THE OTTOMAN CALIPHATE AND

MUSLIMS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO

DURING THE MODERN ERA
ISAAC DONOSO
University of Alicante
I. THE OTTOMAN TURK CALIPHATE AND ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
During centuries the international routes connecting East and West were seized by
Muslims: Arabs and Persians first, Indians and Chinese later, the Modern Era will
witness the rise of Turks and Malays. Cosmopolitan communities joined Islam as
passport for trade and progress, both as economic system and cultural model. Since the
mid-7th century A.D. Islam was known in China, and from Arab and Persian ports (Srf,
Basra, Bagdad, Oman, etc.) commercial factories emerged in southern China
representing the Great Commerce of the World. Guangzhou/ Canton (Khnf / )
was the most prominent city till the rebellion of Huang Chao in 878 A. C. that
massacred the foreign community, as al-Masd states. Two major consequences will
develop from this event: 1) Chinese and Muslims started to meet in a middle point of
the route, i.e. in Southeast Asia, emerging Malay entrepts (being the first Kalh / ;)(
and 2) a Muslim Chinese community (Hui) will seize the route in centralizing the
commerce in Quanzhou (Zaytn / ). Hence, Arabs and Persians will depend on
Chinese regulations to trade, and Malays will try to attract the lucrative interchange. 1 By
the 14th century, Ibn Baa has revealed the strength of Indian Islam, and the control
of the maritime route by Chinese ships. By the 15 th, the Hui Zheng He has expanded
Pax Sinica in terms of Islamization, and exposed clearly the Chinese seizure of the seas.
Similarly, the Indian Krim merchants have led the segmentation of the trade. 2 In this
context, the legendary Arab seafaring knowledge cannot but finally be revealed by
Amad Ibn Mjid and Sulaymn al-Mahr. The conquest of Constantinople (1453) and
Cairo (1517) will establish the rise of the Ottoman Turk Caliphate in the Modern Era,
and the Malay sultanates the scenario of the faster Islamization.
But the centuries of Islamic trade seizure faced a conundrum when Portugal
rounded the Cape in 1498 and threatened the commerce of the Zamorin in Calicut
(Malabar Coast). Christians from the Republics of Venice and Ragusa, and Muslims
from the Mamluk, Gujarat and Ottoman Sultanates colligated to face the serious
1

Arab trade with Chine declined from about the end of the 3 rd/9th century, for it is said that in the
peasant rebellion under Huang Chao (A.D. 878) large number of foreigners were massacred in China.
From this time onwards Arab boats went only as far as Kalah, a port of the western coast of the Malay
Peninsula, no longer existing, in Djughrfiy, loc. cit., p. 583.
2
A setter of 1288 indicates that the Mamluks wished to welcome the merchants of Yemen, India
and China into Syria and Egypt, but such attempts had no very marked success. For the secret of the
Indian Ocean trade route was its segmentation: each group Karimi, Gujarati, Malay, Chinese had its
own area of operation, in which it tended to control shipping, and where many or most of the merchants
who traveled the route were members of the locally dominant commercial group. Only the Portuguese
irruption induced dramatic changes in this manner of conducting business, David Abulafia, Asia, Africa
and the Trade of Medieval Europe, in Michael Mossey Postan & Edward Miller (eds.), The Cambridge
Economic History of Europe. Vol 2: Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1987. p. 452. Citas

de 185 de mi tesis.

competitor. After the triumphal battle of Diu in 1509, Portugal overtook one by one the
main ports of the maritime route:
Continuaron los Portugueses la navegacion de el mar Indico: s gloriosisimo para una
Nacion pobre de fuerzas, falta de bastimentos, escazo de gente, que con atrevimiento, y
valor seorease Mozambique, Sofala, Melinde, Mombaza, toda la Corte de Ethiopia,
hasta el mar Bermejo: pasa adelante con suceso feliz, costea la feliz Arabia, el seno
Persico, y costa de el mar Indico; obligando pagar reconocimiento muchos Principes,
y mui grandes; no se contuvieron en tan vastas extenciones, jusgaron los extrechos limites
su resolucion intrepida: pasan de Zeylan Malaca: Isla de Sumatra, de donde s muy
probable sac Salomon el oro, con que enriqueci el Templo; suben la China, y Iapon, y
con valentia heroyca costea la Tartaria descubriendo una inmensa multitud de Islas; tenian
la sazon el Comercio de especera y aroman Indicos los Soldados de Egipto, que con las
incursiones de los Portugueses perdieron de Renta mas de ochocientos mil ducados:
defendieronlo muchos aos valerosamente contra Moros, Turcos gentiles, y Venecianos,
en que hay prodigiosos sucesos, que illustran la historia de Nacion tan belicosa, y
gloriosa.3

Portugal rooted in the Indian Ocean building fortresses along the route till China,
overtaking the Islamic thalassocracy and confronting the incipient Islamization in
Southeast Asia. Thus, the Spice trade became the centre of commercial attraction, and
the Malays that joined the Islamic world now faced a new global scenario. Islamic
Malacca, the Malay model for political Islam and massive commerce, was taken in 1511
by Afonso de Albuquerque. Though dramatic for the normal evolution of the region, the
fall of Malacca exported its model to the rest of the region: Johore, Aceh, Brunei, Sulu,
Mindanao, etc. The model of Malay sultanate was after 1511 consolidated in political,
religious, economical and cultural terms, and Malays were conscious of their situation
within the Islamic world. It was the time for the Sultan to exhort the protection of the
Caliph. And since 1517 the Caliph settled in Constantinople under the Ottoman Empire
claiming religious authority in a decomposing Dr al-Islm.
For the first time in several centuries at least from the rape of Baghdad in 1258
by the Mongols, a singular Islamic power claimed not only religious authority over
the Islamic world, but political one as well. The Ottoman sultanate became Caliphate
and settled in the new Rome of Constantinople. Both, religious and political power
unified in a project to defence the Dr al-Islm conceptualized again as the old Islamic
Empire (Mamlakat al-Islm). In the West the Empire fought the Spanish expansion in
North Africa, conquest the south Mediterranean land till Algeria and oriental Europe till
Vienna and as fifth column supported the Spanish Moriscos.4 In the East, the conquest
of Egypt opened the vast Indian Ocean and exposed the dramatic Islamization taking
root in the Spice archipelagos. For the 16 th century, Turks and Malays led the
transformations taking place in the Islamic world and, after taking the role of the
Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire had to defence the process of Islamization in eastern
regions, by religious, political and certainly economical reasons.5
3

Juan de la Concepcin, Historia General de Philipinas, Manila, Impr. del Seminario Conciliar y
Real de San Carlos, 1788, vol. I, cap. XIII, pp. 239-240.
4
Cf. Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African
Frontier, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2010.
5
About the Ottoman expansion in the Indian Ocean see: Palmira Johnson Brummett, Ottoman
Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, Albany, State University of New York,
1994; Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; Salih
zbaran, The Ottoman response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in
the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century, Istanbul,

The Zamorin of Calicut was powerless to fight the Portuguese advent, and books
like the Tufat al-Mujhidn by Zabiddin stated the economical ruin of the Muslim
commerce in terms of religious counteraction.6 In order to avoid the usurpation of the
Islamic commercial monopoly, it was needed to counteract as jihd and claim the
protection of the Caliphate. The Mamluk Sultan of Egypt listened up the appeal and
took place the battle of Diu in 1509. The Ottoman Sultan of Constantinople followed,
but Diu survived as a strong Portuguese bastion in protecting the western Indian Ocean
even after siege (1538).
Nevertheless, if the political powers were not able to protect the traders, they did
not stop through contraband. Despite the Estado da ndia from Diu to Malacca, Muslim
traders and preachers kept connected both sides of the Ocean, and the sources are full of
references of scattered but continuous Arabs, Indians and Turks in the region. 7 Most
importantly, at the end the political powers made a final attempt to remove the
Portuguese hegemony. Since the fall of Malacca in 1511 the Sultanate of Aceh was
obsessed with expansionism, and Malacca was the key to revert Portuguese
intromission. Accordingly together with the traders, ambassadors from Aceh were sent
to request friendship with the Ottoman Caliphate offering luxurious presents as soon as
1564.8 Then the Sultan of Aceh Alauddin al-Qahhar requested formal assistance to the
Sultan of Istanbul in 1566, and this sent five hundred soldiers, weapons, ammunitions
and engineers. The Sultan of Aceh offered in exchange the monopoly of the Spicy trade
once the Portuguese were expelled. This is how Diogo de Couto narrated the appeal:
E que para ser Imperator de todo o Malayo lhe faltava a Cidade Malaca pera senhorear,
determinou de levar sua fortuna ao cabo, pera o que se fez prestes muito de ante mo: e
mandou convocar ainda gente, munioes, e artilheria ao Gro Turco, a quem mandou
riquissimos presentes, e lhe offereceo o comercio, e trato de todas as drogas, e especearias
de Maluco, Banda, Jaoa, e de todas as mais partes daquelles arcepelagos, o que o Turco
estimou muito; e logo lhe mandou quinhentos Turcos, e muitas bombardas grossas, e
grande copia de munies, muitos Engenherios, e Mestres de antilheria. 9

Suleiman died in 1566 but Selim II sent the expedition, and at noon January 20,
1568 an immense navy arrived at the shores of Malacca. The captain of the fortress was
Leoniz Pereira. He did not hesitate and wait the ambassador, who brought a letter in
Arabic language with a golden seal. Certainly the letter was written in Arabic script,
but the language most probably was Malay as it was interpreted by a Portuguese
mestizo working as translator in the office of Aceh.10 It is interesting that de Couto
Isis Press, 1994; idem, Ottoman Expansion toward the Indian Ocean in the 16 th century, Istanbul, Bilgi
University Press, 2009.
6

pp. 357-358 tesis

Makhdum, Shaykh Zainuddin, Tufat al-Mujhidn. A Historical Epic of the Sixteenth

Century, Kuala Lumpur and Calicut, Islamic Books Trust and Others Books, 2006.
7
8

Cita de la p. 173 de la tesis.

