Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 15-15211
No. 15-15213
No. 15-15215
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PUENTE ARIZONA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
JOSEPH M. ARPAIO, ET AL.,
Defendant-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Case No. 2:14-CV-01356
The Honorable David G. Campbell
United States District Court Judge
APPELLEES CONSOLIDATED
ANSWERING BRIEF
Anne Lai
University of California, Irvine
School of Law Immigrant Rights
Clinic
401 E. Peltason Dr., Ste. 3500
Irvine, CA 92616-5479
Telephone: (949) 824-9894
Facsimile: (949) 824-2747
alai@law.uci.edu
Cindy Pnuco
Joshua Piovia-Scott
Dan Stormer
Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP
127 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Ste. 204
Pasadena, CA 91103
Telephone: (866) 457-2590
cpanuco@hadsellstormer.com
jps@hadsellstormer.com
dstormer@hadsellstormer.com
Daniel J. Pochoda
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
dpochoda@acluaz.org
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... v
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................... 2
A.
B.
2.
ii
B.
C.
D.
II.
2.
2.
2.
B.
III.
B.
2.
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 59
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................... 61
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ..................................................... 62
iv
T ABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
FEDERAL CASES
Cousins v. Lockyer
568 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) ......................................................... 12
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
530 U.S. 363 (2000) ....................................................... 13, 33, 34, 36
Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker
535 U.S. 125 (2002) ......................................................................... 47
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.
422 U.S. 922 (1975) ......................................................................... 45
Dougherty v. City of Covina
654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................................................... 12
Elrod v. Burns
427 U.S. 347 (1976) ......................................................................... 43
English v. General Electric Co.
496 U.S. 72 (1990) ............................................................... 17, 18, 19
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin
733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013) ................................................. 17, 18, 19
Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association
505 U.S. 88 (1992) ......................................................... 15, 16, 18, 21
Geier v. America Honda Motor Co.
529 U.S. 861 (2000) ....................................................... 14, 15, 31, 39
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia
691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) ....................................................... 26
Goldstein v. City of Long Beach
715 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2013) ..................................................... 56, 59
vi
Hines v. Davidowitz
312 U.S. 52 (1941) ....................................................................... 7, 24
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.
535 U.S. 137 (2002) ............................................................... 4, 24, 28
I.N.S. v. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc.
502 U.S. 183 (1991) ......................................................................... 37
Kenna v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) ......................................................... 49
Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & General Ecology Consultants v. Nelson
48 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................. 45
Kirshner v. Uniden Corporation of America
842 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1988) ......................................................... 58
LaDuke v. Nelson
762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) ......................................................... 45
Lee v. City of Los Angeles
250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................................... 49, 58
Lopez v. Candaele
630 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................................................... 44
Lopez v. Pacific Maritime Association
657 F.3d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................. 45
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio
770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................... 40, 41, 48
Loyal Tire & Automobile Center, Inc. v. Town of Woodbury
445 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2006) ............................................................. 18
Lozano v. City of Hazleton
724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013) ................................................. 26, 27, 41
vii
viii
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (1971) ..................................................................... 45, 51
S TATE CASES
xi
F EDERAL STATUTES
8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15) ...................................................................................... 6
1182(a)(6) ...................................................................................... 26
1227(a)(3)(C) ................................................................................. 26
1324a ..................................................................................... passim
18 U.S.C.
1028 ............................................................................. 24, 25, 30, 35
1546 ................................................................................... 25, 28, 31
22 U.S.C.
7101(b) ........................................................................................... 35
28 U.S.C.
1292(a)(1) .................................................................................. 1, 50
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
28-2.6 ................................................................................................ 62
32(a)(7) ............................................................................................. 61
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b) .................................................................................................. 10
Public Law 99-603
103 ................................................................................................. 25
101 ................................................................................................. 25
111 ................................................................................................... 6
STATE STATUTES
Arizona Constitution
Article XII, Section 3 ....................................................................... 57
Arizona Revised Statutes
11-219 ............................................................................................ 58
11-251 ............................................................................................ 57
11-253 ............................................................................................ 58
xii
11-261 ............................................................................................ 56
11-401 ............................................................................................ 57
11-402 ............................................................................................ 57
11-409 ............................................................................................ 57
11-441 ............................................................................................ 55
13-2002 .......................................................................................... 48
13-2008 .............................................................................. 3, 42, 48
13-2009 ............................................................................ 2, 3, 42, 48
13-2929 .......................................................................................... 27
38-341 ............................................................................................ 57
