Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos

Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos
Author(s): Elaine Fantham

Source: Phoenix, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 262-275
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
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CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN ETHOS

ELAINE FANTHAM
IN THE SECOND BOOK of De OratoreCicero analyses the ratiodicendiin

terms of three functions: (1) ut probemusvera esse, quae defendimus;
(2) ut conciliemuseos nobis,qui audiunt; (3) ut animos eorum,ad quemcumquecausa postulabitmotum,vocemus(2.115). This paper is concerned
with the second of these functionsas presentedby Cicero, and with the
Aristoteliantheoryof ranrs ... &&.. .70r
. -00ovs (Rhet. 1.2.1356 a 5-13)
fromwhich he derived this second function.'I shall try to explain the
modificationsCicero made, his motives in making them, and the difficulties arisingfromhis choice of adaptation.
The theme of conciliarereturnsbrieflyin 2.121 among the VTrexvOL
riLares,illa quae totaab oratorepariuntur.There are tresres quae adfidem
faciendamsolae valent... ut et concilienturanimietdoceanturetmoveantur.
These receive furthercommentin 128:
tres sunt res, ut ante dixi: una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum,tertia
concitandorum.Harum triumpartium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia
vimdesiderat,nam hoc necesseest,ut is, qui nobiscausam adiudicaturussit, aut inclinatione
voluntatis propendeat in nos aut defensionisargumentisadducatur aut animi permotione
cogatur.
From theseintroductoryremarkswe derivethe idea that (115) thejurors

must be won over to us, the advocates2 (114 has parentheticallyincluded
v ovs is not made
xThe association of conciliare with the Aristotelian iaortsb,& 70oi
explicit in the literary and exoteric De Oratore,which generally avoids Greek terms.
Antonius acknowledges his debt to Aristotleforthe analysis of logical proofin 2.160, but
does not repeat the acknowledgmentfor the "ethical" or emotive proofs.
Cicero explicitlymentions'0LKbV, and gives its motive as ad benevolentiam
conciliandam
in Orator128: duo sunt enim quae benetractataab oratoreadmirabilemeloquentiamfaciant;
quorum alterumest quod Graeci
vocant, ad naturas et mores et ad omnem vitae
consuetudinem accommodatum; 1O0LK6V
alterum quod eidem iraerTLK6bnominant,quo perturbanturanimi et concitantur,in quo uno regnatoratio. illud superius come, iucundum, ad
benevolentiam conciliandam paratum.
It should be noted that if OLK6Vand 7ra7erTLK6P
are here used as nouns, ratherthan
adjectives, this is a Hellenistic extension of Aristotle's practice (see below, note 9).
Cicero here definesr07LK6P
as speech adapted to mores,the natural translation of
i607.
As J. E. Sandys comments (on Orator,loc. cit. [Cambridge 1885] p. 131), the moresare
not clearly identifiedas those of the speaker, or the audience, whereas there can be no
doubt that the animi affectedby ira07?1LKb6
are those of the audience. We must thereforego back to the earlier and fulleraccount in De Oratoreto see whereCicero places the
emphasis of the genus quod ad vitamet moresaccommodatur(De Orat. 2.213 = Orator128
above). This is one of the problems which I attempt to solve in the followingpages.
2See now George Kennedy, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy in Greece and Rome," A7P 89
(1968) 419-436. In this broad historical study he traces the principal effectsof the
PHoENIx,
Vol. 27 (1973) 3.
262

CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIANETHOS
263
both advocate and client),and (128) thisrequireslenitasto make thejury

inclinedto favourus. There may also be a contrastintendedbetweenthe
conscious inclinatio voluntatisand the unwittingor unwillingpermotio
animi.
The concept of lenitas is important for Cicero's rhetorical theory
because it enables himto bridgethe gap betweenthe ethicaland aesthetic
aspects of speech; in Cicero's theoreticalwritingsit is most oftenassociated withstyle; compare,e.g., Leg. 1.11, in whichAtticus,remarkingon
Cicero's adaptation of his style to increasingage and his reductionof
contentio,adds ut iam oratiotua non multumab philosophorumlenitate
absit. Historical writingis said in De Orat.2.64 to requiregenusorationis
fusumatque tractumet cum lenitate quadam aequabiliter profluenssine
hac iudiciali asperitate;and forthe combinationwithaequabilis,compare
Orator53, elaborantalii in lenitate et aequabilitate etpuro . . . et candido
generedicendi. It is also applied to deliveryand intonation,as in 2.184
below and Orator56 (with Sandys' note ad loc., p. 65 of his edition). But
at the morallevel lenitasis the quality of wise and mercifuldecisionin the
judge or jury, definedby Cicero in Part. Or. 78, in relation to justice:
ea (sc.iustitia)in moderatione
animi advertendi
lenitasnominatur.Not only
does this correspondclosely to the Aristotelianaccount of irLELKEta
in
Rhet. 1.13, 1374 a 30 following;but
in a more
and the trVLLKr7S
brLELKEL
generalsense are importantelementsin theideal ethoswhichAristotlesets
up forhis oratorat Rhet.1.2. 1356 a 7 and a 13, and 2.1.1378 a 15. While
this wider sense of irLEKls-"reasonable, moderate, gentlemanly"extends beyond the range of lenis, Cicero's choice of lenis and lenitas
enabled himto include,as I willshow,aestheticand stylisticconnotations
which -LeLKeLa
lacked.
Of the threefunctionsCicero discussesfirstthe varietiesof intellectual
proof(docere)which are closest to the orthodoxinventiotheoryof postAristotelianrhetoric,and leads up to a catalogue of the Aristoteliantopoi
in 163-173. Aftera conversationaldigressionAntoniusproceeds to consider the psychological functions,conciliareand movere:182-184 deal
separateidentitiesof advocate and clientfoundoccasionallyin Athensand almost
in Rome.He discussesDe Orat.2.182-184,on pages434-435,concluding
that
universally
of effective
"most especiallythe possibility
contrastbetweenpatronand clientis not
recognised,"and commentson the slownessof Roman rhetoricaltheoryto assimilate
the implications
of theseparatepersonalities
of advocateand client.The wholearticle
is fullofvaluablecommentson manyaspectsof Ethos,and I offermyown discussion
(writtenbeforeI consultedKennedy'swork)in thehope thatthisanalysisof theconflictsgeneratedin Cicero'sadaptationofGreektheorywillprovidea usefulappendixto
his paper.For further
discussionsee Kennedy'sThe ArtofRhetoric
at Rome(Princeton
of Ethosin rhetoricaltheory),and 220-221 (on De Orat.
1972) 139 (on the treatment
2.182-184).

