Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152259
July 29, 2004
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal
indictment prior to plea and trial, however they may be named or
identified -- whether as a motion to quash or motion to dismiss or
by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice
and unduly burden the court system. Grounds not included in the
first of such repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and
can no longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently
filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain
presidential relatives who "intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
business, transaction, contract or application with the
Government." This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad,"
because it can easily be understood with the use of simple
statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a
criminal statute such as this be challenged on the basis of the
"overbreadth" and the "void-for-vagueness" doctrines, which apply
only to free-speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the November 20, 20012 and the March
1, 20023 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
DENIED. The arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the
case shall proceed as scheduled."4
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an
information before [the anti-graft court] charging the accused
[with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,5 as amended.
The Information reads:
'That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July
29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
[the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand
E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore,
related to the latter by affinity within the third civil degree, did then
and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for
the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of
others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a governmentowned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the
majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all
equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops,
quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island
Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding
and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
'Contrary to law.'
"On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first 'MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT' claiming that no valid
preliminary investigation was conducted in the instant case. He
asserts that if a preliminary investigation could be said to have
been conducted, the same was null and void having been
undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.
"On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First
Division, issued an order giving the accused fifteen days to file a
Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
"[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan]
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order.
"On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
"On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III
Victorio U. Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already
concluded the reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor
and the Special Prosecutor approved the recommendation.
However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed
the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
"Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second
'MOTION TO QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.
from the facts essential to the nature of the offense -- need not be
averred.54 Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be
alleged are to be determined by reference to the definition and the
essential elements of the specific crimes.55
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that
the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been
stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense
committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to
prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are
evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary
investigation when he questioned before this Court in GR No.
128317 the Sandiganbayan's Order giving him 15 days to file a
Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.56 Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,57 he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his
right to a preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both
as complainant and as investigator.58
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had
the power to conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could
not do so with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" in cases in
which it was the agency that had gathered evidence and
subsequently filed the complaint.59 On that basis, this Court
nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG and
directed the transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for
appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal
of the Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG
initiated the present Complaint against him; hence, it could not
properly conduct the preliminary investigation. However, he was
accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and
afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure
outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayan's actions are in accord also with Raro v.
Sandiganbayan,60 which held that the failure to conduct a valid
preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an
information. If the information has already been filed, the proper
procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance
while the preliminary investigation is being conducted or
completed.61
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to
Quash filed by petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8,
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.
Tinga, J., in the result. Please see separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., no part. Ponente of assailed SB Resolutions.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA, J.:
I concur in the result of the ponencia and the proposition that
Section 5 of the Anti-Plunder Law is constitutional. The validity of
the provision has been passed upon by the Court before in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan.1 I also agree with the ponencia's reiteration of
the ruling in Estrada that Section 5 is receptive to the basic
principle in statutory construction that words should be construed
in their ordinary and usual meaning.2
However, with all due respect, I raise serious objections to the
ponencia's holding that the so-called "void for vagueness" doctrine
has special application only to free speech cases,3 and the
undeclared proposition that penal
laws may not be stricken down on the ground of ambiguity. 4 I am
aware that the assertions rely upon the separate opinions of the
herein ponente5 and Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza6 in Estrada. I am
also aware that the critical portion of Mr. Justice Mendoza's
separate opinion in Estrada was cited with approval by Mr. Justice
Bellosillo's ponencia therein.7
The incontrovertible reality though is that the majority's
pronouncement in Estrada that penal statutes cannot be
challenged on vagueness grounds did not form part of the ratio
decidendi. The ratio, in the words of Justice Bellosillo, was: "as it is
written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and welldefined parameters which would enable the accused to determine
the nature of his violation,"8 and thus the law does not suffer from
unconstitutionality. The discussion on the vagueness aspect was
not decisive of the main issue and, therefore, clearly obiter dictum.
I submit that it is erroneous to resolve the present petition on the
basis of that dictum in Estrada.
As the obiter dictum in Estrada is needlessly made a ratio in the
present case, the ponencia herein has even unwittingly elevated to
doctrinal level the proposition that the constitutionality of penal
laws cannot be challenged on the ground of vagueness. I humbly
submit that the stance is flawed and contrary to fundamental
principles of due process.
particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does
not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness
grounds cannot succeed.17
This view should be sustained, especially in light of the fact that the
"void for vagueness" doctrine has long been sanctioned as a means
to invalidate penal statutes.
