YAP V.

CHUA, 672 SCRA 411 (2012)

DOCTRINE: Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of
a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action
is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted
and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other
FACTS: Petitioner Jesse Yap filed a complaint against
respondents Eliza Chua and Evelyn before RTC Makati for
the cancellation of several checks he drew against his BPI
account
1. Yap alleged that he purchase several real properties
through Te (real estate broker) and as payment,
delivered to her a number of checks. He stopped
payment on the checks and closed his account when
Te failed to deliver the titles on the properties
2. Chua, on the other hand, averred that she released
P9.14 million to Yap in exchange for 2 postdated
checks payable to her for P5 million each. Despite
demands, Yap failed to make good the checks he
issued to Chua.
3. As such Chua filed with RTC General Santos a
complaint for sum of money against Yap. RTC General
Santos held in favor of Chua
4. Chua filed a Motion to Dismiss before RTC Makati due
to litis pendentia and forum shopping on the reason
that Yap failed to inform RTC Makati of the civil case
filed in General Santos and the pendency of his
appeal in said case
5. RTC Makati denied the MTD on the ground that the
relief prayed for in the two cases are different from
each other since the collection case in RTC General
Santos is different from the case before RTC Makati
which seeks for the annulment of the issued checks

ISSUE: WON there is litis pendentia in this case

HELD: Yes. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a
civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is
the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more
than once regarding the same subject matter and for the
same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public
policy that the same subject matter should not be the
subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order
that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the
sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.
The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.
CAB: The first requisite of litis pendentia is present as there
is identity of parties. The second and third requisites are
likewise present. Apart from the fact that the same factual
antecedents prompted the filing of the two cases, that Yap's
defense in RTC General Santos case constitutes his cause of
action civil case filed before RTC Makati, necessarily implies
reliance on the same evidence for the resolution of both
cases.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are
identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the
same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions
are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is

a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by

varying the form of action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies.

DOCTRINE: An order denying a motion to dismiss is

interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of
certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: CHED enjoined the petitioner Indiana Aerospace
University (IAU) from using the word "university" in its
corporate name and ordering it to revert to its authorized
name,
1. IUA then filed a complaint for damages against the
CHED, alleging that the public's confidence in it as an
educational institution was undermined because of
newspaper publications by the CHED stating that
petitioner had misrepresented itself as a university.
2. RTC denied respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and
declared CHED in default for its failure to file an
answer.
3. On certiorari, the CA granted CHED's Motion to
Dismiss the complaint, grounded on failure to state a
cause of action.
4. IAU claimed that certiorari cannot prosper because
respondent did not first file a motion for
reconsideration of the lower court's order; and that
CHED should also have filed a motion to set aside the
default order
ISSUE: WON a certiorari is the proper remedy when a MTD
is denied

INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY V. COMMISSION ON

HIGHER EDUCATION, 356 SCRA 367

HELD: No. An order denying a Motion to Dismiss is

interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of
certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to correct a grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to

keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve

persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges
have no power or authority in law to perform It is not
designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions
made by the Court.
CAB: There was no grave abuse of discretion in the RTCs
denial of the Motion to Dismiss. The trial court stated in its
Decision that petitioner was an educational institution,
originally registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as the "Indiana School of Aeronautics, Inc." That
name was subsequently changed to "Indiana Aerospace
University" after the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports had interposed no objection to such change. CHED
issued a formal Cease and Desist Order directing IAU to stop
using the word "university" in its corporate name. CHED also
published an announcement in a local newspaper in Cebu
City, that there was no institution of learning by that name.
Such acts, according to the RTC undermined the public's
confidence in petitioner as an educational institution. This
was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action.
When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state
a cause of action, a ruling thereon should be based only on
the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must pass upon
this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them
to be true. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error
and a denial of plaintiff's right to due process.