264
PHOENIX
section,it seems wise

specificallywith the former.Since 182 is a difficult
to set it out in fullbeforeattemptingan analysis.
Valet igitur multumad vincendumprobari moreset institutaetfacta et vitameorum,qui
agentcausas, eteorum,pro quibus, etitemimprobariadversariorum,
animosqueeorum,apud
quos agetur,conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiamcum erga oratoremtumerga illum,
pro quo dicetorator.Concilianturautemanimi dignitatehominis,rebusgestis,existimatione
vitae;quaefacilius ornaripossunt,si modosunt,quamfingi,si nulla sunt.Sed haec adiuvant
in oratore;lenitas vocis voltuspudor[is significatio],verborumcomitas; si quid persequare
acrius, ut invituset coactusfacere videare.Facilitatis, liberalitatis,mansuetudinis,pietatis,
grati animi, non appetentis, non avidi signa proferreperutile est; eaque omnia, quae
proborum,demissorum,non acrium,nonpertinacium,nonlitigiosorum,non acerborumsunt,
conciliantabalienantque ab eis, in quibus haec non sunt; itaque eadem
valde benevolentiam
sunt in adversariosex contrarioconferenda.
In the firstsentencethe aim is given as winningapproval forthe mores

et instituta... etc. both of patrons (eorumqui agentcausas) and clients
(eorumpro quibus), with a correspondingdiscreditingof the adversaries.
While the second sentenceappears to be merelya rephrasingof the first,
it bringsinto prominencethe third party concerned,the iudices (apud
quos agetur) and the theme verb conciliare,which is then expanded by
what follows;such goodwillis won by a man's prestige,achievements,and
reputation,but these may be lacking. What is the next connectionof
thought? Sed relates to the problem of the defendant without these
merits. Certain qualities in the patron such as lenitas of delivery' and
demeanourcan compensateforthese deficiencies.We are now discussing
thecharacterdisplayedby thespeaker,and thenextsentence,facilitatis...
signa proferreperutileest, appears to continue this theme. "It is very
advantageous to display the marksof good and amiable qualities." Only
with the commenton bestowingthe correspondingbad qualities on the
adversaries,do we realise that signa proferremay referto adducing evidence oftheamiable qualitiesoftheclientratherthanthespeakerhimself,
as a means of benevolentiam
conciliare.4
8The text here is damaged. The mss read lenitas vocis voltus pudoris significatio
verborumcomitas. Wilkins follows Kayser in bracketing -is significatio; Harnecker
extends the brackets to pudoris significatioverborumcomitas, reading lenitas vocis et
voltus.The problem does not affectour interpretationas a whole, but I believe that the
three elements of vox, voltus, and verba are all necessary, and would not extend the
brackets beyond pudoris significatio.
4Antonius' referencehere correspondsto the recommendationshe will himselfgive for
the principiumin 2.320 ff.Similarlypopuli benevolentiam
mihi conciliaramin 200 relates
to the captatio benevolentiae,attributed by traditional rhetoricto the beginningof the
speech. A comparison of Aristotle's commentson the exordiumin the Rhetoricawith the
Roman texts reveals the traditionand its modifications.The startingpoint is Rhet. 3.14
1415 a 35 f.: MXyerzat
ro
8U raDra EK
X-yov70OS (1) KaL rov &KpoarofD(2) Kal roD
/re
rp&hyparos(3) Kal ro V avwrtov(4).
Compare Rhet. Her. 1.5.8: Benivolos auditores
facere quattuor modis possumus; ab nostra (1), ab adversariorumnostrorum(4), ab
auditorumpersona (2), et ab rebus ipsis (3). Cic. Inv. 1.16.22: Benivolentiaquattuorex

CICERONIAN
CONCILIARE
AND ARISTOTELIAN
ETHOS
265
Section 183 adds in parenthesisthat this style of speaking is most