"Void For Vagueness" Invalidation of Penal Statutes has LongStanding Jurisprudential History
As early as 1926, the United States Supreme Court held in Connally
v. General Construction Co., thus: 18
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a
well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions
of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process
of law.
Thus in Connally, a statute prescribing penalties for violation of an
eight-hour workday law was voided, presenting as it did, a "double
uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal statute."19
In Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey,20 a challenge was posed to a
statute defining a "gangster" and prescribing appropriate penalties,
for being void for vagueness. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the definition of a "gang" under the statute was vague, and the
statute void for vagueness. It was of no moment that the
information against the accused described the offense with
particularity.
If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due
process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be
charged would not serve to validate it. (United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 221; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25 App.D.C.
443, 453.) It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that
prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against
transgression. (See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 ,
51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 73 A.L. R. 1484; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 ,
58 S.Ct. 666.) No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.21
(Emphasis supplied)
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,22 civil rights protesters were charged
with violating a criminal trespass statute proscribing entry upon the
lands of another after notice prohibiting such entry. A state court
construed the statute as applicable to the act of remaining on the
premises of another after receiving notice to leave. The U.S.
16
Tan Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 354 Phil. 463, 470, July 10, 1998; Cruz
v. CA, 194 SCRA 145, 152, February 18, 1991; Bulaong v. CA, 181
SCRA 618, 622, January 30, 1990.
17
Governed by Rule 117.
18
Under Rule 16.
19
9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states: "The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not
file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on
the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of
section 3 of this Rule." The exceptions refer to the following
grounds: the facts do not constitute an offense, lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty, and
double jeopardy.
20
"The overbreadth doctrine x x x decrees that 'a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'"
Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 430, November 19, 2001 (citing
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12 L. Ed. 2d 325, 338
[1958]; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 [1960]).
21
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law." Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan 421 Phil. 290, 429-430, November 19, 2001
(citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed.
328 [1926]; in turn cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Ass'n v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 [1967]).
22
Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, supra.
23
Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Panganiban in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, supra.
24
271 US 500, June 7, 1926.
25
207 SCRA 712, March 31, 1992.
26
270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.
27
401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971), per Black, J.
28
Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, supra.
29
Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 9.
31
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 210 Phil. 187, 207, October 26,
1983; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55, March
11, 1978; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc.
v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, 314, July 31, 1967.
32
61
Id., p. 941.
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated February 9, 2000; rollo, p. 158.
63
Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 24.
64
Ibid.
65
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized
by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run.
66
Salvador v. Desierto, GR No. 135249, January 16, 2004;
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, 415 Phil. 723, August 22, 2001.
67
Republic v. Desierto, supra, pp. 76-78, per De Leon Jr., J.
68
On February 28, 1986, by virtue of Executive Order No. 1.
69
This Commission was tasked with the recovery of all ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
during his administration; the investigation of cases of graft and
corruption; and adoption of safeguards and institution of adequate
measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.
70
Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 31.
71
353 SCRA 452, 516-524, March 2, 2001, per Puno, J.
72
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra; De Baron
v. Court of Appeals, 368 SCRA 407, 415, October 26, 2001;
Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
170 SCRA 246, 254, February 13, 1989; Butuan Bay Wood Export
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297, 303, April 28, 1980.
TINGA, J.:
1
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001). The author of this
Separate Opinion was not yet a member of the Court when the
Estrada case was decided.
2
Page 19, ponencia. See also Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 348.
3
Page 12, ponencia.
4
Page 13, ponencia.
5
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 1 at 451-482.
6
Id. at 421-450
7
Id. at 353-356.
