2215SCRA 295

G.R.

No.

100671

TEODORICO E. MENDIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Petitioner Teodorico Mendiola
against respondents Civil Service Commission (Commission) and Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (Bureau). Petitioner seeks from this Court the annulment of the resolutions
passed by the Commission on February 1, 1989[1] and June 6, 1991,[2] respectively, and an
order for his immediate reinstatement to the service.
The following facts are undisputed.
Petitioner has been an employee of the Bureau since May 21, 1973. He started as a Covert
Agent of the Bureau and was appointed Budget Examiner III in 1978. He held that position until
April 30, 1988 although he concurrently performed the functions of Intelligence Agent and Acting
Chief, Administrative Branch of the CID.[3]
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 127 mandating the
reorganization of the Department of Finance. In accordance with the said Executive Order, the
Commissioner of the Bureau issued a memorandum dated January 19, 1988[4] to streamline
the Bureau. The said memorandum provided the priority for the separation of personnel, to wit:
CATEGORY I Personnel with administrative, criminal and/or patently undesirable personnel.
CATEGORY II Personnel above 60 yrs of age as of January 1, 1988, and NOT occupying,
sensitive or key supervisory/managerial positions, as fols (sic):
a. Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner/or Assistant Commissioner;
b. Chiefs of Offices;
c. Division Chiefs (Operations Chiefs);
d. Chiefs of Special Units: Medical, Finance, and Special Operations Group;

e. Regional Directors; and

f. Plantilla Positions which may be exempted by EIIB Commissioner.
CATEGORY III Personnel with family relations within the Second Degree of consanguinity or
affinity.
CATEGORY IV Personnel directly or indirectly in the management or control of any private
enterprise which may be affected by the functions of EIIB, and
CATEGORY V Personnel other than the above but willing to be separated to take advantage of
gratuity pursuant to Executive Order Nr. (sic) 127.
On March 30, 1988, petitioner received a notice of termination from service effective at the close
of office hours of April 30, 1988. Alleging that he was not informed of the cause of his dismissal,
petitioner appealed his case to the chairman of the Appeals Board. His appeal was denied.
Subsequently, he appealed to the Commission and averred that he was denied due process
when he was dismissed from the service. Furthermore, he claimed that he could have been
included in Category I of the January 19, 1988 memorandum. However, he contested such
inclusion because he had been commended and satisfactorily rated for his performance. On
September 21, 1988, the Commission resolved the case in petitioners favor and held thus:
The guidelines for separation of personnel established and adopted by the EIIB are not in
accordance with the guidelines prescribed under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988,
where employees can be separated from the service as a result of reorganization only for the
following reasons:
1. When there is a reduction in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern and the
employee separated is the least competent and qualified; or
2. Where there has been a change in the agency functions or orientation rendering the position
of the separated employee redundant.
Ms. Leyesa and Mr. Mendiola were not informed of the particular grounds for their separation.
Hence, they assumed that they might have been covered by Category No. 1 of the unnumbered
Memorandum of the EIIB which pertains to employees with administrative or criminal charges.
However, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, even employees with pending
administrative charges should be included in the evaluation process and should they meet the
standards for retention or placement set forth under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10, s.
1986, they should be appointed. However, they should not be placed in positions higher than
what they previously held and their administrative cases shall be pursued until decided.

On the basis of the above findings, it is apparent that appellants were not accorded due process
of law and were separated from the service not in accordance with the prescribed rules on
reorganization. The actions of the Bureau were violative of the guidelines and procedures set
forth under Presidential Memorandum dated October 2, 1987, CSC Memorandum Circular No.
10, s. 1986, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, and Republic Act No. 6656. The
appellants separation from service is, therefore, considered illegal.
In view therefore, it is hereby ordered that appellants be reappointed to their previous positions
or to positions of comparable or equitable rank without loss of seniority and that they be paid
back salaries reckoned from the dates of their termination. However, reappointment to the
service does not mean exoneration from any accusations of wrongdoing or from any
administrative charges that may be filed against them.[5]
On December 13, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the cited resolution.
The controversy started when the motion for execution was left unacted upon. This, according to
petitioner prompted him to serve on August 16, 1989 a letter prepared by his former counsel,
Atty. Nestor Bamba, to the Bureau Commissioner. That letter requested the Bureau to reinstate
him. On September 12, 1989, petitioner also filed with the Commission a letter informing the
latter of the Bureaus refusal to reinstate him and requesting for the taking of remedial action by
the Commission. These actions on the part of petitioner allegedly remained unheeded. And on
July 26, 1990, petitioner found out that the Bureau filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for
reconsideration of the September 21, 1988 resolution. On February 1, 1989, the Commission
gave due course to the motion for reconsideration thereby setting aside its September 21, 1988
resolution. On July 30, 1990, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[6] with the Commission praying
that the motion for reconsideration of the Bureau be stricken off the records and that the
February 1, 1989 resolution be set aside. On June 6, 1991, the Commission promulgated a
resolution denying the omnibus motion. We quote the relevant portion of the resolution, thus:
At the outset, the Commission is inclined to dismiss the instant motion for lack of merit. The
grounds relied upon by the movant are not any of those provided for under Section 39 of PD 807
as amended wherein a motion for reconsideration may be entertained and/or prosper.
Furthermore, the primary ground raised has already been discussed in the resolution sought to
be reconsidered. However, the legality of movants removal deserves discussion in order to
settle this particular issue once and for all.
Record shows that movant was holding a position of Intelligence Agent. As clearly stated in the
pertinent provision of LOI 71 dated September 4, 1978, all positions in the Bureau are
considered highly confidential in nature and incumbent thereof can be removed for loss of
confidence. The Supreme Court, in a number of decisions has consistently ruled that employees
holding confidential positions do not necessarily enjoy security of tenure. As such they can be

removed for loss of confidence. The removal contemplated is not in the nature of dismissal but
merely expiration of term. Hence, such removal does not constitute violation of the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure (Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171; Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13
SCRA 591). In view thereof, the removal of movant from the office is legal and in accordance
with existing civil service law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
denied. Accordingly, the Resolution dated February 1, 1989 is hereby affirmed. x x x.[7]
This resolution and that of February 1, 1989, are now the subjects of the present petition.
Petitioner raises the following allegations before this Court:
Respondent Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in acting upon EIIBs motion for reconsideration without notice to the
petitioner, thus depriving petitioner of his day in court.[8]
Respondent Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in altering and/or reconsidering its judgment which has already
become final and executory.[9]
Respondent Civil Service Commission refused to perform its ministerial duty of issuing a writ of
execution to enforce its already final and executory Resolution of September 21, 1988.[10]
Did the respondent Commission err in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration of
respondent Bureau? This is the crux of the instant petition.
Petitioner argues that respondent Commission acted without jurisdiction when it acted upon the
motion because the resolution had already become final and executory. According to him,
respondent Bureau received the resolution of September 12, 1988 on October 6, 1988 and from
said date, the Bureau had fifteen (15) days within which to move for a reconsideration. Petitioner
cites Section 39, Presidential Decree 807 and Resolution No. 88-135 of the Commission.[11]
Section 39(a), P.D. 807 states:
Sec. 39 Appeals. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected
by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for
reconsideration is reasonably filed, which petition shall be filed within fifteen days. x x x.
While Resolution No. 88-135[12] of the Commission contains the following provisions:
Section 9. PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION. Any party adversely affected or not
satisfied with the decision of the Commission may file a petition for reconsideration within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the decision. Only one (1) petition for reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 10. FINALITY OF DECISION. The decision of the Commission shall be final and
executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy thereof by the parties, if no petition for
reconsideration thereof is seasonably filed. The Commission may, for exceptional and valid
grounds, stay its execution.
Sec. 11. EFFECTIVITY This Resolution shall take effect immediately.
Quezon City, April 8, 1988.
In refuting petitioners claim, respondent Bureau alleges that it had thirty (30) days from the date
of receipt of the resolution of the Commission within which to file its Motion for Reconsideration.
It cites as authorities Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution and Section 12(11), Chapter III,
Title I, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code.[13]
Sec. 7. x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The cited provision of the Revised Administrative Code (1987) states:
Sec. 12 x x x
xxxxxx
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders,
or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall
be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
x x x x x x.
Respondent Bureau also claims that it received a copy of the resolution of September 21, 1988
on October 21, 1988, not on October 6, 1988 as alleged by petitioner. And, according to
respondent Bureau, granting that it actually received the resolution on October 6, 1988, it still
timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration on October 27, 1988 because the thirty (30)-day
period allowed by law has not yet lapsed. Respondent Bureau then concludes that having timely
filed its Motion, the resolution of the Commission ordering reinstatement did not become final
and executory. Therefore, petitioner cannot compel the Commission by a petition for mandamus
to execute the decision and reinstate him to the service.

After a consideration of the legal provisions invoked by the parties to buttress their respective
claims, this Court agrees with petitioner that an aggrieved party only has a period of fifteen (15),
not thirty (30) days, within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution.
Resolution No. 88-135 of the Commission is clear in providing that a party not satisfied with the
decision of the Commission may file a petition for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the decision. The provisions of this resolution are the applicable rules because they
have been especially adopted to govern appeals to the Commission of cases arising from
reorganization. Thus, Section 1 of Resolution 88-135 provides:
Section 1. OBJECTIVES These rules are promulgated to effect a speedy, fair, and just
resolution of appeals relative to the reorganization of the different Departments or Agencies as
authorized under their respective Executive Orders.
Furthermore, the whereas clauses of the resolution state:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Unnumbered Memorandum Circular dated October 2, 1987, the
President directed each Department or Agency which had undergone reorganization to
constitute a Reorganization. Appeals Board (RAB) at the Central Office on or before October 21,
1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints relative to reorganization;
WHEREAS, the foregoing Memorandum Circular dated October 2, 1987 provides for the remedy
of appeal from decisions of the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB) of each Department or
Agency to the Civil Service Commission;
It has been established in this case that petitioner was dismissed from service pursuant to the
Executive Order No. 127 which ordered the reorganization of the Department of Finance. He
contested such separation until his case reached the Commission which ruled favorably for him
on September 21, 1988. And the Bureau, according to Resolution 88-135 should have filed its
motion for reconsideration fifteen days after its receipt of a copy of the September 21, 1988
resolution.
Respondent Bureau cannot rely on the constitutional nor the Revised Administrative Codes
provisions because they refer to filing of petitions for certiorari of decisions of the constitutional
commission concerned to the Supreme Court. The provisions are clear and leave no room for
interpretation. Nowhere in the cited provisions can it be seen that the same can be applied to
filing a Motion for Reconsideration before an administrative office which rendered the assailed
decision.
It is wrong, however, for petitioner to cite Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree 807. This
provision falls under Article IX thereof entitled Discipline. Section 39 refers to appeals of