successfulin cases whereit is not possible to play on the audience's emotions; heregentleand mild' speech is most appropriate,and most recomis offeredforthewordreus,whichis thelink
mendsa client,and a definition
returningus to the main argumentin 184. Horum igiturexprimeremores
iniuriarummirum
orationeiustos,integros,religiosos,timidos,perferentis
quiddam valetseems to recapitulatethe last sentence of 182 above, but
relatesto the client.Antoniusadds that ifspeakersdo this,whetherin the
than
preamble,narrative,or conclusion,it willoftenbe evenmoreeffective
thecase proper.Further(autem),fromthe feelingand natureof thespeech
it can resultthat quasi moresoratoriseffingat
oratio;genereenim quodam
et genereverborum,
adhibitaetiamactionelenifacilitatemque
sententiarum
utprobi,ut benemorati,ut boni viriesse videamur.In
significante,
efficitur
thelast sentencefacilitatemque
appears to resumefacilitatis...
significante
locis comparatur;ab nostra (1), ab adversariorum(4), ab iudicum persona (2), ab ipsa
causa (3). Cic. De Orat. 2.321: aut ex reo (1) aut ex adversario(4) aut ex re (3) aut ex eis
apud quos agetur (2) sententiasduci licebit.
Rhet.Her. and De Inv. are clearly transcriptionsof the same source, which altered the
Aristotelianorder to give greaterprominenceto the adversarius.De Oratorediffersin two
ways: by postponing the referenceto the audience to fourthposition it restores the
emphasis on their role; also, just as Antonius in 2.80-82 had refused to accept the
limitationof captatiobenevolentiaeto the principium,so in 322 he concludes his summary
of the sententiae: ex eis autem apud quos agetur ut benevolos beneque existimantes
melius quam rogando. est id quidem in totam orationem
efficiamus,quod agendo efficitur
confundendamnec minimein extremam,sed tamenmultaprincipia ex eo generegignuntur.
Because of this belief in the diffusionof the captatio throughoutthe speech, Cicero has
included his comments on this technique in the context of his discussion of conciliare
(182-183) and movere(200; cf. 206-209) rather than under the heading of dispositio.
Aristotlealso, in his section on arrangement,mentionsr76
oevovv rodafcatas a goal of the
exordium, listed, as in De Oratore, under
rTv
aKpoarCyv.He too refers back
'rp6s
(3.14.1415 b 29) to his previous discussion, that is to 2.1.1378 a 22-23, on EC-oLa as an
of tXLta.
ingredientin irtins'v 7r4 Oeteand to 2.4, on the 7rd06os
6In Dionysius of Halicarnassus (see Lockwood, CQ 23 [1929] 183-184) and in Quintilian, 6.2, Ethos and )0GKL are identifiedwith a quieter, milder level of speech than
Pathos and
Grube,both in The Greekand Roman Critics (291-292) and in his
7rar7rLK'.
notes to Aristotle
on Poetryand Style (51, n. 2), suggests that Quintilian's words reflect
the practice of Cicero and perhaps earlier critics; even in Aristotlethe application of the
adjective 'OLK6Sto the Odyssey in Poetics 24 may depend on associating W0oswith a
quieter emotional level. This distinction between Ethos and Pathos does not seem to
occur in the Rhetorica;it is however present, without being used to definethe terms,in
Cicero as in Dionysius. Compare Dionysius De Dem. 8, in which IG0KKis the last of a
.
contrasted with
or ib. 43: r7d
parallel sequence 1Xap ... vetLvy.....EZ6a
V da'roTpayvvEL
KE L7TLKpaLvEL
a ei&
V
ftE
7rv aKO7V,r6aUrpavbEL KaL7raOI7tK';
Kal 7-t
XEaLvEL,
7rOos KTpo7reLrobs &KObOVT7s,r& 5' els 'Oos brad'7yera.From Cicero, compare the
contrast made in De Oratore2.200:... generiorationisvehementi
atque atrocigenus illud
alterum... lenitatiset mansuetudinis,or 212: in his duobusgeneribusquorumalterumlene,
alterum vehemensesse volumus... , and the antithesis of asperitas contentioniswith
remissiolenitatis,or the commentsin Orator128 (above, note 1).

266
PHOENIX
ofthe end of 182, and, at the same time,clearlyrefersto the

signaproferre
amiable qualities of the speaker himself.
There are several confusionslatent here: is Antoniusdiscussingthe art
ofrecommendingthe speaker,or the client?Is he commentingon style,or
content?The end of 184 is clearin itself.Conciliarewillinvolveportraying6
by one's sentiments,style, and delivery,the excellenceof the speaker's
character,a straightforward
by the orator as
piece of self-dramatisation
More difficult
is thesentencebeginning
his own playwrightand performer.
horumigiturexprimeremores,both in its relationto the end of 182, and to
theplacida, summissa,lenis oratiorecommendedin 183. If we take signa
in 182 in the sense firstproposed,displayingmarksof the orator's
proferre
own good qualities, this is consistentwith the end of 184, and with the
emphasison styleand mannerimpliedby placida, summissa,lenis oratio.
This thenseems to be the sense required.But how can the oratorexpress
the excellentcharacterof his client in his speech by placida, summissa,
lenis... oratio?That is, by his style and delivery?This presupposesan
betweenpatronand client; withoutit the
amazing degreeofidentification
orator can express his client's meritsonly by explicit statementsabout
both the double meaningof lenis, passing from
them. In this difficulty
own intense faithin the effectof style,
to
and
Cicero's
morality style,
influencehis statements; but it would seem that the initial distinction
betweencommendationof the speaker himself,and of the client,has not
been maintained,nor its implicationsconsistentlyexplored.In the latter
part of thispaper I shall argue that the distinctionfailsto be maintained
because it was irrelevantto Cicero's Aristoteliansource, and has been
terms.
graftedby Cicero onto a presentationin quite different
More problems arise from the later referencesto this function in
Antonius'account of his greatdefenceof Norbanus (200 ff.).
quod ubi sensi me in possessionemiudicii ac defensionismeae constitisse,quod et populi
benevolentiam mihi conciliaram,... et iudicum animos totos... ad causam nostram
tumadmiscerehuic generiorationisvehementi
converteram,
atque atrocigenus illud alterum,
de quo ante disputavi, lenitatis et mansuetudiniscoepi.
Paradoxicallyin thispassage the conciliaramclause is associated with the

violentand emotivefunction,while the characteristiclenitasof technical
conciliarecomes second, associated withAntonius'vindicationof his own
role as defendingcounsel,and consistsonly of winningthegoodwillofthe
audience forthe patronus.This is confirmedby the later sentence (201)
where the antithesiscommendatio:concitatiocorrespondsto ut mansue6Exprimereand ejingere both belong to the vocabulary of the plastic arts; ef. Austin
on Pro Caelio 12, non expressa sed adumbratasigna virtutum(notes, p. 60); Ac. 1.27, e
qua omnia expressa atque eficta sint; N.D. 1.47, cum artificiumeffingitis
fabricamque
divinam; Off.3.69, solidam atque expressamefigiem,and De Orat. 3.15, in quibus omnibus
fereSocratesexprimitur,of personal portrayal throughlanguage.