8
Id. at 343. The main opinion in Estrada continued: "As long as the
law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable
to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending the one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series of
62
30
Separati
on
Total Pay
Abelardo Sangadan
P23,879.0
6
None
P23,879.06
Luciano Ramos
43,605.24
P711.25
44,316.49
Nestor Tilasan
19,726.18
401.46
20,127.64
Gregorio Tilasan
25,955.50
None
25,955.50
Joaquin Garcia
7,267.54
1,211.25
8,478.79
Rogelio Sabaitan
21,798.00
1,211.25
23,009.25
25,955.50
63.10
26,018.60
Pilardo Potenciano
5,191.10
911.25
6,102.35
Ronillo Potenciano
7,267.54
None
7,267.54
Jovencio Bartolome
8,305.76
477.35
8,783.01
Santiago Sabaitan
4,152.88
1,011.25
5,164.13
Juanito Concerman
7,267.54
611.25
7,928.79
George Tumilas
16,611.52
1,011.25
17,622.77
Patrocinio Domingo
2,076.44
1,011.25
3,087.69
Avelino Francisco
3,114.66
1,211.25
4,325.91
Meliton Sangadan
15,573.30
392.50
15,965.80
Alexander
Geronimo
15,573.00
None
15,573.30
Joaquin Geronimo
24,917.28
1,211.25
26,128.53
Ramil Macaso
6,229.32
861.25
7,090.57
Lamberto Joven
16,611.62
1,011.25
17,622.77
Cristino Garina
35,299.48
849.65
36,149.13
Sammy Gantaan
14,535.08
961.25
15,496.33
Nacial Ustalan
38,414.14
79.95
38,494.09
Edwin Ustalan
7,267.54
1,011.25
8,278.79
Roland Potenciano
5,191.10
911.25
6,102.35
Rody Concerman
7,267.54
691.25
7,958.79
Elmer Domingo
3,114.66
1,211.25
4,325.91
Aranquez Sangada
45,681.68
711.25
46,392.93
Unding Boleng
31,146.60
None
31,146.60
Eduardo Boleng
35,299.48
759.30
36,058.78
Roberto Paneo
23,876.06
911.25
24,787.31
Henry Sangadan
16,611.52
1,011.25
17,622.77
Total Benefits
P586,774.
22
Footnotes
1
5th Division.
2
In NLRC Case No. RAB-09-04-00096-95, Rollo, pp. 23-39.
3
In NLRC CA No. M-002823-96, Rollo, pp. 41-51.
4
Rollo, pp. 43-44.
5
Id, pp. 38-39.
6
5th Division, Cagayan de Oro City.
7
Rollo, pp. 50-51.
8
Id, pp. 61-62.
9
Emphasis ours.
10
Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 263.
11
Fianza vs. People's Law Enforcement Board, 243 SCRA 165, 178
(1995).
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted
merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were
presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary
dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains
unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their
counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948
manifested that they were exercising their right to raise
peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM
No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this
purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges
had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990,
but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the
answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14,
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce
the order for his release and to declare in contempt the
commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order.
He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had
refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be
taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional
liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner,
Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of
additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting
the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is
applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial
proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General CourtMartial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the
mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men
facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void.
Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to
conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner,
intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing
charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General
Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on
provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and
their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an
officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to
military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of
respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of
the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj.
Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided
under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact
that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided
under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not
invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation"
was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were
subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However,
instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the
dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not
able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing,
for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory
questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute
in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General
Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not
signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief
of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the
commanding officer of a major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a
military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the
commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may
appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is
the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried,
the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen.
De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order
itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it
has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor
General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa,
the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great
many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in
these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was
amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory
challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall
not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No.
8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create
military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and
such other cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the
Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters
relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the
peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause
may be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith.
Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie
vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully
challenged member shall be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or
the National Security Code, which was a compilation and
codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended
"to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and
stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D.
No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout
the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and
declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant
thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the
other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of
martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of
the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est
anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to
peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the
apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the
right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No.
39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when
martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having
been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the
Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of
martial law. It is curious that the present government should invoke
the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the
accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory
challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial
to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so
motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light
of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers
and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the
laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects.
This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the
propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the
petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the
Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the
private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the
Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also
cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this Court held
that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now
exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited
refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the
accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or
correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that
mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would
violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated
and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is
substantially different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to
civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that
they had not been charged after more than one year from their
arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on
February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on
February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners
submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the
private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991,
pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and
initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of
the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to
submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There
was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and
preparation of the charges against the private respondents.
However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it
pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds
of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the
failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be
interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to
finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by
the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as
the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges
were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by
the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must
reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the
point that if the participation of petitioner in several coup attempts
for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili
cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or
the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur
of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem);
then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party
over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that
such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE;
RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of
validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having
exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore
his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half
of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the
other half.
DECISION
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION
AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of
the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent
character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954
Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the
opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no
se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation.
We are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation
between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a
sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation
made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to
defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant
would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latters stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as
noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who
was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the
appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; CONSTRUED
WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTENDED SCOPE AND
PURPOSE. - Time and again we have decreed that statutes
are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in
construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
2. ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 142, AS AMENDED (AN ACT
TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES); PURPOSE IS TO
REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTION. - The objective and purpose of C.A. No.
