When an offence is committed by one person only there is no difficulty in determining his guilt, but when it is committed

by two or more persons the question arises How far is each liable? The question is more difficult to answer where the
offence does not consist of a single act or omission but consists, as is generally the case, of a series of acts or
omissions, and only some part of such series is executed by a person acting in concert with others.
For instance, A, B, C and D plan the abduction of Es wife for an immoral purpose. D goes to Es house in Es absence
to detain Es wife at the house to see that she does not go out anywhere. While D is thus busy talking to Es wife, C
comes round and says that he has heard that E has met an accident and while C and D are thus present, B comes
round with a car saying that E has been taken to the hospital where they should all including Es wife, immediately rush
up.
Thus, deceiving Es wife, they take Es wife in the car to As house where she is detained. Here each one of the
confederates does a different act. Ds role is apparently the most innocent, but the behaviour of each of them is criminal
which gives a criminal character to the whole series of acts. A, B, C and D share a common intention.
The plan which they hatch up and in pursuance of which they do the different acts gives to the whole series of acts the
unity of a single transaction. The question requiring solution under such circumstances is whether such persons shall be
liable for the whole series of acts as if such acts had been done by him alone or, to put it in other words, whether he
would be liable for the acts not done by him, but done by his companions.
Persons who join together to commit a crime are known as joint offenders. Suppose two men hold a third for cutting his
throat and one of them cuts it. There can be no doubt that both of them are equally guilty.
Principle of Joint Liability:
Section 34 embodies a principle of joint liability. Where two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, it is just the
same as if each of them had done it individually. Once it is found that a criminal act was done in furtherance of the
common intention of all, each of such person is liable for the criminal act as if it had been done by him alone.
Section 34 is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of the individual
members of a party who act in furtherance of a common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each
of them.
The principle which the section embodies is participation in some action with the common intention of committing a
crime. Once such participation is established Section 34 is at once attracted. Section 34 embodies the same principle
that has been laid down very clearly in the English caseR v.
Cruse. In that case a police party went to arrest A in his house, where several other persons were also present. These
persons in order to evade As apprehension came out to drive the policemen. In the joint attack one of the members of
the police party was killed, and it could not to be found out as to who was the real offender. The court held that each of
the attackers would be responsible in an equal measure for the criminal act, whether he actually committed it or not.
In order that this section may apply, it is not necessary that the prosecution must prove that the act was done by a
particular or a specified person. The language of the section does not bear out this contention.
In fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together and, on the facts of the case, it
is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which of the persons who acted together actually committed the crime.
Once the common intention is established the question as to who gave fatal blow is irrelevant.
The Supreme Court in Girija Shankar v. State of U.P., has observed : Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code has been
enacted on the Principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and does
not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of this Section is the element of participation in action.

The Court further said that the true concept of Section 34 is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the
position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. The existence of a common
intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this Section.
The common intention must be to commit the particular crime, although the actual crime may be committed by anyone
sharing intention. Then only others can be held guilty. If there is common intention to commit murder although the actual
fatal blow is given only by one of the confederates, the others who shared that intention would also be liable even
though their acts did not result in death. In a case with a premeditated intention two accused persons assaulted the
deceased with spears at the most vital part of the body. Supreme Court justified the application of Section 34, I.P.C.
Scope of the Section:
Section 34 does not create a new offence. It simply gives recognition to the common sense principle that if two or more
persons intentionally do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually.
The liability is for the criminal act actually done and not for the common intent. In other words, as the Supreme Court
has put it in a recent decision, is not by itself an offence. But, it creates a joint and constructive liability for the crime
committed in furtherance of such common intention.The section deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse,
by several persons if all are done in furtherance of the common intention of all.
Each person is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself. In B.N. Srikantiah v. State of Mysore, the
Supreme Court held: Section 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
It means that if two or more persons intentionally do a thing jointly it is just the same as if each of them had done
individually. Intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties.
Common intention to kill is dear from the circumstances that accused came together, armed, participated equally in
abusing and assaulting and going away together. That there should be an appreciable passage of time between the
formation of the intent and the act is not necessary for common intention, it may be formed at any time.
Individual liability for acts done in furtherance of common intention is incurred vicariously only when a criminal act is
done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all.
Where the sharing of a particular intention by more than one person to do a criminal act is not proved, Section 34 shall
not be applicable. Accused Nos. 1 and 3 suddenly emerged out of darkness, accused No. 3 gave an axe-blow on the
left arm of the deceased, while accused No. 1 gave an axe-blow on his abdomen and the latter injury resulted in his
death.
These facts clearly show that there was common intention between accused Nos. 1. and 3 to cause the death of the
deceased. In the dying declaration the deceased did not name accused No. 2 as one of his assailants. According to the
eye-witness accused No. 2 was talking to the deceased when accused Nos. 1 and 3 attacked the deceased. Accused
No. 2 neither had any weapon with him nor did he participate in the attack.
Not a single blow was given by him to the deceased. The only thing attributed to accused No. 2 was that after accused
Nos. 1 and 3 had given axe-blows to the deceased, accused No. 2 said, Dont leave him. Kill him. There is no reason
why accused No. 2 should have tried to instigate accused Nos. 1 and 3 after they had delivered axe-blow to the
deceased.
It is also significant that neither accused No. 1 nor accused No. 3 delivered any further blows to the deceased pursuant
to the alleged instigation by accused No. 2. It shows that accused No. 2 was not a party to the common intention of
accused Nos. 1 and 3 to kill the deceased nor had he anything to do with the attack on the deceased.