267
tissimus vidererand ut et acerrimus in Caepionis invidia renovanda

(viderer).Thus in practice Antonius' techniquedoes not conformto the
theoreticalrole of conciliareas presentingthe moresof the defendantin a
favourablelight,whilethe emotivedefenceof seditiois actually described
by a contradictory,non-technicaluse of conciliare.
use
Similarlyanalysisof the emotionsto be rousedleads to a conflicting
of conciliarein the idiom amoremconciliare(206): in the discussion on
arousing the affectionof the judges in 206-208, the firstsection of the
catalogue of emotions,Cicero is basically repeatingthe aims and methods
included in the functionof conciliarein 182-184.
Confrontedby this overlap Cicero reveals his embarrassmentin 212.
He has ended the account of the emotivefunctionin 206-211 withinvidia
(210) and misericordia(211), and his demands made upon the speaker
enable him to reiteratein 211 the distinctionmade in 201 between the
commendatio
probitatis,whichshould be lenis . . . atquesummissa,and the
(pars) quae suscipitur ab oratoread commutandosanimos atque omni
whichshould be intentaac vehemens.But he has finally
rationeflectendos,
to admit the overlap of categories.
est quaedam in his duobus generibus,quorumalterum lene, alterumvehemensesse volumus,
difficilisad distinguendumsimilitudo; nam et ex illa lenitate, qua conciliamur eis, qui
audiunt, ad hanc vim acerrimam,qua eosdem excitamus,influatoportetaliquid ... neque
estullatemperatior
oratioquamilla,in qua asperitascontentionis
oratoris
ipsiushumanitate
conditur,remissio autem lenitatis quadam gravitateet contentione
firmatur(212).
The discussionis already taking anotherdirection,as the referenceto

humanitasshows; and Cicero is leading offgradually towards Caesar
Strabo's digressionon wit, but beforehe leaves the psychologicalfunctions he makes one finalcomment(216).
illa autem, quae aut conciliationis causa leniter aut permotionis vehementer
aguntur,
contrariis commotionibusauferenda sunt, ut odio benevolentia, ut misericordij invidia
tollatur.
Conciliatio has here become merely a label for one section of movere;
that part whose businessit is to stirup friendlyor favourableemotions,
and can be cancelled by arousingcontraryemotions.What startedas an
funcapparentlyindependentaspect of the orator'sskill,with a different
tion fromtheemotiveroleofmovere,
has been transformed
intothegentler
sub-groupincluded in the wider range of movere.The descriptiverole of
conciliare,its connectionwith characterisationby style and content of
(a) thepatronand (b) the client,has been blurredby theapplicationofthe
same termto a categoryof the moreimportantemotion-rousing
function
in the longerfollowingsection.
Why does Cicero choose the termconciliareto distinguishthisseparate
characterisingfunction?After all, the verb clearly implies a formof

PHOENIX
268
only in intensityofpassion fromother

actingupon the emotions,differing
He does not seem to relyon any philosophicaldistinction,
formsofmovere.
such as that conciliareacts upon the reason, movereupon the emotions;
the only hintof such a distinctionlies in the phrases inclinatiovoluntatis
as opposed to permotioanimi in 129 above. If both functionsare emotive,
why keep them distinct? The only special quality of the conciliarefunctionis its descriptivecontent.
The choice of terminologybecomes more meaningfulif we turn to
consider (a) the classificationof Cicero's ultimate or direct source,
Aristotle, in his analysis of rhetorical proofs, and (b) the different
circumstancesand values of oratoryassumed by the Greek and Roman
critics.
In his introductionto theRhetorica,Aristotledistinguishesthreekinds
of
v 41W0^et
a
al
o0
t1orELS (1.2.1356 1-4): (a') t
y&pelow$7v
bEXvoL
XM'ovos,
4
T
7rws,
a(')ait 7TvT6
dTpoa)vKbLaOLVtatl
Lbd
(Y')aC(4 AvabrW
X6yCy,
o
Tro
He
r~aiLveaOabE5KVbva. thencommentson the rLoTeLs
5ELKVubVaz
&&&ro^0ovys,
describingthemas b0av oT'r Xex05 6 X6'yos
WOTeE
&Al6rtTrov7roL7aL
Xeyovra. Tots ydp
avpalvlatv
XMyovra. ....
erieMLEKEaL
rLaoebOAevXXOV
Kal OTTov ...
et
e
rTv
Kal roVro
ikb&V X6yov,&,XX,&) b&d76

orpobebo?&o0aLrovbyTWtaetva TbV
6 E
&XX& xeb6V cr
xrTv
reV KvpLWTrr)YVEXEL
T740os (1356 a 5-15).7
The speechmustbe utteredso as to make theorator&dAerutros

(compare
Cicero's adfidemfaciendam,2.121). This elementin the definitionrecurs
in Rhet.1.9.1366 a 34; 2.1.1378 a 19 f. There is emphasison the need for
brLeLtKeLa8
(compare Cicero's use of lenis, lenitas, 2.128, 182, etc.); the
problem is to make himself appear 7rotovTrva; this recurs in Rhet.
1.9.1366 a 30; 2.1.1378 a 22 (roCovrov).
A side referencein 1.8.1366 a 12 f.
ties up this type of proofwith the1j0lof states and constitutions,making
it clear that the orator should know the nature and aims of a state, so
7On the use of '0os in Aristotle'sRhetorica,see E. M. Cope, Introductionto Aristotle's

Rhetoric(London 1867) 110-113. He distinguishesthreeapplications of the word. (1) the
present reference,g0os Cv 7TYX&yoV'T. (2) "The character of constitutionsor formsof
government and of the differentperiods of life, youth, manhood.., .and so forth;
(these) are to be studied forthe purpose of accommodating our language to the tone and
sentiments prevailing under certain forms of government, and characteristic of, or
peculiar to, certain ages and conditions of life, and thereby conciliating the audience,
when it happens to be composed of membersof one or other of these classes." (3)
i0os
belonging to style; this appears only in Book 3 (see pp. 271-272 below).
8Aristotle's discussion of ?brclKeta in 1.13.1374 a 30 f. starts from this definition:
T6
V
V& LKCatoV
(see Cope, op. cit. [above,
Tar 8~
T6V
rteKrs Thisrap&
vyeYpappvZO
V61oofthe
note 7] 190-193).
is very close
to his definition
brnKEKI;sin Eth.Nic. 1137 b 34 f.:
6 ICt)&KpqfoiKatos~ ~a 76 XELpov.But the adjective (and noun) had a wider sense in
general Greek usage, as a basic word of social recommendation, like gentlemanly,
respectable; so Socrates in Apol. 22 a 5, 36 c 1 opposes it to caDXos (see Burnet ad loc.).
In Aristotle too, where hrLEteK7'explains &L6brtLtrosin Rhet. 1.2.1356 a 7, it is generalised. On its range, and relationshipwith lenis see p. 263 above.