142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to
Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other
than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement,
Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other
purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and
amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made
primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese
of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious
names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No.
142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless
such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996]
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition
for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the
sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his
fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known as aliases.
11
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging
to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication
that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his
real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at
bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of
the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the
messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that
office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely
serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint
in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then
that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that
name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of
the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated
transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his
real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the
Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a
copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part
of public records hence open to inspection and examination by
anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A.
No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion
and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its
related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated
by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There
exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were
never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of
which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte,
General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of
the Philippines which declared:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is,
subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United
States, the sole and only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding
upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and
on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full
powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the
Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the
principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be
reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944,
by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United
States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and
processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,"
has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of
the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings
have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the
present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court
existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military
occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings
pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied
and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is,
whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts
of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called
Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were
continued with no substantial change in organization and
jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed.,
p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in
said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or
other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military
force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their
original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to
the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre
and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution
in support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and
continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and
unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . .
shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts
of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases
commenced and the left pending therein," is "that said courts were
a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws
they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior
to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws and the
courts had become the institutions of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs.
Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws
and institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines."
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not
say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if
continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the
courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily
occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or
military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to
transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the
occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many
other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of
mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of
said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DE JOYA, J., concurring:
The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the
proceedings held in civil case No. 3012, in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine
Republic, during Japanese occupation; and the effect on said
proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur,
dated October 23, 1944. The decision of this question requires the
application of principles of International Law, in connection with the
municipal law in force in this country, before and during Japanese
occupation.
Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of
general law (Juntington vs. Attril, 146 U.S., 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 224; 36
Law. ed., 1123); and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal,
as, under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
it is a part of the fundamental law of the land (Article II, section 3).
As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be
ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever questions of
right depending upon it are presented for our determination, sitting
as an international as well as a domestic Tribunal (Kansas vs.
Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct. 552; 46 Law. Ed., 838).
Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by
nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof of the
existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of nations to
abide by that rule; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the
usages and customs of nations, and to ascertain what these usages
and customs are, the universal practice is to turn to the writings of
publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different
countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.S., 677; 20 Sup. Cit.,
290; 44 Law. ed., 320).
But while usage is the older and original source of International
Law, great international treaties are a later source of increasing
importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of
war on land, expressly declares that:
ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army.
pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding
upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government
in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free enemy
occupation and control; and
I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and
extend to the people of the Philippines the sacred right of
government by constitutional process under the regularly
constituted Commonwealth Government as rapidly as the several
occupied areas are liberated to the military situation will otherwise
permit;
I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for
and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly
constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on
Philippine soil.
October 23, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General U. S. Army Commander in Chief
IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW?
In times of war the Commander in Chief of an army is vested with
extraordinary inherent powers, as a natural result of the nature of
the military operations aimed to achieve the purposes of his
country in the war, victory being paramount among them.
Said Commander in Chief may establish in the occupied or
reoccupied territory, under his control, a complete system of
government; he may appoint officers and employees to manage
the affairs of said government; he may issue proclamations,
instructions, orders, all with the full force of laws enacted by a duly
constituted legislature; he may set policies that should be followed
by the public administration organized by him; he may abolish the
said agencies. In fact, he is the supreme ruler and law-maker of the
territory under his control, with powers limited only by the receipts
of the fundamental laws of his country.
California, or the port of San Francisco, had been conquered by the
arms of the United States as early as 1846. Shortly afterward the
United States had military possession of all upper California. Early
in 1847 the President, as constitutional commander in chief of the
army and navy, authorized the military and naval commander of
our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a
conqueror, and form a civil government for the conquered country,
and to impose duties on imports and tonnage as military
contributions for the support of the government, and of the army
judgement; but generally it imports the writs which issue out of any
court to bring the party to answer, or for doing execution, and all
process out of the King's court ought to be in the name of the King.
It is called "process" because it proceeds or goes upon former
matter, either original or judicial. Gilmer, vs. Bird 15 Fla., 410, 421.
(34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 147.)
In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means whereby a
court compels the appearance of the defendant before it, or a
compliance with it demands, and any every writ, rule order, notice,
or decree, including any process of execution that may issue in or
upon any action, suit, or legal proceedings, and it is not restricted
to mesne process. In a narrow or restricted sense it is means those
mandates of the court intending to bring parties into court or to
require them to answer proceedings there pending. (Colquitt Nat.
