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PROPERTY CASES

MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q.


HERMANO AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 160914
March 25, 2015
FACTS: Respondents Antonio Hermano and his wife Remedios
Hermano were the registered and lawful owners of a house and lot in
Tagaytay City.
On September 1, 2001, petitioner Marcela M. Dela Cruz occupied
and possessed the questioned property pursuant to the alleged
Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario
Enciso Benitez, without the authority and consent of the Hermanos.
On September 27, 2001, A. Hermano, through a counsel, sent a
formal demand letter to Dela Cruz to vacate and turn over the
possession of the property and to pay P 20,000 a month as rent
starting September 1, 2001.
Respondent filed an ejectment case against the petitioner at the
MTCC; however, the court dismissed the case due to lack of
jurisdiction. The court also stated that respondents proper remedy
should be an action for recovery and not of a summary proceeding
for ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer.
Respondent appealed the decision at the RTC; the said court,
however, affirmed the decision of the lower court en toto. The same
filed a petition for review at the CA, of which, granted the petition,
reversed and set aside the decision of RTC. Furthermore, the court
rendered a decision declaring Hermano as the lawful possessor of
the property and order Dela Cruz to vacate the same. With the CAs
decision, petitioner filed a petition for review at the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has adequately pleaded and
proved a case of forcible entry.
HELD: The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical
possession carries with it the concomitant burden of establishing
ones case by a preponderance of evidence. To be able to do so,
respondents herein must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
not on the weakness of that of petitioner. It is not enough that the
allegations of a complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The
plaintiff must prove prior physical possession. It is the basis of the
security accorded by law to a prior occupant of a property until a
person with a better right acquires possession thereof.
The Court has scrutinized the parties submissions, but found no
sufficient evidence to prove respondents allegation of prior physical
possession.
To prove their claim of having a better right to possession,
respondents submitted their title thereto and the latest Tax
Declaration prior to the initiation of the ejectment suit. As the CA
correctly observed, petitioner failed to controvert these documents
with competent evidence. It erred, however, in considering those
documents sufficient to prove respondents prior physical
possession.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the
possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in
issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit
refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not one flowing out of ownership. These are different legal
concepts under which the law provides different remedies for
recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who
can prove prior possession can recover the possession even against
the owner. Whatever may be the character of the possession, the
present occupant of the property has the security to remain on that
property if the occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and
until a person with a better right lawfully causes eviction.

Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not


conclusive proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner based on the presumption that no
one in ones right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in ones actual or constructive possession.
Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the proofs submitted
by respondents only established possession flowing from ownership.
Although respondents have claimed from the inception of the
controversy up to now that they are using the property as their
vacation house, that claim is not substantiated by any corroborative
evidence. On the other hand, petitioners claim that she started
occupying the property in March 2001, and not in September of that
year as Antonio alleged in his Complaint, was corroborated by the
Affidavit of petitioners caretaker. Respondents did not present any
evidence to controvert that affidavit.
Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving
the element of prior physical possession. Their uncorroborated claim
of that fact, even if made under oath, is self-serving. It does not
amount to preponderant evidence, which simply means that which is
of greater weight or is more convincing than evidence that is offered
in opposition.
As noted at the outset, it bears stressing that the Court is not a trier
of facts. However, the conflicting findings of fact of the MTCC and
the RTC, on the one hand, and the CA on the other, compelled us to
revisit the records of this case for the proper dispensation of
justice. Moreover, it must be stressed that the Courts
pronouncements in this case are without prejudice to the parties
right to pursue the appropriate remedy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED, and the Decision of the MTCC
dismissing the Complaint against petitioner is REINSTATED.

