers, who in high position in
Congress would have one shred of moral authority or credibility to challenge
a future presidents excesses under the Espionage Act? On the question of
keeping American citizens in the dark and of punishing
whistleblowers who dare to enlighten them, we truly have bipartisan
authoritarianism.
NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden speaking in Moscow on Oct. 9, 2013.
(From a video posted by WikiLeaks)
NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden speaking in Moscow on Oct. 9, 2013.
(From a video posted by WikiLeaks)
And then a third thing: Dont count much on major U.S. news media for
any meaningful oversight of, and opposition to, the treatment of
whistleblowers under future presidents. The mainstream press and bigname journalists with some intermittent, notable exceptions such as these
two New York Times editorials and this Newark Star-Ledger editorial have
largely ignored the jail-the-whistleblowers policies of the Obama
administration.
Or, worse, as weve reported before, some of the most prominent
names in the media joined elected and appointed government
officials in calling for harsh penalties for Edward Snowden, Chelsea
Manning, Julian Assange and Wikileaks, and others whom they claim
(without proof) to have endangered U.S. national security by
providing classified information to the news media.
With his Justice Department having produced three times as many Espionage
Act indictments for classified document disclosure as all other administrations
combined since the passage of that legislation back in 1917, Obama has
opened the door for his successors to continue and even expand the
assault on national security state whistleblowers who act in the public
interest.
Would any of the announced presidential candidates close that door after
Obama leaves office in January 2017? Again, as with leading journalists and
members of Congress, dont count on it.
Its an open question as to whether any future president could be more
aggressive than Obama in going after whistleblowers. But based on the
100

vengeful views of many of the large crop of Republican candidates

and on Democratic front-runner Hillary Clintons tough statements
on Edward Snowdens NSA spying disclosures, prospects are not
good for a sharp departure from the whistleblower crackdown of the
last six years. Clinton and leading Republican candidates take the
hard line that Snowden committed a serious crime and must be
punished for it, with no chance of leniency.

Obama is all in on the war on whistleblowers [then some

flip flop link in the other ptx file]
Chapman 15 Chapman is president and founder of the American Small
Business League, 4-30-2015 ("Congress should investigate the war on
government whistleblowers," 4-30-2015, Available Online at
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/the-administration/240592-congressshould-investigate-the-war-on-government, Accessed 7-14-2015)
I searched the phrase Obamas war on whistleblowers the other
day and was stunned at the number of stories that popped up on the
Internet. The Obama administrations unprecedented war on
whistleblowers and the administrations historic lack of
transparency has been reported all around the world.
Academy award winning director Robert Greenwalds documentary, The War
on Whistleblowers, chronicles the nightmare four individuals endured to
expose unsafe weapons systems at the Pentagon and illegal activities by
federal agencies.
Congress should hold hearings on why federal employees and private citizens
that have exposed blatant wrong doing by federal contractors and illegal
behavior by federal agencies continue to be harassed and persecuted.
Individuals that report fraud and illegal activities by federal agencies are still
having their careers ruined and in some cases facing federal prosecution and
even harassment by the IRS.
If you uncover a government contractor that has cheated the federal
government you can receive millions in rewards under the False Claims Act. I
think the same principal should apply for uncovering fraud within the federal
government. If a federal employee or private citizen exposes fraud within the
federal government they should be assisted and protected not persecuted
and prosecuted.
have won dozens of legal battles with the federal government under the
Freedom of Information Act. My research prompted the first GAO investigation
into fraud in federal small business contracting programs. Now the House
Small Business Committee has unanimously adopted an amendment to
request yet another GAO investigation into fraud in federal small business
contracting programs based on my research. Rep. Janice Hahn (D-Calif.)
drafted the amendment to uncover why Fortune 500 firms continue to land
billions in federal small business contracts year after year. The federal
government should support and protect private citizens like myself that
101

expose fraud and abuse within the government, but unfortunately that has
not been my experience.
I recently won a major Freedom of Information Act case against the Pentagon.
Federal District Court Judge William Alsup described me as being in a David
and Goliath battle with big government. In talking about the Pentagons
efforts to withhold information Judge Alsup stated, and here is the United
States covering it up. In a subsequent hearing he accused the Pentagon of
trying to suppress the evidence. Is the United States Department of Justice
helping me to uncover abuse and mismanagement at the Pentagon? No, the
Department of Justice is representing the Pentagon and essentially helping
them withhold evidence of possible fraud and abuse in the Pentagons
Comprehensive Subcontracting Plan Test Program (CSPTP).
It seems like Im doing the job the Justice Department and the SBA Office of
Inspector General should be doing. Shouldnt they be doing all the work I
have done to expose fraud and abuse in federal small business contracting
and subcontracting programs?
Looking at the way whistleblowers have been treated recently Im
concerned that Im more likely to get a retaliatory IRS audit and/or
prosecution by the Department of Justice than any kind of protection
or assistance from the federal government.

Flip flopping when it comes to Executive Orders drains

Political Capital immigration proves
Brown 14 Carrie Budoff Brown is the editor of POLITICO Europe. , 7-252014 ("Obama's immigration flip flop," POLITICO, 7-25-2014, Available Online
at http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/barack-obama-immigration-rhetoricthen-vs-now-109352.html, Accessed 7-14-2015)
Obamas pledge to use his executive powers by the end of the
summer marked both a dramatic reversal in rhetoric and a major
strategic shift on immigration. The president is no longer
emphasizing his own powerlessness but rather his determination to
fix as much of our immigration system as I can on my own, without
Congress.
The administration is examining how far it can go, legally and politically, to
protect millions of undocumented immigrants from deportation. Despite the
flow of young Central American children across the southwestern border,
Obama remains committed to taking significant action, according to senior
advisers and advocates who have attended recent meetings with White
House officials.
In other words, Obama has signaled that he intends to do exactly what hes
long said hes unable to do.
I take executive action only when we have a serious problem, a serious
issue, and Congress chooses to do nothing, Obama said last month in his
Rose Garden announcement. And in this situation, the failure of House
Republicans to pass a darn bill is bad for our security, its bad for our
economy, and its bad for our future.
102

Even immigrant rights advocates, who were on the receiving end of the White
House denials for years, were surprised by his abrupt and enthusiastic move
toward executive action in June after House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio)
ruled out a legislative overhaul of immigration this year. Activists had gotten
so fed up in recent months that some tagged the president as the deporterin-chief and demanded that he shift immediately from a legislative strategy
to an administrative one.
The way they talked about it was, Theres nothing we can do, only
Congress can solve it, we dont have the authority, said Lorella Praeli,
director of advocacy and policy for United We Dream. That is very different
from what they are saying today. It is completely different.
The shift could be used by critics as an example of Obama saying
one thing and doing something else, another evolution, in White
House parlance, on a hot-button social issue. Some Republicans see
it as fertile ground for advancing their midterm election strategy,
which focuses on raising questions about the presidents credibility
and competence.
It brings into question, when he commits to other things, whether
he will keep that commitment, said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who
worked closely with Obama on passing a Senate immigration overhaul bill last
year. Things in this town, to a large degree, are done on peoples
commitments.

Executive Orders divide Democrats and unite the GOP

against Obama.
Kraushaar 14 Josh Kraushaar is the political editor for National Journal,
and pens the weekly "Against the Grain" column. Kraushaar has been
managing editor for politics at National Journal, and as executive editor and
editor-in-chief of The Hotline. In addition to his management of The Hotline,
Kraushaar plays a critical role in shaping National Journal's overall political
coverage. He was a political correspondent for PoliticoKraushaar has also
served as the editor of House Race Hotline. Kraushaar has appeared as a
political analyst on television and radio, including FOX News, MSNBC, CNN,
National Public Radio and C-SPAN., 11-18-2014 ("Obama's Agenda Threatens
to Divide the Democratic Party," nationaljournal, 11-18-2014, Available Online
at http://www.nationaljournal.com/against-the-grain/obama-s-agendathreatens-to-divide-the-democratic-party-20141118, Accessed 7-14-2015)
President Obama's biggest problem over the next two years may not
be coming from recalcitrant Republicans, but from members of his
own party blanching at his activist agenda over the final two years
of his presidency. While the midterm election results suggested widespread
dissatisfaction with the president's policies, Obama nonetheless is planning to
press forward on several polarizing decisions in his final two years. It could
help advance his legacy, but come at the expense of the Democratic Party's
long-term health.
103

Three of the administration's biggest agenda itemsthreatening a veto of

bipartisan legislation authorizing construction of the Keystone XL pipeline,
reaching a nuclear deal with Iran, and issuing an executive order
legalizing millions of illegal immigrantsdivide Democrats, and unite
Republicans. If the president moves forward with all of them, it
would aggravate fissures in an increasingly-divided Democratic
Party. And it would put Hillary Clinton, his party's expected 2016 standardbearer, in an uncomfortable position even before she announces her
candidacy. She's already avoided taking stances, if not outright rejecting the
direction Obama is heading during his final two years in office.
The dirty secret in Washington is that while Obama (rightly) blamed
Republicans for holding positions to the right of the American electorate, the
president is pursuing policies that are equally as far to the left.
Approving construction of the long-delayed Keystone XL pipeline may not be
the most consequential legislation, but it is symbolic of the lengths the
administration has gone to avoid a postelection bipartisan accomplishment.
Embattled Sen. Mary Landrieu, on the ballot next month in a Louisiana Senate
runoff, has been furiously lobbying colleagues to approve the pipeline, and
won support from 14 Democrats in an unsuccessful vote Tuesday. A new USA
Today poll of adults, conducted last week, found strong support for it60
percent backing construction of the Keystone pipeline, with only 25 percent
opposed. This month, the Pew Research Center found even 44 percent of
Democrats supporting it, with 46 percent opposed. When Republicans take
control of the Senate in January, it's expected to pass with at least 63 votes.
A president looking to change the tone in Washington would be well-served to
find common ground on an issue that members of both parties agree on. But
instead, he dismissed its job-creating benefits and left his spokesman, Josh
Earnest, to hint at a veto last week. The project has now been delayed for six
years. Given that energy issues played a consequential role in Senate
contests from Colorado to Kentuckyand are dooming the prospects of an
otherwise-reliable ally in Landrieuthe administration's stubbornness on the
issue is baffling. If it's only a symbolic issue, why not use it to build some
confidence-building capital with Republicans on other more significant goals?
Blame environmental activists, who make up a small slice of the Democratic
electorate but an outsize share of influence, for the gridlock. The president is
either being held hostage by his base, or is in sync ideologically with their
interests. Either way, it's remarkably similar to the problems Republican
congressional leaders faced with their rank-and-filea conflict that led to the
deeply unpopular government shutdown. (And as I wrote in last week's
column, there are clear signs that the incoming Republican-controlled House
and Senate are more pragmatic than their predecessors, making the
president's leftward lurch before the next Congress is even sworn in a case of
awful timing.)
Public opinion is more closely divided on immigration reform.
Majorities sympathize with the ends but not the means of the
administration's intent to issue an executive order legalizing millions
of undocumented immigrants. There's a reason that the president
104

avoided intervening in the middle of the midterm campaign, a

telltale acknowledgement that a unilateral decision was a major
political loser. The latest round of polling backs that up. Among all
adults surveyed in a new USA Today poll, a 46 percent plurality want
the president to wait for the GOP Congress to act on immigration,
while 42 percent support the president's desire to act now. If the
sample was of registered voters, the margin would be even greater.
Within the White House, the prevailing political support for the sweeping
executive action is twofold: Win back enthusiasm from Hispanic voters, and
bait Republicans into opposing the move in the most self-defeating way
possible. It's a risky political decision, one that downplays the fact that the
White House is running against public opinion on the issue and spending the
little political capital Obama has left in doing so. There's hardly a guarantee
that Hispanics would respond to the executive order by turning out for
Hillary Clinton, and it could spark a backlash from blue-collar voters
migrating away from the party. Over one-quarter of Democrats
oppose unilateral action on immigration, a significant enough
minority to cause the party future problems. In the meantime, it
risks foreclosing other opportunities for working with the GOP
Congress on trade, tax reform, or even a scaled-back version of
immigration reform in the future. Again, Obama is playing to the base over
reaching out to the middle.

Unknown cost of Executive Orders cause fights and drain

PC
Gregory Korte, 15 Gregory Korte is a White House reporter for USA
TODAY, focusing on executive power and the presidency, 3-21-2015 ("How
much do executive orders cost? No one knows," USA TODAY, 3-21-2015,
Available Online at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/21/cost-of-obamaexecutive-orders/25024489/, Accessed 7-14-2015)
Public opinion is more closely divided on immigration reform.
Majorities sympathize with the ends but not the means of the
administration's intent to issue an executive order legalizing millions of
undocumented immigrants. There's a reason that the president avoided
intervening in the middle of the midterm campaign, a telltale
acknowledgement that a unilateral decision was a major political loser. The
latest round of polling backs that up. Among all adults surveyed in a new USA
Today poll, a 46 percent plurality want the president to wait for the GOP
Congress to act on immigration, while 42 percent support the president's
desire to act now. If the sample was of registered voters, the margin would be
even greater.
Within the White House, the prevailing political support for the
sweeping executive action is twofold: Win back enthusiasm from
Hispanic voters, and bait Republicans into opposing the move in the
most self-defeating way possible. It's a risky political decision, one
105

that downplays the fact that the White House is running against
public opinion on the issue and spending the little political capital
Obama has left in doing so. There's hardly a guarantee that
Hispanics would respond to the executive order by turning out for
Hillary Clinton, and it could spark a backlash from blue-collar voters
migrating away from the party. Over one-quarter of Democrats
oppose unilateral action on immigration, a significant enough
minority to cause the party future problems. In the meantime, it risks
foreclosing other opportunities for working with the GOP Congress on trade,
tax reform, or even a scaled-back version of immigration reform in the future.
Again, Obama is playing to the base over reaching out to the middle.
When President Obama issued an executive order granting civilian
federal employees a 1% pay raise last December, the White House
did not tell Congress how much those raises would cost.
Instead, White House Office of Management and Budget Director Shaun
Donovan said in a report that the order "is not anticipated to increase
discretionary obligations and outlays overall."
To Rep. Ander Crenshaw, R-Fla., that statement is "ludicrous."
As Congress and the White House battle over whether Obama has
the executive authority to halt deportation, delay implementation of
the Affordable Care Act or negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran,
another skirmish has opened up over the question of how much
Obama's executive orders cost.
The answer: No one knows.
Crenshaw, the chairman of a House appropriations subcommittee that
controls the White House budget, is trying to fix that. He inserted a provision
into the spending bill passed by Congress last year, requiring OMB to issue a
statement on the budgetary impact of each executive order.
But 10 executive orders later, Congress has no more insight into
their cost. OMB has declared six to have a "de minimus," or trivial,
effect on costs or revenues, and four are expected to increase
spending by an unknown amount.
For example, an executive order signed Thursday, requiring agencies
to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 40%, contains the same
boilerplate language as the pay raise. "This executive order is not
anticipated to increase discretionary obligations and outlays
overall." But it also suggests long-term cost savings through
decreased energy and water use.