Bank vs. Poitivint, 83 S. E., 198, 199; 15 Ga. App., 329. (34 Words
and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)
A "process" is an instrument in an epistolary from running in the
name of the sovereign of a state and issued out of a court of
justice, or by a judge thereof, at the commencement of an action or
at any time during its progress or incident thereto, usually under
seal of the court, duly attested and directed to some municipal
officer or to the party to be bound by it, commanding the
commission of some act at or within a specified time, or prohibiting
the doing of some act. The cardinal requisites are that the
instrument issue from a court of justice, or a judge thereof; that it
run in the name of the sovereign of the state; that it be duly
attested, but not necessarily by the judge, though usually, but not
always, under seal; and that it be directed to some one
commanding or prohibiting the commission of an act. Watson vs.
Keystone Ironworks Co., 74 P., 272, 273; 70 Kan., 43. (34 Words and
Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p. 148.)
Jacobs in his Law Dictionary says: "Process" has two qualifications:
First, it is largely taken for all proceedings in any action or
prosecution, real or personal, civil or criminal, from the beginning to
the end; secondly, that is termed the "process" by which a man is
called into any temporal court, because the beginning or principal
part thereof, by which the rest is directed or taken. Strictly, it is a
proceeding after the original, before the judgement. A policy of fire
insurance contained the condition that if the property shall be sold
or transferred, or any change takes place in title or possession,
whether by legal process or judicial decree or voluntary transfer or
convenience, then and in every such case the policy shall be void.
The term "legal process," as used in the policy, means what is
known as a writ; and, as attachment or execution on the writs are
usually employed to effect a change of title to property, they are or
are amongst the processes contemplated by the policy. The words
members. There were judges who had to trample laws and shock
their conscience in order not to disgust a Nipponese.
The most noble of all professions, so much so that the universities
of the world could not conceive of higher honor that may be
conferred than that of Doctor of Laws, became the most despised.
It was dangerous to practice the profession by which faith in the
effectiveness of law is maintained; citizens feel confident in the
protection of their liberties, honor, and dignity; the weak may face
the powerful; the lowest citizen is not afraid of the highest official;
civil equality becomes reality; justice is admnistered with more
efficiency; and democracy becomes the best system of government
and the best guaranty for the welfare and happiness of the
individual human being. In fact, the profession of law was annulled,
and the best lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in Fort Santiago
and other centers of torture were the military police, concubines,
procurers, and spies, the providers of war materials and shameful
pleasures, and the accomplices in fraudulent transactions, which
were the specialty of many naval and military Japanese officers.
The courts and Filipino government officials were completely
helpless in the question of protecting the constitutional liberties
and fundamental rights of the citizens who happen to be
unfortunate enough to fall under the dragnet of the hated kempei.
Even the highest government officials were not safe from arrest
and imprisonment in the dreaded military dungeons, where torture
or horrible death were always awaiting the defenseless victim of
the Japanese brutality.
May any one be surprised if General MacArthur decided to annul all
the judicial processes?
The evident policy of the author of the October Proclamation can be
seen if we take into consideration the following provisions of the
Japanese Constitution:
ART. 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law
according to law, in the name of the Emperor.
ART. 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been
infringed by the illegal measures of the executive authority .. shall
be taken cognizance of by a Court of Law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nobody dared challenge the validity of the October Proclamation.
Nobody dared challenge the authority of the military Commander in
Chief who issued it.
Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Supreme
Commander, the military hero, the greatest American general, the
Liberator of the Philippines, the conqueror of Japan, the gallant
soldier under whose authority the Emperor of the Japan, who is
Cabantag filed later a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that, with
the abolition of the military commission which convicted him, there
was no existing tribunal which could order the execution of the
penalty of imprisonment.
The Supreme Court denied the writ, but stated that, if the petitioner
had filed the writ before the enactment of Act No. 865, the question
presented to the Supreme Court would have been different.
Act No. 865, enacted on September 3, 1903, is enabling law,
wherein it is provided that decisions rendered by the provost courts
and military commission shall be ordered executed by the Courts of
First Instance in accordance with the procedure outlined in said Act.
It is evident from the foregoing that this Supreme Court has
accepted and confirmed the doctrine of the necessity of an
enabling act in order that our Courts of First Instance could exercise
jurisdiction to execute the decision of the abolished provost courts
and military commission.