Cf. Carta de Gaspar Ribeiro e seu filho Joo Ribeiro dando parte a D. Sebastio chegarem ao
Cairo 1800 quintais de pimenta, ao Porto de Jud 23 navios com 3 mil quintais de outras drogas, que os
de Achm frequentavam o comrcio e navegao, presenteando os embaixadores do Turco para fazerem
amizade com ele., Arquivo Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, 27/08/1564: [PT-TT-CC/1/107/9].
9
Da Asia de Diogo de Couto. Dos feitos, que os Portuguezes fizeram na conquista, e
descubrimento das terras, e mares do Oriente, Lisbon, Regia Officina Typografica, 1786, Dec. VIII, Cap.
XXI, [T. 5, P. 1], p. 131.
10
Cf. Timothy P. Barnard, Mestizos as Middlemen: Tomas Das and his Travels in Eastern
Sumatra, in Peter Borschberg (ed.), Iberians in the Singapore-Melaka Area and Adjacent Regions (16 th
to 18th Century), Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag & Fundao Oriente, 2004, pp. 147-160.

mentions the baroque style of Malay letters, but is even more valuable that he
reproduced its meaning:
O Capito esteve sempre sentado; e quando foi a lhe elles darem o recado de El Rey, e
huma carta, se levantou em p, e tomou a carta com grande contezia, a qual era escrita em
lingua Arabia com hum grande sello de ouro pendente, e a leo hum mestio renegado, que
elle trazia por lingua; e porque as cartas destes Reys sam muito prolixas, sem estilo, nem
ordem, porei somente o substancia della.
Carta do Achem pera o Capito
Mui notorio he serem meus antecessores mui amigos dos Reys de Portugal, e dos
Capites desta Fortaleza, como eu pudera provar pelos soccorros que deram aos navios de
El Rey de Portugal, quando por aqu passram o trabalho: pelo que folgarei muito que os
Portuguezes vam com as suas nos ao porto da minha Cidade, que eu os favorecerei em
tudo, e por esta amizade fui muitas vezes reprehendido de Turcos, porque no fazia
guerra aos Portuguezes, tendo-me tantas vezes escandalizado: pos isto se quer que v por
diante esta amizade, avise-me: e lhe peo que tome bom conselho, porque eu trago nesta
Armada muita gente, muita artilheria, e muitos Turcos pera a jornada que fao contra o
Rey de Jaoa, que matou meus Embaixadores, folgariamos que no viessemos a
rompimento.11

As we can notice, the Sultan of Aceh justifies the presence of a Turk army for a
campaign against the Sultan of Java. He mentions historical friendship between Portugal
and Aceh, but ends abruptly the letter with a threat: we will be happy not to see the
breakdown of the friendship. The answer of the Portuguese captain was to secure the
spy sent by the Sultan, cutting him in pieces when confessing that he was the
ambassador sent to the Turks.12 The war took place, but Portugal was still able to keep
Malacca and its monopoly.13
However, other forces were weakening little by little the Portuguese monopoly, 14
and during the 17th century Aceh will keep its political and cultural importance. 15 Thus,
the defeat of 1568 did not mean the disappearance of Ottoman political interest in the
region. On the contrary, similarly to the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean became an
open space for contraband, movements of population and destination for exiles. This is
how a Spanish missionary describes in his 1585 journey the Turk involvement in the
Spice trade:

11

Da Asia de Diogo de Couto, loc. cit., pp. 136-137.

E lhe mandou fazer perguntas, e ainda metello a tratos, nos quaes confessou que elle fora ao
Gro Turco por Embaixador sobre aquella jornada [] con que o Capito lhe mandou cortar os ps, e as
mos, e a cabea, e tudo mettido em hum parao o mandou ao Achm em resposta de lho mandar pedir, e
que elle sentio em extremo, in ibid., p. 140.
13
About Aceh in Portuguese sources see: Jorge Manuel Dos Santos Alves, O domnio do norte de
Samatra. A histria dos sultanatos de Samudera-Pacm e de Achm, e das suas relaes com os
Portugueses (1500-1580), Lisbon, Sociedade Histrica da Independncia de Portugal, 1999; and Paulo
Jorge De Sousa Pinto, Portugueses e Malaios. Malaca e os Sultanatos de Johor e Achem, 1575-1619,
Lisbon, Comisso Nacional para as Comemoraces dos Descobrimentos Portugueses & Fundaco
Oriente, 1997 (English version: The Portuguese and the Straits of Melaka, 1575-1619: Power, Trade and
Diplomacy, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 2012).
14
Cf. Ernst van Veen, Decay or defeat ?: An Inquiry into the Portuguese Decline in Asia 1580-1645,
Leiden University, doctoral dissertation, 2000.
15
Cita de Lombard
12

En este Reyno ay muchos Seores y Regulos, aunque el que tiene la mayor parte del es
vn Moro que se llama Achen. Es vna de las mas ricas Islas que ay en todo el mundo, por
tener muchas minas de oro finissimo (de lo qual con hauer ley que no se puede sacar mas
de lo necessario) sale de alla tanta abundancia que se lleua a Malaca, Turquia, y a otras
muchas partes. Cojesse en ella gran abundancia de pimienta, venxu en mucha cantidad, y
mucha Canphora y todo genero de especeria, a cuya causa llegan a contratar en este
Reyno muchos Turcos, que passan en naos, y otras fustas a el por el mar Vermejo.
Contratan ansi mesmo en el los Reynos de Sunda, Iaua mayor, y el de Amboyno, y otros
que estan a el cercanos.16

As the text describes, Aceh was still one of the richest kingdoms in the world, with
gold, pepper, camphor, and all kind of spices. And again despite the defeat, the Turks
seem to be one of the major traders in the region. Accordingly, Portugal could control
the sea routes, but traders, cargos and, more importantly now, preachers, developed
Aceh and other sultanates as counter hegemonic agents.
However, the Ottoman role of defending Islam in a movable geopolitical scenario
was not able to reach the edges, the very core of the process of Islamization. Hence, as a
centrifugal force from Mecca, Islam expanded to the four cardinal points of the Earth. 17
But that force was definitely stopped in the 16 th century in both, the Far West (alAndalus) and the Far East (the Philippine Archipelago), and the Ottoman Caliphate was
unable to help in both sides. Despite the remarkable career of Khayr al-Dn Barbarossa
(1478-1546),18 the battle was brought to North African cities: Tlemcen, Oran, Alger,
Tunis and Tripoli. Charles V and Suleiman fought for the control of the western
Mediterranean Sea trapped in the exiles of thousands of Moriscos. From coast to coast,
the sea was open for changing the side and, if al-Andalus was lost, the Ottomans offered
unlimited opportunities in a transforming world. Thus, in the other side of the planet as
well as of the Islamic world, Spanish authorities were afraid that Turk armies composed
by Moriscos could emerge in the Philippine Archipelago.
II.

AFTER LEPANTO: SPANISH

ARCHIPELAGO

POLICY TOWARDS

MUSLIMS

IN THE

PHILIPPINE

The battle of Lepanto in 1571 was a remarkable event that stopped for a while
Ottoman expansionism. But Tunis was taken again from the Spaniards in 1574, and a
huge number of soldiers were displaced towards other fronts. The Indian Ocean was still
a main centre for Islamic activism indeed. This is where we have to place the clear
expansionist policy delineated by the third Governor General of the Philippines
Francisco de Sande (1575-80). When he arrived to Manila from his American career, as
a lawyer and auditor, he has perfect knowledge of how the Empire worked. From the
new and precarious Asian platform, he has to design the Spanish policy. Rather to wait
defensively, the few Spaniards assigned to Asia have to organize armies to block
possible rivalries and expand Spanish authority in the region. While the Portuguese
controlled the ancient Islamic thalassocracy, the goal of Spain was to conquer the land,
to conquer the souls, and to create new maritime routes based in a New World.
16

Ytinerario del Padre Custodio Fray Martn Ignacio, Roma, 1585, reproduced in W. E. Retana,
Archivo del biblifilo filipino, Madrid, Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Ros, 1905, vol. 5, p. 96.
17
Cf. Isaac Donoso, Islamic Far East: Ethnogenesis of Philippine Islam, Quezon City, University of
the Philippines, 2012.
18
His original memoires can be read in Kaptan Paann Seyir Defteri. Gazavat- Hayreddin Paa,
Istanbul, Babali Kltr Yayncl, 2006.

This was the period of the arbitristas, statesmen who wrote memoriales,
relaciones and cartas to the King advising him how to increase his land, realm and rent.
Within this geographical and legal context, the role of Sande was to prepare a feasible
policy for Spain in Asia in his Carta-Relacin de las Islas Filipinas sent to King Philip
II, dated July 7, 1576. However, his Asian vision was very ambitious due to the
American experience, and it looks to our modern eyes as unachievable indeed. First of
all, after describing China and Chinese character, he strongly emphasized the necessity
to conquer China.19 Eventually, Dutch hostilities and piracy in the region will force to
establish Spanish garrisons in northern FormosaIsla Hermosa.20 Secondly, in order to
break totally Bruneian loyalties of Manilas elite, 21 he wanted to conquer Brunei, what
he did in 1578. Accordingly, in his Relacin de la isla de Burney y jornada que all
hizo Francisco de Sande,22 he describes the links of the Muslim elite of Manila with
Brunei and the reasons why he conquered the city of Brunei in 1578. In what will be
known as the Castilian War, Sande cut the links of islamization in northern
Philippines and the role of Brunei as a thalassocratic empire.23
Thirdly, Francisco de Sande states a point that is not usually known or cited. Aceh
has become a very powerful maritime and economic state, threatening Portuguese
Malacca and attracting not only the merchants of the ancient Islamic trade, but new
actors as the Turks. Since Aceh is the gate to Asia and where commercial, political and
religious rivals enter, he states to help the Portuguese to conquer Aceh in order to stop
the increasing Turkish threat in the region:
Entre otras causas que ponen escrupulo para que vuestra magestad con brevedad embie
la gente para esta tierra es quel rey de achen ques un morillo desventurado desnudo y
descalo trata mal a los portugueses y esto viene de que de meca le an venido quinientos
o seisientos turcos arcabuzeros y con estos va haziendo por alli su conquista questa de
malaca como de berberia anzaluzia y malaca es la propia costa de China que corre de alli
al norte por la qual ay otros dos Reyezillos uno de ian y otro de patan moros y nosotros
los tendremos de aqu como trezientas leguas y obra de iento y cinquenta otro Rey de
borney moro que se comunica con ellos y a quien todo este aripielago obedesiera y
diera tributo de buena gana sino estuvieramos aqui nosotros estos moros borneyes
predican la seta de mahoma y an hecho todos los moros destas yslas. Tengo hecha
19

