Professional Documents
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michel aglietta
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diversity of capitalism lies in specific patterns of coherence, composed of complementary institutions under the authority of states.
5) World capitalism comprises an asymmetrical system of power politics, working through hierarchical interdependencies mediated
by finance. This is the reason why the financial centres dominant
at any one moment are the privileged sites for capturing value. It
follows that turbulence is a way of life in international relations
and harmony the exception. So far as economic performance
goes, deceleration of growth in some parts of the world does not
preclude acceleration in others.
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196979
197990
199095
952000
902000 200005
US
4.2
3.2
3.2
2.5
4.1
3.3
2.6
Japan
10.1
4.4
3.9
1.5
1.3
1.4
1.2
Germany
4.4
2.8
2.3
2.1
2.0
2.1
0.7
Euro-12
5.3
3.2
2.4
1.6
2.7
2.2
1.4
G7
5.1
3.6
3.0
2.5
1.9
3.1
GDP
2.3
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.0
1.7
2.2
Japan
8.6
3.7
3.0
0.8
1.3
1.0
1.5
Germany
4.2
2.5
1.3
2.8
2.4
2.5
1.5
Euro-12
5.1
2.9
1.8
2.1
1.3
1.7
1.4
G7
4.8*
2.8
2.6
1.7
Data marked * refer to 196073; those marked refer to 197379. Source: Brenner, Economics
of Global Turbulence, Table 13.1, p. 240.
1995 = 165
160
140
120
80
60
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
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has been overhauled, and the German social market economy shaken to
its very foundation.
Productivity records
Robert Brenner repeatedly says that the rate of return in the us has been
too low to attract investment. But what is the required rate of return? Who
decides how much and where to invest? Should not institutions enter
the picture, especially the institutions of corporate governance? After all,
the radical change in monetary policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s
triggered financial liberalization. Not only was there a shift from intermediate to market financing that redistributed risk-taking from banks to
institutional investors; there was also a dramatic change in the ownership structure of corporations, that has shifted business strategy from
insider productivity-sharing to shareholder value-optimizing. The
norm of profitability has changed altogether. Market-value accounting has
replaced reproduction-cost accounting as the yardstick of corporate performance. Furthermore, achieving shareholder value in practice means
extracting a rent on behalf of shareholders. This rent is the positive difference between the actual rate of return on equity and the equilibrium
stock-market rate of return of the corporation, given by the capital asset
pricing model (capm), multiplied by the capital of the firm. Combined
with the long ascending wave in the stock market, the imperative of
shareholder value gave rise to a much higher required rate of return than
in the heyday of post-war growth. Most business strategiesdownsizing,
spin-offs and the like, but also external growth via mergers and acquisitions and share buybackswere driven by the lucrative adjustment of
corporate executives to the principle of shareholder value.
The us adopted shareholder value on a large scale in the early 1990s,
at a time when Europe was crippled by extravagantly high real interest rates. Shareholder value does not hamper innovative investment
spurred by private-equity funds, especially venture-capital funds; it has
had a large impact on productivity growththe it revolution was largely
financed by such investment funds. The table overleaf highlights the
dramatic shift against Europe and in favour of the us that is due to the
contribution of it and intangiblesi.e. other components of total factor productivity. In the years 1995 to 2005 the us took the lead over
Europe with it investments that were more productive, both in increasing capital intensity and, above all, in improving total factor productivity.
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19952000
20002005
2.3
1.8
1.1
EU 15
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.8
0.4
0.5
tfp* linked to it
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.9
0.4
1.2
2.3
2.8
US
0.5
1.0
0.6
0.1
0.2
0.5
tfp* linked to it
0.4
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.4
1.4
* tfp: total factor productivitytechnological progress due to product innovation, process rationalization, better management and marketing techniques. Source: Marcel Timmer, Gerard Ypma
and Bart van Ark, it in the European Union: Driving Productivity Divergence?, Grningen
Growth and Development Centre, Research Memorandum gd-67, University of Grningen 2003,
table 7, p. 50.
The latter is the best fillip to profitability, since it raises profit without
requiring more capital.
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199798 was much more than another financial accident. It was the
trigger of sweeping transformations that allowed emerging-market
countries to escape from the so-called Washington Consensusa view
I have developed in a recent book.1 I will sketch here the arguments that
are relevant to the present discussion.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the mainstream view was that
the triumph of Western capitalism would now be completed with its
projection onto the rest of the world. Under the tutorship of the imf and
the World Bank, every countrywhether transitional or developing
was urged to adopt Western institutions and implement economic
policies hospitable to the import of capital. Short-term indebtedness
fuelled the liberalization of most Asian and Latin American countries,
with the exception of China, which kept tight capital controls, and India,
which liberalized cautiously.