It is evident that the doctrine is applicable, with more force, to the
judicial processes coming from governments deriving their
authority from a foreign enemy state.
THE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
It is also evident that the Congress of the United States, by
enacting the Bill of the Philippines on July 1, 1902, confirmed also
the same doctrine.
In effect, in section 9 of said Act, the Congress approved what the
Philippine Commission did as to the jurisdiction of the courts
established and transfer of cases and judicial processes, as
provided in Acts Nos. 136, 186, and 865.
The same doctrine was adopted by the United States government
as part of its international policy, as could be seen in Article XII of
the Treaty concluded with Spain on December 10, 1898, in Paris.
Even in 1866 the Congress of the United States followed the same
doctrine.
The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in the
District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana,
where a decree was rendered for the libellant. From the decree an
appeal was taken to the Circuit Court, where the case was pending,
when in 1861, the proceedings of the court were interrupted by the
civil war. Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the
courts and officers of the United States were excluded from its
limits. In 1862, however, the National authority had been partially
reestablished in the State, though still liable to the overthrown by
the vicissitudes of war. The troops of the Union occupied New
Orleans, and held military possession of the city and such other
portions of the State as had submitted to the General Government.
The nature of this occupation and possession was fully explained in
the case of The Vinice.
The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted
is, I think, that as the different areas of the Philippines were
progressively liberated, the declaration of nullity therein contained
shall attach to the laws, regulations and processes thus condemned
in so far as said areas were concerned. Mark that the proclamation
did not provide that such laws, regulations and processes shall be
or are annulled, but that they are null and void. Annulment implies
some degree of the effectiveness in the act annulled previous to
the annulment, but a declaration of nullity denotes that the act is
null and void ab initio the nullity precedes the declaration. The
proclamation speaks in the present tense, not in the future. If so,
the fact that the declaration of nullity as to the condemned laws,
regulations, and processes in areas not yet free from enemy
occupation and control upon the date of the proclamation, would
attach thereto at a later date, is no argument for giving them
validity or effectiveness in the interregnum. By the very terms of
the proclamation itself, that nullity had to date back from the
inception of such laws, regulations and processes; and to dispel any
shadow of doubt which may still remain, we need only consider the
concluding paragraph of the proclamation wherein the Commander
in Chief of the army liberation solemnly enjoined upon all loyal
citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws,
regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government.
This is all-inclusive it comprises not only the loyal citizens in the
liberated areas but also those in areas still under enemy occupation
and control. It will be noticed that the complaint in said civil case
No. 3012 was filed twenty-six days after the above-quoted
proclamations of General of the Army MacArthur. If the parties to
said case were to consider the proceedings therein up to the date
of the liberation of Manila valid and binding, they would hardly be
complying with the severe injunction to render full respect for and
obedience to our Constitution and the laws, regulations and other
acts of our duly constituted government from October 23, 1944,
onwards. Indeed, to my mind, in choosing between these two
courses of action, they would be dangerously standing on the
dividing line between loyalty and disloyalty to this country and its
government.
The proceeding in question, having been had before the liberation
of Manila, were unquestionably "processes" of the Japanesesponsored government in the Philippines within the meaning of the
aforesaid proclamation of General of the Army MacArthur and,
consequently, fall within the condemnation of the proclamation.
Being processes of a branch of a government which had been
established in the hostility to the Commonwealth Government, as
well as the United States Government, they could not very well be
The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of
occupation was in control in the Islands and their paramount
military strength gave those of our people who were within their
reach no other alternative, these had to obey their orders and
decrees, but the only reason for such obedience would be that
paramount military strength and not any intrinsic legal validity in
the enemy's orders and decrees. And once that paramount military
strength disappeared, the reason for the obedience vanished, and
obedience should likewise cease.
As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 719), "In the
face of an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may
often be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No
concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority
exercised." (Emphasis ours.) The court there refers to its own
former decision in Thorington vs. Smith, and makes it clear that the
doctrine in the Thorington case, so far as the effects of the acts of
the provisional government maintained by the British in Casetine,
from September, 1814 to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the
consideration of Tampico as United States territory, were
concerned, was limited to the period during which the British, in the
first case, retained possession of Castine, and the United States, in
the second, retained possession of Tampico. In referring to the
Confederate Government during the Civil War, as mentioned in the
Thorington case, the court again says in effect that the actual
supremacy of the Confederate Government over a portion of the
territory of the Union was the only reason for holding that its
inhabitants could not but obey its authority. But the court was
careful to limit this to the time when that actual supremacy existed,
when it said: . . . individual resistance to its authority then would
have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable." (Emphasis ours.)