Congress continues to support Insider Threat

Aftergood 14 Steven Aftergood directs the FAS Project on Government
Secrecy.("Congress Tells DoD to Report on Leaks, Insider Threats," Federation
Of American Scientists, 12-8-2014, Available Online at
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/12/dod-leaks-report/, Accessed 7-16-2015)
For the next two years, Congress wants to receive quarterly reports
from the Department of Defense on how the Pentagon is responding
106

to leaks of classified information. The reporting requirement was

included in the pending National Defense Authorization Act for FY
2015 (Sec. 1052).
Compromises of classified information cause indiscriminate and
long-lasting damage to United States national security and often
have a direct impact on the safety of warfighters, the Act states.
In 2010, hundreds of thousands of classified documents were illegally copied
and disclosed across the Internet, it says, presumably referring to the
WikiLeaks disclosures of that year.
In 2013, nearly 1,700,000 files were downloaded from United States
Government information systems, threatening the national security
of the United States and placing the lives of United States personnel
at extreme risk, the Act states, in a presumed reference to the
Snowden disclosures. The majority of the information compromised
relates to the capabilities, operations, tactics, techniques, and
procedures of the Armed Forces of the United States, and is the
single greatest quantitative compromise in the history of the United
States.
The Secretary of Defense will be required to report on changes in
policy and resource allocations that are adopted in response to significant
compromises of classified information.
The defense authorization act does not address irregularities in the
classification system, such as overclassification or failure to timely declassify
information.
It does call for additional reporting on the Department of Defense
insider threat program (Sec. 1628), and on the adoption of an interim
capability to continuously evaluate the security status of the employees and
contractors of the Department who have been determined eligible for and
granted access to classified information.

107

Insider Threat DA

108

UQ/Links
The NITTF is vital for national security but still preserves
an environment of productivity and trust
NCSC, 14, (National Insider Threat Task Force Mission Fact Sheet, NCSC,
Aug 15, 2014,
http://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/National_Insider_Threat_Task_Force_Fact_Sheet
.pdf)//erg
Why was the NITTF established? The National Insider Threat Task Force was established after the WikiLeaks

Its mission is
to deter, detect and mitigate actions by employees who may
represent a threat to national security by developing a national
insider threat program with supporting policy, standards, guidance
and training. Who runs the task force, and which agencies are involved? Under Executive Order
release of thousands of classified documents through the global media and internet.

(E.O.) 13587, the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) is cochairedbytheU.S.AttorneyGeneralandtheDirectorofNationalIntelligence(DNI). They,in turn, designated the

National Counterintelligence Executive

(NCIX) to co-direct the daily activities of the NITTF. The NITTF comprises
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the

employees and contractors from a variety of federal departments and agencies (D/A), and its work impacts

Currently, the following

departments and agencies have representatives on the NITTF: FBI,
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX),
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Veterans Administration (VA),
and Department of Justice (DOJ). The NITTF responds directly to the Senior Information
more than 70 federal D/As that handle classified material.

Sharing and Safeguarding Steering Committee, which was also established under E.O. 13587. The Steering
Committee comprises representatives from largely Intelligence Community agencies with extensive access
to classified networks and materials, including the Departments of State, Energy, Justice, Defense, and
Homeland Security, CIA, FBI, ODNI, ONCIX, NSA, DIA, the Program Manager--Information Sharing
Environment, Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council Staff, and the Information
Security Oversight Office. What is an insider threat? It is a threat posed to U.S. national security by
someone who misuses or betrays, wittingly or unwittingly, his or her authorized access to any U.S.

This threat can include damage through espionage,

terrorism, sabotage, unauthorized disclosure of national security
information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental
resources or capabilities. How does the task force operate? The NITTF has
drawn together expertise from across the government in the areas
of security, counterintelligence, and information assurance to
develop the policies and standards necessary for individual D/As to
implement insider threat programs. Part of the NITTF effort involves hosting
training and providing D/As with assistance to better educate their workforce to
recognize potential insider threat activity, without creating an
atmosphere of distrust . The NITTF conducts assessments of the adequacy of insider threat
Government resource.

programs within individual D/As. Through its interface with individual D/As, the NITTF identifies and
circulates best practices for detecting, deterring and mitigating emerging threats, and continues to assist

Detection of potentially
malicious behavior involves authorized insider threat personnel
gathering information from many sources and analyzing that
information for clues or behavior of concern. A single indicator may
109
D/As in troubleshooting issues. How do you detect an insider threat?

say little; however, if taken together with other indicators, a pattern

of concerning behavior may arise that can add up to someone who
could pose a threat . It is important to consider relevant information from
multiple sources to determine if an employees behavior deserves closer scrutiny, or whether a
matter should be formally brought to the attention of an investigative or administrative entity, such as the
FBI or an agencys Inspector General. It is also possible that the individual has no malicious intent, but is in
need of help. In either case, the individual may pose a threat to national security, and the situation
requires further inquiry.

DOD insider threat prevention is getting better now- new

tech and behavioral analysis solve threats
Pomerleau 15
(Mark, Jul 16, 2015, DOD trying behavioral analytics as a way to thwart
insider threats, http://defensesystems.com/Articles/2015/07/16/DOD-ICbehavioral-analytics-insider-threats.aspx?Page=3, JZG)
The thought of a data breach such as the one that hit the Office of Personnel Management
is truly frightening to government officials and the public at large. The sensitive
personal data of tens of millions of federal employees that has been lifted recently not only puts
individuals at risk, but compromises certain operational practices of the U.S. military/intelligence complex.
But while these incidents are disturbing, they are also to be expected. To grab the equivalent in the
Chinese system, I would not have thought twice, former CIA and NSA chief Gen. Michael Hayden (ret.)
said recently about the OPM hacks thought to be perpetrated by China. I would not have asked
permission...This is not shame on China. This is shame on us for not protecting that kind of information.
And while the U.S. works to exploit intelligence gaps and deficiencies of adversaries and protect its own

one other trend that has blindsided the defense and

intelligence communities cant be overlookedleaks from the inside.
The insider threat has posed significant challenges, from the trove
of millions of documents unearthed by former contractor Edward Snowden to the
documents released by former Army Pvt. Chelsea Manning. The insider threat is not new.
But what is changing is that threat landscape, Patricia Larsen, codirector of the National Insider Threat Task Force of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, said this week during a panel discussion in Arlington,
Va., hosted by Defense One. Larsen noted that in the not-so-distant past, these
types of breaches were much harder to pull off. One had to stand at a copier,
copy several pages, and meet someone somewhere. Now, somebody sitting at the
comfort of their desk can go to a websiteand find their secure drop page and
upload a classified document or something sensitive, still be anonymous and
have that published in tomorrows Washington PostThat is a whole different
paradigm, she warned. For Larsen, however, the part of the solution for mitigating
potential threats also poses a risk if one is capable of getting into
the system. In the past, it was very hard to get a lot of information
about you as a person in one place, she said. Now, it is so much easier to pull the
entire 360 of an individual using technology and using all the data weve collected on you. That is a
great, great asset for any insider threat program. Its also a liability
because that same individual can access a ton of information sitting
from the comfort of their own workstation as well. The Defense
Department is trying a few different technological approaches to
mitigating the insider threat, through various beta programs and
behavioral analytics. One such effort is the creation of the DOD Insider
110
data from similar attacks,

Threat Management and Analysis Center, or DITMAC, which would

enable information sharing collaboration analysis and risk
management across the Department of Defense components to
address current and emerging threats to DOD personnel and
missions, said Mark Nehmer, deputy chief of implementation for DITMAC. In 2013, then-Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel outlined the establishment of DITMAC as one of four key recommendations following

DITMAC has worked to really gather

and fuse relative information from different data sources within the
department, said Carrie Wibben, director of Security Policy Operations Directorate at the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense. Information Management Enterprise System
Application, or IMESA, is another approach being used to vet individuals
with regard to workplace violence, Wibben said. IMESA is also useful for evaluating the
the Navy Yard shooting. Over the past year,

identity of individuals by comparing Common Access Cards with information in internal and external

DOD also is working with

behavioral analytics, Nehmer said, to compile the indicators,
characteristics and behaviors associated with insider threats , including
databases to ensure that individuals are who they say they are.

how theyve written, where were they in social media, where were they in their work life, where were they
in their personal life that we know of that we can find as deep a dive as we can get on the individuals
that we know have actually committed insider threat behaviors. But despite the push of what Nehmer
called this human science, he said hes not sure when DOD will be able to establish verifiable metrics for
identifying insider threats. The other component to the behavioral issue is tying it to authorizing users
within the network. Authentication goes back to identity. It says youre credentialed to get in. But what if
you steal the credentials? Well now youre authorized, you have the authority to be there but you still
shouldnt, Christine Heckart, CMO of Brocade, a data storage and networking solutions firm, said in an
interview in June. So, weve got to look beyond identity, beyond the normal sources of authentication to
behavior. The network can understand and take a benchmark on all kinds of behavioral based analytics.
What is the norm? And the minute you start deviating from that norm, you can say alright, there might be

Heckart explained that in real time, the network can

respond by either stopping traffic and calling for more analytics or
shutting down operations until a human authorizes the activity.
Once we add behavioral-based analytics and tools to the identity
and credentialed based system, youve got additional layers, of
security protection, she said. Expanded use of multi-factor authentication is something that
a problem.

many security experts and Federal CIO Tony Scott have called for, especially after recent high-profile
security breaches. Going forward, one challenge regarding analyzing online behavior, however, is context.
Computers and humans have not figured out a way to determine context of social media postings to
determine the tone, be it serious or sarcastic, though, this is only one component of a multi-pronged risk
assessment.

Litany of reasons the program is good

Amjad and Gelles, 15, (Adnan, partner, Cyber Risk Services, Deloitte
& Touche LLP and Michael, director, Deloitte Consulting LLP, 9 Building
Blocks of Insider Threat Mitigation Programs, CIO Journal, March 23, 2015,
http://deloitte.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/23/9-building-blocks-of-insider-threatmitigation-programs/)//erg
A definition of insider threats. Few organizations have a specific internal working definition of insider
threats because theyve traditionally paid more attention to preventing external attacks. Yet defining what
constitutes an insider threat is an essential first step in formulating a mitigation program; it helps to inform
the programs size, structure, scope, and alignment with business risk priorities. Broadly speaking, an
insider threat can be defined as an employee, contractor, or vendor that either maliciously or due to
complacency or ignorance uses privileged access in a way that results in malfeasance, whether fraud,

Its important to
prioritize the critical assets requiring extra protectionfor example,
111
espionage, sabotage, data theft, or workplace violence. A risk assessment.

facilities, source code, and customer informationand determine the

organizations tolerance for loss of or damage to those assets .
Identify the top threats that could affect your business and consider
vulnerabilities from a technology and process perspective : What
weaknesses or loopholes could an insider abuse? How could an employee exploit or damage a facility,
product, process, or fellow employees without ever using a computer system? Tailor the development of
the insider threat mitigation program to address those specific needs and threats, and take into account
the organizations culturein other words, the specific measures it may or may not be willing to take (such
as monitoring employees, blocking Web mail, or restricting the use of USB drives) to protect critical assets
while sustaining the way it has traditionally operated and done business. Broad-based support. An insider
threat mitigation program should have one owner but comprise a broad set of invested stakeholders. It
should also have top leadership support. Consider establishing a cross-disciplinary insider threat working
group with stakeholders from a variety of functions that may include HR, risk, legal, finance, IT, and
research and development (R&D). These stakeholders can serve as change agents and cement buy-in from
their respective functions. The working group should assist in addressing common concerns, such as
privacy and legal issues, and support the development of messaging tailored to executives, managers, and

Identity and access management

systems, compliant provision systems, data loss prevention systems,
digital rights management systems, and encryption are just a few of
the technologies companies can implement to help monitor and prevent unauthorized access and
restrict employees ability to download, print, or transmit certain
data assets. People-centric policies and training. While technology is an essential
component of detecting and preventing insider threats, insider
threats are fundamentally a people issue that involves a peoplecentric solution.
Consequently, an insider threat mitigation program should define the
behavioral expectations of the workforce through clear and
consistently enforced policies that also articulate the consequences
for violating them. Policy areas might include segregation of duties, social media, processes for
the broader employee population. Technology.

reporting incidents, and bring your own device. The program should also include customized security
training based on employees physical and network access levels, privilege rights, and job responsibilities.
Audits and verification.

Establishing routine and random reviews of

privileged and critical functions such as IT, finance, and R&D can also
help identify potential insider threats. Continually monitor systems that employees in
those functions access and the data they download. Organizations should trust their workforce, but
balance that trust with verification to avoid unfettered access and single points of failure. Behavioral

Case studies analyzed by the CERT Division of the Software Engineering

have shown that insider threats are seldom
impulsive acts. Instead, the analyses indicate that insiders move on a continuum
from idea to action. Along the way, they often display observable
behaviors that can serve as risk indicators or otherwise signal
malicious intent: They may begin coming in late to work, staying at the office after hours,
violating policies, or trying to access systems or facilities they dont typically use. Therefore, effective
detection of insider threats should include behavioral-based
techniques that consider how people operate in the office and on the network,
and build baselines of normal behavior to help identify anomalies.
Analytics. Correlating precursors or potential risk indicators can give
organizations insights into micro and macro trends regarding the
high-risk behaviors exhibited across the organization . An advanced analytics
platform that correlates data from a variety of tools can help
organizations identify potential insider threats to investigate . Analytics
analysis.

Institute at Carnegie Mellon University

112

can also shed light on processes and policies that the organization should either strengthen or implement;
these processes can often enhance efficiency and productivity.