R EGULATIONS
8 C.F.R.
214.14 .............................................................................................. 6
274a.2 ........................................................................................ 4, 23
28 C.F.R.
68.1 ................................................................................................ 26
MISCELLANEOUS
132 Congressional Record, S16879-01 (1986) ..................................... 5, 25
H.R. Rep., 99-682 (1986) ............................................................................. 6
xiii
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellees agree that the Court has jurisdiction over Appellants
appeal of the District Courts preliminary injunction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). However, Appellant Maricopa Countys attempted
appeal of the District Courts ruling regarding municipal liability is not
properly before the Court, as it does not meet the criteria for pendent
appellate jurisdiction and is not a collateral order.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.
irreparable harm and the balance of equities and public interest favored
a preliminary injunction; and
4.
Factual Background
immigration crimes rather than its general Fraud and Identity Theft
Bureau. 1-SER-212-15 (testimony of Vicki Kratovil); 1-SER-221 (MCAO
Special Report). In six years, MCSO conducted over seventy worksite
operations, arresting nearly 790 workers on charges of identity theft
and/or forgery. 1-SER-226. In 2014, after the courts had enjoined other
aspects of his offices program on immigration, Sheriff Arpaio told a
crowd of supporters, I still enforce the illegal immigration laws by
virtue of going into businesses and locking up the employees with fake
ID. Statement at Minnesota Tea Party Special Event, March 6, 2014,
at minute 51:14, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFdXxrl5qw. In six years, only five employers were charged by Maricopa
County law enforcement with violations related to employing
undocumented workers. 1-SER-228.
The worksite operations spread fear through the immigrant
community, discouraged undocumented workers from reporting labor
rights violations, and separated breadwinners from their families. See
14-ER-3186-88, Garcia Decl. 13, 16, 18-19, 23-24; see also 14-ER3201-03, Cervantes Decl. 15-19, 24-29 (describing harms experienced
as a result of being arrested); 14-ER- 3197-98, Romero Decl. 14-15,
18, 22-26) (same). In response, Puente staff and volunteers began
providing direct assistance to members affected by the worksite
operations and conducting advocacy to try to stop them. 14-ER-3187-89,
Garcia Decl. 17, 28-31. In the meantime, the Supreme Court and
other federal courts issued several landmark rulings on the application
of the Supremacy Clause to state immigration measures. See, e.g., infra
Part I.B.1 (discussing precedents). In 2014, with workers continuing to
8
Because the County is liable for the decisions of Sheriff Arpaio, the
District Court found it was not necessary to address whether the
County is also liable for the decisions of Appellant Montgomery under
Monell. 1-ER-46.
7
10
irreparable harm , , , that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest. Arc of Cal. v. Douglas, 757
F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit
evaluate[s] these factors via a sliding scale approach. Id. (citation
omitted).
When properly raised, this Court reviews a denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir.
2011). All allegations of material fact [in the complaint] are taken as
true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The worker identity provisions are the latest aspect of Arizonas
effort to make its own immigration policy to have been struck down by
the courts. Appellants fill up many pages of briefing, but they fail to
point to a single piece of record evidence to contradict the District
Courts finding that the worker identity provisions were enacted in
order to punish fraud in the federal work authorization verification
system. Rather, they attempt to rewrite history by insisting that the
measures were about identity theft generally. This Court should decline
Appellants invitation to ignore the provisions plain intent and
practical effect. Appellants position not only flies in the face of binding
precedent, but would allow any stateunder the guise of punishing
identity theftto create its own scheme for punishing undocumented
workers who provide false information in response to the employment
12
Congress has the power to preempt state law. Crosby v. Natl Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). In the absence of an express
preemption provision, state law is preempted when the scope of a
statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field
13
15
Though Appellants cite to Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980, the Court there
declined to consider the legislative history of the federal statute, IRCA,
because it found it would be unhelpful to the question of statutory
construction.
