Politics in Pakistan

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.
org 0
POLITICS
IN
PAKISTAN
Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 1

POLITICS
IN
PAKISTAN
With Special Reference to Rise and Fall

of Bhutto
SURENDRA NATH KAUSHIK

1984
Reproduced By
Sani Hussain Panhwar
Member Sindh Council, PP

CONTENTS
Director’s Note .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1
Preface .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2
Chapters
1. Bhutto’s Assumption of Political Power: An Introduction .. 4
2. Quest for Consolidation of Power: The Phase of Interim

Constitution: Dec. 1971—July 73 .. .. .. .. .. 10
3. The New Constitution (1973): An Experiment .. .. .. 21
4. Sectarian and Provincial Challenges: Bhutto’s Capitulation .. 30
5. Economic Scene: A Brief Survey .. .. .. .. .. 43
6. Bhutto’s Foreign Policy .. .. .. .. .. .. 55
7. The PPP And the Opposition Parties: Interactive Dilemmas .. 65
8. The March 1977 General Elections and Disenchantment .. 76
9. PNA’s Protest Movement and Bhutto’s Down Fall .. .. 88
10. Aftermath .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100
Bibliography .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 128
DIRECTOR’S NOTE
Pakistan occupies a position of crucial importance in the South Asia region, more
specifically as India’s close neighbour. Naturally therefore, it has attracted the
attention of academicians.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appeared on the Pakistan political scene as a meteor and also
disappeared in the like manner. However, the Bhutto phenomenon persists in
contemporary Pakistan. As a dynamic leader Bhutto possessed a multi-
dimensional personality. He not only succeeded on the domestic front but also
tried to project his image as a third world leader. The Bhutto phase in Pakistan
represented a shift from military-bureaucratic authoritarianism to parliamentary
democracy. His style can also be distinguished from the established pattern of
leadership in Pakistan -mainly because he operated within a constitutional set up.
His endeavor to institutionalize a new style foundered on the rock of his own
personal ambition and also because the army had deeper roots in the Pakistani
politics than he could visualize.
It gives me immense pleasure to place Politics In Pakistan: A Study of The Rise

and Fall of Z. A. Bhutto in the hands of scholars of Pakistan and South Asia. I
would like to avail this opportunity of thanking Dr. Surendra Nath Kaushik,
who has produced an immensely useful work on Pakistani Politics, under the
auspices of the South Asia Studies Centre.
DIRECTOR RAMAKANT
South Asia Studies Centre
University of Rajasthan
Jaipur.

PREFACE
This study grew out of my assignment at the South Asia Studies Centre,
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. It was indeed a challenging obligation, made
more so owing to paucity and non—availability of source—material. I believe
that several dilemma; and vague notions which I confronted were at least
partially resolved and clarified consequent upon useful discussions with the
faculty and area — experts. I am indebted for that opportunity.
I must explain that the chapter— scheme of this study seeks to maintain some
sort of explanatory continuity rather than uphold chronological sequence. The
purpose was to present as viable a thematic study as possible under the given
circumstances, in full cognizance of the expanse of the subject and the several
possibilities of critical evaluation, I had to defer any ambitious notions and
attempt a modest study, which it ultimately turned out to be. I am aware of the
limitations of this study. I must state that the present study is restricted to events
and issues upto April 5, 1979 and does not, therefore, claim to sort out the
transformation that followed.
I am deeply indebted to Dr. Ramakant, Professor and Director South Asia

Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, for suggesting the subject of this
study as well as for his academic guidance and constructive evaluation. His
erudite insight and comprehension were of great inspiration to me.
Professor Iqbal Narain former Director, South Asia Studies Centre now Vice —
Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, had always taken keen interest
in my academic endeavors and his suggestions in this context have been of great
help to me. I am sincerely beholden to him.
Dr. Satish Kumar, Associate Professor of Diplomacy, School of International

Studies, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi, very kindly went through
the draft of this study and gave me very useful suggestions, for which I express
my sincere gratitude.
I shall be failing in my duty if I do not acknowledge the valuable suggestions

given by Dr. D. B. Mathur, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, at every stage of this work.
I am thankful to authorities of the libraries of the Indian Council of World Affairs,

New Delhi and the Central Library, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, for their help
and cooperation.

And, finally, I am deeply beholden to Shri S. B. Gupta, Proprietor, Aalekh
Publishers, for taking up my assignment as his own and imparting to it the
format of his kindness and generosity.
Surendra Nath Kaushik

December 22, 1984.

BHUTTO’S ASSUMPTIONOF POLITICAL POWER:
AN INTRODUCTION
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power of the residual (west) Pakistan1 on December
20, 1971, consequent upon the emergence of its erstwhile eastern wing (East
Pakistan) as independent Bangladesh. The landslide victory of his Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) during 1970 general elections enhanced his popularity and
enabled him to take over from the military Junta. This was a very challenging
moment in the history of Pakistan. Bhutto inherited a truncated and disillusioned
nation, facing multifarious challenges on socioeconomic and political fronts.
These challenges, however, did not deter Bhutto’s quest for consolidation of
power. Soon; he earned considerable popular support. Bhutto came to acquire
the esteemed prefix, “Quaid-e-Awam” (leader of the people) and, it is believed
that his popularity was perhaps next only to “Quaid-e-Azam” Father of the
nation) Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
In his shrewd and concerted style, Bhutto succeeded in maintaining himself in

power for over five and a half years, a feat of some consequence considering the
fact that Pakistan had till then, given little evidence of resilience of political
leadership. Previously, as is known, Pakistan was dominated by bureaucratic-
military leadership. In fact, in totality it might be stated that Bhutto deserved
credit for his popular pronouncement that Pakistan and democracy could well,
and effectively, coexist, which was a departure from the style and approach of
his predecessors. Had Bhutto operationalised his popular policies and “radical
programmes and steered clear of issues that later eroded his legitimacy, he
would have been better placed to his political tenure considerably.
Beginning with vociferous advocacy for democracy and socialism Bhutto lapsed
into unfortunate tenor of personal and partisan ambition and adventurism which
ultimately caused his downfall. For the sake of his own survival, Bhutto adopted
a dual style on the one hand, through radical postures, he assured the common
man of inevitable dawn of equality and social justice. On the other hand, he
seemed to have been over enthusiastic for safeguarding the interests of orthodox-
feudal elements and business community.
1
After the creation of Bangladesh the remaining (West) Pakistan covers an —area of 310,403 sq. miles. In
December 1971, then East Pakistan covering an area of 54,501 sq. miles and 70 million people, 56% of the
total population of united Pakistan declared itself as an independent state. This was a great challenge to the
ideological foundation of Pakistan. It is widely believed in reliable quarters that Bhutto was the "catalyst"
of Pakistan's dismemberment. His unwillingness to accept the landslide victory of the Awami League of
Sehikh Mujib materialized the movement for separate Bangladesh nation.

And yet, for all sections of society to note, Bhutto’s style seemed to have been
reflected in his carefully pronounced postures of concern catering to all sections
of Pakistani society without bartering away his political alternatives and decision
making discretion. It might be recalled that like his predecessors Bhutto
exploited the name of Islam and indulged in anti-India tirade in order to ensure
his legitimacy. Though, Bhutto enthusiastically claimed to rebuild a “New
Pakistan” of what was left, he did not succeed entirely in the ultimate analysis.
Not surprisingly his tenure witnessed religious and sectarian clashes, regional
disparities political instability and economic stagnation and widespread violence,
which together presented a gloomy picture of Pakistan.
What eventually became a source of protracted anxiety was the widening crisis
of national identity of Pakistan. The situation became more acute after the
liberation of Bangladesh. In the “New Pakistan”, dilemmas of national
integration surfaced with crudity and spelt concern for the system as such.
During Bhutto’s rule, regionalism sought to assert itself in a variety of ways
especially repeated allegations and voices of concern against Punjab’s
domination in various walks of national life. The call for autonomy for provinces
followed. In the absence of viable alternative Bhutto could neither control these
trends nor did he succeed in containing the military and bureaucracy, the former
exhausting more than half of the total national budget, with a view to warding
off alleged treat from India. Such a policy of defence could not preclude
strengthening of political ambitions of armed forces. As later events showed,
Bhutto’s game failed. As for bureaucracy, it might be added that Bhutto had to
rely heavily on its allegiance and fidelity. But, in highly surcharged political
climate, Bhutto’s calculations misfired once again and one might surmise that
either, the bureaucracy was not prepared to go all the way along with Bhutto, to
the point of no return, or else that Bhutto relied upon elements of doubtful
credibility. However, one might view the past, Bhutto failed to correctly assess
the potential sources of mischief.
Both as President and Prime Minister of Pakistan Bhutto exerted effective

influence on national and provincial politics and it was often difficult to discern
where his influence turned into interference. Democratic accountability soon
became a casualty. By the end of 1974, Bhutto’s name became synonymous with
the political system of Pakistan. “Bhuttoism” became sole ideology of the nation.
Under strict Emergency regulations Bhutto exercised his authoritarianism as if

the trends of South Asian neighbours had afflicted Pakistan as well. What
followed was perhaps inevitable, considering the fact that Bhutto was never a
serious votary of democracy. It seems that having consolidated, or so he believed,
his position and authority, Bhutto announced the date of general elections. As

subsequent events showed, there was widespread rigging at the March 1977
polls which ultimately led to the army ‘Coup’ (July 5, 1977). 2 The erstwhile
mentor of democracy and socialism came to be looked down upon as detractor
and persecutor. In the totality of perspective of Bhutto’s rule, it might be said
that if only he did not over-stretch the patience and trust of his followers among
citizens and within the party and if he promptly conceded demands for fresh
elections, his stock would have gone up and perhaps, he would have
rehabilitated his former popular image.
It appears that Bhutto miscalculated the potential and extent of popular fervour
and support and was equally confounded by over reliance on the numerical and
brawn power of the PPP. The numerous coercive and repressive measures he
adopted to neutralize antagonists and perpetuate personal and partisan
hegemony, easily invited criticism and disbelief abroad and mass frenzy at home.
Whatever Bhutto could or could have done for Pakistan pales into insignificance
if one ponders over the fact that he failed to exterminate the intriguing
recurrence of military intervention in Pakistan political system.
It is true that the general elections of 1970 provided Bhutto with a purposive
probe in to the mechanics of power-politics and also induction of the PPP into
spoils of electoral victory. There were other equally weighty factors that ensured
for Bhutto a reasonable level of mass adulation and considerable popular
expectations.
Even his detractors would not deny that Bhutto was a unique personality. His
flamboyant oratory, persuasive style, academic attainments and feudal,
aristocratic paternalism, created instantaneous impression on the common man.
His training in ‘laws’ and political science stood him in good stead in his career
as an activist. Some even thought that he commanded greater veneration and
trust than those attributed to M. A. Jinnah at one time. Bhutto’s youthful
dynamism was an instant draw for the common man, and for the youth and
students specifically, he emerged as a natural leader and mentor. Bhutto was not
unaware of these expressions of almost total trust in him and he succeeded in
harnessing these forces to his -maximum advantage so long as the title favoured
him. If he gambled and erred massively his support base also eroded, ensuring
his fall from grace.
If one goes over the vocabulary Bhutto persisted with in his numerous public
meetings and announcements, the interesting fact emerges that he employed
2
By the end of 1974 major South Asian Countries witnessed similar political trends such as growth of
personality cult and rule of Emergency. The mounting pace of repressive politics ultimately resulted in the
downfall of the ruling elite of several South Asian States.

expressions as were familiar to even the poor. His utterances seemed to be hall
marks of sincerity and profuse concern for the poor and the deprived. He would
lapse into self-pity and genuine pain and concern after flashes of extravagant and
impossible policy declarations, signifying considerable talent for playing to the
gallery. To the Ulema, he gave the call of commitment to Islam; to the feudal
landowners, he would recall his own wadera (Sindhi landlord) antecedents, and,
to the radical and pseudo-radicals, he gave the mythical prefix and suffix of
socialism. All these postures cumulatively made Bhutto look ‘different’ and full of
promise. It was not surprising why he came to be looked upon as the “savior” of
the people.
Though it is too early to delineate the manifold aspects concerning ‘Bhutto’s

elevation to national leadership, it would be relevant to state that Bhutto’s
familial political socialization and personality traits notwithstanding, his long
association with Ayub’s military government proved more helpful in learning
the art of real politics. Owing to his father’s distinguished stature in provincial
politics of Sindh, Bhutto came into contact with several erstwhile political entities,
such as G. M. Sayed, Ayub Khusro, Amir Ali Lohari, Haji Abdullab Haroon and
others. Pakistan’s last Governor General and first President, Iskandar Mirza, also
a close friend of Bhutto’s father, evinced keen interest in Bhutto and was
responsible for his entry into Ayub’s military government. In a way, General
Ayub was taken up by Bhutto’s youth and ebullience.
On October 27, 1958, Bhutto became the Minister of Commerce and Industries.
He was then around thirty and the youngest federal Minister to be appointed in
the Asian sub-continent. 3 In January 1960, Bhutto was appointed Minister of
Information and National Reconstruction, Bhutto was awarded Hilal-e Pakistan,
the highest civil honour in August 1963.4 Bhutto assumed the office of Foreign
Affairs Minister in January 1963 after the death of Muhammad Ali Bogra. As
Foreign Affairs Minister Bhutto tried to give a new perspective to Pakistan’s
foreign policy and reformulated its priorities and alternatives. From an overt pro
US inclination Bhutto succeeded, to an extent, in normalizing Pakistan’s relations
with both the communist countries the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of
China.
General Ayub needed Bhutto, as much as the latter needed the former, for the
simple reason that Bhutto’s talent, energy and zeal notwithstanding, perhaps he
would have done practically nothing if Ayub’s patronage and ready acceptance
were not there. Bhutto could be credited to have repaid a major portion of the
debt to his benefactor as he succeeded in convincing the people, by and large, of
3
See: Victoria Schofield, Bhutto: Trial And Execution, London, Cassell, 1979, pp. 2-3.
4
After his exit from Ayub's cabinet Bhutto surrendered 'Hilal-i-Pakistan' award on February 24, 1969.

the legitimacy of Ayub’s military regime. Prior to 1965, Bhutto gave full fledged
support to Ayub’s military dictatorship.
So long as it suited his political ambitions, Bhutto continued to support the Ayub
regime and as soon as it became obvious that Ayub’s credibility was being
seriously jeopardized, be cleverly dissociated himself from and in fact, stood
against Ayub’s regime. Political instability, socio-economic unrest and war of
1965, were reasons enough for the people to be disillusioned with Ayub. Bhutto’s
opposition of the Tashkant Declaration raised his stature. The people seemed to
have been taken up by the new found charisma of Bhutto in a big way in the post
1965-phase.
On his part, Bhutto openly accused the Ayub regime of failing to invest itself
with a legitimate national purpose. He charged that it was a government of the
privileged few, which perpetuated administrative corruption, nepotism and
chaos. During his visit to erstwhile ‘East Pakistan’ in November 1967, Bhutto
openly attacked Ayub’s dictatorial postures and expressed his open support to
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s “Six-point Programme”.5
Bhutto’s trump card was his formation of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in 1967.6
The political credo of the PPP, significantly, revolved round: “Islam is our Faith,
Democracy is our Polity, Socialism is our Economy and All power to the
People”.7 On March 25, 1969, Ayub was forced to quit and the then commander
in chief, General Yahya Khan, assumed leadership of Pakistan. During Yahya
regime, pressures for restoration of democracy became more severe, which
ultimately led to the first general elections (1970) and also, overwhelming
electoral victory of the PPP in West Pakistan.8
The radical and socialistic pronouncements of the PPP proved to be populist

expectation and the electorate gave its candidates overwhelming support. In the
two prosperous provinces i.e., Punjab and Sindh, Bhutto’s PPP emerged as a
majority party. In addition the prevailing disunity among other parties mostly
rightist and religious helped in PPP victory. It was not strange for disillusioned
electorate to turn their fury against the previous regimes by voting
5
The Pakistan Times, November 3, 1967.
6
Pakistan's daily Dawn (25 November, 1967) commented that Party (PPP) "will be one man show"-----
"Bhutto can shift his ground faster than a fox and, unlike a leopard, can change his snots from year to year."
7
For details refer to Hasan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan People's Party: The First Phase, (Lahore, Progressive
Publishers, 1973).
8
See: Dilip Mukerjee, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest For Power (New Delhi, Vikask 1972), pp.67-103.
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77 (London, Macmillan, 1980) pp. 11-58

overwhelmingly, for the PPP in search of a systemic alternative. However, it
should be recalled that Bhutto failed to muster adequate following in Pakistan’s
two provinces Baluchistan and the NWFP.
That, however, did not adversely affect his assumption of almost complete
control over Pakistan’s political system. Infact Bhutto’s rise to power witnessed
the beginning of a new phase in Pakistan’s politics and systemic process, His
tenure in power was of considerable significance and his fall from grace seemed
inevitable, considering the policies he came to adopt and pursue almost
ruthlessly.

QUEST FOR CONSOLIDATION OF POWER: THE PHASE OF
INTERIM CONSTITUTION OFCEMBER 1971-JULY 1973.
After the disintegration of Pakistan the then President, General Yahya Khan was
forced to hand over power to the democratically elected leader Z. A. Bhutto.
Prior to the adoption of the new constitution, Bhutto exercised powers through
an interim constitution. He assumed both the offices of the President and of Chief
Martial Law Administrator. It was widely believed in several quarters that given
a popular mandate Bhutto was likely to transform the political system into an
egalitarian, democratic one. It is a matter of debate whether Bhutto; himself a
product of electoral process, did in reality, have enduring faith in the democratic
system. However, it is true that he never tired of giving considerable priority to
slogans of democracy and socialism, his interpretation notwithstanding.
“The New Pakistan” as Bhutto termed, it was obviously facing manifold

problems and challenges. Pakistan’s defeat in the war (December 1971) with
India caused unprecedented economic crisis, political instability along with
erosion of morale of the entire nation. In fact, Pakistan appeared to be on the
verge of further disintegration.
Bhutto was shrewd enough to exploit such a critical national situation, in his first
broadcast to the nation, he said:
“I have come in at a decisive moment in Pakistan. We are facing the worst crisis
in our country life, a deadly crisis. We have to pick up pieces, very small pieces
but we will make a new Pakistan”.1
It was not only Bhutto’s duty to rehabilitate the shattered morale of the people of
Pakistan, he did indeed make considerable efforts to raise the nation, from the
ashes as it were. But, it is one thing to aspire and hope for a strong, viable nation
and quite another to be able to undo the inherent constraints and consolidate
instruments of nation-building. He made categorical declarations that the old
military regime was finished and under his leadership Pakistan will be more
democratic and strong nation witnessing the beginning of new saga in the annals
of Pakistan”.2 Bhutto hopefully asserted: “We are going to build a new country
1
Quoted in Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (Vikas, New Delni, 1978) p. 1.
2
Z. A. Bhutto in his article "Pakistan Builds A new" (Foreign Affairs), Vol. 51, No. 3 April 1973, 541-554)
has stated : "Since the early years of Pakistan's inception democracy in Pakistan had been supplanted by
dictatorship,--The introduction of democratic process is being accompanied by measures aimed at the
establishment of egalitarian society".

again. It is almost like the first chapter of the genesis of Pakistan”. 3 His
announcements seemed to have been directed for consumption of the common
man as well as his opponents and with the obvious intention to assert that
civilian rule had come to stay. Above all, Bhutto had to ensure his own
legitimacy. How he went about seeking it is an interesting prelude to fruition of
his political ambitions, as subsequent events amply showed.
It might be recalled that, Bhutto, in his initial speeches took recourse to anti-India
tirade. Justifying the relevance of two-nation theory, Bhutto refused to recognize
the existence of Bangladesh as a, separate, independent nation. He gave out the
expectation that the eastern wing of Pakistan would come round and revoke its
separate entity. He insisted “There is no Bangladesh, there is East Pakistan ...:....
What we must do is to get People’s consent for grand reconciliation”.4
As a dramatic political gesture, Bhutto released Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,

permitting him to return to Dacca via London. This move was coupled with an
attempt at publicly maintaining the fiction of Pakistan as a federal union of four
provinces of West Pakistan with Bangladesh. Bhutto was prepared even to step
down, as President, making Mujib the President of Pakistan.5
As far as his pronouncements went, Bhutto seethed determined to refurbish the

structure of the army and bureaucracy. He was well aware of the Nested interest
that these two had acquired in Pakistan and that they might even in future
threaten his own power. It was for that reason that General Yahya Khan was
removed from office (President) and Chief of Army Staff General Abdul Hamid
Khan was also deposed. A three-man judicial Commission headed by former
Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman was appointed to investigate into the “military
crackdown in East Pakistan”. As a shrewd political leader Bhutto wanted to
prevent professional soldiers from becoming “professional politicians”. Similarly
Lt. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan were replaced by trusted
and loyal officers like General Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Z. A. Chaudhry.
It was widely talked about that Bhutto purged the army set-up with the exclusive
purpose of preventing the army to stage another comeback as well as to ensure
its continuing support for his political survival.
3
Dilip Mukerjee, Z. A. Bhutto: Quest For Power, (Vikas, New Delhi, 1972).
4
Ibid : p. 8.
5
Robert La Porte: Power And Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan (New Delhi, Vikas
Publishing House, 1976) p. 101.

In addition to the purge of the army, Bhutto overhauled the entire-bureaucratic
structure. About, 1,300 civil servants were dismissed under Martial Law Order
No. 114. Several civil servants were demoted from their higher ranks, and many
were suspended. Obviously, an ambitious political leader like Bhutto could not
afford to take the “steel frame” of the system for granted.6 He curbed privileges
and powers of the CSP and other branches of the civil services. Moreover, Bhutto
assailed remnants of “Viceregal” system in free Pakistan and warned that the
military and the bureaucracy would not be permitted to go beyond their
specified duties and obligations.
It was not unnatural that soon after there was a demand for lifting martial law.
But, Bhutto was hesitant to set an early date for the return of civilian
government.7
Throughout the interim constitution phase, Bhutto endeavored to consolidate his

power and authority. He directly interfered in the “making” and “unmaking” of
provincial governments violating democratic and constitutional norms.
Gradually, it became obvious that Bhutto was not prepared to either trust his
antagonists or to be tolerant to their political existence. “For instance, the
activities of democratically elected NAP-JUI coalition governments in
Baluchistan and the NWFP were severely curbed under the dictates any
directives of the federal government.
On the front of socio-economic reforms Bhutto was quite vocal in his

pronouncements but took little interest when it came to actual policy-making
and execution of programmes. It is true that with a view to gaining the
sympathies of the working class, passports of 22 top business families were
impounded on. December 22, 1971. Several statutory curbs were also imposed.
Some arrests were made both of key businessmen and of top industrialists. In
addition, on January 2, 1972, management of 20 private firms with assets of 200
million were taken over by the government. This move, however, excluded
foreign-owned firms or investment and the cotton textile industries. Through a
presidential order, promulgated on March, 19, 1972, Life Insurance was
nationalized.8 Such policies, not with standing, no one took Bhutto seriously as a
socialist. His measures did not seek to eradicate the ills and evils of the existing
socio-economic reality. If at all, he wanted to present himself ac a reformer in
6
Neither Bhutto's interim constitution (adopted in April 1972) nor the permanent (1973) constitution
included the "guarantees" which were provided to civil servants previously in the 1956 and 1962
Constitutions.
7
Dilip Mukerjee, op. cit : p. 174.
8
Ibid : pp 177-206

which venture, also he was partly successful. However, he was at no time either
genuinely anti-capitalist nor anti-foreign investment.
In might be recalled that on March 1, 1972, Bhutto announced lowering of ceiling

on individual ownership of land from 500 to 150 irrigated acres, and from 1000 to
300 non-irrigated acres. The upper ceiling of permissible land holdings was
reduced to 240 acres. In addition the government decreed several changes in the
landlord tenant relationship to eliminate domination of the landlords. Liability
for payment of water rates and other agricultural taxes was shifted from tenants
to landowners. These reforms were, in fact, introduced to appease the poor
peasants and workers.
On February 10, 1972, Bhutto’s government proclaimed a “new labour policy”,

raising the workers’ share in the annual profits of the undertaking from two
percent (as fixed by Ayub regime in 1968) to four percent.” Employees were
specifically directed to improve the living standards of the workers, providing
them with Educational and housing facilities.9
In his enthusiasm for idealistic pronouncements, Bhutto introduced some

educational reforms, which were publicized as socialistic. Private schools and
colleges were nationalized. On March 15, 1972 the federal government
introduced a “16-point Education Plan” providing free education upto class X
and raised salaries of teachers to bring them at par with those drawn by
government officials.10
However, the socio-economic reform measures proved -to be neither effective

nor far reaching. Moreover, the measures frustrated the radical elements and
antagonized vested elite interests. Also, industrial workers and agrarian
labourers came to realize the futility of alleged reforms. It was widely felt at that,
time that Bhutto’s policies and measures were meant to ensure the welfare of the
middle class.
Maintaining a facade of democracy and socio-economic justice”, President

Bhutto was all the while concentrating on acquiring absolute power. Popular
resentment against Bhutto’s atrocities was mounting in all the four provinces of
Pakistan. Signs were visible that the country was drifting towards a grave
domestic crisis. The opposition parties were insistent upon introduction of
“Parliamentary-federal form of government”, in accordance with PPP’s 1970
general election Manifesto. On this issue one could see intraparty cleavages also
surfacing and adversely affecting party discipline and harmony.
9
See Meenakshi Gopinath: Pakistan In Transition (New Delhi; Manohar Books, 1975) pp. 118-119.
10
Asian Recorder, April 1-7, 1972.

In the constituent provinces of Pakistan sub-cultural groups openly waged
struggle for provision of safeguards for development of their respective socio
cultural heritage and identities. Above all, the three provinces of Pakistan, i.e.
Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, openly expressed
apprehensions of growing dominance of Punjab. At the same time Punjab and
Sindh were pressurizing the federal government for added privileges claiming to
be the exclusive support base of Bhutto’s PPP. On the pleas of territorial
dimensions and prosperity, Punjab was indeed in a better position to take the
bargaining stance. The leaders of Punjab, besides having monopoly in politics,
economy, administration, and army were demanding greater regional-autonomy
and reinforcement of “Islamic values”. They were exerting immense pressures
for promotion of “Punjabi culture”, since they were apprehensive of Bhutto’s
preferential attitude towards ‘‘Sindhi culture”. It was alleged by some Sindhi
leaders that Bhutto was leaning more towards Punjabis to The detriment of the
Sindhis, and yet none else than Bhutto himself could be more suspicious of the
preponderance of Punjabi elements in the army and administration, which
provided the support base for him. That was Bhutto’s dilemma. He required a
reliable support base; he had one though its reliability was suspected. Also, the
support—base was not necessarily Bhutto’s best choice.
Situation in Sindh was becoming very critical. Bhutto succeeded only in

satisfying the vested interests, the waderas and big industrialists of Sindh. The
leaders of opposition parties were not impressed with Bhutto’s flamboyant
gestures and politics of appeasement. The veteran opposition leader, G. M. Syed
organized “Sired United Front” and revived his militant regional “Jiye-Sindh
Movement” for greater regional autonomy and saving original “Sindhi” culture
from the influence of “Urdu-speaking” settlers known as Muhajirs
(immigrants).11 Militant Sindhi regionalists propagated the theory of “Sons of the
soil” demanding more safeguards to the original residents of Sindh. They
pleaded for more security in governmental jobs and administration, which was
heavily occupied by the outsiders. Echoing the “Six-point programme” of late
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League, G. M. Syed demanded that the federal
government should deal with only defence, foreign affairs and currency matters.
Pressures of Sindhi regionalism were so intense that Bhutto was compelled to
grant the demand of adopting “Sindhi” as the official language of Sindh province.
Violence gripped the entire province on July 7, 1972, when Sindh Assembly
passed a bill making Sindhi the only official language. The leaders of Jamaat-i-
11
The Muhajirs are generally known as “new Sindhis” who constitute about 50% of the entire Sindh
population. They constitute nearly 70% of the population in the metropolitan city of Karachi and about half
the population in the second biggest city of the province, Hyderabad. In other cities of Sindh, like Sukkur,
Jacobabad and Rohri they constitute a sizeable part of the population.

Islami12 advocating the cause of Urdu-speaking Muhajirs pressurized Bhutto to
retain “Urdu” as the official language. Bhutto ultimately resolved the language
controversy through a “peace formula” -announcing both ‘Sindhi and Urdu” as
the official languages of the province.
In Baluchistan and NWFP, Bhutto was really on the horns of greater dilemma.
These two provinces posed real challenge to Bhutto’s authority. The non-PPP
(NAP-JUI-coalition) governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP were critical of
Bhutto’s iron hand methods and excessive centralization. The local Baluchis and
Pakhtoons demanded “regional autonomy” and the restoration of “Undiluted
democracy” and socialism as promised in 1970 Manifesto of the PPP13.
The local Baluchis and Pathans launched regional militant movement like
“Greater Baluchistan Movement” and “Azad. Pakhtoonistan Movement”. It
might be recalled that these two provinces; since the very creation of Pakistan
remained subjugated to the will of the central government in general, and other
relatively prosperous provinces Punjab and Sindh in particular. Specific socio-
cultural identity of Baluchis and Pathans was alleged to be threatened. In
September 1972 important leaders of the NWFP and Baluchistan were accused of
fomenting anti-state Conspiracy, hatching plots, in London and Geneva, under
an alleged “London-Plan”.14 The official media also gave out stories of large-
scale procurement of arms and ammunition in the NWFP and Baluchistan
through foreign sources which were the alleged enemies of Pakistan since its
creation. In the name of national unity, it was widely reported in international
press that, Bhutto ruthlessly crushed the genuine aspirations of the Baluchis and
Pathans for ensuring his unchallenged authority and survival. Moreover, Bhutto
also tried to put Baluchis and Pathans against each other.
With the mounting pressures of regionalism and opposition and with the
increasing pace of infighting in the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Bhutto
12
The ruling PPP was strong in rural Sindhi-Speaking areas of the province. The urban centers were split
mainly between the Jatmat-i-Isiami (backed by Urdu-Speaking new Sindhis. The sons of the soil).
13
Khan Abdul Wali Khan the leader of the NAP and the leader of opposition in the National Assembly
criticized President Bhutto's repressive measures and demanded restoration of “Undiluted democracy”
under a new democratic and Socialistic constitutions, See Asian Recorder 29 July and 4 August, 1972.
14
The issue of the alleged 'London-Plan' was also raised in the national Assembly on September 12, 1972.
The then Interior Minister Abdul Qaiyum Khan moved a resolution. He alleged that according to report in
Nawa-i-Waqt (10-9-72) which were based on report of London-Trines Akbar Bugti, Ataullala Mengal,
Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, Malik Ghulam Jilani, Yusuf Haroon, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Zafar All Shah
gathered in Loudon. These leaders reportedly held discussions with Sheikh Mujib and his associates in
London and Geneva. They jointly envisaged a confederal structure for Pakistan with full regional autonomy
to the four provinces of Pakistan in turn, to be federated with India and Bangladesh. See: The National
Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature Debates) September 12, 1972, vol. 1, No. 22, pp. 124-125.

ultimately decided to replace the interim phase with Parliamentary-federal
constitutional framework by 1973. By mid-1972, he appointed a Committee, of
which he became chairman, to draft the new constitution.
True to Pakistan’s previous experience in constitution-making, things became

complicated at the very outset. On the issues bearing upon form and content of
the constitution, acute differences came up between the government and the
opposition parties and also within the ruling PPP. Specifically, the issues were:
(i) The nature of the executive;

(ii) The relationship between the state and religion (Islam), and
(iii) The quantum of regional autonomy of federating units.
The differences within the ruling PPP surfaced in October 1972, when Bhutto,
due to ideological differences asked, the then Parliamentary Affairs Minister,
Mahmud Ali Kasuri, to quit the constitution-drafting Committee and the
National Assembly. Subsequently, Kasuri was expelled from the PPP in February
1973. 15 Another prominent PPP leader Mairaj Mohammed Khan (Minister of
state for political affairs in the Cabinet) also resigned on account of differences
with Bhutto’s policies on “labour and political matters”.16
Rightist Islam Pasand partics and conservative pressure groups were anxious to
protect the alleged values of “the land of the pure” - Pakistan, in the name of
incorporating adequate “Islamic provisions” in the proposed constitution. The
leftist forces were insisting for a constitution based on the ideals of democracy
and socialism as promised in PPP’s (1970 general election) manifesto.
Initially, Bhutto was not very enthusiastic about inclusion of rigid Islamic
provisions in the constitution. However, for his legitimacy and political survival,
he succumbed to pressures of orthodox Ulema lobby. Events showed that when
these provisions came to be incorporated in the body-politic of Pakistan, an
entirely different value-system was initiated which, by no stretch of imagination,
could be equated with the aspirations of a modern state.
Amidst mounting regional tensions in constituent provinces, Bhutto agreed to

include federal provisions in the constitution. It was widely felt that Bhutto
15
Differences between Z. A. Bhutto and Mahmud Ali Kasuri were on the basic aspects of the proposed
constitution. The former wanted to have a modified version of Parliamentary system providing
unchallenged status to the Chief executive. While the latter was in favour of an "unqualified Parliamentary
system" based on Westminster model.
16
Asian Recorder, 11 November, 1972.

might have conceded the federal principles though he could not be trusted to
abide by them.
In spite of the intra party dissensions, Bhutto ultimately succeeded in gaining

consensus of different political parties at the ‘All-Party Constitutional
Conference’ held at Rawalpindi on October 20, 1972. 17 The Constitution
Committee of the National Assembly completed the draft and formally
submitted it to the Constituent Assembly on December 31, 1972. The draft of the
permanent constitution was, however, a modified version of the agreement
arrived at by the All-Party Conference (October 20, 1972). The leaders of the
opposition accused Bhutto of centralizing all power in the bands of the chief-
executive that is the Prime-Minister. The modifications introduced by Bhutto
were against parliamentary norms. For instance
(i) In order to be valid, a motion expressing want of confidence in the

Prime Minister must also name his successor;
(ii) Such a motion can not be moved during the budget session:
(iii) Once a motion of want of confidence is defeated, a subsequent one

can not be tabled within a period of six Months; and
(iv) For a period of 15 years or three general elections thereafter,

whichever is longer, such a motion has to be passed by a majority
of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the National
Assembly.
The Provincial governments especially, in Baluchistan and the NWFP, were not
satisfied with certain provisions regarding centre province relations. The
National Awami Party (NAP) called a meeting of its General Council on 17
November, 1972, to voice its opposition to the so called “Constitutional Accord.”
General Council of the NAP in its resolution criticized provisions regarding the
role of Prime Minister at central level and the role of Chief Ministers at provincial
level. It expressed dissatisfaction over the quantum of regional autonomy.
17
The main points of agreement at All-Party constitutional conference were :
(i) A federal Parliamentary system with a Prime minister as the chief executive responsible
to the National Assembly;
(ii) President to be a titular head;
(iii) Bi-Cameral legislature;
(iv) Designation of Pakistan as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" and declaration of "Islam
as the State religion";
(v) Incorporation of two lists: "federal" and "concurrent" and all residuary power resting with
the provinces.
Dawn, October 21, 1972.