disciplinary administrative cases to the Commission. The present case did not originate from a
disciplinary administrative proceeding.
Since only fifteen (15) days are allowed an aggrieved party to file a motion for reconsideration,
respondent Bureau should have filed its motion within fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the
questioned resolution or on or before October 21, 1988, if the prescriptive period is based on
October 6, 1988. And the filing by respondent Bureau of the motion for reconsideration on
October 27, 1988 is indubitably too late. But there is an allegation that respondent Bureau
received its copy of the resolution on October 21, 1988. This claim, however, is unsupported by
evidence. On the other hand, petitioner supported his allegation that respondent Bureau
received its copy on October 6, 1988 by a transmittal document[14] of the Commission which
was signed by a Bureau agent.[15] Between the two conflicting claims, we accept the latter
since it has been adequately backed by evidence. Consequently, We hold that the fifteen-day
period for filing a motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from October 6, 1988. And the
failure of respondent Bureau to request for reconsideration of the September 21, 1988 resolution
of the Commission within the allowed period made the resolution final and executory by
operation of law. And this Court has ruled that (t)he Civil Service Commission has no power or
authority to reconsider its decision which has become final and executory[16] even if the
Commission later discovers that its decision is erroneous. The doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice x x x.[17] Thus,
We have ruled in Young vs. Court of Appeals[18] that:
x x x Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power and
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it. This
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final
at some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts to amend final judgments will result in endless
litigation.
This doctrine applies equally to quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, in Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs.
NLRC,[19] We also said:
A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by
the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. Likewise, an executory and final decision cannot
be lawfully altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same, especially where the
alteration or modification is material or substantial. In such a situation, the trial court loses
jurisdiction over the case except for execution of the final judgment. Any amendment or
alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.

Since the September 21, 1988 resolution has already become final and executory after October
21, 1988, the Commission could no longer alter the resolution, much less entertain a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution and reverse the same. The only power left with the
Commission as far as the resolution is concerned is to execute it. The rule is well-settled that the
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof is
the courts ministerial duty compellable by mandamus.[20]
With respect to petitioners contention that he was denied due process when the Commission
heard the Bureaus motion for reconsideration without notice to him, We agree with respondent
Bureaus argument that the defect was cured by the filing by petitioner of his Omnibus Motion on
July 30, 1990. Thus, in Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission,[21] We said that the lack of
notice to petitioner regarding the pending appeal and the hearing of said appeal was cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
dated February 1, 1989 and June 6, 1990 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. This Court
orders respondents Civil Service Commission and Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau to reinstate petitioner Teodorico E. Mendiola to his former position or to an equivalent
position if the former is no longer available without loss of seniority rights and privileges granted
by
law.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Quiason, JJ., concur
[1] Annex B of Petition; Rollo, pp. 19-21.
[2] Annex C of Petition; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[3] Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
[4] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[5] Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[6] Annex K of Petition; Rollo, pp. 45-54.
[7] Supra, note 2.
[8] Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 9.

[9] Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.

[10] Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 13.
[11] Reply, p. 9; Rollo, p. 103.
[12] Annex C, Reply; Rollo, p. 117.
[13] Rejoinder, p. 8; Rollo, p. 147.
[14] Annex D, Reply; Rollo, p. 120.
[15] Reply, p. 10; Rollo, p. 110.
[16] Marcayda vs. Civil Service Commission, 198 SCRA 447 (1991).
[17] Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814 (1991).
[18] 204 SCRA 584, 599 (1991) citing Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 180
SCRA 353, (1989); Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 94 (1989); Commercial Credit Corporation of Cagayan de Oro vs. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA 1 (1989); United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 (1987);
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 (1987); Villanueva vs. CFI of
Oriental Mindoro, 119 SCRA 288 (1982).
[19] Supra, note, 17 at p. 822 citing Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Liwanag Paras Briones, et al.,
165 SCRA 464 (1988).
[20] Maceda, Jr. vs. Moreman Builder Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 (1991).
[21] 194 SCRA 278 (1991).
[22] T. H. Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308 (1990).

190S673
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997]

C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA,

Secretary of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources, HON. ANTONIO
T. CARPIO, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification of
the order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the
President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued
to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of
Aurora and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province.[1]
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984 [2] to President Marcos, Filipinas Loggers
Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president and general manager, requested a
timber concession over the same area covered by petitioners TLA No. 106, alleging that the
same had been cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive banning all forms of logging in the

area. The request was granted in a note dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who
wrote, as was his wont, on the margin of the letter of FLDC: Approved.[3]
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as it was then
called, issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date September 30, 1994, to FLDC, covering the
area subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began logging operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA
No. 360 for FLDCs gross violation of the terms and conditions thereof, especially the
reforestation and selective logging activities and in consonance with the national policy on forest
conservation.[4] On July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license
of FLDC on the ground that in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said
concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations.[5]
Learning of the cancellation of FLDCs TLA, petitioner, through its officer-in-charge, wrote
Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986, requesting revalidation of its TLA No. 106.
[6]
As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another
letter dated February 13, 1987,[7] alleging that because of the log ban imposed by the previous
administration it had to stop its logging operations, but that when the ban was lifted on
September 21, 1984, its concession area was awarded to FLDC as a result of [FLDCs]
covetous maneuvers and unlawful machinations. (Petitioner was later to say that those behind
FLDC, among them being the former Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were very
influential because of their very strong connections with the previous Marcos regime.)
[8]
Petitioner prayed that it be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988,[9] Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared
petitioners TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect and consequently denied the petition for
its restoration, even as he denied FLDCs motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA
No. 360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioners petition was barred by reason of laches,
because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC until February 13,
1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost two years. On the other hand,
FLDCs motion for reconsideration was denied, since the findings on which the cancellation
order had been based, notably gross violation of the terms and conditions of its license, such as
reforestation and selective logging activities appear to be firmly grounded.
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the President. Petitioner denied
that it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had sent a letter to the then Minister of Natural
Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24, 1984 protesting the grant of a TLA to
FLDC over the area covered by its (petitioners) TLA and, for this reason, requesting nullification
of FLDCs TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991, [10] the Office of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENRs order of May 2, 1988. Like the DENR it found
petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984 not
having been duly proven. The decision of the Office of the President stated:[11]
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had requested the DENR to issue
a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of CMTCs aforesaid Annex A to enable it to resolve
this case judiciously and expeditiously. Said letter-request pertinently reads:
x x x C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its Supplemental Petition For Review, dated June 1,
1988, a xerox copy of (Annex A) of its letter to the Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario,
dated September 24, 1984, prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting against the

award of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation and requesting that it be
annulled and voided.
Considering that the aforementioned Annex A constitutes a vital defense to C & M Timber
Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by this Office of the instant appeal, may we
request your good office for a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of said document (Annex A) to
enable us to resolve the case judiciously and expeditiously.
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo D. San Juan, in a letter of
July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:
x

x
x

Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex A, no such document could
be found or is on file in this Office.
This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as to the authenticity/veracity
of the document.
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the DENR on (a) the duplicate
original copy of Annex A; (b) a xerox copy of Page 164, entry No. 2233, of the MNRs logbook
tending to show that the original copy of Annex A was received by the MNR; and (c) a xerox copy of
Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD indicating that the original copy of Annex A was received by BFD
from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this Office the updated comment
of Director of Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in a 2nd endorsement of October 25, 1990, which
pertinently reads as follows:
Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the letter dated September 24,
1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was just directed by then Minister Rodolfo del Rosario
to act on the purported letter of Atty. Quisumbing and as directed, we prepared a memorandum to the
President which was duly complied with as shown by the entries in the logbook. Annex A, which is the
main document of the letter-appeal of C & M Timber Corporation is presumed appended to the records
when it was acted upon by the BFD (now FMB) and forwarded to the Secretary (then
Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a position to certify as to the authenticity of Annex A.
Clearly therefore, CMTCs reliance on its Annex A is misplaced, the authenticity thereof not having
been duly proven or established. Significantly, we note that in all the pleadings filed by CMTC in the
office a quo, and during the hearing conducted, nothing is mentioned therein about its letter of September
24, 1984 (Annex A). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither averred in the pleadings nor raised
during the trial below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (City of Manila vs. Ebay, 1 SCRA
1086, 1089); that issues of fact not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Santos v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 592, 595); and that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position
inconsistent with what they sustained below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENRs order of July 31, 1986,
cancelling FLDCs TLA No. 360, after finding the same to be fully substantiated.

Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated January 25, 1993, [12] the
Office of the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. It held that even assuming that CMTC did file regularly
its letter-protest of September 24, 1984 with MNR on September 25, 1984, CMTC failed to
protect its rights for more than two (2) years until it opposed reinstatement of FLDCs TLA on
February 13, 1987. Within that two (2) year period, FLDC logged the area without any
opposition from CMTC. In the same order, the Office of the President, however, directed the
reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the Presidents office reconsidered its action after
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993,
expressed concern that reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360 might negate efforts to enhance
the conservation and protection of our forest resources. In a new order dated February 26,
1993,[13] the Office of the President reinstated its March 21, 1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated March 21, 1991 and for
its license to be revived/restored. Petitioners motion was, however, denied by the Office of
the President on June 7, 1993[14] in a resolution signed by Assistant Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona. The Presidents office ruled:
The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated therein, on a new policy
consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the Presidents
handwritten instruction. Accordingly, this Order shall be taken not only as an affirmation of the
March 21, 1991 decision, but also as a FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters incident
thereto, like CMTCs motion for reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed to it because it did
not incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there was delay, the delay did not work to the
prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC, because the cancellation of the FLDCs TLA was
attributable only to its own actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had been suspended
by reason of mediocre performance in reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural
Resources Teodoro O. Pea. It says that it did not receive any order to this
effect. Finally, petitioner claims that the denial of its petition, because of a new policy
consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the Presidents
handwritten instruction, as stated in the resolution of June 7, 1993 of the Office of the
President, would deny it the due process of law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log
ban in the country; that Congress has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any
notice to this effect must be stated in good form, not implied; and that in any case, any new
policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect petitioners vested
rights in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioners TLA No.
106 as no longer of any force and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No. 106s
date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs
mediocre performance in reforestation and petitioners laches in failing to protest the
subsequent award of the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was
really an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA because of mediocre
performance in reforestation, just as there is a dispute whether there indeed was a letter written
on September 24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting the award of the concession covered
by its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did not sleep on its rights.