CICERONIAN CONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIAN ETHOS
269
himself:
as tobeabletoassumesimilar
J0G
T6 hvy'p K&rrTs 30osIravW7arov
of
in 1.9.leadsto a comment
His
virtue
etvac.
analysis
pr1
&ddVY4l s e&Kar4v7
on the value of this analysisforthe 5evrTpa
yap &Jaa
ovUCf7ieraL
7rLrTas:
irept robrvTWXeyovTra K&KEWila57IXOv
4v irotoirwes broXn-Orlb06~E0aKaTA 7T
TK aTbr&v)Lav
10os, i 7repiv bevrTepa
ydp
rTEK
&Kal XXovd&AtrwTroV
irtrtLs.
r7y
a
srpbs
(1366
29-33).
7rotety
dApETr'
5vvba6;eOa
Facts about
virtue,basicallyusefulforpraisingothers(Tr
'trawoiVTr,
1366a 29),willenabletheoratortorepresent
himself
as virtuous.
Aristotle
on thelogicalproofs,
concentrates
leavingthe
subsequently
7iLrTLS
bevrEpa
intellectual
frommoral
untilBook 2. This begins(2.1) by distinguishing
Thenherepeatstheimportant
ofhisoriginaldefinition
of
elements
proofs.
Tv
the7rLaTLrs
T7 Oet:
..
abrVT6
vrobv rTa KalIvT
av&dyKrl
KaratKEV6AEW roXZyap &badpet
,VKrpLTV Kal raTs
.Kal
ts
ovXaZs,
7rpbs
Cdra
v
5tKas r6 rOSbyrtva
7rLTW, &XATcraAvtV ra at
V7roXaI3cz'vEU
T6rpbs
EXEtU 7rws abrT6
Kal
6atv'ela
o ua
M'XOTra
r
aCbrobs
(2.1.1377b 24-29).
Thistypeofproof,then,dependsontwothings:thecharacter
whichthe
in hisspeech,and theattitudetowardstheaudiencewith
oratorpresents
which he representshimself.These are elaboratedin 2.1.1378a7f.:
p rL rdTaLrTaArT.
.....
r70o
/I
o.LV abrobS
etvaL7rtrobsrobsMyovras7rpLa
in
1378
a
Aristotle
Kat
this,
19,
Following
Tapra 6pbV7it plaET Kal
Etivota.
refersthe readerback to 1.9 forthemeansby whichoratorscan make
themselves
one's
trovbatot. The questionofpresenting
appear 6pbpveoKal
is to be studiedin thesectionon 7raif0.
This is generally
eDvota
agreedto
referthe readerforwardto the sectionon OXla,in 2.4 (1380 b 431381 b, end). The wholenatureof thisproofconsistsin portrayalor
thespeakerin a certainlight;thesevoLa
at issue
presenting
description;
is the speaker'sown (real or supposed)goodwillto the audience,not
theirstowardshim.Specificconcernwithwinningtheireivota,theequivalentofCiceronianconciliare,
motiveof
althoughthisis theunderlying
therLrTa
8s Tod70 ovs,is notdiscussedhere.
WhenAristotle
in 2.4., he does so analytically,
comesto discussOtXMa
withoutstatinga motiveorapplication;it is merely
oneoftheir6. which
theoratormustknowhowto rouse.In one sensea sizableproportion
of
thischapterreflects
theissueofeivocaunderlying
thesecondproof,forhis
on the tXlamenfeelforthosewhoseattitudeto
emphasisis repeatedly
and theirloyaltiesis favourable.
themselves
He has includedthischapter
to satisfytwoneedsof theorator:(a) accordingto its classification,
to
showbywhatpersonsand causesthe r&0oof tXtais roused:hencehow
can the speakerarouseit in the audience,towardsothersor towards
himself?
from2.1.1378a 22-3: whatis tXtta
(b) to satisfythereference
like?Hence howcan thespeakerportrayhimself
to showthathe feelsit
towardsthe audience? Yet it should be noted that the wordsEvovs,eivoLa

270
PHOENIX
do not occur even once. That is, although Aristotle has referredthe
readers to this section forthe techniqueof makingoneselfappear edvous,
he has formulatedthe chapterto illustratea rdos, and has not adapted it
to the needs of the taTsLu
Tbe roi^0ovs.
The later sections 2.12-17, on the characteristicsassociated with age,
class, and fortune,are designedto continuethe analysis ofemotionsin the
audience so that the speaker may know how to appeal to the type of
audience he is dealing with. It is a discussionof I4, in one sense, but is
aimed at the third, emotive category of proof. Yet M6d6ric Dufour
(Aristote:RhitoriqueLivre2 [Paris 1960] introduction29) is too absolute
in denyingits relevance to the rlrn tLT roDT
40ovs.Cope (Introductionto
Aristotle'sRhetoric,110) points to the directionsin 2.13.1390 a 29-33,
t
AOV Kal robs
X6
oTefre t?ldroexovral
rdlresrobs 7T^obTerTpqy
jOe XeyopJEovsO
6SolovsobK687Xovrws XpCopeV0o
KOal
aTO Kalo
ravodWvra
TOTs
X67yos
TroLDroT
X6roL.
This makes thesame connectionwith"ethical" proofas in 1.8.1366 a 12