Moreover, it was critical of the policy of direct recruitment to national services
and the manipulation of media by the establishment.18
Bhutto seemed to be losing patience. He resorted to iron-hand methods to

contain the challenge of the opposition. Severe restrictions were imposed on
opposition leaders and on provincial governments. The federal government
mobilized the police, the Federal Security Force and the army to crush dissent. It
became apparent that Bhutto had given the provincial governments a clear hint
to toe the line of the federal government to ensure their own interests. It was
strange that Bhutto had to rely upon the military and the bureaucracy and the
history seemed to be repeating itself as it were.19
Despite the repression and coercion, fissiparous tendencies were mounting with
greater intensity. The entire situation appeared to be similar to that of
“Balakanization” of Pakistan. Violent clashes between the government and
opposition were common features in the National Assembly. Protesting against
authoritarian tendencies of the government, Pakistan’s opposition parties gave a
call for “Pakistan Black Friday” on March 23, 1973.20
Even within the ruling PPP, fissures became obvious. Erstwhile radical elements
and former supporters accused Bhutto of imposing personalism, violating the
norms of 1970 election Manifesto of the PPP. Consequently, several disenchanted
PPP members on March 27, 1973 joined the opposition boycott of the National
Assembly, demanding introduction of a “democratic constitution leading to a
socialist economy”21
In Punjab violent clashes occurred between the government and opposition. Also
the rebel group of the PPP, led by Mukhtar Rana and Ahmed Raza Kasuri, was
posing tremendous challenge to Bhutto’s leadership.22 From opposition it was
Telrrik-e-Istiglal of Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan which accused Bhutto of
18
Asian Recorder 16-22 December, 1972.
19
Opposition leader in the National Assembly, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, accused President Bhutto of being
"counter revolutionary" and "Fascist." He described the situation under Bhutto worse than the previous
martial laws. Referring to the "relentless campaign of character assassination against the NAP and its
leaders, Khan Abdul Wali Khan said : "I call him Adolf Bhutto, because of his fascist policies. His only
aim in life in to secure absolute and undiluted power at the cost of the welfare of the people of Pakistan."
Asian Recorder, 25 November, 1 December, 1972.
20
Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April, 1973.
21
Pakistan Times, March 28, 1973.
22
Link, 2 December, 1972.

exploiting the people of Pakistan in the name of democracy and socialism. He
called Bhutto a “sick man”, “thoroughly evil”, “insane” and a dictator”.
However, the pro-establishment media publicized Asghar Khan’s political
postures as detrimental to the integrity and viability of Pakistani nation. On the
other hand praising Bhutto’s rule, the media highlighted the achievements of the
PPP expressing commitment and faith of Punjabis in the leadership of Quaid-e-
Awam.
In Sindh, the situation was very tense. Protesting against Bhutto’s ruthless
postures, the militant Sindhis were insisting upon the release of their leader, G,
M. Syed. In major cities of Sindh, the local Sindhi students smashed Mohammed
Ali Jinnah’s photos from their educational institutions and replaced them with
those of G. M. Syed’s. The “Sind United Front was critical of the policies of the
federal government over the issue of the repatriation of 2,60,000 Behari Muslims
from Bangladesh. The Jamaat-i-Islami was strongly pleading for the
rehabilitation of Behari Muslims in “Urdu-speaking” areas of Sindh specifically
in Karachi and Hyderabad. This was strongly opposed by the local Sindhis who
were demanding specific safeguards for the protection of their distinctive socio-
cultural interests. Their interests were grossly endangered by the heavy influx of
outsiders.23
In a series of swift moves to reassert federal authority, Bhutto imposed central

rule in Baluchistan and the NWFP in February 1973.24 To counter the challenge of
mounting provincialism, Bhutto installed puppet governments replacing the
democratically elected NAP-JUI coalition governments.25 Besides this the federal
government, deployed units of army in these two provinces under the
supervision of General Tikka Khan, who, in addition to his earlier notoriety in
erstwhile East Pakistan, earned the stigma of “butcher” of the people of
Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.
The challenges, thus were several and manifest, complex and exacting. Shrewd
and calculating as he proved, Bhutto succeeded in contriving the support of all
the major political parties for the proposed constitution.
23
See: News Review On South Asia, institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, May-June,
1973
24
In a bid to strengthen his hold and curbing the threat of regionalism, Bhutto appointed loyal and faithful
persons as governors of Baluchistan and the NWFP. In Baluchistan the former Governor Bizenjo was
replaced by Akbar Khan Bugti and Aslam Khattak was appointed the Governor of the NWFP replacing
former governor Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil.
25
On 15 April 1973, a coalition government (PPP). PML (Q) and United Front of Independents) headed by
I. K. Gandapur was installed in the NWFP. Similarly, on 27 April, 1973, a three-men coalition government
(PML (Q), JUI and PPP) headed by Ghulam Qadir Jam was installed in Baluchistan.

The New constitution was finally approved by the National Assembly on April
10, 1973. It was notable that out of 128, 125 members present and voting, out of
the 146 members in all, put the stamp of their approval. On August 13, 1973,
Bhutto assumed the office of Prime Minister of Pakistan the new constitution
came into force on August 14, 1973. Z. A. Bhutto, thus, completed a significant
phase of his tenure in the political life of Pakistan. What preceded that, and what
eventually followed, give a reasonably reliable clue to the success and failure of a
mercurial Asian politician.

THE NEW CONSTITUTTION (1973): AN EXPERIMENT
With the adoption of the new constitution on 13 August 1973; Pakistan embarked
upon the Parliamentary-federal phase, which remained suspended for almost
two decades. In the beginning it was thought that Bhutto would succeed in some
measures in resolving the multifarious challenges within the parliamentary—
framework. Knowledgeable people characterized the adoption of new
constitution as a significant landmark in the annals of Pakistan. There was reason
enough to expect that Bhutto would have learnt the relevant lessons from
Pakistan’s antecedents, especially the military’s role and apprehensions about its
comeback. His repeated call to establish secular socialist processes could not be
lightly dismissed and yet, as time passed, it became evident that Bhutto was not
seriously concerned with translating his zealous ideas into systemic realities. It
seems he did not take the challenge of nation-building and integration as
priorities. It was no alternative to take recourse to the convenient myth that once
he was firmly in the saddle, nation-building and integration would automatically
become settled facts. If, in fact, Bhutto believed in such a miracle, it did not
happen, ultimately.
On the one hand, Bhutto was armed with the potential of institutional assets of a
parliamentary system, and, on the other, the people were rightly cultivating
hopes and aspirations, in keeping with representative democratic norms and
traditions. A hiatus between the two contexts could spell disaster. Perhaps, that
was Bhutto’s greatest challenge, and his calculated neglect of one or the other, or
both, was beset with serious consequences, Was Bhutto cognizant of that is
another matter.
In the beginning, however, it seemed Bhutto was endeavoring to be acceptable to

all segments of society. Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that he was
primarily concerned with means and measures for the smokescreen of
parliamentary federal democracy. He grew unreservedly committed to
concentrating absolute powers in the office of the Primeninister. It might be
recalled that successive Pakistan leaders floundered in ventures to give the
nation a new constitution. Their exclusive preoccupation with partisan objectives
led to their political failure and also precluded them from giving Pakistan a
viable and purposive constitution. Pakistan continued to suffer from the
recurrent irony of neglect of nation-building and integration, so very vital, for the
diversities of political culture of Pakistan.

Like his predecessors, Bhutto also failed in developing a positive outlook
towards the ideals of democracy and secularism. He failed to completely liberate
himself from the clutches of “Islamic theocracy”. In fact, Islam was revived by
Bhutto as a symbol and as a rallying point, his so-called socialistic expressions
notwithstanding. That duality in his style ultimately proved the undoing of
Bhutto. The more he leaned on Islam, the more vulnerable his stance became,
though, for all practical purposes he did not relent in his efforts to consolidate his
own powers and position. Despite the constitutional framework, he was not
overtly concerned with resolution of the major and pressing problems and
challenges of the common men.
In retrospect, it might be stated that Bhutto’s quest for establishment of a federal-

parliamentary constitution in the image of the Westminster model, was basically
a lever to extend his own authority, Soon after assuming power Bhutto started
justifying the Presidential form of government. He assumed the office of
President under an Interim constitution. That was against the promises made by
the election manifesto of PPP during 1970 general election. The PPP manifesto
vehemently criticized the former presidential governments of General Ayub and
Yahya Khan and promised to introduce parliamentary government in Pakistan if
voted to power. However, in the context of Pakistan’s disintegration, Bhutto also
changed his preference favouring a presidential form of government. He
reiterated that the presidential system would be more suitable for the integration
of the remaining Pakistan. In his public speeches Bhutto squarely pointed out
that in the light of past experience the Westminster model of government could
not be adopted in the country. Such attitude confirmed the fears of his critics that
in the name of political stability, Bhutto was trying to perpetuate personal power.
Contrary to Bhutto’s changed preferences the opposition leaders wanted a

parliamentary system based on Westminster framework. They misted that the
permanent constitution of Pakistan should explicitly recognize the absolute
sovereignty of Parliament and unmitigated executive interactions. Bhutto
ultimately agreed to introduce parliamentary form of government though he did
not follow the Westminster tradition. He wanted to have a parliament without
ultimate sovereignty, and a president without requisite legislative and judicial
checks on his authority.
As if enthused by the tradition of authoritarianism in Pakistan, Bhutto ensured in

full measure retention of specific provisions in the new constitution, which
enabled him to realize his authoritarian ambitions to a considerable extent. In a
way, owing to considerable modifications, it was given out that, the new

constitution was no more than “quasi—Presidential” constitution. 1 That
assuredly was no way to ensure credibility or stability of parliamentary system.
As one turns to the major aspects of Bhutto’s constitution, one finds that it was
inherently a document full of paradoxes and contradictions. To begin with, it
incorporated a confusing dualism of western-democratic framework and Islamic
theology, reinforced by a curious mixture of feudalism and modern concepts of
social justice. Secondly, within the federal-frame-work one could discern a high
degree of centralization of powers in the chief executive. It was not surprising
that the new constitution came to be identified as a conglomeration of divergent
and contradictory trends, pulling in different directions.
The Preamble of Bhutto’s constitution stated: “Whereas sovereignty over the

entire Universe belongs to Almightily Allah alone and the authority to be
exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a
sacred trust;
“And whereas it is the Will of the people of Pakistan to establish on order:
“Wherein the state shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen
representatives of the people, wherein the principles of democracy, freedom,
equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully
observed; wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess
and practice, their religions and develop their cultures; wherein shall be
guaranteed fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and
before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought,
expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public
morality....”
It is interesting to note that part IX of the constitution has been specifically

devoted to “Islamic provisions” which could be seen as replica of previous
efforts in this regard, in a bid to satisfy, Islam Pasand parties and orthodox
Muslims. On the other hand, Bhutto conceded the demands of progressive and
democratic elements providing socio-economic and political justice. However, in
practice the theoretic and obscurantist provisions hampered the process of
1
See : G. W. Choudhury "New Pakistan's Constitution" (1973) Mirldel East Journal (28; 1, 1974) 10-18.
For a comparative perspective refer to G. W. Choudhury. Constitutional Development in Pakistan. (London,
Orient Longman) 1969.

implementing and enforcing provisions pertaining to assurance concerning
socio-economic and political justice.
Although the preamble declared: “adequate provision........for minorities freely to

profess their cultures”, in practice, Bhutto’s government treated the minorities as
political outcasts. The highest political office (President) was constitutionally
denied to the non-Muslims. The very caption of the constitution as “Islamic
Republic” of Pakistan2 and declaration of Islam as the “State religion”3 were clear
pointers to perpetuation of theocratic priorities.
The constitution provided that: “All existing laws shall be brought in conformity
with the injunction of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah........”
As if extending the provisions of Ayub’s constitution, Bhutto’s constitution

provided an “Islamic Council” headed by a President consisting of experts who
could pronounce views both on interpretation of Islamic laws and their
application to Pakistan. Similarly, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, the
constitution indicated directly that the “President of Pakistan must be a
Muslim”.4 More over, the systemic theocracy of Pakistan was extended to her
foreign policy and principles of policy.
Article 40 states:
“
The State shall endeavor to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among
the Muslim countries based on Islamic unity and brotherhood”. Pakistan’s tilt
towards Islamic countries in preceding decades notwithstanding, there was no
statutory provision to that effect in previous constitution of Pakistan. That
indeed was a significant constitutional induction.
To a very minor extent like India’s “Directive Principles”, Pakistan’s new

constitution included “Principles of Policy”, which were predominantly inspired
by Islamic theocracy:
2
Article I of the 1973 constitution designated Pakistan as an "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" like, 1956
constitution. In 1962 constitution there was no such mention. After some time through a constitution
amendment Ayub re-designated Pakistan as an “Islamic Republic.”
3
Article 11 states, Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan." This was a new addition in Bhutto's
constitution.
4
Article 41(2) states: The President of Pakistan must be a Muslim believing in the finality of Prophet
Mohammad as laid down in Holy Quran and Sunaah." For details See: The Constitution (1973) of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Karachi, Government of Pakistan, 1973).

“Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims in Pakistan, individually and
collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental
principles and basic concepts of Islam.”
It is conceivable how such a heavily loaded theocratic constitution could be

conducive to operational effectiveness of democracy and socialism subservient to
the fiats of the Mullahs and Islamic theologians. For his own political survival,
Bhutto, to a considerable extent, “Islamized” the political process of Pakistan
rather than evolving a secular tradition.5
The new constitution introduced a Parliamentary framework in a modified

version. As stated earlier, unlimited power were vested in the office of the chief
executive i.e., the Prime Minister. The theoretical contents of the constitution,
notwithstanding, in practice the parliamentary frame work got converted into
‘Prime-ministerial’ form of government, Bhutto modified the west minister
model making the prime minister “supreme” through statutory provisions :
Article 91 (2) states
“The Prime minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the total
membership of the National Assembly; the real executive authority will be
vested in the office of the Prime minister.
According to Article 48 (1)
“The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall act in accordance with
the advice of the Prime minister and such advice shall be binding on him”.
Bhutto’s constitution also deviated sharply from established convention of the

Westminster parliamentary process concerning ‘no confidence’ against Prime
Minister:
According to Article 96 (2) the resolution for a vote of no-confidence against the
Prime Minister will not be passed unless the successor to the Prime Minister is
identified and the vote of no confidence must be passed by a majority of the total
membership of the National Assembly. As if the preceding provisions were not
adequate to ensure a particular incumbent in office.
Article 96 (5) provided that the adverse vote of a member belonging to a political
party shall be disregarded if the majority of that party does not support the vote
5
For an interesting study of the role of Islam in Bhutto's constitution, see Fazlur Rahman, "Islam and The
New Constitution of Pakistan," Journal of African and Asian Studies (VIII : 1973) 190-224.

of no-confidence. This provision was specifically inducted with a view to
counteracting any dissent or rebel group within the ruling party for years to
come, as it were.
It might also be recalled that the tradition of prim us-inter pares, affecting the
Prime Minister, was calculatedly subverted. Bhutto’s intentions were obviously
tainted in favour of presidential authority of the US model under the garb of
parliamentary, responsible prime ministership of the U. K. model.
Perhaps, Bhutto provided all such stringent safeguards against what he termed –
”political instability”, which also characterized Pakistan during the preliminary
phase of parliamentary system (1947 1958). Field Marshal Ayub Khan, also
provided a number of constitutional devices against political instability, but
ultimately those safeguards were denounced by Bhutto himself as crude
attempts to perpetuate personal rule. During Bhutto’s regime, opposition leaders
like Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Asghar Khan alleged that the so called
safeguards were no more than authoritarian assertions of Bhutto’s quest for
unchallenged power.
Provisions regarding the federal structure were provided in parts V and VI of the
new constitution. These federal provisions were similar to those of Ayub’s (1962)
constitution to a considerable extent. Bhutto’s constitution provided for a bi-
cameral legislature, comprising the Senate and the National Assembly. The
National Assembly, like lower Houses of other parliamentary systems, was to be
elected by adult franchise and was empowered with greater authority than the
Senate. The constitution mentioned that the National Assembly would consist of
200 elected members and the Senate by 65 elected members from the four
provinces.
The process of constitutional amendment was meant to be tilted towards,

flexibility. The constitution stated that “for any amendment, 2/3 majority of the
National Assembly and simple majority of the Senate shall be required”. It was
owing to this flexibility that Bhutto was able to declare 40,00,000 Ahmadiyas as
“non—Muslim” minority under the IInd constitutional amendment.6 Through III,
IV and V constitutional amendments,7 Bhutto succeeded in curbing the powers
of the judiciary, and extended the sphere of executive power.
6
Both the Houses of Parliament unanimously passed on 7 September, 1974, II constitution Amendment
Bill declaring as "non-Muslim" any person who did not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of
Prophet Hazrat Mohammed or who claimed to be a prophet after Prophet Mohammed or recognized such a
claim as prophet.
7
Through the III constitutional amendments (April 1975) the scope of certain preventive detention laws
was clarified: The limitation of detention laws on charges of creating law and order situation and other
charges will not apply to those working under instructions from enemy in a prejudicial manner to the

Bhutto’s constitution did not make any mention of Judicial Review, almost an
accepted norm of federal constitution. However, there was a stipulation that “the
judiciary would become independent within three years.” In practice, that did
not happen.
As we turn to the powers of provinces, it would be se n that subjects within their

purview were left undefined, but were intended to cover all matters which did
not fall within the federal or concurrent lists of subjects, Perhaps, Bhutto’s aim
was to provide some measure of decentralization in legislative sphere, and, at the
same time, to ensure the authority of the centre regarding administrative and
financial affairs. This dualism of Bhutto ruined the very spirit of federalism and
gave rise to provincial unrest and centrifugal forces.
Unfortunately, Bhutto did not learn much from Pakistan’s dismemberment in

1971 and outstanding economic and political issues. He had a ready made
opportunity of making a fresh start in the new constitutional framework. He,
however, bungled the opportunity and the outcome was also blatantly dismissed
by him as of little significance. Consequently, conflicting claims of regional
fixations erupted and prospects of national integrating and viable federal system
were blurred. It Bhutto had made sincere efforts; the new constitution would
have become an effective vehicle of social change and nation-building. It was in
retrospect, a folly to adopt harsh measures to curb regional aspirations and his
outward-bound adventurist policy concerning Baluchistan and the NWFP was to
prove suicidal. In retrospect, it can be stated that no government in Pakistan at
any time of its existence gave priority to reconcile national sovereignty with
provincial aspirations. Inspite of the plural context of Pakistan’s society, the
rulers supported a strong central government for Pakistan. They rejected the
demand of regional autonomy as antithetical to the very creation of Pakistan and
its Islamic character. Like former rulers of Pakistan Bhutto also gradually became
an advocate of strong centre. The entire constitution making phase witnessed
conflicts between the government and the opposition on the issue of the
quantum of regional autonomy that the new constitution envisaged.
Interestingly, the PPP and NAP, in their (1970) election manifestoes were almost
equally committed to maximum provincial autonomy. After assuming power,
Bhutto found it difficult to fulfill the promises made in the PPP manifesto.
However, in view of the mounting opposition by the NAP, Bhutto agreed to
country's integrity and Security. The IV constitutional amendment (April 1976) clarified the jurisdiction of
the Executive regarding the issuance of orders of preventive detention.
The V constitutional amendment (September 1976) restricted the powers of the Judiciary with regard to the
emergency regulations and fundamental rights and empowered the Parliament to bring amendments in the
basic structure of the constitution.

adopt a federal constitution. Though the new constitution provided for a federal
frame work the provisions regarding relations between the centre and provinces
were contrary to established norms of federalism.
The 1973 constitution provided for a ‘federal list’ containing 60 subjects, and a
‘concurrent list’ containing 47 subjects. The residuary powers were vested in the
provinces. Ironically the federal list included a wide range of subjects-much
more than defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications which
constituted the charter of autonomy originally demanded by the parties (NAP-
JUI) ruling in NWFP and Baluchistan. For instance, it included foreign trade,
railways, mineral, oil and natural gas, industrial development, nuclear energy,
taxes on income other than agricultural income, national planning and economic
coordination, and so on. These were certainly not subsidiary subjects’. Moreover,
the constitution did not clarify which law was to prevail in the event of a conflict
between central law and provincial law, on any subject in the concurrent list. The
Senate, which was visualized as the Upper House of the central Legislature, was
devoid of power. In all matters on the federal list with the exception of three-it
would only have recommendatory and delaying powers. If the Senate differed
from the National Assembly, the matter would be resolved by a joint session of
the two houses, through a majority vote. Thus even the Senate had hardly a role
to perform as the watchdog of the interests of the provinces.8
There was specific inclusion of “Fundamental Rights” and the “Principles of

Policy”, though, there was no remedy against violation of rights through
recourse to judicial action. The Principles of Policy were declared non—
justifiable. It was also provided that “loyalty to the state shall be the basic duty of
every citizen”. This was a new addition in Bhutto’s constitution. However, the
operational validity of fundamental rights was jeopardized, to begin with by
Bhutto’s reluctance to be committed to the spirit and the value of a provision,
and secondly, owing to flouting of rights during Bhutto’s heavy handed crushing
of dissent and protest.
As a safeguard for the perpetuation of his rule, Bhutto provided for a specific
provision in the constitution against its abrogation. Article 6 of the constitution
provided for continuing with the constitution even in unprecedented
circumstances and described the act of abrogating the constitution as an act of
“high treason”. This provision was obviously included to check the military
intervention. However, the ‘Coup’ of July 5, 1977 shattered Bhutto’s vision.
Though the military intervened in the political affairs of Pakistan, it has not
completely abrogated Bhutto’s constitution as the previous army rulers had done.
8
For details refer to Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1978), pp. 68-70.

In 1958 Ayub abrogated the 1956 constitution and later Yahya Khan abrogated
Ayub’s constitution in 1969.
It would, therefore, be seen that though Bhutto revived the constitutional

apparatus, its operational aspect was subverted. That did Bhutto little credit in
the ultimate analysis. It is surprising that on the one hand, he apparently showed
some concern for popular aspirations. to begin with, on the other hand, when it
came to consolidating his support base, he faltered and renounced the very
opportunity which he had helped establish, Assuredly the common man had not
bargained for such flouting of heightened expectations and negation of rightful
aspirations. Bhutto, unfortunately for his own political survival, seemed intent to
prove that his democratic pronouncements were no more than a facade.

SECTARIAN AND PROVINCIAL CHALLENGES:
BHUTTO’S CAPITULATION
Sectarian and Provincial challenges have always existed in Pakistan. These,

however, became more pressing and complex during Bhutto regime, especially
when the new constitution (1973) proved incapable of resolving them in a
positive manner. The entire national ethos witnessed widespread sectarian and
regional challenges threatening the so called compactness of Pakistani
nationalism. Not that the orthodox forces had become more incisive and
articulate but that Bhutto seemed to have lost grip on system’s priorities. The
orthodox Ulema, therefore, were only too willing to resume pressure tactics to
force Bhutto to revive Islamic theocracy and two-nation psyche. That seemed to
be the revivalists’ trump-card to neutralize apprehensions of postures of
socialism and secularism. What was worse was Bhutto’s ambivalence in his
paradoxical stance of bringing about “Islamic revolution” and evolving “secular
political culture” under the banner of “Islamic Socialism”. Bhutto was naive to
have created such a self-defeating framework. For his political survival, Bhutto
ultimately yielded to the pressure of orthodox Ulema. Throughout his rule,
Bhutto exploited religious fervour, though it is doubtful if he ultimately emerged
victorious.
It is, therefore, understandable that, his understanding of Pakistan’s situation

notwithstanding, Bhutto failed to consolidate the bases of Pakistani nationalism,
even in its truncated shape.1 Bhutto’s failure to contribute to the evolution of an
integrated Pakistan’s identity was also an index of his inhibited style. During his
regime religious and sectarian issues were politicized to a considerable extent.
He did not bring together the disparate provinces into the fold of a cohesive
nation, What is so much more surprising is that despite, his commitment to
“Islamic Unity” and call for Islamic “brotherhood” at international forums,
Bhutto found himself a helpless failure on internal level: he could not take any
substantial steps to remove protracted animosity and hatred among the various
sects of Muslims in Pakistan.
The Year 1974 began with spurt of tirades among orthodox Muslims and
Ahmadiyas and Sunnis and Shias. The dominant orthodox Muslims wanted the
Ahmadiya (Qaidiani) sect to be statutorily debarred from claiming themselves
1
Pakistani nationalism is a unique conception, because it was not based on territorial factor as such, In fact,
communalism, separatism and religion provided for the framework of Pakistani nationalism. The Islamic
ideology and two-nation theory, it became evident, were no more than tools of Muslim political elite soon
after the creation of Pakistan. Interestingly Pakistan appeared "Unique" even in her dismemberment with
the majority province seceding from the minority province." For details refer to: Saleem M. M. Kureshi,
"Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered," Pacific Affairs (45:4 winter 1972-73) 556-72.

true Muslims. Historically speaking, animosity between these two sects is based
on religious fanaticism. The orthodox Muslims believed in the “finality” of
Prophet Hazrat Mohammad as mentioned in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. While
the Ahmadiya sect regarded Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as their Prophet. 2 The
Ahmadiya sect, claimed that the Almighty Allah will send more prophets after
Prophet Mohammad for the benefit of the followers of Islam. That was cause
enough to create serious dissensions on an issue which affected the
susceptibilities of both the sects. In addition, socio-economic factors also
sharpened the hiatus between the two. Owing to their higher socio-economic
status and political influence,3 the Ahamadiyas had always been suspected by
orthodox Muslim sects. Traditional conservative elements had, therefore, always
exerted pressure on every ruling elite to take effective measure against those who
did not believe in the “finality” of Prophet Hazrat Mohammad. During Bhutto’s
regime they came in open confrontation with Ahmadiyas. Specifically Islam
Passand Parties like, Jamat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiatul-
Uelma-e-Pakistan politicized the Ahmadiya issue and demanded a complete ban
on the organisations of the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. They also
pointed to the provisions of the new constitution which specified that non-
believers in the finality of Quranic interpretation about prophet hood were to be
denied the highest officies.4 The Islam Pasand parties and groups launched a
nation-wide protest movement for socio-political and economic boycott of the
Ahmadiyas. The right-wing opposition press alleged that the Ahmadiyas were
2
The Ahmadiya sect was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889 at his birth place Qadian (in
Gurdaspur district of East Punjab). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimad that he had attained the status of a
Prophet through Holy benediction and launched a Divine mission to preach and spread the teachings of
Islam. After the partition of India Ahmadiyas settled in Pakistan's West Punjab near Layallpur. The
Ahmadiyas have also established well-knit missionary agencies throughout the world, especially in African
countries.
3
The orthodox Muslims were not happy with Ahmadiya sect ever since the establishment of Pakistan. The
leaders of Janwat-i-Islami, time and again, accused the rulers of Pakistan of favoring the anti-Islamic
Ahmadiya sect. During Bhutto's rule the anti-Ahmadiya stir became more violent. Leading Uleina, who had
launched the campaign to keep Ahmadiyas out of the fold of Islam, welcomed the decision of Bhutto
government declaring the sect as a non-Muslim minority and called it significant not only in the history of
Pakistan but also of Islam. Bhutto's government also assured the 18-party "Council of Action" that matters
relating to the property and trusts of the Ahmadiyas would be investigated. Even after the passage of
second constitutional amendment (September 7, 1974), the conservative Mullahs insisted for a total social
boycott of Ahmadiyas. They demanded ouster of Ahmadiyas from sensitive administrative and military
posts. The 18-party Council of Action demanded that Ahmadiyas should be given representation in the
legislatures and government jobs according to their population.
For details See ; POT (Pakistan series) September 11 & 20, 194.
4
Article 2 of the 1973 constitution declares that "Islam shall be the State religion." Article (41) 2 states
that "any person aspiring for the posts of country's President must be a true Muslim believing in the finality
of Prophet Mohammad." Though, there is no direct mention in the constitution that the Prime Minister must
be a Muslim the text of the Oath that the Prime Minister takes is entirely identical to the one indicated for
the President.

intent upon launching a conspiracy against the state of Pakistan with the help of
Pakistan’s enemies. It was also alleged that a secret army of Ahmadiyas was
being raised with foreign connivance.
By the mid of 1974, all the major cities of Pakistan came under the grip of anti-
Ahmadiya riots. It appeared that the Ulema were more powerful and assertive
than the ruling PPP. For the first time, Pakistan witnessed such bitter and
intensive political intolerance and religious bigotry. Perhaps, for the first time all
opposition parties and pressure groups unanimously opposed the Ahmadiya
community. The opposition parties of Pakistan boycotted, the National Assembly
and the provincial assemblies in a bid to statutorily debar the Ahmadiyas. After
prolonged discussions, on September 7, 1974, both the Houses of Pakistan’s
parliament unanimously passed the II constitutional Amendment Bill, declaring
the 40,00,000 Ahmadiyas as “non-Muslim minority” like Christians, Parsis and
Hindus. 5 Prime—Minister Bhutto, speaking during the final reading declared
that “the decision to amend the constitution was a national decision. It was a
difficult decision which could not be taken without democratic institutions and
democratic authority.”
The whole controversy brought out clearly Bhutto’s failure to discipline orthodox
sections of Pakistan. Also, it showed the inherent limitations of Bhutto’s style of
functioning. Though Bhutto acquiesced in the narrow and irrational policies of
the Ulema he could not ultimately ensure his own political existence. While it was
one thing to rake up the Ahmadiya issue and gain some populist acclaim, it was
a dangerous exercise in the total context of national integration. Whipping up
mass hysteria has been Pakistan’s bane for decades and if Bhutto also succumbed
to that temptation, it did no credit to his oftrepeated sense of political perspective.
The anti-Ahmadiya controversy did sentimentally divide the nation. Bhutto
might also have earned popular plaudits. And, yet, it was in Bhutto’s personal
interest and also in the interest of Pakistan, that he should have decried, opposed
and suppressed the anti—Ahmadiya movement. It was true that the majority
succeeded in disqualifying the Ahmadiyas but Bhutto should have distinguished
between the pressures of numbers and the rationalism of sober second thought.
Having once succumbed to the pressures of the orthodoxy, it was evidently
beyond him to liberate himself from their influence.
Similarly, relations between Sunnis and Shias, as ever, also caused considerable
disquiet and concern during Bhutto’s regime. The dominant Sunni sect alleged
that Bhutto favoured the cause of Shias, the minority sect, because he was himself
5
The had constitutional amendment states : "Any person can be declared as `non-Muslim' who did not
believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of Prophet Hazarat Mohammad, or who claimed to be a
prophet after Prophet Mohammad or recognized such a claim as Prophet." Pakistan Times, September 8,
1974.

a shia. The Shias insisted that the government should ensure specific safeguards
for their socio-cultural integrity. The Sunnis, on the other hand, were not happy
over Bhutto government’s decision to introduce “separate Islamiat syllabus for
Shias”. In the National Assembly, leaders of Sunni sect introduced an
adjournment motion against that decision. 6 During Bhutto’s tenure Shias and
Sunnis confronted each other on several religious ceremonies and the
controversy became much more acute. It might be stated that Bhutto failed on
this score also. He could not convince the warring sects that tolerance and
mutuality alone could ensure harmony and unity. While, analysts have gone
hysterical over condemnation of communalism in preparation India, it was
surprising that Pakistan’s existence hitherto failed to resolve the eternal conflict
between Shias and Sunnis, both Muslim sects, and that no substantive efforts
were made to ensure Pakistan’s national integration.
Similarly Provincial instability had always been a bane of Pakistan politics. It

became alarming during Bhutto regime in the new (west) Pakistan. It might be
recalled that Pakistan’s integration (administrative) under “one-unit” plan in
1955 so as to be on par with erstwhile East Pakistan gave a new dimension to
provincial unrest. After the abolition of one unit scheme (1970) distinct socio-
cultural groups and sub-nationalities came on the surface Regional and
intraregional tensions became pronounced in the constituent provinces of
Pakistan. Despite the federal framework, it was obvious that the real spirit
neither existed nor attempted. The call for “Islamic” bonds also failed to cement
diverse pulls and pressures of various cultural entities.
It was not wholly idle to expect Bhutto to accept the challenges of regionalism
and endeavor to resolve the manifold ramifications thereof. Perhaps, Bhutto
thought that the issue would be resolved in due course of time if left to fend for
itself. That however was not to be, regional tensions were heightened consequent
upon Bhutto’s dalliance. Instead of any possibilities of resolution, regionalism
emerged with greater vehemence and regained momentum. And, in the Process,
Bhutto antagonized the various provincial interests as well.
Bhutto’s strategy seemed to be to exercise complete control over provincial

government and that he achieved by interfering in making and unmaking of
governments. Those who toed his line were patronized in several ways, by
award of effective portfolios or influential offices.
6
Maulana Abdul Haq (MNA) introduced an adjournment motion in the National Assembly to that effect.
He argued that "the demand of separate syllabus was against national solidarity and Sunnis had never made
such separatist demand. Maulana Mufti Mahmood of Jamaitul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) supported this
adjournment motion. Nawai Wagt December 13, 1974.