Status quo solvesthe program is becoming more

targeted and effectiveits necessary for security
Dillard, 14, (John, President of Big Sky, application of evidence-based
management science to security and insider threats, Changes To National
Insider Threat Policy: Is Your Agency Prepared? Big Sky, 2014,
http://www.bigskyassociates.com/blog/bid/370857/Changes-To-NationalInsider-Threat-Policy-Is-Your-Agency-Prepared)//erg
Until recently, national insider threat policy wasnt measuring if your agencys insider threat detection
program actually identified insider threats. The only measure was that you had a program that met certain

all of that is changing fast , especially for agencies

under the Department of Defense. (Other agencies likely need to follow suit, more
below.) Because of major insider threat incidents like THE WASHINGTON
NAVY YARD SHOOTING and Edward Snowdens information leaks,
federal law now mandates that your agency not only have an insider
threat detection program, but that your internal organizational
security meet specific functioning standards. In order to understand what action
standards. However,

steps your agency needs to take today, we need to take a step back to review the evolving story of
national insider threat policy. Memorandum For National Insider Threat Policy In November 2012, President
Obama issued a MEMORANDUM FOR ALL AGENCIES UNDER HIS JURISDICTION entitled, The National
Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs. The policy
requires all executive departments and agencies that access classified information to establish insider

The required programs must adhere to minimum

standards for personnel security, threat and risk analysis, law
enforcement, information sharing, network monitoring and training
and awareness. Each agency and department must conduct quarterly self-assessments on insider
threat detection programs.

threat compliance and report the results to the National Insider Threat Task Force, which oversees the
policy implementation. Memorandum Failure Points As with most far-reaching national policies, many of the
memorandums requirements arent specific in expressing what insider threat compliance involves.

it is up to the agencies themselves to determine compliance. For

example, the mandatory self-assessments use metrics known as Key Information
Sharing and Safeguarding Indicators (KISSI). These are essentially yes or no
questions that assess whether an agency has an insider threat detection program. There are about
Usually,

fifty of these questions in the assessment, including: Do we have an implemented insider threat program?
Do we have an insider threat policy? Do we monitor user activities for insider threat indicators? Do we
conduct briefings for travel to countries with high-risk security threats and vulnerabilities? KISSI
assessments are useful for a high-level view of an agencys insider threat compliance, but they dont
measure the effectiveness of the program. Instead, metrics should CALCULATE THE VALUE OF DIFFERENT
EFFORTS IN PREVENTING INSIDER THREATS and should require nuanced discussion in their answers. For
example, after noting that your agency employs network monitoring tools, you should also ask: What kinds
of network monitoring tools are employed? How much do they cost? What aspects of user behavior do they
monitor? How effectively do they detect anomalous or suspicious behavior? With the Snowden affair and
Navy Yard shooting occurring after the November 2012 memorandum was issued, the failure points of the
policy became clearer. As a result, federal policy focused more intently on the effectiveness of insider

The best example

this shift toward insider threat detection effectiveness is the 2014
National Defense Authorization (NDA) Act. This law mandates the Secretary of
threat detection programs. A Shift Toward Effectiveness: The 2014 NDA Act

Defense, Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

develop a strategy to modernize personnel security for the

113

Department of Defense and reduce insider threats and espionage.

The
President and Congress also demanded that these updated processes be evaluated with specific metrics.

By assessing the effectiveness of the Defense Departments insider

threat detection program, the new law could be much more
applicable in deterring and detecting potential threats. Implications For
Other Federal Agencies While the NDA Act focuses primarily on Defense Department personnel, the
law also emphasizes the importance of sharing information between
different agencies including those not under the Department of Defense. Specifically , it
calls for the electronic integration of information systems between
every agency deemed necessary for complete insider threat
assessment and deterrence. If your agency is included in that information sharing or
system integration, then you need to prepare your agency for full compliance with the NDA Act and its

Congress and the President

arent satisfied with agency self-built and self-assessed insider
threat programs instead, theyre raising the bar. While that might initially only

insider threat detection implications. The NDA Act shows that

include the Department of Defense and a handful of connected groups, every agency should plan for the
NDAs jurisdiction to widen if its initial requirements are successful. Even if your agency doesnt fall under
the initial jurisdiction of the new law, start preparing today for more accountable insider threat detection
metrics. And since NDA requirements dont come with an explicit budget increase, plan to COMPLETE YOUR
UPGRADES WITH LITTLE OR NO BUDGET BOOST.

Insider threat program secures DoD programs that

combat terrorism and crime
Work, 14, (Robert O., Deputy Secretary of Defense, The DoD Insider
Threat Program, NUMBER 5205.16, September 30, 2014,
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520516p.pdf)//erg
1. PURPOSE.

In accordance with

sections 113 and 131 through 137 of Title 10, United States

Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (a)); Presidential Memorandum (Reference (b));

Executive Orders (E.O.s)

12333, 13526, and 13587 (References (c), (d), and (e)); section 922 of Public Law 112- 81 (Reference
(f)); National Security Directive 42 (Reference (g)), and Committee on National Security Systems Directive

Establishes policy and assigns

responsibilities within DoD to develop and maintain an insider threat
program to comply with the requirements and minimum standards to
prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by malicious insiders
who represent a threat to national security or DoD personnel,
facilities, operations, and resources. b. Identifies appropriate
training, education, and awareness initiatives that may be made
available to DoD personnel and contractors in accordance with Reference (b). c.
Ensures appropriate DoD policies, including but not limited to
counterintelligence (CI), cybersecurity, security, civilian and military
personnel management, workplace violence, emergency
management, law enforcement (LE), and antiterrorism (AT) risk
management, are evaluated and modified to effectively address
insider threats to DoD. d. Cancels Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (i)). e.
504 (Reference (h)), this directive: a.

Incorporates and cancels Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (j)). 2. APPLICABILITY. This
directive: a. Applies to: (1) OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department
of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within DoD
(referred to collectively in this directive as the DoD Components). (2) Contractors and other non-DoD

114

entities that have authorized access to DoD resources as required by their contract or agreement. (3)
Individuals who volunteer and donate their services to the DoD Components, including non-appropriated
fund instrumentalities, pursuant to DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1100.21 (Reference (k)). b. Will not alter or
supersede: (1) The existing authorities and policies of the Director of National Intelligence regarding the
protection of sensitive compartmented information and special access programs for intelligence as
directed by Reference (c) and other laws and regulations. (2) Existing statutes, E.O.s, and DoD policy
issuances governing access to or dissemination of LE, LE sensitive, or classified LE information. (3) Existing
suspicious activity reporting and dissemination requirements as outlined in DoDI 2000.26 (Reference (l)). 3.
POLICY. It is DoD policy that: a.

DoD will implement the National Insider Threat

Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat
Programs in accordance with References (b), (e), (f), and (h). b. The threat that an insider will use
their authorized access to do harm to the security of the United States requires the integration and

This threat can include damage to

the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized
disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or
degradation of resources or capabilities.

synchronization of programs across the Department.

Insider Threat Program allows for reasonable monitoring

in vital national security departments
Work, 14, (Robert O., Deputy Secretary of Defense, The DoD Insider
Threat Program, NUMBER 5205.16, September 30, 2014,
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520516p.pdf)//erg
Through an integrated capability to monitor and audit information
for insider threat detection and mitigation, the DoD Insider Threat
Program will gather, integrate, review, assess, and respond to
information derived from CI, security, cybersecurity, civilian and
military personnel management, workplace violence, AT risk
management, LE, the monitoring of user activity on DoD information
networks, and other sources as necessary and appropriate to
identify, mitigate, and counter insider threats. d. Appropriate training, education,
and awareness of the insider threat will be provided to DoD military and civilian personnel, DoD
contractors, and volunteers who have access to DoD resources. DoDD 5205.16, September 30, 2014 2 e.

DoD
efforts to counter insider threats must comply with all applicable
laws and DoD policy issuances, including those regarding
whistleblower, civil liberties, and privacy protections . (1) Personally

The collection, use, maintenance, and dissemination of information critical to the success of

identifiable information (PII) for U.S. persons must be handled in accordance with section 552a of Title 5,
U.S.C. (also known as The Privacy Act of 1974 (Reference (m))), DoD Directive (DoDD) 5400.11
(Reference (n)), and DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (o)). (2) Defense Intelligence Components will handle U.S.
persons PII in accordance with DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (p)). (3) Activities related to the insider threat
program, including information sharing and collection, will comply with DoDI 1000.29 (Reference (q)). (4)

Information on individuals and organizations not affiliated with the

DoD will not be collected unless allowed pursuant to DoDD 5200.27 (Reference (r)). (5)
Personally identifiable health information must be handled in
accordance with Public Law 104-191 (Reference (s)), parts 160, 162, and 164 of Title 45,
Code of Federal Regulations (Reference (t)), DoDI 6490.04 (Reference (u)), DoDI 6490.08 (Reference (v)),
DoD 6025.18-R (Reference (w)), and DoD 8580.02-R (Reference (x)). 4. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.
5. INFORMATION COLLECTIONS REQUIREMENTS. The DoD Insider Threat Program annual progress report
and quarterly Key Information Sharing and Safeguarding Indicators questionnaire self-assessment

115

compliance reports, referred to in paragraphs 1e, 5d, 5e, 6e, 6f, 8g, 11f and 11h of Enclosure 2 of this
directive, have been assigned report control symbol DD- CIO(A,Q)2561 in accordance with the procedures
in Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01 (Reference (y)).

Shift to more effective board/oversight is keyavoids

paranoia and bad work environment
Bunn, 13, (Chris, Manager of IS Decisions, Insider Threat Program. From
Paranoia to Protection, IS Decisions, 2013,
http://www.isdecisions.com/blog/it-security/insider-threat-program-fromparanoia-to-protetion/)//erg
The Unreported Insider Threat Insider cases are numerous and spin all industries .
Its said that 3 out of 4 cases are unreported! As you can see reputation is perhaps the biggest risk of all. Organizations

This shouldnt however be about the business

of fear. It calls for a Risk Management approach. Understand the risk
and balance it. This however, requires top level strategic oversight
for any enterprise . Risk Management is and must be, a problem for the board.
dont want to tell or dont even know.

Are the board always considered when an organization attempts to manage these risks? From our own research involving
500 IT decision makers, the insider threat is not a top security priority, even for IT professionals. This however could be
changing. The belief is that the Target Breach could well be a turning point . The breach
resulted in the first CEO to lose their job because of an insider security breach and possibly five other directors to follow.
This is significant. Every board should now be thinking this is not going to happen to me. we need to address this problem.
The latest news however suggests that the retailers chief executive and board may not get a complete picture on the
companys security, if the CISO does not report directly to them. Proactive Steps to Mitigate the Risk

Todays

reality is there are proactive steps to mitigate the risk . But

organizations and individuals are guilty of not having the time, so
end up creating bigger gaps. One typical example is when employees who have left the
organization still have access to the network. The thinking suggests if your organization is not doing the basics forget
about any more complex behavior analysis to alert high risks or any big data tools. Building an Insider Threat Program

Insider Threat Program moves an organization from paranoia

to protection . Not only is this a sensible thing to do but a US Mandate means
organizations must develop an Insider Threat Program if dealing
with a federal government. It also applies to worldwide companies that are dealing with the US
Building an

government. To help the CERT Insider Threat Centre has been serving as a trusted broker to assist the community in the
short term and through ongoing research since 2001. The foundation of their work is a database of more than 1000 insider
threat cases, government records and information from criminals themselves, which helps characterize the nature of the
insider threat problem and offers dynamic indicators of insider threat risk. They also identify and experiment with

The CERT Insider Threat

Program helps organizations consider or start making themselves
more secure and more immune to reputation and financial damage . In
administrative and technical controls for insider threat mitigation.

the UK, The CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure) and PA Consulting published new guidance (HoMER)
to help organizations reduce employee risk. HoMER (Holistic Management of Employee Risk) offers a range of practical

The risk ranges from

oversight such as sharing passwords to opportunistic behavior
including theft and fraud. Moving from paranoia to protection Moving from paranoia
to protection means involving a sophisticated tool set, staff and
managers awareness and an efficient process. At IS Decisions, our solution UserLock
is a unique and proven technology tool that helps organizations mitigate the
risk of insider threat by securing users access to the shared
Windows network. Whether were dealing with careless or malicious activity both involve authenticated
users who have access and rights. Organizations are recognizing the need to better
manage and secure network access for authenticated users to
116
measures to help organizations reduce the risk from their employees.

reduce the risk of security breaches. FileAudit helps organizations

proactively track, alert and report on all access (and access attempts) to files and
folders. It helps protect an organizations most sensitive information
stored on Windows Servers.

Team methods and co-worker cooperation can detect

threats and eliminate dark corners that make attacks
possible
Catrantzos, 10, (Nick, Adjunct Professor, Homeland Security & Author of
Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners, Tackling the Insider Threat,
CRISP REPORT, ASIS Foundation, 2010,
http://www.popcenter.org/library/crisp/insider-threat.pdf)//erg
All a hostile insider needs to carry out an attack are access to a
worthy target, an open door, and a dark corner from which to study and strike.
Insider threat studies abound, and the malicious insider phenomenon remains statistically rare yet
potentially devastating to any institution with critical assets to defend. Accepted wisdom offers
conventional security advice: preemployment background investigations, random audits, tighter access

This report
combines a review of the insider threat literature with the findings
of a Delphi study to arrive at a new approach to defeating the kind
of trust betrayer intent on carrying out an attack that is fatal to the
organization. While the Delphi research itself began with substantially the same views and counsel
controls, more invasive monitoring through procedural or technological innovations.

as prevailing wisdom represented in the literature, it ended altogether somewhere else. Certain pivot
points in the research revealed that a reasonably prepared infiltrator poses a greater threat than a
disgruntled career employeeat least if the focus is on adversaries bent on bringing an institution to its
knees, rather than on exacting revenge against bosses or carrying out nuisance-level attacks against the

Research findings also highlighted flaws in traditional

defenses, including background investigations that identify neither the prepared infiltrator nor the
future disgruntled careerist. Findings even suggested random audits are
seldom truly random and pose only a surmountable hurdle to a
worthy adversary. Moreover, ineffective exercise of employer
prerogatives like probationary periods appears underexploited as an
insider threat defense. Into this context, a new approach emerged. This
approach is about engaging co-workers on the team level to take a
hand in their own protection . It calls into protective service the vast majority of employees
employer.

consigned to the sidelines and sometimes referred to as the weakest link in insider defense. Instead,

with a shift in emphasis toward more productive countermeasures,

the proposed alternative brings these people off the sidelines and
onto the front lines, making them the first line of defense. No Dark
Corners extends to private spaces and institutions the seminal theories of proprietary interest and
ownership that Defensible Space and Fixing Broken Windows demonstrated for public housing and

this approach proposes less

emphasis on the laser of specialized monitoring by corporate
sentinels . Instead, it promotes using the flashlight of open team
engagement as a method of implementing layered defenses , particularly
community environments. In defending against insider threats,

on the front lines of detection and intervention, where critical operations take place.