10
18
693 F.3d at 860 (pretextually asserted motive will not save a law from
preemption); Entergy, 733 F.3d at 42021 (same).11
In sum, the purpose and effects analyses, taken together, allow
courts to distinguish between state laws that have some tangential but
acceptable effect on a field of federal regulation, on the one hand, and
state laws that improperly regulate in a prohibited field, on the other.
See English, 496 U.S. at 85. The District Court applied the analyses
precisely right in this case.
2.
19
Indeed, in the year prior to passage of H.B. 2779, Pearce had been
chief sponsor of a precursor bill, Arizona House Bill 2577 (H.B. 2577),
that proposed to revise the definition of the offense of forgery to include
falsely making or altering a written instrument that purports to be a
document that fulfills the requirements for establishing identity, or
eligibility to work in the United States pursuant to the federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and that is used to obtain
employment in this state by a person who is not authorized to work in
the United States. 1-SER-11 (H.B. 2577 6). The bill passed the
legislature but was vetoed by the Governor. Letter from Janet
Napolitano to Jim Weiers, June 6, 2006, available at
http://www.azleg.gov/govlettr/47leg/2R/HB2577.pdf. That the
Legislatures earlier attempt to criminalize fraudulent activity by
undocumented workers was explicitly linked to IRCA leaves no doubt as
to its true purpose in the years following H.B. 2577.
12
20
21
22
132 S.Ct at 2501), cert. denied sub nom. Arizona v. Valle Del Sol, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014). In other words, a field is preempted if federal
statutory directives provide a full set of standards . . . designed as a
harmonious whole. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2502 (quoting Hines, 312
U.S. at 72).
After a full review of the federal statutory framework, the District
Court concluded that Congress had occupied the field of unauthorizedalien fraud in obtaining employment. 1-ER-29. Appellants do not
directly contest this finding. Instead, they argue, irrelevantly, that
Congress has not fully occupied the field of identity theft generally.
AOB 22-33. Appellants focus on the field of identity theft
misapprehends the District Courts analysis and the reason for its
reliance on statutes such as 18 U.S.C. 1028.
1.
There are few areas where the federal interest is more dominant
than in immigration. Federal control over immigration policy is
necessary because [i]mmigration policy can affect trade, investment,
tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the
perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full
protection of its laws. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. In an exercise of its
broad, undoubted power over immigration, id., in 1986, Congress
created a comprehensive and careful[ly] balance[d] system
regulating the employment of undocumented immigrants, id. at 250405, that is now central to the nations policy on immigration. Hoffman,
24
535 U.S. at 147. See supra at 4-6 (describing IRCA). As part of this
system, Congress anticipated that individuals might respond to IRCA
by using false documents to show eligibility to work and provide[d] for
this reality by equipping federal officials with multifaceted, versatile
tools to address fraud. 132 Cong. Rec. S16879-01 (statement of cosponsor Sen. Simpson).
First, IRCA amended 18 U.S.C. 1546(b) pertaining to Fraud
and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents to allow criminal
sanctions for the use of a false identification document or making of a
false attestation for purposes of satisfying the employment verification
requirement. Pub. L. 99-603, 103 (1986). It expanded the prohibition
on selling, making or using fraudulent immigration documents to
include those documents used as evidence of authorized . . .
employment in the United States. Id. (amending 18 U.S.C. 1546(a)).
In addition, IRCA specifically designated the additional federal
criminal statutesboth newly amended and pre-existingthat could
be used to address fraud in the employment verification process. See
Pub. L. 99-603, 101 (adding 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(5) and listing certain
statutes related to fraud in Title 18, Sections 1001 [false statements],
1028 [fraud in connection with identity documents], 1546, and 1621
[perjury]).
Second, Congress created civil penalties for document fraud. 8
U.S.C. 1324c allows an administrative law judge to impose a fine,
after a hearing, on any person or entity who knowingly forge[s],
use[s] or attempt[s] to use a document not belonging to the
possessor to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration and
25
26
Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012) (GLAHR); United States
v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2013). Each of these
factors confirms that Congress has occupied the field of fraud in
response to the federal employment verification system.