Cf. Manel Oll, La invencin de China: percepciones y estrategias filipinas respecto a China
durante el siglo XVI, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000; idem, La empresa de China: de la
Armada Invencible al Galen de Manila, Barcelona, Acantilado, 2002.
20
Cf. Jos Eugenio Borao Mateo, The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626-1642: The Baroque
Ending of a Renaissance Endeavour, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2009.
21
Cf. Julkipli M. Wadi, Rajah Sulayman, Spain, and the Transformation of Islamic Manila, in
Isaac Donoso (ed.), More Hispanic than We Admit. Insights into Philippine Cultural History, Quezon
City, Vibal Foundation, 2008, pp. 37-51.
22
Jornadas a Borneo, Jol, Mindanao, en Filipinas, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla:
[PATRONATO, 24, R.48].
23
On 20 April [1578], De Sande ceremoniously took possession of Brunei, marching with his
troops in battle array through houses belonging to the Sultan and through sections of the town, cutting
branches from trees, entering the mosque and establishing his quarters in a large house; all this
symbolized his taking possession in the name of the King of Spain. He ordered the construction of a fort
and various buildings so that a Spanish presence could be made permanent [] However,
illnessprobably dysentery or cholerastruck the Spanish camp [] The Spanish were so weakened
that they abandoned their settlement and returned to Manila. Before doing so, they burned the mosque, a
high structure with a five-tiered roof. They took with them Pengiran Seri Lelas daughter [] Some
Bruneians, including Pengirans Maharaja di Raja and Seri Lela, returned and collaborated with the
Spanish and the daughter of Seri Lela married the Christian Tagalog, Don Augustine de Legazpi of
Tondo, in Graham E. Saunders, A History of Brunei, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 55-57.

ynformaion dello para quando sea dios servido que convenga de manera que aviendo en
esta tierra fueras y gente se podria ayudar a los portugueses acabando el reyezillo de
achen el qual ymbia predicadores de la seta por su pertenencia y como tengo dicho tiene
turcos y quitandoles aquel puesto se cerrara el paso para que turcos y moros no pasasen
jamas de malaca para aca ques la gente que mas dao puede hazer y que tienen uso de
todo genero de armas y cavallos esperar a que portugueses hagan nada es el mundo
enfadado por su pobreza y todos los que aca andan casi son nasidos en la yndia e hijos
de yndias.24

As the text clearly asserts, Sande requested soldiers to the King in order to help
Portugal to conquer Aceh, since the Asian Portuguese do not have enough strength to do
it. Aceh has become the center of Islamic resistance in the region, and together with
Muslim preachers Turk soldiers are coming.
The first and second major expansionist policies of Sande were somehow
undertaking. Indeed China was not conquered, but there were attempts to settle in both
mainland and island. The conquest of Brunei did happen, but in a short time was
abandoned. Maybe this explains why the conquest of Aceh was not attempted. Portugal
and Spain could have the power to conquer Aceh, but the problem was what to do
afterwards. The interest of Portugal was in the sea, and the interest of Spain in the land,
but both seem to be exhausted with a universal empire at the end of the 16 th century
after the union under Philip II. Thus, the Spanish King became as well King of Portugal
in 1580 and, with the union of the Iberian kingdoms, the foreign policy was mutual.
Consequently, more aggressive memoriales were sent to the King requesting a
more belligerent policy. In this context we have to place one of the more important
documents of that time, and the first western report concerning exclusively Islam in the
Philippines: the two letters of Melchor de valos in 1585, Cartas para la S.C.M.R
acerca de los mahometanos de las Philipinas.25 Melchor de valos, auditor of the
Audiencia in Manila, was one of the leading supporters of the conservative party during
the first years of the city. He overstated the strong islamization of the population in
Manila in order to issue stronger laws and prerogatives to conquer more lands. More
importantly, by overstressing the role of Islam, valos sanctioned whatever Spanish
expansionist attempt in the region. He tried to establish a radical official policy after
years of light impressions about the grade of Islamization of the islands.26
24

Carta-Relacin de las Islas Filipinas (con noticias de China) dirigida al Rey Felipe II por el Dr.
Don Francisco de Sande [7 de julio de 1576], in W. E. Retana, Archivo del biblifilo filipino, Madrid,
Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Ros, 1895, vol. 2, pp. 47-48.
25
Original manuscript: Alegaciones de derecho del licenciado Melchor de valos, oidor de la real
audiencia de Manila, para la S.C.M.R. acerca de los mahometanos de las Philipinas y contra ellos.
Cartas de Ayala sobre moros, idolatra etc. Ordenanzas, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla: [FILIPINAS,
18A,R.3,N.19]. The expedient is composed by the two letters with another as introduction. The letters
were first edited as Dos cartas al Rey contra los moros de las Filipinas by Lewis Hanke, Cuerpo de
documentos del siglo XVI. Sobre los derechos de Espaa en las Indias y las Filipinas . Descubiertos y
anotados por Lewis Hanke. Compilador Agustn Millares Carlo, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Econmica,
1943, pp. 65-115. Recent edition and analysis in Francisco Franco-Snchez & Isaac Donoso, Moriscos
peninsulares y moros filipinos: la lucha contra el Islam llevada al extremo oriental del imperio espaol.
Estudio y edicin de las Cartas para la S.C.M.R acerca de los mahometanos de las Philipinas de Melchor
de valos (1585), Sharq al-Andalus. Revista de Mudjares y Moriscos, Alicante, University of Alicante
& Centro de Estudios Mudjares (in press).
26
Como digo, comen y beven hasta perder el juicio dende el menor hasta el mayor; en estos
pueblos ms cercanos de la mar no comen puerco algunos, la ocasin que an tomado de no lo comer, al
principio dixe, cmo por tratar con los moros de Burney les an predicado alguna parte de la seta malvada
de Mahoma, y que no coman puerco; y en esto hazen gran hincapi, venido a preguntar algunos destos
por qu no lo comen, dizen: porque no lo saben; y si les preguntan quin fue Mahoma y qu es lo que
manda su ley, dicen: que no lo saben, ni Mahoma conocen, ny aun su nombre tampoco, ny saben qu

The main purpose of valos statement was to connect Muslims in the Philippine
Archipelago with the worldwide Islamic network and, in doing so, with the Iberian
Muslims. Here the Andalusian legacy involving both sides of the Islamic world is
definitely pointed out. In fact, this is one of the first statements linking the Islamic
presence in eastern Asia with the collapse of the Mediterranean Sea. Accordingly, if
Monaide was an astonished surprise to the Portuguese in India, 27 the Islamic presence
in the Philippine Archipelago was even more puzzling to the Spaniards. Yet, to the
conservative sector of the new Manilas population leaded by Melchor de valos
the answer was clear: Islam was an international network and the very same warriors in
Lepanto emerged later in Southeast Asia. In consequence, like the Iberian Muslims,
Muslims in the Philippine Archipelago are Moros, and the mandate of the King has to
be to fight against them, even to enslave them as proposed by Miguel Lpez de
Legazpi.28
es su ley ni de qu manera. Verdad es que algunos que an estado en Burney, entienden alguna cosa, y
saben leer algunas palabras del Alcorn; empero estos son muy pocos y tienen entre ellos opinin que el
que no ubiere estado en Burney puede comer puerco, y esto yo se lo he oydo dezir muchos dellos. The
title of this account speaks by itself: Relacion del descubrimiento y conquista de la isla de Luzn y
Mindoro; de las cosas ms sealadas que en ellas sucedieron: tratase breve y sumariamente de la
manera que se conquist y gan de lo que hasta oy est ganado y conquistado en esta dicha isla; ans
mesmo, de la calidad de la gente della y su manera de vivir y las armas que usan y tiene, fuertes que
hazen para defenderse de los enemigos. Aseme ogreido escribir esta rrelain por ser informado que se
an escripto otras muchas, ymbiado Nueva Espaa, tratando de lo que en esta tierra a subcedido; las
quales dicen que son muy fabulosas y profanas, diziendo que en esta tierra ay moros como los de
Berberia, y que las fueras armas que tienen es ni mas ni menos; y que pelean y se defienden como
TURCOS. Los que tal han escripto no han tenido rrazn; escribir mas de aquello que es por que cierto los
naturales desta isla de Luzn, que comnmente llamamos los espaoles moros, ellos no lo son, porque en
verdad es que ellos no saben la ley de Mahoma, ni la entienden; solamente en algunos pueblos orilla de
la mar no comen entender sin sospecha ninguna la defensa que de estos naturales ay, por que el que
esto leyere sepa la verdad de lo que ac pasa, Manila, 1572, in Wenceslao E. Retana, Archivo del
Biblifilo Filipino. Recopilacin de documentos histricos, cientficos, literarios y polticos y Estudios
Bibliogrficos, Madrid, Librera General de Victoriano Surez, 1898, vol. 4, p. 29. Our translation: As I
said, they are fun of drinking and eating until they become crazy; in the towns sear the sea the people do
not eat pork, being the reason the trading contact with the people from Burney, which gave chance to
preach the sect of Mahoma; and in this lore are very persistent. But I asked some of them why they do not
eat pork, and they do not know, and who is Mahoma and his Law, and they do not know, neither Mahoma
not his religion. However, it is true that some of them that have been in Burney know a few rules of the
Islamic religion and know how to read Arabic words in the Koran. Nevertheless, these are very small
number, and they even think that the one who travels to Burney could eat pork, and I listen to say it to a
lot of people.
27
Just arrived to Calicut [], they [the Portuguese] meet Monaide (El-Masud), a Muslim from
Tunis, who welcomes them in a mixture of Spanish and Portuguese: E veio con ele un daqueles mouros, o
qual, tanto que foi em os navios, comeou de dizer estas palavras: Buena ventura! Buena ventura!
Muitos rubis, muitas esmeraldas! Muitas graas debis de dar a Deus por vos trazer a terra onde h
tanta riqueza! Era para ns isto de tanto espanto, que o ouvamos falar e no o cramosque homem
houvesse to longe de Portugal que nos entendesse nossa fala! What Monaide spoke was not
Portuguese, but a corrupt form of Spanish. Despite this, finding the familiar in the unknown had a very
strong effect on the seamen, in Elena Losada Soler, The Encounter of Languages: Reflections on the
Language of the Other in Roteiro da Primeira Viagen de Vasco da Gama, in Anthony Disney & Emily
BOOTH, Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.
207-208. The encounter with Monaide was immortalized in Os Lusadas: Entre a gente que a v-lo
concorria,/ Se chega un Maometa, que nacido/ Fora na regio da Berberia/ [] Em vendo o mensageiro,
com jucundo/ Rosto, como quem sabe a lngua Hispana,/ Lhe disse: Quem te trouxe a estoutro mundo,/
To longe da tua ptria Lusitana?/ Abrindo, lhe responde, o mar produndo/ Pon onde nunca veio gente
humana;/ Vimos buscar do Indo a gras corrente,/ Por onde a Lei Divina se acrecent, Lus de Cames,
Os Lusadas, Mem Martins, Europa-Amrica, 1997, VII, pp. 24-25.
28
Miguel Lpez de Legazpi, in his Memoria to the Philip II in 1567, requested the possibility to
enslave the Muslims in the region, since they were a political, commercial and religious threat: Otro s,