DOCTRINE: When a Notice of Dismissal, following Rule 17

Sec 1 ROC, is filed by the plaintiff, it is mandatory that the
trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal and,
unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff
through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion
subject to approval by the court.
FACTS: Petitioner Frederick Dael filed an action for breach
of contract and damages against Spouses Beltran. He
alleged that a purchased a parcel of land from Beltran.
Spouses Beltran failed to disclose that said property was
previously mortgaged and subsequently foreclosed. He
argued that Beltrans non-disclosure of the foreclosure
constituted a breach of implied warranties in a sale under
Art 1547 NCC
1. Spouses Beltran filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that petitioner Dael had no cause of action
since the contract to sell stated that the vendee was
Frederick George Ghent Dael, not petitioner
2. As such, RTC ordered petitioner to clarify whether he
and Frederick George Ghent Dael were one and the
same person. Instead, petitioner filed a Notice of
Dismissal
3. RTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with
prejudice
HELD: Yes. As to the propriety of dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice, Sec 1, Rule 17 ROC provides:

DAEL V. SPOUSES BELTRAN G.R. NO 156470 (2008)

Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be

dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at
any time before service of the answer or of a motion for
summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court
shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication

upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once

dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim.
Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court
issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff through
mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to
approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice,
and without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice.
The trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint
as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal
as a matter of right, regardless of the ground.
Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed
precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and
hence, the trial court correctly gave it precedence and ruled
based on the motion.
This argument is erroneous. Sec 1, Rule 17 does not
encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The provision specifically
provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before
service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment.
Thus, upon the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the
plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became
moot and academic and the trial court should have
dismissed the case without prejudice based on the Notice of
Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice
would erroneously result in res judicata 18 and imply that
petitioner can no longer file a case against respondents
without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove
otherwise.

HEIRS OF REYES V. COURT OF APPEALS, 519 SCRA

250 (2007)
DOCTRINE: A pre-trial is meant to serve as a device to
clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the
parties, to ascertain the facts relative to those issues and to
enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge
of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent
trials from being carried on in the dark. The rule, however, is
not to be applied with rigidity and admits of certain
exceptions. When the issues raised are embodied in the
pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the complaint,
and actively litigated by them without objection on the part
of the adverse parties, the latter are deemed to have given
their implied consent to try such issue.
FACTS:
1. Estaquia owned a parcel of land which she inherited
prior to her marriage to Magno Sarreal (private
respondent)
2. In 1979, Eustaquia allegedly sold the property to
private respondents Anatalia Reyes and Gloria ReyesPaulino. Eustaquia expressly stated in the Deed of
Sale that the property was paraphernal in character
and did not belong to the conjugal partnership
3. After her death, the children of the siblings of
Eustaquia (petitioner) filed a complaint with RTC
Quezon City for partition and accounting with
receivership against Magno Sarreal and private
respondents Anatalia and Gloria because they
allegedly discovered that the property had been
divided among private respondents and registered in
their names
4. Private respondents filed an answer contending that
complaint did not state a cause of action;
complainants were not compulsory heirs of Eustaquia
and the title to the property was pursuant to a valid
sale executed before Eustaquias death
5. During the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the sole
issue to be resolved was whether the sale to the
private respondents was simulated or fictitious

6. RTC held in favor of petitioners and declared the sale

void. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of RTC
citing that RTC showed undue bias in favor of
petitioners by resolving the case on issued not
agreed upon during the pre-trial
ISSUE: WON the court, in deciding a case, may go beyond
the scope of issues agreed by the parties during the pre-trial
HELD: Yes. The Court is mindful of the rule that the
determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the
consideration of other questions on appeal. A pre-trial is
meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the
basic issues between the parties, to ascertain the facts
relative to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
civil trials and thus prevent trials from being carried on in
the dark. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties
are expected to disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues
of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except
such as may involve privileged or impeaching matters. The
rule, however, is not to be applied with rigidity and admits
of certain exceptions.

There is merit in petitioners' claim that the limitation upon

the issue embodied in the pre-trial order did not control the
course of the trial. The issue on the nature of the property
was embodied in the pleadings filed by the parties
subsequent to the complaint and was actively litigated by
them without any objection on the part of private
respondents. In view thereof, the latter are deemed to have
given their implied consent for the RTC to try this issue. It is
worthy to note that a careful perusal of the RTC decision
would reveal that the trial court found it unnecessary to
make a categorical finding as to whether the deed was
simulated or fictitious, the focal point being the character of
the property at the time of the transfer to private
respondents. While it is true that the RTC cited the evidence
introduced by petitioners to establish that the sale was
simulated or fictitious, it did not make a clear and definitive
ruling on this matter