3' W
"V
(above, page 268). Thus whenin 2.18.1391 b 34 Aristotlestates rnt
&
Trovrwcv
it
is
reasonable
robs
Kai
1X6yovs
rept
roteY,
GOLKobs
WxeraL
&6opwrat,
to take?70LKobs9
as coveringboththe rtLaretsbt ro
o4Oovs and thosetIvros
forhe has used the analyticalmaterialof 2.4. and 2.12-17 to

rar0eat;
equip thespeakerwithbothcategoriesofproof.
the range of meaning of 710LK6s
in Aristotle's Rhetorica,see Lockwood in CQ 23
O90n
(1929) 180-181.He analysesthreepassagesincludedin thisdiscussion,and suggests

threeseparateusages forthe word,whichdo not, howevercorrespondto the three
distinctuses ofi0os listedin note7. (1) In 3.7.1408a 22 f., theadjectiveis appliedto
speechin charactermorataoratio(thethirduse of 80os).(2) In 2.18.1391b 29,it is rather
"adapted to thecharacterof theaudienceto whomit is addressed"(the seconduse of
in 2.18.1391b 34. (3) In 2.21.1395b 17, it
~Oos).He does notdiscusstheuse of OmLKbs
is connectedwith2rpoalpeors,
andrelatedto a man'srtXos.Hereit is "moral,""of moral
moralcharacter."(Thisis equallythecase in3.16.1417a
value,"or"to marka particular
20, on
not considered by Lockwood, whereas in 1417 a 27 10LK.dare
7'0LKJL
7,cyfls, as at 3.7.1408a 22
utterances
in character,
above.)
Some additionalcommentsare needed.Lockwood ignores1.8.1366a 12: brel 6'
udV XXa Kal W&'076LK0o
ob pb6o' at trLerEts
(r~ y^p
7ylouraW6.'dro6EfrtKKo
X6yo
t
a alveo-Oa& pXbMyovra Lretebopev, roro 6' tWv & dyaObs qathlnra&
roL va
EOr
~
0,
Here the
d 7i1j
xew
JIES.
depovs I &JAow),bo& AT
ra
&
pKaarsthefirst
ofthespeaker,
adjectiveis specifically
appliedto the9OosroXLrecwu
usageof70os listedby
and theuse is adjectival,and
Cope. This appearsto be theonlyinstancein theRhetorica,
has notyettakenon an independent
lifeas a noun,whichmaybe thecase in Orator128
is notrecordedinAst,and apparently
(above,note1). Lockwoodpointsout that
not used by Plato. Aristotleseemsto use it0mLK6b
as an innovation,despitepreviousoccurrencesin, e.g., thePoetics(ch. 24), and is carefulto associateit withits rootnounj0os.
In 2.21.1359b 17 and 3.7.1408a 22 f.,and 16, 1417a 20 and 27, althoughdifferent
uses
are involved, it is supported by referencesto

or roL~elI. It seems that
of 0bLK6s
70os EXetw,
whatever 0os
makes speech 770LK6v; whatever i0os 9XELis itself 7706KbP.
Thus in
1.8.1366a 12 rOLte
and 2.18.1391b 34 O&Kd6s
X67os reflectsthe 30osof eitherspeakeror
audience.

271
of Cicero,Aristotle'saccount is entirelyin
Unlike the recommendations
termsofrepresentation:descriptionof theorator'scharacterand attitude.
The Ciceronianemphasison the act of conciliare,of winningbenevolence,
has convertedthe unstressedmotive of Aristotle'sproofinto its actual
method.At the same time,the Aristoteliandiscussionof contenthas been
largelydisplaced by Cicero's emphasis on style and mannerof delivery.
There is anothermajor difference.
Aristotlegenerallyspeaks as though
the oratoris actingon his own behalf,and excludesthe clientelement.In
deliberative oratory, in which as Aristotle says (2.1.1356 a 15) the
speaker's t0osis most important,thereis no client,and normallyno other
party to defendor support.In forensicoratoryin Greece, the speech was
normallydeliveredby the defendant,so that if the oratorwas not himself
the defendant Aristotle's remarks would have to be applied to the
defendantas speakerof the orator'swords. K. J. Dover, in Lysias and the
CorpusLysiacum (Berkeley 1968), Chapter 8, pp. 149-150, discusses the
circumstancesgoverninga consultant'sdecision whetherto speak in his
own personforthe defendant,or to writea speechwhollyor in part forthe
client to perform.Aristotletakes no noticeof this issue in Books 1 and 2
of the Rhetorica,in connectionwith90os.The sole referencesto a clientlOttrLtT0o 8vvf67Oa0a troseT irpbs
Kalc
figure are fKrc7var&Pv ydp a^ts rTE
AXXoprv
a
a
and
reference
back
to 1.9) EK7'Wva'brTWv
(1.9.1366
32),
(in
cpEripv
7p KAP
a
He
does
not
eLe
K&Y
(2.1.1378
21-22).
Tep6vr7LS &avrbv
KaaaKEvae r7Lorop
of the speech,as a
regardthe client,eitheras subjector performer
inhisdiscussion."'
element
significant
In his earlierbook TheArtof Persuasionin Greece(Princeton1963),
saw a reference
to thistypeofcomposition
fora
pp. 91-92,Kennedy
in Rhet.3.7. 'HOoroda,
the stylisticcharacterisation
of a
client-speaker
waspractisedbyLysiaslongbeforethecomposition
ofthe
client-speaker,
and is describedby Dionysiusof Halicarnassusin Lys. 8 ff.
Rhetorica,
What Aristotle says in 3.7.1408 a 24 is: r&Oavo T 7brpa-Aa Kal

7 oIKELa
ts~ (6) Kcl 1OLKU1aLiT 7 &rL'v
EK
OEL, 05t&KOXOVOEJL
...
cfr/ELCEov
&pJ6r77ovaa
to a Spartan,
or
dtaryq
Y've&LKal ies,suchas the languageappropriate
oi Kalbra
Thessalian,or a woman.He adds (1408a 30) MAv
d v6Para
oiLca1a
Ee,roL~
T r
b Oos. ob ydp 7rabr7obby' raabros ypoPos