Obviosly, the purpose of Melchor de valos was to prove legitimacy of conquest

to the Spanish King, by connecting Muslims in both Spain (Moriscos as Maurus
Africanus) and the Philippine Archipelago (Moros as Maurus Asiae). This was a
political perception rather than historical, to apply into Asia the ideological concept of
Reconquista. However, in doing so he overemphasized aspects that somehow could
happen in some degree. Thus, he cited Portuguese sources about Islamic presence in the
Indian Ocean, and moreover, he mentioned astonishing links of warriors after Lepanto
going to Southeast Asia:
Ass que como de todos los otros sus Reynos, puede y deve V. M. echar y expeller a los
moros de todas las Yslas Philipinas del archipilago y a lo menos subjetarlos y hazerlos
tributarios, debellando los de las Javas y Samatra, Achen, Borney, Mindanao, Xoloc,
Malucos, Malaca y de Siam y Patn, Pegu, y otros Reynos en que se adora Mahoma, cuya
venerain y mala secta traxeron por ac persas, y arabios, y egipcios, y turcos, y aun
vinieron moros de Tnez y de Granada, algunas vezes en armadas del Campsn, Soldn
que fue del Cayro y Rey de Egipto, como en muchas partes se collige de las historias de
Portugal y espeialmente de la que escrivi en buen latn el obispo de Algarve don
Ihernimo Ossorio por mandado de la magestad del seor Rey don Enrique, siendo
cardenal, lib. 4, fol. mihi 342,29 adonde dize que vinieron a la Yndia contra Alonso de
Albuquerque, capitn general del glorioso seor Rey don Manuel, abuelo de V. M.,
emviados del dicho Soldn en una armada veynte y siete navios y galeras, seteientos
mahometanos mamelucos, y trezientos turcos y mill moros de Tnez y de Granada, cuyo
general se deza Solimn, turco de nain [] Ass que me paree que entran en la
cuenta estos moros de las Yslas Philipinas, mayormente que, como est dicho, vienen de
Egipto y de Arabia y de Meca, y son parientes, dispulos y miembros suyos, y cada ao
dizen que vienen a la Samatra y a Bomei turcos, y a Ternate, adonde estn abra algunos
de los venidos en la famosa batalla naval que dio el seor don Jhoan de Austria. Y a
otras islas del Maluco tanbin vienen y suelen venir a predicar la secta, y dar avisos para
guerra contra christianos30.
piden y suplican a su Majestad por cuanto en estos reinos e seoros suyos tratan moros y llevan el oro
que en estas islas ay y los dems frutos, como es cera, canela y otras cosas que hasta ahora no se han
alcanzado a entender; y por cuanto estorban y procuran estorbar la contratacin de los naturales con
nosotros y les predican la seta mahometana e no da lugar a que en ella se cultive el santo evangelio, que
los tales moros sean esclavos e pierdan las haciendas que se les tomaren, in Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera,
La recta administracin. Primeros tiempos de la colonizacin hispana en Filipinas: La situacin de la
poblacin nativa, Madrid, Polifemo, 2001, p. 89. Quotation from Memoria de lo que se envi a pedir a su
Majestad de merced, franquezas e libertades por los capitanes conquistadores oficiales que al presente
en esta jornada e nuevo descubrimiento le sirven en las Yslas Felipinas, governador Miguel Lpez de
Legazpi, 1567 en Ceb; text edited as well in Coleccin de documentos inditos relativos al
descubrimiento, conquista y organizacin de las antiguas posesiones espaolas de ultramar, Madrid,
Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1887, vol. 3, II, pp. 321-322. The Kings response was that, unless Muslims
from outside the Archipelago come to preach or declare open war, no Muslim-called Moros within the
islands may be madeunder any circumstances slave. Moreover, it should be promoted a policy of
attraction and incorporation within the new structures of the state. The text was glossed by valos himself
trying to change the mind of the King: Tambin se nos ha pedido por vuestra parte [Legazpi], que atento
a que hay en esa tierra islas de moros y ellos vienen y tratan y contratan, los cuales impiden la
predicacin del Santo Evangelio y os inquietan, os damos licencia a hacer a tales moros esclavos, y
tomarles sus haciendas, y estaris advertidos que si los tales moros son de su nacin y naturaleza moros, y
vinieran a dogmatizar su secta mahomtica o a hacer guerra a vosotros o a los indios que estn a nos
sujetos y a vuestro real servicio, los podis hacer esclavos; ms a los que fueren indios y hubieren tomado
la secta de Mahoma, no los haris esclavos por ninguna va ni manera que sea, sino procuraris de los
convertir y persuadir por lcitos y buenos modos a nuestra santa fe catlica.
29
Jernimo Osorio, De rebus Emmanuelis, Colonia, 1581-1585, 12. vols.
30
Primera carta-tratado, 6 y 8, in Francisco Franco-Snchez & Isaac Donoso, op. cit. Our
translation: In consequence, like in other parts of the Empire, His Majesty the King must expel and force
out all the Moros of the Philippine Islands, or at least to make them pay tributes, as in other lands as Java,

This can be an exaggeration to enforce the linkage between Philippine Muslims

and the Islamic world, in order to credit the Spanish intervention against Islam in the
region. However, the statement could be in some degree real: Muslims that fought in
Lepanto moved to the Indian Ocean since commercial and political actions in the
Mediterranean Sea have been ruined. What it is of concern is that Melchor de valos
though overemphasising the facts made a likely description of what could happen in
the Islamic world between the 15th and the 16th centuries: exiles of thousands of
Andalusians (Islamic Far West), Portuguese conquest of Malacca (Islamic Far East) and
Ottoman reaction in both the West and the East.
III.

THE CALIPH OF CONSTANTINOPLE OVER THE PHILIPPINE SULTANATES

The 17 th century will witness the rise of north European rivals in the region.
Iberian nations were confronted not only by the local communities and the international
Islamic network, but also by the Dutch and the British. In this context every party will
fight the battle of alliances, pacts and agreements. Diplomacy became a key tool to
group interest against each other. Evidently, the new comers into the region aligned with
the rivals of the Iberians, and this is how Dutch and British without an Islamic past
like Spain and Portugal supported political, commercial and even militarily local
sultanates in the islands.
The Spanish intervention into southern Philippine sultanates started disastrously.
Manila was already secured against Bruneian claims, and Esteban Rodrguez de
Figueroa was named Governor of Mindanao in 1596. When he was just starting the
campaign in the Ro Grande of Mindanao, was killed in an ambush. Juan Ronquillo was
assigned to pursue the conquest and was able to obtain agreements with the major
sultans of the region, including Silonga of Buayan. However, he hastily retreated in
1598 and the Spanish positions were demolished, including La Caldera. The

Sumatra, Aceh, Brunei, Mindanao, Jolo, Malucco, Malacca, Siam, Patani, Pegu and other kingdoms
where Mohammedans faith is worshiped, which veneration and erroneous sect brought here Persians,
Arabs, Egyptians and Turks, and even Muslims from Tunis and Granada, sometimes in the navy of
Campsn, Sultan of Cairo and Egypt, as is evident in the histories of Portugal and especially the one
wrote by the Bishop of the Algarve don Jernimo Osorio under the mandate of the King Don Enrique,
book 4, page 343, where he said that against Alonso de Albuquerque, general captain of the navy, were
sent by the mentioned Sultan to India a navy composed by twenty seven ships, seven hundred Mamluks,
three hundred Turks and one thousand Muslims from Tunis and Granada, which admiral was Solimn, a
Turk. Therefore, I think that in this list can be part the Muslims of the Philippine Islands, given the fact
that, as said, they came from Egypt and Arabia and Mecca, and are related, and everyday Turks come to
Sumatra and Brunei, and to Ternate, where there is now some of the defeated in the famous battle
commanded by Juan de Austria [Battle of Lepanto]. And also they come to other islands in Malucco, to
preach their sect and enforce war against the Christians.
Persians and Arabs and Egyptians and Turks brought [Muhammads] veneration and evil sect here,
and even Moors from Tunis and Granada came here [Ternate], sometimes in the armadas of Campson
[Kait Bey], former Sultan of Cairo and King of Egypt [] Thus it seems to me that these Moros of the
Philippines Islands [are] mainly those who, as has been said, come from Egypt and Arabia and Mecca,
and are their relatives, disciples and members, and every year they say that Turks come to Sumatra and
Borneo, and to Ternate, where there are now some of those defeated in the famous battle which Seor
Don Juan de Austria won [Lepanto]; An [] ecumenical armada in 1515 was manned by 700 Egyptian
Mamelukes, 300 Turkish Janissaries, a thousand of Moors from Granada and Tunis, and 70 Levantine
Christians [against the Portuguese in Goa], partial translation in William Henry Scott, Looking for the
Prehispanic Filipino and Other Essays in Philippine History, Quezon City, New Day, 1992, pp. 34-35.

consequence of this instable policy was immediate: Silonga raided during the
continuing years the shores of the Visayas.31
During the next decades the Sultanate of Maguindanao will rise along the Ro
Grande as coalition of different sultans. Namely, Katchil Qudarat (Cachil Corralat in the
Spanish sources; c.1619-1671) was able to obtain the support of Moncay of Buayan and
Manaquior head of the Manobos.32 The Spanish diplomacy was quite inadequate,
meantime the Dutch provided assistance to Qudarat. 33 It is likely that he requested
assistance to Constantinople too. And it is more likely that, due to the unfeasibility of
any help and advised by some of the numerous ulamas that found home in Southeast
Asia, Katchil Qudarat adopted the name Nar al-Dn Qudrat Allh /
( Victor of the Religion beloved by God) More than a name, this seems a caliphal
title similar to al-Nir li-Dn Allh / ( That who makes victorious the
Religion of God) used by Abd al-Ramn III when he was proclaimed Caliph of
Cordoba in 929. This was the probable scenario for Majul, and even he postulated that
Qudarat obtained the recognition of Sulu as Nar al-Dn II / ( c.1645
c.1648):
It is entirely plausible that Nasir ud-Din refers to no less than Sultan Qudarat of
Maguindanao. Qudarat was also entitled Nasir ud-Din and around the 1650s had become
the most powerful Muslim ruler in the Philippine Archipelago. His declaration of the
jihad (holy war) around this time could have endeared him so much to the ulama of the
different Muslim sultanates, including the Moluccas, that they could have included him in
their prayers. After all, there was a heightened consciousness of Islam during this time
that transcended regional and dynastic loyalties. Sultan Qudarat appeared to have been
the Muslim ruler who was best able to hold his own against the Spaniards; and his
prestige was such that even in Sulu he was respected to the extent of actually influencing
its internal affairs.34