First, the federal scheme addressing such fraud is extensive. As
set forth above, Congress has imposed every kind of penalty that can
arise from an unauthorized aliens use of false documents to secure
employmentcriminal, civil and immigration[.] 1-ER-29. Faced with a
similarly comprehensive federal scheme involving the harboring of
undocumented immigrants, this Court voided another Arizona criminal
law, A.R.S. 13-2929. Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1023-26 (finding federal
alien harboring scheme to be comprehensive because it included a full
set of standards, including graduated punishments); see also Lozano,
724 F.3d at 31618; South Carolina, 720 F.3d at 53132; GLAHR, 691
F.3d at 1267; United States v. Arizona, Case 2:10-cv-01413-SRB, Doc.
215 (filed Nov. 17, 2014); We Are America v. Maricopa County Bd. of
Suprs, 297 F.R.D. 373, 38892 (D. Ariz. 2013). Like the alien harboring
scheme, the federal scheme for regulating fraud in the employment
verification process reflects careful consideration by Congress, providing
federal officials with a complete set of tools to address a range of
regulated conduct. See Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1025-26.
Second, just as regulation of alien harboring is one part of a
broader scheme governing the crimes associated with the movement of
aliens in the United States, Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1024, federal
regulation of fraud in employment verification is one part of a broader
policy framework regulating the employment of immigrants. See
27
Like Appellants here, South Carolina had argued that its state law,
which made it unlawful for any person to display or possess a false or
counterfeit ID for the purpose of proving lawful presence in the United
States, did not relate to the field of alien registration because it
instead addressed ordinary fraud. Id. (summarizing Section 6(B)(2) of
South Carolinas Act 69). But the Fourth Circuit nevertheless found the
provision preempted. Id.17
The comprehensiveness of the federal scheme here, the place of
that scheme within a larger regulatory structure governing the
employment of undocumented immigrants, and the direct evidence of
Congresss intent to prevent the employment verification requirements
from being appropriated for law enforcement goals outside of the federal
system all demonstrate[] an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest
in the field. Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1026 (quoting GLAHR, 691 F.3d
at 1264). They impel the conclusion that Congress has fully occupied
the field.
Appellants try to distinguish this case from South Carolina and other
preemption precedents by arguing that they did not apply to U.S.
citizens. AOB 27. But, among other things, they ignore the fact that
South Carolinas law did apply to U.S. citizens. Section 6(B) of Act 69
requires officers to investigate any person they reasonably suspect to be
unlawfully present by examining any number of documents, including a
state drivers license. Act 69, 2011 S.C. Acts (S.B. 20). A U.S. citizen
asked for identification under this Section who presented a false
document would certainly have been in violation of the fraud provision
in Section 6(B)(2).
17
29
2.
31
34
at 2502.21 The cases cited by Appellants do not deal with this situation.
See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989) (noting
in that case that there was no clear purpose of Congress that would
render states imposition of additional liability preempted).
2.
36
38
conflict with federal law. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350 ([s]tate-law fraudon-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with federal scheme); see also
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503; Valle del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1027; GLAHR,
691 F.3d at 1266. Such a finding would have been unlikely in Whiting,
given the express savings clause in IRCA that allows states to regulate
employers through licensing and similar laws. 131 S. Ct. at 1984
(quoting 8 U.S.C. 1324(h)(2)).
Further, Whiting noted that in implement[ing] the sanctions that
Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pursue through licensing laws . .
. Arizona went the extra mile in ensuring that its law closely tracks
IRCA's provisions in all material respects. Id. at 1981. That is far from
the case here with the worker identity provisions, which impose
different penalties than federal law and permit felony prosecutions
against individuals that federal law has exempted or deprioritized for
punishment. See supra at 35-36, 38-39.
D.
Arpaio. 770 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). As the Court
explained, [b]ecause Proposition 100 is not carefully limited as
Salernos heightened scrutiny test requires, the entire statute fails . . .
and would thus be invalid in all of its applications. Id. (citations
omitted).