LAv Kai
There
need
be
no
reference
here
to
language as
reraLbev8J.Lvo
sZlretev.
Xy
r
7~
designedto characterisethe speaker,as therewas in the account of X~cts

,raf7O7Ki
in the preceding section (1408 a 20-24).
Instead Aristotle is
"oCompare
Kennedy,"The RhetoricofAdvocacy,"420-421.He showsthatalthough
Aristotletwicein theRhetorica
refersto anecdotesin whicha specificadvocatespoke
himselfforhisclient(1.13.1374b 36; 2.20.1393b 22-23) he "neverdiscussesthevaried
possibilitieswhichadvocacymightopen" . . . "in rhetoricaltheorythe litigantis assumedto speak forhimself,
presumablybecausethisis the basic situationin a Greek
court."

272
PHOENIX
discussing how to make language fittingto a Spartan, Thessalian, or

a woman. But women and foreigners
could not plead theirown cases, so
Aristotlecannot be discussinghow to characterisea client, but rather
how to include narrativequotations in the style of those quoted. This is
T
apparent in Kennedy's second reference(3.16.1417 a 27), aXX&7'7LK6d
'
b~
of
this
characIta
L
40
Oe,
aLObt?e:
Tr6peva
technique
K&T1rq
olov
Xycowv
terisationis foruse in narrative,when a thirdpartyhas to be portrayed.
This was seen quite clearly by Cope (Introductionto Aristotle'sRhetoric,
112): "The third variety of 0Oos... belongs to style, and accordingly
appears only in book 3 .... It occurs usually, and is most appropriatein
or narrative."
the second divisionof the speech, &t?irttEs
It would seem then that in the RhetoricaAristotledoes not discuss the
implicationsof the orator-clientrelationship,neitherassumingthe client
as possible speaker, nor givingmore than minimalattentionto the type
of oratorywhichinvolvesdefenceof another.The double roleof depicting
the characterand attitudeof both speakerand clientwould be more rare
in Greek courts,and is not thereforean issue in theRhetorica.Whetheror
not his interestsare primarilyin deliberativeoratory,Aristotlemakes it
clear that this type of oratoryis the main fieldof the 7rlo~sbLd 70rov
j0ovs,
so that the t0osto be representedis that of one man, the orator.
Comparingthe Ciceronian with the Aristotelianpresentation,we can
see that Cicero's difficulties
have arisen forfourreasons. (1) Since Cicero
sets his commentsin the contextof forensic,not deliberativeoratory,he
has to accommodate them to Roman forensicpractice. Unless the
defendantwas himselfan orator(such as Caelius Rufus,who spoke in his
own defencede vi,56 B.c.), this always entailed a distinctionbetweenthe
patronus,speaking in his own person, and the client; hence conciliare
involved a double function,of creating credit for the character and
attitudes of both parties. (2) Cicero's choice of the verb conciliare,
appropriateto the purpose of this,as also of othercategoriesof proof,is
too general,and preventshimfromdistinguishing
betweenthe descriptive
role of the "ethical" proof,with its emphasis on ror6vruvasalvea0at7
r
(Rhet. 2.1.137 b 27) and the emotive role of the 7rior&
aldl rWVP
XMyovra
(Rhet. 1.2.1356 a 15). It is probably awareness of this convereKpoaracv
whichleads him to put
gence of the two proofsin conciliarebenevolentiam
Amorfirstin his list of emotions,whereasAristotlehad begun with 6pyq
to
as the opposite (2.3 and 4).
(2.2), passing on through
,rpapvE0ta OItla,
Nevertheless
theAristotelian
is
outin the
descriptive
principle brought
oratio(2.184),
phrases exprimere
mores,and ut quasi moresoratoriseJfingat
and the expressedaim utprobi,ut benemorati,ut boni viriesse videamur.
Videri is used again in 201, ut ... mansuetissimusviderer,but the real
a comes in two earlier passages not
counterpartto rotLb6
iva 4alvpeOB
explicitlyassociated with the verb conciliare,at 1.89, ut et ipse eis apud

273
quos agerettalis qualem se esse optaretvideretur,et ut ei qui audirentsic

animis ut eos adficivellet,and (virtuallyrepeated) at 2.176, in
adficerentur
the transitionfromdocereto the other functions:si veroadsequetur,ut
talis videaturqualem se viderivelit,etanimoseorumita adficiat,apud quos
aget, ut eos quocumquevelitvel traherevel raperepossit, nihil profectoad
dicendumrequiret.(3) Aristotlehimselfmakes it difficultto discuss the
clearly,since he uses the same chapter (2.4.) as raw
question of qOLK6V
materialforthe two aims of (a) creating MXLa/eivota
in the audience and
of the orator.This has a psychologicaljustificathe
(b) representing
in duvoLa
the orator begets d5vozain the audience, but it may
tion, since
edora
Cicero's
presentationof the two aims in Antonius' trial
explain why
and part of
narrative,using the same key-word,conciliare,forbothiOLuK6v
has
become
it
and
contributes
to the
confused,
inextricably
7raOnpLK6V,
of
which
him
functions
causes
evident
in
211-212.
overlap
difficulty
(4) Finally, Cicero's professionallove of, and faithin, style,means that
he sees style and deliveryas a primaryelementin the representationof
the orator's lenitas (intended to translateirLLKELa).Now lenitasof style
moresoratoris,but barely exprimeremoresof the
can indeed effingere
client, as he seems to maintain in 2.184. This difficultyhas however
nothingto do with 7o0roda to suit the client,which as we have seen is
absent fromAristotleand irrelevantto Roman practice. Roman taste
admittedonly one formof Ethosin thissense; that of the wise,good, and
benevolent statesman (Aristotle's opo6vLwL,
and edvoLof
uarov&saoL,
2.1.1378 a 6 f.). For Cicero a mild and virtuousstyleportrayedthe Ethos
of the orator,and would reflectits excellenceupon the client described
and defended.
The last two points require furthercommentin the light of Cicero's
later practice. He obviously valued the implicationsof the verb conciliare when he chose it to representthe Aristotelianuse of Ethos. Yet he
uses it only once" afterDe Oratorein connectionwith this themeof the
threefunctions.In Brutus,delectare12
performsthis role in 185, 187-188,
276
it
where
is
associated with the conciliatory
(and compare 322,
197,
effectof humour).Combined withdelectarearefidemfacere,187, 197, and
animos a severitate
traducere,197 (cf. 322 again), animos devincirevolup"At Orator128, quoted in note 1 above. The index to Cicero's Rhetoricalists seven uses
of the verb subsequent to De Oratore;of these three are in the idiom conciliarebenevolentiam: Part. Or. 15.2; 28.7; Orator128.7 above. Add Part. Or. 53.2, c.fidem; Brut. 156.11,
c. gratiam(social, not rhetorical); Orator122.7, c. auditorem(in theexordium); and 162.10,
c. voluptatem
aurium (on compositio).The noun conciliatiooccurs only in De Oratore:2.216
and 2.292 allude to this use of Ethos and mark the end of the topic of psychological
proofs (216) and Antonius' recapitulation after the digression on humour; 3.205 is
general, in a long list of emotional devices.
1sA. E. Douglas, Cicero: Brutus (Oxford 1968) Intr. xxxv, no. 28, is misleading;
conciliare occurs in none of these passages.