In Punjab and Sindh, however, owing to the support—base of his party, Bhutto
succeeded, in some measure, in containing the inter-regional and intraregional
problems. However, in the two less developed provinces-Baluchistan and the
North-West Frontier Province, Bhutto proved a failure in curbing regional forces.
Throughout Bhutto’s rule the two prosperous and traditionally influential
provinces—Punjab and Sindh successfully bargained with the central
government for greater developmental benefits. The Punjabi regionalists raised
the bogey of Sindhi domination, whereas regional chauvinists in Sindh
complained of neglect of their vital interests. For his political survival Bhutto
maintained a balance in satisfying the regional aspirations of both Punjab and
Sindh. The other two less developed and economically backward tribal
provinces-Baluchistan and the NWFP did not gain the favour of the federal
government. Their regional aspirations were suppressed as they raised the
banner of regional autonomy” in accordance with the federal framework of the
new constitution. These provinces persisted with a protest against the
domination of Punjabis and Sindhis as well as Bhutto’s growing authoritarian
postures.
Punjabi Regionalism: As one looks back, it would be recalled that Punjab, being
the most influential and prosperous province, was acutely apprehensive of
Sindhi domination in national politics since Bhutto belonged to Sindh. However,
despite his close identity with Sindh, Bhutto found it very difficult to ignore the
specific economic and political interests of Punjab. Bhutto was well aware of the
fact that even slight neglect of Punjab’s interests could prove disastrous to his
political survival since, Punjab accounted for 65% of Pakistan’s population nearly
80% of its armed forces and 55 out of 86 ruling party’s members of Provincial
Assembly. It was Bhutto’s tactics of playing a dual game of distribution of
benefits and threatening deprivations. To a considerable extent he tried to
appease both radical elements and feudal interests. It also became evident that
Bhutto encouraged most of linguistic, sectarian and religious controversies and
turned the advantages to his favour.
Bhutto’s excessive personalism and radical postures displeased the militant

Punjabi regionalists. The most potential challenge to Bhutto’s leadership came
from the former Governor and the Chief Minister Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar,
though previously he was a staunch supporter of Bhutto. Ghulam Mustafa Khar
having massive support of big industrialists and affluent Kulaks, bargained with
the Prime Minister for “Punjabisation” of the politics of Pakistan. He was against
Bhutto’s nationalization and land reform policies7 which had adversely affected
7
Influential industrial groups and lobbies, in Punjab, like vanaspati ghee producers, and cotton traders did
not favour Bhutto's nationalization measures and, therefore, for safeguarding their interests they lined up
behind Bhutto's opponent G. M. Khar. Pakistan Economist (27 April. 1974). Similarly Punjab's influential
Peasant organization "Pakistan Kisan Council", was unhappy with Bhutto's forcible wheat procurement

the interests of Zamindars and big industrialists. As a counter to Khar’s
mounting challenge, Bhutto appointed Mohammad Hanif Ramay (a member of
the middle urban class) as the Chief Minister of Punjab. 8 But he proved less
effective in carrying Bhutto’s partisan motives and countering the growing threat
of Punjabi regionalism. Ramay was also ousted from power. 9 Than Bhutto
appointed Sadiq Qureshi a feudal landlord and politically less effective as the
Chief Minister of Punjab realizing that in a politically conscious and ambitious
province it was dangerous to appoint active and over-zealous persons to power.
However, Bhutto’s strategy of replacing the politically active persons with less
effective and less politically ambitious persons did not yield desired results. Even
after their ouster, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Hanif Ramay threatened Bhutto
through their “Save Punjab Movement”. Demands of separate provinces10 and
regional languages perturbed Bhutto to a considerable extent. The demand for a
separate Bahawalpur Province caused considerable tensions in the Province. The
militant Punjabis insisted upon the federal government to declare Punjabi as the
regional language. They also endeavored for the restoration of the prestine core
of Punjabi based on Gurmukhi to save it from the heavy influence of Urdu,
Arabic and Persian dialects.11 Interestingly the conservative Punjabi elite harped
on the revival of “Islamic fundamentalism” and the “two nation theory”
highlighting the traditional hegemony of Punjab in the national politics. They
also propagated that Pakistan ought to become a unitary state with a view, to
ensuring that no other region could exert pressure and subvert the interests of
Punjab The liberal organisatations like, “Punjabi Adabi Sangat” insisted upon
integrating the two Punjabs (East and West) of the sub-continent on the basis of
common socio-cultural heritage.12
policy". The Pakistan Kisan Council was also critical of the differences in cotton rates in Punjab and Sindh
(See : POT (Pakistan series) 31 July, 1974.
8
In March 1974, Bhutto ousted G. M. Khar from the office of Chief Minister owing to severe ideological
and personal differences.
9
Mohammad Hanif Ramay was also forced to quit the Chief Ministetrship on July 12, 1975 owing to his
excessive radicalism.
10
The inhabitants of Bahawalpur area, a former Princely state, demanded as autonomous Siraiki speaking
province of Bahawalpur. The local leaders rationalized their demand on two points: Firstly, their language
Siraika was a different language from Punjabi; Secondly, their movement was a reaction against the
domination of "Central Punjab", which was causing immense problems to their region. For details see
LINK 10 August, 1975.
11
See POT (Pakistan series) 3 December, 1975.
12
The conservative Mullahs and pro—establishment forces criticized the view of "Punjabi Adabi Sangat"
and alleged that the phenomenon of integrating the two Punjab was a calculated Indian move. They accused
India for countering the very rationale of two-nation theory through cultural offensive" by TV and Radio.

Besides his policy of changing the governmental and administrative apparatus,
Bhutto also maneuvered to create the bogey of external threat in curbing the
regional threats. Being an astute politician Bhutto succeeded in countering the
regional challenge from Punjab which emanated from curious mixture of
rightwing. “Islamism” and left-oriented “Punjabism”.13
Sindhi Regionalism: In his own home province - Sindh, Bhutto, also faced
mounting challenges in the form of inter-regional and intra — regional issues.
Prolonged conflicts between indigenous Sindhis, known as “Old Sindhis” and
the ‘‘New Sindhi immigrants” (Muhajirs), engulfed the entire provincial politics.
The militant Sindhis launched a protest movement against the alleged hegemony
of the new “Urdu—speaking” Sindhis. They took a strong line in favour of
reinstatement of “classical” Sindhi culture and language which, allegedly, had
been threatened by the massive influx of Muhajirs. Mililant members of “Jiye
Sind Front” led by G. M. Syed also threatened to launch a secessionist movement
for separate “Sindhudesh”. Earlier the “Jiye Sindh Front” had been insisting
upon greater regional autonomy and not on secession. 14 On the basis of the
theory of “sons of the soil” old Sindhis demanded equal opportunities in
governmental jobs and also called for rural development since the new Sindhi
settlers were enjoying, a virtual monopoly over trade, industry and
administration in the developed urban centers of Sindh. It might be mentioned
here that the “New Sindhis” constituted about 40% of the entire population of
the province and 70% of the population in the metropolitan city of Karachi.15
They also constituted about half of the population in other cities like Sukkur,
Jacobabad and Rohri.
The deepening rivalry and misunderstanding between the local Sindhis and the
new settlers caused political instability, violence, student unrest and language
riots, on a large scale in the province. It might be recalled that the rivalry
between the “old” and the “New” Sindhis was originated in Sindh University in
sixties. The Sindh University Engineering College set up a quota system for
admission, providing for separate seats to rural and urban areas. Consequently
the Liaquat Medical College students followed suit, and thus, gradually, but
13
Link 7 December, 1975.
14
Sindhu Desh Movement" was basically secessionist in nature. The "Jiye - Sind Movement" was
essentially a positive move for furthering the cause of Sindh and its people for greater regional autonomy.
15
The new Sindhis called for establishment of "separate Karachi Province" on the plea of their numerical
strength in the area. It might be recalled that the movement for separate Karachi province was similar to the
demand of separate Bahawalpur Province" in Punjab. For details refer to: POT, 13 November, 1974.

steadily, two Sindhis were created in one province. This contamination
ultimately spread in governmental jobs and services.16
Besides their grievance against the New Sindhis, the indigenous Sindhis insisted
upon Bhutto’s administration to save Sindh from the hegemony of Punjab in
national politics, economy and administration. Militant Sindhi regionalists
alleged that the federal government was biased in its developmental schemes.
They demanded equitable distribution of water and power resources between
Sindh and Punjab. The influential waderas (land-lords. of Sindh) complained that
Sindh was deprived of modern agricultural technology and other facilities which
were available in Punjab. 17 Interestingly, they insisted for the release of 60%
Sindhi programmes from Sindh Radio Station on the pleas that Sindhi was the
oldest language of the province.18
Bhutto tried to tackle the mounting regional tensions in his home province
through constantly touring the important areas of the province calling the
common man’s attention to alleged protracted involvement of foreign enemies in
the domestic politics of Pakistan. In addition, as part of his strategy, Bhutto often
appointed his own people to offices of responsibility. He did not face the
problem of constantly removing the Chief Ministers in Sindh as he faced in
Punjab. Though, he had to replace his own cousin Mumtaz Ali Bhutto from the
Chief Ministership of Sindh with another person Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, his
replacement did not cause much of trouble for the Prime Minister because
Mustafa Jatoi was also one of his trusted associates. Mustafa Jatoi carried out
smoothly all the directives of the federal government and imposed strict
restrictions on the regional chauvinists. Provocative Sindhi literature was banned
by the provincial government. The veteran Militant Sindhi leader G. M. Syed
throughout Bhutto regime was kept under heavy restrictions. On the whole,
Bhutto’s PPP was in sound position in the province. 19 Bhutto very tactfully
controlled the regional threat from Sind and appeased both the Old and the New
Sindhis awarding them privileged positions in government jobs.
Baluchi and Pakhtoon Regionalism: It has been mentioned earlier also that
“multiethnic” frontier provinces-Baluchistan and the North West Frontier
16
See: Outlook, 27 April, 1974.
17
See: POT, 27 November, 1974.
18
A Former Food Minister of Sind, Syed Abdullah Shah moved a resolution in the Sind Assembly asking
the Federal government to fix 60% programmes from Radio Pakistan Karachi, and 30% national broadcast
in Sindhi language. Morning News, 6 December, 1974.
19
After winning the bye-election in December 1975, the PPP secured 45 out of the 61 seats in the
Provincial Assembly of Sind. Morning News 31 December, 1975.

Province,20 which were, for long, neglected posed a real challenge to Bhutto’s
authority. What seemed to have irked people of these areas was that Bhutto’s
approach and methods proved no different from those which had been applied
by Ayub and Yahya Khan earlier to crush regional movement in erstwhile East
Pakistan.21
Since the dismissal of NAP-JUI coalition governments in these provinces, the

federal government did not hesitate to apply fascist and militant tactics in
suppressing the regional aspirations. Sidetracking the constitutional issues, pro-
establishment media widely publicized that that the real issues in these
provinces were basically those of “economic development.” Lacking a
substantial support- base in these provinces, the ruling PPP throughout Bhutto
regime tried to suppress the popular elements through coercive and
unconstitutional measures. The National Awami Party which took up the cause
of restoration of democracy and regional autonomy 22 was banned by Bhutto
government. It might be recalled that following Pakistan’s 1970 general elections,
three major political parties emerged with popular support in well defined
geographical regions. The Awami League in erstwhile East Pakistan, PPP in
Punjab and Sindh and the NAP in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier
Province. Right from his coming to power, Bhutto adopted militant and fascist
methods for his political survival and did not allow the operation of normal
democracy in these two provinces.
In Baluchistan, the situation had deteriorated considerably and posed a veritable

challenge to Bhutto administration after the dismissal of NAP-JUI popular
government. The puppet government installed by Bhutto proved incapable of
resolving mounting tribal unrest and regional tensions in the province. Despite
heavy military “crackdown” by the federal government, the Baluchi regionalists
continued their struggle for regional autonomy and restoration of constitutional
processes.
20
For an interesting historical analysis of Baluchistan and the NWFP Anslie T. Embree (Ed.) Pakistan's
Western Border Lands: The Transformation of Political order (New Delhi, Vikas 1977) pp. 158-160.
21
The veteran Red Shirt leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan stated: "As far as the Baluchis and Pathans are
concerned there is in any case Military rule, worse than what could have been envisaged even, during the
days of Ayub and Yahya Khan". Press Asia International (PAI, Pakistan Service) 26 June, 1974.
22
The NAP launched its struggle against Bhutto regime on three point programme for the restoration of
normalcy in Baluchistan and the NWFP:
1) Withdrawal of contingents from civilian areas except the Border outposts;
2) Release of all political prisoners in both the provinces and
3) Restoration of NAP-JUI governments in both the provinces.

Interestingly Bhutto’s strategy of changing the provincial government structure
did not yield desired results Former Governor Akbar Khan Bugti, who was one
of Bhutto’s loyalists and staunch critic of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his NAP
also resigned from his post. According to reliable sources he did not approve of
military action in the province which came down heavily on the tribal people.
Moreover, Akbar Khan Bugti was not satisfied with the constitutional position of
the Governor, which had created serious problems in the relationship between
the Governor and the Chief Minister.23 There upon, Bhutto appointed Khan of
Kalat (another feudal sardar) as the Governor of Baluchistan. Khan of Kalat
readily accepted to act us Bhutto’s spokesman in latter’s communication with
NAP leadership and as a counter weight to army hawks and the Chief Minister.24
Without paying adequate attention to the real causes of unrest, Bhutto tried to
put up a facade of policies aimed, at “economic reconstruction and
development.” In a determined bid to teach dissidents a lesson, operation
annihilation” was vigorously launched through indiscriminate armed force. It is
believed that China and Iran provided massive military assistance which enabled
Bhutto to execute such a wanton policy.25 His regime did not hesitate to apply a
veritable “economic blockade” to squeeze tribal insurgents out of their
entrenched positions.
As events showed, Bhutto did not succeed even minimally in this context The
vicarious satisfaction of having applied oppressive machinery might have
assuredly belonged to Bhutto but the determination of Baluchis, some chose to
call it tribal insurgency”, was not to be cowed down by Bhutto’s indiscretion and
lack. “Baluch Student Organization” (BSO) and “Baluchistan People’s Front. For
Armed Resistance (BPFAR) were active in underground guerilla warfare. It is
strange that Bhutto ignored the lesson of history that even the British chose to
stop at a point and did not go beyond it vis-a-vis Baluch affairs.
Throughout his tenure, Bhutto calculatedly undermined the real constitutional

problem of Baluchistan. He harped on the theme that the problem of Baluchistan,
was, infact, one of economic advancement. The pro-establishment media
23
Refer to: Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 November 1973.
24
See, LINK, 20 October, 1974.
25
According to reliable sources, with the help of Iran and China, Military cantonments were established in
strategic areas of Baluchistan: for instance Mushki, Kharan, Khuzdar and Turbot. It was reported that Iran
also constructed air bases in a 16 Sq. Km, area at Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar, in close proximity of
Baluchistan. Chinese instructors were operating vital pro-establishment elements in the Military staff
college, Quetta.

highlighted that tribal insurgency was against feudal Sardars and not against his
regime.
The White Paper26 issued by the federal government presented false data and
contrived analysis concerning the provincial turmoil and blatantly justified
deployment of army units, Moreover, Bhutto’s action against the “National
Awami Party” further aggravated the problem The strategy of federal
government proved a failure in appeasing the militant Baluchis. For instance, the
declaration of “general amnesty” and abolition of “Sardari system”27 bore little
fruits and the confrontation continued unabated till Bhutto’s fall. It would not be
entirely wrong to say even thereafter the new military regime finds itself in no
better, or different, position vis-à-vis Baluchistan.
In the NWFP also federal government employed tactics similar to those which
were used in Baluchistan. After the removal of NAP-JUl government in the
province (Feb. 1973) the puppet government presented a picture of despair,
helplessness and desperation. Bhutto’s government imposed strict restrictions on
the activities of regional activities. Frontier Gandhi Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
was kept under severe restrictions. Militant organization “Zalme Pakhtoon” was
banned under Defence of Pakistan Rules. Like-Baluchistan the military was
deployed to convert the province into “iron curtain”. Aimed at creating
misunderstanding between the Pakhtoons and Baluchis the federal government
also adopted a strategy of spreading of wild and unsubstantial rumours. It might
be recalled that the story of the murder of Khan Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai,
Baluch Gandhi was widely publicized by establishment media to drive a wedge
between the Baluchis and Pakhtoons28. Like Baluchistan the puppet government
proved a failure in NWFP also and the federal rule was installed in the Province
in February 197529. The federal government imposed “military crackdown” in
the NWFP to cowdown dissident elements.
Bhutto’s intention became obvious when, consequent upon his failure to curb the
regional movement, he went back to the dubious theme of “foreign interference
and conspiracy”, being responsible for Pakistan ills. The media were blatant in
26
For details See: "White Paper on Baluchistan", (Government of Pakistan (Islamabad, 1974).
27
See : News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Sapru
House, New Delhi) April, 1976.
28
Khan Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, Baluch Gandhi, leader of the Pakhtoon Khawa (Pro-Pathan faction)
was assassinated on December 2, 1973 in Baluchistan. According to the former Governor of Baluchistan,
Akbar Khan Bugti, the murder was a deliberate attempt of the federal government to ensure estrangement
between Baluchis and Pathans. See : News Review on South Asia, January 1974.
29
News Review on South Asia, March, 1975.

indentifying Afghanistan as directly responsible for disharmony in the NWFP.
India and Soviet Union were also attacked indirectly.
Throughout Bhutto regime the Province presented a worst picture of turmoil and
instability witnessing unprecedented student unrest, agrarian conflicts and
politics of violence and terrorism. Pakhtoon regionalists accused Bhutto regime
of converting Parliamentary democracy into a mockery through brutal military
action, Even after the imposition of ban on the NAP, they continued their
struggle based on NAP’s stand: for “self-determination for Pakhtoon People”,
residing in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and greater regional autonomy to the
province 30 . The “Khudai Khidmatgar” (Red Shirt Party) led by Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan continued its underground activities and became more vociferous
for recognition of distinct Pakhtoon culture and identity. The Pakhtoon Student
Federation was also actively involved in opposing federal government
suppressive politics. The Pakhtoons never recognised the Peoples Party as a
popular force. However, they alleged that movements launched by the Muslim
League and the PPP were basically movements of and for Punjab, and Sindh and
not for the Pakistani nation as a whole.31
In retrospect it might be stated that Bhutto inherited sectarian and regional

challenges. His initial policy pronouncements had given some hope to elements
aspiring for integrated and viable Pakistan. There was adequate evidence in
Pakistan’s history since independence, to indicate how under unimaginative
regimes, sectarian and regional fixations came to assume threatening proportions.
Bhutto was expected, therefore, to imbibe suitable lessons from the dilemma
resultant from quest for national identity, on the one hand, and, ethno-religious
parochialism, on the other. Instead of meeting the challenge squarely, Bhutto also
faltered and failed to rid himself of the populist appeal to religious
susceptibilities. Islam alone did not emerge as a positive and effective instrument
of forging national integration as amply vindicated during preceding decades.
Bangladesh was a cruel reminder of that realistic situation. But, it seemed, Bhutto
was not prepared to see the writing on the wall and learn appropriate lessons
thereof. Bhutto’s motive clearly was retaining power and extending it, like any
ambitious politician. But, he did not give evidence of clarity of perspective, when
he bowed to the pressures of the Ulema and, to the same time, did not tire of
raising a radical banner for reforms. That, evidently, was neither opportunistic
judgment nor statesmanship. It was thoughtless of Bhutto to have lightly
dismissed regional aspirations and passed on the onus to feudal elements,
30
The National Awami Party put forward the demand of self-determination for Pakhtoons as a prelude to
the problem between Pakhton and Afghanistan.
31
For a useful analysis of the problem of the NWFP, refer to Sukha Ranjan Chakravarty: "The Pakhtoon
National Movement", Foreign Affairs Reports (XXV, I Jan., 1976).

insensitivity and foreign conspiracy. Systemic realities were taken non-seriously,
perhaps, owing to overconfidence in the potential of political administrative,
militant and diplomatic alternatives, with which Bhutto proposed to out-
maneuver the dissidents and the protestant. But he did not fully reckon with the
imponderables of forces of “festering nationalism”. Above all, Bhutto failed to
give a national response to sub-national challenges. And, therein lies some
answer to the continuing dilemma of Pakistan.

ECONOMIC SCENE:
A BRIEF SURVEY
With the breakaway of the erstwhile Eastern wing, Pakistan’s economy came
under abrupt strain not only because a large area of productive potential was
thus taken away but more so because, consequent upon the war of 1971, Pakistan
as it stood truncated and humiliated, has to reassess and reformulate its
economic priorities and prospects. The political system stood at cross-roads and
the economy was in shambles after the fiasco of 1971. It was imperative for
Bhutto to announce programmes and policies which could catch the common
man’s imagination, whatever the ultimate operational relevance thereof. In a bid
to building-up a popular base for himself, Bhutto had very few alternatives
available. That context, in a way, explains his pronouncement concerning Islamic
Socialism.” Basically an extension of mixed economic system, Bhutto, time and
again, emphasized that Pakistan had to undergo smooth transition to become
full—fledged “Socialized Economy.”
More, specifically, Bhutto embarked upon variety of radical and reformatory

programmes, such as, nationalization, land-reform, federal programme for
population-planning and revitalization of education system. However, as events
eventually showed, the quest for consolidation of personal power overshadowed
Bhutto’s promised revitalization of Pakistan’s economy. That also diluted the
flavor and intensity of Islamic Socialism. In the long run, Bhutto’s oftrepeated
declaration of “distributive justice” (ensuring bread, clothes and houses to all)
did not convince anybody as a serious attempt to alleviate sufferings of the
people. In fact, the operational aspect of his economic policies did not ultimately
satisfy the capitalist and feudal critics nor did they fulfill the rising expectations
of the radical element. Being a shrewd politicians, Bhutto attempted “to use both
the carrot and the stick with business, in much the same fashion as he dealt with
the Army and the Civil Service.”1 Broadly speaking, Bhutto’s economic measures,
did give some inkling of the overall reformist vision that had emerged in
Pakistan after 1971, and which undeniably could form the core of initial steps
towards nation-building.
However, Bhutto’s economic policies and measures did not positively affect the
common man and, thus, failed to formulate and implement an integrated and
viable economic plan. Official claims notwithstanding, it is doubtful if the pace of
economic development during five and a half years of Bhutto’s leadership was
either brisk or effective. The other side of the economic scene was: growing
1
Robert La Porte, opcit, p. 113.

inflation, fall in production-agricultural and industrial, and deteriorating balance
of payments position. That posed a severe challenge to the economy of Pakistan.
It was not unexpected that, during his tenure, Bhutto tried to explain away the
hiatus between promises and performance by putting the blame on national and
international determinants, such as, inflation, price spiral, natural calamities-
heavy rains and floods, locust and pest menace. What Bhutto did riot reckon,
however, was recurrence of political instability, emergence of antagonism and
challenges against his own legitimacy. Assuredly with such challenges growing
steadily, Bhutto could not give even minimal attention to the priorities of
economic revitalization.
As one goes back for an evaluation, it would be seen that the initial year (1972-73)
of Bhutto’s rule saw a good enough beginning towards economic survey
conducted by the government of Pakistan. It would be recalled that the war with
India over Bangladesh was a catastrophe, politically and economically, and
Bhutto did give some evidence of his commitment to rehabilitate Pakistan’s
national identity. If the common-man discovered in the process some sort of
initial participatory enthusiasm, it was not entirely unexpected.
However, it would be unjust to ignore Bhutto’s perception of the primacy of

socio economic measures or to belittle his boldness as a political leader to
formulate policies and measures accordingly. Perhaps, a far more convincing
answer would be found in the systemic constraints which Bhutto could not
remove or resolve at will and which had to be accepted as part of the socio-
economic reality. It was unfortunate that Bhutto inherited not only a truncated
Pakistan but also a sluggish economy. 1972, the initial year of Bhutto’s rule,
proved to be perhaps the most critical year in Pakistan so far as the economy was
concerned. Spiraling prices set off by the impact of the economic burdens of
Indo-Pak war (1971) on an acutely stagnant economy posed serious problems.
According to the official annual economic survey for 1972-73 (released in the
second week of June, 1973), though the economy had shown signs of remarkable
recovery in 1971-73 it had barely succeeded in over coming the setbacks of the
past two or three years. The GNP showed an increase of 0.5 percent, but the per
capita income had hardly regained the level of 1971-72. Even with a bumper
wheat crop of 74,00,000 tons harvested in May 1973, the country had to import
substantial quantities of food grains from abroad. The investment ratio was
considerably lower than attained during 1964-65 Domestic savings financed only
6.9 percent of gross domestic investment. The wholesale price index showed a
steep rise of 18.5 percent during July 1972-March 1973 with prices of food items
spiraling substantially.

However, explaining the economic trends the survey pointed out that the
progress during 1972-73 had prepared the economy for a major thrust forward.
The revival of economic activity was led by the export sector, which recorded a
remarkable increase of 30 percent over the preceding year. Imports largely
consisting of raw materials, increased by 24 percent. Agriculture, which
continued to occupy a pivotal position in the economy (contributing 38 percent
to the total value of gross domestic produce and absorbing 55% of the entire
labour force), recorded a growth-rate of above 3%. Wheat production increased
by 9% and sugarcane production by 7%. Industrial production increased by 6.3%
mainly owing to better utilization of existing capacity. Construction activity
expanded by 13%. Also foreign exchange reserves increased from $ 170 9 million
in December 1971 to $ 341.7 million in March 1973. The net utilization of foreign
aid was about $ 200 million. The foreign trade sector expanded much faster than
the national income, with exports amounting to $ 750 million showing an
increase of 27% over the preceding year. 2 The ratio of exports to GNP was
estimated at 14.5 percent.
However, the economy was considerably strained due to abnormal price hike.
The worst phase of price spiral was reflected in the indices for the first half of
1972. Renewed price pressures were observed during 1972-73 due to various
factors such as rupee devaluation, relaxation of anti-inflationary phenomenon
originating in developed industrial countries.
The wholesale price index increased by as much as 19.5% during July 1972-
March 73, over the corresponding period of 1971-72 when the price rise was only
7.4%. The consumer price indices at different places recorded increase ranging
from 10% to 16%.
By the end of 1973; Pakistan was confronted with serious economic problems,
some owing to natural calamities and some as a fall-out of absence of balanced
and rational economic planning. The worst even floods hit the country in August
1973, not only creating a colossal problem of human rehabilitation, but also
disrupting the entire economic system. The heavy destruction of crops and food
grains, accompanied by large-scale disruption of communication channels
created a serious problem in the availability of essential items like, wheat,
vanaspati, sugar, kerosene and vegetables.
Major crops, such as wheat, rice and cotton, were heavily damaged. Nearly 4.3
million bales of cotton (the major foreign exchange earner), almost a quarter of
the total annual produce, were destroyed. It was proposed to increase exports
during 1973-74 by 12.5% over the previous year’s figure of Rs. 825 crores.
2
Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 June, 1973.

Pakistan’s cotton produce constituted 33 to 40% of total world cotton exports
during 1972-73. But the achievement of the aforesaid target became extremely
difficult, particularly due to the ban on cotton export in order to fulfill the
essential requirements of the domestic market. Also, spurt in cotton prices in the
world markets made it difficult for Pakistani cotton to achieve competitive
viability.
The economic survey (1973-74)3 released by Pakistan’s Finance Ministry revealed

a not-so-gloomy” picture of the economy, particularly in the context of natural
calamities. In addition, the oil crisis, following the 1973 war in West Asia, created
problems for Pakistan also. Pakistan’s domestic production of crude oil meets
hardly 15% of its total consumption of crude and finished product. The oil
import bill increased from $60 million to $225 million in 1973-74, and was placed
at $387 million in 1974-75. Similarly, fertilizer prices were considerably affected
and the country had to spend $150 on fertilizer imports, as against $40 million in
the preceding year. The same was true of wheat, edible oils, chemicals and other
technical equipment.
According to official estimates, Pakistan lost nearly $500 million after adjusting
the gains due to high export price of rice, against losses due to high import prices
of petroleum, fertilizers, raw materials and technical equipment The import bill
was estimated to have gone up to $1450 million in 1973-74, as against $797
million in 1972-73, without any significant increase in the quantities imported.
The year, it was expected, would close with a balance of payments deficit of $165
million4
The year 1974-75 proved worse for the economy of Pakistan. In an interview to
Kayhan International in October 1975, Bhutto stated: “Let us make no bones
about it; we are facing a serious economic situation. The nightmare is receding
into the past. But we still, have numerous difficulties to overcome”. There was
reason for that statement. During 1974-75, the GDP fixed at 7.2% was reduced to
2.6% as against the population growth rate of 3%. The GNP came down from the
envisaged growth of 10 percent to 4.4 percent. The regression in per capita
income which had been caused as consequence was projected at 4%. There had
been a general decline in both agricultural and industrial production as
compared with that during the previous year. On the other hand, the
expenditure on defence continued to rise. According to reliable sources, Pakistan
was spending Rs. 615 crores out of Rs. 12000 crores of its revenue income on
defence. The amount considerably increased during 1974-75, when the budget
had earmarked Rs. 583 crores for defence expenditure. The wholesale price index
3
See: New Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, July 1974.
4
Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan, (Vikas New Delhi, 1978), p. 145.

maintained an upward trend and rose by 25.9% during 1974-75. The deficit in the
balance of trade increased to an all time high of Rs. 1038.3 million. Exports
during the year increased by 1 2%, while imports went up by over 53%. The
gross domestic savings (GDS) rate came down from 7.5% in 1973-74 to 6.8% in
1974-75.
Though the fiscal year 1975-76 began in a climate of hope and optimism, this
economic progress made by Pakistan during this period was less promising. As
during the preceding years, the domestic as well as international factors
adversely affected the economic situation. International prices of quality rice
declined drastically during 1975. The market for cotton textiles also did not show
the level of recovery anticipated earlier. On the other hand, the enhanced prices
of petroleum and petroleum products further strained the economy. On the
domestic scene, too, a few adverse developments occurred. Continued problems
at Tarbela dam restricted the additional flow of water for irrigation. Cotton
production fell owing mainly to heavy rains, floods and a massive pest attack.
Against the target of 40 lakh bales, the actual production was only 29 lakh bales.
Pakistan was also denied its share of upsurge in international cotton prices.
Difficulties of the textile industry were considerably aggravated, as a
consequence. Furthermore, the decline in the availability of cotton-seed oil led to
larger imports of edible oil.
According to the economic survey, Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Produce (GDP)

recorded a growth rate of 5% during 1975-76 agriculture sector registering a 4%
increase Despite the heavy damage of Tarbela complex, wheat production went
up to 8.1 million tonnes, a half million tonne more than in the previous year. The
country also registered increase in the production of maize, rice and sugarcane.
Substantial increase was also recorded in sugar, Vegetable oil and fertilizer
production. The GNP rose to 4.3% against the preceding year’s (1974-75). In spite
of the world-wide recession the export of yarn and cotton cloth had shown 8%
increase in 1975-76 over 1974-75. Figures for population growth, however, far
exceeded expectations, thereby adversely affecting economic plans during 1975-
76. Population figures, in July 1976, estimated at about 72.37 million showing an
annual growth rate around 3.6%.5
Similarly, during the final fiscal year (1976-77 of Bhutto regime) the economy
showed considerable stagnation. The GNP grew only at the rate of 1.2% against
the projected 8.1% target. Excluding the effect of net remittances by Pakistani
nationals abroad, the upward trend was a bare 0. 5%. With population (about 74
million) growing at 3%. Growth of GDP during the same period was stalled by a
fall in cotton output, as seen earlier. Also, political unrest consequent upon PPP-
5
For details refer to POT, Pakistan Series, June 16, 1976,

PNA confrontation after March 1977 general elections inhibited developing
economic projects and scared investments. Tax collection went down and
remittances from abroad also showed decline. In all, industrial production was in
dismal state.
Textiles accounted for 26% of large - scale manufacturers but production,

declined by 18.3% for yearn and 13.2% for cloth (with the cotton crop estimated
at 2.4% million bales) almost 40% below the 4 million bales target. Overall
agricultural output rose by only 2% with the result that per capita availability of
food grains fell more owing to population explosion.
Exports amounted to $1,129 million against a target of $1,400 million. Imports

rose to $2,301 million from $2,947 million during the previous year (1975-76)
leaving a deficit of $1,172 million. Home remittances of $575 million provided
major support to balance of payments. The large current-accounts deficit was
about $ 7 billion compared with about half of that, in 1971. Domestic inflationary
pressures persisted, revised estimates for 1976-77 showing a tally of Rs. 2,230
million but the actual deficit adding up to Rs. 5,650 million. Though 33% of the
annual development out—lay of Rs. 17,000 million came from deficit financing,
the result was a staggering monetary expansion amounting Rs. 8,310 million, i.e.
18.6%.6
The aforesaid brief economic survey shows that, like his predecessors, Bhutto
also failed to restore viability to the economy of Pakistan. It seems that successive
regimes and rulers in Pakistan only succeeded in giving undue importance to
political survival rather than making concerted efforts to revitalize the national
economic infra-structure. True, there was never a let-up in pronouncing
impossible promises, raising popular expectations but the hiatus between
commitments and actual systemic outputs continued to widen and deeper.
Perhaps, the failure was compounded by the choice of a developmental model,
quite beyond the inherent capabilities of Pakistan’s economy to sustain. On a
bedrock of semi-agrarian economy, was sought to be raised a structure of mass
consumption society, to be enjoyed by the fast growing middle class. In addition
to inadequacies of such a proposed edifice of economy, the rulers of Pakistan
failed to identify specific dimensions of modernisation and indutrialisation and
also did not heed the likely consequences of dovetailing Pakistan’s economy with
international economy. In fact, Pakistan’s vulnerability to world influences is
several times more than that of, for instance, India, since 40% of the former’s
economic activity is susceptible to world influences.
6
Ibid June 12, 13, 1977.