According to Majul, the Sultan of Sulu that appears in the genealogies 35 as Nar
al-Dn II is no other than Nar al-Dn Qudrat Allh, the Sultan of Maguindanao.
Accordingly, since the Caliph of Constantinople cannot defend Islamic interest in the
margins of the Dr al-Islm (Abode of Islam), Muslims have to organize a political and
religious response. The action was perfectly clear: to adopt a caliphal title and to unify
Muslims.
However the unity did not last, and what we have in the 18 th century is two civil
wars in both Sulu and Maguindanao. Everything started when the King of Spain Philip
V sent a letter in similar terms to each sultan dated July 12, 1744. The purpose was the
31

Cf. Jos Montero y Vidal, Historia de la piratera malayo-mahometana en Mindanao, Jol y

Borneo. Comprende desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta junio de 1888, Madrid, Imprenta y
Fundicin de Manuel Tello, 1888, vol. I, pp. 138-147.
32
The career of Qudarat is described largely in Historia de Mindanao y Jol por el P. Francisco
Combes de la Compaa de Jess, obra publicada en Madrid en 1667, y que ahora, con la colaboracin
del P. Pablo Pastells, de la misma Compaa, saca nuevamente a luz W. E. Retana, Madrid, Minuesa de
los Ros, 1897; and Vicente Barrantes, Guerras pirticas de Filipinas contra mindanaos y joloanos,
Madrid, Imprenta de Manuel G. Hernndez, 1878.
33
Cf. Ruurdje Laarhoven, Triumph of Moro Diplomacy. The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17 th
Century, Quezon City, New Day, 1989.
34
Csar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, Quezon City, University of the Philippines, 1999,
p. 16.
35
About Philippine Islamic sources see Isaac Donoso Philippine Islamic Manuscripts and Western
Historiography, in Manuscripta Islamica: International Journal for Oriental Manuscript Research, Sr.
Petersburg, Thesa, 2010, vol. 16, num. 2, pp. 3-28.

attraction, and certainly the Sultan of Sulu Azm al-Dn I / answered

positively. A trip was prepared to Manila, and Alimudn (as known by the Spanish
sources) entered triumphal to the city January 20, 1749.36 After several months living he
and his two hundred person office and service under the expenses of the Spanish
government, he decided to be converted into Christian. This is how the Sultan Alimudn
became Fernando I King of Jolo April 28, 1750. 37 Obviously the people of Jolo was
altered knowing the news from Manila, and the reaction was to proclaim a new Sultan,
Muizz al-Dn / , known as Bantilan.
In this context we have the first positive datum of formal request to the Caliph of
Constantinople. Namely, Bantilan sent a letter asking for intervention and protection to
the Ottomans as protectors of Islam and the seat of the Caliph:
Ya tengo despachado un embajador para Dicatra, con cartas, para que de all se remitan
al rey de Constantinopla, y por aquella va se despachen a Espaa para entregar las
capitulaciones; pues, segn entiendo, el gobernador ha sido ms que el rey, que ha
quebrantado las capitulaciones desde que empez a hacer dao a los joloanos, y en esto el
rey es el que ha perdido, porque se le han cautivado ms de 2.000 personas entre la gente
joloana y la de Tirong. Esta es la verdad, que digo en mi carta para el rey y para el rey de
Constantinopla; y le pido tambin auxilio para que pida a mi profeta Mahoma, porque
quiere acabar ya la ley el espaol, y para que se crea lo que digo dentro de mi carta y sepa
la mala correspondencia, sea tarde o temprano ha de experimentar algn dao, ya que se
han cumplido los intentos de Vuesa Merced; y de aqu adelante tengo que comunicarle
porque yo soy el principal que tengo que morir por la ley de Mahoma. 38

A civil war was openly declared. While Bantilan asked for help to the Ottomans,
Alimudn embarked in the Spanish navy to retake Jolo as Fernando I. Indeed the
situation became abnormal, and everything exploited when a letter sent to the Sultan of
Maguindanao by Alimudn was translated July 25, 1751. The Spaniards reacted
suspicious and vehemently, and Alimudn was jailed and sent to Manila. Theological
debates and controversies agitated Manila during the next months, to proof if Alimudn
was sincerely converted or not.39
The important is that Spain had to change quickly the policy, since Bantilan
requested assistance from Constantinople to Mindanao. The Governor of the
Philippines, Francisco Jos de Ovando, analysed the situation as critical between
internal instability and a possible external help. Thus, maybe the support could not
come from the remote Constantinople, but it could perhaps do from Brunei:
No dudava yo, que la cavilacion Ioloana havia de poner el mayor empeo en
malquistarnos con todas las Potencias circumvecinas, para ganar amigos al mismo paso
36

Cf. Relacion de la entrada del svltan rey de Jolo Mahamad Alimuddin en esta Ciudad de Manila:
y del honor, y regocijos, con que le recibi en 20. de Henero de 1749. el Illmo, y Rmo Seor Doctor, y
Mro D. Fr. Ioan de Arechederra, Manila 1749.
37
Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. I, p. 288.
38
Ibid., vol. II, pp. 25-26. Montero y Vidal provided the translation of the letter, but the original
seems to be not extant. However, a letter of Bantilan still to be studied is preserved in the Philippine
National Archives in Manila: Letter of Muizz al-Dn Sultan of Sulu (c. 1750): [Mindanao y Sul, Rare
3 (1749-1754), Fol. 59].
39
Cf. Jol: manifiesto en defensa del rey de Jol, Fernando I, y en su infidelidad Alimodin
Mohamad, bautizado en Manila, capital de las islas Filipinas, preso y arrestado en el castillo de
Santiago de la misma ciudad por falso testimonios de sus emulos: dado y declarado por bueno su
bautismo, por el Ilmo. Sr. D. Fr. Pedro de la Santsima Trinidad, Manila, 1751. About Alimudns career
see Horacio de la Costa, S.J., Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, l735-l773, in Journal of the
Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Singapore, 1965, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 43- 76.

que nos criase enemigos. Buenos testimonios de estos empeos guardamos en este
Govierno en vna carta original de Bantilan, Hermano del Sultan de Iol prisionero, que al
presente govierna aquel Reyno, en la qual nos amenaza, pedir socorro hasta los Turcos
de Meca, y en otra interceptada por nuestros Guardacostas de Samboangan, en que el
mismo Rey de Iol, quando todavia se nos simulaba amigo, ruega al Sultan de Mindanao
nuestro aliado, no dexe de auxiliar su Hermano Bantilan contra los Espaoles. Con estas
experiencias, quien no deviera poner toda la atencion, que no se difundiera el veneno al
Borney, ni tan distante de Iol, y de nuestras fronteras, como los Turcos de Meca, ni tan
obligado a nuestros beneficios, como el Mindanao. 40

Thus, in few months was prepared a diplomatic mission to Brunei with three main
objectives: 1) to assure friendship with Brunei against Sulu; 2) to secure Maguindanao
neutrality; and 3) to justify that the war was not a religious one:41
Tom por medio para fin tan importante el despachar la Isla, y Corte de Borney vna
formal Embajada, y renovar la antigua amistad del Rey de los Espaoles D. Fernando el
Sexto (que Dios Guarde), y de esta Capitania General con aquella Potencia,
combidandola con nuestro comercio, y que lograse la buena coyuntura de recuperar las
injustas adquisiciones, que tiranicamente pose en su grande Isla el Iol, mientras
nuestras armas por esta parte le tenian entretenido, hostilizando sangre, y fuego sus
costas, para castigar sus repetidas alevosas, e infracciones continuadas del derecho de las
Gentes en la violacion excecrable de las Leyes de la fina amistad, tan solemnemente
prometida nuestro Rey (que Dios Guarde); expresando los justificados motivos de la
prision del Sultan de Iol y sus Principales, sin ser nuestra guerra de Religin; solicitando
al mismo tiempo el rescate de los cautivos Christianos, que de qualquiera suerte se
hallasen en Borney, por via de Cange por los Borneyes, y Ioloes, que se encontrasen en
nuestros dominios, y vltimamente induciendola a que cediese la Corona de Espaa
todos los derechos, que pretendia tener en las dos Islas de la Paragua, y Balaba, donde
pensaba este Govierno construir vn fuerte, para estorvar el paso de los Tirones, y Ioloes,
que por aquella parte entravan infestar nuestras Costas, y las suyas; pues desde el ao
de 1705, consta en este Govierno, haver ya cedido dichas Islas nuestro Rey el de Iol,
quien solo se las disputaba al Borney; con cuyas dos autenticas Cesiones se haze ya
inaccesible el establecimiento en dichas Islas qualquiera otro Seoro, que pudiera en
algun tiempo perturbar la armonia de este Archipielago; aadiendo, como principal
articulo de esta alianza, el que no havia de dar auxilio al Iol en la Guerra, que al presente
traen contra este Reyno los Espaoles.42

The expedition under Antonio Faveau de Quesada was certainly successful, and
not only was secured the peace, but the Sultan of Brunei gave to Spain the islands of
Palawan and Balabac.43 After all, it became clear that Constantinople was far indeed,
40

Francisco J. de Ovando, Manifiesto en que succintamente se exponen los motivos, y feliz exito de
la Embajada la Isla, y Corte de Borney, despachada desde esta Capital de Manila en 8 de Abril de
1752, Manila, [s. n.], 1752, pp. 2-3.
41
Hence, despite the tradition Majuls framework that has induced decades of historiography based
on the so-called Moro Wars, a 18 th century text clearly said sin ser nuestra guerra de Religin, without
being our war of religion. The consequences of this paradigm have had direct political implications, not
only in the recent history of Muslim movements in the Philippines, but even in so distant ideas as the
Reconquista concept promoted by Charles Truxillo to create an independent republic into the United
Stated. See Charles Truxillo, Crusaders in the Far East: The Moro Wars in the Philippines in the Context
of the Ibero-Islamic World War, Fremont, Jain Publishing Company, 2012.
42
Francisco J. de Ovando, ob. cit., pp. 6-7.
43
Y en muestras de la Hermandad tan perfecta que quiero profesar con el Gran Rey de Espaa, le
doy para siempre la Isla de la Paragua con la pequea Isla de Balaba, que otro Rey no se la diera,
aunque diera por ella quatrocientos mil pesos, y con la voluntad, que se la doy, me desposeo de ella,

and that the war was not of religion. Spain secured links with Brunei and Maguindanao,
and the Malay sultans played in the arena of Southeast Asia, since the Caliph could not
protect their interests.
IV.