Appellants point to the Supreme Courts decision in Arizona to
overturn the preliminary injunction against Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070
and suggest that the challenged provisions could similarly be read in a
way to avoid constitutional problems here. AOB 21. First, as the Third
Circuit recognized in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014), no part of the majority
opinion in Arizona . . . references Salerno at all. Id. at 313 n.22
(discussing Salernos interaction with preemption challenges).
Moreover, in Arizona, the Supreme Court was dealing with a preenforcement challenge. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. Here, the worker
identity provisions have been fully implemented and they have not
been implemented in any narrower, constitutional manner. LopezValenzuela, 770 F.3d at 789; see supra at 21-23. Indeed, the provisions
could not be implemented in a constitutional manner without
eviscerating the meaning of H.B. 2779 1 and H.B. 2745 1thus, no
reasonable or readily apparent narrowing construction is available.
Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 789.23
Amici for Appellants contend that the District Court should have
considered the possibility of severance to enjoin only the state
prosecution of fictitious identification documents when being used to
satisfy and at the time of the federal employment verification process.
23
41
II.
1.
676 F.3d at 835. The Court considers: (1) whether the plaintiffs have
articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question; (2) whether
the government has communicated a specific warning or threat to
initiate proceedings; and (3) the history of past prosecution or
enforcement under the statute. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the
presence of a specific threat of enforcement is one way that a plaintiff
can demonstrate a likelihood of prosecution, but not the only way.
Indeed, as the District Court noted, whether prosecuting
authorities have communicated a specific warning is less relevant
when there is a clear history of enforcing the law in question. 1-ER-17.
A history of past enforcement against parties similarly situated to the
plaintiffs cuts in favor of a conclusion that a threat is specific and
credible. Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 786-87 (9th Cir. 2010). Here,
there was a substantial history of vigorous enforcement. See supra at 78; 1-ER-16 (summarizing prosecution data); see also 14-ER-3186-90,
Garcia Decl. 13, 35-37.25
Lyons does not hold otherwise. In Lyons, the Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff faced a low risk of being subjected again to a
chokehold by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) because that
would only occur following an unlikely chain of events. 461 U.S. at 105-
44
45
2.
Finally, the District Court found that the equities and public
interest favored a preliminary injunction. 1-ER-35-36. It did not reach
this conclusion lightly. While Appellants would have this Court
substitute its judgment for that of the District Court, that is not the
proper role of the appellate court. See Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113,
1118 (9th Cir. 2001) revd on other grounds sub nom. Dept of Hous. &
Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) ([W]e will not second guess
whether the court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case,
which may be largely undeveloped at the early stages of litigation.);
Williams v. Zbaraz, 442 U.S. 1309, 1312 (1979) (Balancing the equities
is always a difficult task, and few cases are ever free from doubt.).
Of course, no equitable or public interest can come from enforcing
an unconstitutional law. Ariz. Dream Act Coal., 757 F.3d at 1069; Valle
del Sol, 732 F.3d at 1029; Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. By
preliminarily enjoining the worker identity provisions, the District
Court halted the disruption to the federal system that Arizonas laws
28
47
48
49
51
the suit is allowed to proceed past the motion stage of the litigation, or
(2) it goes to an issue, such as jurisdiction or abstention, that calls into
question the very power of the district court to issue the rulin[g] under
consideration. Id. at 816 (citations omitted). Neither is present here. As
the Supreme Court explained in Swint, the Countys assertion that the
Sheriff is not its policymaker does not rank . . . as an immunity from
suit, but is instead a mere defense to liability . . . [that] may be
reviewed effectively on appeal from final judgment. 514 U.S. at 43
(citations omitted).33 The Countys argument is also not one that
implicates the District Courts jurisdiction.
In Poulos, the this Court declined pendent jurisdiction even where
a subset of defendants raised jurisdictional challenges, since the court
would have retained jurisdiction over the class certification decision
regardless of whether it asserted personal jurisdiction over [those
defendants]. 379 F.3d at 672. An allegedly improperly enjoined
defendant is in no worse a position on interlocutory appeal than a
defendant forced to defend a class action in a court that she claims lacks
personal jurisdiction over her. Under this Courts precedent, both can
attack the underlying order to which they objectin this case, the
preliminary injunctionbut neither has a right to immediate relief on
ancillary issues that fall outside the narrow . . . realm of pendent
appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 669.