It is against such a backdrop that one should assess the role of Bhutto regime
with regard to Pakistan’s economic deterioration in the over-all specificity of
domestic constraints, natural, calamities and international economic pressures.
Like the preceding ruling elite Bhutto also squandered the national exchange on
the proliferation of security agencies, paramilitary organizations and massive
administrative net work. More over Bhutto did not lessen Pakistan’s heavy
reliance on foreign-aid and multiplying armaments spending. Foreign Economic
aid, ultimately, is not expected to boost and prop up national economic
development and growth. There was a five—fold increase in OPEC aid (from $
110.5 million in 1975-76 to $. 555.4 in 1976) and marked decline in consortium aid
from $809.0 million to $730.7 million during the same period. Besides changing
the terms of trade, heavy consortium debts reduced the utility of aid, since about
25% of export earnings went to service external debts. On a rough calculation,
every $100 of aid granted $33 of income but $11 out of this was paid back as
interest and other charges7. Unfortunately, during Bhutto regime more than half
of the total budget were allotted to defence which heavily retarded the
developmental potential of other important sectors. According to reliable sources,
Pakistan’s defence budget had gone up to Rs. 702 crores in 1975-76 from Rs. 560
crores in 1974-75. While, Pakistan’s defence budget, before the liberation of
Bangladesh, totaled Rs. 444 crores which during Bhutto regime registered an
increase of 58% (Rs 702 crores) more for less than half the earlier area.8
Giving a detailed analysis of the working of Pakistan’s economy under the

ousted PPP government, Pakistan’s prominent economist, Zafar, Iqbal published
significant analyses in the Dawn of August 7 and 8, 1977. Facts and figures in the
following analysis are largely collected from Zafar Igbal’s articles, as mentioned
above.9
It would, therefore, be seen that although the period of political uncertainty

started in 1968, its main impact on economic performance was felt in 1970-71 and
1971-72, when Pakistan passed through a period of political crises which
culminated in the dismemberment of the country in December 1971. As seen
above, despite Bhutto’s specific or vague promises, there was little evidence of
detailed specificities of purposive reforms effecting maximum number of the
people, if only to give some credibility to Bhutto’s vociferous commitment to
people’s welfare. Gradually the elements of populism became obvious and it was
7
India Today, March 1-15, 1978, pp. 46-47.
8
Hindu, 7 April, 1976.
9
For the text of Zafar Iqbal's article refer to POT, August 10, 11, 1977.

not without reason that the discerning among his supporters as well as critics,
realized the futility of Bhutto’s assurances.
A look at comparative economic situation shows that up to 1970-71, over 60% of

imports related to capital goods or raw materials for capital goods. The average
for the period 1972-73 to 1975-76 was 40% for capital goods and raw materials for
capital goods, and 60% for consumer goods or raw materials for such goods.
Obviously, the composition of imports decisively shifted from development
goods to consumer goods. As a matter of fact, finished consumer goods which
accounted for 10% in 1969-70 accounted for almost 30% of total imports in 1972-
73 and in 1975-76, accounted for about 22% of total imports The main purpose of
imports came to be increased consumption instead of increased investment. That
could not be called productive or welfare-oriented.
Similarly, between 1970 and 1975, savings in the private sector dropped from
over 12% of the GDP to 6.5% and in the public sector from + 0.9% to — 0.9%.
As we turn to investment in the private sector, it might be recalled that Bhutto’s

ambivalence concerning private and public sectors did not help either the
prospects of investment or extension of benefits of nationalization. In fact,
extended pronouncements concerning the latter acted as disincentive to the
former. In 1969-70, investment in manufacturing industry accounted for about
35% of all private investment in fixed assets. By 1975-76, capital formation in the
private sector (while inflation continued to provide high profits, instead of being
invested productively), either led to wasteful consumption, hoarding and
speculation, or flights of capital abroad.
In the public sector also, things were far from satisfactory. Deployment of
investment in public sector was, by and large inefficient. A large number of
schemes were started, but none proved to be productive. Also, by subjecting
public servants to insecurity, one could see emergence of a sycophant breed of
careerists which adversely affected decision-making in the public sector. In
addition, development resources, instead of being concentrated for maximum
effect, were squandered away owing to partisan decision-making.
It is interesting that while the total amount of investment in the public sector
went up, Pakistan’s own contribution diminished. Foreign resources available to
the public sector increased from Rs. 2180 million in 1969-70 to Rs. 12,580 million
in 1975-76. Pakistan’s abject dependence on foreign borrowings led to serious
economic consequences. In 1969-70, external resources contributed 44% to
development expenditure financed by the federal government. In 1975-76, such
contributions were total (100%). As a matter of fact, external resources were far in

excess of development expenditure and Pakistan’s own contribution to
development in the public sector came down to a mere formality.
It needs no undue emphasis that in the specific context of an under-developed

country, with limited natural resources, savings and investment are one of the
imperatives of the development process. There is, in such situations, a natural
presumption that avoidable expenditure would be tightly controlled. That,
however, was not in evidence considering the consistent manner in which
successive regimes in Pakistan paid little attention to thrift savings and economy.
For instance, while revenue receipts in 1975-76 were a little more than double the
level prevailing in 1969-70, expenditure in 1975-76 was more than three times the
level of 1969-70. Reckless expansion also took place throughout. Government
secretariat had 700 section officers in 1971, whereas their number rose to more
than 2,000 in 1975-76.
In the agriculture sector, from 1964-65 to 1969-70, agriculture output had grown
more or less steadily at an average rate of over 6.3% per annum. In the
subsequent period up to 1975-76, agricultural output went down to an average
rate of 1.4% per annum. The situation of agricultural crops was equally dismal.
Though between 1964-65 and 1969-70, crop production increased more or less
steadily at the rate of 7.8% per annum, after 1969-70, it stagnated and rate of
production went down to 1.2% per annum. Output per acre of Wheat and Maize,
to begin with, steadily rose. Rice output behaved erratically and Sugar-cane
output per acre also declined over this period. Cotton reached a level of 3.9%
maunds per acre in 1971-72 and retained it till 1973-74. However, there was
deterioration in this respect, and in 1975- 76, yield per acre and fallen by 10% as
compared to that in 1969-70. Growth in agricultural productivity, as a whole,
became a cause for concern.
The industrial output also showed decline though during the period 1964-65 to
1969-70, industrial output grew at an average annual rate of 8.2% per annum,
from 1969-70 to 1975-76, average annual rate came down to 2 0%.
As one recalls the fact that almost one-third to a half of manufacturing industry
had been nationalized since 1972, the bulk of investment during the next five
years was diverted to the public sector. However, the results did not vindicate
such heavy reliance on expansion of public sector. It also become obvious that
the objectives of nationalization were neither economic nor social, but only to
acquire additional levers of political power regardless of economic consequences.
There is one more dimension to the preceding analysis, When we consider that
the rate of growth of population went on increasing by 3% per annum, per capita
agricultural and industrial outputs kept on declining, and the economy, indeed,
showed terrifying prospects.

As one looks back to the steadily declining state of economy, one recalls the
unnecessary and ill-timed devaluation in 1972, which only proved how ill-
conceived the monetary and fiscal policies gradually became, which, in turn, led
to extravagant public expenditure and severe inflationary pressures on the
economy. A word about the consumers plight is called for. Prior to 1971-72, the
prices in Pakistan were relatively stable. Between 1959-60 and 1969-70, prices
rose at an annual rate of 2.8%. Between 1969-70 and 1971-72, a period of
uncertainty and political turmoil, prices rose at an annual rate of 6.7%. Since
1971-72, in sharp contrast to past trends, the prices rose by about 22% per annum
till 1975-76 giving the overall situation in which prices rose, by and large, by
about 2 to three times from the time the Pakistan People’s Party took over.
Bhutto’s tenure, therefore, did not alleviate the plight of the common man.
We referred earlier to the Universal consequences of price hike in oil and oil
products. It is the view of Zafar Iqbal that “while oil prices have had influences
mainly through changes in the terms of trade with developed countries, their
effect on Pakistan’s economy has been grossly exaggerated. In 1969-70 petroleum
products valued at about $44 million were imported. In 1975-76, these imports
rose to $378 million. Between 1972-73 and 1974-75, the value of imports increased
five times, however, only about 3% of the GDP”. It is stated that: “As far as the
foreign exchange impact of oil prices is concerned, it has been compensated for
by increased remittances from Pakistani workers abroad. Between 1973-74 and
1975-76, such remittances have increased about $ 200 million per annum which
more or less matched the increased outlay on oil imports over the same period.
In addition, such earnings (not passing through banking channels) are also
financing imports of luxury items as well as a considerable amount of smuggling,
which has further increased the availability of consumer goods in Pakistan”
Zafar Iqbals logic seems impeccable.
The position with regard to currency in circulation was also not very
encouraging. During June 1965 to June 1970, the currency in circulation increased
by 41% (which gives an average annual rate of a little over 7%). During June 1972
to June, 1976, the currency in circulation registered an increase of 140% yielding
an annual rate of 25%. Total money supply over the same period expanded at the
rate of 17.2% per annum as, compared to about 11% during June 1965 to June
1970. It might be recalled that Pakistan also fought a war with India during this
period.
The preceding analysis amply shows that during the period under review, the
interactive effectiveness between money supply, prices and physical output was
of a low order. Instead of bringing about stability to the economy, loud-mouthed
pronouncements went astray with regard to fulfillment of objectives. Political

priorities and unthinking economic formulations resulted in a situation which
was bound to be beyond retrieval.
It is surprising that the government to contain inflation, sought to import

consumer goods, either through official channels or through a highly permissive
attitude towards smuggling, which made the development outlook utterly
inconceivable. Basic economic premises prove that unless domestic savings are
rapidly raised, an adequate level of investment to achieve a respectable level of
economic growth would be impossible. Zafar Iqbal is of the view that even if
exports attain a growth level of 6% per annum and if domestic savings are
conserved, it might be estimated that $ 2,000 million, as external resources,
would be needed by 1981 if there is to be any perceptible growth in per capita
income. “Given Pakistan’s sharply declining credit-worthiness, such large funds
through aid or loans may not be forthcoming. In any case, the present economic
structure of the country is extremely wasteful of both domestic and and foreign
resources”.
Zafar Iqbal rues the fact that systematic emasculation of academic institutions,
the media and the civil service which had gone on since 1958 in one form or
another, precluded discerning analyses of Pakistan’s economic fluidity. His
words of caution are relevant: “A reversal is overdue. Otherwise the public will
continue to be hood-winked and deprived of all opportunity of informed
analysis and criticism which is inconvenient to whoever happens to be in power
at any given moment. Things ultimately surface but by that time the country had
paid a very heavy price”.
A large share of the blame, however, goes to Bhutto’s policy for keeping partisan
interests over economic priorities and development obligations.
The preceding analysis shows that much of where Bhutto erred was in his
declarations seeking national revival of Islamic Socialism. There was no
identification or explanation of the idealistic concept, especially how Islamic
philosophy was sought to be linked with that of socialism. For the consolidation
of his political base, Bhutto sought to woo the common man by inviting slogans
and symbols of socialism whereas he was helpless in challenging the base of
entrepreneur and big business. Besides his call of socialism, Bhutto insisted upon
evolving a ‘mixed economic system’ in Pakistan. It is obvious that Bhutto’s socio-
economic precepts and objectives notwithstanding his primary consideration
were political. Given the systemic reality of Pakistan, he could not afford to alter
or reverse the order of priorities. It could not, however, be denied that Bhutto
was the first political leader of Pakistan to have initially identified and
recognised the urgency for socio-economic welfare of the people. He could not be

faulted on that score, specifically in the over all context of his radical socio-
economic reform.

BHUTTO’S FOREIGN POLICY
In the formulation of foreign policy of any country, there are multi-dimensional

determinants, such, as, geo physical context, politico-economic realities and
given international environment, such as, interests and objectives of global
powers, nature of the balance of power in a particular region and bilateral and
multi-lateral alignments. These are as relevant as the nature and impact of
outlook and perception of national leadership. In the specific context of Pakistan,
Bhutto could be considered one of the major architects of that country’s foreign
policy. His domestic preoccupations notwithstanding Bhutto continued to
demonstrate an indentifiable perception of international linkages. During his
tenure as Pakistan’s foreign Minister in Field Marshal Ayub’s cabinet, Bhutto
enjoyed wide latitude in establishing the framework for Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Prior to that, Bhutto voiced disenchantment with Pakistan’s total reliance on the
United States of America. His views were a reaction against the feudal-orthodox
elite who believed that Pakistan was the only Asian country which the United
States could truly depend upon, given the latter’s interest in the containment of
international Communism.1
From 1954, until the Sino-Indian border conflict (1962), ‘Pakistan’s foreign policy
could be said to be predominantly determined by the US factor, which
displeased the radical forces led by Bhutto. When Bhutto became the foreign
Minister, he strongly affirmed that the country must modify its policy of
exclusive reliance on the US. It was not without reason that Bhutto gave a fresh
perspective to international postures and a new dimension to foreign policy
formulations.2 After Pakistan’s disillusionment in two Indo-Pak wars (1965 and
1971), Bhutto thought in terms of the theory of “interdependence” and
“bilateralism” in foreign affairs. He realized geostrategic situation of Pakistan
which was caught up in superpower machinations. Moreover he seemed to have
realized that in the South Asian region, India had come to attain a distinct level
and significance. If he interpreted that situation to mean a threat for Pakistan, it
was another matter.
It was during Bhutto’s tenure that the full significance of Pakistan’s geo-religious
affinity with South and West Asia was realized. The location of Iran, Afghanistan
and the Persian Gulf assumed added significance. Pakistan’s strategic location to
1
Lawrence Ziring: "Bhutto's Foreign Policy." 1972-73, in Contemporary Problems of Pakistan, Ed. J
Henry (E. J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1974) p. 57.
2
For details refer to: Z. A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, (London, Oxford University Press, 1969).

the north of the Arabian sea, gave that country considerable importance
specifically owing to the fact that it is also the point of entry to the oil rich
Persian Gulf and also because almost 80% oil meant for South-East Asia and the
Mediterranean, passes through Pakistan’s strategic port at Karachi.
It was interesting that Bhutto wrote a 38-page signed article, entitled

“Bilateralism-New Directions” in which he asserted that the concept of
bilateralism, adopted as the guiding principle of Pakistan’s foreign policy-was
not incompatible with alliances with great powers and multilateral arrangements.
Prior to the adoption of bilateralism he had said, Pakistan’s foreign policy was,
“at worst capricious and at best one of pragmatism planted on half-forgotten
ideology”. Bhutto claimed that with the adoption of bilateralism, Pakistan had
steered itself through the treacherous shoals and currents that menaced the
passage of strategically placed states in the complex, contemporary age. Bhutto
thought that bilateralism was an affective strategy for the transformed
international situation.
Along with Bhutto’s article were also issued, as annexure, 17 documents

supplied by the cabinet Davison and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Information. Bhutto stated that for Pakistan, its membership of the Islamic
conference, bonds with Iran and Turkey and links with Saudi Arabia as cradle of
Islam, governed considerable segment of its external relations. “The cause of the
Arab world, Africa’s struggle against racism, residual of colonialism and the
general interest of the Third World in the establishment of an “equitable
economic order can not but decisively influence our attitude towards
international issues and to that extent, mould our external relationships”.
While praising non-alignment as morally the “only valid and practically the only
effective policy”, Bhutto complained: “But there has been a cankcr in the rose.
This had been generated by the assumed or professed leadership of the group of
non-aligned states by one or more powers that have sought to use non-alignment
as a level for their own diplomacy in pursuance of their own chauvinistic ends.”
He said “if non-alignment were to become a movement of great value once again,
it had to be restored to its pristine image by redefining its objectives and
redetermining its priorities. Pleading for the inclusion of all the third world
countries, “regardless of geographical location, power alignment, race, religion
or ideology”, Bhutto warned that “any movement, grouping, any maneuver
retarding third world’s unification for mobilisation of its energies would involve
the cause of being little minded.”3
3
Morning News, 31 October, 1976.

In a 14 - page signed article released on 5 September, 1976, Bhutto further gave a
blue-print for “Third World mobilisation” and called for a Third World summit
around March 1977 in Pakistan, because for the year 1977, he was elected as the
chairman of the Group of 77 at the United Nations. Bhutto affirmed that the
conference of third world countries would “signal the turning away from the
threat of a simmering and potentially disastrous confrontation to the promise of
global partnership----The Third World massage should not be clothed in the
jargon of a by gone age, nor be tailored to the political ends of any country, or
group of countries. If the opulent and the powerful can combine, as they
invariably do at critical movements, to maintain their dominance on the basis of
their wealth and technology, it would be perpetrating a wrong on humanity if
the poor nations should dissipate their relatively limited strength in dividing
their own ranks, in creating a gulf between the poor and the poor.”4 Assailing the
nuclear armaments race Bhutto advocated for declaration of Indian, Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans as “Peace Zones.”
Thus, the central features of Bhutto’s foreign policy were: evolution of

bilateralism, Third World mobilisation through the creation of a new economic
order, criticism of nuclear proliferation and establishment of special relations
with the Muslim countries of the world on the basis of “Pan-Islamism,” These
value postulates notwithstanding, the operational aspect of Bhutto’s foreign
policy was not very different from that in the past. In political context, Bhutto did
not succeed in dismantling Pakistan’s long standing bias especially, with regard
to India and Afghanistan. Despite his bitter criticism of foreign interference in
third world affairs Bhutto himself relied on foreign powers for economic and
military assistance. Posing himself as a staunch socialist at home, Bhutto showed
definite leanings in external affairs towards “Pan-Islamism.” Bhutto’s foreign
policy ventures can be briefly discussed here, in the context of Pakistan’s
relations with some major countries.
Pakistan’s foreign policy towards South Asian region during Bhutto’s rule did
not appear to be significantly different from that in the past. Though he initiated
the process of bilateralism, he could not implement it fully. Bhutto always
suspected India as a potential threat to the existence of Pakistan and rejected
various attempts to rectify matters on one prefect or the other. He did not stop
rushing to super and major powers to intervene in the affairs of South Asian
region. It was interesting that instead of strengthening understanding and
mutual goodwill with the neighbouring states. Bhutto sought super-power
support and prop. Such policy could not ensure an operational distinction
between alliance based support and going beyond the critical parameters of non-
interference by super and big powers. Such postures only precluded extension of
4
Dawn, 6 September, 1976

areas of agreement and development in the region, and, as events amply
vindicated strains and stresses continued to adversely affect the politics of South
Asia. It was in this context that Bhutto’s search for equilibrium’ in relations
between super and big powers, in South Asia specifically, should be viewed.
Bhutto’s postures concerning South Asia were ambivalent. He pleaded for

bilateralism or equilibrium depending primarily on how far it suited his
objective to consolidate internal politics and economic stability of Pakistan. He
also wanted that whatever policies he pursued, did not adversely affect “big-
power equilibrium” in the region.
As one takes closer look at Pakistan’s relations with India, it would be seen that
there was protracted history of ill-will and tension. Right from the Simla
agreement (July 1972) to Indo-Pak agreement (14 May 1975)5 for the restoration
of full diplomatic relations, the spirit of “Coexistence” did not take reliable roots.
As during the preceding years, Bhutto continued to project the Jammu and
Kashmir issue as a bone of contention, thwarting amicable resolution of conflict
between the two countries. Owing to unpredictable domestic situation, Bhutto
resorted to political propaganda with a view to creating favorable public opinion.
Like his predecessors, Bhutto kept harping upon supposed threats to Pakistan’s
sovereignty. India-baiting took new proportions, primarily to dilute political
opposition at home. There was a systematic building up of Bhutto’s image as the
saviour and ‘heroic figure,’ who alone was capable of ensuring Pakistan’s
integrity and stability.
Bhutto concluded the historic Simla agreement (1972) with India as a leader of
the defeated and dismembered nation, 6 Bhutto was adequately seized of the
transformation in the balance of power in the sub-continent. His primary concern
was to get the release of Pakistan’s 93,000 POWS, interned in India. It might be
presumed that he would never have agreed to the delineation of the line of
control in Jammu and Kashmir, had he foreseen that the withdrawal of Indian
troops from the occupied areas of Pakistan could be achieved otherwise: From
the very beginning, he was under concerted pressure, especially in Punjab and
Sindh, his main stay of power, for release of the POWs, because the majority of
the POWs belonged to these two provinces. Even after agreeing to restore
diplomatic relations with India, in May 1976, Bhutto persisted with Kashmir
issue more to assuage the mounting domestic opposition and also for
refurbishing his party’s image in the forthcoming general elections. Addressing
the National Assembly on 21 June, 1976, Bhutto reaffirmed the view that there
5
For details See: The Hindustan Times, 15 May, 1976.
6
Refer to Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan, chapter 7 and 8 (Vikas, New Delhi, 1978).

could be no compromise on fundamental issue regarding the problem of Jamu
and Kashmir. He said:
“We remain committed to the right of self-determination for the people of

Jammu and Kashmir”. Bhutto strongly criticized opposition leader’s allegations
that the Kashmir issue had been by- passed at the 1972 Simla conference To sooth
his political rivals at home, Bhutto claimed to have revived the Kashmir issue
and had made it clear that “it was the only issue left to be resolved between India
and Pakistan following the settlement on other outstanding issues, and on this
settlement depended friendly relations between them.7
The recurrent appeal to keep Kashmir issue ‘live’ thwarted all efforts of
developing happy relations in South Asia in general, and Indo-Pak amity in
particular. In that at least, Bhutto showed consistency of performance, without
manifestly deviating from policies of the preceding regime.
Pakistan’s relations with Bangladesh also were as sour as could be expected in

case of a country’s dismemberment into two sovereign states. So long as Mujib
was alive, Bhutto was evasive and reluctant to accept the political reality of
Bangladesh. It was only after Mujib’s assassination that Pakistan’s postures
showed signs of change. Pakistan recognized Bangladesh during the Islamic
Summit held at Lahore in February 1974. It would be recalled that Bangla-Pak
relations were set on the course of Normalization, only after the change, of
regime in Bangladesh. Bhutto seemed to have presumed that Bangladesh during
Mujib’s regime would, automatically be tilting, towards India; and, against
Pakistan. In December 1975, Bhutto initiated the course of improving Pak -
Bangladesh relations through concluding a treaty almost on the pattern of “Indo
Bangladesh treaty”. In 1976 both the countries resumed diplomatic relations, and
restored, postal and telecommunication links. It would be recalled that time and
again, Bhutto repeated his slogan of ‘special relations’ with Bangladesh
respecting its sovereignty and integrity. Bhutto,, also, gave wide publicity to.
Bangladesh’s desire to have closer links with “Islamic world” as the vindication
of “two nation theory”, despite that country’s birth in violence and confrontation
against West Pakistan’s hegemony. Bhutto took pains to stress the point that
Bangladesh was basically “Muslim Bengal”.
Pakistan’s relations with other South Asian countries Sri Lanka, Nepal and
Bhutto did not show any controversial aspects during Bhutto regime. By his
pronouncements to strengthen the unity of the “littoral” state of the region,
Bhutto gained considerable good will among these nations and succeeded in
developing mutual economic and cultural ties.
7
Dawn, 22 June, 1976.

With the exception of Afghanistan, Bhutto persisted with seeking better and
“special” relations with Muslim countries of the world, specifically, west Asian
countries. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained tense and
strained on the question of self—determination of “Pakhtoone” residing in
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Bhutto who talked of
“self-determination” of Kashmir people, would not agree to an identical policy
for the Pakhtoons. It was only in 1976 that he took initiatives to restore friendly
relations with Afghanistan 8 . However, no specific outcome was in evidence
owing primarily to the legacy of distrust and strains. Even as Pakistan was
founded Afghan leaders did not accept the Durand Line (1893) which established
the frontier between the two countries. Afghans also supported creation of a
separate Pathan state in the sensitive region of Pakistan’s North West Frontier
Province ever since.9
It is to be noted, however, that Unlike India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and

Pakistan, have avoided any major confrontation. On the whole, relations
between the two countries, therefore, could be said to have differed from ‘poor’
and ‘Luke-warm’.10
Bhutto’s constitution (1973) specifically mentioned that Pakistan would strive for
preservation and strengthening of fraternal relations among Muslim countries
based on “Islamic Unity and brotherhood” (Article 40). Soon upon assumption of
power, Bhutto singled out the “Muslim bloc of nations” as having demonstrated
the greatest friendship toward Pakistan. After the emergence of Bangladesh,
Bhutto gave a new orientation to Pakistan’s policy ensuring the dimension of
amity towards the Muslim countries in the context of changing geo-political
relations :
“The severance of our eastern limb by force has significantly altered our
geographic focus. This will naturally affect our geopolitical perspective. There is
whole uninterrupted belt of Muslim nations.... Clearly we have to make a major
effort in building upon the fraternal ties that already bind us to the Muslim
World.”11
Whether that new - found affinity with Muslim countries, during Bhutto regime
in West Asia was a tactical overture, is hard to verify. But, thereby, it might be
8
News Review on South Asia, November 1976.
9
For details refer to : Ainslie T. Embree (Ed.), Pakistan's Western Borderlands (Vikas, New Delhi, 1977).
10
Lawrence Ziring, Opcit, p. 65
11
Pakistan Affairs, May 16, 1972, Quoted by Lawrence Ziring, Opcit, p. 63

presumed that he wanted to legitimize his own rule at home and his foreign
policy. Bhutto developed close relations with Turkey and Iran on the one hand,
and with the Sheikhdoms on the other, as the manifestation of Pakistan’s affinity
with” Pan-Islamism”.
The holding of Islamic Summit (1974) at Lahore, gave Bhutto considerable

popularity in Arab countries in particular, and the Islamic world in general.
Addressing the International Seerat Congress in Rawalpindi on March 3, 1976,
Bhutto strongly put forward his determination to make Pakistan “a mighty
fortress of Islam”, and made fervent call for the unity of the Arabs and other
Muslim countries.12
Bhutto developed politico-economic and cultural relations with Iran and Turkey
by reaffirming Pakistan’s commitment to CENTO and RCD. Perhaps, after the
USA and Red China, Iran was the other country which gave massive military
assistance to Pakistan. With the collaboration of Iran and Turkey, Bhutto also set-
up several agro-industrial projects to strengthen the economy of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s relations with Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Syria and Jordan were improved to a considerable extent. According to
well informed sources, the Arab countries provided massive economic assistance
to Pakistan. Up to 1975, during Bhutto’s time, Pakistan received economic
assistance amounting $ 1,000 million from oil producing Arab countries.13
It was shrewd perception of Bhutto to have extended Pakistan’s relations

towards Muslim countries in west Asia. It was considered an adequate enough
umbrella to safeguard Pakistan’s interests. Bhutto successfully equated
Pakistan’s geo-political interests and Islamic objectives. It was not without reason
that after winning the March 1977 general election, Bhutto sought to ensure his
legitimacy by expecting these countries to bolster his claims. It seems the PNA
leadership chose to take a leaf out of Bhutto’s strategy and pretended, obviously
successfully, of far greater allegiance to Islam, which seems to have earned the
PNA greater credibility among the West Asian Muslim states. Consequently,
when the inevitable parting of the ways came vis-a-vis Bhutto and the PNA, the
former commanded much less support from the West Asian World. To extend
this presumption further, West Asian states seem to prefer the present military
(Gen. Zia’s) dictatorship in Pakistan primarily because the latter has gone out of
the way to prove its bonafides as Islamic regime.
12
Dawn, 4 March, 1976
13
The Hindustan Times, 13 March, 1976.