THE TITLE OF CALIPH AMONG MOROS IN THE PHILIPPINES

A larger civil conflict took place in Maguindanao Sultanate, since the power,
loyalties and land accumulated by Katchil Qudarat became a succulent object for his
heirs. This is how the events started:
En 1701 [in fact 1702] ocurri en el Sur de Filipinas un suceso tan trgico como
curioso. El sultn de Jol pas visitar al de Mindanao, hacindose escoltar, para mayor
ostentacin, por una escuadra compuesta por 67 embarcaciones. Viendo tal squito, temi
el de Mindanao, Cutay [Kahar al-Dn Kuda], sucesor del insigne Corralat, que no llevara
intenciones pacficas y mand cerrar la boca del ro, con lo cual, ofendido el de Jol,
desafi aqul un combate personal. Aceptado su reto, lucharon cuerpo cuerpo ambos
sultanes, con tal rabia, que se dieron la muerte el uno al otro. Inmediatamente se encendi
la guerra en los dos pueblos [] El nuevo soberano de Mindanao pidi auxilios al
gobernador de Manila, D. Domingo Zublburu, pero les aconsej depusieran sus
diferencias, enviando con este fin al padre jesuita Antonio de Borja, quien pudo lograr su
objeto.44

The two sons of Sultan Muammad Shh Abd al-Ramn / (

(Barahaman in the Spanish sources; c.1675-1699) contested the nomination as sultan of
their brother Kahar al-Dn Kuda (Cutay). To prove his legitimacy, Kuda called the
Sultan of Sulu for bichara,45 this is, diplomatic meeting. Suspicions between the two
rulers ended in a personal combat, and the Sultan of Maguindanao died in the encounter.
The consequences were catastrophics between Bayan al-Anwr and his son Malinog in
one side, and Jfar diq Manamir in the other. It was the latter who requested help to
the Spaniards, since the former was supported by the Dutch.46
El sultn de Tamontaca, Maulana Diafar, solicit el auxilio de los espaoles para
combatir al prncipe Malinog, que se haba sublevado con el apoyo de los dattos de treinta
pueblos del ro grande de Mindanao, proclamndose sultn de Salangan [] En
Noviembre de dicho ao 1731 sali de Manila el comandante Villarreal con dos galeras y
dos champanes [] Con idntico fin de prestar auxilio al sultn de Tamontaca parti otra
expedicin en Enero de 1733 [] Mientras peleaban los espaoles, en unin de las
fuerzas aliadas, contra los defensores de la corte de Malinog, ste invadi con 300
piraguas la capital de Tamontaca, dando muerte al sultn. Los expedicionarios espaoles
regresaron a Manila. Amuril Mahomonin Campsa [Pakir Maulana Kamsa], hijo del sultn
Maulana Diafar [Jfar diq Manamir], escribi el 30 de Marzo de 1733 al gobernador
general de Filipinas, exponindole la triste situacin que le tena reducido Malinog
desde que ste diera muerte su padre, y demandaba una vez ms el auxilio de los
espaoles, como aliado y sbdito del monarca catlico, manifestndose dispuesto
como si fuera una oja de arbol, y todos los Prncipes de mi gran Reyno estan gustosos de esta cesion, por
lo que en ningun tiempo tendran, que pretender mas en ella, in ibid., p. 13.
44
Jos Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 251-252.
45
Entre los mahometanos del Extremo Oriente, conversacin que se tiene en las reuniones oficiales
o simplemente oficiosas, en W. E. Retana, Diccionario de Filipinismos con la revisin que al respecto
lleva publicado la Real Academia Espaola, Nueva York & Pars, Revue Hispanique, tomo LI, p. 53
46
Hard pressed by his nephew [Malinog] who was close to the Dutch, Jafar Sadiq appealed for
help to the Spaniards, en Csar Adib Majul, op. cit., p. 238.

ratificar las capitulaciones que su padre firmara [] El sultn de Tamontaca [] ofreca

fortificar y mantener sus dominios en la obediencia del Rey de Espaa, pudiendo los
espaoles levantar fuertes en su territorio y destinar misioneros para instruir los que
voluntariamente quisieran convertirse al cristianismo. 47

As mentioned by the text it was the same Malinog who killed his uncle Jfar
diq Manamir, making desperate the situation for Tamontaca branch. In this context,
Manamirs son Pakir Maulana Kamsa requested again the support of Spain:
Amir ud-Din Hamza, a son of Jafar Sadiq, succeeded as ruler of Tamontaka and
continued his fathers friendly policy towards the Spaniards in the hope that they would
help him defeat his uncle Bayan ul-Anwar and cousin Malinug. Hanza even volunteered
some form of vassalage to the Spaniards, and he offered to accept missionaries in his
realm [] The next year [1734], he was formally invested with the duties of a sultan in
the presence of Spanish officials from Zamboanga. With some Spanish aid, he was able to
consolidate his position in Tamontaka and contest the rule of his uncle Bayan ul-Anwar
and later of his cousin Malinog. But upon the latters death around 1748, the struggle for
the sultanate ceased. Pakir Maulana Kamsa emerged as paramount chief of
Maguindanao.48

What it was a desperate situation in 1733 turned a paramount victory for Pakir
Maulana Kamsa in 1748. He achieved to obtain not only the power of both branches in
Sibuguey and Tamontaca, but even recognition by Buayan. 49 Therefore the Spanish help
became determinant for him to obtain the power during the civil war. However, he will
rely on two other vital elements: 1) a brilliant and aggressive diplomacy of attraction
through political marriages;50 and 2) a political Islamization of his figure.
In this context he requested to marry his niece Dominga Estrada de Montal, from
the royal family of Zamboanga, with the clear purpose to get back to the Maguindanao
Sultanate the land of Zamboanga. Accordingly, due to the civil war Jfar diq
Manamir requested assistance to Spain in 1719 for the first time, signing a treaty of
cession of Zamboanga, one year after the reestablishment of the fort. 51 With the death of
47

Jos Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 263-266.

Csar Adib Majul, op. cit., pp. 238 and 28.
49
As it seems to prove the genealogies of Buayan rulers. See Najeeb Mitry Saleeby, Studies in Moro
History, Law and Religion, Manila, Bureau of Print, 1905, p. 15.
50
Pakir Mawlana Mohammed Amiru-d-Din Kamza begot the following: By Dang, Raja Muda
Amiru-l-Umara Mohammed Alimu-d-Din Kibad Sahriyal; by Dawung the daughter of Dipatwan Anwar
[Bayan ul-Anwar], Lidang and Paywa; by Dawa-dawa, Kuda, and Lalanu; by Bay Linaw, Burhanu-d-Din;
by Sapar, Basing and Hajar; by Kanul, Paku; by Sinayan, Mohammed Sahru-d-Don, Asim, and Tawung;
by Dalikayin, Jamalu-d-Din, Gindu, Amina, and Ampay; by Talangami, Jamalya, Ami, Zamzam, and
Ismayl; by Muna, Sara, Yasin, Malinug, and Abdu-l-Lah; by Mida, Idu, and Sad; by Untay, Isra-il,
Angkaya, and Tambi; by Palambi, Ndaw; by Jalya, Dudawa; by Anggun, Payak; by Kalima, Badaru-dDin; by Janim, Maryam; by Limbay, Isa; by Linuyaman, Sinal; by Milagandi, Bilangkul, in Saleeby,
Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion, op. cit., p. 37. Obviously, 37 children of 20 women facilitate
the establishment of alliances. For a detailed insight in this period see Ariel C. Lopez, Family and
Politics in Maguindanao, ca. 1680-1760, Leiden University, thesis of master, 2012.
51
Congregados, pues, el M.P.S. sultan de Mindanao Muhamad Aunanodin [Kawasa Anwar al-Dn
Iskandar Julkarnain] el prncipe Ladiatuca [Radia Mura] y otros magnates de primero y segundo rden,
mand S.A. su secretario de Estado [Gaspar Mara] que interpretase y explicase las capitulaciones
hechas por sus amados predecesores que iban ratificarse [] Hay que advertir que para estas
capitulaciones sirvieron de base las del ao de 1794, basadas su vez en las de 1645 [] El cuarto
[captulo], restitucin de los pueblos de Siocon, Sibuco y Coroan. A esto di el sultan la contestacion que
habia dado su padre, saber, que confirmaba los trminos del territorio de Zamboanga sealados en la
paz de 1719, in Vicente Barrantes, op. cit., pp. 280-281.
48

Manamir in 1733, his son Pakir Maulana Kamsa faced a desperate situation and
requested assistance to Spain, even directly to the King of Spain Philip V. This is how
he answered the letter of the Spanish monarch, Carta del Rey de Espaa Felipe V al
Rey de Tamontaca, dated in the palace Buen Retiro, July 12, 1744:
Recib [the letter] con sumo agradecimiento, por venir de un monarca tan grande y
poderoso en las cuatro partes del mundo, adonde se estienden tus dilatados dominios; y la
he estimado con muy fino reconocimiento por la benignidad con que me has mirado, y
porque t eres el que me puedes dar favor en todas mis aflicciones [] En esta
conformidad digo: Que aunque todos mis vecinos y confinantes se coligasen contra m,
guardar siempre tu amistad hasta morir, y sta dejar por herencia como mi ltima
voluntad mi hijo, y al prncipe mi hermano, que me sucediere en el reino [] Esta carta
se escribi en esta casa alta de este reino, que est en la isla de Mindanao, el ao de mil
ciento y sesenta, el da martes veinte y tres del mes de sama 52

Forrest saw a letter of the Spanish King in 1775 sent to Pakir Maulana Kamsa, and
states flimsily that the Spanish monarch avoided the title Sultan.53 In fact, the title used
was Rey, King of Tamontaca, since there was a civil war and both parties declared
himself sultan. But the issue was that neither king not sultan was used by Pakir Maulana
Kamsa, who signed as Amiril Mamini, this is to say, Amr al-Muminn /
(Prince of the Believers), the caliphal title per excellence. Going beyond the Nar alDn of Qudarat, he was crowned as Amr al-Muminn Hanza (Amiril Mamini Camsa) at
less before 1733. Hence, several letters reveals his political strategy during these years.
As we have mentioned, he wanted to marry his niece Dominga Estrada de Montal in
order to recover Zamboanga. For this reason he sent a letter to the mother Felipa Estrada
de Montal in 1733, signed already as Amiril Mamini Camsa:
No corones sin casar la biznieta de nuestro bisabuelo el Salip Saligaya Buns, y de
mis huesos haris estacadas en defensa del espaol, en memoria de mi Dusa que dicen
por Capil; esto es el encargo de Am, Vds. cuidado y don Hilario Lapis y don Pedro Lapis
el vichara con el espaol del segundo encargo y n del primero. Su cuado Radia Mura
Amiril Mamini Camsa.54