117

Snowden could have been detected with the program

insiders are dangerous but detectable
McNamera, 13, (Paul, Snowden used sys admin role to collect
passwords: Reuters, Network World, Nov 8, 2013,
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2225752/security/snowden-used-sysadmin-role-to-collect-passwords--reuters.html)//erg
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden
"persuaded" some two dozen colleagues at a Hawaii government facility to give
him their login credentials by claiming it was necessary for him to do
his job as systems administrator. From that Reuters report: A handful of agency
Reuters is reporting this morning that

employees who gave their login details to Snowden were identified, questioned and removed from their
assignments, said a source close to several U.S. government investigations into the damage caused by the

Snowden may have persuaded between 20 and 25 fellow

workers at the NSA regional operations center in Hawaii to give him their
logins and passwords by telling them they were needed for him to
do his job as a computer systems administrator, a second source said. The
leaks.

revelation is the latest to indicate that inadequate security measures at the NSA played a significant role in
the worst breach of classified data in the super-secret eavesdropping agency's 61-year history. It's not
clear whether "removed from their assignments" means fired or not, but, if true, his damaging the careers
of coworkers will add another dimension to the debate about whether Snowden is a whistleblower or a

What is clear has long been understood, though: There is no

greater security threat than a "trusted" insider with access.
traitor.

Behavioral analysis within the program stops attacks

Winkler and Manke, 14, (Ira, Irari Report, Secure Mentem, Internet
Security Advisors Group and Samantha, Executive Vice President of Secure
Mentem, How to create awareness of the insider threat, CSO, Apr 15, 2014,
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2142603/security-leadership/how-to-createawareness-of-the-insider-threat.html)//erg
One of the results of Edward Snowden's data leak is that companies are now concerned about the insider

a single person inside an

organization can devastate the organization. While technology should have caught
Snowden, there is also the realization that his coworkers and managers should have
noticed indications of unusual activities. The question then becomes how do
you train employees to tactfully recognize the signs of a malicious
insider, without creating widespread distrust within an organization. Back when I
threat more than they ever were before. He demonstrates that

worked at NSA, one of my coworkers pointed out two documents that both describe a fellow employee who
was 1) always interested in what their coworkers are doing, 2) volunteers for extra assignments, 3) always
works late, and 4) never takes a vacation. One of the documents was from human resources on how to get
promoted. The other was from the security department describing how to tell if your coworker is a spy.

NSA employees
failed to determine which side of the spectrum Snowden fell on , while
employees at his past employer, the CIA, accurately determined his
predisposition to expose classified information. Snowden demonstrates that
MORE ON CSO: 10 ways to prep for and ace a security job interview Clearly

even within organizations that should know better, detecting a malicious insider is hit or miss. How then is
an organization outside of the Intelligence Community supposed to make their employees aware of the
concern, especially without inspiring a witchhunt?

The problem is real. Malicious

insiders have wreaked havoc in organizations of all types. While the IT world focuses on
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stories of rogue administrators, insiders in all roles carry out thefts and other malicious actions. While
some wrongdoers are very clever and are able to cover their actions very well, the reality is that just about
all malicious insiders show indications of their intent. This is relevant to awareness programs as their

Balancing concerns of tact and

awareness is delicate, but it must be done to maintain order . Generally,
coworkers are in the best position to see those indications.

there are three requirements for awareness to be effective: 1) Understanding of the problem, 2) Knowledge
of what actions to take, and 3) Motivation to take the appropriate actions. Generally understanding the

an effective awareness program must

specifically ensure that it addresses both concerns. You can be aware an issue
problem should create motivation, but

exists, while not being motivated to do anything about it. The easy part of addressing the insider threat is

there are now many examples to help get the message across.
People like Snowden and Chelsea Manning are clear examples that it only takes one
that

person to cause a lot of damage. While these individuals have become household names, it is better to use
examples from your own company or industry. While some companies understandably do not like to
highlight their own incidents, they can anonymize the cases. The message is actually simple, insiders are a
big threat and do not ignore signs of questionable behaviors. The message tagline could be the
organizational equivalent of, If you see something, say something. The message should highlight to be
on the lookout for violations of policies and procedures. It is also critical to remind employees that it is
people, just like themselves, who have stopped major insider crimes. [Why companies need to check their
handling of internal threats]

Insider Threat program utilizes patterns and best data

studies
Moore, 14, (Andrew P, CERT Insider Threat Team Research Leader,
Designing Insider Threat Programs, SEI, September 29, 2014,
http://blog.sei.cmu.edu/post.cfm/designing-insider-thread-programs-272)//erg
Insider threat is the threat to organizations critical assets posed by trusted individuals - including
employees, contractors, and business partners - authorized to use the organizations information

Insider threat programs within an organization help to

manage the risks due to these threats through specific prevention,
detection, and response practices and technologies. The National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), which provides baseline
standards for the protection of classified information, is considering proposed changes
that would require contractors that engage with federal agencies,
which process or access classified information, to establish insider
threat programs. The proposed changes to the NISPOM were preceded by Executive Order 13587,
technology systems.

Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and
Safeguarding of Classified Information. Signed by President Obama in September 2011, Executive Order
13587 requires federal agencies that operate or access classified computer networks to implement insider
threat detection and prevention programs. Since the passage of Executive Order 13587, the following key
resources have been developed: The National Insider Threat Task Force developed minimum standards for
implementing insider threat programs. These standards include a set of questions to help organizations
conduct insider threat self-assessments. The Intelligence and National Security Alliance conducted
research to determine the capabilities of existing insider threat programs The Intelligence Community

CERTs
insider threat program training and certificate programs are based
on the above resources as well as CERTs own Insider Threat
Workshop, common sense guidelines for mitigating insider threats, and in-depth experience and
Analyst-Private Sector Partnership Program developed a roadmap for insider threat programs.

insights from helping organizations establish computer security incident response teams. As described in
this blog post, researchers from the Insider Threat Center at the Carnegie Mellon University Software
Engineering Institute are also developing an approach based on organizational patterns to help agencies
and contractors systematically improve the capability of insider threat programs to protect against and
mitigate attacks. A Pattern-based Approach to Insider Threat This post is the latest installment in an

validate an insider threat

mitigation pattern language to help organizations prevent, detect,
ongoing series describing our research to create and

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and respond to insider threats. As described in a previous post, our research is

based upon our database of more than 700 insider threat cases and
interviews with the United States Secret Service, victims organizations, and convicted felons. From that
database, we identified 26 patterns that capture reusable solutions to recurring problems associated with
insider threat. Insider threat mitigation patterns are organizational patterns that involve the full scope of
enterprise architecture concerns, including people, processes, technology, and facilities. This broad scope
is necessary because insiders often have authorized accessboth online and physicalto organizational
systems. Our approach acknowledges inter-relationships between organizational structures, such as policy,
training, and employee and policy agreements, and draws upon those inter-relationships to describe the
patterns themselves. The following is a high-level outline of a pattern for disabling access after an insider
leaves an organization for other employment, an older version of which was published at the 2013 PLOP
Workshop: Title: Eliminate Methods of Access after Departure Intent: To avoid insider theft of information or
sabotage of information technology after departure Context: An insider is departing an organization for
employment elsewhere and you have a comprehensive record of access paths the insider has for
accessing the organizations systems Problem: Insiders who depart an organization under problematic
circumstances may become angry to the point of wanting to steal information from the organization or
compromise the integrity of the organizations information or information systems. Active access paths into
the organizations systems after departure provide the opportunity to do that. Solution: Disable accounts
that you know about upon departure, and prepare to monitor suspicious remote access after departure for
signs of unauthorized access attempts Related Patterns: Monitor Activity after Departure For organizations
and agencies establishing insider threat programs, our approach specifies what processes are important
and stresses the need for consistent enforcement what policies are important how those processes and
policies are implemented both by humans and technology what technology is needed to support all of that
There will undoubtedly be great variation in insider threat programs, depending on the risks faced by

designate paths
through the mitigation pattern language with the goal of mitigating
a specific insider threat behavior. The mitigation pattern outlined
above will be used in a capability development scenario described
below. Such capability development scenarios serve to guide insider threat program designers as they
individual organizations. We therefore use capability development scenarios to

try to ensure their programs are resilient against insider threats to their critical assets. An Example
Capability Development Scenario In a forthcoming report on this topic, we will outline several capability
development scenarios (CDSs). One scenario involves mitigating theft of intellectual property when an
employee resigns or is fired from the organization: Through our analysis of our insider threat database, we
observed that 70 percent of insiders who stole intellectual property from an employer did so within 60 days
of their termination from an organization. This CDS urges that both parties must agree at employee hiring
regarding the ownership of intellectual property as well as the consequences if the agreement is breached.
Upon termination, whether voluntary or forced, the organization should disable insiders accesses. During
the exit interview, the organization must review existing agreements regarding IP. The CDS advocates that
an employer monitor insider actions 60 days prior to termination and for 60 days after termination.
Suspicious behaviors including uncharacteristically large downloads of intellectual property should be
handled either by the human resources or legal departments or a combination of both. As specified by the
associated path through the mitigation pattern language, this CDS advocates that organizations Screen
Employees Agree on IP Ownership Periodically Raise Security Awareness Log Employee Actions Increase
Monitoring Due to an Employees Pending Departure Reconfirm Employee Agreements on Departure
Eliminate Methods of Access after Departure Monitor Activity after Departure In summary ,

mitigating
theft of IP at departure involves ensuring that the organization
increases their monitoring of any insider with access to critical
assets for specific suspicious behaviors when the insider resigns or
is terminated. In addition, the insider must agree to and be reminded that they cant take
organization-owned IP with them. Future Work in Insider Threat Continuing our efforts to
help federal agencies and contractors develop insider threat
programs, per executive order 13587, we are now seeking active government partners
to apply and refine our approach. We also are continuing our research into fundamental patterns of insider

make sure that they remain well grounded and

validated scientifically. Looking ahead, we plan next to investigate insider
social networks and the role they play in contributing to insider
threat. In particular, we plan to examine how those social networks change over time to determine
threat mitigation to

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whether we can distinguish the social networks of malicious and non-malicious insiders. As part of this
research, we are collaborating with Dr. Kathleen Carley, a professor at Carnegie Mellon Universitys
Institute for Software Research in the School of Computer Science.

The insider threat program sets extensive threat

mitigation standardsemployees could unintentionally
aid an external organizationdetection and monitoring
are key
Amjad and Gelles, 15, (Adnan, partner, Cyber Risk Services, Deloitte
& Touche LLP and Michael, director, Deloitte Consulting LLP, 9 Building
Blocks of Insider Threat Mitigation Programs, CIO Journal, March 23, 2015,
http://deloitte.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/23/9-building-blocks-of-insider-threatmitigation-programs/)//erg
You cant blame organizations that focus their cyber risk mitigation programs primarily, if not exclusively,
on external threats. After all, external actors, including hostile nation-states and criminal organizations, are
alleged to have been behind some of the most damaging and high-profile cyber attacks of the past two

those external actors are assisted by an employee

or third party associated with the targeted organization . An
employee or contractor, either ignorant of or flippant toward company
policies or specific security threats, may unwittingly download malware
onto a corporate network, giving attackers access to intellectual property (IP),
years. But, often enough,

employee social security numbers, patients protected health information, or customer credit card data.

On other occasions, employees and contractors arent innocent. When

they leave a company, some may feel entitled to walk off with IP they helped to develop, even though the
IP legally belongs to the organization. And even if theyre not stealing sensitive information for personal or
financial gain, plenty get a voyeuristic thrill from accessing data and records that literally arent their
business. According to a survey conducted on behalf of Raytheon, 65 percent of respondents indicated
curiosity, not job necessity, compels users with privileged access to peek (or worse) at sensitive or
confidential data. Given the many ways insiders may threaten their organizations security, its no
wonder nearly nine out of 10 IT professionals polled on behalf of data security provider Vormetric believe
their organizations are vulnerable to insider threats. And almost as many IT professionals surveyed appear

88 percent
of respondents are concerned about insider threats but have difficulty
to have trouble addressing the risks insiders can pose. According to the Raytheon survey,

identifying specific threatening actions, and 69 percent said their security tools dont provide enough

well-designed and executed insider threat

mitigation program that considers how individuals conduct
themselves in both virtual and physical environments and that
includes policies, training, technology, behavioral analysis, and a
broad set of stakeholders can help organizations detect, prevent,
and respond to insider threats. Here are nine crucial components to consider when
context to determine insiders intent. A

implementing a systematic insider threat mitigation program.

They are wrongthey get rid of key detection procedures.