It is interesting that while Bhutto succeeded in developing balanced relations
with the two Super Powers and Major Powers, Pakistan’s search for these
diplomatic sureties was, by and large, determined by her relations with India.
Theoretically speaking, Bhutto claimed to maintain “bilateral” approach in
foreign affairs with a view to equating Pakistan with the USA, USSR, UK,
People’s Republic of China, and France. In an article published in Foreign Affairs,
Bhutto stated:
“By maintaining friendly relations with all the great powers on the basis of
principles and not expediency, Pakistan hopes to avoid involvement in disputes
and struggles between them. It is a part of our new policy that one should refrain
from participating in multilateral pacts directed by one bloc of powers against
another”.14
However, in practice, Bhutto did not disengage Pakistan from global power -
politics. Biased with the phobia of “India’s hegemony” in South Asian region, in
general, and the sub-continent, in particular, Bhutto kept on his quest for military
aid from various sources. It might also be recalled that Bhutto’s foreign policy
ventures came up in the larger context of protracted Sino—Indian estrangement
and Indo—Pak distrust, on the one hand, and Pakistan’s growing understanding
with the USA and Communist China as a policy of diplomatic vision, on the
other, especially the Indo—Soviet treaty (1971) further explained Pakistan’s
search for diplomatic allies. And, yet, Pakistan’s relations with the USSR, even
during the systemic crisis of December 1971, however, non—specific, were not
estranged, and, mutual economic and trade relations continued to be maintained.
At no time did Bhutto permit his personal or his government’s unhappiness over
the Soviet Union’s role during the conflict of 1971, to be transformed into
diplomatic rupture with the USSR. Bhutto’s greater reliance on the USA and
China was also aimed against any possible threat from the USSR also. On the
other hand, it might also be said that Bhutto’s persistence with cordiality with
the USA, did not prevent him from forging mutual understanding with China
and France. Bhutto’s foreign policy options, therefore, were considerably
extended as the aforesaid context seeks to show. And, yet, the other side of the
issue was equally valid; precisely, that Pakistan could not wholly dispense with
US assistance and alliance, of a variety. Bhutto’s Foreign Policy formulation,
therefore, was not without adequate hard - core calculations and long term
perspective.
While it is true that during the 1965 Indo—Pak war, the USA did not gift away
substantial and decisive military hardware to Pakistan, during the crisis over
Bangladesh (1971), the role of the USA was much more specific. Sale of
14
Z. A. Bhutto: "Pakistan Builds Anew", Foreign Affairs, 51:3, April 1973, p. 552.

armaments rose about $ 82 million even before lifting the arms embargo (1975)
and it was promised that ammunition, anti-tank missiles and Jeeps and other
military vehicles worth about $ 100 million would be supplied to Pakistan.
As a signatory to the 1954, mutual assistance pact with the USA, Pakistan is
entitled to military aid and other concessions and Bhutto often reminded the US
of its “treaty obligations” to supply conventional arms to Pakistan. The long
period (almost a decade) of US arms embargo perhaps forced Bhutto to lean
towards China and France for military and economic assistance. That the USA,
Pakistan’s professed ally for years, could not digest. In that situation perhaps
Bhutto came at crossroads of diplomatic options, which compelled him to go for
nuclear reprocessing plant (1976) from France, Bhutto threatened to dissociate
Pakistan from military pacts sponsored by the USA, including CENTO.15 Bhutto
later alleged that he was ousted by a military ‘coup’ at the instance of the USA so,
also, the search for nuclear reprocessing plant was aborted.16
During Bhutto regime, relations between Pakistan and the People’s Republic of
China became more cordial than ever before. Even Bhutto had persistently tried
to involve China as a countervailing power vis-a-vis India. When Bhutto
assumed complete control over administration, Pakistan heavily relied on
Chinese military and economic assistance and also got maximum support
regarding political issues. In 1971 China agreed to provide Rs. 1000 millions of
free long — term loan to Finance development projects in addition to Rs. 540
millions pledged in the past.17 At Bhutto’s request China also agreed to cancel a
$110,000,00 debt growing out of the 1965 Indo—Pak war. Though, China
declined to sign a defence pact with Pakistan to counter balance the Indo—Soviet
Treaty, it gave the assurance that, it would give Pakistan every assistance as and
when the occasion demanded.
China helped Pakistan not only to make—up the war losses suffered during the
conflict of 1971, but also to build up capacity for increasing arms production and
in modernization of Pakistan’s defence system. During Bhutto regime Pakistan
was the biggest recipient of Chinese military aid among non—Communist
countries. Pakistan received Chinese arms aid worth more than S 300 million.18
Bhutto not only restored cordial relations between the two countries but also
played a historic role in seeking detente between the USA and China. Bhutto
always supported the cause of China in international forums. He persistently
15
The Statesman, Nov. 7, 1976.
16
The Times of India, Dec. 28, 1978.
17
The Pakistan Times, Nov. 15, 1971.
18
For Details: News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, June, 1976.

supported China’s entry into the United Nations and also called for
representation of China in Asian Development Bank (ADM). Bhutto vociferously
asserted that “there is no point in denying the rightful place to the “Asian
Giant”19. The PRC in turn, also provided ample support to Pakistan to contain
super power rivalry in the South Asian region and, to a considerable extent,
hardened the militaristic tendencies in Pakistan. It would not, however, be an
exaggeration to state that during Bhutto’s tenure Pakistan’s relations with the
PRC remained relatively consistent.
In Summation, it would be seen that despite his academic training in

international politics and diplomacy and attempts to formulate a broad
perspective of inter-state political realities. Bhutto regime resulted in dilemmas
emanating from a mix of emotional and realistic contradictions. Bhutto was
obsessed with parity vis-à-vis India and that led to alternatives which had their
respective inhibiting factors. In the context of fluctuating relations with
neighbouring states, Bhutto relied on favourable alliance with super and big
powers, and, consequently, economic resurgence was relegated to secondary
level with military priorities taking precedence. In addition, Bhutto’s foreign
policy sought to elicit maximum advantage out of a situation of super and big
power interests in South Asia, an alternative which had infinite imponderables
and hazards, as later events showed Bhutto was also instrumental in giving
West-Asia dimension to foreign policy, in keeping with his pronouncements of
Islamic national core.
However, Bhutto’s contribution in the field of Pakistan’s foreign policy can not
be overlooked. In addition to playing a leading role in formulating and
implementing domestic policy, Bhutto also gave a fresh and realistic perspective
to Pakistan’s foreign policy. He was the first political leader who visualised a
self-respecting role for Pakistan in the arena of international politics. He was also
aware of the fact that exclusive dependence on either super power would only
preclude Pakistan from exercising the freedom to identify foreign policy options.
Bhutto also deserves credit for supporting bilateralism in international politics.
Moreover, Bhutto’s concern for third-world unity and establishment of a new
economic world order were indices of his conscious efforts to create a place for
Pakistan not only among the developing world but also at the global level.
19
Dawn, 26 April, 1976.

THE PPP AND THE OPPOSITION PARTIES:
INTERACTIVE DILEMMAS
Having tasted power Bhutto not only adopted coercive measures against the
opposition parties, he also took care to ward off disgruntled elements within his
own Pakistan People’s Party. By resorting to extra - constitutional forces ----
army, para-military force and police, he crushed progressive and left-wing
elements thereof. On the national political sense, Bhutto endeavored to make the
PPP as dominant Party, with a view to establishing one party hegemony. That,
however, was synonymous with Bhutto’s quest for personal power.
Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party
Before we proceed further, it would be relevant to state that the PPP, during its
first phase of inception (1967-70) acted as an opposition party with generous
sprinkling of what looked like radical postures and policy declaration. However,
as the PPP assumed political power, its second phase (1971-77) showed
considerable departure from its former radical stance and perspective. As the
party in power, the PPP came to show considerable obduracy in its functional
aspect. But, it was not so much owing to its institutional and ideological strength
that the PPP succeeded in being at the helm of affairs as it was owing to the
ineffectiveness and helplessness of the opposition such as they were.
To begin at the beginning, Bhutto formed the PPP in November 1967. The
Pakistan People’s Party emerged in response to growing awareness among the
common man concerning the socio-politico and economic problems during
Ayub’s military regime. That seemed an opportune time for Bhutto to appeal to
the masses and announce the four—point programme of the PPP
“Islam is our Faith;

Democracy is our Polity;
Socialism is our Economy and
All Power to the People.”
The inherent contradictions of the four—point—Programme notwithstanding,

Bhutto succeeded in presenting himself as a champion of the masses and a
crusader against military dictatorship. Consequently, the image of the PPP was
also refurbished. It was not unnatural for factory workers, labourers, peasants
and students to rally behind Bhutto and give massive support to Bhutto’s
criticism of the Ayub government as “illegitimate and anti—people.” In its bid to
become a progressive party, the PPP concentrated on three objectives:

1. Opposition of Ayub’s dictatorial and undemocratic methods ;
2. Establishment of democracy in Pakistan and
3. Transformation of Pakistan into a Socialist Society.
In the larger context of developing society, the common man in Pakistan was also
lured by the glamour and promise of slogan—symbolism and various classes of
people were attracted by Bhutto’s call. One can not blame the people for looking
upon Bhutto and the PPP as saviors considering the fact of Pakistan’s political
experience and antecedents.
By 1968 anti—Ayub feelings in Pakistan were widespread. Bhutto’s PPP

succeeded in mobilising popular resentment against the Ayub regime. The
masses who were getting increasingly politicized through PPP’s revolutionary
and secular calls, provided considerable support to Bhutto and his Party
ultimately persuaded Ayub to quit. Though Ayub left the political scene in 1969,
he transferred power to the then army chief, General Yahya Khan. General
Yahya Khan like his predecessors, failed to make any appreciable dent in the
growing popularity of the PPP. The extent of People’s Party’s popular image
could be assessed by the fact that it was the first opposition party which
succeeded in persuading the military Junta to declare general elections in
Pakistan, and eventually transferring power to the representatives of the People
of Pakistan.
After elections were announced to be held in December 1970, Bhutto’s PPP

reiterated radical and revolutionary postures which were amply reflected in the
election manifesto of the PPP.
The orthodox and conservative political elements were not happy with Bhutto’s
apparently radical programme. In both, East (erstwhile) and West Pakistan, the
Ulema belonging to both Shia and Sunni sects assailed PPP’s radical stance as
repugnant to Islamic philosophy. They organized meetings for expressing Fatwa
(formal declaration of Islamic propriety or impropriety on an act) against
Bhutto’s conception of socialism. The ideology of the PPP was criticized as
“Kufr” (anti-Islam) and anti-Pakistan The Islam Pasand Parties - Jamaat-e-Islami,
Jamiatual-Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Pakistan raised the slogan
“Socialism Kufr Hai” during the 1970 general election campaign.
In view of the mounting criticism of religious elite and right-wing parties, Bhutto
introduced some modifications in the PPP’s ideology. During the election
campaign (1970) PPP’s original ideology of “Socialism” was identified as
“Islamic Socialism”. In-fact, in order to gain massive popular support, Bhutto
gave a call for “restructuring Pakistan’s society in accordance with the principles

of egalitarianism as mentioned in the Holy Quran and Sunnah”. The Islamic term
Musawaat-e-Mohammadi (equality according to Islamic Principles) was
specifically added in the PPP manifesto. 1 Thus, through this modification in
keeping with “Islamic value postulates” Bhutto’s PPP not only acquired massive
popular appeal but also neutralized the growing challenge of rightist and
obscurantist forces.
After the resounding victory at 1970 general elections, Bhutto’s political

ambitions got aroused to a greater extent. Conveniently forgetting the
democratic and socialistic ideals of the PPP, for whatever they were worth,
Bhutto made little secret of his ambition to rule the “entire Pakistan”. However,
that was not immediately possible, in view of Sheikh Mujib’s victory in the
erstwhile eastern wing. As events turned out to be, Bhutto succeeded in carving
a political position exclusively for himself negating the accepted norms of
majority’s right to govern in a parliamentary system. What transpired, however,
was that Bhutto’s PPP in an overall minority refused to play its role as
responsible opposition in the national legislature and, instead, chose to thwart all
efforts of Sheikh Mujib to ensure reconciliation. The rest of the story of Pakistan’s
dismemberment does not need recounting here. It is notable that Bhutto’s PPP
after winning the 1970 general election repeated the haughty tactics of the
Muslim League when the latter had also sought to disregard the parliamentary
norms of the majority’s right to form the government. Similarly Bhutto’s decision
to stay away from the National Assembly reminds the Muslim League’s refusal
to participate in the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1946-47 just before the
partition. A strong and determined minority felt that the only way it would
safeguard its vital interests was to opt out of the democratic process to seek extra
parliamentary solutions.2
After the emergence of Bangladesh, Bhutto’s PPP assumed power in what was
left of Pakistan and ruled the country for five and a half years. During the power
phase (1971-77), the complexion and ideology of the PPP underwent
considerable changes. Bhutto became growingly ambitious and traits of
authoritarianism were apparent in his handling of the party affairs as well as
governance. He did not tolerate criticism even when it came from tried and
trusted colleagues 3 . There was little doubt that the PPP after 1970 became a
1
Bhutto rationalized the addition of Islamic contents in the socialistic framework of his party ideology on
the ground that, since, there were verities of Socialism in the world as in the USSR, China and elsewhere,
why can not there be a Pakistani form of Socialism suitable to that countries genius. For details see ; Dilip
Mukherjee, (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto : Quest For Power (New Delhi, Vikas, 1972) (pp, 179-180)
2
Ibid (pp. 113-114)
3
Pakistan People's Party leader from Dacca Nuruzzaman was the first among those who vehemently
criticized Bhutto's excessive personalism and running the party on "purely dictatorial lines." He was

convenient tool for Bhutto’s personal rule. Owing to Bhutto’s excessive
personalism and repressive style, the PPP could not succeed in becoming a
national party. True, it was popular in Punjab and Sindh. But, in Baluchistan and
the NWFP, it failed to enlist any reliable mass support.
During 1970 general elections the Pakistan People’s Party became an amalgam of
new pressure group and old vested interests. 4 With a view to earn massive
popular appeal, Bhutto opened the party membership to all kinds of persons,
who were prepared to follow his dictates. Consequently, the reactionary forces
and feudal elements and middle class professionals became the “band
waggoners” within the PPP. Thus, the very content and character of the PPP got
converted into an “hybrid complexion”, which threatened the ideological
rationale and organizational viability of the PPP and antagonized the leftist
forces within the PPP. Consequently, the PPP could not earn popularity in
remote rural areas, where Islam pasand parties were in dominant position. The
PPP’s popularity and support bases remained centered in urban areas dominated
by the middle class. The founding and committed members of the PPP became
apprehensive of the transformation of the party into an “elitist party” dominated
by reactionary and feudal forces and drawing - room politicians.
Bhutto was satisfied with keeping himself in power. Being chief of the Party and
the head of the government, he showed little concern for issues likely to threaten
the integrity and solidarity of the ruling PPP. He could not successfully harness
the roots of “socialism” in the PPP. It became apparent, that Bhutto’s inclination
towards socialism enabled him to acquire some semblance of popular appeal and,
yet, it would not be idle guess to states that his personality traits and popular
image had made ‘ socialism” popular and not vice-versa5. The weak ideological
roots caused intra-party cleavages. Increasing conflicts between the
“doctrinaires” versus “bandwaggoners” challenged the credibility of the
Pakistan People’s Party to a larger extent.
The Pakistan People’s Party convention for rejuvenating the internal solidarity of
the party held at Islamabad in November 1972, revealed formidable intra-party
weaknesses rather than renaissance. The process of delegate selection
crystallized intra-party bickerings between the founding leftist members and the
new entrants.
immediately expelled form the Party membership for criticizing the role of the Chairman of the PPP. See:
Pakistan Observer, Feb. 2, 1970.
4
For details : Elliot L. Tepper, "The New Pakistan: Problems and Prospects", Pacific Affairs, (47:1, Spring.
1974) p. 63.
5
See : Khalid Bin Syeed, "How Radical is the PPP" ? Pacific Affairs, (48:1, Spring 1975) pp. 42-60.

Throughout his rule Bhutto showed little concern for institutionalizing the party
structure. He did not establish substantial unity within the party ranks. Through
his constant Purge of the ruling party he succeeded only in maintaining a fragile
unity. The feeling of uncertainty within party ranks posed insurmountable
challenges in the process of evolving a cohesive and integrated party. From
Bhutto’s mounting personalism and growing authoritarianism, it appeared that
he was more concerned with short-term gains rather than consolidating long-
term objectives. It was obvious that the objectives of establishment of egalitarian
society and democratic and secular principles, earlier announced by the PPP,
were ignored as Bhutto came to consolidate his power at the helm.
By the end of 1974, the PPP was completely “personalized” by Bhutto’s charisma.
He openly started insisting that “I am the People’s Party and they are all my
creatures”6. Bhutto’s increasing boastful postures irritated the leftist forces within
the PPP. Consequently, Bhutto dispassionately ousted several founder members
of the PPP, like Mahmud All Kasuri, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Mohammad Hanif
Ramay, Khursheed Hasan Meer, Malik Mohammad Khan, Mukhtar Rana and J.
A. Rahim from the party. All persons were very close to Bhutto in his wilderness
during Ayub regime. They provided full-fledged support to Bhutto in his anti
Ayub and anti—Mujib crusades. But, Bhutto, for his own political survival
expelled them from the party membership. In their place Bhutto preferred
associates who were not troublesome and who had no ambitions of their own
because only such persons would toe his line. That led to increasing influence of
rightist and reactionary forces in the affairs of the party. Thus, the growing
influence of the rightwing elements not only weakened the solidarity of the party
but also tarnished its progressive and radical image. The PPP having shed its
socialistic character lost its revolutionary clan and enabled the rightists to
increase their political influence.7
In January 1975, the chairman of the PPP (Bhutto) called a major convention to
reorganize the party structure on ideological lines. The convention agreed upon
the resolution of key-problems within the party, and emphasized on the creation
of grass root level party organizations, implementation of steadfast socialist
programmes, and keeping a constant check on the trends of intra party
factionalism. Operationally, however, not much transformation occurred thereof.
In reality, Bhutto was still dominant in party affairs.
PPP’s ambivalence and disorganization continued, since Bhutto’s major priority

was to stabilize his personal rule, Bhutto, continued to avoid the issue of party
elections on one pretext or the other. His plea was that the party elections would
6
Quoted in Lawrence Ziring: "Pakistan: A Political Perspective" Asian Survey (XL: 7 July 1975) 629-644.
7
See: POT (Pakistan Series) August 12, 1974.

be held only after the general elections. On the basis of this argument, Bhutto
succeeded in keeping himself as the chairman of the Party throughout his rule.
The year 1976 was devoted to preparation of the next general elections. Since the
party was in a complete mess and confronting insurmountable challenges both
national and provincial levels, Bhutto thought it relevant to overhaul the entire
party structure. Addressing a party meeting at Muzaffarbad on 29 April, 1976,
Bhutto said
“I want the People’s Party to be reorganized on sound and solid foundations

with complete discipline in its ranks”.8
Consequently, a massive drive was initiated for reorganization of the party, at

central, provincial, district and tehsil levels. Again the membership of the partly
was opened to all, and, it was inevitable that opportunist forces entered with
relative ease. By the end of December 1976, the PPP, enrolled about one crore
new members who were defectors either of the opposition parties or from
various tribes and minority groups. Such a contrived drive could neither rebuild
the popular base of the PPP nor ensure reliable rank and file with a view to
strengthening the institutional core.9
Thus, through his reorganization move Bhutto chiefly concentrated on enhancing

the numerical strength of the party and not on its organizational and ideological
infighting and disorganization in the PPP. Bhutto held three types of party
members responsible for causing splits and disharmony within the party ranks.
Of the first type were those who did not have a clear understanding of the
historical processes which brought the People’s party manifesto into being, such
elements were liable to be swayed by petty considerations, much to the
detriment of principles and party discipline. The second type comprised small
land lords whose only purpose in politics was attainment of power. Bhutto
believed that they caused maximum damage to the party by creating factions
and caused divisions among party members as “progressive” and others as
“non-progressive”. The Third type comprised idealists who were sincere in their
motivations but were inexperienced and hasty. They wanted to do everything in
short-time by forcing the pace of change. They were unaware of the realities of
adjustment and strategy.10
8
Dawn 12 May, 1976.
9
PPP's Secretary General Mubashir Hassan admitted that "vested interests, like Waderas, Jagirdars and
capitalists were trying to infiltrate PPP ranks en bloc." See: News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean,
Dec., 1976.
10
The Hindustan Times. Feb. 2, 1976.

In his various party speeches during 1976 Bhutto reiterated the achievements of
his regime and sought to project the PPP as a “revolutionary” party and
castigated the opposition as no more than a conglomeration of self-seeking and
opportunist elements. However, Bhutto’s leadership of the PPP did not
corroborate his declarations and his handling of the party affairs was neither
democratic nor conducive to bringing about cohesive integration. Similarly, the
basic issues bearing upon nation-building and integration were not given
priority. He seemed to have been more concerned with stability of his rule rather
than with the stability of the nation.
After the announcement of March 1977 general elections, Bhutto controlled the
entire political scene of the country and planned a full-fledged scheme for
rigging the general elections because he was not very confident of PPP’s
resounding victory in the March 1977 general elections as compared to its victory
during 1970 general elections. Through massive rigging Bhutto succeeded in
capturing more than adequate seats for the ruling PPP. That, however, was not to
be an asset and came out to be a liability. The PNA refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the electoral verdict and assailed the PPP and Bhutto’s leadership
for unprecedented malpractices in the general elections. After a period of
indecision, and uncertainty, Bhutto was overthrown by the army.
Despite, its limitations and short comings, it would be correct to say that the PPP
did emerge as a powerful and single influential party in the political system of
Pakistan. Even the Muslim League did not attain that stature after the creation of
Pakistan. It was more owing to shifts in Bhutto’s objectives and methods that the
PPP had to bear the brunt of people’s dismay and opposition’s wrath, and which
also caused considerable harm to the unity and integration of the party. As seen
earlier, Bhutto did not care to utilize the PPP as an instrument of attaining
national objectives. One- in saddle, Bhutto cared to ensure his personal survival
at the helm and the PPP became an instrument at his command. And once the
PPP lost its identity, it was too much to expect it to perform the basic functions of
a popular and strong political forum.
Bhutto And The Opposition Parties
Bhutto’s quest for survival also extended to his approach towards the opposition
parties, which did not escape the consequences of his authoritarian tactics. With
a view to refurbishing the image of the PPP rule, Bhutto resorted to coercive and
repressive policies towards the opposition instead of following a competitive
approach based on principles of democracy and constitutionalism. Through
various statutory laws and regulations, Bhutto succeeded in suppressing the
opposition. On the other hand, the opposition parties were also responsible, to a
greater extent, in giving opportunity to Bhutto for extending one-party

hegemony. Bhutto was aware of the disunity and parochialism of the opposition
parties soon after the formation of the PPP.
A brief estimate of the opposition parties would show that they lacked reliable
ideology and were organizationally weak. Their tactics were ineffective and
popular base fragile. Being primarily reactionary and dogmatic, they wanted to
take Pakistan back to medieval practices, and values which could not be termed
either secular or progressive. In addition with the exception of the National
Awami Party (NAP), other opposition parties proved vulnerable to
government’s pressure tactics and failed to assert themselves as viable
opposition parties. That further eroded their popular base for whatever it was
worth. Singly or unitedly, they failed to pose a challenge to Bhutto’s dictatorial
measures and adventurism. Perhaps lack of modern priorities and historical
perspective made the opposition parties prisoners of indecision and inaction.
Though they made Islam the plank of their survival, the tactics failed to click.
In fact, the opposition parties were more concerned with the formality of
contesting general elections and assuming power than with long term objectives
of nation-building and integration. Intra party factionalism, ideological
incredibility and lack of political will, left the opposition parties in chaotic
condition. The maximum semblances of concerted opposition was seen at the
time of elections, which was not only transitory but lacked any purposive
perspective of the totality of political process.11
As for leadership of opposition parties, it would suffice to say that most of them
failed to go beyond the confines of self seeking, opportunist and traditional
postures. Most opposition leaders were religious leaders first and they joined
politics only for convenience, whereas there were some who were retired
military officers and bureaucrats. Such a conglomeration could not be expected
to have risen equal to the political acumen of Bhutto. In the general elections of
1979 and 1977, the opposition failed to present itself in an authentic fashion and
very fact that they appealed to orthodoxy and yet failed to convince the
electorate was a measure of Bhutto’s image at that time.
It might be recalled that after assuming power, Bhutto persisted with the martial
law, primarily to deter his political opponents. He realized that despite
11
In January 1967, Some opposition parties like Council Muslim League, The Jamaat-e-Islami Nizame-
Islami and the Awami League Unitedly formed "Pakistan Democratic Movement" (PDM) to oppose Ayub's
Military dictatorship. In 1973 some opposition parties after the failure of PDM formed another joint front
namely the United Democratic Front" (UDF) to oppose Bhutto's dictatorial postures. The UDF constituents
were: Jamaitul-Ulema-e-Islam, The Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim League (Pagara group), The Pakistan
Democratic Party, Muslim Conference and Khalcsar Tehrik. While on the eve of 1977 general elections the
nine major opposition parties formed "Pakistan National Alliance" to jointly contest elections against the
ruling PPP.

commanding support of 88 members in a House of 144, the opposition,
comprising the remaining 56 members, could create enough trouble for him.
Bhutto also delayed convening the National Assembly, with a view to deferring
issues of immediate concern arising out of Pakistan’s dismemberment as well as
those flowing from formulations of a permanent constitution. Throughout the
constitution-making process, Bhutto did not follow established constitutional
norms. Under the Interim constitution, Bhutto exercised unlimited authority as
the President of Pakistan. Despite the repeated demand of opposition for the end
of the state of emergency, before drafting a permanent constitution, Bhutto
persisted with national emergency. Bhutto violated the constitutional accord of
October 20 1972, which he had concluded with the opposition parties. Nearly all
the opposition parties had appended note of dissent to the report of the
constitution committee presented to the National Assembly. The opposition
alleged that Bhutto was intent upon making the executive authority dictatorial.
For instance, Bhutto retained both the Political Parties Act (1962) and the
provision of a two-third majority for a no-confidence vote on the Draft
Constitution. Despite controversies and conflict between government and
opposition, Bhutto ultimately succeeded in securing adequate support for the
approval of the new constitution by the National Assembly on April 10, 1973. In
a House of 144 members, the constitution was approved by 125 votes out of 128
present and voting. Surprisingly, the voting pattern was over whelming in
favour of Bhutto and gave the lie to the potential of the opposition. After
assuming the office of Prime Minister under the new constitution on August 13,
1973, Bhutto seemed to have ignored the challenge of opposition parties.
It was not merely that he belittled the opposition on specific issues; his whole
approach towards the opposition parties was that of intolerance He wanted the
opposition only as a show piece and a facade of a democratic dispensation to
silence critics at home and abroad. In actual practice, he spared no opposition
leader and party worth any reckoning, in a calculated move of vilification, which
seemed to have become a built-in mechanism of .Bhutto’s political style.
Of all opposition parties, Bhutto administration showed utmost intolerance

towards the National Awami Party.12 Led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the NAP
came under concentrated attack on different occasions from 1972 to February
1975 till it was finally banned. It appeared that Bhutto was intent upon crushing
Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s charisma and popular image which he gained after
12
The NAP was formed in 1956; it was an offshoot of the Awami League. During 1970 general elections,
the NAP emerged as the single largest party in provincial assemblies of the NWFP and Baluchistan. While
in the National Assembly it won only six seats. Being a relatively progressive party, the ruling elite had
apprehensions about its objectives and activities. General Yahya Khan banned the NAP in November 1971.
Bhutto acted like wise in February 1975.

1970 general elections. Through its propaganda offensive the federal government
extensively publicized NAP’s role as anti-national aimed at the further
disintegration of Pakistan. In February 1973 the NAP-JUI coalition government
of Baluchistan and the NWFP had been dismissed. And the NAP was finally
banned on February 10, 1975 13 . Khan Abdul Wali Khan and more than 300
leaders of the NAP were arrested on fabricated charges of operating in a
prejudicial manner to the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. Through III
constitutional amendment the detention of NAP leaders had been extended
indefinitely14. The Supreme Court also toed the line of the federal government
since it upheld the ban on the NAP.
As events showed, the progressive members of the defunct NAP formed a new
Party viz; the National Democratic Party under the leadership of Sherbaz Khan
Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali Khan. NDP launched a seven- point programme;
lifting of emergency; restoration of civic liberties; release of all political detenues;
political solution of Baluchistan problem; implementation of the constitution as
was unanimously approved by the National Assembly in 1973; grant of
admission to all educational institution, purely on merit basis; minimization of
unemployment, job security and unemployment allowance.
However, owing to the split15 in the party and lack of ideological commitment
and nation-wide popularity, Bhutto succeeded in neutralizing the challenge of
the NDP.
Similarly, other rightist opposition parties comprising reactionary, traditional

and religious forces did not provide effective challenge to Bhutto and his PPP.
These opposition parties were either cajoled or coerced tactfully by Bhutto’s
government. Though in 1973 the rightist parties jointly formed the “United
Democratic Front” to oppose Bhutto’s autocratic policies, but it did not yield
expected results. Intra-party factions and splinter groupings marred the efforts of
the UDF. The component parties of the UDF maintained their individuality
which hindered the process of taking joint and collective action against the
13
According to the Gazette of Pakistan notifications, the NAP was dissolved under Sub-Section (I) of
Section 6 of the "Political Parties Act" of 1962 on February 10, 1975.
14
The III Constitutional Amendment (April 1975) amended certain detention laws of Article (10) of the
constitution. It was specified: "The limitation of detention on charges of creating law and order situation
and other charges will not apply to those working under instructions from the enemy in a prejudicial
manner to the country's integrity and security." See News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, May,
1975.
15
The NDP was split in June 1976 when Saif Khalid, a former office bearer of the defunct NAP formed a
new wing of the NDP. Saif Khalid claimed that his NDP was more progressive and radical and accused
Sardar Sher Baz Khan Mazari of violating the manifesto of the party both in letter and spirit, and, instead of
making it anti-imperialist organization, converting it into a reactionary forum: Refer to POT. July 5, 1976.

government. In view of the continuing domination of religious parties, it could
not attract the other opposition parties like the NDP, Tehrik-e-Istiglal and
Jamiatul Ulema e-Pakistan (JUP) and Pakistan Muslim League (Quayyum group).
Most of the UDF parties, like Jammat-e-Islami, Jamiatail Ulema-e-Islam, after
experiencing ruthless coercion of the ruling PPP, adopted a pro-PPP and Pro-
Bhutto stance. Bhutto through his “Islamic fervour” minimized the challenge of
these religious parties. The Muslim League (Pagara group) was one of the main
parties of the UDF which was ruthlessly coerced by Bhutto. The government
launched a heavy crackdown on the Pakistan Muslim League (Pagara) because of
the growing popularity of Ghulam Mustafa Khan and Hanif Ramay-the staunch
critics of Bhutto and the erstwhile founder members of the PPP.
The Tehrik-e-Istiqlal of Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-

Pakistan were the two rightist and reactionary parties which refused to join the
UDF. The former party throughout Bhutto’s rule remained an outright critic of
Bhutto’s dictatorial postures. The latter proved vulnerable to government’s
pressure tactics and finally adopted a pro-Bhutto stance.
It might be noted that parties which succumbed to such pressures were financed
by the establishment, whereas parties critical of Bhutto such as the NDP. Tehric-
e-Istiqlal, Pakistan Muslim League were ruthlessly suppressed. Their leaders
were charged with causing threats to the integrity of the nation and were
arrested by the regime. The opposition parties owing to their internal bickerings
and ideological weaknesses, failed to project a united and integrated approach to
stand up to the tactics of Bhutto’s government. The UDF could not positively and
constructively guide the government in parliament. Staging boycotts of the
National Assembly, the UDF either criticized Bhutto’s policies or demanded
unambiguous declaration of the date of general election. After the declaration of
the date of general election the nine opposition parties formed another alliance
viz; the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in order to contest the general
elections. But the components of the PNA remained united only for a limited
period. Within less than a year’s time, the PNA also started disintegrating.
Thus, owing to ideological and organizational hiatus among the opposition,

Bhutto conveniently imposed “one-party hegemony” in the country and
maintained a facade of Parliamentary democracy for five, and a half years.
However, the transitional phase of unity among opposition parties compelled
Bhutto to hold general elections and face the people again to test his legitimacy.
That perhaps, was the only contribution of the short lived unity of opposition
parties.

THE MARCH 1977 GENERAL ELECTION AND
DISENCHANTMENT
Despite harsh emergency regulations and use of coercive methods, Bhutto was
confronted with insurmountable challenges to legitimacy of his leadership. By
the end of 1975, the opposition parties were determined to extract from Bhutto a
definite and categorical declaration of the date of the general elections. The
opposition parties put up a unanimous front to challenge Bhutto’s leadership at
the hustings. For purposes of popular image-building, the opposition parties
observed a “Black Flag Day” on December 19, 1975,1 and turned down offers of
dialogue with the federal government. They also boycotted the sessions of the
National Assembly. There was widespread apprehension among opposition
quarters about Bhutto’s willingness to hold free fair general elections. It seemed
that owing to allegations of manipulations in by-elections held in the country
since 1972, the opposition parties had lost faith in Bhutto’s bonafides. Some
opposition parties apprehended that the government might hold piecemeal
elections instead of holding nationwide elections in view of the prevailing
controlled political atmosphere. So ne quarters did not hide their apprehensions
and held the view that Bhutto might not hold elections at all.
Insisting upon the declaration of the dale of general elections, the opposition
parties vociferously argued that Bhutto’s prolonging of despotic measures and
harassment of democratic forces would only cause hindrances to the integrity
and viability of the political system. Law and order situation was deteriorating
day by day. It was alleged that more than 50,000 political detenus were in jails.
Political activities of the opposition parties were curbed drastically through
specific presidential ordinances and ‘Defence of Pakistan Rules’. 2 The Federal
Review Board’ had been set up to watch the activities of important opposition
leaders. Under “Criminal Law Ordinance” the federal government tried several
political opponents in special tribunals.3 With the help of such harsh measures
Bhutto planned to immobilize potential threat of opposition parties and political
rivals. More specifically, he seemed to have aimed his coercive tactics against
Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his National Awami Party.
1
The Tribune, December 26, 1975.
2
On December 26, 1975, The President of Pakistan issued an ordinance for the disqualification of the
members of a dissolved political party from holding any seat in the National Assembly or Provincial
Assemblies for five years: Pakistan Times, Dec. 27, 1975.
3
For details refer to: News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, January 1976.