The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of the Solicitor General
was given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the order but on May 7, 1997 the OSG
manifested that the order in question could not be found in the records of this case in which the
order might be.[15] Earlier, petitioner requested a copy of the order but the DENR, through
Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe, said that based from our records there is no
file copy of said alleged order.[16]
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by Atty. Norberto J.
Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in question to FLDC cannot be found in the
records of the DENR either. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that
Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged [letter], no such document could be found
or is on file in this Office. [17] In a later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the DENR,
claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the Records and Documents Section of the Ministry of
Natural Resources and that on September 25, 1984 she received the letter of Atty. Quisumbing
and placed on all copies thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy in the
possession of petitioner was a faithful copy of the letter in question.[18]
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is indeed a reflection on
the sorry state of record keeping in an important office of the executive department. Yet these
two documents are vital to the presentation of the evidence of both parties in this
case. Fortunately, there are extant certain records from which it is possible to determine
whether these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA No. 106 for
mediocre performance in reforestation, the Court will presume that there is such an order in
accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions inasmuch
as such order is cited both in the order dated May 2, 1988 of the DENR, declaring as of no force
and effect TLA No. 106, and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of the President
affirming the order of the DENR. It is improbable that so responsible officials as the Secretary of
the DENR and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24, 1984, there are
circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the aforesaid certification of Ofelia Castro
Biron that she was the person who received the letter for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry
of Natural Resources contains entries indicating that the letter was received by the Bureau of
Forest Development from the MNR.[19] DENR Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan likewise
informed the Office of the President that the Bureau of Forest Management prepared a
memorandum on the aforesaid letter of September 24, 1984,[20] thereby implying that there was
such a letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find that after suspending
petitioners TLA for mediocre performance in reforestation under this order, the DENR
cancelled the TLA, this time because of a Presidential directive imposing a log ban. The
records of G.R. No. 76538, entitled Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,
the decision in which is reported in 190 SCRA 673 (1990), contain a copy of the memorandum
of then Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development to the Regional
Director of Region 2, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the
instruction of the President and the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then Minister
Teodoro Q. Pea, the log ban previously declared included the concessions of the companies
enumerated in Cortes memorandum, in consequence of which the concessions in question
were deemed cancelled. The memorandum of Director Cortes stated:
MEMORANDUM ORDER

TO

The Regional Director

Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan

FROM

The Director

DATE

24 August 1983

SUBJECT

REMARKS

Stopping of all logging operations

in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino

Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister Teodoro Q. Pea dated 18
August 1983, and in connection with my previous radio message, please be informed that the coverage of
the logging banin Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya provinces include the following concessions which are
deemed cancelled as of the date of the previous notice:
-

Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.

- Industries Dev. Corp.
- Luzon Loggers, Inc.
- C & M Timber Corporation
- Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation
- Dominion Forest Resources Corp.
- FCA Timber Development Corp.
- Kasibu Logging Corp.
- RCC Timber Company
- Benjamin Cuaresma
You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop logging operations by all
licensees above mentioned and submit a report on the pullout of equipment and inventory of logs within
five days upon receipt hereof.
ACTION
DESIRED

For your immediate implementation.

EDMUNDO V. CORTES

(Emphasis added)
It thus appears that petitioners license had been cancelled way back in 1983, a year before
its concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy that petitioner admits that at the time of
the award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no longer operating its concession because of a log
ban although it claims that the suspension of operations was only temporary. As a result of the
log ban, the TLA of petitioner, along with those of other loggers in the region, were cancelled
and petitioner and others were ordered to stop operations. Petitioner also admits that it
received a telegram sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD, directing it to stop
all logging operations to conserve our remaining forests.[21] It is then not true, as Atty.
Quisumbing stated in protesting the award of the concession to FLDC, that the logging ban did
not cancel [petitioners] timber license agreement.

Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA. Consequently, even if
consideration is given to the fact that a year later, on September 24, 1984, its counsel protested
the grant of the concession to another party (FLDC), this failure of petitioner to contest first the
suspension of its license on June 3, 1983 and later its cancellation on August 24, 1983 must be
deemed fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural Resources, which it
reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines, petitioner took no legal steps to protect
its interest. After receiving no favorable response to its two letters, petitioner could have
brought the necessary action in court for the restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it
waited until FLDCs concession was cancelled in 1986 by asking for the revalidation of its
(petitioners) on TLA No. 106.
Petitioners excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest because its
president, Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President Marcos that the area in question had
been awarded to the Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go
against the wishes of the former President.[22] This is a poor excuse for petitioners
inaction. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,[23] a similar excuse
was given that Ysmael & Cos license had been cancelled and its concession awarded to
entities controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this reason,
after the EDSA Revolution, Ysmael & Co. sought in 1986 the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement and the revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential cronies. As its request
was denied by the Office of the President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court. On the basis of the facts stated, this Court denied the petition: (1) because the August
25, 1983 order of the Bureau of Forest Development, cancelling petitioners timber license
agreement had become final and executory. Although petitioner sent a letter dated September
19, 1983 to President Marcos seeking reconsideration of the 1983 order of cancellation of the
BFD, the grounds stated there were different from those later relied upon by petitioner for
seeking its reinstatement; (2) because the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial
recourse to have the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its license and granting another
one covering the same concession to respondent] reviewed by the court through a petition
for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. Such special civil action of certiorari should have been
filed within a reasonable time. And since none was filed within such period, petitioners action
was barred by laches; and (3) because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their
consequent cancellation in the process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of
timber lands is a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence
showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive
Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any policy consideration on forest conservation and
protection justifying the decision of the executive department not to reinstate petitioners license
must be formally enunciated and cannot merely be implied from the Presidents instruction to his
subordinates and that, at all events, the new policy cannot be applied to existing licenses such
as petitioners.
The Presidents order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal Adviser (insofar
as it reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns expressed by the then
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources that said reinstatement [of FLDCs license]
may negate our efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources. There
was really no new policy but, as noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a
policy of conservation and protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, 16 of the Constitution

which commands the State to protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. There is therefore no merit
in petitioners contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioners contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an impairment of
the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.
Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary:[24]
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR, which
were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy considerations which effectively
forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and
conserve the countrys natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber
license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global
concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a
balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in
this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled
exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing
public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(33) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

MECANO vs.COA Leave a comment

MECANO vs.COA

G.R. No. 103982

December 11, 1992
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of
which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which
he is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his
expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the
RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of
duty. When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby
to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on
full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion
also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some
act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding
petitioners illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination
of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners
claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to
Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was

not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,

however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro
to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699
of the RAC
HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioners claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific
law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of
whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the
new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example
of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.

Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of
the earlier one.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on
the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
NOTES:
1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated
in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed.
The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which
states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new
Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative
Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an
earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act,

since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar
the recovery of benefits under the Employees Compensation Program, the same
cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that the payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699
of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.

Garces v CA
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio
Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed
by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But
she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from
assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department,
with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling
booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte
which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile,
since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en
banccancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as
the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be
cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same
was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the
case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only
on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court
becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo
warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred under
the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this
Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled
rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving
elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational
set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective,
official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power
to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
*Petition denied

Citation: GSIS vs. Civil Service CommissionG.R. No. 96938202 SCRA

799October 15, 1991
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review the order of the Civil Service
Commission(CSC) dated June 20, 1990 which directed the Government Service
Insurance System(GSIS) to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and
Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date
of their demise. TheOrder dated November 22, 1990, however, denied herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration of CSCs Order dated June 20, 1990.
Deceased Elizar Namuco andEusebio Manuel were illegally dismissed by the GSIS
for allegedly being involved inirregularities in the canvass of supplies and
materials.Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the power to
execute its judgments, final orders or resolutions?Whether or not the writ of
execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because itvaries with the Courts
Resolution of July 4, 1988?Ruling: The Civil Service Commission has the power to
execute its judgment, finalorders or resolutions. The CSC is a constitutional
commission invested by theConstitution and relevant laws not only with the
authority to administer the civil service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers.
It has the authority to hear and decideadministrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it or brought to it on appeal. Thegrant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power or the authority to hear and adjudgecases, normally and
logically is deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders unless the law otherwise provides. It is quiteobvious that
the authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by theauthority
to see that what has been decided is carried out.The writ of execution issued on
June 20, 1990 is valid. The Court upholds thesame, simply because there is no fair
and feasible alternative in the circumstances. The binding force of Resolution of July
4, 1988, for all intents and purposes, is that it makesexoneration in the
administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of said back salaries,
it can not however exact an impossible performance or decree a uselessexercise
such as that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings is an empty, and inutile
procedure as to the deceased employees, they can not possibly be bound by
anysubstantiation in the said proceedings of the abovementioned charges.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129132. July 8, 1998]
ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:*
This is a sequel to our decision[1] of 5 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, entitled Isabelita
Vital-Gozon v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., which held that the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction, in a special civil action for mandamus against a public officer (docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 and entitled Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente v. Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, et
al.), to take cognizance of the claim for damages against respondent public officer.
Specifically, the instant petition seeks to reverse the Resolution of 7 May 1997 [2] of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 awarding to petitioner below, now
private respondent, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees after hearing the
evidence thereon sometime after this Courts decision in G.R. No. 101428 became final.
The factual antecedents then, as found by us in G.R. No. 101428, must be restated, thus:
In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on
January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino -- reorganization of the various
offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers
of personnel effected.

At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics
of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on
December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a
position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of the
same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health
that he would be re-appointed Medical Specialist II. Considering this to be a
demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente
filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he
brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case
No. 4. In the meantime the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of
Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D.
Merencilla, Jr.
Dr. de la Fuentes case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution
dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following
conclusion and disposition, to wit:
xxx (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela
Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialist II as null and void:
hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National Children's Hospital
was not abolished and the positions therein remained intact although the title
or the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to 'Chief of Medical
Professional Staff' with substantially the same functions and responsibilities,
the Commission hereby orders that:
1.

Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never having

relinquished his position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical
Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and

2.

He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing

allowances and such other benefits withheld from him from the date of his
illegal demotion/transfer.

No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal
therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed
therefor by the Constitution. Consequently, the resolution became final, on September
21, 1988.
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center
Chief of the National Childrens Hospital, demanding implementation of the
Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred de la Fuentes claims to the
Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice
and/or action xxx (She did this allegedly because, according to the Solicitor General,

she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory,
whether such Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the DOH
Legal Department would officially assail the mentioned Resolution. But she did not
answer Dr. de la Fuentes letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the
Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await legal guidance from the DOH Legal
Department. On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to
reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance,
with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In fact, de la
Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had actually threatened to stop paying xxx (his) salary
and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved' appointment even as
Medical Specialist II x x x.
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her
behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be
obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances
otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the
Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however
told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission
had no coercive powers -- unlike a court -- to enforce its final decisions/resolutions.
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of
mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction to compel Vital-Gozon, and the
Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final
and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission. He prayed for the following
specific reliefs:

xxx

(1)

(That) xxx a temporary restraining order be issued immediately, ordering the

principal and other respondents to revert the funds of the NCH corresponding to
the amounts necessary to implement the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case
No. 4 in favor of herein petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay
such sums which have accrued and due and payable as of the date of said order;

(2)

After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the restraining order be
converted to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued ordering principal respondent and the other
respondents to implement in full the said final resolution; and

(3)

That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be rendered
seeking (sic) permanent writs issued and that principal respondent be ordered
and commanded to comply with and implement the said final resolution without
further delay; and, furthermore, that the principal respondent be ordered to pay to
the petitioner the sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary
restraining order as prayed for, and required the respondents to show cause why it
should not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record shows that the
respondents prayed for and were granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their
answer through counsel, who, as the Court of Appeals was later to point out, did not
bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him through the individual
respondents xxx (However, no) answer was filed; neither was there any show cause
[sic] against a writ of preliminary injunction. It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who
appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf.
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a
Supplemental/Amended Petition dated February 2, 1989. The second petition
described as one for quo warranto aside from mandamus, added three respondents
including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia that he (de la Fuente) had
clear title to the position in question [by] virtue of the final and executory judgment of
the Civil Service Commission; that even after the Commission's judgment had become
final and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed Dr.
Merencilla, Jr. as OIC Professional Service to further usurp, intrude into and
unlawfully hold and exercise the public office/position of petitioner (under a duly
approved permanent appointment as Chief of Clinics since 1978). De la Fuente thus
prayed, additionally, for judgment:
(a)
Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not
legally entitled to the office of Chief of Clinics (now retitled/known as Chief of
Medical Professional Staff, NCH), ousting him therefrom and ordering said
respondent to immediately cease and desist from further performing as OIC
Professional Service any and all duties and responsibilities of the said office;
(and)
(b)
Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is the
lawful or de jure Chief of Clinics (now known as Chief of the Medical
Professional Staff and placing him in the possession of said office/position,
without the need of reappointment or new appointment as held by the Civil
Service Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.
xxx."
Copy of the Supplemental/Amended Petition was sent to Atty. Jose A. Favia,
Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children's
Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated or
mentioned in his motion for Extension of Time).
Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none was filed.
The petitions were consequently resolved on the basis of their allegations and the

annexes. The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. It held that
-The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position as Chief of
Clinics by the expedient of having him appointed to another, lower position is
no longer an issue. It ceased to be such when the resolution in CSC Case
No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicit in its mandate; petitioner
was declared the lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical
Professional Staff) of the National Childrens Hospital, and by this token,
respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the
office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or
choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was ill-advised
of principal respondent, and violative of the rule of law, that the resolution has
not been obeyed or implemented.
and accordingly ordered
xxx respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, xxx to forthwith
comply with, obey and implement the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and)
xxx Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, xx to
immediately cease and desist from further performing and acting as OIC
Professional Service.
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages -- founded essentially on the refusal of Gozon,
et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, which
thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different forum -- was denied by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the
Court the forum for xxx (said) claim of damages.
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate Tribunal's
Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged
receipt of his own copy on June 15, 1989. Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr.
Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the decision.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion filed
through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. He insisted that the Appellate Court had
competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a
claim for damages might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the
Appellate Court before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals
had authority to issue such writs only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the situation
was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts -- the Supreme
Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferred concurrent
original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power to
conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to

separately litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead to that multiplicity
of suits which is abhorred by the law.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to enforce the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 -- directing his reinstatement
pursuant to the Civil Service Commissions Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He
filed on July 4, 1989 a Motion for Execution, alleging that the judgment of June 9,
1989 had become final and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. -- served with notice
thereof on June 16, 1989 -- to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to the
Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
July 7, 1989, reading as follows:
The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory, as prayed
for, let the writ of execution issue forthwith.
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, on the invoked authority
of Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the judgment of June
9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor Generals Office points out, the second paragraph to
the effect that the petitions are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim
of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied.
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989 judgment was
not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an Urgent Ex
Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt, complaining that
although Gozon and her co-parties had been served with the writ of execution on July
14, they had not complied therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court
required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer the
charge and show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt for disobeying
and/or resisting the judgment.
At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied by
their individual private lawyers -- one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla
(Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in their
behalf, from the Health Department, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he was there in
behalf of Jose A. Fabia. They explained that they had no intention to defy the Court,
they had simply referred the matter to their superiors in good faith; and they were
perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking to do so even in the
afternoon of that same day. The Court consequently ordered them "to comply with
their undertaking xxx without any further delay, and report the action taken towards
this end, within five (5) days.
On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as Medical Center Chief, sent a letter to Associate
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated
August 3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to assume the position of Chief of the

Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment of his allowances had
been prepared and was being processed.
More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the Court of
Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion for
reconsideration of June 29, 1989. It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a)
deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b) consequently
describing and treating it as a PARTIAL DECISION, and (c) scheduling further
proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (of damages), since said question
cannot be resolved by mere reference to the pleadings. This was done in reliance on
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la Fuente, which reads as
follows:
SEC. 3. Mandamus. -- When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and topay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the defendant.
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his appearance
for Isabelita Gozon. At his instance, the Court gave him an opportunity to xxx file a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. That motion he
filed by registered mail on November 10, 1989. His basic contentions were (a) that the
decision of June 9, 1989 could no longer be altered, having become final and
executory and having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129, the Appellate
Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action.
The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf at this
juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it only on November 14, 1989. It,
too, sought reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filed on
November 16, 1989 an Omnibus Motion: I. For Reconsideration of Resolution dated
September 27, 1989; and II. To defer hearing on petitioner's claims for damages.
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 11,
1991. In that Resolution, the Court
1)
declared that the amended decision had already become final and
could no longer be re-opened because, although a copy of the amendatory
resolution was received by counsel who was representing Gozon on October

3, 1989, the first motion for reconsideration was not mailed until November
10, 1989 and the Solicitor Generals Omnibus Motion was not filed until
November 16, 1989; and
2)
prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon in
connection with xx (de la Fuentes) claim for damages, on the authority of this
Courts ruling promulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R. No. 87977 (Urbano, et
al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig).
Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor Generals
Office on January 18, 1991. Again the Solicitor General sought reconsideration, by
motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January 30, 1991. Again it was rebuffed.
In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991, served on the Solicitor Generals Office
on August 20, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the question
of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon xxx
(had already) been extensively discussed, and that its jurisdiction xxx to hear and
determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129 as
amended.
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of Appeals -- and obtain
the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuentes claim for
damages - the Solicitor Generals Office has instituted the special civil action
of certiorari at bar. It contends that the Court of Appeals is not legally competent to
take cognizance of and decide the question of damages in a mandamus suit. xxx[3]
On 5 May 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution [4] which noted that our decision in
G.R. No. 101428 had become final and left the option to reopen the case to de la Fuente.
In its resolution of 26 October 1995, [5] the Court of Appeals, inter alia, set the hearing for
reception of evidence on the matter of damages on 7 December 1995.
After de la Fuente presented his evidence, the Court of Appeals set reception of VitalGozons evidence on 16 and 17 January 1996.[6]
At the scheduled hearing on 16 January 1996, Conrado M. Dela Fuente sought to block the
presentation of Vital-Gozons evidence on the ground that the former had not filed an answer,
which the latter refuted. The hearing was then reset to other dates for the parties to prove their
respective claims. Vital-Gozon submitted, on 18 January 1996, copies of a Manifestation and
Motion dated 10 September 1992 to which was attached an Answer likewise dated 10
September 1992. It was claimed in the Manifestation that the answer to the claim for damages
could not have been filed earlier as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over de la Fuentes
claim for damages had been questioned before the Supreme Court. Vital-Gozon likewise
claimed that copies of the Manifestation and Motion were received by the Court of Appeals on
18 September 1992 at 3:40 p.m. and sent by registered mail to counsel for dela Fuente. [7] The
filing of the Manifestation and Motion with the Court of Appeals was confirmed by Remigio M.