The Court made this statement in the context of ruling that the
decision on the county commissions Monell liability was not a collateral
order. Though the County has not asserted that the District Courts
ruling on Monell liability is a collateral order, this finding in Swint
would foreclose such a possibility.
33
52
B.
If the Court reviews the Monell issue, it should affirm the District
Courts carefully considered and twice-made holding that the County is
liable for the Sheriffs official law enforcement decisions and policies. In
denying the Countys motion to dismiss and finding the County liable,
the District Court joined every other court to have considered the
question. See United States v. Maricopa Cnty., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1083-84 (D. Ariz. 2012) (finding as a matter of law that County is liable
for policies of the Sheriff); Mora v. Arpaio, No. CV-09-1719-PHX-DGC,
2011 WL 1562443, at *7 (D. Ariz. Apr. 25, 2011) (same); Lovejoy v.
Arpaio, No. CV 091912PHXNVW, 2010 WL 466010, at *12 (D. Ariz.
Feb. 10, 2010) (same); Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1038-39 (D. Ariz. 2009) (same); 34 see also Flanders v. Maricopa
County, 54 P.3d 837, 847 (Ariz. App. 2002) (same as to jail
management);35 Guillory v. Greenlee County, No. CV 05352 TUC DCB,
In addition, this Court recently ordered that the County be
substituted for the MCSO as a defendant after MCSO was found not to
be a jural entity in Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir.
2015). The County petitioned for a panel rehearing and an en banc
determination, arguing as it does here that it should not be liable due to
the Countys horizontal structure of governance. Countys Pet. for
Panel Rehg and En Banc Determination, Melendres v. Arpaio, No. 1316285, Dkt. 77. The panel unanimously denied the Countys petition,
and no judge of this Court requested a vote. Id., Dkt. 87.
35 Though Flanders dealt with the Sheriffs responsibility over the jails,
the County makes no argument as to why the result should be different
with respect to the Sheriffs law enforcement duties. In Brewster v.
Shasta County, this Court found it require[d] little extension of a case
34
53
2006 WL 2816600, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28. 2006) (same as to Greenlee
County).
A municipality is liable under Monell for the actions of those
officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking
authority for the [municipality] concerning the action alleged to have
caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.
McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997) (citation
omitted). Courts analyzing Monell policymaker liability look to whether
(1) the official had final policymaking authority concerning the action
alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory
violation at issue and (2) the official was the policymaker for the local
governing body for the purposes of the particular act. Weiner v. San
Diego Cnty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting McMillian,
520 U.S. at 785).
1.
[a]rrest and take before the nearest magistrate for examination all
persons who attempt to commit or who have committed a public
offense. A.R.S. 11-441. Here, the County has acknowledged, there is
no other county entity or official that can review the Sheriffs law
enforcement decisions. CR 141 at 4, 6 (stating that the Sheriffs policy
represents the policy that exists in Maricopa County and that if the
Sheriff decide[s] to enforce a criminal law, the [Board of Supervisors
(Board)] cannot stop [him]. Conversely, if [the Sheriff] decide[s] not to
enforce a criminal law, the [Board] cannot require [him] to reverse [his]
decisions) (emphasis in original).
The County argues that because the Board cannot overrule the
Sheriff and force him to comply with court orders, it makes no sense to
keep [the] County as a party defendant. MCOB 14. Although Appellees
request only declaratory and injunctive relief and not damages, there is
at least one practical reason why the Countys participation as a
defendant is consequentialAppellees seek to halt the Boards
expenditure of tax revenues to finance arrests, detentions and
prosecutions under the worker identity provisions. See id. at 9 n. 2
(citing A.R.S. 11-201(A)(6) and explaining that the Board determines
the budgets of all elected and appointed county officers).36 In any
event, as the District Court observed, though the Boards inability to
The District Court did not specifically reach the question of whether
this provided independent basis for keeping the County in the suit. 1ER-44-46. However, the availability of this alternative ground is yet
another reason why review of the Monell issue is not necessary to
ensure meaningful review of the District Courts preliminary
injunction order. Meredith, 321 F.3d at 812-13.