Being more than reassured of the popular base of the PPP, and the disarray in the
opposition Bhutto seemed to have eliminated any serious challenge to his
legitimacy, and, therefore it was not surprising that on January 1, 1976, Bhutto
announced his decision to hold free and impartial general elections before the
expiry of the term of the National Assembly. But, he did not fix any date for the
announced general elections, on the plea that the experience in the past showed
that before elections the political climate tended to degenerate into utter chaos
and confusion which could prove detrimental to the solidarity of the nation. He
argued that the freedom shown during the first general elections (Dec. 1970)
caused Pakistan’s dismemberment. According to Bhutto the provincial elections
held during the life time of “Shaheed—e—Millat” Liaqat Ali Khan spread the
virus of provincialism and sectarianism.4
Perhaps, Bhutto envisaged the forthcoming general elections as some kind of a

“war” against the opposition. Soon after the announcement of the holding of
general elections on schedule, Bhutto gave primacy to create a built—in
mechanism to ensure PPP’s massive victory. The government throughout the
year 1976 indulged in pre-election preparations. At the very beginning of the
year (1976) Bhutto embarked upon a strategic move to overhaul governmental,
administrative and military structures of the country. This move had been
defended in terms of facilitating the establishment of the “Vigilant Democracy”.
On February 5, 1976, Bhutto reshuffled his cabinet and ordered the
reorganization of the Federal Secretariat and the revival of the ministry of
broad—casting and information. More faithful persons were promoted to higher
ranks and several trusted fellows had been appointed as special advisors on
defence, agriculture and economic affairs. The governmental and administrative
structures of the various provinces had also been overhauled in order to ensure
PPP’s massive victory at the, forthcoming polls. Changes in the army were also
brought about to avoid the fear of further military intervention. Bhutto
appointed the then chief of the Army Staff-General Tikka Khan as special
assistant for national security to the Prime Minister and the then, Lt General
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq was made the Chief of the Army Staff.5 Obviously these
changes in the military and governmental structures were brought about to
ensure the victory of the ruling party in the forthcoming general elections as
much as to forestall any moves and challenges against Bhutto’s continuing
supremacy.
Besides these measures, Bhutto ordered his special assistants to prepare a

detailed working plan, dealing with the infrastructure, techniques and credibility
of general elections. The then information adviser Pir Ali Mohammed Rashdi
4
Dawn, January 2, 1976.
5
See: News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, February 1976.

was specifically designed this pre-electoral plan. Bhutto’s special secretary Rao
Rashid suggested a drastic revision of electoral laws and to prevent opposition
parties from spreading emotional and divisive issues. Rao Rashid also suggested
weeding out “undesirable and undependable officials” and outlined plans to
preclude prospective candidates of the opposition parties from filing nomination
papers, Muhammad Hayat Tamman the then political adviser to Bhutto,
suggested that the forthcoming elections should be so “controlled as to flow in
regulated channels”. For this purpose, he advocated establishment of a Secret
cell/Policy cell, a Publicity cell, a Communication and Information cell, a
Mapping cell, a Statistical cell, a Finance cell, an Administration and Transport
cell, and a Field cell.
On October 9, 1976, the then Minister for production, Rafi Raza called a special
meeting to consolidate various electoral plans and blueprints. Among those who
attended were: Maulana Kausar Niazi (Minister for Information and
Broadcasting) Mohammed Hayat Tamman (Special Assistant to the Prime
Minister for Political Affairs), Mohammad Yusuf Buch (Special Assistant to the
Prime Minister for information) Pir Ali Mohammed Rashdi (Adviser, Minister of
Information and broadcasting) Rao A. Rashid Khau (Special Secretary, Prime
Minister’s Secretariat) and Hamid Jalal (Additional Secretary, Prime Minister’s
Secretariat). Bhutto immediately approved the consolidated plan forwarded by
Rafi Raza Committee.6
Along with these pre-electoral master plans and blueprints for the conduct of
general elections, Bhutto government put in special efforts to strengthen
“propaganda” tactics in preparing firm ground for PPP’s sweeping victory,
which he planned to ensure as a foregone conclusion.
The federal government instructed the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

to prepare a “broad publicity strategy” projecting the achievements of Bhutto
regime on national and international fronts in view of the forthcoming general
elections. More specifically, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting asked
to project the pivotal role of the Prime Minister in Pakistan - as a builder of
Pakistan and a defender of its ideology; as an exponent of a new social-economic
order; as a great Muslim and Third World leader and as a world statesman
whose views got appreciation all over the world”7. The Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting specifically directed the editors of National Press Trust (NPT)
to project Bhutto as following the basic principles of the tradition of Quaid-e-
6
For details see : White Paper on the Conduct of The General Elections in March 1977, (Government of
Pakistan, Rawalpindi, July 1978) pp. 1-25.
7
Refer to: White Paper on Misuse of media, (Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, August 1978) pp. 232-
23.

Azam M. A. Jinnah and counter the criticism of opposition parties highlighting
their internal weaknesses. In order to equip the information set-up for general
elections, the budget allocations including the supplementary grants of the
information media were considerably increased for 1976-77.8
The Ministry of Finance sanctioned additional economic assistance for field

publicity. The “Directorate of News Documentaries” prepared eleven films
costing about Rs, 10 laks projecting achievements of the Prime Minister Bhutto.
In addition, the Directorate of News Documentaries produced five special films
in 1976-77 at a cost of over Rs. 13 lakhs as part of the pre-election publicity
undertaken by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting:
1) A Nation Reborn (Pakistan Ke Pichley Panch Saal),

2) Achievements of the People’s Government.
3) Dharti Ke Lal
4) Prime Minister Bhutto-The Man of People (Eik Hi Rasta).
5) Prime Minister Bhutto-The Servant of Islam (Khadim-e-Islam).
Several books were also produced- highlighting the image of the ruling PPP and
Prime Minister Bhutto. The mass Media, including Radio, T.V., Films and the
press gave full—fledged publicity to Bhutto’s tours to different regions from
May 1976 to December 1976. Moreover, the federal government arranged a
whole series of weeks on Minorities, Women, Peasants and Defence from June
1976 to January 1977 to project the performance of Bhutto regime in various
walks of life. According to reliable sources the expenditure on the celebration of
the Peasants week alone costed the public exchequer more than Rs. Twenty four
lakhs.9
The “Publicity cell” established in November 1976 gave priority to Islam

emphasizing that the People’s Party government would take no step contrary to
the teachings and the spirit of Islam.10 The media widely emphasized that it was
during Bhutto regime that for the first time it has been guaranteed in the
constitution that no law which was in conflict with Islamic injunctions would be
8
The grant of the "Pakistan National Centre" (PNC), an organization almost totally devoted to political
work for the party in power, jumped from about fifty lakhs in 1975-76 to about one crore and twenty five
lakhs of rupees. In addition, the PNC was given 38,68,000 rupees for "New Measures" in 1976-77, The
Pakistan Broadcasting Service grant increased from about five crores in 1975-76 to about - Seven and a
half crores in 1976-77 including a supplementary grant of about one crore and sixty lakhs of rupees.
Similarly, allocation for publicly of government activities on Television increased from sixty-four and a
half lakhs in 1975-76 to over five crores seventy lakhs of rupees in 1976-77 more than the eight times:
"White Paper on Misuse of Media." opcit, pp. 243-44.
9
Ibid, pp. 247-250.
10
Ibid, pp. 254-256.

enacted and that a society based on sublime principles of Islamic justice would
be established in Pakistan.
Apart from broad publicity strategy Bhutto’s government brought about specific
constitutional measures to ensure PPP’s victory. The National Assembly passed
the Fifth (v) constitution amendment Bill on September 5, 1976 curtailing the
powers of the judiciary. The powers exercisable by the Supreme Court were
made subject to clause 2 of Article 175 of the constitution whereby the Supreme
Court could exercise only such powers as were conferred by constitution or
under any law and go beyond its jurisdiction. More specifically, the fifth
Constitutional Amendment had been brought about to safeguard any law, rule
or order made in pursuance of the Emergency Provisions, from any challenge on
the ground of inconsistency with any of the fundamental rights.11 The Parliament
also passed another important Bill viz; The People’s Representation Bill
providing for the necessary legal framework for general elections in November
1976.12 The People’s Representation Bill had been specifically designed to debar
the leaders of the defunct NAP from contesting the general elections. With
regard to the imposition of Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR), considerable
powers were centralized in the bands of the Prime Minister and the Chief
Ministers of the four provinces.13
Through the sixth (VI) Constitution Amendment Bill14 (December 1976), Bhutto
administration provided for the exclusion of special Assistants and Advisers to
the Prime Minister and the provincial Chief Ministers and Chairman and
members of the Law Commission and the Council of Islamic Ideology from the
purview of the definition of the “Service of Pakistan”. This amendment
obviously implied that persons of the Prime Ministers’ choice could enter politics,
fight elections and come to power without suffering from any disadvantages or
disqualifications.
11
Refer to - News Review on South Asia, Sept. 1976.
12
The "People's Representation Bill" (November 1976) had been introduced to disqualify a person from
being elected as a member of an Assembly incase he was an office bearer of dissolved political party under
sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Political Parties Act 1962. It also provided for a deterrent punishment for
corrupt practice in elections. According to this Bill corrupt practice in elections was made punishable for up
to three years imprisonments or a fine upto Rs. 5,000. The ceiling on election expenses was determined as
Rs. 40,000 for National Assembly and Rs. 25,000 for Provincial Assemblies. See: News Review on South
Asia, December, 1976.
13
Morning News. Sept. 6, 1976.
14
For details see: Dawn, 23, December, 1976.

The federal government also took some steps in the economic sphere during the
year 1976. To enlist political support the government announced various
incentives to farmers of Punjab and Sindh. The price of staple cotton had been
raised from Rs. 215 to Rs. 300 per maund for 1976-77. The government also
lowered the prices of all chemical fertilizers and removed permit system for the
sale of tractors. Similarly, prices of maize, potato, and onions were fixed at Rs.
32,25 and 18 per maund respectively.15 The amount of agricultural credit was
increased from Rs. 120 crore (in 1971) to Rs. 1000 crore to boost agricultural
production. The expenditure on fertilizers was raised five-fold as compared to
that in 1971. The amount of subsidy, which was Rs. 20 crore during 1975 was
raised to Rs. 36 crore.16 Pakistan’s major industrial projects were sanctioned loans
totaling Rs. 6.2 crore including a foreign exchange component of Rs. 5.30 crore by
the “Board of Directors of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan17. The
investment corporation of Pakistan also sanctioned Rs. 9 crore assistance to major
industrial projects. The deluxe hotels in Karachi also got ample financial
assistance from the government18.
Bhutto’s government also announced that foreign capital invested in Pakistan

would not be nationalized. In an interview with Iranian Journalists in Karachi,
Bhutto promised to provide a favourable climate to foreign investment because
large-scale investment was expected from Iran and oil-rich Arab countries.19 In
May 1976, the government announced introduction of a national scheme for
cooperative farming and agro-industries under an ordinance passed by the
parliament. The scheme envisaged formation of cooperatives with a minimum
area of 500 acres with the exception of the North-West Frontier Province where it
was 300 acres.20
On June 30, 1976, the federal government announced a “liberal import policy”
for fiscal year 1976-77, with the Free list increased from 389 to 407 items and the
Tied list reduced from 29 to 18 items. The import policy sought to accelerate the
liberal pattern of imports introduced by Bhutto’s government in 1972, providing
ample provisions for import of tractors, fertilizers and pesticides to boost
agricultural production. Also, several essential consumer goods were placed on
15
Dawn, April 16, 1976.
16
The Pakistan Tines, May 9, 1976.
17
Dawn, April 17, 1976.
18
Morning News, April 24, 1976.
19
Dawn, February 17, 1976.
20
The Pakistan Times, May 26, 1976.

Free List.21 Besides this liberal import policy the government announced to give
full protection and facilities to foreign investment agencies in Pakistan. 22 The
government gave priority to the publicity on the report of World Bank mission23
which highlighted the impressive recovery of Pakistan in the economic field
since 1971. The report specifically lauded the efforts of Pakistan government in
the field of rapid economic growth and self-reliance. It also foresaw prospects of
“green revolution” in Pakistan.
By the end of 1976 the government completed its pre-electoral planning ensuring
ample safeguards in favour of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party. On the eve of
the fifth anniversary (20 Dec. 1976) of his rule and the centenary of Quaid-e-
Azam M. A. Jinnah, Bhutto reiterated his earlier commitment to hold general
elections in Pakistan. Speaking at the Lahore Press Club on Dec. 23, 1976, Bhutto
declared: “Elections in Pakistan would not be postponed just because some other
Asian countries had done likewise ............ Pakistan had democracy now. It had
democratic government, which was also a constitutional government”.24
Bhutto also affirmed the pledge of the people’s government to abide by Quaid-e-
Azam’s “undying motto” of faith, unity and discipline and “never allow any one
to mute or mutilate it.” Bhutto also insisted that “his government and the party
had put the nation back on the course that its founder (M. A. Jinnah) had
visualized for it.25
On January 2 1977 the Election Commission announced the final electoral list for
the National Assembly and four provincial Assemblies.26 Bhutto gave a green
signal in the National Assembly announcing the date of general elections on
January 7, 1977. The then President Fazal Elahi Chaudhury on the advise of PM
Bhutto formally dissolved the Parliament on 10 January 1977 and said that the
elections to the National Assembly and the four provincial Assemblies would be
held on 7 March and 10 March respectively.27
21
Dawn, July 1, 1976.
22
Business Recorder, October 29, 1976.
23
The Pakistan Times, October 30, 1976.
24
Morning News, December 24, 1976.
25
The Pakistan Times, December 25, 1976.
26
Dawn, January 3, 1977.
27
The Pakistan Times, January 11, 1977.

Soon after the announcement of the date of general elections the government
launched election campaign. The government massively used the media of
communication to project the popular image of Bhutto vis-à-vis Pakistan
People’s Party. However, the government received a severe jolt when the nine
opposition parties made a surprise announcement for the formation of the
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) on January 11, 1977. The nine parties of the
PNA which agreed to contest the elections for the 216 National Assembly seats
and more than 400 seats in the four provincial legislatures, were: The Muslim
League (Pagara group) Jamiatual Ulenta-e-Islatn, Jamat-Ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan
(JUP), Tehrik-Estiglal, Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan Democratic Party, Khaksar
Tehrik, Muslim Conference and the National Democratic Party.”28
On January 20, 1977, (then Information Minister) Hanif Khan submitted a note to
Bhutto giving a preliminary review of the election oriented projection.” He said:
“So far the major thrust of the projection campaign is directed towards a ruthless
exposure of the Pakistan National Alliance ........The objective is to alienate the
masses from the Alliance by portraying it as a worthless combination of different
political elements with the ability to serve the masses either before or after the
elections ....... There is also an effort to impress upon the masses that the Pakistan
People’s Party is the only party which has the capacity to serve the masses.”29
In view of the increasing anti-opposition propaganda by Bhutto’s government,

the PNA declared its intention to boycott polls in Baluchistan. Maulana Mufti
Mahmood, President of the PNA, decided not to put up candidates for any of the
seven National Assembly and 40 Provincial Assembly seats of Baluchistan.30
It was believed that through manipulative tactics, the PPP secured 17 National
Assembly seats, as its candidates were declared elected unopposed in the process
of scrutiny of nomination papers by the Election Commission on January 21, 77.
Interestingly, fourteen of them, including PM Bhutto, were from Sindh and three
from Baluchistan. Bhutto was elected unopposed from his home constituency
Larkana.31 The PNA denounced Bhutto’s unopposed election and alleged that it
was done after the abduction of Bhutto’s rival Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi.
The Election Commission dismissed the complaint field by Maulana Jan
28
The Pakistan Times, Jan., 12, 1977.
29
See: White Paper on Misuse of Media, op. cit, pp. 254-265.
30
The Pakistan Times, January 18, 1977.
31
Dawn, Jan. 22. 1977.

Mohammad Abbasi and finally declared Bhutto elected unopposed to the
National Assembly.32
The pro establishment media gave wide publicity to the unopposed election of
the PPP candidates and especially of Prime Minister Bhutto. Reports of
kidnapping and arrest of Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi, who was forcibly
prevented from filing his nomination papers, were first suppressed, later denied,
and finally sought to be drowned in the loud din raised over Bhutto’s victory.33
The correspondents of major newspapers were asked to link up the unopposed
election of the Prime Minister with his massive popularity and highlight in their
reports his services to the people of his constituency, the province of Sindh and
the nation as a whole; various reforms introduced by him to establish an
egalitarian socio-economic order in the country; and his family tradition of
philanthropy and service to the people.34
The government controlled media gave priority to highlight the election

Manifesto (1977) of the ruling PPP as the most “revolutionary” and progressive
document and bitterly criticized the manifesto of the PNA as obscurantist and
reactionary. In his various election speeches, Bhutto himself asserted that
“Pakistan would be mortgaged to its enemies and face disintegration” if the
opposition coalition won the general election. The PNA was identified as the
motley group of capitalists and feudal lords who had joined hands “to usurp the
rights of the people”35
The entire election campaign, lasting two months, was marked by mounting
violence and hatred between the PPP and PNA The ruling PPP had made
considerable efforts for ensuring its victory at the polls through institutionalized
coercive methods aided by the vast apparatus at the behest of government.
Before the commencement of general elections as seen earlier, the PNA leaders
apprehended massive rigging by the ruling PPP. PNA’s (then) President,
Maulana Mahmood, demanded that the Election Commission should seek
assistance of the army for supervising the conduct of the elections at every
polling station in the country36.
32
Hindu, February 13, 1977.
33
White Paper on Misuse of Media, op. cit p. 265.
34
Ibid, p. 266.
35
The Tribune, February 8, 1977.
36
The Pakistan Times, March 5, 1977.

The government had drastically curbed the freedom of Press. Publicity of PNA’s
election promises was discouraged by the government. Pakistan Federal Union
of Journalists (PFUJ) demanded unfettered freedom of the press in their Seven-
point demand charter 37 and alleged that the forthcoming general elections
without a ‘free press” would be an exercise in futility so far as democracy was
concerned.
Knowledgeable sources predicted PPP’s sweeping victory at the polls, which was
what ultimately happened. Bhutto’s PPP swept the polls at both the National
Assembly and the four provincial Assemblies. The PPP again returned to power
with considerably increased strength, capturing 155 seats in a House of 200
(elected) seats to the National Assembly.38
In view of its heavy defeat in the National Assembly the PNA boycotted the
Provincial Assembly polls. That further ensured PPP’s clean sweep.
Consequently the PPP bagged 435 of the 460 seats of the four provincial
Assemblies. Sixteen seats went to independents and two to Pakistan Muslim
League (Qayyum group). Results of seven constituencies were not declared.
Interestingly in Sindh, the PPP made a clean sweep capturing all the 100 seats,
while it had gained an overwhelming majority in other three provinces.
In Punjab, the PPP secured 232 of the 240 seats, seven went to independents and
the result from one constituency was awaited. Of the 80 North West Frontier
Province seats the PPP captured 69 seats. Qayyum Muslim League took two and
Independents got four. Results from five snow—bound and far-flung
37
The Seven-Point demand charter of the PFUJ specified : (1) repeal of all undemocratic laws; (2) an
announcements by the government that it would not resort to arbitrary and abnormal action against the
Press and Journalists: (3) an unequivocal commitment by the government against the use of official
advertisement and newsprint quota as instrument of political favour or chastisement; (4) dissolution of the
National Press Trust; (5) reconstitution of the Press Commission; (6) freeing of Radio, T.V., and News
agencies from the government control and (7) complete freedom of trade-union activities as guaranteed by
ILO convention, Bangladesh Observer, Feb 5, 1977.
38
Final Party Position in the (March, 1977) ational Assembly Election.
Parties Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan Total seats
116 43 34 7 200
PPP 108 32 8 7 155
P NA 8 11 17 - 36
PM L (Q) - - 1 - 1
Independents - - 8 - 8
Other Parties - - - - -
Source: Dawn, March 9, 1977.

constituencies were not received, In Baluchistan the People’s Party secured 34 of
the 40 seats.39
A notable feature of the polling for the National Assembly was the size of the
turn out of voters according to a survey conducted by All Pakistan Press (APP).
Estimates showed that over 17 million men and women, out of 31 million
registered voters had cast their votes. This worked out to about 50% turnout.
During the 1970 general election, the turnout of voters in West Pakistan was
about 52%. This estimate, however, did not take into account the 19 uncontested
constituencies which had about 3 million voters.
Out of the estimated 17 million votes cast in the NWFP, the PPP candidates
polled 937,000 votes and the PNA 816,000 votes—a difference of about 11%
between the votes polled by the PPP and PNA candidates.
In Punjab, about 12.5 million votes were cast. Of these, the PPP polled 61%,
namely 76 million votes, and the PNA 36%. The difference in the votes cast for
the two parties worked out to be 3.2 million. In Sindh, out of the total 2.7 million
votes cast, the PPP polled 1.7 million and the PNA 843,000. The percentage for
the PPP came to 64, and that for the PNA 31 which indicated that the PPP
secured more than twice the votes compared to those polled by the PNA.
Of the 135,000 votes cast in Baluchistan, about 50% of the total........The PNA did
not contest the election in Baluchistan. It might be recalled that in the 1970
general election to the National Assembly, the turn out was 66.48% in Punjab,
46.83% in the NWFP including tribal areas; 39,04% in Baluchistan and 58.33% in
Sindh.40
Though the PPP succeeded in securing sweeping victory in March 1977 general
election, the opposition parties alliance PNA rejected the results of National
Assembly polls accusing Bhutto administration of massive “rigging”. The PNA
insisted for fresh polls under the direct supervision of the army.41 Widespread
disenchantment among the populace was also reported. The opposition parties
openly alleged that the government and the PPP colluded in massive rigging of
elections to ensure continuance of Bhutto’s autocratic rule. The expectations
raised by electoral alternatives were thus, neutralized and the common man in
Pakistan seemed to be confused, for, it seemed that public opinion, by and large,
expected PPP’s victory in any case. The alleged rigging therefore, was considered
39
Morning News, March 2, 1977.
40
Dawn, March 13, 1977.
41
Dawn, March 11, 1977.

to be a thoughtless action which was considered neither necessary nor
productive.

PNA’S PROTEST MOVEMENT AND BHUTTO’S DOWN FALL
The landslide victory of the PPP in March 1977 General Elections became a hot
bed of controversy in Pakistan. The nine opposition parties comprising “Pakistan
National Alliance” (PNA) accused Bhutto and the PPP of rigging the general
election and misusing governmental, bureaucratic and military machine at the
hustings. On March 9, 1977, the General Council of the PNA unanimously
rejected elections to the National Assembly held on March 7, 1977. The PNA
nominees declared elected to the National Assembly were asked to resign with
immediate effect. The General Council demanded that fresh elections should be
held in the country under the direct supervision of the army with a care—taker
government in office. The Council also demanded immediate resignation of the
Chief Election Commissioner in view of the “blatant failure” of the Election
Commission to conduct “free and impartial” elections. The PNA leaders
appealed to the people of Pakistan to stage a peaceful, country—wide strike on
March 11, 1977, as a protest against the alleged rigging of elections.1
The establishment denied the alleged rigging in elections. Bhutto warned the
PNA leaders to accept the election result and told them that he would never
allow them to “bring death and destruction to the people.” Despite Bhutto’s
initial warnings, the PNA observed a mass strike on March 11, 1977. According
to reliable sources more than 200 persons including PNA’s eminent leaders were
arrested in Karachi.2
On March 12, Bhutto seemed to have relaxed in his countenance and offered to
have a dialogue with the opposition if it had “any complaints.” In a broadcast to
the nation Bhutto, however, rejected any suggestion for re—election to the
National Assembly. Making an impassioned plea to the opposition to accept
their defeat in “good grace,” Bhutto insisted that “he was always ready to a
dialogue, except for re—thinking over the National Assembly elections, which
were a settled matter and could not be discussed.”3
The PNA was firm on its demand for the conduct of fresh general elections and
the resignation by the illegitimate government of Bhutto. The stiff attitude of
both the government and the opposition further deepened the crisis.
1
The Pakistan Times, 10 March, 1977.
2
The Statesman, 13 March, 1977.
3

The PNA observed a nationwide protest day in the major cities of Pakistan on
March 14, and insisted for the immediate resignation of Bhutto and fresh
elections to the National Assembly4. Clashes ensued between the armed forces
and protest marchers of the PNA resulting in several deaths and injuries to
countless agitators. At about that time, Bhutto was reported to have admitted
that in some marginal cases rigging might have taken place. As a solace to the
PNA Bhutto expressed his willingness to provide PNA additional seats in the
National Assembly and countermand the elections to the provincial legislatures
which were boycotted by the PNA. 5 Through a letter to PNA’s chief Bhutto
conveyed his willingness Ito discuss all issues of conflict within the frame work
of the constitution. The PNA’s General Council, however, rejected this offer of
the government, like the previous ones.6
Consequently, the government arrested important PNA leaders like Asghar

Khan, Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Maulana Shah Ahmed
Noorani and Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari7 and imposed curfew in Karachi.
Demanding the release of its leaders the “Karachi Action Committee of the PNA
called for strike in Karachi on 21, 1977. Besides this, the PNA organized
processions and demonstrations against “Bhutto’s illegitimate government” in
Layallpur, Sargodha, Multan, Lahore and other major towns violating section
144.8
Bhutto for the third time, wrote a letter to PNA president Maulana Mufti
Mahmood conveying his readiness to have an “open and sincere dialogue with
the PNA for the resolution of the prevailing crisis. Along with his dialogue offer,
Bhutto made it clear that his dialogue offer was not made in the capacity of the
Chairman of the PPP but, in the capacity of the “Chief Executive” of the nation.
Without paying any heed to Bhutto’s third letter, Maulana Mufti Mahmood
rejected the dialogue offer thrice, and insisted on implementation of demands
made by the General Council of the PNA, and asked for immediate release of
detained leaders.
It was reported from reliable quarters that the moderate group in PNA was
willing to have dialogue with the government. The extremist leaders like, Asghar
4
5
Indian Express, 17 March, 1977
6
7
The Hidustan Times, 19 March, 1977.
8
Dawn, 20 March, 1977.

Khan, Sherbaz Mazari and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani described Bhutto’s
“dialogue” diplomacy as mere facade. The extremist leaders of the PNA were
critical of the constitutional approach of the moderates. In their view “dialogue”
and non-cooperation movement techniques were impractical. They were in
favour of violent tactics such as military intervention. They insisted that unless
the “proper and congenial atmosphere” was restored and all arrested PNA
leaders and workers were released, it would be futile to have any dialogue with
the government. Interestingly these leaders called upon the President of Pakistan,
Fazal Elahi Chaudhary to take over the administration and ensure “free and fair”
elections. Citing the Indian example, Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari stated that
“after the defeat of Indira Gandhi in India the situation had completely changed
as events in India are bound to affect Pakistan.” He also insisted for the
revocation of emergency and release of all political detenus before agreeing to
any dialogue offer of the government. The PNA sources revealed that by March
21, 1977 over 10,000 PNA workers were imprisoned, over 100 persons were
killed and about 1,000 were injured.9
The General Council of PNA put forward a three-point demand charter as a pre-
condition for having any dialogue with the government:
1. Resignation of the Prime Minister Bhutto;

2. Appointment of new Election Commissioner:
3. And holding of fresh general election.10
The government described PNA’s stand as not merely unconstitutional but, also
as detrimental to the integrity of the nation as a whole. The establishment media
accused PNA leaders of fomenting lawlessness and instability in the country
through senseless agitational politics. In order to counter the mounting agitation
of the PNA, the federal government revitalized its coercive measures. Shortly
shoot-at-sight orders were issued and the army was called to disrupt PNA’s
mass strike on March 26, 1977. In spite of the heavy presence of the police and
the army, the PNA’s strike paralyzed normal life in Pakistan’s major cities and
towns.11
The General Council of the PNA through its resolution emphasized that not only
the PNA but the People of Pakistan have also, rejected the elections to the
National Assembly in view of the heavy rigging........The nationwide
9
Morning News, 22 March, 1977.
10
Morning News, 25 March, 1977.
11

demonstrations and strikes have proved that the people do not recognize the poll
results and the legitimacy of the National Assembly.
Once again renewing his dialogue offer to the PNA, Bhutto on March 28, 1977
disclosed his willingness to consider the demand for lifting emergency in
Pakistan, provided the opposition gave an understanding that it would behave
in legal, constitutional and democratic terms, giving up politics of vandalism and
agitation, setting scores in the street.
Soon after the Oath—taking ceremony to the office of the Prime Minister, Bhutto
said that he was prepared for a “grand consensus” with the PNA. However, he
ruled out the possibility of the dissolution of the National Assembly.12
Both the government and the opposition, adopted rigid postures. On the one
hand, the PNA leaders were insistent upon their three—point demand. On the
other hand, Bhutto was determined neither to quit nor let the PNA agitation
succeed. The situation, thus, was far from enviable for both the parties to the
national confrontation.
The PNA Movement got a new turn, when it gave a call on April 11, 1977, for a
nationwide “civil disobedience” to express protest against alleged rigging of
March 7 general elections. Leaders of the PNA urged the citizens of Pakistan not
to pay taxes to the illegitimate government of Bhutto withdraw savings from
banks, refuse to buy public transport tickets, and withhold payment, of loans
taken from state organizations. This call for civil disobedience movement exerted
considerable pressure on Bhutto’s government and strengthened PNA’s
support—base13.
With the increasing momentum of PNA’s protest, Bhutto again tried to bargain
with the PNA but without tendering his resignation.
On April 13, 1977, Bhutto further offered to dissolve the National Assembly and
arrange fresh general elections on the pre-condition that the opposition first wins
two thirds majority.14
The government lifted official ban on public gatherings and pledged to suspend
the state of emergency as and when the situation in strife—torn Pakistan
returned to normal. Bhutto personally disclosed that he was prepared to
12
Dawn, 29 March, 1977.
13
The Tribune, 12 April, 1977.
14
The Statesman, 15 April, 1977.

negotiate with the opposition for a “cast—iron system” to ensure free and fair
elections. To gain popularity among religious sections, Bhutto dramatically
turned to Islam. The government announced a series of measures aimed at
enforcing Shariat laws which included prohibition and closure of liquor shops
throughout the country.15 But all proved in vain.
The PNA’s General Council on April 18, 1977, outrightly rejected Bhutto’s
conditional dialogue offer and firmly reiterated its demand for Bhutto’s
resignation.16 It was stated in the decision of the General Council that the PNA
did not recognize Z. A. Bhutto as a legitimate Prime Minister since March 8, 1977
and was not prepared to negotiate with his government. The PNA gave a call to
the people of Pakistan to observe mass strike on 22 April, 1977.
In order to crush PNA’s attempts for observing “mass strike” on April 22, 1977,
the government imposed ‘Martial Law in major cities of Pakistan: Karachi,
Lahore and Hyderabad.17 Thus, Bhutto ultimately resorted to armed action in
political affairs. The PNA bitterly criticized the government for the imposition of
Martial Law. The General Council of the PNA, on 25 April, 1977 adopted a
resolution condemning the proclamation of Martial Law as a shield to protect the
illegal and unconstitutional government led by Bhutto and his PPP”.
In the month of April, 1977 the deadlock between the government and the
opposition took a formidable shape and there was a situation of virtual “civil
war” in Pakistan. Addressing a joint session of the parliament, Bhutto on April
28, 1977 disclosed that the “current PNA’ agitation to topple his government was
not indigenous but a colossal international conspiracy against the Islamic state of
Pakistan”, Hiding the real issues Bhutto asserted that the conflict between the
government and opposition was not over “general elections” but was related to
‘‘the norms of egalitarian society and economic reforms that had been carried out
by the People’s government”.18
Finding no other alternative Bhutto, thus, termed the “domestic crisis” as a

“foreign conspiracy”19 . With the mounting pace of PNA movement, Bhutto’s
charisma seemed to have eroded substantially. As a result of Bhutto’s
dependence on the army, the ruling PPP also started disintegrating. Several
15
The Times of India, 18 April, 1977.
16
The Times of Lydia, 19 April, 1977.
17
The Pakistan Times, 22 April, 1977,
18
The Pakistan Times, 29 April, 1977.
19
The Pakistan: Times, 20 April, 1977.

opportunist members of the PPP renounced Bhutto’s leadership and quit the
party. In April, 1977 Ahmad Raza Kasuri, along with other dissenters, formed a
new political party, viz; the “Pakistan Awami Jamhoori Party”20. It might be
recalled that Ahmad Raza Kasuri, a founder member of the PPP was expelled
from Party membership in October, 1972. Differences between Bhutto and
Ahmad Raza Kasuri became more serious after the assassination of Nawab
Ahmed Khan (Ahmad Raza Kasuri’s father on November 10, 1974). However, on
the eve of March 1977 general elections, Ahmad Raza Kasuri rejoined PPP.
Bhutto refused to give him party ticket. Thus, finding no political prospects in
the PPP, Ahmad Raza again resigned from the PPP on April 8, 1977.
In the wake of deepening conflict between government and the opposition, the
Pakistan’s ambassadors to Spain, Greece, France and the USSR, tendered their
resignations. It was reported that these diplomats had resigned to express
against Bhutto’s dictatorial policies. Similarly, three Pakistani army brigadiers
also resigned in protest against government’s decision to impose Martial Law in
the major cities of Pakistan. Lt. General Mohammad Iqbal (then) Commander of
Martial Law troops in Lahore also tendered his resignation in protest against the
continued use of army to quell anti government demonstrations.21
The harsh approach of Bhutto administration provided wider popularity to PNA

movement. Several influential pressure groups and political organizations joined
the PNA movement and expressed their resentment against Bhutto’s ruthless
measures. The PNA got massive support of students, labour organizations, trade
unions, professional groups and women organizations. The “Pakistan Student
Alliance”, in support of the PNA movement, criticized Bhutto’s unwarranted
measures and demanded resolution of protracted political crisis and reopening
of educational institutions. About thirty six trade unions and “Pakistan Labour
Alliance” (comprising twenty six labour federations) threw their muscle behind
the PNA, bringing additional pressure on the government for the solution of the
political conflict. The ‘All Pakistan Lawyers’ Association vehemently criticized
Bhutto’s unconstitutional attitude and policies especially, the imposition of
Martial Law and brutal tactics of the federal Security Force. The Pakistan Federal
Union of Journalists (PFUJ) condemned the policies of the government restricting
freedom of Press and manipulation and distortion of mass media. 22 In this
context, a development of considerable significance was the active involvement
of the traditionally “a - political” women-folk in the agitation. For the first time,
women were seen in huge numbers launching massive anti-government
20
Morning News, 9 April, 1977,
21
For details see: News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, April & May -1977.
22
Ibid, May, 1977.