Escalada, Jr., Division Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in an undated
Report.[8] He further disclosed that the pleading was transmitted to the Archives Section on 19
September 1992.
The Court of Appeals then ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda, [9] after
which, the Court of Appeals promulgated, on 20 March 1997, a resolution denying petitioners
motion to admit her Answer to the petition and supplemental/amended petition
for mandamus with damages, on the ground that the period to file the answer had long
prescribed, thus:
It was too late that the answer was filed in this Court on September 18, 1992, after
promulgation on August 5, 1992, of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
101428. The prescribed period to file such answer as well as the extended period had
long expired on January 24, 1989 (pp. 35, 37, 55, Rollo) by the time respondents
answer was filed in this Court on September 18, 1992. She had another opportunity to
answer when petitioner filed a supplemental/amended petition. (pp. 57,
72, Rollo). Still, she filed none. It is evident respondent just ignored the case filed
against her or gave no importance to the petitions and the notices sent to her by this
Court. The delay in filing her answer is inexcusable.
After promulgation and upon finality of this Courts decision granting the principal relief
sought by the petitioner, the instant case for mandamus was virtually disposed of with
theexception of the incidental damages that petitioner has claimed. It was
uncontested in view of respondents failure to answer the petition setting up her
defenses. Consequently, the allegations in the petition and supplemental petition were
deemed admitted; unpleaded defenses were deemed waived and any counterclaim
not set up, barred (Sections 1, 2 and 4, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court). Such
procedural rules would become meaningless unless strictly complied with by
litigants. As clearly indicated in the proposed answer, respondents purpose is to set
up a counterclaim already barred and to plead defenses already waived.
Besides, the parties as well as this Court are bound by the comprehensive findings
and conclusions of the Supreme Court in its final decision in G.R. No. 101428, based
on the uncontroverted allegations of the verified petitions. So are they bound thereby
in this proceeding which deals with the lone issue of incidental damages claimed by
petitioner. What remains to be done by this Court is but the determination of whether
respondents wrongful act or refusal/failure to perform an official duty caused injury to
the claimant and the amount of the damages that may be awarded in his favor.[10]
Respondent court then set the hearing of the case on 22-23 April 1997 for the presentation of
[Vital-Gozons] evidence to controvert or rebut that of [de la Fuente] which he has adduced in
support of his claim for damages.
In its resolution[11] of 21 April 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion to
reconsider[12] the 20 March 1997 resolution.

Petitioner then opted not to present her evidence, as she intended to file a petition with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the 20 March 1997 resolution and 21 April 1997 order
of the Court of Appeals.[13]
On 7 May 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution [14] finding petitioner liable
for damages and ordered her to pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral
damages,P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. In support
thereof, respondent court quoted our finding in G.R. No. 101428,[15] to wit:
The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts and events:
1)

the proceeding commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission in

protest against his demotion;

2)

the Commissions Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the

direction therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries and
other monetary benefits otherwise due him, this being couched in fairly simple
language obviously understandable to persons of ordinary or normal intelligence;

3)

no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of the
CSCs aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;

4)

the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the
CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988;

5)

the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer, notice
thereof having been sent directly to her and her co-respondents since the
attorney who sought the extension in their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his
address in his motion for extension;

6)

the supplemental/amended petition subsequently presented by de la Fuente,

copy of which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and

7)

the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3, 1989.

To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health concerned, was a
regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the Health officials concerned
accorded said acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was being
done to contest or negate de la Fuentes petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time
went by, de la Fuentes efforts were being met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the final and
executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not disturb that
Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its
becoming final and executory.

The Court of Appeals then considered the evidence for private respondent and the
applicable law, thus:
Upon respondents continued refusal without justifiable cause to implement the final
resolution of the Civil Service Commission upholding petitioners right to the position
he has been claiming with back salaries, transportation, representation and housing
allowances and other benefits withheld from him, petitioner is entitled to the damages
he claims. Testifying in his own behalf petitioner declared that he was greatly
disturbed, shocked and frustrated during the three months preceding the filing of his
petition; that he had sleepless nights and suffered from mental anxiety, mental
anguish, worry, tension and humiliation when respondent ignored and disregarded the
final resolution of the Civil Service Commission; that he felt harassed by her refusal
because he had to go to court to obtain relief and had to incur additional expenses for
litigation which he could hardly afford; and that he had to spend no less than P5,000
for court fees and incidental expenses and to pay his counsel P10,000 at the end of
the litigation (pp. 6, 7, 12, 13, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1995). All these respondent has not
successfully rebutted by her evidence since she adduced none in her behalf.
Petitioner, therefore, is entitled to recover moral damages from respondent for her
refusal and neglect without just cause to perform her official duty to reinstate petitioner
to the position he was entitled, as ordered by the Civil Service Commission in its
decision. While he was reinstated to his position, petitioner had to seek the aid of the
courts for that purpose. In point is the case of San Luis vs. Court of Appeals, decided
by the Supreme Court on June 26, 1989 (174 SCRA 258, 276), which involves the
unlawful suspension and dismissal by a Provincial Governor of a quarry superintendent
and the Governors obstinate refusal to comply with the final decisions of the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President which declared said suspension
and dismissal unlawful or without just cause. The Supreme Court held that the
Governor (who was sued both in his official and private capacities) was personally
liable for the damages claimed and awarded in favor of the offended party P50,000 as
moral damages and P20,000 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Tan Kapoe
vs. Masa, decided January 21, 1985 (134 SCRA 231), is also pertinent. There the
Supreme Court upheld the award of moral damages although it was made on the
basis of documentary evidence x x x without supporting oral testimonies. And the
award of exemplary damages, in addition to moral damages, was also deemed proper
even if not expressly pleaded in the complaint nor proved. Such award of exemplary
damages is by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral
damages (Article 2229, Civil Code). Inasmuch as petitioner is entitled to exemplary
damages, he should be awarded attorneys fees. The award in favor of petitioner of
moral and exemplary damages are attorneys fees in the amounts of P50,000, P20,000
and P10,000, respectively, is but fair and just and not excessive.[16]

Unsatisfied, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. She prays that we reverse and set aside the challenged Resolution
on the following grounds:
1. There is absolutely no ground for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees.
2. Petitioners right to due process was violated.
Anent the first ground, petitioner asserts there is no factual basis for the award of moral
damages for, concretely, private respondent was unable to show any causal connection
between his supposed injury and petitioners alleged actionable wrong. Petitioner argues that
while testifying, private respondent simply made generalized statements that he had sleepless
nights and suffered mental anxiety, mental anguish, worry, tension and humiliation. Petitioner
next reiterates her stand that she had nothing to do with the Civil Service case relative to
respondents original position, as she was not yet connected with the NCH when said case was
filed. Moreover, the failure to immediately reinstate private respondent was caused by the
directive of the Legal Department of the Department of Health, to which office she forwarded the
decision of the Civil Service Commission for guidance, pursuant to standard
procedure. Petitioner, therefore, acted in good faith. She likewise faults the Court of Appeals
for considering our observations in G.R. No. 101428 as factual findings which bound respondent
court.
As to exemplary damages, petitioner asserts that she did not act with vindictiveness nor
wantonness, hence the award of said damages was unwarranted, [17] as such, there could
likewise be no basis for the award of attorneys fees.[18]
Anent the second ground, petitioner contends that she was sued in her official capacity,
hence could not be held liable for damages, and to hold otherwise would violate her right to due
process as a private individual, citing Cario v. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration[19] and Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office.[20]
Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due process by refusing to
admit her answer, considering that: (a) she personally attended each and every hearing of
themandamus case; (b) in its decision of 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared
that it was not the proper forum for the claim for damages, at which point then the necessity of
an answer had become moot; (c) it was only on 27 September 1989 that the Court of Appeals
reconsidered its decision of 9 June 1989 thereby upholding its jurisdiction to hear the claims for
damages; (d) but then, consistent with her stand that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction
over the claims for damages, she assailed such ruling before this Court, hence she could not
have been expected to file an answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of the adverse decision of
this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she immediately filed her answer with a
corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) while her motion for admission of the answer
had been pending since 18 October 1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was
already her turn to present her evidence on the claim for damages.

In his comment on the petition submitted in compliance with the Resolution of 21 July 1997,
private respondent contends that: (a) petitioners incomplete and slanted version of the facts of
the case cannot be relied upon; (b) the factual findings of this Court in G.R. No. 101428 are
conclusive and binding, hence the Court of Appeals did not err nor abuse its discretion in relying
on said findings; (c) petitioners invocation of state immunity is untenable as she was sued not in
her official capacity, and assuming otherwise, petitioner could nevertheless be held liable for
damages under Articles 20, 27 and 2176 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court; (d) the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioners motion to admit her answer;
and (e) the Court of Appeals awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees were
proper, fair, reasonable, justified and in accord with the law and precedent.
Two principal issues thus confront us, viz: (a) whether petitioner was denied due process
when her answer to the petition was not admitted; and (b) whether the awards of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees were proper. These will be resolved in seriatim.
I
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner was not denied due process. The record of CAG.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution of 29 December 1998, the Court of Appeals
gave due course to private respondents petition and required herein petitioner and the other
respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from notice of the resolution. [21] On 9 January
1988, petitioner and the other respondents, represented by Atty. Jose Fabia, filed a motion for
an extension of 15 days from said date within which to file their answer, which respondent court
granted in its resolution of 17 January 1989. [22] Likewise, on 17 January 1989, private
respondent, as petitioner below, was granted leave to file a supplemental/amended petition.[23]
The Supplemental/Amended Petition was filed on 3 February 1989,[24] and in the resolution
of 9 February 1989,[25] the Court of Appeals required petitioner herein and her co-respondents in
CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 to file their answer thereto within 10 days from notice. However, no
such answer was filed, and on 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. [26] De la
Fuente seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, [27] principally as regards the holding that
the petitions are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages. A copy of
this motion was furnished counsel for respondents. Respondents therein were then required, in
the resolution of 5 July 1989,[28] to comment within 10 days from notice. However, respondents
below once more failed to comply. Thus, on 27 September 1989, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a resolution[29] granting the motion for reconsideration by deleting therefrom the
challenged portion of its decision of 9 June 1989. Respondent court then set reception of
evidence on the claims for damages on 9 and 11 of October 1989.
Respondents below, represented by new counsel, Atty. Pedro Martinez, and the rest by the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed motions to reconsider the resolution of 27 September 1989,
primarily on the ground that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claim for damages
in the petition for mandamus. The incidental issue of the authority of the Solicitor General to