Behavioral analysis and awareness is key to catch threats
Garlipp, 14, (Matthew, Associate at Grant Thornton LLP, HOW CAN YOU
COMBAT INSIDER THREATS? Gov Loop, December 3, 2014,
https://www.govloop.com/can-combat-insider-threats/)//erg
Insider threats can have severe consequences, with victim organizations
facing significant costs and damages. According to the FBI, the average cost per
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incident is $412,000, with victims losing an average of $15 million a year. Although most
agencies primarily focus on external cyber threats, it is crucial to also prepare and
combat insider threats. The U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) defines an insider threat as:
A current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to
an organizations network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner
that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organizations information or
information systems. Insider threats are not necessarily hackers and they often dont start with malicious
intent. Usually a trigger event such as a denied vacation or being bypassed for a raise or promotion
initiates the threat. Whats more striking, the CERT Division of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at
Carnegie Mellon University found that 90 percent of IT saboteurs were system administrators. Despite this,
most security tools are designed with hackers in mind, but theyre not always the real threat. For a more
overarching, office-wide approach, Patrick Reidy, former chief information security officer at the FBI, offers

A good insider threat program should

focus on deterrence, not detection. An employees work environment,
regardless of job function, should discourage insiders by
crowdsourcing security and deploying data-centric, not system-centric,
security. By creating a data-centric approach, organizations can monitor how data moves across an
agency and block certain actions from occurring. This gives a more holistic view of
data, rather than just simply monitoring a workstation or specific
network systems. This helps create an environment where it is
difficult to become an insider. Avoid the data overload problem. In security efforts, do
three pieces of advice regarding insider threats:

not get overwhelmed with data. Reidy proposes that only two sources of data are needed: HR data to
better understand employees and workplace or personnel issues and system logs to track what is being
printed or downloaded via USB, CD or DVD. D etection

of insider threats must use

behavior-based techniques . Detecting insider threats is very hard, like looking for a needle
in a stack of needles, Reidy said. By using behavioral analytics, agencies can build a
baseline of behavior and look for red flags anomalies that differentiate potential
insiders from innocuous employees. The CERT Division of SEI also provides 10 best practices to prevent

Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk

assessments and security awareness training for all employees .
and combat insider threats:

Implement strict password and account management policies and practices. Log, monitor and audit
employee online actions, especially unusually large queries, downloads, print jobs or e-mails, or other
suspicious behavior. Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged users. Collect and save
data for use in investigations. Implement secure backup and recovery processes. Clearly document insider
threat controls. Provide an Employee Assistance Program or other recourse for employees experiencing
personal problems. Deactivate computer access and change passwords for all accounts upon termination,
including external accounts. Train management on the patterns of behavior that could indicate an IT

Insider threats present potentially catastrophic risks for

all organizations, no matter what sector. But preparation, awareness,
training, periodic assessments and the implementation of security
measures and strategies can decrease an organizations
vulnerability.
sabotage attack.

The program provides key oversight that gets rid of dark

cornersprevents cascading failure of critical
infrastructurepeer vigilance key
Catrantzos, 10, (Nick, Adjunct Professor, Homeland Security & Author of
Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners, Tackling the Insider Threat,
CRISP REPORT, ASIS Foundation, 2010,
http://www.popcenter.org/library/crisp/insider-threat.pdf)//erg

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All a hostile insider needs to carry out an attack are access to a

worthy target, an open door, and a dark corner from which to plot
and maneuver. Any adversary seeking to strike a devastating blow
against any institution need look no further. Public and private sector institutions
and critical infrastructures number among the many worthy targets, as would any organization with critical
assets to be defended. The potential for loss does not always stop at the door of one target, however.

Not only are some targets like infrastructure irreplaceable, their

damage or destruction may lead to cascading failures of other,
interdependent components, from banking and finance to
emergency responders, from transportation and logistics to food and
agriculture. All depend on electricity or water or communicationsthe double-edged sword of living in
an interconnected world. The open door comes from a traditional culture of
openness and few restrictions to movement or assets in the average
workplace. This openness flourishes because local government agencies and investor-owned
organizations alike must answer to demanding stockholders, ratepayers, and various regulatory agencies.
Even when these organizations have critical assets to protect, when it comes to their public customers,
they cannot be perceived as having something to hide. In this environment ,

defenses against
infiltrators or any type of insider threat require a cultural shift . The

challenge is to close the door to infiltrators while leaving it open to legitimate workers and business. Even
if an infiltrator sets sights on a worthy target and exploits weak defenses ,

he or she still needs

a dark corner free of oversight in order to gather pre-strike
intelligence and then initiate an attack without risk of timely
intervention and defeat. The best way to defeat such an attack is to
remove the dark corners. Our societys reliance on technology and specialists to solve

problems can marginalize the average employee, excluding him or her from playing a useful and
necessary role in insider defense. Employees should be recognized as the first line of defense, bringing

in addressing the
insider threat, we must reconsider our usual efforts to penetrate
with the intensity and focus of a laser what we should instead be
illuminating with a flashlight. No matter how deep the laser drills, it points to only a
them onto the front lines with a No Dark Corners approach. Consequently,

fragment of the entire picture. Caught in the lasers beam, a clever insider can mask or explain away

The same malicious insider, however, cannot

deceive alert peers whose combined, wider gaze acts as a flashlight
making enemy action visible before it is too late to intervene. The new

hostile activities with relative ease.

approach offers open team and employee engagement as a method of implementing layered defenses,
particularly on the front lines of detection and intervention, where critical operations take place.

The

insider threat remains as alive as it is statistically rare , despite generations

of study. Infiltrators continue to pose a risk to critical infrastructure and
other institutions. There are no easy answers. No Dark Corners shows promise, however, as an
approach to overcome gaps in traditional defenses. By going beyond corporate sentinels to engage
stakeholders in their own protection, this approach offers the victory of ownership over surprise.

Counter measures against insider threats are critical for

preventing crime and terrorist attacks
Catrantzos, 10, (Nick, Adjunct Professor, Homeland Security & Author of
Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners, Tackling the Insider Threat,
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CRISP REPORT, ASIS Foundation, 2010,

http://www.popcenter.org/library/crisp/insider-threat.pdf)//erg
The insider threat is an Achilles heel for critical infrastructure
protection and the protection of any enterprise or institution targeted for destruction by adversaries.
While risk and vulnerability assessments skyrocketed in the aftermath
of 9/11, as reflected in the federal subsidies promoting them, the security focus
centered largely on the vulnerability of large populations to attack
(Masse, ONeil, & Rollins, 2007, pp. 57). In this context, adversaries were characterized as traditional
attackers working as outsiders who generally approach their targets head on with brute forceprecisely in

The insider threat, in this context, has been

generally relegated to secondary status. One possible reason is that there is a dearth
the manner of the 9/11 hijackers.

of statistically significant data on hostile insiders. As a review of the current literature indicates, trust
betrayalwhether in espionage or other fields remains statistically rare (Shaw & Fischer, 2005, p. 34;
Parker & Wiskoff, 1991, p. 4).1 When analyzed further, the insider threat has been subordinated to cyber
security studies centering on hackers and disgruntled employees, ex-employees, or consultants (Brackney
& Anderson, 2004; Cappelli, Moore, Trzeciak, & Shimeall, 2009; Leach, 2009). While such studies have
supplied value and drawn attention to the problem, they 1 Shaw and Fischer, looking at espionage as a
subset of trust betrayal, argued that such trust betrayal appeared relatively rare, while betrayals by cyber
insiders might be poised to be more frequent, hence more amenable to profiling and categorizing by
subtype. have offered few solutions other than to advise continuing scrutiny. Data compiled to date
suggest that the vast majority of insider cyber attacks have been either fraud-driven or moderate in scope

such attacks remain less than devastating to the

targeted employerthe modern, electronic equivalent of
embezzlement or vandalism (Kowalski, Cappelli, & Moore, 2008, pp. 2426). Similarly,
such studies preserve their narrow focus by excluding cases of
espionage, while at the same time avowing that the threat remains
real and advising ordinary, more-of-the-same solutions like layered
defense (Capelli, Moore, Trzeciak, & Shimeall, pp. 68). Consequently, it is difficult for
security practitioners to derive new insights from cyber- centric
insider threat investigations. The net result is that todays insider threat
remains substantially as it did yesterday: often studied retroactively, yet seldom
and impact. In other words,

yielding practical tools, tactics, or recommendations that would serve a defender in countering the threat.

identify countermeasures that defenders can

use to prevent terrorist attacks via trust betrayers and thereby
reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and institutions . The
The overall aim of this study is to

journey to this destination involves applying lessons of experts from other, more mature arenas of defense
from insider threats, such as workplace violence, line management, corporate security, and counterespionage. In the course of following this path, the study also explores one answer to the question, If
current indicators and countermeasures fall short, what should we do differently?

Insider threats are realstaff awareness is key to

detection
Greitzer, et al 08, (Frank L., a chief scientist at the Pacific Northwest
National Labo- ratory, Andrew P. Moore is a senior member of the technical
staff of CERT at the Soft- ware Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon
University, Dawn M. Cappelli is senior member of the technical staff, Dee H.
Andrews, Lynn A. Carroll, Thomas D. Hull is a graduate fellow with the Oak
Ridge Institute for Sci- ence and Education, Combating the insider Cyber
threat, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498605.pdf)//erg
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current or former employees and contrac tors are

the second greatest cy bersecurity threat, exceeded only by hackers, and that
the number of security incidents has increased geometrically in
recent years. The insider threat is manifested when human behavior
departs from com pliance with established policies, regardless of whether it
results from malice or a disregard for se curity policies . The types of crimes and abuse
associated with insider threats are significant ; the most se rious include
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, embezzlement, extor tion, bribery, and corruption. Ma licious
activities include an even broader range of exploits, such as
copyright violations, negligent use of classified data, fraud,
unauthor ized access to sensitive informa tion, and illicit
communications with unauthorized recipients. The insider is an
individual currently or at one time authorized to access an
organizations infor mation system, data, or network; such
authorization implies a de gree of trust in the individual. The insider threat
(Summary.pdf ), reveal that

refers to harmful acts that trusted insiders might carry out; for example, something that causes harm to
the organization, or an unauthorized act that benefits the individual. A 1997 US Depart ment of Defense
(DoD) Inspec tor General report1 found that 87 percent of identified intruders into DoD information
systems were ei ther employees or others internal to the organization. More gener ally, recent studies of
cybercrime (such as the 2004 through 2006 E-Crime Watch Surveys; www.cert. org/archive/) in both
government and commercial sectors reveal that although the proportion of insid er events is declining (31
percent in 2004 and 27 percent in 2006), the financial impact and operat ing losses due to insider
intrusions are increasing. Of those compa nies experiencing security events, the majority (55 percent)

well focus on the

need for effective training to raise staff awareness about insider
threats and the need for organi zations to adopt a more effective
approach to identifying potential risks and then taking proactive
steps to mitigate them.
report at least one insider event (up from 39 percent in 2005). In this article,

Insider threats are real and dangerousfull vigilance is

key
Spitzner, 03, (Lance, internationally recognized leader in the field of
cyber threat research and security training and awareness, Honeypots:
Catching the Insider Threat, Honeypot Technologies Inc, 2003,
http://craigchamberlain.com/library/insider/Honeypots%20-%20%20Catching
%20the%20Insider%20Threat.pdf)//erg
Before we can discuss how honeypots, specifically Honeynets and honeytokens, can catch the insider

Our goal is to detect,

identify, and confirm insider threats. This means leveraging
honeypots to not only indicate that we have an insider, but also
confirm their actions, and potentially learn their motives and
resources. What makes our goal difficult is the threat we face, the
sophisticated insider. What we mean by this is someone who is technically
skilled, highly motivated, and has access to extensive resources. For
threat, we need to first define what our goal is, and the threat we face.

example, this threat may be an employee working for a large corporation, but in reality they are employed
by a competitor to engage in corporate espionage. A second example is highly skilled, disgruntled

125

could be
a spy working for a foreign country. Regardless of who the insider is,
we are dealing with a highly dangerous threat, one that is extremely
difficult to detect. They have access to critical information; they know the
employee motivated to cause a great deal of damage before they are fired. A third example

structure of the organization. They are most likely after information, not systems. As a result, there may be
few attacks and their access to information may even be authorized. It is what they do with that
information that comprises the threat. It is our goal to detect and capture the activity of this threat. For the
purposes of this paper, we will take the lessons learned from the ARDA Cyber Indications and Warning
workshop. In this workshop, we focused on past spies in the Intelligence community. Examples of such
spies include Aldrich Ames, Robert Hansen, and Anna Montes. These individuals were all highly trusted
individuals with extensive and critical knowledge to their respective organizations. However, as insiders
they were able to cause extreme harm to their organizations, and over long periods of time without being
detected.

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Internal Link Turns Groupthink

Combatting the insider threat avoids groupthink
Catrantzos, 10, (Nick, Adjunct Professor, Homeland Security & Author of
Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners, Tackling the Insider Threat,
CRISP REPORT, ASIS Foundation, 2010,
http://www.popcenter.org/library/crisp/insider-threat.pdf)//erg
The Delphi process is iterative yet anonymous, and required a significant commitment on the part of

In order to obtain
meaningful insights rather than just confirming the authors opinions, this study
sought out practitioners who each have over 20 years of experience
in responsible charge in their respective fields and were willing to
voluntarily participate in what would otherwise constitute billable hours. This undertaking
respondents, including responses that took the form of explanatory narratives.

required the fullest stretch of the authors network and availing of professional courtesy. Despite 31 years
of industry experience and an address book with some 2,024 entries, the author rated himself fortunate to
be able to assemble a dozen professionals who contributed their career thoughts throughout the Delphi
process. Note that the Delphi method isolates respondents from each other, rather than gathering them
together in a focus group .

This technique defends against groupthink and

offers equal deference to the introverted whose voices might
otherwise go unheard in the presence of more vocal and extroverted
participants gathered together in the same room. In order to increase
respondent numbers, the research would have risked a corresponding lowering of the bar in experience
and insight of experts. Neophytes are in greater supply, as are graduate students who would be more
receptive to providing iterative responses. However, such a response pool would necessarily rob the
process of the kind of wisdom and deep smarts that come only through broad, practical experience over
time (Leonard & Swap, 2004). In Delphi research, the smallest number of respondents should not fall under
10, hence this study settled on 12in case of any losses from one round of questions to the next. In
practice, informed analysts have gone on record to state that the sample size varies... from 4 to 171
experts. One quickly concludes that there is no typical Delphi; rather that the method is modified to suit
the circumstances and research question (Skulmoski, G. J., Harman, F. T., & Krahn, J., 2007, p. 5). Other
analysts, applying the Delphi method to policy issues, found useful sample sizes varying from 10 to 50
experts (Linstone, H., & Turoff, M., 2002, p. 82). The Delphi research effort itself extended from January

Recruitment
of experts and gathering of their signed, informed consent forms, in
satisfaction of the requirements of the Institutional Review Board of the Naval
through April 2009 and consisted of three iterative rounds of questions and feedback.

Postgraduate School, took place between the months of November 2008 to January 2009.