demonstrations in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Layallpur, Hyderabad and Karachi.
Several regional organizations also pledged to join the struggle. The Baluchistan
branch of the “National Democratic Party” and the ‘Jiye Sindh Front’ led by G. M.
Syed, joined the protest movement.23
Increasingly deteriorating political situation created additional burdens on the

national economy which was already passing through a critical phase owing to
natural calamities and unfavorable world prices. Economic crisis, arising from
Pakistan’s political dilemma and crop failure, cost the national economy about Rs.
7, 500 million The cost of damage to the economy caused by government - PNA
confrontation, after the disputed March 1977 general elections, had been
estimated at between $ 500 and $ 1,000 million.24 Pakistan’s total export earnings
indicated a decline of about $ 13 million as compared to the export earnings
during 1975-76.25 The prolonged tussle not only weakened the national economy
but also negatively affected the economy in various regions. Several prominent
economic analysts compared the situation with the 1971 tragedy and
apprehended that the drift, if not rectified in time, might lead to total national
disaster.
In view of the government’s increasing brutality and coercion and deteriorating

economic condition, PNA’s moderate leaders seemed to have lost all hope for
restoration of normalcy in the country through constitutional and civil
disobedience methods. The extremist PNA leaders then decided to fight Bhutto’s
illegitimate government with more effective militant methods. Air Marshal
(Retd.) Asghar Khan appealed to the armed forces to disobey the orders of
Bhutto administration.26 Former Air Mashal Rahim Khan and former Army Chief
General Gul Hasan (after resigning from their ambassadorial posts) asked for
military intervention in political affairs. Internal dissensions and confrontation
assumed serious proportions with the call for army intervention.
The PNA proposed a 32-point plan of proposals on May 5, 1977 for resolution of
crisis. The proposals were divided into two phases: In the first phase, the PNA
demanded immediate lifting of Martial Law, setting free political prisoners,
annulment of II amendments to the constitution not unanimously agreed upon,
apportioning time for opposition over Radio and TV, and an end to censorship.
The Second phase included dissolution of parliament, to be followed by
simultaneous general and local elections within 30 days and Bhutto’s resignation
23
Ibid.
24
The Economic Times, 12 June, 1977.
25
Business Recorder, 14 April, 1977.
26
Kayhan, 2 May, 1977.

immediately, complete reorganization of electoral machinery, military’s
responsibility for security at polling booths, the naming of acceptable governors
and dismissal of certain senior civil servants. The acting PNA President, Pir of
Pagara said that the -Proposals were a basis for negotiation and it was not up to
Prime Minister Bhutto to reply.27
Bhutto expressed reservations about fresh proposals of t to PNA on the plea that
those demands would create further complications. Obviously, he was not
prepared to resign as Prime Minister at any cost. Rejecting demands for his
resignation, Bhutto again took recourse to evasive tactics. He offered to bring
about the 7th Constitution Amendment Bill to seek a vote of confidence through
a nationwide referendum.28 Bhutto insisted that he was placing his fate in the
hands of the people of Pakistan because PNA had turned down all his
reconciliatory measures. The leaders of the PNA condemned Bhutto’s
referendum proposal as a calculated device to ensure PPP’s illegitimate rule. The
General Council of the PNA accused Bhutto of foisting one-party hegemony.29
The PNA vowed on May 14, 1977, to pass on with its agitation against Bhutto
alleging that his planned referendum would be, a “fraud upon fraud”. One of the
main reasons for rejection of referendum proposal by the PNA was the fear
generated by Bhutto’s speech of May 13 in which he showed inclination for
certain administrative changes and reversion to Presidential form of
government 30 PNA’s non-cooperation with Bhutto government assumed new
perspective after publication of the report of the Election Commission. The then
Election commissioner Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan said that “he was now
convinced that the March 7, General Election had been totally rigged in more
than half the constituencies.”31
In order to get the support of the common man Bhutto described the PNA
agitation as a “petty-bourgeois counter revolution” and maintained that the
masses were not against his regime. On several occasions he claimed to have
stated that it was not given to him to act unconstitutionally or in perverse,
political fashion: “I could not be Ghulam Mohammad, who was not a politician
and, therefore, dissolved the Assembly. I also do not want to become Iskandar
27
The Times of India, 6 May, 1977.
28
On 16 May, 1977, the Pakistan Government passed Constitution VIIth Amendment Bill to provide for
seeking legitimacy for the rule of the PPP through a nation-wide referendum before the end of September,
1977.
29
Patriot, 14 May, 1977.
30
The Times of India, 15 May, 1977,
31
Hindu, 15 May, 1977.

Mirza, who, inspite of being a civilian President, had imposed martial law in the
whole country............I will only continue to make political efforts.”32
In the midst of widening political impasse Bhutto gave a call to Islamic countries
to save Pakistan from grave disaster. Prominent leaders from Saudi Arabia, The
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Libya approached the conflicting parties for
resolution of political turmoil in Pakistan. The Arabian countries were reported
to have offered to provide financial assistance for fresh general elections. The
Islamic solidarity committee appealed to all political leaders involved in the
political tangle, for immediate settlement of problems mutually, in accordance
with the spirit of Islamic solidarity and brotherhood.
After protracted efforts by Islamic countries the disputing parties again agreed to
resume negotiation for settlement of the conflict. The PNA, on May 26, 1977,
announced its decision to resume negotiations with the government. Also, then
Federal Religious Affairs Minister and Information Secretary of the PPP,
Maulana Kausar Niazi disclosed on 30 May, that the government had decided to
hold talks with the opposition with an open mind.
Pir Pagara, then acting chief of the PNA listed a seven-point demand charter for
resolution of political crisis:
1. Release of those arrested during the PNA agitation and withdrawal of

cases against them;
2. Financial help to those injured during the agitation;
3. Withdrawal of Martial Law;
4. Release of central leaders of the PNA for consultations;
5. Stoppage of propaganda against the PNA:
6. Lifting of the emergency; and
7. Removal of Press restrictions.33
On June 3, 1977, the government and the PNA resumed negotiations to diffuse
the political situation. A two-men Sub-Committee, comprising one nominee of
the government and another of the opposition, was constituted to work out
details of a formula relating to “basic issues” of disagreement. After the seventh
round of talks, it appeared, that the results of the “package-deal” between the
government and the PNA would be decisive and positive.
In the second week of June, Bhutto conceded the PNA’s longstanding demand to
hold fresh general elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies. However,
32
The Pakistan Times, 26 May, 1977.
33
Ibid, 2 June, 1977.

he made a surprise statement in the National Assembly on June 16, that a “final
accord between the government and the PNA would be signed only after his
four-day visit to the Middle East”.34 Thus, Bhutto again tried to gamble with the
opposition. In Bhutto’s absence (during his visit to Middle East), differences
again cropped up at the meeting of the “sub-committee” entrusted with the task
of finalizing government-PNA agreement. After his return from West — Asian
Countries, Bhutto introduced certain amendments in the original “agreement
formula”. That further annoyed the leaders of the PNA. Negotiations between
the government and the PNA aimed at holding new elections in Pakistan were
finally stalled on July 4, 1977.
It could be seen in Pakistan’s brief history that at times when alternatives other
than civilian government failed to bail out the political system from crisis
situations, the army stepped in. Such a situation existed in Pakistan and
knowledgeable quarters apprehended return of the army as a foregone
inevitability. That actually happened on July 5, 1977,35 when during a bloodless
‘Coup’, Bhutto was overthrown and martial law was declared as the army
stepped in.
As events proved, the army take over was not an instant happening. Various
factors and forces domestic as well as international proved contributory to such
an eventuality. Some analysts thought it was on the cards ever since Bhutto
assumed power in December 1971. It seems the growing discontent within the
army over Bhutto’s handling of civil and army affairs in ruthless manner,
contributed considerably towards re-imposition of army rule. Through ruthless
purges and periodic overhaul of the military set-up, Bhutto not only adversely
affected the former’s faith in civilian leadership and sharpened intra-military
contradictions. Also, it might be recalled that Bhutto’s dependence on the army
with regard to the administration of Baluchistan and the NWFP and his massive
dependence on military machine during PNA agitation, were reasons which
helped the revitalization of military rule. It also showed that when civilian
government failed to control and administer, it had to look upon the military for
systemic restoration and viability. Such an ethos proved dangerous for Pakistan.
Bhutto’s trusted and reliable soldier, army Chief General Zia-ul-Haq, ultimately
decided to depose him from power. Even when one concedes that Bhutto wished
to keep the military under effective control, his policies only helped in
strengthening the military and, what was worse, events gradually convinced the
army of its self-imposed role as savior of Pakistan. It was surprising that a person
as shrewd as Bhutto failed to assess the implications of relying, time and again,
on the military. He paid a heavy price for this misplaced trust in his top-brass
34
Ibid, 17 June, 1977.
35
The Time of India, 6 July, 1977.

and for having miscalculated the potential of his own charisma to maintain
overall control over the political system.
The responsibility for revival of military rule was exclusively the failure of
Bhutto’s leadership. Bhutto’s exaggerated promises notwithstanding, owing to
failure to strengthen democratic, responsible and accountable norms, rules and
structures, spelt his downfall. He did not comprehend the totality of new
priorities of nationalism in Pakistan. His overt and covert recourse to two-nation
theory did not make sense: in fact, it strengthened the hardcore reactionary
elements, which only made his own political survival difficult. His assurances of
reforms, obviously, did not convince the common man of his legitimacy nor
infallibility, Also, Bhutto seemed to have miscalculated the nature and extent of
PNA’s agitative politics. If only Bhutto acted with political sagacity and accepted
dialogue with the PNA, he could have averted the possibility of the revival of
“militarism” in Pakistan and also ensuring his political survival.
Apart from Bhutto’s weaknesses and shortcomings, the PNA was also equally
responsible for the army take-over. The PNA, owing to its hybrid composition,
lack of cohesive unity and somewhat dissipated approach, did not provide a
viable alternative to the autocratic Bhutto-regime. The PNA appeared united
only from a negative standpoint in opposing Bhutto’s rule and did not convine a
substantive number of people of its reality and prospects as a native alternative.
Besides these indigenous factors, certain exogenous trends also led to the revival
of militarism in Pakistan. After Bhutto’s deposement, the pro-Bhutto lobby
alleged that the Coup had been engineered by the USA. The CIA was reported to
be actively involved in destabilization of Bhutto regime due to his anti-US
policies. 36 It was given out that Pakistan’s nuclear deal with France and the
increasing Chinese military assistance to Pakistan posed a direct threat to US
military and strategic interests. Pakistan’s neighbour Afghanistan was not very
happy over Bhutto’s policies in Baluchistan and the NWFP. Similarly, several
Islamic countries like United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were not
very happy over Bhutto’s failure (during PNA agitation) to maintain stability at
home. These countries were chiefly concerned with ensuring their own national
and strategic interests, which were in peril if Pakistan became unstable.
According to these oil-rich countries, Pakistan’s continuing crisis also
jeopardized Islamic unity and solidarity. Their primary concern was a strong and
pro-Arab government in Pakistan. Thus, though for different reasons, several
quarters preferred a change in the regime and leadership in Pakistan and
Bhutto’s failure only prompted matters in this regard. However, tentatively, it
36
Bhutto extensively referred to the US involvement in his deposition in his latest book “If I am
Assassinated”. (New Delhi, Vikas, 1979) pp. 135-139.

would not be out of place to mention that one may not lightly ignore the
presumption that without active help and support of foreign interests, it would
not have been possible, nor easy for General Zia-ul-Haq to overthrow Bhutto.
One may not shed too many tears over Bhutto’s downfall but one can also not
accept the military take-over as a very healthy alternative for the national good
of Pakistan. Bhutto’s fall, therefore, should be seen in the broader perspective of
failure of national ethos of Pakistan. It was also the failure of a people to grow
and evolve to the stature of constitutional democracy and self-reliance.

THE AFTERMATH
On July 5, 1977, Bhutto was eased out by army ‘coup’. On April 4, 1979, he was
hanged. Thus culminated a vital chapter of Pakistan’s history and political
process. As one enters the Post — Bhutto era, one is confronted with manifold
challenging issues and situations which emanate from Bhutto’s execution.
Whether that action solved Pakistan’s pressing problems is another issue: What
is more relevant is that the General Zia’s takeover seems to have failed in giving
concrete and purposive direction to Pakistan; and also Bhutto’s liquidation seems
to have aggravated Pakistan’s problems rather than resolving them.
There is considerable relevance in the trends signified by retributive policies

towards members of Bhutto family and the PPP, worsening economy, revival of
Islamic fundamentalism, and overall atmosphere of despair and frustration,
which, put together, heighten apprehensions concerning Pakistan’s integrity.
Liberal educated people feel that Bhutto’s democratic authoritarianism was
better and more tolerable than the present military despotism, However, the
hard core orthodox mullahs in connivance with military Generals feel that
Bhutto’s rule proved disastrous and elimination of ‘‘Bhuttoism” was thought to
be the only alternative for a better Pakistan. Nevertheless the common man in
Pakistan is apparently disturbed at the abrupt and possibly unwarranted
transformation of the political scene. It would not be out of order to state that at
the moment there is vacuum at the level of popular leadership not because any
one person is indispensable but chiefly because the military rulers have not been
able to fulfill popular expectations
I — BHUTTO’S LIMITATIONS
The aforesaid aforesaid does not necessarily exonerate Bhutto from the several
charges of political highhandedness, resort to violent tactics, and coercive
policies, and yet, it was he who gave Pakistan some semblance of political
process ushering some measures to benefit the common man, the farmer, the
worker and the youth and also putting, the army in its place. However, Bhutto’s
authoritarian political style precluded strengthening institutional framework and
for that he paid the heaviest price. Bhutto forgot that once he alienated
considerable segments of the masses, the army would only too readily stage a
revival and take over reins of power, of which it has some taste in preceding
years. It was Bhutto’s undoing to have forgotten the insatiable thirst for power
among the top—brass of the army. In fact, the army would not have dared to
depose him from power and ultimately eliminated him, if Bhutto had not

recklessly enfeebled himself by his several follies. His ebullience, brilliance and
capacity to innovate notwithstanding, Bhutto’s arrogance and penchant for
easing out and humiliating closest associates paved the way to his unpopularity.
His self righteous postures made enemies of his former friends. He arrogated to
himself exclusive rights to think and act for the people, in the mistaken belief that
he had no peers in intellectual attainments, in political skill, in popularity and in
international standing. Circumstances enabled him to reach the zenith and he
thought of himself to be the man of destiny. He had a vision to become
spokesman of the third world “ala Nehru and Nasser”.1
In keeping with his arrogance was his belief in power as an end in itself. The
combination of arrogance and authoritarianism in his political makeup resulted
in a style of politics in which he had consistently placed end above means, the
end being the perpetuation of his own power through “quasi — one party rule”
Having greater popularity and charisma, Bhutto found himself as Pakistan’s only
“Saviour” Therein lies some clue to Bhutto’s belief that he was indispensable,
almost haunted by a `° messiah complex”.
Though Bhutto began with abundant fund of faith and good will, trust and
expectations, his five and a half years of power found him in an unenviable
position. He alienated and antagonized top elite in almost all walks of life in
Pakistan — the army, the bureaucracy, feudal lords, Ulema, industrialists and
professionals. The last straw was the thoughtless rigging of elections which did
not help the PPP at all, because in any case, it would have swept the polls. For
the sake of his own survival, Bhutto promoted the interests of the persons of his
own liking. On personal preferences, he ordered periodic overhaul of
government, bureaucracy and the army, which led to a quick ‘coup’.
As one recounts Pakistan’s history, it becomes clear that the army has always
looked upon itself as a viable alternative to civil authority. Whenever politicians
have bungled and failed, the army chose to take over. Whatever he the apology
for that, military Generals intervened on the pronounced pretext of safeguarding
integrity of the nation. For instance, after the collapse of parliamentary
government in Pakistan, General Ayub Khan was the first to stage a coup d’etat
in October 1958. He too described army’s action to facilitate Pakistan’s return to
sanity’ and identified the army as the “Saviour” of Pakistan from perennial
political chaos.2
Later, in 1969, General Yahya Khan gave the same logic rationalizing the
imposition of martial law in order to foster civilian rule in the country. In the
1
The Times of India, Feb. 14, 1979.
2
Wayane A. Wilcox: “The Pakistan Coup deat Of 1958”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, 1965, 142-163.

same vein, General Zia-ul-Haq intervened in political affairs With minor
variations of expression, it is interesting to note that all generals, hitherto, at the
outset, described their action inevitable to safeguard democracy and civilian rule
in Pakistan and took pains to reiterate their avowed commitment to hand over
power to elected representatives of the people. It would also be seen that the
military rulers did never renounce political authority of their own free volition.
They renounced political power only when it became impossible for them to
survive as the ruling elite. Also, they did not live up to their promises of granting
and ensuring civilian rule so long as they could conveniently put off the day of
reckoning.
It is, however, true that General Zia took over from the civilian administration in
a different context. In the previous twp army coups authority to govern was
handed over to the respective chiefs of the army. General Zia, on the other hand,
staged a coup in a dramatic manner deposing the former prime minister Z. A.
Bhutto.3
II - GENERAL ZIA’S QUEST FOR POWER
A look back into Zia’s initial policies is called for. Soon after taking over, he
promised to conduct general elections within three months and promised to
remain politically neutral. He described the coup as a military contingency plan
“to end political deadlock caused by the conflict between government and
opposition parties on the issue of conducting -free and fair elections”.
It is interesting to recall his first address to the nation:
I want to make it absolutely clear that neither I have any political ambition nor
does the army want to be taken away from its profession of soldiering........ I was
obliged to step in to fill in the vacuum created by the political leaders. I have
accepted this challenge as a true soldier of Islam. We are absolutely determined
to carry, out a ‘90—day operation Fair Play’ leading up to free and fair general
elections”.4
It soon became clear that General Zia had no intention to uphold his avowed
objective of political neutrality. Once in complete command of authority, he has
3
The intelligence expert’s theory on the July 5, 1977 coup which is being outlined in a recently published
book: The Fall of Gilgit: Untold Story of Indo—Pak Affairs from Jinnah to Bhutto.” by K. L. Kak, stated
that the army takeover was followed by leakage of General Tikka Khan’s plan to topple Bhutto government
and assume control of the civil administration. A service group formed by Tikka Khan, who was inducted
into the government by Bhutto, as Defence Minister was functioning without any name or number. Quoted
in the Times of India, August 29, 1977.
4
The Pakistan Times, July 6, 1977.

gradually been extending his powers and taking decisions which no military
general would normally do if he were to consider himself as a mere stop—gap
arrangement. He took deep interest in partisan politics in the garb of political
neutrality. Through his pro—Islamic postures and anti—Bhutto measures,
general Zia tried to legitimize his rule and to a considerable extent neutralized
the threat of opposition. Besides crushing Bhutto and the PPP General Zia’s non
chalant ambivalence finally divided the PNA constituents. Thus, the military
Junta is heavily capitalizing on the weaknesses, bickerings and inaction of
wavering politicians and administrators on the pretext of “cleansing the politics
of Pakistan” and holding “free and fair” election, General Zia seems to be
consolidating his own power base.
In his quest for personal power General Zia—ul—Haq changed the entire
complexion of 1973 (Bhutto’s) constitution and through “anti—Bhutto hysteria”
and “Islamization of political process”, he tried to legitimize his rule. For the
moment, General Zia seem to be riding on they crest of power without
immediate threat, but it is doubtful if his action aimed at Islamization of politics
and eradication of “Bhuttoism” would enable him to acquire sustenance, ensure
systemic viability and legitimize his position. It is astonishing how without any
trace of remorse, an army general makes categorical pronouncements only to
falter and postpone action and implementation, there by confirming the
apprehension that Bhutto was eliminated not as a consequence of an instant
decision but owing to a deep and pervasive plot.
It is also interesting that though with no political experience Zia usurped power
without any scruples with the support of the army so far ensured, he has hitherto
been executing his policies rather coercively. His avowed commitment to
political neutrality notwithstanding, General Zia blatantly indulged in partisan
politics. Through sheer politking, he manipulated formation of a “national
government” of his own choice and himself assumed office of the president of
Pakistan. It is true that he did not abrogate the constitution of 1973, but he
changed its complexion suspending and amending its relevant parts.
III- GEN. ZIA’S MOVE FOR PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM
Soon after the coup, General Zia expressed clear preference for change in the
preceding governmental structure (the parliamentary framework) as prescribed
in the 1973 constitution. He preferred “introduction of presidential form of
government” in Pakistan and “constitutional role for the army in times of
political crisis”. On 1 September, 1977, spelling out his blue-print for the first
time at a press conference, General Zia said that he favored Presidential from of
government as the major hindrance in bringing about national integration and

cohesion. Unlike the Ayubian model, his conception of Presidential form of
government was primarily dominated by ‘Islamic overtones”. General Zia said:
“A presidential form of government closest to Islamic ideology with the

president or Ameer elected by the entire nation was best suited for Pakistan. The
President will be checked by a legislature through “I jma” (consensus), an Islamic
concept first introduced by Hazrat Bakr, the first caliph providing that the caliph
shall be guided by the consensus of opinion (Ijma) in the majlis-e-Mushawat (the
council of advisors) consisting of the Ulema possessing unimpeachable character.
The President will be counter checked by the Prime Minister and the Prime
Minister by the National Assembly”.5 General Zia also suggested introduction of
a “shadow cabinet” in the system where the opposition is not dubbed as “traitor”
but acts as contributory agency in the governmental affairs. More significantly,
General Zia added that such a form of government would also have to have
“in—built arrangements to safeguard the integrity of the country which could
not be done by politicians alone but could be ensured by the Armed Forces who
should have contributory and constitutional role to that extent.6
It would be seen that by suggesting these arrangement General Zia resiled from
his earlier stand of political neutrality.
The General’s suggestions immediately stirred a veritable “hornet’s nest”.

Almost all the leading news papers reacted sharply in a note of rare unanimity
and warned the military government that the import of fresh controversy into
the already over — charged political situation would only add fuel to the raging
fire. Of the two leading political parties, the PPP adopted a cautious posture in
the beginning, but after the release of Bhutto on bail on 13 September, 1977, it
was declared with considerable flexibility, keeping his options open: “Only
parliament and representatives of the people could decide the issue........the
country’s present constitution was the only constitution that had been
unanimously approved by the different political parties.” On these suggestions,
the NPA for the first time showed its split personality. The Tehrik-e-Istialal chief,
Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan said that the proposal deserved consideration.
The secretary general of the PNA Ghafoor Ahmed stated that the central council
of Pakistan National Alliance had given a “unanimous mandate in favour of a
5
Ibid, September 2, 1977 (Quoted in POT, September 3, 1977).
6
Though initially General Zia was not in favour of annulling the 1973 constitution; he wanted more
powers for the president who should also be the constitutional head of the armed forces. According to the
constitution, Primeminister was more powerful. It is interesting to note that the oaths taken by General Zia-
ul-Haq as the chief Martial Law Administrator and other martial law administrators, do not provide for
allegiance to the constitution which places the armed forces of Pakistan under the control and command of
the federal government (Article 213 (1) names the Prime minister as the chief executive of the federation,”
(Article 90 (1) )

parliamentary form of government”. The Pakistan Muslim League chief, Pir
Mardan Ali Shah Pagara struck a discordant note as he said on September 13,
1977 at a press conference that “the PNA stood committed to amending the
present constitution and providing for checks and balances by relieving the
Prime Minister of his dictatorial powers and restoring to the President the
powers provided by 1956 constitution thereby ensuring a parliamentary
republican system.”
The Karachi daily Jasarat (Quoted in the Times of India, September 20, 1977)
favoring the constitution of Parliamentary system expressed deep concern over
Zia’s plea for Presidential form of government: “It is our humble submission to
General Zia-ul-Haq that instead of being carried away by his sincerity, he should
keep in mind the country’s past experience. The Presidential form of government
functioned in this country for ten years. But what we got as a result of this was
not national integration or economic progress but all-round decline........The
General should take into account the fact that Pakistan is a federal state and the
units of this federation are highly imbalanced. In such a situation any form, of
government which tends to concentrate power in a few hands will only result in
alienating the different units by denying them participation in the functioning of
the government—It was this feeling of deprivation during the Ayub regime
which prompted East Pakistan to seek secession. A repetition of this experiment
might create new crises and problems. Therefore, settled matters should not be re
opened. It is already settled that the parliamentary form of government is best
suited to Pakistani ethos-Even otherwise the present elections are being held for
the legislative assembly and not a constituent assembly. To reopen the chapter of
framing a constitution for Pakistan, would only create a new crisis”.
In the midst of wide criticism from the political parties, General Zia postponed
his idea of changing the form of government in order to avert further
constitutional crisis and attached greater importance to two issues: “eradication
of Bhuttoism” and “islamization of Pakistan’s politics”. 7 Perhaps he came to
realize that any arbitrary change in the existing system would be troublesome
and complicated before holding general elections. Moreover, for perpetuating
himself in power General Zia launched a new move for establishment of in
“interim national government”, till the holding of general elections. For popular
consumption, Gen. Zia disclosed that he has proposed the national government
scheme with the aim of “associating important politicians in power to gain their
cooperation in national affairs”. General Zia also said that this sort of interim
7
Times of India, September 20, 1977 Pir Pagara at this Press conference was almost echoing the amended
views of General Zia-ul-Haq who told an Urdu monthly of Lahore (Urdu Digest) in an interview that all
that he had meant by favouring a presidential form of government was to give more powers to the president
and place the Armed Forces under his control. According to Zia, the president under the 1973 constitution
was totally ineffective.

government will be a “collective enterprise” not monopoly of the armed forces.
However, he made it clear that the national government will work under the
umbrella of the army.
It took ten months for establishment of such a government. Initially, General Zia
was favorable to inclusion of nominees from all major political parties. The
proposal, however, had been strongly turned down by the PPP led by Begum
Nusrat Bhutto. The other faction of the PPP led by Maulana Kausar Niazi which
claims to be a liberal group was trying hard to join the proposed national
government. But due to heavy criticism from the PNA constituents, General Zia
prevented the entry of this PPP’s liberal faction. The two former PNA parties,
The Tehrik-e-Istialal and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema e-Pakistan criticized Zia’s proposal
and even severed links with the PNA.8 The other parties of the PNA faced a
dilemma whether to join or keep out of the proposed government. Before the
formation of the national government, the president of the PNA Mufti Mahmud
clarified that his party will extend help and support to the present military
government in the larger interest of the nation but no representative of the PNA
will join the proposed government.9
On the eve of the first anniversary of his rule (July 5, 78) General Zia announced
the formation of a “federal cabinet”, as the leaders of different political parties
failed to arrive at an agreement on the proposed scheme. The 22 — member
federal cabinet replaced the previous (19—member) council of advisers.
Interestingly in the cabinet no politician was included. That brought uncertainty
and indecision in the PNA. Without prior permission of the PNA, the Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) led by Pir Pagara was first to announce its decision to join
the newly formed federal cabinet. Pir Pagara (in Lahore on 19 July, 1978)
declared that the Muslim League’s nominees in the federal cabinet would not
quit the government. He said that the PM L’s working committee had authorised
him to pull the party out of the Pakistan National Alliance if the situation so
warranted.10 The Jamaat—e—Islami led by Mufti Mahmood was another party to
8
The Tehrik-e-Istiglal led by Asghar Khan withdrew from the PNA in November 1977. The JUP led by
Shah Ahmed Noorani severed its links with the PNA in July 1978 soon after the formation of the National
government. The JUP described the PNA as an “ineffective and unconstitutional organization.” The NDP
was the third party to withdraw its links with the PNA, In August, 1978 the NDP ended its identification
with the PNA as the “national government” did not show a favorable consideration towards the issue of
regional autonomy. The PNA finally left the interim national government soon after Bhutto’s execution and
the announcement of the date of general elections in April 1979. It was reported that PNA took the decision
in view of mounting criticism of Zia’s government with regard to Bhutto’s execution. The PNA appeared a
bit hesitant to share the blame. Hence, it ultimately decided to quit the federal cabinet. Afterwards President
Zia formed a new 20-member cabinet comprising military men and civilians on April 21, 1979.
9
Dawn, June 26, 1978.
10
Adorning News, July 20, 1978.

join the federal cabinet. In keeping with such a situation PNA president
reviewed his earlier stand and after one month’s discussions with the CMLA
General Zia-ul-Haq, announced PNA’s collective decision to participate in the
National government. On August 5, 1978 the then seven parties PNA joined the
national government specifying its three objectives:
1. Paving the way for holding general elections as early as possible;

2. To maintain close contacts with the people and to seek immediate
solution of their problems; and
3. To facilitate introduction of Nizanfre-Mustafa in Pakistan.11
After the formation of interim national government, “General Zia’s next political
move was “self-elevation as the President of Pakistan.” He assumed the office of
the President on 16 September, 1978 following relinquishment of the office by
Fazal Elahi Choudhury. Reiterating his political neutrality slogan Gen. Zia said:
“There was no other way to fill the vacuum. This was not my choice but the
decision was made for me in all the forums (of government)......I never wanted to
be a political candidate but technically and legally the appointment was least
controversial course. I will remain in office until the next elected President can
take over.12
Zia’s assumption of Presidentship also evoked widespread reaction in the

country. According to constitutional provisions, only the National Assembly was
authorised to elect the new president. The outgoing president Fazal Elahi
Chaudhury refused to continue in office beyond one year’s extended term. It was
reported that the former President was not happy with Gen. Zia for delaying
general elections; for introducing certain amendments in the constitution and
formation of PNA dominated cabinet.13
The PPP led by Begun Nursrat Bhutto warned that “the country is being driven
to disaster and the constitution has been torn to shreds.” The Tehrik-e-Istiglal
described Zia’s decision, as amounting to “expost-facto regularization of a past
action in the terminology of the Armed Forces.” While apprehending the
11
Morning News, August 7, 1978.
12
The Times of India, September 17, 1978: According to reliable sources, the decision was taken in an
emergency session of the cabinet. The cabinet meeting concluded that “instead of elevating any political
figure or nonpolitical personality to the presidentship, it would be better that the defacto head of the state
formally assumed the office.” It was also announced that the Martial Law Administrators (MLAS) of the
four provinces would assume the office of the governor and the outgoing setting governors will be reverted.
13
The Times of India, September 18. 1978.

bonafides of Gen. Zia, the JUP identified the move as the first step towards a
presidential form of government.14
But the pro-government PNA parties welcomed the move and expressed their
full support to the new President. The PNA collectively identified the new
arrangement as only a temporary step which was not a basic issue of
apprehension and in no way automatically meant to bring presidential form of
government. According to PNA leaders’ Parliamentary form of government was
a “settled issue in conformity with the 1973 constitution.”15
The preceding sequences show how Zia-ul-Haq concertedly - strengthened his

own position, shrewdly combining three statutory offices; President, Chief
Martial Law Administrator and Chiefs of the Army Staff. Once Bhutto was
imprisoned and Zia had consolidated his power, the latter seemed in no hurry to
take steps to thwart any challenge to his entrenched position. Beginning from his
announcement that he did not intend either to keep himself in power or meddle
with politics, he went ahead demolishing much of what Bhutto has sought to
strengthen and consolidate. Under a veneer of forming national government, he
found ready partners among the PNA, that measure turned out eventually to be
a clever device to dilute the widespread popularity of the PPP (after Bhutto’s
deposement) and erase Bhutto’s popular image. Thereby, Zia placated and
humoured the PNA and pretended to be an ‘Islamic saviour” of the nation. It
was no secret thereafter that the PNA and Zia both wanted Bhutto removed from
Pakistan’s political scene. Perhaps the only issue agitating both was now best to
achieve-that objective. As later events showed, it was a crude and clumsy steps
which ensured fulfillment of a well thought out design.
IV - POLITICS OF ISLAMIZATION
General Zia not only took calculated steps to meddle with the constitution, he
also took measures for Islamization of Pakistani politics, In fact, the imposition of
army rule reinforced the revival of “Islamic era” in Pakistan. The military ruler
exploited Islamic fervour both for legitimizing his rule and denigrating Bhutto
and ‘‘Bhuttoism.” Owing to his close identity with Jamaat-e-Islami General Zia
gave top priority to establishment of Nizam-e-Islam replacing former structures
of parliamentary democracy whatever they were worth. Interestingly, the
establishment of Islamic system was brought about in keeping with PNA’s major
demand for introduction of Islamic system as suggested by Prophet Hazrat
Mohammed. Thus, Gen. Zia’s military regime gave primacy to bring about what
it called “Islamic revolution” in Pakistan.
14
POT, September 19, 1978.
15
Morning News, September 19, 1978.