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA,


Respondent.
G.R. No. 193038
March 11, 2015
FACTS: Respondent Shirley Nuega, an OFW working as a domestic
helper in Israel, was married to Rogelio Nuega on September 1,
1990. On 1988, prior to their marriage, Shirley financed Rogelio in
buying a house and lot in Marikina. The same was purchased by
Rogelio on September 1989 and was registered on October 1989
under his sole name.
The couple then moved to their new home after their marriage in
September 1990. Then after, Shirley returned to Israel. While at
overseas, she learned about extra-marital affairs of her husband, and
it was confirmed upon her return that she was living and having an
affair with a certain Monica Escobar in the same property.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for
Concubinage and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of
Property. Shirley withdraw the latter complaint but later re-filed the
same. In between the filing of the cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio
had the intention of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised
the interested buyersone was their neighbor and the other was the
petitionerof the existence of the cases that she had filed against
Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until
the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject
property to petitioner without Shirley's consent for 380,000 pesos,
including petitioner's undertaking to assume the existing mortgage
on the property and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.
On May 16, 1994, the RTC granted the petition for legal separation
and ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the regime of absolute
community of property between Shirley and Rogelio. Rogelio
appealed the ruling before the CA which denied due course and
dismissed the petition. It became final and executory and a writ of
execution
was
issued
in
August
1995.
On August 27, 1996, Shirley instituted a Complaint for Rescission of
Sale and Recovery of Property against petitioner and Rogelio before
the RTC. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the sale of
Shirleys portion being null and void; ordered Nobleza to reconvey
or pay Shirley with that of her share; and ordered the same to pay for
the latters attorneys fees.
Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, while Rogelio did not appeal
the ruling of the trial court. In its assailed Decision promulgated on
May 14, 2010, the appellate court affirmed with modification the
trial court's ruling that the property should entirely be reconveyed to
the Shirley and Rogelio.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated July 21,
2010, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence,
the reason of filing a petition questioning errors that the courts may
have made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the decision
of the RTC by sustaining the finding that the petitioner was not a
purchaser in good faith.
HELD: Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. Even if the petitioner
had contended that she had examined the Transfer Certificate of
Title over the subject property, the court held that merely relying on
the same while ignoring all other surrounding circumstances
relevant to the sale.
Moreover, the court held that she did not exercise prudence. For at
the time of the sale, her sister was residing at the same Village where
the property was situated. She could have easily checked if Rogelio
has the capacity to dispose the property. The respondent had even
warned her neighbors in the Village, including her sister, not to
engage in any deal with her husband because there are pending cases
filed against him.

Another were the issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of


Absolute Sale had also pose question on the claim of petitioner that
she is a buyer in good faith. As correctly observed by both courts,
the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated on December 29,
1992. However, the Community Tax Certificates of the witnesses
therein were dated January 2 and 20, 1993. While this irregularity is
not a direct proof of the intent of the parties to the sale to make it
appear that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on December
29, 1992 or before Shirley filed the petition for legal separation on
January 29, 1993it is circumstantial and relevant to the claim of
herein petitioner as an innocent purchaser for value. In addition to
those, in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the
civil status of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while petitioner as
buyer was indicated as "single. It puzzles the Court that while
petitioner has repeatedly claimed that Rogelio is "single" under the
Transfer Certificate of Title and two tax declarations, his civil status
as seller was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale - further
creating a cloud on the claim of petitioner that she is an innocent
purchaser for value.

PILAR
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. RAMON DUMADAG, et al, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194336
March 11, 2013
FACTS: On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for accion
publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building
their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in Pilar Village
Subd situated in Las Pias City. The petitioner claims that said
parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name, was designated
as an open space of Pilar Village Subd intended for village
recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents. In
their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the material
allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local
government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over
them.
Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and
the trial court additionally conducted an ocular inspection of the
subject property. On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed
petitioner's complaint, finding that the land being occupied by
respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading
towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek and within the three-meter legal
easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public
dominion, which could not be owned by petitioner. The trial court
opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied
lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes
and that only the local government of Las Pias City could institute
an action for recovery of possession or ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 21, 2007.
Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which, on March 5, 2010, sustained the dismissal of the case.
Referring to Section 2 of A.O. No. 99-21 of the DENR, the appellate
court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the
creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to
the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or
ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip
was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the Transfer
Certificate of Title it is then estopped from claiming ownership and
enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA
noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of
the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the Republic
of the Philippines, through the SG, pursuant to Section 101 of C.A.
No. 141.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the
CA per Resolution dated October 29, 2010, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pilar Development Corporation is entitled to
the lawful possession of the 3-meter easement, as provided by Art.
630 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: The court ruled that Pilar Development Corporation is not
lawfully entitled to the 3-meter easement. This is because, according
to the lands Transfer Certificate of Title the said easement has a
reservation, to wit:
That the 3.00 meter strip of the lot described herein along
the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement
purposes and to limitations imposed by RA No. 440.
Also, though Art. 630 of the New Civil Code provides for the
general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the
ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of
the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all
matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating
thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title
Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."

Furthermore, according to DENR A.O. No. 99-21, When titled


lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes the segregation of the
three (3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall
be observed and be made part of the open space requirement
pursuant to P.D. 1216. The strip shall be preserved and shall not be
subject to subsequent subdivision. Certainly, in the case of
residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the
banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is
required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977. Said law
is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond
the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks,
playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands,
and non-buildable."
The Court, however, cannot agree with the trial court's opinion, as to
which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right
to possess the subject portion of the land because they are occupying
an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner,
respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is
public land. Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no
possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time
that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they
are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the
nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same
character throughout their occupancy.