36
55
56
duties of his office, and may require [him] to give such bonds or further
bonds as may be necessary for the faithful performance of his respective
duties. A.R.S. 11-253; see also, e.g., Hounshell v. White, 199 P.3d 636
(Ariz. App. 2008).37 The County argues that Arizona exerts greater
control over the Sheriff because his powers and duties are set in state
statute and because he enforces state laws. MCOB at 11-12. But
California sheriffs also derive their powers from state statute and
enforce state laws, and this Court found them to be county officials.
Brewster, 275 F.3d at 808-09, 812.
The County suggests that the Sheriff makes policy for himself
only, MCOB at 10, 13; CR 141 at 4, and points to the horizontal
structure of County government to show that other court rulings finding
it liable were the result of confusion and misunderstanding. MCOB at
7, 9.38 But as the District Court emphasized, any limits on the Boards
The County misstates the holding of Hounshell. See MCOB at 11. In
that case, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed that the board of
supervisors had the authority to require the sheriff to post a bond and
could remove the sheriff for failure to do so. Id. at 640-43. It held that
the board could not require the sheriff to pay a premium on the bond.
Id. at 644.
38 The County flouts the rules of practice by presenting organizational
charts of the horizontal Maricopa County and the unitary New York
City, see MCOB at 9-10 n. 3-4, Exs. A-B, that it never presented to the
District Court in connection with its motion to dismiss or its motion for
reconsideration. See Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 842 F.2d 1074,
1077 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Fed.R.App.P. 10(a)). Though the County
suggests the Court can take judicial notice of the charts, judicial notice
is only available for matters of public record that are beyond
reasonable dispute. Lee, 250 F.3d at 689 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)). That is not the case here.
37
58
control over the Sheriff is not dispositive of its liability. 1-ER-4. The
task here is not to determine whether a county official exercises certain
functions independently of other political entities within the county but
whether he acts for the county. Brewster, 275 F.3d at 810 (emphasis in
original) (finding that provision strengthening the separation of
powers between the sheriff and board of supervisors has no obvious
bearing on whether the sheriff should be understood to act for the state
or the county); see also Goldstein, 715 F.3d at 755 (holding that a
courts task is not merely to weigh the amount of control that the
[state] and county board of supervisors possess over [the Sheriff];
instead, we must decide whether the [Sheriff] was acting on behalf of
the state or the county) (emphasis in original). Here, the Sheriff most
certainly does act for the
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the
District Courts order.
Dated:
Respectfully Submitted,
By /s/ Anne Lai
Anne Lai
University of California, Irvine
School of Law Immigrant Rights
Clinic
401 E. Peltason Dr., Ste. 3500
Irvine, CA 92616-5479
Jessica Myers Vosburgh
National Day Laborer
59
Organizing Network
2104 Chapel Hill Rd.
Hoover, AL 35216
Daniel J. Pochoda
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
3707 N. 7th St., Ste. 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Cindy Pnuco
Joshua Piovia-Scott
Dan Stormer
Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP
127 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Ste. 204
Pasadena, CA 91103
Jessica Karp Bansal
National Day Laborer Organizing
Network
675 S. Park View St., Ste. B
Los Angeles, CA 90057
Ray A. Ybarra Maldonado
Law Office of Ray A. Ybarra
Maldonado, PLC
2637 North 16th St., Unit 1
Phoenix, AZ 85006
On the brief:
Joshua D. Bendor
Joel Edman
Attorneys for Appellees
60
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
(F.R.A.P. 32(a)(7)(C))
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(C) and
Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, I certify that this APPELLEES
CONSOLIDATED ANSWERING BRIEF is proportionately spaced,
has a typeface of 14 points, and contains 15,748 words.
Dated:
61
62
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
hereby
certify
that
electronically
filed
the
foregoing
63
ADDENDUM
Circuit Rule 28-2.7
1. A.R.S. 13-2008
2. A.R.S. 13-2009