appear for herein petitioner in respect of the claim for damages against her in her personal
capacity was also raised. These matters became the subject of various pleadings.
Eventually, on 11 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution [30] which
gave rise to G.R. No. 101428, after the Court of Appeals denied herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners failure to file the answer to the petition was due to her fault or
negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court of Appeals, required to file answers to
both the original petition and the Supplemental/Amended Petition; yet, she failed to heed both
resolutions. As regards the resolution to answer the Supplemental/Amended Petition, herein
petitioner totally disregarded the same. And if only to further evince that herein petitioner had
no one to blame but herself for her plight, as regards the resolution to answer the original
petition, this she spurned despite the fact that she asked for and was granted an extension of 15
days within which to do so. That she questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the
claims for damages is entirely irrelevant, considering that she did so only after the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Resolution of 27 September 1989. Up to that time, petitioner had
absolutely no responsive pleading setting forth her defense.
It may likewise be stressed that under Section 2.c.(4) of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals then in force, after the expiration of the period for filing the answer or the reply
in special civil actions, a case is deemed submitted for resolution. Thus, after the expiration of
the 10-day period granted to herein petitioner to file her Answer to the Supplemental/Amended
Petition, and in light of her failure to file her answer to the original petition despite the grant of
her motion for extension of time to file it, then the case was automatically deemed submitted for
decision. After the decision was rendered, she could then no longer be heard to raise a defense
which, by her inaction, she indubitably expressed no desire to raise.
It cannot then be successfully maintained that the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, when it denied admission to an answer that was
filed only after this Courts decision in G.R. No. 101428 had long become final and immutable.
What further militates against petitioners advocacy is that the Court of Appeals, aside from
affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard through the filing of pleadings, likewise sustained
petitioners right to due process at the hearing. What petitioner neglects to mention is that
respondent court did not deprive her the right to cross-examine private respondent when the
latter testified as to the matter of damages. Through the exercise of the right, petitioner could
have negated private respondents claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis
therefor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals explicitly allowed petitioner to present her evidence
against the claim for damages. However, petitioner again failed to take the opportunity to have
herself heard.
It may be pointed out that in her Answer,[31] she interposed the following defenses against
the claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, namely: (1) the claim was
effectively and exclusively a suit against the State, but without its consent; (2) she had not

committed any actionable wrong as she acted in good faith and without malice or negligence;
and (3) whatever injury private respondent may have suffered were mere consequences of his
indiscretion, negligence and/or ignorance of the law which, at best, constituted damnum absque
injuria. From the nature of these defenses, they could very well have been taken up, even
indirectly, on cross-examination of private respondent or in the course of petitioners testimony
had she chosen to present her evidence. All told, the above discussion should readily refute
petitioners claim of a denial of due process.
II
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. They may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.[32] The instances when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, acts and
actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,[33] which, in
turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations of the Preliminary Title of the Civil
Code. Relevant to the instant case, which involves public officers, is Article 27, [34] which
provides:
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative
action that may be taken.
Article 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section 1 of Article XI (Accountability of Public
Officers) of the Constitution,[35] which provides:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil
Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the
moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result of petitioners wrongful
act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. In
fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability of public officials and employees to suits for damages
to answer for any form or degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, this Court has
had occasion to rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a public official may be
made to pay damages for performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of
the abuse of right doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning
Human Relations.[36]
Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[37]

Attorneys fees and other expenses of litigation may be recovered as actual or

compensatory damages when, inter alia, exemplary damages are awarded; when the defendant
acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
demandable claim, and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.[38]
There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to his position
as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the Civil Service
Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Childrens Hospital, then had the duty
to see to it that the decision be obeyed and implemented. This she failed to do and private
respondents two official demands for compliance with the Civil Service Commissions decision
were merely referred by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as
further noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, she did not answer [private
respondents] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for
Legal Affairs]. She chose simply to await legal guidance from the DOH Legal
Department. This Court further noted:
To all these, [petitioners] reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health
concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the Health
Department officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never
bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate [private respondents] petitions
and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, [private respondents] efforts were being met
with success.
That petitioner then committed an actionable wrong for unjustifiably refusing or neglecting
to perform an official duty is undeniable. Private respondent testified on the moral damages
which he suffered by reason of such misfeasance or malfeasance of petitioner, and the
attorneys fees and litigation expenses he incurred to vindicate his rights and protect his
interests. The Court of Appeals which heard him gave full faith and credit to his
testimony. Private respondent declared that by reason of the unjust action or refusal of
petitioner when she did not recognize, ignored and disregarded the final and executory Civil
Service Resolution, he:
[W]as actually greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during those three ...
months. [He] had sleepless nights and ... suffered from mental anxiety, worry, tension
and humiliation...[39]
Private respondents anguish even continued during the 5-month period while the case was
pending with the Court of Appeals, thus:
During this period my sleepless nights and my moral sufferings continued. As a matter of fact,
even worsened. I just could not understand, actually I could not understand the action here of
Dr. Gozon for having not followed the decision of the Court of Appeals. And that is why I felt
very much aggrieved during this period. I could not sleep at all and this has weakened me.[40]

Private respondent further testified that he spent not less than P5,000.00 for court fees and as
incidental expenses and had committed himself to pay P10,000.00 to his counsel at the end of
the case.[41]
While private respondent did not quantify the extent of his moral damages, the Court of
Appeals fixed the same at P50,000.00. Since moral damages are, in the language of Article
2217 of the Civil Code, incapable of pecuniary estimation, courts have the discretion to fix the
corresponding amount, not being bound by any self-serving assessment by the claimants. On
the other hand, a claimants failure to state the monetary value of moral damages suffered
presents no legal obstacle to a courts determination thereof, as long as there is factual basis for
the award such as the claimants testimony as to his sufferings. As a matter of fact, it is not
unusual for claimants to leave the determination of the amount of the award to the discretion of
the court.
Under Article 2233 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In the instant case, the
Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00. Considering that
a public official is the culprit here, the propriety of such an award cannot be questioned. It serve
as an example or deterrent so that other public officials be always reminded that they are public
servants bound to adhere faithfully to the constitutional injunction that a public office is a public
trust. That the aggrieved party happened to be another public official will not serve to mitigate
the effects of petitioners having failed to observe the required degree of accountability and
responsibility.
As to attorneys fees as actual damages, the Court of Appeals determination of its propriety
in this case and the extent thereof were well within its discretion. The agreement between
private respondent and his counsel as to the amount does not control.
Petitioners contention that she cannot be liable for damages since she was sued in her
official capacity is without merit. Whether petitioner was impleaded as respondent in an official
capacity, i.e., solely in her capacity as Chief of the National Childrens Hospital, is best
determined from the Petition as well as the Supplemental/Amended Petition. For one, in the
captions in both, she is named as one of the respondents without any express mention that she
was so sued in her capacity, as Chief of the National Childrens Hospital. For another, the
allegations in the body of the Petition clearly show that she was sued in both her official and
private capacities. As to the former, paragraphs 1 and 7 respectively allege petitioners position
as a public official, and specifically as Head of the Childrens Hospital; her duty to restore
private respondent to his position by virtue of the final decision of the Civil Service Commission;
and her refusal to allow private respondent to perform and discharge his duties and
responsibilities as Chief of Clinics. As to the latter, paragraph 16 of the Petition explicitly speaks
of petitioners personal liability, thus:
16. For causing such mental suffering and anguish, etc.,[42] principal respondent [herein
petitioner] ought to and must be, in accordance with the Civil Code, held personally answerable

and liable to the petitioner in the sum of not less than P100,000.00 as moral damages, and
another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, by way of example or correction for the
public good.[43] (emphasis supplied)
In maintaining then that she was sued merely in her official capacity, petitioner has either
overlooked paragraph 16 or sought to deliberately mislead this Court.
WHEREFORE, for utter failure to show that respondent Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in the challenged resolutions, the instant petition is denied.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

[G.R.

No.

L-10759.

May

20,

1957.]

LEONARDO MONTES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD

OF
APPEALS
and
THE
SECRETARY
OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents-Appellees.
Gonzalo

U.

Garcia

PUBLIC

WORKS

AND

for Appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio

for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS; DECISION OF, REVIEWABLE BY THE
PRESIDENT; JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENTS DECISION DOES NOT MAKE
EXECUTIVE SUBORDINATE TO COURTS. When a presidential act is challenged
before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is
being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under
judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because the
law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret,
apply or implement the law. A judicial review of the Presidents decision on a case
of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in
this light and the bringing of the case to the courts should be governed by the same
principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative acts of all
administrative
officers.
2. ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF; EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
FIRST BEFORE RESOLVING TO COURTS. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that where an administrative remedy is provided
by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will
act. If, as in this case, the President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in
our administrative system as head of the executive department may be able to
grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure
demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In
Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the
performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the
bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of Civil
Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil
Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of

contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that
he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice
to
reinstatement
at
the
discretion
of
the
appointing
officer.
Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the
decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the
ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he
instituted the action. The case is now before us on appeal against the order of
dismissal.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No.
598,
which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and
decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in such
cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the President of the
Philippines."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It is urged on the appeal that there is no duty imposed on a party against whom a
decision has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the
President, and that the tendency of courts has been not to subject the decision of
the President to judicial review. It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor
General may be appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of Appeals
need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be had to the
courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should
be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action would be
derogatory
to
the
high
office
of
the
President.
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to
recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executive, the legislative
and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a
presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied
therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts.
The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is
inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and
the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review
of the Presidents decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service
Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the
courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of
all
administrative
acts
of
all
administrative
officers.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought
by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) The
doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a
remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted
to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative

agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary
and
premature
resort
to
the
courts.
(Ibid.)
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 above-quoted is a clear expression of the
policy or principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President, under
whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system as head of the
executive department, may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues,
reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before
recourse can be had to the courts. We have applied this same rule in De la Paz v.
Alcaraz, Et Al., 99 Phil., 130, 52 Off. Gaz., 3037, Miguel, Et. Al. v. Reyes, Et Al., 93
Phil., 542, and especially in Ang Tuan Kai & Co. v. The Import Control Commission,
91 Phil., 143, and we are loathe to deviate from the rule we have consistently
followed, especially in view of the express provision of the law (section 2,
Commonwealth
Act
No.
598).
The

judgment

appealed

from

is

affirmed,

with

costs

against Appellant.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13744

November 29, 1918

JOSE LINO LUNA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, respondent-appellant;
SERVANDO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.
Ramon
Diokno
and
Sumulong & Estrada for respondent.

JOHNSON, J.:

Agapito

Ygnacio

for

petitioner.