127

Russia Containment DA

128

1NC
Deterring Russia in Europe is k2 curb Russian
expansionism
OHanlon 7/12

(Michael, 2015, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, We Need to Get Serious
About Russia, Now, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/we-need-to-get-tough-with-russianow-120002.html#ixzz3gOxGu49h)//RTF

We are at a crucial juncture in the conflict over Ukraine and the

Wests relationship with Russia. Obamas restraint has been wise at
one level, but Washingtons tendency has been to move this issue to
the back burner and hope it stays there. Yet there is little reason to think that it will
and also little reason to believe that a new U.S. president in 18 months, who will probably be harder-line in

As
Gen. Joseph Dunford, the incoming Joint Chiefs chairman, told the
Senate Armed Services Committee at his confirmation hearing last
week: If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an
existential threat to the United States, I would have to point to
Russia. If you look at their behavior, its nothing short of alarming, Meanwhile the
current crisis over Greece and the Eurozonewhich is not likely to
end soon, if everis only likely to further undermine Europes
resolve and induce it to turn inward, allowing Putin to breathe
easier. Or at least, the Russian president might get that impression. So the United States
and its NATO allies need to get serious about the situation now, and
complement their existing policy approach with new ideassome of
them to show resolve and firmness towards Putin and Russia, others to
offer him a way out of this crisis should he wish to take such a path. But this is not a time for
drift; the longer the Kremlin senses irresolution in the West, the
more it is likely to assume that its new order in the east is a fait
accompli. There is also a risk it could become yet more aggressive,
even towards the NATO-member Baltic states, in some way. The context
dealing with Vladimir Putin than Barack Obama has been, will be able to fix the situation either.

of the situation was well summarized in a recent poll, released June 10, that the Pew Research Center
conducted over the previous several months. It underscored that the West has a number of strengths in
dealing with Putinbut also a number of serious vulnerabilities that will not get better just by ignoring
them. The survey, led by Bruce Stokes and Katie Simmons, found that majorities of citizens in a number of
key NATO states would not favor the use of force to protect another alliance member in the event of
Russian aggression against them. That would seem, on its face, to ignore Article V of the NATO alliances
founding charter, the Washington Treaty of 1949, which states that an attack on one is an attack on all,
and should be treated accordingly. This may appear to some as tantamount to an invitation to renewed
Russian aggression. It seems to raise the scenario of Vladimir Putin again employing his patriotic cyber
attackers and little green men, not just in Crimea but perhaps in Latvia or Estoniaformer republics in
the Soviet Union turned independent nations and, since 2004, members of NATO. Each also has significant
populations of Russian speakers that Putin can claim want to be reunited with the motherland; each is too
far east for NATO easily to mount a military defense in any case. Are such parts of the Western alliance,
and perhaps other countries like Poland, now vulnerable to Russian aggression? In fact, it would be a

While there
are indeed some troubling findings in the Pew results, on balance
what emerges is the picture of an alliance that still provides the
West with considerable cohesion, and considerable leverage, in
addressing the problem of Putin. Before trying to make sense of the poll results, it is
mistake to reach this conclusion based on the Pew survey or any other recent polling.

important to summarize not just the headline-dominating findings noted above, but several other key
results from Pew: The NATO publics have negative views of Russia and Putin. They seem to have little
doubt of who is primarily responsible for the crisis in relations of the last two years, dating to the

129

immediate aftermath of the Sochi Olympics when protests in Ukraine forced out the countrys previous
leader, President Yanukovich. Five of eight NATO countries surveyed (the UK, France, Spain, Italy and
Germany) oppose sending weapons to Ukraine to defend itself in the current crisis. NATO countries remain
more than willing to employ sanctions against Russia over its behavior. This was true in every alliance
member-state that was polled, including Germany, the most pro-Russia NATO state that was included in
the polling. Indeed, although just 38 percent of Germans favored a military response in the event of a
hypothetical Russian attack against another NATO member, they remained in favor of sanctions against
Russia. Only 29 percent favored a loosening of the current sanctions, unless Russias behavior were to
change. This helps explain why the EU just reauthorized sanctions against Russia, with even Greece in
support. Putin remains extremely popular in Russia, with favorability ratings approaching 90 percent;
Russians currently blame the West, and falling oil prices, for their current economic woes, and not their

most Russians believe that eastern

Ukraine, where the current fighting rages, should not remain part of
Ukraine but should either become independent or join their country.
own government or its policies. Forebodingly,

Two more key points are crucial to remember. First, the type of hypothetical Russian attack against a NATO
country that formed the premise for the Pew question about Article V was not clearly specified. Perhaps
respondents were in some sense wondering if a takedown of several Latvian or Estonian computer
networks really needed to be met with NATO tanks? For most western publics, the advisability of a major
military response might well, understandably enough, depend in detail on the nature of the perceived
Russian attack as well as the other options available to the alliance. Second, and relatedly, it is important
to remember that Article V does NOT demand an automatic, unconditional military response by each
alliance member. It says, rather, that an attack on one should lead to a response by allinvolving
whatever means the individual states determine. This ambiguity may risk complicating deterrence, to be
surebut it worked during the Cold War and, if NATO leaders are sufficiently clear in their dealings with

The
United States and other NATO member states should adopt the
Pentagons recent proposal to station modest amounts of equipment
in the easternmost NATO countriesa proposal that is harder to
oppose at this juncture given Putins continued stirring up of the
conflict. Ideally, equipment from NOT ONLY America BUT also other NATO countries would be part of
Putin, it can and should work now. These results collectively suggest the following path ahead:

the initiative. The sanctions tool remains powerful and should still be employed. As they pursue Russian
compliance with the so-called Minsk accords, which Moscow agreed to this past winter, and which would
allow autonomy for Ukraines eastern provinces in return for verifiable Russian withdrawal from those same
regions and an end to hostility by separatists, western policymakers can and should keep up the economic
pressure. A grand solution should also be proposed to Moscow. As a complement to the Minsk concept and
the continuation of economic sanctions, the West should offer a proposal for a new Central European
security architecture for non-NATO states that Russia would be asked and expected to co-guarantee, if it
wishes that countries like Ukraine permanently forgo pursuit of NATO membership. This should not weaken
Ukraines formal sovereignty; no long-term Hong Kong handover solution is needed. But all would
understand that Ukraine would not formally join the West in geostrategic terms, though it certainly could
accept western help out of its current economic malaise once the right policy foundation was established.
So far Putin has managed to convince Russians that their economic predicament is not his fault, but over
time, he may not be able to maintain the charade. The Pew poll suggests that Western publics are firmly
united behind this sanctions-based approachand that modern democracies, while wary about the use of
force, are a far cry from the paper tigers their critics sometimes purport them to be. But our policies are far
from adequate to the task at hand and need to be improved nowbefore the situation escalates further
and reduces our room for maneuver, and before the 2016 U.S. presidential race reduces Washingtons
room for maneuver as well.

Expansion risks war and nuclear use

Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF

Should the warnings prove right,

and a major war break out in Europe between Russia and the West, then the story of that
war, if anyone is still around to tell it, will begin with Russian President Vladimir
Putin trying to solve a problem. That problem is this: Putin's Russia is weak.
It can no longer stand toe to toe with the US. It no longer has Europe
divided in a stalemate; rather, it sees the continent as dominated by
II. The gamble: Putin's plan to make Russia great again

130

an ever-encroaching anti-Russian alliance. In the Russian view, the country's

weakness leaves it at imminent risk, vulnerable to a hostile West bent on subjugating or outright

This is made more urgent for Putin by

his political problems at home. In 2012, during his reelection,
popular protests and accusations of fraud weakened his sense of
political legitimacy. The problem worsened with Russia's 2014
economic collapse; Putin's implicit bargain with the Russian people had been that he would
destroying Russia as it did to Iraq and Libya.

deliver economic growth and they would let him erode basic rights. Without the economy, what did he

Putin's answer has been to assert Russian power

beyond its actual strength and, in the process, to recast himself
as a national hero guarding against foreign enemies. Without a
world-power-class military or economy at his disposal, he is instead
wielding confusion and uncertainty which Soviet leaders rightly
avoided as existential dangers as weapons against the West.
Unable to overtly control Eastern Europe, he has fomented risks and
crises in there, sponsoring separatists in Ukraine and conducting
dangerous military activity along NATO airspace and coastal borders,
giving Russia more leverage there. Reasserting a Russian sphere of
influence over Eastern Europe, he apparently believes, will finally
give Russia security from the hostile West and make Russia a
great power once more. Knowing his military is outmatched against
the Americans, he is blurring the distinction between war and peace,
deploying tactics that exist in, and thus widen, the gray between:
militia violence, propaganda, cyberattacks, under a new rubric the Russian military
have to offer them?

sometimes calls "hybrid war." "This was the theory of the Kaiser before World War I: The more threatening

Putins going to threaten and

threaten and hope that NATO bends. But the long run of
international relations suggests that it goes the other way." Unable
to cross America's red lines, Putin is doing his best to muddy them
and, to deter the Americans, muddying his own. Turning otherwise routine
you are, the more people will submit to your will.

diplomatic and military incidents into games of high-stakes chicken favors Russia, he believes, as the West
will ultimately yield to his superior will. To solve the problem of Russia's conventional military weakness,

he has dramatically lowered the threshold for when he would use

nuclear weapons, hoping to terrify the West such that it will bend to
avoid conflict. In public speeches, over and over, he references those weapons and his willingness
to use them. He has enshrined, in Russia's official nuclear doctrine, a
dangerous idea no Soviet leader ever adopted: that a nuclear war
could be winnable. Putin, having recast himself at home as a national hero standing up to
foreign enemies, is more popular than ever. Russia has once more become a shadow hanging over Eastern
Europe, feared and only rarely bowed to, but always taken seriously. Many Western Europeans, asked in a
poll whether they would defend their own Eastern European allies from a Russian invasion, said no.

Russia's aggression, born of both a desire to reengineer a European

order that it views as hostile and a sense of existential weakness
that justifies drastic measures, makes it far more willing to accept
the dangers of war. As RAND's F. Stephen Larrabee wrote in one of
the increasingly urgent warnings that some analysts are issuing,
"The Russia that the United States faces today is more assertive and
more unpredictable and thus, in many ways, more dangerous
than the Russia that the United States confronted during the latter
131

part of the Cold War."

Nye, the dean of Harvard University's school of government

pointed out that
Russia's weakness-masking aggression was yet another disturbing
parallel to the buildup to World War I. "Russia seems doomed to continue its decline
Joseph

and one of America's most respected international relations scholars,

an outcome that should be no cause for celebration in the West," Nye wrote in a recent column.
"States

in decline think of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914

tend to become less risk-averse and thus much more dangerous."

Nuclear war in Europe with Russia is possible and on the

brink
Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF

It was in August 2014 that the real danger began, and that we heard the first
warnings of war. That month, unmarked Russian troops covertly invaded
eastern Ukraine, where the separatist conflict had grown out of its
control. The Russian air force began harassing the neighboring
Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are members of
NATO. The US pledged that it would uphold its commitment to
defend those countries as if they were American soil, and later
staged military exercises a few hundred yards from Russia's border.
Both sides came to believe that the other had more drastic
intentions. Moscow is convinced the West is bent on isolating,
subjugating, or outright destroying Russia . One in three Russians now believe the
US may invade. Western nations worry, with reason, that Russia could use
the threat of war, or provoke an actual conflict, to fracture NATO and
its commitment to defend Eastern Europe. This would break the status quo order
that has peacefully unified Europe under Western leadership, and kept out Russian influence, for 25 years.

Fearing the worst of one another, the US and Russia have pledged to
go to war, if necessary, to defend their interests in the Eastern
European borderlands. They have positioned military forces and conducted chest-thumping
exercises, hoping to scare one another down. Putin, warning repeatedly that he
would use nuclear weapons in a conflict, began forward-deploying
nuclear-capable missiles and bombers. Europe today looks
disturbingly similar to the Europe of just over 100 years ago, on the
eve of World War I. It is a tangle of military commitments and defense pledges, some of them
unclear and thus easier to trigger. Its leaders have given vague signals for what would and would not lead

Its political tensions have become military buildups. Its nations

are teetering on an unstable balance of power, barely held together
by a Cold Warera alliance that no longer quite applies. If you take a walk
to war.

around Washington or a Western European capital today, there is no feeling of looming catastrophe. The
threats are too complex, with many moving pieces and overlapping layers of risk adding up to a larger
danger that is less obvious. People can be forgiven for not seeing the cloud hanging over them, for feeling
that all is well even as in Eastern Europe they are digging in for war. But this complacency is itself part

There
is a growing chorus of political analysts, arms control experts, and
government officials who are sounding the alarm, trying to call the
world's attention to its drift toward disaster. The prospect of a major
war, even a nuclear war, in Europe has become thinkable, they warn,
even plausible. What they describe is a threat that combines many of the hair-trigger dangers and
of the problem, making the threat more difficult to foresee, to manage, or, potentially, to avert.

world-ending stakes of the Cold War with the volatility and false calm that preceded World War I a

132

comparison I heard with disturbing frequency. They described a number of ways that an unwanted but

major war, like that of 1914, could break out in the Eastern
European borderlands. The stakes, they say, could not be higher: the
postWorld War II peace in Europe, the lives of thousands or millions
of Eastern Europeans, or even, in a worst-case scenario that is
remote but real, the nuclear devastation of the planet.
nonetheless

133

2NC Containment Key

Hardline responses to Russia deter expansion
Aleksashenko 5/28

(Sergei, 2015, nonresident senior fellow in Global Economy and Development

@ Brookings, Former deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia and former chairman of Merrill Lynch
Russia, Stop calling Russia weak, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/05/29russia-not-weak-aleksashenko)//RTF

Twelve weeks have passed since the second Minsk agreement was
signed, and the military situation in Eastern Ukraine has quieted . While
this is a positive development, we cannot declare the crisis over. Unfortunately, it seems
most likely that another territory with non-specified status will emerge in
Europe, opening the door for yet another frozen conflict in the
region. In the short run, the current situation in Ukraine is in some sense understood on all sides:
Ukraine is able to concentrate on its reform agenda efforts; Russia can keep Donbass hostage and

Europe can relax a bit as the

threat of military spillover subsides; and the United States hopes to
just forget about the whole headache. But that approach would be a
major strategic mistake for the U.S. and Europe. In the wake of the 2008
Georgian war, the West made the grave error of letting down its
guard. Going this direction again means undermining European and American principles.
At the same time, it undermines our very global security system , which rejects the
maintain its ability to destabilize Ukraine at any moment;

use of force as an instrument of conflict resolution and forcible changes of the state borders via military

By accepting the status quo in Ukraine, the West suggests

to the world that it will not prevent Putin from imposing his
narrative across Russian borders. More broadly, it risks demonstrating
that it is the rule of forcenot of lawthat reigns in the world today .
Tacitly supporting a return to business as usual in Ukraine makes life easier for the U.S. and Europe. But
the Wests reliance on traditional methods of diplomacy is a mistake
in dealing with Putin, who has clearly decided to employ
nontraditional forms of international relations. The West needs a
nontraditional response to Russias nontraditional foreign policy. If
intervention.

leaders in Europe and the U.S. believe Putin is weakas Valeriano and Maness proposethey should
demonstrate that fact to the world and to the Russian president himself. We have yet to see that kind of
clear demonstration.

