Of all the things that can be said about the Automatic Dependent

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system, only two can be uttered with any

certainty: 1. It is coming (eventually) to an aircraft and airport near you; 2. It is
highly controversial.
On one side of the glide path, ADS-B supporters, including most policy
makers at the FAA, believe that the global satellite-based ADS-B system
should completely replace the current radar-driven ATC system, hopefully
within the next two decades.
On approach in the middle of the runway are a large group of professional
and private aviators who believe ADS-B should be deployed alongside the
current radar system. This group is about evenly divided between those who
believe ADS-B should be used to supplement radar and those who believe
ADS-B should
become the
dominant technology,
with the existing
system relegated to a
backup role.
Finally, waiting for
takeoff clearance on
the taxiway, are a
vociferous group of
ADS-B opponents
who claim that the
current system,
despite being "ancient" in high-tech terms, is operating brilliantly, that the
skies are safer now than at any time in the history of aviation and that, to put it
simply, if it ain't broke it shouldn't be fixed.
Before examining each of these three positions, let's take a brief look at how
ADS-B works.
In flight, an ADS-B equipped aircraft obtains location information from GPS
satellites, automatically labels it with the its call sign, attaches it to information
about its altitude, velocity vector and velocity rate and broadcasts the
continuously updated data stream at very short intervals. This information is
received by automated ground transponders, which combine it with weather
and other data and rebroadcast it to aircraft for viewing on a graphical display;
ATC controllers, who use it much the same way that they now use radar to
position and direct traffic throughout airspace; and transponders in nearby
aircraft where it can be viewed on a cockpit display and accessed by
automated collision-avoidance systems.
Proponents of full conversion to ADS-B claim that it will, in addition to adding
air-to-air surveillance capability to the air-traffic control system, make it easier
for ATCs to schedule arrivals and departures, enable reductions in FAA
aircraft-separation requirements, reduce runway incursions, improve surface

operations in poor visibility, deliver real-time traffic, weather, terrain and other
information to pilots in an easily accessible form and -- perhaps most
important to the nation's financially sagging commercial air carriers -- allow
airlines to improve fleet utilization rates and return on investment.
As noted, this position is strongly supported by the FAA, which defines ADS-B
as "simply put, the future of air traffic control" and a cornerstone of its Next
Generation air-traffic management initiative.
In commenting on its October 2, 2007 proposed rule which would require all
aircraft -- commercial and non-commercial -- passing through the nation's
major air corridors to be ADS-B compliant by 2020, the Agency describes
ADS-B satellite positioning as "ten times" more accurate than current
navigation technologies and says it "may eventually allow air traffic controllers
to reduce separation standards between aircraft, significantly increasing the
number of aircraft that can be safely managed in the nation's skies."
The agency also noted that "pilots viewing ADS-B cockpit displays are able to
see, in real time, their location in relation to other aircraft, bad weather and
terrain" and claims that "in Southwest Alaska, the fatal accident rate for ADSB-equipped aircraft has dropped by 47 percent."
Opponents of totally replacing the existing ASR radar system with ADS-B
generally acknowledge the technological virtuosity of the new technology, but
question whether it has really been proven ready for the prime-time protection
of millions of lives.
They point out that the government's Alaska statistics, based upon an FAA
research project - the Capstone Program - did not offer conclusive evidence
that ADS-B would be as safe and dependable as the current radar-based
system in the highly congested air corridors of the lower 48 states. The very
richness of the data flowing back and forth between aircraft and ground
transponders, they say, may compromise the system's integrity in high-traffic
areas by overloading the available digital-communications bandwidth.
They further claim that the FAA's plans to "privatize" the ADS-B system by
allowing outside contractors to set the hardware design specifications and
operate the system after its deployment do not provide the kind of oversight
necessary to ensure optimally secure and reliable operation.
Noting that at least one potential contractor had proposed using commercial
XMRadio broadcasts as a source of weather data for the system, an FAA
opponent commented that "if the Pentagon had allowed the aircraft
manufactures to build to their own specifications for piston-engined bombers
we'd probably have lost World War II. I f NASA had let the aerospace industry
spec the hardware we might never have made it to the moon." Though ITT's
modest $207 million contract runs only three years, detractors point out that it
contains close to $2 billion in options that give the contractor operating and
maintenance authority for the system through 2025.