It appears from the record that an election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was
held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and
Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes
cast in the various municipalities were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said
municipalities to the provincial board of canvassers, who, after a canvass of said returns,
proclaimed the following result:
(a) That Eulogio Rodriguez received 4,321 votes; (b) Jose Lino Luna 4,157; (c) Servando de los
Angeles 3,576 votes; and (d) that Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes,
was duly elected governor of said province.
Against said proclamation Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the Court of First Instance.
Upon said protest issue was joined, hearing was had and a decision was rendered which was,
on appeal, set aside and a new trial ordered. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, 37
Phil. Rep., 186.) Complying with said order, a new trial was had at which the Honorable William
E. McMahon, judge, presided. Additional evidence was adduced. After a consideration of all of
the facts and the evidence adduced at both trials, Judge McMahon reached the conclusion that
the ballots cast for the various candidates were as indicated in the returns of the inspectors of
the various municipalities except those in the municipality of Taytay and Binangonan. In the
municipality of Taytay, Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50 ballots cast for Eulogio
Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and ordered that number of votes deducted
from his total. In the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon found that the inspectors did
not close the polls at 6 o'clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time,
and directed that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced by the number of such
votes, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. By
deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock p.m. in the
municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a
plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the provincial board of canvassers
to correct its canvass accordingly. From that conclusion both parties to the contest appealed to
this court and made several assignments of error.
Considering all of said assignments of error, we find that they present, in fact, but three
questions:
(1) What is the effect of holding the polls open after the hour fixed for closing the election?
(2) What is the effect of assistance rendered by the inspectors of the election to incapacitated
persons, without first requiring of such persons an oath to the effect that they are incapacitated
to prepare their own ballots?
(3) What is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper voting booths?
With reference to the first question, the law provides that "at all the elections held under the
provisions of this Act the polls shall be open from seven o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in
the afternoon, during which period not more than one member of the board of inspectors shall

be absent at one time, and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at one time." (Sec. 21 of Act
No. 1582; sec. 11 of Act No. 2045; sec. 543 of Act No. 2657, and sec. 445 of Act No. 2711.) Are
the provisions with reference to the time of opening and closing the polls mandatory? It is
admitted in the present case that the polls were not closed at 6 p.m. The record shows that at 6
p.m. a large number of voters had not yet been able to vote and that, for that reason, an
agreement was made between some of the candidates for office who were present and the
board of inspectors, to the effect that the polls should be kept open in order that such electors
might vote. No objection whatever to that agreement was made by any person at that time.
One of the reasons why all of the voters of the municipality had not voted before 6 p.m. was that
the board of inspectors failed to have the list of voters properly prepared at 7 a.m., and therefore
but few of the voters were able to vote before eleven or eleven-thirty in the morning. That
failure, on the part of the board of inspectors, made it impossible for many of the voters of the
municipality of Binangonan to vote before the regular time for the closing of the polls.
Shall the ballot of an innocent voter, who is prevented, through no fault of his, from casting the
same before 6 p.m. be annulled for the simple reason that the polls were kept open, after the
hour designated by the law, for the purpose of giving such voter an opportunity to vote?
Experience and observation has taught legislatures and courts that, at the time of a hotly
contested election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and unscrupulous politicians will lead them
beyond the limits of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation,
despoil the purity of the ballot and defeat the will of the people at the polls. Such experience has
led the legislatures to adopt very stringent rules for the purpose of protecting the voter in the
manner of preparing and casting his ballot to guard the purity of elections. (Paulino vs. Cailles,
37 Phil. Rep., 825.)
The infinite ingenuity of violent partisan spirit in evading the rules and regulation of elections and
the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has made necessary the establishment of elaborate
and rigid rules and regulations for the conduct of elections. The very elaborateness of these
rules has resulted in their frequent violation and the reports of the courts are replete with cases
in which the result of an election has been attacked on the ground that some provision of the
law has not been complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of the election laws have a
purpose and should therefore be observed. (Detroit vs. Rush, 82 Mich., 532; 10 L. R. A., 171; 9
R. C. L., 1091; Patton vs. Watkins, 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. State Rep., 43, 72.)
It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of
elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the
election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to
be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.
(Patton vs. Watkins, 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. State Rep., 43, 72; Jones vs. State, 153 Ind., 440.)
In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil. Rep., 521), we held that when the Election Law
does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has
been due to an honest mistake or misrepresentation of the Election Law, and such departure

has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices and it is clear that there has been a free
and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held to be directory and such
departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. However, the irregularities may be so
numerous as not to be attributed to ignorance or honest mistake, but to a design to defeat the
will of the voters or to such careless disregard of the law as to amount not only to laches but to
fraudulent intent. In such cases, the election officers should be punished, the election should be
declared null and a new election held.
It has been held, therefore, very generally, that the provisions of a statute as to the manner of
conducting the details of an election are not mandatory, but directory merely, and irregularities,
in conducting an election and counting the votes, not proceeding from any wrongful intent and
which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will not vitiate an election or justify the rejection of the
entire votes of a precinct. (Behrensmeyer vs. Kreitz, 135 Ill., 591; Hankey vs. Bowman, 82
Minn., 328; Sprague vs. Norway, 31 Cal., 173; Webre vs. Wilton, 29 La. Ann., 610.)
The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their
government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question
of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered
and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the
ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should
not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on
the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would
make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty
itself. (Loomis vs.Jackson, 6 W. Va., 613.)
The errors and irregularities which warrant the rejection of ballots and the annulment of an
election and thus deprive lawful voters of their legal right to vote, should be such as to fully
justify that result. (The People vs. Cook, 8 N. Y., 67; 59 Am. Dec., 451.) It has been held that
even great irregularities on the part of election officers will not of necessity vitiate an election,
where no fraud is committed or attempted, or no illegal vote was polled was no legal voter was
deprived of his vote. (Morris vs. Vanlaningham, 11 Kan., 269.)
No complaint is made that any fraud was committed nor that any person voted who had no right
to vote, by reason of the fact that the polls were kept open after the hour fixed by the law. It is
admitted that the polls were kept open after the hour, by the consent of all parties concerned, for
the reasons and purposes above indicated. In view of such facts, should the vote of the
innocent voter be annulled and he thereby deprived of his participation in the affairs of the
government when he was guilty of no illegal act? If the inspectors may, for one reason or
another, prevent the opening of the polls or delay the commencement of the voting until 11
o'clock in the morning and then close the polls in the evening so as to prevent all those who
desire to vote from voting, without incurring criminal liability for a violation of the election laws,
the same motives will induce them to delay the opening of the polls until later and thus prevent
any to vote except those whom they desire.

The polls should be opened and closed in strict accord with the provisions of the law. Voters
who do not appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be
permitted to vote after the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter
is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the
failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither
such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes
were cast after the regular hour. (People vs. Prewett, 124 Cal., 7; Packwood vs. Brownell, 121
Cal., 478; Pickett vs.Russell, 42 Fla., 116.)
The decisions in the various States of the United States are not uniform upon the effect of a
failure to open and close polls at the time specified by the law. In some States such a provision
has been held to be mandatory, in others directory. The decisions seem to be based upon the
language of the particular statutes discussed.
We are not inclined to the belief that the legislature intended that a failure to comply with the law
in this jurisdiction should render the entire election void, nor nullify the votes cast after the
period mentioned in the law, unless the polls were kept open after the hour for the purpose of
permitting some fraud to be committed, or for the purpose of permitting some person to vote
who had not appeared during the regular voting hours.
The section of the law which we are discussing provides that 'not more than one member of the
board of inspectors shall be absent at one time and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at
one time." Suppose that the evidence showed that two of the inspectors were absent at one
time and for a period longer than twenty minutes, would the courts be justified in holding that the
entire election was void, in the absence of fraud, for the reason? There is little justification for
holding that one provision of said section is mandatory and the other directory.
Our conclusion upon the first question, in view of the foregoing, is that in the present case there
seems to be no justification, under the facts, there being no fraud committed, for annulling the
votes of innocent voters who were permitted by the election inspectors to cast their votes in a
legal manner after the regular hour for closing the polls. In this conclusion, however, we do not
desire to be understood to have decided that in no case should the courts not annul and set
aside an election, where fraud is clearly proved, for a violation of the section under discussion.
When the polls are kept open after the hour prescribed by the law for the purpose of defeating
the will of the people, such a violation of the law should result in annulling and setting aside the
election of that precinct. No such facts exist in the present case. It is true, perhaps, that a
number of the votes cast after the hour for closing the polls were sufficient to change the result
of the election, but the result would have been the same had those same voters been permitted
to vote, except for the negligence of the inspectors, during the regular hours for voting. There
seems to be no more reason for annulling the votes cast, after the hour for closing the election,
than for annulling the election for the reason that the inspectors failed to provide the means for
voting at the time fixed for opening the polls in the morning.

We are firmly of the opinion that instead of depriving the innocent voters of their right to
participate in the affairs of their government for irregularities committed by the election
inspectors, the latter should be proceeded against in a criminal action for failure, on their part, to
comply with the law and be punished in accordance with section 29 of Act No. 1592; section
2632 of Act No. 2657 and section 2639 of Act No. 2711.
The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law are adopted to assist the voters in
their participation in the affairs of the government, and not to defeat that object. When the voters
have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because
the officers appointed, under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of elections,
have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They
should be prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should
be protected and upheld.lawphi1.net
It may be noted in this relation that, under the law, the polls are kept open from 7 a.m. until 6
p.m. or, for a period of eleven hours only. In the municipality of Binangonan the record shows
that there were 375 analfabetos (illiterate persons) and 164 other voters. The law requires
an analfabeto to take an oath and that the oath shall be filed. Naturally the inspectors require
some time in (a) ascertaining whether or not the voter is in fact an analfabeto; (b) in
administering, preparing, signing and filing the oath. Suppose one minute only is allowed for that
work. Then two inspectors must accompany such a voter to the booth, there assist him in
preparing his ballot and then return to their position occupied by them as inspectors. We do not
think that work could be accomplished in less than another minute and it would more than likely
occupy nearer two minutes. But admitting that it could be accomplished in one minute, we have,
at least, two minutes occupied by two inspectors for each analfabeto. There being
375 analfabetos, it would require 750 minutes to vote, or 12 hours. If the inspectors had
strictly complied with the law, not all of the analfabetos of said municipality could have voted in
the eleven hours provided by the law, not to say anything of the time necessarily occupied with
the 164 other voters of the municipality who would, at least, occupy one minute each of the time
of the inspectors, or nearly 2 1/2 hours more. With reference to this particular question of the
time necessary for each analfabeto to vote, some of the judges have estimated that it would
take, at least, five minutes of the time of the inspectors for each analfabeto.
(Hontiveros vs. Mobo, R. G. No. 13959, p. 230, post.)
From the foregoing, it was practically an impossibility for all of the voters of said municipality to
have voted in the eleven hours prescribed by the law even though the polls had been opened
promptly at 7 a.m. instead of at nearly 11 a.m. The above time is computed upon the theory that
no time whatever is lost, that the voters arrive one immediately after another and that no time is
lost waiting for the arrival of the voters.
With reference to the second question above presented, the law provides that:
A voter otherwise qualified who declares that he can not write, or that from blindness or
other physical disability he is unable to prepare his ballot, may make an oath to the