Residents of Lower Atab and Teachers' Village, Sto. Timas


Proper Barangay, Baguio City, Represented by Pulas, Lapao, et
al v Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corp GR No
198878, October 15, 2014
Facts:
In May 2001, petitioners residents of Lower Atab & Teachers
Village, Sto. Tomas Proper Barangay, Baguio City filed a civil
case for quieting of title with damages against respondent Sta.
Monica Industrial and DevelopmentCorporation. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4946-R and assigned to Branch 59 of the
Baguio RTC. The Complaint in said case essentially alleged that
petitioners are successors and transferees-in-interest of Torres, the
supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City (the
subject property, consisting of 177,778 square meters) which Torres
possessed and declared for tax purposes in 1918; that they are in
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, declared
their respective lots and homes for tax purposes, and paid the real
estate taxes thereon; that in May 2000, respondent began to erect a
fence on the subject property, claiming that it is the owner of a large
portion thereof by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-63184
(TCT No. T-63184); that said TCT No. T-63184 is null and void, as
it was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. O-281 (OCT
No. O-281), which was declared void pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1271 (PD 1271) and in the decided case of Republic v.
Marcos; and that TCT No. T-63184 is a cloud upon their title and
interests and should therefore be cancelled. Petitioners thus prayed
that respondents TCT No. T-63184 be surrendered and cancelled;
that actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, legal
expenses, and costs be awarded in their favor; and finally, that
injunctive relief be issued against respondent to prevent it from
selling the subject property.
In its Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,
respondent claimed that petitioners have no cause of action; that
TCT No. T- 63184 is a valid and subsisting title; that the case for
quieting of title constitutes a collateral attack upon TCT No. T63184; and that petitioners have no title to the subject property and
are mere illegal occupants thereof. Thus, it prayed for the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 4946-R and an award of exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs in its favor.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in this Petition:
1. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the Petitioners x x x have no cause of action.
2. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the action is a collateral attack on the Torrens
Title of respondent Corporation.
3. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the present action is to annul the title of
respondent Corporation due to fraud, [thus] it should be
the Solicitor General who should file the case for
reversion.
4. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the validation of TCT No. T-63184 registered
in the name of respondent Corporation was in accordance
with law.
Held:
The Court denies the Petition.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must be present, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy."

"Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title


means beneficial ownership."
Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by
law and capable of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the
beneficial owner. Blacks Law Dictionary indicates that the term is
used in two senses: first, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in
trust property (also called "equitable ownership"); and second, to
refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell the
shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the corporations
books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished
from naked ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits
and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the bare title to
property.
Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property.
Evidently, there are no certificates of title in their respective names.
And by their own admission in their pleadings, specifically in their
pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial court, they
acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the property
from the government, through townsite sales applications coursed
through the DENR. In their Petition before this Court, they
particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in order that
the said title would not hinder the approval of their townsite sales
applications pending with the DENR.Thus, petitioners admitted that
they are not the owners of the subject property; the same constitutes
state or government land which they would like to acquire by
purchase. It would have been different if they were directly claiming
the property as their own as a result of acquisitive prescription,
which would then give them the requisite equitable title. By stating
that they were in the process of applying to purchase the subject
property from the government, they admitted that they had no such
equitable title, at the very least, which should allow them to
prosecute a case for quieting of title.
In short, petitioners recognize that legal and equitable title to the
subject property lies in the State. Thus, as to them, quieting of title is
not an available remedy.
Lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation are public land. Laws
and decrees such as PD 1271 were passed recognizing ownership
acquired by individuals over portions of the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, but evidently, those who do not fall within the coverage
of said laws and decrees the petitioners included cannot claim
ownership over property falling within the said reservation. This
explains why they have pending applications to purchase the
portions of the subject property which they occupy; they have no
legal or equitable claim to the same, unless ownership by acquisitive
prescription is specifically authorized with respect to such lands, in
which case they may prove their adverse possession, if so. As far as
this case is concerned, the extent of petitioners possession has not
been sufficiently shown, and by their application to purchase the
subject property, it appears that they are not claiming the same
through acquisitive prescription.
The trial and appellate courts are correct in dismissing Civil Case
No. 4946-R; however, they failed to appreciate petitioners
admission of lack of equitable title which denies them the standing
to institute a case for quieting of title. Nevertheless, they are not
precluded from filing another case a direct proceeding to question
respondents TCT No. T-63184; after all, it appears that their
townsite sales applications are still pending and have not been
summarily dismissed by the government which could indicate that
the subject property is still available for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries. If TCT No. T-63184 is indeed null and void, then such
proceeding would only be proper to nullify the same. It is just that a
quieting of title case is not an option for petitioners, because in order
to maintain such action, it is primarily required that the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to the subject property a
condition which they could not satisfy.

With the conclusion arrived at, the Court finds no need to resolve the
other issues raised.

particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from


Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.