To marry within the Zamboangas royal family could be a brilliant political

strategy, seizing the lands of those who helped him, the Spaniards. Yet, Dominga
preferred to marry a Spaniard, Inocencio Atilano, Captain of the Navy. The reaction of
the sultan was tranquil, and he even revealed the letter sent to him by Bantilan of Sulu
blaming the infidelity of the people from Zamboanga, and requesting help to the Caliph
of Constantinople. Moreover, he ordered to kill the interpreter to secure diplomatic
secrets:
Seora D. Felipa Estrada de Montal Maestre de Campo y Generala de Zamboanga.
52

Ibid., pp. 332-333. The letter has as date 1160 H., 1747 a. D.
I have seen a letter from the King of Spain, directed to Fakymolano [Pakir Maulana Kamsa],
King of Tamantakka, desiring him, amongst other things, to permit the preaching of the Christian Faith.
His Catholic Majesty avoids giving the title of Sultan of Mindanao, in Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to New
Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: Including an Account of Magindano, Sooloo, and other
Islands, Dublin, 1779, p. 217.
54
Isaac Donoso, Orgenes del chabacano: la Trsila zamboanguea, in idem (ed.), Historia
cultural de la lengua espaola en Filipinas. Ayer y hoy, Madrid, Verbum, 2012, pp. As can be seen, the
letter was written already in a kind of pidginized Spanish. These letters are part of the documents that
compose the Tarsila zamboanguea, the genealogical account of the royal family of Zamboanga.
53

Sulagan 6 de Marzo de 1746

Mi querida cuada: con las atenciones de restaurar los atrasos y perjuicios de mi
reino no le he podido V. mandar el tanto de la carta que me remiti el sultn de Jol
para el seor gobernador Pulgar que consiste con los Lutaos y Samal Nauan y la
compaa del Tercio Pampango de matar con los Joloanos y tirones sin respetar los
tratados de su Rey y para eso me dice ya hice mi embajada para Diacatra llevando cartas
y los tratados con trasporte Constantinopla para entregar al gran Seor y luego remitir al
Rey de Espaa y tambin encarg que haga rogaciones al Gran Profeta que los Sres.
espaoles quieren acabar y consumir con la ley mahometana y tambin haga camarcan55
en nombre de Tuan56 contra el Zeytan 57 pueblo de Zamboanga que son perjuros de Islam
Capil vencer morir en la pelea por el Rey de Espaa y no pagar tributo. Y as cuada si
V. ha prometido el casamiento de Dominga con el espaol me mandar V. los tratados y
ttulos de nuestros visabuelos y Tos abuelos y de Primo Bad-de porque la de mi sobrina
D. Dominga Estrada de Montal ya me entreg el Padre Francisco Isasi el Rector y me ha
ledo mi intrprete de secreto y me hizo entender que tal apellido es honor con hidalgua
de solar con ttulos de Montal es por su abuelo y por su Padre y Lutaos, Samal Nauan que
no respetan montes ni collados que han salido triunfante con sus armas por el Rey de
Espaa cuando alz Manila, Camarines, Ceb, Bohol, Palapag pero es cosa unbalde
despus que ya me qued enterado de intrprete de secreto que han propuesto los Padres
de la Compaa que el apellido de los Padres naturales de Zamboanga no poner sus
hijos y no esplico ms mi saligan 58 te dir y que te hago saber que por tu orden ya lo
mat al pobrecito de mi intrprete porque me dices que puede tal vez divulgar secretos
regios. Y no mas tu cuado.El Sultn Aramil.

In sum, the two civil wars proved for Sulu and Maguindanao two different
answers. In one hand, Bantilan tried to lead Sulu in a religious war against Alimudn
that was crowned Christian King of Sulu as Fernando I. He sent letters to the Caliph of
Constantinople to request assistance as protector of the Dr al-Islm. In the other,
Kamsa adopted the title of Amr al-Muminn and develop a policy of attraction to claim
Tamontaca, Sibuguey, Buayan and even Zamboanga. As far as we know, he was one of
the first Malay rulers to adopt the main caliphal title, and in doing so he exposed the
distance of Constantinople in Southeast Asian affairs. Amiril Mamini Camsa used the
support of the Spaniards to create a sphere of influence in the region, without waiting
for Ottoman help. Similarly to the Moroccan case in the other edge of the Islamic
World, Kamsa was proclaimed Amr al-Muminn lying outside Ottoman sphere. At the
end, he was grateful for the Spanish help and he vowed to the King Philip V in 1747:
guardar siempre tu amistad hasta morir, y sta dejar por herencia como mi ltima
voluntad a mi hijo, y al prncipe mi hermano, que me sucediere en el reino, which
actually happened.
Every century the distance with Constantinople became further, from appeal to
auto-proclamation of Caliph, and during the 19th century the matter will move one step
more. Not only the sultan will be proclaimed Amr al-Muminn, not even assistance
will cam from Spain, but a Philippine Caliphate will be established under the tutelage
of Spain with payment of a monthly salary. This will be the complete tergiversation of
the classical sense of the Islamic Caliphate. The Amr al-Muminn was pensioned by an
infidel nation in a modern colonial protectorate. Religion was out of the discussion

55
56
57
58

Alliance.
Malay: Prince.
Arab: Satan.
Ambassador.

indeed, and the dictum was to survive in the frenetic turn of the century. We are
speaking about the career of

Hablar del califato

De la Guerras de Diu
De la guerra de Aceh
De Lepanto
Cita de custodio
Cita de Sande, y su poltica para conquistar china y Aceh
Politica de Avalos
Completar el trabajo con multitud de citas.
(Cantn); no obstante, a comienzos del siglo IX empezar a desarrollarse el que ser el
famoso puerto (Quanzhou).
Se tiene tambin por asumido que la masacre del 878 caus no slo el hundimiento de Cantn y el
surgimiento del nuevo puerto franco para el comercio internacional de Zaytn, sino tambin la
progresiva implicacin del sudeste asitico en el comercio entre los musulmanes y China, siendo los
malayos ahora mediadores entre musulmanes y chinos:

(Chinese: ; Mandarin pronunciation: [kw ]), known historically as Canton or

Kwangchow
Quanzhou was established in 718 during the Tang Dynasty (618907). In those days,
Guangzhou was China's greatest seaport, but this status would be surpassed later by
Quanzhou. During the Song Dynasty (9601279) and Yuan Dynasty (12791368),
Quanzhou was one of the world's largest seaports,

Lopez, Ariel C. Family and Politics in Maguindanao, ca. 1680-1760. (2012).

Link
http://sfx.leidenuniv.nl:9003/sfx_local?year=2012

Portuguese Seizure of the Islamic Thalassocracy

Eastern border of the Islamization
Protection of Islam and Dar al-Islam
Attempts to exert power in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean

Portuguese blockage
Aceh
Melchor de Ayala
Qudatat and the Maguindanao coallition
Bantilan and Alimudn
The Maguindanao Civil War and the Tarsila from Zamboanga
Claim to the Ottomans and title of Amir al-Muminin
Harum al-Rashid

The eventual conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517 and their activities in the
Indian Ocean as protectors of Muslims domains was confronted by the Portuguese
usurpation of the Islamic thalassocracy. Ottomans initiated a decisive campaign as the
abode of the Caliphate to defend Islamic States, as far as Southeast Asia. However, the
Ottoman-Iberian rivalry to control the seas will end in 1571 after the battle of Lepanto.
The consequences of the Ottoman defeat seem to be dramatic in the Indian Ocean.
Portugal seized the Ocean meantime Spain started the landing in the Philippine
Archipelago, the Maluku islands and even Brunei. The Ottoman Empire withdrew its
direct actions in the region, but not its diplomacy and Islamic involvement.
The present research aims to gather a preliminary data about the Ottoman involvement
in
Southeast Asia from the 16th century as appears in the Portuguese and Spanish sources,
in order to analyze the Ottoman-Iberian challenge to control the region in the era of the
discoveries.
The research seeks to uncover several data of the 16th century dealing with exiled
people from al-Andalus that were located in the Indian Ocean arena. Accordingly, when
the Iberian nations created after the fall of al-Andalus emerged in the Indian Ocean
Portugal from the East and Spain from the West they encounter scattered people
from the former al-Andalus.
Since the 12th century onwards, the Islamic domain in the Iberian Peninsula
gradually was being conquered by the northern Christian Kingdoms. Population from
al-Andalus faced a dramatic dilemma whether being under Christian rule or exile. The
situation lasted until 1492, when the last Iberian Islamic kingdom was defeated in
Granada. Nevertheless, Muslim people remained until the final Expulsion Act of 1609
issued by Phillip III, officially due to the threat of an eventual help of the Spanish
Muslims (Moriscos) in an Ottoman invasion of Spain.
Al-Andalus disappeared at last, and Andalusian became a people without nation.
Therefore, since the 12th to the beginning of the 17 th century Andalusians have been
compelled to exile. In this historical conundrum, the nearest destination was North
Africa, but nothing invalidates the idea of a further travel towards the East. In fact,
during the golden days of the Caliphate of Cordoba, Andalusians were very much
welcome as reputable scholars in the major cities of the Middle East. Indeed, in the
growing political chancelleries of the Islamic East in a divided Islamic Empire after the

rape of Bagdad by the Mongols in 1258, it is feasible that Andalusian scholars could
play a major role.
Hence, when the Iberian nations emerged from the former al-Andalus arrived to
the Indian Ocean, surprisingly they found another Iberiansthe Andalusians. Within
this paradoxical context, another dilemma was faced, whether to support the Iberians or
the Muslims. The eventual conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517 and their
activities in the Indian Ocean as protectors of Muslims domains in threat by the
Portuguese, made clear the new scenario. Ottomans initiated a decisive campaign as the
abode of the Caliphate to defend Islamic States, as far as Aceh in Sumatra in 1568.
However, the Ottoman-Iberian rivalry to control the seas will end in 1571 after
the battle of Lepanto. The consequences of the Ottoman defeat seem to be dramatic in
the Indian Ocean. Portugal seized the Ocean meantime Spain started the landing in the
Philippine Archipelago, the Maluku islands and even Brunei. The Ottoman Empire
retreated its direct actions in South-East Asia, but not its diplomacy and Islamic
involvement. Hence, when the Spaniards found Muslim population in the Philippines,
they started to analyze the Islamic expansion in South-East Asia. In a 1585 report by
Melchor de valos to the King of Spain, it is stated that defeated Turks from Lepanto
and even former Andalusians from Granada are actively involved in South-East Asia
defending Islamic States.
In sum, the present research aims to gather the data concerning Andalusian
presence in the Indian Ocean during the 16 th century. The goal will be to analyze the
repercussion of the fall of al-Andalus (Granada) in 1492 and the battle of Lepanto in
1571 in the Ottoman-Iberian challenge to control the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.