effect that he is so disabled and the nature of his disability and that he desires the
inspectors to assist him in the preparation of such ballot. The board shall keep a record
of all such oaths taken and file the same with the municipal secretary with the other
records of the board after the election. Two of the inspectors, each of whom shall belong
to a different political party, shall ascertain the wishes of the voter, and one of them shall
prepare the ballot of the voter in proper form according to his wishes, in the presence of
the other inspector, and out of view of any other person. The information this obtained
shall be regarded as a privileged communication. (Section 12, Act No. 2045; section
550, Act No. 2657; section 453, Act No. 2711.)
Said quoted section provides the method by which a person who cannot prepare his ballot may
be assisted. The conditions are:
(a) That he must make an oath to the effect that he is disabled and the nature of his
disability together with the fact that he desires the inspectors to assist him in the
preparation of his ballot;
(b) That a record of said oath shall be filed with the municipal secretary with the other
records of the board of inspectors after the election; and
(c) When said oath is taken, then two of the inspectors, each of whom shall belong to
different political party, may assist him in the preparation of his ballot.
In view of said conditions, what shall be the effect of a failure to comply therewith? Suppose, for
example, that the voter is incapacitated; that the board of inspectors are fully aware of that fact;
that they failed to require of him the oath; that they failed to keep on file the oath taken, or that
one inspector only assisted said voter in the preparation of his ballot, or that two assisted him
which belonged to the same party, shall the ballot of such an incapacitated person be rejected?
Shall all of the votes of the precinct be nullified because of the failure of the inspectors to
comply strictly with the letter of the law?
We held in the case of Paulino vs. Cailles (R. G. No. 12753, 37 Phil. Rep., 825) that the ballots
of incapacitated persons who voted without taking the oath or were assisted by one inspector
alone, or by two belonging to the same party, should not be counted if such ballots could be
identified. We further held that, in the absence of fraud, all of the ballots of the precinct should
not be invalidated by the mere fact that the inspectors did not comply with their duty. Innocent
voters should not be deprived of their participation in an election for a violation of the law for
which they were in no way responsible and which they could not prevent.lawphil.net
The incapacitated persons mentioned in said section above noted are usually persons who are
unable to acquaint themselves with the provisions of the law. They are, therefore, absolutely
dependent upon the advice and counsel of others. Generally, they have no idea whatever as to
the form and requirements in casting their ballots. Their ignorance, however, does not relieve
them from their responsibility under the law, nor from the effect of their failure to comply
therewith. (Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. Rep., 609; Gardiner vs. De Leon, R. G. No. 12382

decided March 15, 1917, not published; Paulino vs. Cailles, R. G. No. 12763, 37 Phil. Rep.,
825.)
The law intended that those votes only who are incapacitated in some way should be assisted.
To insure a compliance with the law an oath of incapacity is required. To prove that only such
persons have received assistance, the election board is required to keep a record of such oath.
To guarantee that such voters should not be imposed upon, the law wisely provided that two
inspectors of different political faith should assist them. Upon the other hand, if the inspectors
have failed or declined to perform a duty or obligation imposed upon them by the Election Law,
they may be punished.
The record shows that in many of the municipalities of the Province of Rizal, during the election
in question, a great many incapacitated persons voted without taking the oath required and
were assisted by one inspector only in the preparation of their ballots. But, in view of the fact
that such ballots have not been identified they cannot be rejected. The voter cannot be
punished. The remedy is by a criminal action against the inspectors for a failure to comply with
the law. (Section 29, Act No. 1582; section 2632, Act No. 2657; section 2639, Act No. 2711.)
Said section (2632) provides, among other things, that any member of a board of registration, or
board of inspectors, or board of canvassers who willfully declines or fails to perform any duty or
obligation imposed by the Election Law, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than P200 nor more than P500 or both.
With reference to the third question above indicated, relating to what is the effect of a failure on
the part of the authorities to provide proper voting booths, it may be said that we have held in
the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil. Rep., 521) that the requirements of the Election Law
providing for the location of polling stations and the construction of booths and guard rails for
the latter may be departed from in some particulars and yet preserve, in substantial form, the
secrecy which the law requires. But the failure to provide doors and guard rails for the booths
and the placing of the writing shelf so that it faces the side instead of the rear of the booths are,
combined, a fatal disregard of the law, inasmuch as such an arrangement does not offer, even
in substantial form, the secrecy and seclusion which, according to the purpose and spirit of the
Election Law, is its most mandatory requirement.
Section 9 of Act No. 1582, as amended by section 512 of Act No. 2657 and section 415 of Act
2711, provides that there shall be in each polling place, during each election, a sufficient
number of voting booths, not less than one for every fifty voters, in the election precinct. Said
section further provides how such voting booths, not less than one every fifty voters, in the
election precinct. Said section further provides how such voting booths shall be constructed.
The purpose of said provisions is to furnish each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in
secrecy. Suppose the board of inspectors does not prepare the voting booth in exactly the form
prescribed by law, what shall be the effect? Support, the example, that they construct a booth
less than one meter square as is provided by the law but yet sufficiently large to enable the
voter to enter and to prepare his ballot in secrecy; or suppose that the door swinging outward to

the booth shall extend to the floor instead of within fifty centimeters of the floor; or suppose that
the shelf upon which the voter shall prepare his ballot shall be less than thirty centimeters wide,
shall the entire election be declared null and void for such failures when it is admitted and
proved, beyond question, that even with such defects in the fulfillment of the requirements of the
election law they were in fact constructed in a manner which provided the voter a complete
opportunity to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy? While there is no provision in the law,
relating to the construction of booths, they shall be constructed in such manner as to afford the
voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in secret, that must be the primary and ultimate object
of having the booths constructed in the manner indicated.
When we held that the law requiring the preparation of the booths in a particular manner was
mandatory, we did not mean to hold that unless they were prepared in exact conformity with the
law, that the election would be nullified. We simply held that if they were not constructed in a
manner which afforded the voters an opportunity to prepare their ballots in secret, the election
would be declared null and void on that account. If, however, upon the other hand, the booths
were so constructed, even though not in strict accord with the provisions of the law, as to afford
each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in secret, the election should not be declared null
and void. Secrecy is the object of the booth. An opportunity to prepare his ballot in private is the
purpose of the provision. When the booth affords that protection, the purpose of the law is
fulfilled. To hold otherwise to establish a different rule would make the manner of
performing a public duty more important than the performance of the duty itself.
In the present case, while there is some conflict in the evidence, and while the proof clearly
shows that the booths were not constructed in strict accordance with the provisions of the law,
we are of the opinion that a large preponderance of the evidence shows that the booths were
constructed (defectively perhaps) in a manner which afforded each voter an opportunity to
prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy. That being true, we find no reason for changing or
modifying the conclusion of the lower court.
The defendant-appellant alleges, and attempts to establish the fact, that in the municipality of
San Felipe Nery many irregularities were committed which should invalidate the election. For
example, he alleges the different columns of the polling list were not properly filled. Even
granting that fact, the voter was in no way responsible. The voter not being responsible, his
ballot should not be nullified on that account. Filling the different columns of the polling list is a
duty imposed upon the election officers. If they fail to perform their duty they are responsible;
and as we have frequently said, the ballots of innocent voters should not be nullified for a failure
on the part of election officers to perform their duty in accordance with the provisions of the law.
The remedy is a criminal action against the inspectors if they have violated the law and not to
nullify the votes of innocent voters.
The defendant-appellant further alleges that in the municipality of San Felipe Nery, a number of
voters voted who were not residents of said municipality. That question was presented to the
court below, and upon a full consideration he refused to nullify the election in said municipality
upon the grounds alleged. While it is true that the proof shows that some grave irregularities

were committed by the board of inspectors, we are not persuaded that the evidence is sufficient
to justify this court in nullifying the entire vote of said municipality. In view of that conclusion, we
deem it unnecessary to discuss the other allegations of the defendant-appellant with reference
to the striking out of certain allegations in his answer.
The lower court, after hearing the evidence and after examining the ballots cast in the
municipality of Taytay, found that 50 ballots which had been counted for the defendant-appellant
should not be counted for him and ordered that the total vote of the defendant-appellant should
be reduced by that number. The defendant-appellant in fact admits that the said 50 votes should
be deducted from his total vote. In view of that admission of the defendant-appellant, we deem it
unnecessary to discuss the reasons therefor.
Upon the various errors assigned, our conclusions are:
(1) That the total votes cast in the municipality of Binangonan should be counted for the
respective candidates; that for the special reason given, the board of inspectors was
justified in keeping the polls open after the hour for closing. But this conclusion must not
be interpreted to mean that under other circumstances and other conditions, where the
polls are kept open after the hour for fraudulent purposes, that such act on the part of
the inspectors might not nullify the entire election (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. Rep.,
521);
(2) That while it is irregular for the board of inspectors to permit incapacitated voters to
vote without taking the oath and for one inspector only to assist such voters, yet the
ballots of the innocent voters should not be nullified on that account; that the ballots of
such persons only should be annulled when identified;
(3) That inasmuch as the voting booths in the municipality of Antipolo were prepared in a
manner and form which permitted the voter to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy, the
vote of that municipality should not be nullified; and
(4) That the judgment of the lower court reducing the total vote of the defendantappellant by fifty identified fraudulent ballots counted for him, in the municipality of
Taytay, should be affirmed.
As a result of the count of the ballots, cast in the various municipalities by the provincial board of
inspectors, Eulogio Rodriguez received 4,321 votes, Jose Lino Luna received 4,157 votes and
Servando de los Angeles received 3,576 votes. Servando de los Angeles did not protest the
election. From all of the foregoing, the total votes of Eulogio Rodriguez must be reduced by 50
votes, leaving him a total of 4,271 only, or a clear majority of 114 votes.
Therefore, with the modification herein indicated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed as
modified, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the record be immediately returned to the
lower court with direction that a judgment be entered directing and ordering the provincial board
of inspectors to amend its count accordingly.

It is so ordered, without any finding as to costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.