Because of its pertinence, we beg leave to quote the following
paragraph from that leading decision:
There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. Smith
(supra), which conflicts with these views. In that case, the
Confederate Government is characterized as one of paramount
force, and classed among the governments of which the one
maintained by great Britain in Castine, from September 1814, to
the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the one maintained by the United
States in Tampico, during our War with Mexico, are examples.
Whilst the British retained possession of Castine, the inhabitants
were held to be subject to such laws as the British Government
chose to recognize and impose. Whilst the United States retained
possession of Tampico, it was held that it must regarded and
respected as their territory. The Confederate Government, the court
observed, differed from these temporary governments in the
time. In such a case, we admit that, not because the acts of that
government would then have intrinsically been legal and valid, but
simply because of the paramount military force to which our people
would then have continued to be subjected, they would have had to
recognize as binding and obligatory the acts of the different
departments of that government. But fortunately for the Filipinos
and for the entire civilized world, Japan was defeated. And I now
ask: Now that Japan has been defeated, why should the Filipinos be
still bound to respect or recognize validity in the acts of the
Japanese-sponsored government which has been so severely
condemned by both the heads of the United States and our
Commonwealth Government throughout the duration of the war? If
we were to draw a parallel between that government and that
which was established by the Confederate States during the
American Civil War, we will find that both met with ultimate failure.
And, in my opinion, the conclusion to be drawn should be the same
in both cases.
As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. Bruffy
(supra), referring to the Confederate Government, its failure carried
with it the dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking down in
pieces of the whole fabric of its government. The Court said among
other things:
The immense power exercised by the government of the
Confederate States for nearly four years, the territory over which it
extended, the vast resources it wielded, and the millions who
acknowledged its authority, present an imposing spectacle well
fitted to mislead the mind in considering the legal character of that
organization. It claimed to represent an independent nation and to
posses sovereign powers; as such to displace to jurisdiction and
authority of the United States from nearly half of their territory and,
instead of their laws, to substitute and enforce those of its own
enactment. Its pretentions being resisted, they were submitted to
the arbitrament of war. In that contest the Confederacy failed; and
in its failure its pretentions were dissipated, its armies scattered,
and the whole fabric of its government broken in pieces. (24 Law,
ed., 719; emphasis ours.)
By analogy, if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the
Philippines had been lawful which, however, is not the case
and if Japan had succeeded in permanently maintaining the
government that she established in the Philippines, which would
have been the case had victory been hers, there would be more
reason for holding the acts of that government valid, but because
Japan has lost the war and, therefore, failed in giving permanence
to that government, the contrary conclusion should legitimately
follow.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr.,
father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N.
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
In our predisposition to discover the original intent of a statute,
courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we
realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of
compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to
our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following
reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued
restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960;
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
He then got a Johnsons Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ
as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into
her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen
found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling
severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his
sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall
how long the defendant was in that position. (Id., pp. 8-9)
After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also
told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could
only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she
presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she
took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime,
defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After
the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell
asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at
about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time
because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to
give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about
8:00 oclock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after breakfast of
biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen
while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and
coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00
p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had
stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks
like lugaw. For the third time, Karen was raped again during the
night. During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting
his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted
wholly.
Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The
defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her
mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might
be killed; besides, all those windows and doors were closed. And
even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so
afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call a
police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the house,
defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that
Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept
with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once
in the morning for thirty minutes after breakfast of biscuits; again in
the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know
that there was a window because everything was covered by a
carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen
minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window
was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed
the window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and
carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although
defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom
and saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted
a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help
through the hole. She cried: Maawa na po kayo sa akin. Tulungan
nyo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It
was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she
was istorbo. Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to
sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no
policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)
She woke up at 6:00 oclock the following morning, and she saw
defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake
up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept
the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke.
On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times.
The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 9:00,
and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her
for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his
return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not understand
what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time,
he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went
to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five
minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her
name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she
heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They
were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the
bathroom to the room but she did not change her clothes being
afraid that should the neighbors call the police and the defendant
see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was
wearing a T-shirt of the American bacause the latter washed her
dress. (Id., p. 16)
Afterwards, defendant arrived and opened the door. He asked her if
she had asked for help because there were many policemen
outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and
she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He
instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly;
then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear
people conversing but she could not understand what they were
saying. (Id., p. 19)
When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing
downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she
could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was
opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and
the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped.
Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil
down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that
original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the
lower court? She Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known
as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a
foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 providing that Foreign currency deposits shall
be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. should be adjudged as
unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right
of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y
Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners
favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue
favor or a class privilege n violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals
like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminal
could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a
foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.)
The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it
took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim
sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ
of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the
judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the
bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment
creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond
its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment
alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB
Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the
subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426
as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board
that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign
currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it
does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to
honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 893214.
The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition
for declatory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications
and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as
one for mandamus.
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all
Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his
alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American,
trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she
was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten
times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American
tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On
the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in
the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than
P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation,
anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may
continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this
person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however
get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated
by the trial court in its decision,
Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes
that it was indoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she
had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time,
the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in
fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused
admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University,
where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because
the school authorities of the said High School learned about what
happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated
in the case.
xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to
the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts
of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless
victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being
so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an
American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor
capable of committing such heinous crime. Being only 12 years old
when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of
an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, xxx.
If Karens sad fate had happened to anybodys own kin, it would be
difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency
deposit could be more important than his childs right to said award
of damages; in this case, the victims claim for damages from this
alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country
where he is mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the
questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at
a time when the countrys economy was in a shambles; when
foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the
reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the
present times show that the country has recovered economically;
and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The
intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The
law failed to anticipate the inquitous effects producing outright
injustice and inequality such as as the case before us.
It has thus been said thatBut I also know, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep
pace with the times We might as well require a man to wear still
the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
In his comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:
"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a
national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who
takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose
which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by
the allien. More specifically, the petition raises the question
whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other
court process accorded to foreign currency deposits PD No. 1246
and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come
from a lender or investor but from a mere transient who is not
expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.
The resolution of this question is important for the protection of
nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are
merely passing through.
xxx
xxx Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of
the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of
Central Bank Circular No. 960:
Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. Foreign currency deposits
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that
privilege did not ripen into demandable right unless and until they
were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed
arbiters or referees or judges.
2. COURTS; STARE DECISIS; PARTICULAR ACTION NO PRECEDENT.
The fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long
period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right
sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion
must have often arisen.
3. ORATORICAL COMPETITION; ERROR AND WRONG,
DISTINGUISHED. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing.
"Wrong" as used in the legal principle that where there is a wrong
there is a remedy, is the deprivation or violation of a right.
4. ID.; LITERARY CONTESTS; COURTS INTERFERENCE. Generally,
the judiciary has no power to reverse - on the ground of error - the
award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
Statement of the case. The issue in the litigation is whether the
courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical competition.
In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor
was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second
honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of
the first instance of that province to reversed that award, alleging
that one of the judges had fallen to error in grading her
performance. After a hearing, and over the objection of the other
four judges of the contest, the court declared Emma Imperial
winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action challenging
the court's power to modify the board's verdict.
The facts. There is no dispute about the facts:
1. On March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest
was held in Naga City. The contestants were eight, among them
Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr.
2. There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon
B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman.
3. After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after
the judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly
announced their decision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce,
second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides
and fourth place to Luis General, Jr.
Obias ..............
Rodriguez ..........
Prado ..............
Moll ...............
10
10
17
17
8. It appearing that Nestor Nosce and Emma Imperial had tied for
the first place, the Chairman, apparently with the consent of the
board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second
honors to Imperial.
9. For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms
contained blank spaces in which, after the names of the rival
orators and their respective orations, the judge could not jot down
the grades he thought the contestants deserved according to
"Originality", "Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality",
"Pronunciation and Enunciation" and "Voice". From such data he
made up his vote.
10. It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez,
one of the Judges, gave Imperial and General the following ratings
under the above headings; Imperial 19-15-15-18-14-14 Total 94Place 4th General 19-15-15 or 14-19-14-14 Total 95-Place 3rd.
11. Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and
therefore should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3
from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten,
with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust.
do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal
principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before,
a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there
are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If
fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different
proposition. But then her action should be directed against the
individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured
her. Not against the other judges.
By the way what is here in stated must not be understood as
applying to those activities which the government has chosen to
regulate with the creation of the Games and Amusements Board in
Executive Order No. 392, Series 1950.
Judgment. In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so
declare, that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the
board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would
not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar
competitions.
Wherefore the order in controversy is hereby set aside. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and
Ladrador, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1
In the College of Law U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was
awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labradorin
1916.