ANDALUSIAN PRESENCE IN THE OTTOMAN-IBERIAN RIVALRY

FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN DURING THE 16TH CENTURY
Anonymous, Relacion del descubrimiento y conquista de la isla de Luzn y Mindoro; de las
cosas ms sealadas que en ellas sucedieron: tratase breve y sumariamente de la manera que
se conquist y gan de lo que hasta oy est ganado y conquistado en esta dicha isla; ans
mesmo, de la calidad de la gente della y su manera de vivir y las armas que usan y tiene,
fuertes que hazen para defenderse de los enemigos. Aseme ogreido escribir esta rrelain por
ser informado que se an escripto otras muchas, ymbiado Nueva Espaa, tratando de lo que en
esta tierra a subcedido; las quales dicen que son muy fabulosas y profanas, diziendo que en
esta tierra ay moros como los de Berberia, y que las fueras armas que tienen es ni mas ni
menos; y que pelean y se defienden como turcos. Los que tal han escripto no han tenido rrazn;
escribir mas de aquello que es por que cierto los naturales desta isla de Luzn, que
comnmente llamamos los espaoles moros, ellos no lo son, porque en verdad es que ellos no
saben la ley de Mahoma, ni la entienden; solamente en algunos pueblos orilla de la mar no
comen entender sin sospecha ninguna la defensa que de estos naturales ay, por que el que esto
leyere sepa la verdad de lo que ac pasa, Manila, 1572, Wenceslao E. Retana, Archivo del
Biblifilo Filipino. Recopilacin de documentos histricos, cientficos, literarios y polticos y
Estudios Bibliogrficos, Madrid, Librera General de Victoriano Surez, 1898, vol. 4.
Blair, Emma Helen & James Alexander Robertson (eds.), The Philippine Islands. 1493-1898,
Cleveland, A.H.Clark, 1903-1919, 55 vols.
Brown, C.C., Sjarah Mlayu or Malay Annals, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press,
1970.

Cames, Lus de, Os Lusadas, Mem Martins, Europa-Amrica, 1997.

Ching-hong, Wu, A Study of References to the Philippines in Chinese Sources from Earliest
Times to the Ming Dynasty, in Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review, Quezon City,
University of the Philippines, vol. XXIV, n 1-2, 1959.
Chirino, Pedro (1600), Relacin de las islas Filipinas, Manila, Historical Conservation
Society, 1969.
Corteso, Armando (ed.), A Suma Oriental de Tom Pires e o livro de Francisco Rodrigues,
Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra, 1978.
Couto, Diogo de, Dcadas, 12 vols.
De valos, Melchor Cartas de Ayala sobre moros, idolatra etc. Ordenanzas, in Archivo
General de Indias (AGI-Seville): FILIPINAS, 18A,R.3,N.19. Edition: Dos cartas al rey contra
los moros de las Filipinas, in Lewis Hanke, Cuerpo de documentos del siglo XVI sobre los
derechos de Espaa en las Indias y las Filipinas, Mxico, Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1943.
De Grijalva, Juan, Crnica de la orden de nuestro padre san Agustn en las provincias de
Nueva Espaa, Mxico, Porra, 1985.
De San Agustn, Gaspar, Conquista de las Islas Filipinas, CSIC, Madrid, 1974.
De San Antonio, Juan Francisco, Chronica de la Apostlica Provincia de Sap Gregorio de
Religiosos Descalzos de N.S.P San Francisco en las Islas Philipinas, China, Japon &c.,
Sampaloc, 1738.
Ferrand, Gabriel, Relations de voyages et textes gographiques arabes, persans et turks
relatifs a lExtrme-Orient du viiie au xviiie sicles, Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1913.
Garcia, Jos Manuel, As Filipinas na Historiografia Portuguesa do Sculo XVI. Philippines
in the Portuguese XVIth Century Historiography, Porto, Centro Portugus de Estudos do
Sudoeste Asitico, 2003.
Legazpi, Miguel Lpez de, Relacin de las Islas Filipinas,1570. Archivo General de Indias
(AGI-Seville): FILIPINAS, L1-1-2/24. Edition in W.E. Retana, Archivo del Biblifilo Filipino.
Recopilacin de documentos histricos, cientficos, literarios y polticos y Estudios
Bibliogrficos, Madrid, Librera General de Victoriano Surez, 1898, vol. V.
Martnez de Ziga, Joaqun, Estadismo de las islas Filipinas mis viajes por este pas,
Manila, Viuda de Minuesa de los Ros, 1893.

Snchez, Cayetano, The First Printed Report on the Philippine Islands, in Philippiniana
Sacra, Manila, University of Santo Tomas, 1991, vol. XXVI, no. 78.
Tibbetts, G. R., A Study of the Arabic Texts containing Material on South-East Asia, Leiden &
London, R. J. Brill, 1979.

a) Secondary souces:

Carta de Gaspar Ribeiro e seu filho Joo Ribeiro dando parte a D. Sebastio chegarem ao Cairo 1800
quintais de pimenta, ao Porto de Jud 23 navios com 3 mil quintais de outras drogas, que os de Achm
frequentavam o comrcio e navegao, presenteando os embaixadores do Turco para fazerem amizade
com ele., Arquivo Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, 27/08/1564: [PT-TT-CC/1/107/9].

Sultana de Jol. Acta de incorporacin a la Monarqua Espaola. Jol, 30 de abril de 1851.

[Archivo Nacional de Filipinas (Manila): Mindanao y Sul. SDS 9274
[18361897] Expediente 7. S. 118125]

El tratado firmado en 1851 reconoca la soberana espaola sobre el sultanato de

Sul. No obstante, hasta la creacin del Gobierno Poltico-Militar de Jol el 15 de
noviembre de 1877, bajo la direccin de Juan Arolas, no habr una presencia
administrativa y poltica de Espaa sobre Sul59. La creacin del gobierno polticomilitares en Jol, y comandancias en Siasi, Tatan y Bongao, junto a sus oficinas,
fuertes y personal administrativo y militar 60, harn definitivamente presente la soberana
espaola. Se llegar incluso a pagar mensualidad al sultn:

59

Sobre el establecimiento espaol en Jol, los principales documentos se hallan en el Archivo

Nacional de Filipinas (Manila): Creacin de la estacin naval de Jol. Toma de Jol por Cervera.
[Mindanao y Sul, SDS 9285 [18391898], S. 547548]; Establecimiento militar de Jol [Mindanao
y Sul, Rare 1 [18691894], S. 350-351]; y Real Orden n 839 de 15 de noviembre de 1877, aprobando
la creacin del Gobierno Poltico Militar de Jol, que ser desempeado por un Jefe de la categora de
Coronel [Mindanao y Sul, SDS 9289 [18421896]. Expediente 36. S. 5760].
60
Relacin detallada de los intrpretes que prestan sus servicios en este Gobierno y en las
Comandancias Poltico Militares de Siasi, Tatan y Bongao. Jol, 9 de julio de 1892. Archivo Nacional
de Filipinas (Manila): [Mindanao y Sul. SDS 9286 [18391898] Expediente 28. S. 336338].

Sueldo mensual del sultn Hrn al-Rad: Nmina de los haberes que han correspondido en
los meses que ha continuacin se expresan en el individuo que se relaciona, con sujecin a lo
prevenido en el Superior Decreto del Gobierno General. Jol, 30 de noviembre de 1887.
[Archivo Nacional de Filipinas (Manila): Mindanao y Sul. SDS 9246
[17741887] Expediente 35. Fol. 560561]

Como se puede ver este documento, se trata de una nmina, de un salario en toda
regla, pagado mensualmente al sultn (tambin habr nmina semejante para una serie
de datus, y la viuda del sultn podr reclamar los atrasos y compensaciones). ste ser
el momento en el cual el sultanato de Sul sea en la prctica absorvido por el gobierno
general de las islas Filipinas. La ciudad de Jol haba pasado a ser una ciudad espaola,
con escuela, hospital, telgrafo, y oficinas gubernamentales, mientras que en el palacio
del sultn en Maibung se localizara la sede del sultanato. De este modo Jol empieza a
ser denominado por los moros como Tiangue (mercado), para diferenciarlo de la sede
sultanal en Maibung. Finalmente se llegar a la eleccin del sultn de Sul no por medio
de la Ruma Bichara, sino por decisin poltica tomada en Manila.
Cuando Hrn al-Rad sea proclamado sultn con todo el ceremonial organizado
por el gobierno de Filipinas en 1886, se producir la final escisin entre la autoridad del
sultn y sus sbditos, surgiendo de inmediato una guerra civil que acabar haciendo
inoperante el sultanato de Sul. Ser Hrn al-Rad el sultn que reciba nmina del
gobierno de Filipinas, y cuya pomposa firma encabezada por el ttulo de Amr alMuminn / el ttulo que adoptaban los califas, no pone sino en evidencia que la
figura del sultn pertenece a otros tiempos. Se ha producido una doble subversin en la
pirmide de la soberana islmica: 1) asuncin ilegar del ttulo de califa ignorando la
autoridad del califa otomano; y 2) proclamacin del califato para estar conscientemente
bajo la autoridad de un estado cristiano.
En este sentido, los smbolos sern importantes para seguir el proceso de
descomposicin del sultanato, y los sellos irn hispanizndose cada vez ms, primero
con el nombre en espaol de Sultn de Sul, y despus directamente con el escudo
espaol:
Finalmente, como resultado de la sumisin prestada, el sultn de Mindanao, as
como el de Jol, cobra desde luengos tiempos una asignacin de 1.500 pesos
anuales, como sbdito de Espaa, con las obligaciones que en los contratos acept,
y actualmente, como prueba de la dependencia que tiene de nuestro gobierno, usa
de un sello rabe en cuyo centro campea el escudo de armas de Espaa, y cuan
pueden sus seoras ver en la presente carta particular que el referido sultn me
dirigi anuncindome una prxima visita61.

61

Joaqun Rajal, Acerca de la Isla de Mindanao, en Boletn de la Sociedad Geogrfica, Madrid,

1885, vol. 18, p. 180.

No obstante, las consecuencias de la ocupacin real del sultanato de Sul para una
nacin anmica como la Espaa del siglo XIX, no podan haberse llevado a cabo sino
con la renuncia de vastas extensiones en la isla de Borneo que, legtimamente, podan
ser reclamadas por Espaa. Dada la incapacidad de solucionar el problema de la frontera
meridional filipina, se decidi establecer unos lmites tangibles, y abandonar la
inexplorada isla de Borneo al Reino Unido.

Expediente promovido por el ex-Sultn de Jol, datto de la Paragua Harum Nasarrid.

22 de junio de 1895.
[Archivo Nacional de Filipinas (Manila): Mindanao y Sul. SDS 9241
[17501898] Expediente 313. S. 11131116]