274
PHOENIX
tate, 276. The differentemphasis in the set-piece describing Crassus'

famous speech in the civil causa Curiana at 197 f., the counterpartof
Antonius' great speech forNorbanus describedin De Orat.2.197 f.,may
account for the choice of delectare,since the issue in court was more
academic, and less provocative; conciliare was not an urgent need.
However, the absence of the verb fromthe otherreferencesto the three
functionsdoes suggest deliberate avoidance of conciliareas a term. In
De OptimoGenereand in Oratoralso, when Cicero distinguishesthe three
functions,he uses delectareforthe second, most explicitlyand repeatedly
at Orator69, where he elaborates this in the process of reconcilingthe
three functionswith the threegenera: subtilein probando,modicum in
Conciliareremains absent fromthe
delectando, vehemensin flectendo."1
it
occurs
ensuingdiscussion,although
casually in 122 as one of the three
of
the
The
exordium.
requirements
exceptionassociated with Ethos is a
briefallusion in 128, whereone paragraph covers Aristotle'ssecond and
thirdproofsin a summaryof miscellaneoustheory(121-128), openingthe
transitionfromthefirstthemeofOratorto thesecondsectionon compositio.
This is already the pattern in the earlier PartitionesOratoriae.When
Cicero discusses the elementof Ethos in oratoryin 22, the key word is
delectat... oratio. .quae significatoratorisipsius amabilis mores.Conciliare is reservedforthe specificbenevolentiam
conciliareof the exordium
for
the
and
in
the
(15, 28)
peroration which (53) motu
amplificatio
animorumconcilietin dicendofidem-surely a case of movere,the third
function!Thus thisspecial use of conciliarelapses afterDe Oratore,which
would suggest that Cicero became dissatisfiedwith the termsome time
beforehe took the furtherstep of modifyingthe threefunctionsto fitthe
threestylesin Orator.We may thenbe justifiedin explainingthe substitution of delectarewith or withoutfidemfacere by the difficultieshe experienced in the application of conciliarein De Oratore,as at 211-212
above. CertainlySandys is rightto note on Orator69 that delectarehas no
connectionwith the Aristotelian riors &td roDfliovsand "in Aristotle's
view is strictly speaking superfluous," but mistaken in denying an
original connection between the Ciceronian functionsand Aristotelian
Pisteis; the originaltermconciliare,as used in De Oratore,was chosen to
to RhetoricalTheory,"Eranos 55
laSee A. E. Douglas,"A Ciceroniancontribution
(1957) 18-26, whose account I follow in the chronologyof Cicero's changing approach
to the three functions.He does not, however, commenton the replacementof conciliare
by delectare;as in the referencequoted in note 12, he treats the two verbs as equivalent.
This article seems to have been neglected by recent scholarship (e.g., Kennedy, The Art
ofRhetoricat Rome,255, sees no change in the threefunctionsfromDe Oratoreto Orator),
and is a valuable correctiveto the scepticism which explains all discrepancies between
one work of Cicero and the next in terms of his acquiescence in the structure and
principles of his differentsources.

CICERONIANCONCILIARE AND ARISTOTELIANETHOS
275
ofEthos;itwasindiscarding
an aspectofAristotle's
reflect
presentation
Cicero
theconnection.
and
that
severed
delectare,
it,
adopting
To return
toCicero's
of
valuation
style;inthishedidnotchange.
high
In Orator
witha categorical
50f.heprefaces
hisdiscussion
ofits
assertion
of
the
court
cum
autem
et
and
domination
situation:
et
primacy
quid quo
locodicatinvenerit,
illudestlongemaximum,
videre
quonammodo.If thisis
true even in philosophy,how much more so in causis... quibus totis

moderaturoratio? Its importancelay in its power to persuade, which
Cicero saw as equal to, ifnot greaterthan, that of truthor logic, because
it appealed like music to the uncriticalsenses,and persuaded,as it were,
subliminally.This emergesfromthe major digressionat Brutus 187-200,
ending in the portrayalof the perfectorator in absolute controlof his
audience like a virtuosoinstrumentalist-ithas become his instrument.
If Cicero claimed forstylemorethan Aristotlewould have thoughteither
possible or desirable,thistoo may explain whyhe moved fromthe partial
representationof Aristotle'ssecond proofby conciliare,to a termwhich
had nothingin commonwith Aristotle,but carried richeraesthetic and
stylisticassociations.
TRINITYCOLLEGE,TORONTO


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