Russia, China and Pakistan: An Emerging

New Axis?
Regional realities are shifting fast, with some significant ramifications for India.
By Joy Mitra
August 18, 2015
In geopolitics, strategic realities can change with surprising speed, and even before countries
realize it decisive shifts occur that shape the future for the years to come. That seems to be the
case with traditional Cold War rivals Russia and Pakistan, which have of late seen a gradual
warming of ties. Traditionally an ally of India and hitherto supportive of Indias stance on
Kashmir, Russia has shown clear signs of cozying up to Pakistan.
Having earlier lifted its self-imposed arms embargo on Pakistan, in November 2014 Russia
signed a landmark military cooperation agreement with Pakistan, which spoke about
exchanging information on politico-military issues, strengthening collaboration in the defense
and counter-terrorism sectors, sharing similar views on developments in Afghanistan and doing
business with each other. There have been reports that Pakistan may purchase Mi-35 combat
helicopters apart from directly importing the Klimov RD-93 engines from Russia rather than via
China for its JF-17 multi-role fighters. This could also mean a significant role for Russian
equipment and spares in future development of the fighter. In addition, Russian state-owned firm
Rostekh Corporation is planning to build a 680 mile gas pipeline in Pakistan in 2017 at an
estimated cost of $2.5 billion.
The mutual overtures between Russia and Pakistan are part of a greater shift in international
relations. In Europe, Russia is embroiled in a showdown with the West over Ukraine, with
Moscows military adventure in Crimea being followed by Western sanctions. In the AsiaPacific, Chinas encroachments in the South China Sea has inflamed tensions with other AsiaPacific countries allied with the U.S. These developments have forced Russia and China to look
for allies, which explains the bonhomie between the two powers of late. Some analysts question
whether a partnership motivated by external factors could lead to an alliance of countries that
formerly distrusted each other. But the old adage the enemy of my enemy is my friend fits
perfectly well here; the single most important factor that overrides all others is their concurrent
perception of the U.S. and its policy of containment towards them. China needs allies to
change the world order and it begins with Asia.
The China-Pakistan link is well known and is the most formidable leg of the Russia-ChinaPakistan triangle. China has been a traditional ally of Pakistan and has historically supported it
against its arch rival India both in terms of military equipment and diplomacy. Chinese have
been involved in building nuclear reactors for Pakistan; Pakistan is the largest importer of
Chinese manufactured defense equipment, is involved in co-production and co-development of
JF-17 fighter jets and now is slated to buy almost eight Chineses S20 or Yuan-class dieselelectric submarines (SSK). China has also significantly invested in Pakistans Gwadar Port and

in the Karakoram corridor. The imperative here is not just for China but for Pakistan as well. The
burgeoning relationship between the U.S. and India, with their extensive trade ties and
cooperation on strategic issues of mutual concern in the sphere of defense technology and
equipment, does unnerve Pakistan from time to time. Since Pakistans failed misadventure in the
Kargil heights, it has lost the support of successive U.S. administrations on the Kashmir issue
and its own relationship with the U.S. has been rocky.
It is from here that the congruence of interests between the three states of Pakistan, China and
Russia stems. For China and Russia, the U.S. is an anathema, which must dethroned from its
hegemonic position for their own security. Pakistan has enough of an incentive to be a willing
partner in an Asian security architecture that is shaped by China. With India having diversified
its military suppliers to include countries like the U.S. and Israel, Russia no longer sees any
impediment to establishing a strategic relationship with Pakistan. In the future one could see
signs of integration between the three states, as their abilities complement each other: Russia is
an alternate source for Western military technology and energy supplier, China is economically
more potent than the other two, with considerable foreign exchange reserves looking to invest
and in need of energy supplies, Pakistan despite its structural problems is a growing economy
with young population in need of both of both energy supplies and defense equipment. Already
importing equipment from China, Pakistan will have access to Russian technology, which was in
fact the source for many Chinese products as well. Sanctions-hit Russia will have a new market
for its defense equipment, although this may well in the future see some competition between
Russia and China. It is possible that Russia will continue to arm India along with China and now
Pakistan. Both EU and US have followed the strategy of supplying defense equipment to both
India and Pakistan. But Russia arming Pakistan is still significant because that implies that
Russia will no longer give preferential treatment to its historical friend India.
It is true India is still economically too big to be overlooked and Russia has an interest in
preserving its relationship with India. But India has estranged security ties with China and
Pakistan, and with Russia drawing ever closer to China, its divergence of interest with India in
the world order it perceives is growing more apparent. The Russia-Pakistan-China triumvirate is
a reality in the offing and has a far greater convergence of security objectives in Asia than a
similar Russia-China-India grouping (also subsumed within BRICS). It is important to note here
that the Chinese economy is visibly slowing and this could lead to some internal turmoil, the
Russian economy may very well see further contraction, while that of Pakistan, albeit showing
signs of improvement, is external aid dependent and beset by internal security concerns.
Aggression on the part of this triumvirate to deflect attention from internal problems cannot be
ruled out. The strategic ramifications will be for India as much as they will be the U.S. and other
countries in the region. As the contours of the alliances in Asia harden, India will have to shed its
reluctance to take a firmer stand in Asia and work more closely with the U.S. and Japan.