134

2NC Expansionism Bad

Russian expansion into the Baltic states causes war
Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF

In September of last year, President

Obama traveled to Estonia, a nation of 1.3 million people that most Americans have never heard of,
and pledged that the United States would if necessary go to war with Russia to defend it. Estonia, along
with Latvia and Lithuania together known as the Baltic states
are at the far edge of Eastern Europe, along Russia's border. They were
IV. How it would happen: The Baltics scenario

formerly part of the Soviet Union. And they are where many Western analysts fear World War III is likeliest to start.

These small countries are "the most likely front line of any future
crisis," according to Stephen Saideman, an international relations professor at Carleton University. Allison
and Simes, in their essay warning of war, called the Baltics "the
Achilles heel of the NATO alliance." A full quarter of Estonia's
population is ethnically Russian. Clustered on the border with
Russia, this minority is served by the same Russian state media that
helped stir up separatist violence among Russian speakers in
eastern Ukraine. But unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are all members
of NATO, whose charter states that an attack on one member is an
attack on them all. Whereas a Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted Western sanctions, a Russian
invasion of Estonia would legally obligate the US and most of Europe
to declare war on Moscow. "We'll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for
Lithuania. You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again," Obama pledged in his
September speech in Estonia. Less than 48 hours after Obama's address, Russian agents blanketed an Estonia-Russia
border crossing with tear gas, stormed across, and kidnapped an Estonian state security officer, Eston Kohver, who
specialized in counterintelligence. Kohver has been held illegally in a Russian prison for nine months now. It was
something like an act of geopolitical trolling: aggressive enough to assert Russian dominion over Estonia, but not so
aggressive as to be considered a formal act of war that would trigger a Western counterattack. And it was one of several

The Russian
military has already begun pressing the Baltic states. Russian
warships were spotted in Latvian waters 40 times in 2014. Russian
military flights over the Baltics are now routine, often with the
planes switching off their transponders, which makes them harder to
spot and increases the chances of an accident. Military activity in
the region had reached Cold War levels. NATO, fearing the worst, is
increasing military exercises in the Baltics. The US is installing heavy
equipment. And in February, the US military paraded through the
Russian-majority Estonian city of Narva, a few hundred yards from
Russia's borders. It's a textbook example of what political scientists
call the security dilemma: Each side sees its actions as defensive
and the other side's as offensive. Each responds to the other's
perceived provocations by escalating further, a self-reinforcing cycle
that can all too easily lead to war. It is considered, for example, a major contributor to the
signs that Putin's Russia is asserting a right to meddle in these former Soviet territories.

outbreak of World War I. That it is entirely foreseeable does little to reduce the risk. Even if Russia in fact has no designs
on the Baltics, its bluffing and posturing has already created the conditions for an unwanted war. In early April, for
example, a Russian fighter jet crossed into the Baltic Sea and "buzzed" a US military plane, missing it by only 20 feet. It
was one of several recent near-misses that, according to a think tank called the European Leadership Institute, have had a
"high probability of causing casualties or a direct military confrontation between Russia and Western states." Meanwhile,

Russia has been flying its nuclear-capable strategic bombers along

NATO airspace, often with the planes' transponders switched off,
135

making an accident or misperception more likely.

As if that weren't dangerous

enough, the bombers hulking, decades-old Tupolev Tu-95 models have become prone to accidents such as engine
fires. What if a Tu-95 went down unexpectedly, say, off the coast of Norway? What if it was carrying nuclear warheads, or
it went down during a moment of high tension? Such incidents can lead to misunderstandings, and such
misunderstandings can lead to war. By late April, when NATO officials gathered at the security conference in Estonia's
capital of Tallinn, the severity of the danger had become unmistakable. As Ahmed Rashid wrote from the conference:
Baltic presidents and NATO officials were unusually blunt in describing the extent to which the security architecture in
Eastern Europe has collapsed, how Russia poses the gravest threat to peace since World War II, and how the conflict in
Ukraine and the loss of the Crimea has left the Baltic states on the front line of an increasingly hostile standoff. Amid
these tensions, the thought of a plane crash leading to war seems scarily plausible. It is not just Western officials who fear
such an incident could spark war. Fyodor Lukyanov, the prominent Russian analyst who is considered close to the
government, worried that the NATO military exercises in the Baltics meant to deter Russia were also contributing to the
problem. "Russia reacts to that because Russia perceives it as a hostile approach to the Russian border," he explained.
"And its a vicious circle." It is easy to imagine, Lukyanov said, any number of ways that the powder keg could explode.
"Without

any intention to create the big conflict, it might happen,"

he said. "One step, another step, and reciprocity can become very
dangerous. Say a Russian aircraft comes very close to an area that
NATO believes is prohibited while Russia believes its not prohibited,
and then British aircraft respond. It might be manageable, and in
most cases of course it will be, but who knows."

136

2NC NATO Scenario

If NATO doesnt intervene, itll be destroyed
Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF

Andrei Piontkovsky, a Russian

political analyst and frequent Kremlin critic , who first suggested the
theory, last August, that Putin's plan for the Baltics was more
sophisticated, and more calculated, than anybody realized. Piontkovsky
V. How it would happen: A plot to break NATO It was

was trying to answer a question that Western analysts and policymakers had been puzzling over since
Russian provocations began in the Baltics last fall: What does Putin want? Unlike in Ukraine, with which
Russia has a long shared history, there is little demand among the Russian public for intervention in the
Baltic states. They are of modest strategic value. And the risks of Russia's aggression there are potentially

His is a theory that is now taken much more

seriously by Western policymakers and appears more plausible all
the time. Putin hopes to spark a conflict in the Baltics, Piontkovsky wrote, so
as to force Western European leaders into an impossible choice: Fulfill
their NATO obligation to defend the Baltics and counterattack, even
if it means fighting World War III over a tiny post-Soviet republic
most Europeans couldn't care less about or do nothing. The
implications of doing nothing, Piontkovsky pointed out, would extend far beyond the
Baltics. It would lay bare NATO's mutual defense provision as a lie,
effectively dissolving the military alliance, ending a quarter-century
of Europe's security unification under Western leadership, and
leaving Eastern Europe once more vulnerable to Russian domination.
In this way, Putin could do what Soviet leaders never came close to:
defeat NATO. "This is his most cherished objective," Piontkovsky told me when
we talked in his kitchen, in a leafy Moscow neighborhood across the river from Gorky Park. " It's an
enormous temptation. He may retreat at any stage, but the
temptation is enormous, to destroy NATO. ... The risk is big, yes? But
the prize is enormous." "To destroy NATO, to demonstrate that
Article V does not work, the Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia
are the best place for this," he said. "It's happening now, every day. Intrusions into the
airspace, psychological pressure, the propaganda on TV." He suggested that Putin, rather than rolling
Russian tanks across the border, would perhaps seed unmarked Russian special
forces into, say, the Russian-majority city of Narva in Estonia, where
they would organize localized violence or a phony independence
referendum. A handful of such unacknowledged forces, whom Putin
referred to as "little green men" after they appeared in Crimea,
would perhaps be dressed as local volunteers or a far-right gang;
they might be joined by vigilantes, as they were in eastern Ukraine .
catastrophic. Why bother?

They would almost certainly be aided by a wave of Russian propaganda, making it harder for outsiders to
differentiate unmarked Russian troops from civilian volunteers, to determine who was fighting where and

Such an intervention would force NATO into an

impossible choice: Are you really going to open fire on some
hoodlums stirring up trouble in Estonia, knowing they might actually
be unmarked Russian troops? Would you risk the first major
European war since 1945, all to eject some unmarked Russian troops
from the Estonian town of Narva? Putin, Piontkovsky believes, is gambling
137
had started what.

that the answer is no. That NATO would not intervene, thus
effectively abandoning its commitment to defend its Eastern
European member states. Piontkovsky's scenario, once considered extreme, is
now widely seen by Western security experts and policymakers as
plausible. At the end of 2014, the military intelligence service of Denmark, a member of NATO, issued
a formal paper warning of precisely that: Russia may attempt to test NATOs cohesion by engaging in
military intimidation of the Baltic countries, for instance with a threatening military build-up close to the
borders of these countries and simultaneous attempts of political pressure, destabilization and possibly
infiltration. Russia could launch such an intimidation campaign in connection with a serious crisis in the
post-Soviet space or another international crisis in which Russia confronts the United States and NATO.
"The

concern is that what Putin wants to do is break NATO, and the

best way to do that would be to poach on the Baltics," Saideman, the political
scientist, told me on a call from a European security conference where he said the scenario was being

if Germany doesnt respond to incursions in the

Baltics, if France doesnt respond and its just an American
operation, then it will lead to the breaking of NATO, is the theory ," he
taken very seriously. "And

said. "Thats the biggest concern." Saideman described a variation on this scenario that I heard from

Putin might attempt to seize some small sliver of the

Baltics quickly and bloodlessly. This would make it politically easier
for Western European leaders to do nothing how to rally your
nation to war if hardly anyone has even been killed? and harder to
counterattack, knowing it would require a full-scale invasion. "I think
theyre very serious about this," Saideman said. "Theres a real
concern."
others as well: that

Either Russian expansion causes war or it fractures NATO

Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF
VI. How it would happen: The fog of hybrid war In

early 2015, Pew pollsters asked

citizens of several NATO states the exact question that analysts and
policymakers from Washington to Moscow are gaming out: "If Russia
got into a serious military conflict with one of its neighboring
countries that is our NATO ally, do you think our country should or
should not use military force to defend that country?" The numbers
from Western Europe were alarming: Among Germans, only 38
percent said yes; 58 percent said no. If it were up to German voters
and to at least some extent, it is NATO would effectively
surrender the Baltics to Russia in a conflict. This poll is even worse than it looks. It
assumes that Russia would launch an overt military invasion of the Baltics. What would actually
happen is something far murkier, and far more likely to leverage
European hesitation: the playbook from Ukraine, where Russia
deployed its newly developed concepts of postmodern "hybrid war,"
designed to blur the distinction between war and not-war, to make it
as difficult as possible to differentiate grassroots unrest or vigilante
cyberattacks from Russian military aggression. Putin may already be
laying the groundwork. In March of 2014, shortly after Russia had annexed
Crimea, Putin gave a speech there pledging to protect Russians even
outside of Russia, which many took as a gesture to the substantial
Russian minorities in the Baltics. "That kind of misperception
situation is definitely possible, and thats how wars start" Then, in
138

October, Putin warned that "open manifestations of neo-Nazism" had

"become commonplace in Latvia and other Baltic states" repeating
the language that he and Russian state media had earlier used to
frighten Russian speakers in Ukraine into taking up arms. This April,
several Russian outlets issued spurious reports that Latvia was planning to forcibly relocate ethnic Russians
into Nazi-style ghettos an echo of similar scaremongering Russian propaganda broadcast in the runup in
Ukraine. Martin Hurt, a former senior official of the country's defense ministry, warned that his country's
ethnic Russian minority could be "receptive to Kremlin disinformation." Moscow, he said, could generate
unrest "as a pretext to use military force against the Baltic states." In early 2007, Estonia's
parliament voted to relocate a Soviet-era military statue, the Bronze Soldier, that had become a cultural

Russian
politicians and state media accused the Estonian government of
fascism and Nazi-style discrimination against ethnic Russians; they
issued false reports claiming ethnic Russians were being tortured
and murdered. Protests broke out and escalated into riots and mass
looting. One person was killed in the violence, and the next day
hackers took many of the country's major institutions offline. Russia
could do it again, only this time gradually escalating further toward
a Ukraine-style conflict. NATO is just not built to deal with such a
crisis. Its mutual defense pledge, after all, rests on the assumption that war is a black-and-white
concept, that a country is either at war or not at war. Its charter is from a time when
war was very different than it is today, with its many shades of gray.
Russia can exploit this flaw by introducing low-level violence that
more hawkish NATO members would consider grounds for war but
that war-averse Western European states might not see that way.
Disagreement among NATO's member states would be guaranteed as
they hesitated over where to declare a moment when Russia had
crossed the line into war. Meanwhile, Russian state media, which has shown real influence in
symbol and annual rallying point for the country's ethnic Russians. In response,

Western Europe, would unleash a flurry of propaganda to confuse the issue, make it harder to pin blame on

Germany, which is
would be particularly
resistant to going to war. The legacy of World War II and the
ideology of pacifism and compromise make even the idea of
declaring war on Russia unthinkable. German leaders would come
under intense political pressure to, if not reject the call to arms, then at least
delay and negotiate a de facto rejection of NATO's collective selfdefense. In such a scenario, it is disturbingly easy to imagine how NATO's
European member states could split over whether Russia had even
crossed their red line for war, much less whether to respond. Under a fog of confusion and
doubt, Russia could gradually escalate until a Ukraine-style conflict in
the Baltics was foregone, until it had marched far across NATO's red
line, exposing that red line as meaningless. But the greatest danger
of all is if Putin's plan were to stumble: By overreaching, by
underestimating Western resolve to defend the Baltics, or by
starting something that escalates beyond his control, it could all too
easily lead to full-blown war. "That kind of misperception situation is
definitely possible, and thats how wars start," Saideman said, going on to
Moscow for the violence, and gin up skepticism of any American calls for war.
widely considered the deciding vote on whether Europe would go to war,

compare Europe today with 1914, just before World War I. "The thing that makes war most thinkable is
when other people dont think its thinkable."

In 1963, a few months after the Cuban missile crisis had

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Kennedy gave a speech

drawing on the lessons of the world's brush with nuclear war: "Above
all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert
those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a
humiliating retreat or a nuclear war." That is the choice that Putin
may well force upon NATO.
almost brought the US and Soviet Union to blows, President John F.