But this process of unilateral financial integration crashed against another
wall: the Asian crisis of 199798. This time there was no adjustment,
followed by resumption of business as usual. Instead, the countries that
experienced the full force of the crisis overhauled their growth regime
to regain control over their economies. From debtors they have become
creditors. They have rejected imf guidance and accumulated foreignexchange reserves. The Asian and oil-exporting countries have built up
powerful sovereign wealth funds. Rivalries will arise with Europe and
the us, as they are now trying to convert their new financial power into
technological power by acquiring Western firms.
The sources of their growth have shifted from domestic demand to
exports, thanks to competitive devaluations in the aftermath of the chain
of crises between 1997 and 2002, when the collapse of Argentinas
currency board proved the final blow to the old order. Meanwhile, international trade has diversified, with intra-Asian integration and linkages
between emerging-market countries. Chinas exports to America and
Europe combined make up no more than 40 per cent of its total; furthermore, exports make up about 40 per cent of Chinas gdp. Let us suppose
that Europe and the us both experience a slowdown of 1 per cent in their
growth rates. Since the income elasticity of imports is roughly 2.5, the
impact on Chinas growth would be 2.5 per cent on its exports to these
Michel Aglietta and Laurent Berrebi, Dsordres dans le capitalisme mondial,
Paris 2007.
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customers. This would translate into a 0.4 per cent reduction in growth
(2.5 x 0.4 x 0.4), or slightly more because of the roundabout effect of
lower imports in the West on other emerging countries that are clients
of China. For a country capable of sustaining 11 per cent annual growth,
this is scarcely Armageddon. In fact, it would be something of a blessing, since the Chinese government is actively seeking to restrain the
breakneck pace of investment of the last several years.
The rise of China, and to some extent of India, to the status of world
powers is a long-standing trend restructuring the world growth regime.
The most dramatic change it has brought has been to the labour market. The world supply of labour has almost doubled with the opening
of these countries to foreign trade since the mid 1990s, and above all
since China prepared its entry into the wto at the turn of the century.
This huge supply shock radically changed the relative returns on labour
and capital. It made inflation global, meaning that its rates have become
highly correlated all over the world, and it subdued long-run inflation.
Subsequently risk aversion abated, and in most emerging-market countries the cost of capital has fallen, while the rate of profit has risen. No
wonder that credit surged and financed a boom in asset prices.
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where the state has powerful resources to ward off the impact of a prolonged Western slowdownwill be faster than could have been expected
before the crisis.
The prospects for productivity growth in both China and India are durable. They rest on two sources: on the one hand, diffusion of technology
and improvement of management, drawn from developed countries; on
the other, migration of the rural population into cities and the ensuing
massive urbanization. The Chinese Economic Council plans to create
two hundred new cities with a size of around one million people each in
the next 25 years. The potential for growth in consumption, investment
in infrastructure and development of services involved in such a shift
in the life pattern of so many people is not hard to imagine. It remains
gigantic even after thirty years of average growth at 9 per cent or so.
Admittedly, the hurdles are high, too. But they will have nothing to do
with the fate of capitalism in the us, unless the upcoming superpower
clashes with the incumbent superpower for lack of mechanisms of international governance. What could derail Chinas trajectory is more likely
to be inefficiencies on the part of the state in providing collective goods
in provinces with very uneven levels of development, and in regulating
such an enormous, disparate and complex country. The Chinese budget
needs to encompass a universal welfare system and universal public
education. Reform of land ownership in the countryside is vital to give
farmers the capacity to borrow on the value of their holdings, or sell them.
Reversing the deadly progression of environmental costs is a top priority.
To handle these immense tasks the political process will have to change,
though not in the direction of Western-style democracy. An empire with
a cultural continuity of three millennia has other beliefs about the common good. If, in Hirschmans terms, Western capitalism is ruled by exit
and by voice, Chinese capitalism is ruled by loyalty. Confucian moral values, emphasizing informal social ties rather than legal rules, are quite at
odds with Max Webers spirit of capitalism. That is why the problem of
governance in China lies at the local level. The bureaucrats who allocate
collective goods must be recruited for their competence, as they were in
the heyday of the successful emperors, and subjected to the scrutiny of
the people, to mitigate the drift to the abuse of power.
The rising continental powers can spur world growth for the next halfcentury. But occasions for conflict might arise on more than one matter:
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