Beumer v Amores GR No 195670 December 3, 2012


Facts:

She further asserted that after she filed for annulment oftheir
marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and
brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of
drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that
these tools and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.

Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in

Issue:

March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental,
Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision
dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.

WON Beumer has a right to assert or claim half or whole of the


purchase price used in the purchase of the real properties subject of
this case.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal


Partnership dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of
the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of
the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.),
including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974,
containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house
constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306,
containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of
the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an
area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT
No. 23567, containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that
appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT
No. 23575, containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains
to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two
(2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not
acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth
being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1,
2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and
2055-I by way of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit
executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased
Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.
Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for
dissolution as well as payment for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4
were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were
acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government
benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for
their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the
purchase of the lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in

Held:
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he is well aware of the
constitutional prohibition and even asseverated that, because of
such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties
in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his
palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of
such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply
the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement.
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the
funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable
refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule
will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,
petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage
any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered
into.

Leong and Leong, et al v See GR No 194077 December 3, 2014


Facts:
The spouses Florentino Leong and Carmelita Leong used to own the
property located at No. 53941 Z.P. De Guzman Street, Quiapo,
Manila.
Petitioner Elena Leong (Elena) is Florentino's sister-in-law. She had
stayed with her in-laws on the property rental-free for over two
decades until the building they lived in was razed by fire. They then
constructed makeshift houses, and the rental-free arrangement
continued. Florentino and Carmelita immigrated to the United States
and eventually had their marriage dissolved in Illinois. A provision
in their marital settlement agreement states that"Florentino shall
convey and quitclaim all of his right, title and interest in and to 540
De Guzman Street, Manila, Philippines . . . to Carmelita."
The Court of Appeals found that "[a]pparently intercalated in the
lower margin of page 12 of the instrument was a long-hand
scribbling of a proviso, purporting to be a footnote remark":Neither
party shall evict or charge rent to relatives of the parties, or convey
title, until it has been established that Florentino has clear title to the
Malabon property. Clear title to be established by the attorneys for
the parties or the ruling of a court of competent jurisdiction. In the
event Florentino does not obtain clear title, this court reserves
jurisdiction to reapportion the properties or their values to effect a
50-50 division of the value of the 2 remaining Philippine properties.
On November 14, 1996, Carmelita sold the land to Edna. In lieu of
Florentino's signature of conformity in the deed of absolute sale,
Carmelita presented to Edna and her father, witness Ernesto See, a
waiver of interest notarized on March 11, 1996 in Illinois. In this
waiver, Florentino reiterated his quitclaim over his right, title, and
interest to the land. Consequently, the lands title, covered by TCT
No. 231105, was transferred to Edna's name.
Edna was aware of the Leong relatives staying in the makeshift
houses on the land. Carmelita assured her that her nieces and
nephews would move out, but demands to vacate were unheeded.
On April 1, 1997, Edna filed a complaint for recovery of possession
against Elena and the other relatives of the Leong ex-spouses.

In response, Elena alleged the titles legal infirmity for lack of


Florentino's conformity to its sale. She argued that Carmelita's
noncompliance with the proviso in the property agreement that
the Quiapo property "may not be alienated without Florentino first
obtaining a clean title over the Malabon property" annulled the
transfer to Edna.
On April 23, 1997, Florentino filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of contract, title, and damages against Carmelita Leong, Edna
C. See, and the Manila Register of Deeds, alleging that the sale was
without his consent. The two cases were consolidated.
Issue:
WON Edna was a purchaser in good faith.
Held:
First, good faith is presumed, and petitioners did not substantiate
their bold allegation of fraud. Second, respondent did notrely on the
clean title alone precisely because of the possession by third parties,
thus, she also relied on Florentinos waiver of interest. Respondent
even verified the authenticity of the title at the Manila Register of
Deeds with her father and Carmelita. These further inquiries prove
respondents good faith.
By her overt acts, Edna See with her father verified the authenticity
of Carmelitas land title at the Registry of Deeds of Manila. There
was no annotation on the same thus deemed a clean title (page 19,
TSN, 12 January 2005). Also, she relied on the duly executed and
notarized Certificate of Authority issued by the State of Illinois and
Certificate of Authentication issued by the Consul of the Republic of
the Philippines for Illinois in support to the Waiver of Interest
incorporated in the Deed of Absolute Sale presented to her by
Carmelita (Exhibit 2). Examination of the assailed Certificate of
Authority shows that it is valid and regular on its face. It contains a
notarial seal.
The assailed Certificate of Authority is a notarized document and
therefore, presumed to be valid and duly executed. Thus, Edna Sees
reliance on the notarial acknowledgment found in the duly notarized
Certificate of Authority presented by Carmelita is sufficient
evidence of good faith.

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