The common intention referred to in Section 34 pre-supposes a prior concert, a pre-arranged plan, i.e., prior meeting of
minds. This does not mean that there must be a long interval of time between formation of the common intention and
the doing of the act. It may be sudden. But there must be pre-arrangement and pre-meditated concert. It is not enough
to have the same intention.
The question whether in a proved situation all the individuals concerned there have simultaneously developed only an
independent intention or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said
to have been developed and thereby intended by all of them is one that has to be determined on the facts of each case.
Same or similar intention is not to be confused with common intention. Persons having a common intention must have
the same intention. Same intention must be to make it common intention and be indicated in some way by words or
acts between the persons who share it. Such intention may be inferred from circumstances.
It is true that prior concert and arrangement can and indeed often must be determined from subsequent conduct. But
the inference of the common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the
circumstances of the case. The mere circumstance of a person being present on an unlawful occurrence does not raise
a presumption of that persons complicity in an offence then committed so as to make Section 34 applicable.
In Kacheru Singh v. State of UP., eleven persons were charged under Sections 148, 323 and 326 read with Section 149,
I.P.C. It was proved that out of them three accused had attacked the complainant in the first incident.
The complainant ran away followed by the three accused; the complainant and his companions were again attacked by
these three accused. The Sessions Judge acquitted eight accused and convicted three.
The High Court in revision held that as a result of the Trial Courts judgment the three accused could not be convicted
under Sections 148, 323 and 326 read with Section 149 as the ingredients to establish the existence of an unlawful
assembly were absent. The High Court, however, convicted these three accused under Sections 323 and 326 read with
Section 34.
In appeal the Supreme Court held that provisions of Section 34 were applicable. These accused assaulted the
complainant in the first incident. They pursued the complainant and they persisted in assaulting him and deterring those
who had come to his help.
The clear implication of this was that the assault in the second incident was the result of previous concert. The evidence
to prove the common intention was the same which would have proved the common object of it had it been established
that there had been an unlawful assembly.
The Supreme Court held in, Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of AP that Section 34 really means that if two or more
persons intentionally do a common thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually.
The Supreme Court in case, Nagarathimam v. State of Tamil Nadu, observed that once it was held that appellants were
liable to be convicted for their individual acts Section 34, I.P.C. cannot be invoked.

joint liabilty
10-31-2012
A crime may be committed by an individual or in collaboration with others. An individual committing a crime
would be punished according to the nature of the offence committed. However, the difficulty arises when
several persons are engaged in the commission of an offence in different capacities. While one of them might
be engaged in the actual commission of offence, like murder, the other might have assisted the assailant by
placing a knife in his hand, and another might have chalked out the plan but stayed away from the scene of
occurrence throughout the commission of act. In such cases, a distinction is drawn between the acts of each of
such individuals according to their mode and degree of participation or involvement in the commission of the
offence for ascertaining guilt and awarding punishment. Such persons may broadly be classified into abettors.
If a person personally commits a crime, there will be no much difficulty in ascertaining his culpability. However,
in case, if a crime is committed by a group of people and it is not possible to fix the culpability of each of them
individually then, how the culpability of them can be fixed?

Golden rule:This can be done by the Doctrine of Joint Liability according to which, if crime is
committed by a group of people, then each of them will be liable in the same way as if the act was
done by the person himself/herself. The doctrine of combination (joint liability) in crime helps in
apportioning the liability of members who committed the crime in a group. When a crime is
committed by a group and a problem is experienced in ascertaining the liability of each of them,
then each of the members of the group will be liable in the same way as if the act (of which they
are liable) was done by him alone.
The doctrine of Joint Liability is based on the common sense principle that if an act is done conjointly by two or
more persons then they should be held liable in the same way as if the act was done by him alone. In this
liability, the person who commits the crime originally is no more liable than who was present on the spot to
assist him. Under the English law, persons connected with the commission of crime are of two types(1) Those who participate in the commission of crime. This includes the person who commits the crime
actually. They are called principals.
(2) This type includes the persons who in any way, assists the principal in the execution of the crime and
hence, are called accessories.
The principles governing the criminal liability of joint offenders are found in the common law, based on grounds
of public policy. There must be a common purpose/venture between the participants to commit an offence.
Each participant acts as a primary offender and is equally liable, regardless of his/her level of participation. In
Brown & Isaacs v. The
The provisions relating to joint liability (also called constructive liability) have been elaborately dealt with in
Section 34- 38, 114, 120A, 149, 396 and 460 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. These provisions can be
classified into three categories:
(a) First, where the offence is committed with the common intention of the group. (Section 34- 38)
(b)Second, where the accused is a member of a conspiracy to commit an offence (Section 120A, 120B), and
(c) Third, where the offence is committed with the common object of an unlawful assembly. (Section 149).
Section 34- Act done by several persons in furtherance of a common intentionWhen a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Section 35- When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or
intentionWhenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or intention, is
done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention is liable
for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.
Section 36- Effect caused partly by act and partly by omissionWhenever the causing of a certain effect or any attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an
offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly by an omission is the
same offence.
Section 37- Co- operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence- When an offence is
committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co- operates in the commission of that offence by
doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence.
Section 38- Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offencesWhere several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of
different offences by means of that act.
Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, holds members of a group of criminal conspirators jointly liable
for the conspiracy to commit an offence and Section 120B provides for punishment in such cases. The parties
to an agreement are guilty of criminal conspiracy, irrespective of the fact whether the illegal act has been
accomplished or not.