Russian Expansion fractures NATO

Johnston 6/3

(Ian, 2015, The Guardian, Nato and EU face collapse if they fail to stop Russian
aggression, warn experts, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/nato-and-eu-face-collapse-ifthey-fail-to-stop-russian-aggression-experts-warn-10295927.html)//RTF

Nato and the European Union could collapse in the face of

increasing aggression from Russia, which has been emboldened by
the EUs apparent unwillingness to defend its principles, an
influential think-tank has warned. A major study by Chatham House found the
conflict in Ukraine where Moscow is backing separatist rebels
represented a defining moment for the future of Europe. It called
for the West to increase the strength of its conventional military
forces. It also warned that Russia was prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances and Nato should make clear that a so-called limited war
was impossible. The conflict in Ukraine is a defining factor for the future of European
security, the report said. Ukraines failure would deepen instability in Eastern Europe, increase the risk of
further Kremlin adventures and diminish the prospects for eventual beneficial change in Russia. Russia

may have the greater interest in Ukraine. But the West has an even
bigger interest in preserving the post-Cold War environment. If that
is dismantled, it is conceivable that Nato and the EU could collapse
too. The report, whose authors include two former ambassadors to Moscow, Sir Roderic Lyne and Sir
Andrew Wood, said Russian President Vladimir Putin had been encouraged by the weak and unconvincing
responses from the West to events such as Russias seizure of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia
in 2008. The

Kremlin perceives that Europe lacks the will to pay the

necessary price to defend its principles, it said. Russian ambitions
and intentions had been telegraphed for well over a decade, but the
West found it easier at the time to disregard them and indulge in the
fantasy that Russia was progressing towards a liberal-democratic
model with which the West felt comfortable. The war in Ukraine is,
in part, the result of the Wests laissez-faire approach to Russia. And
it warned that if there was a wider conflict in Europe, Russia would be prepared to use tactical nuclear
weapons. Nato

must retain its credibility as a deterrent to Russian

aggression. In particular, it needs to demonstrate that limited war is
impossible and that the response to ambiguous or hybrid war will
be robust. Hybrid tactics is a term that describes the deployment of unbadged Russian troops and
the use of local pro-Moscow forces in eastern Ukraine. The growing threat from Moscow means that
conventional deterrent capability must be restored as a matter of urgency and convincingly conveyed, to
avoid presenting Russia with inviting targets, the think-tank warned. The Treasury has reportedly asked
the Ministry of Defence to make spending cuts of 1bn this year. David Lidington, the Europe minister,
said: The UK is working closely with EU and G7 partners in response to Russian actions in Ukraine. The
UK is also playing a leading role in Nato exercises in Eastern Europe and with Baltic partners as part of the
assurance measures and collective defence in the region.

Collapse of NATO causes multiple escalatory nuclear wars

John Duffield 1994, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of
Virginia,

140

[Political Science Quarterly 109:5, p. 766-7]

important factors that have

ensure the alliance's enduring relevance . First, they underestimated the
extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the
alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a
number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their territory. These include not
only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new
concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions . Second, the pessimists failed to
consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war,
the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as
having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in
Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it works to prevent such
conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc.
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three
helped to

Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always
performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize
Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security
dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies,

NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the
countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves
the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving
a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties,
American economic interests in Europe as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable
imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies remain

the United States could easily be drawn

into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely
be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of
nuclear weapons.11
substantial. If history is any guide, moreover,

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2NC War Goes Nuclear

Russian nuclear doctrine means war in Ukraine escalates
Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF

The Cold War was a dangerous

game, but it was a game in which everyone knew and agreed upon
the stakes and the rules. That is not the case today. The Western
side believes it is playing a game where the rules are clear enough,
the stakes relatively modest, and the competition easily winnable .
The Russian side, however, sees a game where the rules can be
rewritten on the fly, even the definition of war itself altered . For Russia,
III. The drift: How the unthinkable became possible

fearing a threat from the West it sees as imminent and existential, the stakes are unimaginably high,
justifying virtually any action or gamble if it could deter defeat and, perhaps, lead to victory. Separately,
the ever-paranoid Kremlin believes that the West is playing the same game in Ukraine. Western support for
Ukraine's government and efforts to broker a ceasefire to the war there, Moscow believes, are really a plot
to encircle Russia with hostile puppet states and to rob Russia of its rightful sphere of influence.

Repeated Russian warnings that it would go to war to defend its

perceived interests in Ukraine, potentially even nuclear war, are
dismissed in most Western capitals as bluffing, mere rhetoric. Western
leaders view these threats through Western eyes, in which
impoverished Ukraine would never be worth risking a major war. In
Russian eyes, Ukraine looks much more important: an extension of
Russian heritage that is sacrosanct and, as the final remaining
component of the empire, a strategic loss that would unacceptably
weaken Russian strength and thus Russian security. Both side are gambling
and guessing in the absence of a clear understanding of what the other side truly intends, how it will act,
what will and will not trigger the invisible triplines that would send us careening into war. Today's tensions
bear far more similarity to the period before World War I During the Cold War, the comparably matched
Western and Soviet blocs prepared for war but also made sure that war never came. They locked Europe in
a tense but stable balance of power; that balance is gone. They set clear red lines and vowed to defend
them at all costs. Today, those red lines are murky and ill-defined. Neither side is sure where they lie or
what really happens if they are crossed. No one can say for sure what would trigger war. That is why,
analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an
unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes
over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force
the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than
its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger
described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, a rising power, propelled by
nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order. Now, as then, it believes that through superior
cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift
toward war is gradual and easy to miss which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there is one
way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I, and more similar to those of the Cold
War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies
parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a

Russia, hoping
to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative
weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear
weapons. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure
deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be
used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. Russia's official
nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear
strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential
potential armageddon. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous.

142

threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its
willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more
limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use,
particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's
borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that
Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the
battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "Its not just a difference in rhetoric. Its a whole
different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He
called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. " Theres

a low
nuclear threshold now that didnt exist during the Cold War." Nuclear
theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he
is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a "limited" nuclear
strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war a doomsday
scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities
would be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the
bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow
remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would
cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

Russian nuclear doctrine means even conventional wars

escalate
Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF
VIII. The nuclear dangers: The red line is closer than you think This August, as the Russian military
launched its undeclared and unofficial invasion of eastern Ukraine to defend separatist rebels there against
defeat, Putin attended an annual youth conference at Lake Seliger, just north of Moscow. During a Q&A
session, a teaching student asked an odd question about the "cyclical" nature of history and concerns that

Putin, in his answer, did something that the

leaders of major nuclear powers generally avoid doing he rattled the nuclear saber a
bit: Let me remind you that Russia is one of the worlds biggest
nuclear powers. These are not just words this is the reality.
Whats more, we are strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability
and developing our armed forces. They have become more compact
and effective and are becoming more modern in terms of the
weapons at their disposal. There is a certain fear in Russia, never far
from the surface, that the only thing preventing the West from
realizing its dream of destroying or subjugating Russia is its nuclear
arsenal. (Three months later, Putin warned that the West wanted to tame the Russian bear so as to
"tear out his fangs and his claws," which he explained meant its nuclear weapons.) " There is a
widespread belief that the only guarantee for Russian security, if not
sovereignty and existence, is the nuclear deterrent," Lukyanov, the Russian
foreign policy expert, explained. "After the Yugoslavia wars, Iraq War, Libyan
intervention, its not an argument anymore, its conventional
wisdom: 'If Russia were not a nuclear superpower, the regime
change of an Iraqi or Libyan style would be inevitable here. The
Russia could be "drawn into a new, open global conflict."

Americans are so unhappy with the Russian regime, they would do it. Praise God, we have a nuclear

Russia faced a problem: Its

conventional military forces are now so much weaker than NATO's,
and its capital city so close to NATO's forces in the Baltics , that it feared
NATO tank divisions could push all the way to Moscow and quickly
arsenal, and that makes us untouchable.'" But

143

win a war without ever using a nuclear weapon. Both the US and Russia had
pledged to use nuclear weapons only to deter one another from nuclear attacks. This kept the Cold War

because the US would not need its ICBMs to win a war, that
deterrence is no longer enough to keep Russia safe. In response,
Russia has been gradually lowering its bar for when it would use
nuclear weapons, and in the process upending the decades-old logic
of mutually assured destruction, adding tremendous nuclear danger
to any conflict in Europe. The possibility that a limited or unintended
skirmish could spiral into nuclear war is higher than ever. Russia's
nuclear doctrine, a formal document the Kremlin publishes every few years outlining when it will
and will not use nuclear weapons, declares that the Russian military can launch
nuclear weapons not just in the case of a nuclear attack, but in case
of a conventional military attack that poses an existential threat. In
other words, if Russia believes that American tanks could be bound for
the Kremlin, it has declared it may respond by dropping nuclear
bombs. The danger that this adds to any possible confrontation, particularly along the Baltic states, is
difficult to overstate. If an accident or miscalculation were to lead to a
border skirmish, all it would take is for the Kremlin to misperceive
the fighting as the beginning of an assault toward Moscow and its
own doctrine would call for using nuclear weapons. Indeed, it would be the
only way to avoid total defeat. There is another layer of danger and uncertainty to this : It is not
clear what Russia would consider a conventional threat worthy of a
nuclear response. A few months after he'd annexed Crimea, Putin revealed that
during Russia's undeclared invasion of the territory he had
considered putting his country's nuclear forces on alert; his
government has signaled it would consider using nuclear force to
defend Crimea from an attack, something Russian analysts told me was not just bluster.
cold. But

The United States, of course, has no intention of militarily retaking Crimea, despite surprisingly common
fears to the contrary in Russia. But Russian paranoia about such a threat, and a possible willingness to use
nuclear weapons to avert it, adds more danger to the already dangerous war in eastern Ukraine and the

the
Crimea revelation raises a disconcerting question: Where exactly
does Moscow place the line for a threat severe enough to use
nuclear weapons? Its doctrine says they should be used only against an existential threat, but an
attack on Crimea would be far from existentially dangerous. We can only guess where the
real red line lays, and hope not to cross it by mistake.
fears that greater Russian or Western involvement there could spark a broader conflict. And

Any war escalates- Russian actions put us on the brink

Fisher 6/29

(Max, 2015, writing for Vox, How World War III became possible,
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)//RTF
IX. The nuclear dangers: How Putin is pushing us back to the brink There is a specific moment that arms
control experts often cite to highlight the dangers of nuclear weapons, how they kept the world poised, for
years at a time, mere minutes away from nuclear devastation. That moment was September 26, 1983.
That evening, a Russian lieutenant colonel named Stanislav Petrov settled in for his shift overseeing the
Soviet Union's missile attack early warning system. Petrov had a top-secret network of satellites, all
pointed squarely at the United States and its arsenal of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles,
which pointed back at him. The US and Soviet Union were ramping up development of ICBMs, which could
circle the globe in 30 minutes and reduce an enemy city to ash. Both sides were driven by fear that the
other could one day gain the ability to launch a preemptive nuclear strike so devastating and so fast that it
would start and win the war within hours. Each sought to develop ever more sensitive warning systems,
and ever more rapid mechanisms for retaliation, to deter the threat. Petrov ran one such warning system.
If he caught an American attack as soon as it crossed his sensors, it would give the Soviet leadership about

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20 minutes of warning time. That was their window to determine how to respond. The space for mistakes
was effectively zero. Five hours into Petrov's shift that night, something he had never encountered in his
11-year career happened: The system went into full alarm. The word "LAUNCH" displayed in large red
letters. The screen announced a "high reliability" of an American ICBM barreling toward the Soviet Union.
Petrov had to make a decision: Would he report an incoming American strike? If he did, Soviet nuclear
doctrine called for a full nuclear retaliation; there would be no time to double-check the warning system,
much less seek negotiations with the US. If he didn't, and he was wrong, he would have left his country
defenseless, an act tantamount to treason. His gut instinct told him the warning was in error, but when he
flipped through the incoming imagery and data and he could reach no hard conclusion from it. After a few
moments, he called his superiors and stated categorically that it was a false alarm. There was, he insisted,
no attack. Petrov waited in agony for 23 minutes the missile's estimated time to target before he
knew for sure that he'd been right. Only a few people were aware of it at the time, but thanks to Petrov,

The US
and Soviet Union, shaken by this and other near-misses, spent the next few
years stepping back from the brink. They decommissioned a large number of nuclear
warheads and signed treaties to limit their deployment. One of their most important
measures was a 1987 agreement called the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which saw both sides conclude that the
medium-range, land-based nuclear missiles they'd stuffed across
Europe were simply too dangerous and destabilizing to be allowed.
Because the missiles could reach Moscow or Berlin or London at lightening speeds, they shortened
the "response time" to any crisis the window in which a Soviet or Western leader
the world had only barely avoided World War III and, potentially, total nuclear annihilation.

would have to decide whether the country was under attack before such an attack would hit to just a

They made the danger of an unintended escalation, or of an

error like the that one Petrov only barely prevented, far greater. The
few minutes.

risk they posed was deemed, in the 1987 INF Treaty, unacceptable to the world. And the weapons were

Putin has taken several steps to push Europe back toward the
nuclear brink, to the logic of nuclear escalation and hair-trigger weapons that made the early
1980s, by many accounts, the most dangerous time in human history. Perhaps most
drastically, he appears to have undone the 1987 INF Treaty,
reintroducing the long-banned nuclear weapons. In March, Russia
announced it would place nuclear-capable bombers and mediumrange, nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in the Russian enclave of
Kaliningrad only an hour, by commercial airliner, from Berlin. Meanwhile, it has been
testing medium-range, land-based missiles. The missiles , to the alarm of
the United States, appear to violate the INF Treaty. This is far from Putin's only nuclear
escalation. He is developing more nuclear weapons, and calling frequent
attention to them, as apparent cover for his aggression and
adventurism in Europe. There are suspicions, for example, that Russia may have deployed
nuclear-armed submarines off of the US Eastern Seaboard. What makes this so dangerous is that Putin
appears to believe, as the scholar Edward Lucas outlined in a recent report for the Center for
European Policy Analysis, that he has a greater willingness than NATO to use
nuclear weapons, and thus that his superior will allows him to bully
the otherwise stronger Western powers with games of nuclear
chicken. This is a substantial, and indeed terrifying, break from Cold Warera nuclear thinking, in
removed.

which both sides rightly feared nuclear brinksmanship as too dangerous to contemplate and used their
weapons primarily to deter one another. "Russias

nuclear saber-rattling is
unjustified, destabilizing and dangerous," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg
said in a May speech in Washington. Putin is acting out of an apparent belief that
increasing the nuclear threat to Europe, and as a result to his own country, is
ultimately good for Russia and worth the risks. It is a gamble with
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the lives of hundreds of millions of Europeans, and perhaps many

beyond, at stake.

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