These opponents also note that the current air traffic management system
has been federalized since virtually the dawn of the passenger air age and
has never been safer than in the years since President Ronald Reagan
dramatically increased the amount of governmental control over the system
following the 1981 air traffic controller strike. They ask whether a public
corporation whose primary mission is to create maximum return for
shareholders faces a conflict of interest in running a system where
maintaining operational excellence may compromise profits, and they
question the cost to taxpayers if ITT's contract has to be terminated prior to
2025 for performance-related issues.
Those opposing ADS-B altogether are split into two camps: The larger camp
is populated by those who say "why buy what we don't need," the smaller by
what some folks would consider alarmists. (Defenders of the later group
would point out that being paranoid doesn't mean someone isn't out to get
you.)
According to the first camp, the basic assumptions about air traffic trends
being put forth in support of ADS-B are questionable. They claim that the
major causes of poor airline fleet utilization and delayed flights are a lack of
runways at commercial airports and "convenience" airline schedules that
mimic their competitors takeoff and landing times.
Reducing air-separation requirements to allow more planes per hour to
approach an airport accomplishes nothing if there aren't enough runways for
them to set down on, they say, and ADS-B will not allow significantly more
closely timed or simultaneous landings than the current generation of
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) technology .
They also contend that a projected doubling in the number of annual air
travelers of all types over the next two decades will not overtax the existing
system because all those additional fliers will be transported in, according to
the FAA's own numbers, only about 20 percent more aircraft than are already
in service.
Which brings us to the final group of naysayers, those who consider ADS-B, in
the words of one of them, "a terrorist's dream."
"Government policy using conventional radar makes it almost impossible for a
terrorist or a criminal to locate the position and identity of an aircraft, because
many millions of dollars are required to build a directional radar antenna,"
says Lindbergh Award winner Dick Smith, former chairman of Australia's Civil
Aviation Safety Authority. "With ADS-B, it's the opposite because all you need
to track every aircraft is a small non-directional aerial, worth $5."
People who claim ADS-B can be used to empower terrorists set forth a
number of futuristic scenarios to support their position. A common one, as
described by pilot and frequent FAA critic Darryl H. Phillips, goes like this:

A lone Mideast terrorist comes to the United States and purchases (or rents or
steals) a light aircraft such as a Cessna 172, Beech Bonanza, or Piper Arrow.
While selecting his plane, he is looking for just one item: ADS-B collision
avoidance equipment. He knows that ADS-B, installed on all airliners and some
business and pleasure aircraft, automatically reports the precise position of the
aircraft and also the identity of the aircraft, twice per second.
He has no particular target, his only desire is to cause fear and destruction ... he
flies at low altitude and slow speed above the busy highway toward a major
airport. He knows that Air Traffic Control radar will not see him because he has
disabled his transponder output, thereby assuring that there will be no
secondary returns nor any ADS-B transmissions. His aircraft is smaller than the
tractor-trailers on the highway below, and the ATC primary radar has been
programmed to eliminate highway clutter from the display. He will not be seen.
The terrorist also knows that the interval when a large aircraft is most
vulnerable is on final approach. It is moving slowly at low altitude, flaps, slats,
and gear are extended, and engines spooled down. This is the point in the flight
when the plane is least maneuverable. Using the ADS-B readout to spot his
target, he flies up the glideslope and directly toward the doomed airliner.
Until the last moment he cannot see the oncoming plane but he knows it is there.
The display on his ADS-B is showing its altitude and position with an accuracy of
a few meters. The airline crew, monitoring their instruments and complying
with pre-landing checklists, never sees him at all. At the last instant he shouts
"Allah Akbar" as he flies thru the windshield of the larger aircraft, taking
hundreds of people to their death.
Not a very comforting vision, to be sure, but also not, to most aviation experts,
a very potent argument against ADS-B. In the vast majority of the nation's
airspace, that out of proximity to Washington, D.C., New York and a few other
"hot spots," they say, a terrorist can perform exactly the same suicide mission
under VFR with only a minimal risk that an F16 will be scrambled fast enough
to shoot him down before he dives on the jetliner.
There is, of course, much more, pro and con, that can be said about how well
ADS-B works, whether it is needed right now, in 20 years or never, and if the
cost-benefit projections for or against it are valid.
But none of that really matters. ADS-B is coming and like the Iron Horse 150
years ago nothing is going to stop it. The only open question -- unless some
even better, cheaper technology is discovered the day after tomorrow -- is
whether it will, like the Iron Horse and the stage coach, run in tandem with its
predecessor for a few years or even a couple of decades.
Or will America's ATC radar dishes, once ADS-B is deployed, be consigned to
the surplus peddlers as quickly as Pony Express saddlebags after the coming
of the telegraph.