Apart from his domestic religious perspective, General Zia showed greater
concern for “Pan-Islamism” in foreign affairs. Since the assumption of power, he
has been giving utmost attention to make Pakistan’s relations cordial with the
Muslim countries, especially with Saudi Arabia. Obviously Zia’s Islamic stance
gave him strong support both at national and international levels. At the national
level all religious and obscurantist forces aided with General Zia to eradicate the
“evils of Bhuttoism.” While at the international front, Muslim countries assured
General Zia of their full-fledged support providing additional military and
economic assistance.
It might be recalled that various limitations of Bhutto notwithstanding, he gave

some semblance of a perspective which was, if not entirely secular, at least gave
manifest evidence of not being dogmatically Islamic. It was a different story that
ultimately Bhutto yielded to the pressures of Ulema especially in the case of the
declaration of Ahmadiyas as non-Muslim minority. At international front Bhutto
strongly adhered to the Philosophy of “Pan-Islamism,” and at domestic scene he
combined socialistic ideals with Islamic ideology. Though one would not entirely
disagree that Bhutto was not doing so not so much for his love for Islamic
fundamentalism as for exerting his own version of diplomatic priorities. It can
not; however, be denied that Bhutto was the cleverest and the most articulate
champion of modernization. General Ayub was a modernizer but he was not
charismatic and articulate leader as compared to Bhutto. While General Zia is
manifestly a religious bigot lacking popularity and influence among the masses.
In the context of Pakistan, General Zia is the first military ruler to have
emphasized singularly on Islam as the panacea for all maladies. In order to
exercise ruthless power, the army found no other tool than that of Islam. In fact,
Islam became a convenient political tool in the hands of military authorities.
Whether they were genuinely enamored of Islam and welfare of the faithful, is a
matter of considerable doubt. Also the army rulers are not overly concerned with
economic progress and socio-cultural harmony.
General Zia identified three broad aspects of the Islamic system: social, economic
and legal. In his view the reform of socio-economic conditions was a long term
objective which would realized only through a gradual process. According to Zia
the easier path was “to introduce certain legal reforms in order to attain socio-
economic reformation.” Therefore, General Zia gave specific attention to reform
the prevailing legal system in Pakistan in accordance with Shariat laws. He also
justified the introduction of Islamic laws since they were in conformity with the
1973 constitution which provides for establishment of “Islamic Republic of
Pakistan” and identified “Islam as the state religion of Pakistan.”16
16
Refer to POT, April 11, 1978,

In a self-glorifying vein, Gen. Zia identified himself as “a man with a sacred
mission” to “purify” Pakistan. However, he betrayed his ulterior motives in an
interview to BBC reporter which were televised on April 12, 1975. General Zia
said:
“There is some hand, hand of providence perhaps which is helping me

out, and if I am the man which perhaps God had chosen to do some—
thing for Pakistan and if he gives me the strength, by God, I will do it.”17
He also expressed similar views during an interview with a London Journal:

“Impact International, owned by the world Islamic body. General Zia firmly
maintained that he was engaged in completing the “mission of God” assigned to
him, and that he could not be removed through “a revolution”. He claimed that
he had changed the course of the country’s history. “This course is towards
Islam”. He also mentioned that before the elections, he hoped to achieve 50
percent success in establishing an ‘Islamic social system”. He claimed “where
there was Islamic social system communism could not enter”.18
The simplistic perspectives of a military ruler are all too obvious in such
utterances which could not be lightly ignored. At periodic intervals, the military
authorities warned politicians and political parties not to act against the Islamic
ideology of Pakistan. They, however, suggested that all political activity should
revolve around the ideology of Pakistan, viz; Islam devoid of agitation and
regional parochialism.
In his (July 27, 1977) address to the nation, Gen. Zia categorically stated;
“All political parties in their programme and election manifesto should give
priority to national unity and integrity of Pakistan and should not encourage
regional prejudices or sectarianism They should resolve to work for
establishment of an Islamic order in the country, because it was created in the
name of Islam and shall survive only holding fast to Islam”.19
Obviously General Zia’s views are nearer to the well known two—nation theory.
The sole emphasis on Islamization by the military regime has only created sharp
confrontation between the religious fundamentalists and votaries of secular and
17
Quoted in the Times of India, April 14, 1978.
18
The Times of India, September 7, 1978.
19
The Pakistan Times, July 28, 1977.

federal polity. Interestingly all reactionary “Islam Pasand” parties joined hands
with General Zia, with a view to humiliating in the name of Islam, all
progressive and secular forces, and ultimately consolidating the position of army.
The much emphasized Islamic fundamentalism of the military Junta and its
advocacy of two—nation theory created deep apprehensions in the minds of
secular forces and multi nation theorists of Pakistan. One of the important
advocates of multi-nationalism in Pakistan Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, ex
governor of Baluchistan ridiculed the propagation of the so called “two-nation
theory” and the “Islamic ideology of Pakistan”. He gave exhaustive rejoinder to
religious fundamentalists and advocates of two-nation theory;
“So much publicized two-nation theory was never meant to give birth to the
ideology of Pakistan. It was a slogan coined to merely describe the division of
India”. According to Bizenjo, the term “ideology of Pakistan” was used for the
first time by General Yahya Khan and was never used or referred to even by the
Quaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah. Bizanjo opined that the protagonists of the ideology
of Pakistan were using it for no other purpose than to deprive the people of
different units of the federation of Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and
NWFP) of their economic rights and socio-cultural freedom.20 Moreover, he said
that “the theory of multi-nationalism was first presented by Islam. He challenged
the Ulema to deny the fact that “Islam was a religion composed of various nations
yet the Muslims formed a single Millat”. He asserted that using the name of
Islam for ones own vested interests and negating the facts would not help in the
emergence of a strong and united Pakistani nation”. He added that “the name of
Islam would not be useful for those who had ignored the actual problems faced
by the people”. “The present social structure”, Bizenjo argued, “needed basic
changes in its frame-work”.21
Thus, instead of Islamization, Bizenjo had called for the evolution of “pure”
Pakistani system to forge unity to steer the country out of the prevailing crisis
and asserted that only way to solve the multi-farious problems confronting
Pakistan lay in effecting revolutionary changes in the present set up. In his view,
the only alternative left for the extrication of Pakistan’s problems was of
developing a “national outlook”, honouring the rights of each sub-nationality
inhabitating different provinces Recalling the painful tragedy of erstwhile East
Pakistan Bizenjo declared that it was the People’s responsibility to uphold the
integrity of Pakistan.22
20
A. K. Brohi, minister of law and parliamentary affairs, a well known jurist and liberal intellectual
countering Binenjo’s thesis of multi nationalism strongly favoured two—nation theory and regarded Islam
as the linchpin of the state of Pakistan. He preferred for a strong unitary state.
21
Dawn, August 13 and 29, 1978.
22
Pakistan Times, August 13, 1978.

It is, of course, true that religion will continue to provide a strong impulse to
Pakistan’s search for national identity. But the dogma of Islam can not be
equaled with the increasing pace of modernization and challenges of nation-
building and integration. Pakistan has reached a point wherefrom it would be
almost impossible as well as suicidal for the rulers to reverse and turn back
without generating critical backlash. Most other Muslim countries facing this
very dilemma have resolved it by modifying traditional dogmatic Koranic
concepts in line with primacies of equality and justice. For instance, comparison
between Pakistan and Saudi-Arabia (where “paraphernalia” of strict conformity
is still retained) can not stand a moment’s scrutiny. Pakistan has neither the
Wahabi tradition nor the oil wealth to sustain it. Moreover, in Pakistan, there has,
in any case, not been anything like a popular movement favouring a return to the
past. Gen. Zia has managed to create an atmosphere of bigotry and revivalism
much to the dismay and concern of thinking people.
It might be seen that General has failed to take into account the collective identity
of Pakistan. He has hitherto adopted a partisan and dogmatic approach edifying
to the hard core Mullahs. The various reforms, introduced in the name of Islam,
by the military Junta have created deep contradictions between different sects of
citizens and there are perceptible rumblings in the social fabric which could
cause grave damage to systemic stability. As noted earlier also, Zia readily went
over to be in tune with orthodox Ulema and ‘Islam Pasand’ parties, and therefrom
he could be seen to have derived inspiration and supports for draconian Koranic
penalties, such as amputation of hands, public flogging and hanging for different
offences. Soon after the coup, General Zia imposed -fourteen harsh Islamic
Penalties”23 for offenders conforming to the view of Ulema that “Islamic (Shariat)
laws should prevail in Pakistan since, it was created in the name of Islam” It was
for the first time in Pakistan’s history that such harsh Islamic penalties, which
continue to be prevalent in Saudi Arabia, came into force.
The military rulers also devised a plan to completely overhaul the legal system of
the county. After assuming the office of the President of Pakistan, General Zia
under the intense pressure of Ulema, brought about an amendment in the
constitution providing for “separate electorate” for non-Muslim minorities in the
forthcoming general elections. 24 This move also evoked sharp reaction in
23
Pakistan Times, July 11, 1977.
24
On September 24, 1978, General Zia-ul-Haq introduced an amendment in the (1973) constitution
providing for separate electorate for non-Muslim in Pakistan. Article 7 which provided for joint-electorate
has been amended through a presidential order number 16 of the 1978. Following this amendment the
breakup of seats in the national and provincial assemblies will be as under :
National Assembly — 200 Muslims
8 Minorities

Pakistan. In Lahore High Court, a leader of Christian minority was reported to
have challenged constitutional validity of General Zia’s amendment to the
constitution.25 Religious and rightist parties both inside and outside the PNA
welcomed the move, while the Thehrik-e-Istigial, NDP, and the PDP criticized
Zia’s action as a “divisive course which was against the political solidarity of the
country and its national integration”. The central committee of Pakistan People’s
Party (Nusrat Group) criticized introduction of “separate electorate” since, it was
against the ideology of Pakistan and repugnant to the constitution in which the
issues of electorates was a “settled issue”.26
10 Women
Total 218
The share of various provinces in the 200 Muslim seats will be :

Punjab 115
Sindh 43
NWFP 26
Baluchistan 7
Federally Administered Areas 8
Federal Capital 1
Total 200
Provincial Assemblies;
Punjab 240 Muslim seats
6 Minorities
12 Women Total 258
Sind 100 Muslim seats

7 Minorities
5 Women Total 112
WFP 80 Muslim seats

1 Minorities
4 Women Total 85
Baluchistan 40 Muslim seats

1 Minorities
2 Women Total 42
Under the amendment laws Muslims voters will vote only for Muslim seats, and members of the minority
communities will vote for minority seats on the basis of ‘direct vote.’ While various assemblies will
constitute the `electoral college’ for electing women members on the basis of ‘proportional representation’
through single transferable votes. Dawn, September 25, 1978.
25
Morning News, September 26, 1978.
26
Dawn, September 26, 1978.

Besides introducing separate electorate system, Gen. Zia on the same day (Sept.
24, 1978) issued Presidential orders that with immediate effect all official and
semi-official correspondence will begin in the name of Allah, the Merciful and
Beneficent. For this he insisted inscription of Arabic letter (“Bismillahirreh-
manirrahim”) to reflect the symbolic significance of Pakistan as an Islamic state.27
Whether all the aforesaid devices were in consonance with the accepted priorities
of a modern political system, is quite another matter.
It is not surprising that the religious fundamentalism of present government did

not spare educational institutions. In pursuance of the so called new education
policy based on “Islamic ideology of Pakistan”, all English medium schools in
Pakistan had been ordered to switch over to Urdu as the medium of
instruction.28
In conformity with the persistent demand of the PNA for introduction of Nizam-
e-Mustafa’ General Zia introduced several Islamic Laws. On Feb. 8, 1979, Zia-ul-
Haq through a Presidential order No. 3 (1979) set up Shariat Benches so as to
confer on the High Courts the power to decide injunctions of Islam and to
provide that a law declared by a High Court to be so repugnant, shall cease to
have effect on the day on which the decision of the High. Court becomes
effective.29 On the eve of the birthday of prophet Hazrat Mohammed (10 Feb.
1979) General. Zia announced the establishment of “Nizam-e-Islam” in Pakistan.
For the establishment of Islamic system two aspects were specifically mentioned:
legal and economic. On the legal front, Gen. Zia promulgated stiff Islamic
penalties with immediate effect for all four’’ offences which are subject to
“hadood” - intoxication, theft, Zina (adultery) and Qazf (False imputation of
Zina). On the economic front the government promised to abolish interest on
capital in all fiscal transactions. But it introduced Islamic taxation system in the
form of Zakat (Tax on wealth) and Ushr (Tax on agricultural produce). It was
specified that Zakat will be collected from July 1, 1979 and Ushr from October
1979. 30 According to government sources these new laws were aimed at
“islamizing the local economy of Pakistan.” The collection of Zakat and Ushr
shall be expanded on the removal of hunger and beggary from the country.
However, this Islamic taxation system will not be applied on non—Muslim
minorities.31
27
Refer to POT, September 27, 1978.
28
Indian Express, November 12, 1978.
29
Pakistan Times, Feb. 9, 1979.
30
Refer to POT, Feb. 13, 1979.
31
Ibid.

Introduction of these harsh Islamic penalties and traditional taxation system had
become a debatable issue in Pakistan, especially in the context of the priorities of
the modern age. The stiff Shariat penalties have not yet deterred crime and
corruption in any spectacular way. There are no reliable restraints on pro—
regime elements. Owing to complex provisions involved, one would not
normally invite the wrath of such a system and may not report to authorities
cases of violation of the law. The police force has begun Islamizing itself and has
announced that it will not entertain any report or a complaint from any member
of the public unless made under an oath certified by a clergy-man (Pir) from a
mosque.
Ironically introduction of these Shareat laws brought about a serious controversy

between Shia’s and Sunnis. The former, who claim to account for one third of the
country’s population—around 25 million, have alleged that by such laws,
General Zia has imposed “Sunni hegemony” on the people of Pakistan. The main
grievance of Shias relates to Zakat which is to be enforced in July 1979. According
to Shia leaders the Zakat is payable on nine items which include dates, camels
and buffaloes, as well as gold and silver; no Zakat is payable, they insist, on
ornaments of gold and silver, nor on prices of art and decoration made of gold
and silver, nor on paper currency nor on savings, certificates and prizes bonds.
According to Shias the punishment of wrist amputation ordered in the case of
theft is a Sunni punishment. The Shia view requires the hand to cut at the joints
of the fingers.32
Proclamation concerning the so called Islamic taxes Zakat and Ushr also poses
complex problems. It was reported that people started withdrawing their savings
from banks. The price of gold immediately shot up to Rs. 865 per tola (11.664
gram) and cost of land in any middle class suburb jumped to an unprecedented
Rs. 500 per square yard. Apart from the 2.5% deduction from savings, the people
also started that fearing deductions might be made the basis for income—tax
assessment.33
In a country with diverse sects, tribe and distinct regional entities compounded
by ruthless quest for Islamization national integration and economic
development are a definite casualty. Such a situation creates and is likely to add
to, insurmountable problems for the military regime. However it would be
entirely idealistic to expect the people of Pakistan to reassess the sequence of
events that has culminated in their present dilemma, and, therefore to derive and
nurture hope, unity and determination to establish a system which would, in
32
The Times of News, March 2, 1979.
33
Ibid, March 9, 1979.

some way to begin with, offer an alternative to martial interference at intervals.
Much of what ultimately transpire in this sphere would be a manifestation of the
crises ridden political culture of Pakistan. The role the PNA plays, the manner in
which the PPP rehabilitates itself, and, above all, the mechanism to discipline
and control the army to preclude its ambitions and adventure, would be decisive
indices of Pakistan’s future polity.
V- BHUTT’S TRIAL AND EXECUTION
Bhutto’s execution by the military Junta has seemingly added one more chapter
of agony to the travail of Pakistan. Right from staging the coup and postponing
the promised October 18, 1977 general elections General Zia had to play his cards
effectively with a view to save his own neck in the unlikely event of Bhutto either
living and imprisoned for life, or, wore still, set free and back to politics. In the
situation following, Zia’s coup against his benefactor, Zia’s option was so very
evident from the very beginning. How seemingly legally to remove Bhutto must
have been the only worry of Zia once he decided not to stage a bloody coup. If
Zia were so confident of his own popularity and assured of Bhutto’s fall in public
esteem, the case implicating Bhutto in a murder charge would not have been so
religiously pursued. Therefore, it is obvious that Zia was frightened of Bhutto
and dreaded the day when and if Bhutto returned to power. Zia himself would
have to face charges of high treason. Thus, General Zia was trapped in a most
paradoxical situation. According to 1973 constitution any act of subversion of the
constitution by the army was punishable by death. Zia looked on the Bhutto
issue as one of his own neck versus that of Bhutto. Therefore, in connivance with
the PNA parties, General Zia in a cynical manner exploited the established
institutions of Pakistan and launched a jehad against Bhutto and “Bhuttoism.”
After conducting an open trial, perhaps, the longest trial in Pakistan’s judicial
history, General Zia went ahead with the Supreme Court’s verdict and finished
Bhutto by a brutal hanging on April 4, 1979 at 2.30 A.M in the district jail of
Rawalpindi.
With Bhutto executed, it is not so very sure if the dead man would not gather an
aura of martyrdom and, history abounds in instances where myths are likely to
multiply. Whether in the event of elections in future, Zia would succeed in
convincing the electorate of his own, and the army’s, innocence, and would the
people take him for his word that Bhutto’s execution was not owing to
complicity of the army and the judiciary, are issues only time will sort out.
Nevertheless, one thing is obvious: the army has as given a very rough deal to
politicians, especially to a former politician of Bhutto’s stature at home and
abroad, and this fact is likely to haunt politicians of variety.

Bhutto’s removal by execution is not a political solution: considering it as
political victory is to deny the political reality of Pakistan. And this seems to be
exactly what Zia has done. It is beyond the operational competence of Zia to put
forth to the people why and how Bhutto and the PPP are retrograde to national
survival and development. If elections are held, the army cannot count itself
among legislators or ministers. And if elections are held the army will have to go
back to the barracks. What happens to Zia in that case? Also, one may not forget
that Bhutto’s many faults and autocracy notwithstanding will the people accept
the army as an alternative to politicians or would the people not yet wait
patiently for the opportune time to strike back at the army or army - backed
politicians and bring about the political alternative to Bhutto.
As one recalls the judicial exercise - Bhutto, was made to suffer, one finds that it
bristled with paradoxes, contradictions and ironies. Initially to show his political
neutrality General Zia released Bhutto from “protective custody” along with
other important PNA leaders on July 28, 1977. But the military authorities kept
strict watch on Bhutto’s activities. As Bhutto showed his willingness to contest
the fixed October 18, 1977 general elections, the military government intensified
its vilification campaign against Bhutto and the PPP.
Fearing Bhutto’s come back to power and realizing their own contradictions and
weaknesses, PNA leaders urged General Zia to usher and ensure a process of
“accountability” before holding general elections. The whole idea behind
accountability process was to expose Bhutto’s misuse of power during his five
and a half year rule. It might be recalled that top PNA leaders exerted
considerable pressure to prevent Bhutto from participating in the proposed
general election. Soon after the imposition of martial law, Pir Pagara of Muslim
League was first to demand Bhutto’s trial in an open court.34 Afterwards NDP
leader Begum Nasim Wali Khan suggested that before conducting “free and fair”
elections, a “national government” should be set up in the country for at least
five years, to extricate it from the morass of Bhuttoism.35 The Tehrike-Istiglal
leader, Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan demanded Bhutto’s trial, even at the
cost of postponement of the promised October 18 general elections. He was in
favour of Bhutto’s trial in an ordinary court.36 The PNA leaders also demanded a
34
The Statesman, July 9, 1977.
35
POT, August 23, 1977.
36
Asghar Khan demanded that court case spending against Bhutto and other Pakistan People’s party
leaders be brought before the vote is taken. He said that although he was not recommending postponement
of the elections, 18 October, 1977 was not sacrosanct and the heavens would not fall if there was a delay of
few days or weeks.” The Tribune, September, 2, 1977.

probe into Pakistan’s failure in two wars with India (1965 and 1971) and
publication of Hamobdur Rahman Commission report before polls.
In keeping with PNA’s persistent demand to make Bhutto accountable for his
actions, General Zia assured PNA leaders to deal with the “evils of Bhuttoism”
before- holding October, 18, 1977 General election. With a view to prevent Bhutto
from taking part in the elections, the military government brought about a series
of criminal charges against Bhutto, including murder charges, misuse of
governmental funds, and resources. Bhutto’s role in 1971 Pakistan’s war with
India resulting in the breakup of Pakistan was given wide publicity. Since all
other charges were not deemed adequate to implicate Bhutto, the military
authorities immediately arrested him on 3 September, 1977 (five days after his
release from protective custody) in connection with a government agency’s
probe of his alleged role in 1974 political assassination.37 It was reported that
Bhutto’s erstwhile party colleague Ahmed Raza Kasuri, registered a complaint in
Lahore High Court against Bhutto and other ten persons for conspiring against
him and killing his Father Nawab Ahmed Khan in November 1974.38
On September 13, 1977, Bhutto was freed on bail amounting Rs. 50,000 with two
securities of the same amount by the Lahore High Court. As Bhutto made no
secret of his intentions to take part in polls, the military authorities again
detained him on September, 17, 1977, just two days before the opening of the
election campaign.
Interestingly the US daily New York Times (21-9-1977) called for a postponement
of October polls until the completion of the trial of the former Prime Minister Z.
A. Bhutto.39 The Supreme Court (on 24 September, 1977) refused to dismiss the
murder charges against Bhutto in connection with a habeas corpus petition filed
in the Supreme Court, on behalf of Begum Nusrat Bhutto, against detention of
her husband and ten of his associates. Begum Bhutto criticized the decision of the
Supreme Court as prejudicial and accused that her husband’s arrest was aimed
at preventing him from contesting general election. In view of PNA president’s
demand for Bhutto’s trial, General Zia postponed the scheduled October 18 1977
General Election on 1 October, 1977 and imposed ban on all political activities
37
Bhutto was picked by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) which had been looking into the murder
of Nawab Ahmed Khan killed in an ambush at Lahore in 1974. The then Director General of Federal
Security Forces (FSF) Masud Mahmood, formally accused Bhutto of ordering him to prepare the ambush.
Mahmood also disclosed that the trap was not aimed at killing Nawab Ahmed Khan, but his son Ahmed
Raza Kasuri.
38
Morning News, August 22, 1977.
39
Times of India, September 22, 1977.

throughout the country. The military government also imposed severe restriction
on press and other communication media. Gen. Zia disclosed that Bhutto and his
associates would be tried in “open civilian courts”.40
A full bench of Lahore High Court on 9 October, 1977, cancelled the bail granted
to Bhutto earlier and ordered for his confinement in a judicial custody. A five —
man bench of the Lahore High Court started regular trial and formally charged
Bhutto the former Prime Minister, Mian Mohammed Abbas, a former Director
Operation, FSF and three junior officers of the Federal Security Force, for a
murder conspiracy.
On October 18, 1977, Bhutto urged the Supreme Court to reject the military coup
that too pled his government. He alleged that the July 5, 1977 take over was a
“master plan” of outside forces to deal with the leaders of India and Pakistan.
Was it a coincidence, he asked, that the former Prime Ministers of both countries
(India and Pakistan) were being proceeded against “in like manner” because
both of them refused to succumb to the pressures of a foreign power41. In an
address to the Supreme Court on October 22, 1977, Bhutto warned that continued
— martial law could lead to the break—up of Pakistan. He accused martial law
authorities of suspending the constitution solely to destroy him. He said:
“Why punish the entire nation for the sake of one individual”. Bhutto described
the situation of Pakistan as worse than that of 1971 during the war with India
and the secession of Bangladesh. He told the Supreme Court that the only
solution to the prevailing “total constitutional crisis” lay in the holding of general
election immediately”.42
Dismissing the habeas corpus petition of Begum Nusrat Bhutto the Supreme
Court of Pakistan up held the detention of Bhutto and his ten associates on
November 10 under Martial Law, order No. 12. All the nine judges including the
chief justice S. Anwarul—Haq returned a “unanimous verdict” on the petition.
The 108—page judgment described the promulgation of martial law (on July 5,
1977) as an “extra-constitutional step stemming from a necessity and added that
the promulgation of martial law had a legal validity. It noted that the CMLA was
entitled to perform all legislative functions of the 1973 constitution except for a
few provisions. The Court said it had no power to issue directive to the CMLA
about holding of elections, but it mentioned the intention of the CMLA to hold
40
Ibid, October 2, 1977.
41
The Hindustan Times, October 19, 1977.
42
The Times of India, October 23, 1977.

elections as soon as the process of accountability was over. The Court said it
hoped that the period between now and the holding of elections would be as
short as possible. It described that period as a period of constitutional deviation
necessitated by grave circumstances”.43
That gave a serious blow to Bhutto and the PPP. Henceforth General Zia
intensified his campaign of “accountability process” more vigorously. The
accountability process was heavily loaded with Islamic overtones with a view to
“cleansing” perverted politics of Pakistan General Zia explained that it was for
first time in the history of Pakistan that those personalities who remained at the
helm of affairs were being made to account their acts of omission and
commission. In this context the trial of Z. A. Bhutto and his coterie had become a
matter of necessity so that the people of Pakistan should be able to choose their
representatives without doubt and repose their confidence in them.44
The military regime imposed strict ban on Press and political activity
maintaining that “free political activity was not desirable until the completion of
accountability process”. The government issued Presidential orders for the
disqualification of the membership of the national and provincial assemblies for
seven years, for those politicians who were found corrupt and undesirable. For
the trial of undesirable political elements, eleven special disqualification
tribunals were setup. Obviously, the military regime was trying to expose the
members of the PPP. Under Martial Law, order No. 31, political activity in the
country had been banned until March 31, 1978 45 . However, it was extended
indefinitely.
The pro-government media gave wide publicity to the “evils of Bhuttoism”. The
government controlled press chiefly focused on the views of Bhutto’s potential
rivals like, Khan Abdual Wali Khan and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others
who were the victims of Bhutto’s despotism. From the strategically stand point
General Zia released all these leaders who were kept in jails during Bhutto
regime. The speeches of Khan Abdul Wali Khan were widely quoted in the major
newspapers. All these released leaders hailed the anti-Bhutto steps of General
Zia-ul-Haq.
43
The Pakistan Times, November 11, 1977. In a rejoinder to the statement of the state lawyer A, K. Brohi,
in the Supreme Court Bhutto said : “It was greatest mistake of his life to make a Jamaat-e-Islami man the
Army Chief over the head of Seven officers.” He accused that during the post March 1977 General election
agitation in the country, General Zia made contacts with a foreign power. He did not identify that foreign
power, but hinted that it was the United States of America, the country which he had earlier charged, was
responsible for his downfall. Time of India, November 14, 1977.
44
The Pakistan Times, October 26, 1977.
45

In his various speeches Khan Abdul Wali Khan equated “Bhuttoism” with
“Fascism”. He vociferously reiterated that Bhutto and Pakistan can not coexist.
He asserted that “unless the traces of Bhuttoism were removed from the body-
politic of the country, no positive achievement could be made in any direction”46.
The Pakistan Economist (March 11, 1978) described the meaning of Bhuttoism
thus :
“In our view Bhuttoism stands for license to break all laws as well as long
entrenched social norms in one could do it with impunity. Mr. Bhutto set the
style for it by living in regal splendour but appearing on special occasions
capped like Mao-tsetung or Chou-en-Lai with the scythe and spade in his hands
ranting-ad nanuseam about his government being one of the poor, by the poor
and for the poor. But it was the poor and the middle classes whose lot grew
worse as time passed and who found themselves on the way to having all doors
of remedies closed to them. The resultant could only be ‘maddening
frustration’............For Bhuttoism consisted essentially in appropriating the
ingredients of existentialism”.
It is not so sure if it was even a relatively objective assessment of Bhutto’s

objectives and policies. Besides the ban on political activities and wide publicity
to the evils of Bhuttoism, the martial law government closed the educational
institutions throughout Pakistan.
In such an environment, closed and made awesome due to army show of

strength and ruthless intentions, the Lahore High Court, on March 18, 1978 gave
its verdict of death penalty to the former primeminister Z. A. Bhutto for ordering
a political murder in 1974. The five—men bench of Lahore High Court
“unanimously convicted Bhutto and his four associates giving them a death
sentence. Besides death sentence all were given sentences of seven years jail for
conspiracy. Bhutto was ordered by the Court to pay Rs. 25,000 as compensation
to the family of the member of the man killed. Bhutto was immediately sent to
the death cell in Kot Lakhpat Jail in Lahore.
After the announcement of Lahore High Court judgment, Bhutto became

apprehensive of the intentions of General Zia. With little hope of his survival
Bhutto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. It was reported that Bhutto wanted
withdrawal of the chief justice Mr. S. Anwarul-Haq since he did not expect an
impartial verdict from him. But Bhutto failed to move the army authorities. In
May 1978 Bhutto was transferred to the Rawalpindi Central Jail.
46
Dawn, December 15, 1978.

In May 1978, a nine-member full bench of the Supreme Court started the hearing
of Bhutto's appeal. Bhutto was absent on the first day of the hearing. His lawyer
Yahya Bakhtiar denounced the case against his client as politically motivated and
part of an international conspiracy aimed at politically and physically
eliminating him. Meanwhile, the nine-member bench of the Supreme Court was
reduced to - member bench following the retirement of Mr. Justice Qaiser Khan
and the sickness of Mr. Justice Wahiceduddin Ahmad. After nine months of
tortuous judicial exercise, the Supreme Court of Pakistan on February 6, 1979,
confirmed the Lahore High Court verdict awarding death sentence for Bhutto
and other four co-accused.
The confirmation of death sentence became a debatable issue it was a split-

verdict: four judges (from Punjab) favoured the Lahore High Court verdict, the
other three judges in their dissenting note favoured Bhutto’s acquittal.47 Bhutto’s
counsel filed a petition for the review of judgment. But all in vain, on March 24,
1979, Z. A. Bhutto lost the final battle against his death sentence when the
Seven—men Supreme Court bench “unanimously” rejected the review petition.
But the Supreme Court included a paragraph in their ruling recommending
executive clemency. In suggesting clemency, the Supreme Court mentioned that
it supported Bhutto’s counsel Yahya Bakhtiar’s claim that ‘‘the sentence should
be commuted to life impriosonment because, Bhutto did not wield the murder
weapon and was not at the scene of the crime.”48
General Zia expected that Bhutto will request him to grant him clemency
commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment But Bhutto was very firm
in his resolve. He vowed not to appeal for clemency, since he felt that an appeal
would be an admission of guilt. Ultimately, on April 4, 1979, General Zia carried
out a showdown, disregarding international appeals for granting Bhutto
clemency.”49
VI- REACTIONS OVER BHUTTO’S EXECUTION
Bhutto’s hanging can not be viewed in isolation of specific political context.

Though military authorities justified the execution on legal ground; political
factors played a determinant role. Excepting the PPP, the entire political
leadership of the country was in favour of Bhutto’s execution. Right from the
announcement of Lahore High Court judgment, the PNA parties were insisting
47
48
The Times of India, March 24, 1979.
49
The Times of India, April 5, 1979.

General Zia not to bow down before the international pressure. They criticized
the world appeals as“interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs”. They also
repeatedly warned the military authorities, if Bhutto was not penalized, the
country will face a tragic civil—war. However, soon after Bhutto’s execution the
PNA withdraw from Zia’s Cabinet. Now they are a bit hesitant to share the
blame because of its grave repercussions in the forth coming general elections.
It might be recalled that the rightist ‘Islam Pasand’ parties hailed the Lahore High
Court verdict maintaining that “the imprint of the punishment awarded to
Bhutto should be so firmly ingrained that it may put a deterrent fear of God in
the minds of the people.”50
It is evident that for the sake of his own survival General Zia adopted a stiff and
partisan attitude. Throughout the Court’s legal battle he used the media in
denigrating Bhutto’s leadership. The government published a series of “White
Papers” to expose Bhutto’s unlawful actions.51 To show his political neutrality
General Zia hailed the Lahore High Court verdict and, later the Supreme Court’s
confirmation, as unimpeachable evidence of the “sacrosanct principle of
independence of judiciary”. In reality, he directly interfered with judicial
procedure regarding Bhutto’s case. From the very beginning General Zia was
tempering with the judiciary. Soon after Bhutto’s detention, he prescribed a new
oath of office for the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts on gain of
loss of office in which the pledge to “preserve, protect and defend” the
constitution was omitted. That very day (September 22, 1977) the then Chief
Justice of Pakistan Supreme Court Mr. Justice Yaqub Ali was removed by Martial
Law order amending the constitution. General Zia appointed one of his close
men Mr. Juctice Shaikh Anwarul Haq as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.52
Later, when appeals for clemency started pouring in, General Zia described them
as merely “formal and best example of political trade Unionism.”53 He did not
even bother to read them. General Zia repeatedly said that he was right in
50
51
Bhutto in his death cell wrote a rejoinder to government’s white papers in the name of “Pakistan Papers”
— He countered the information of these White papers as “White lies.” These “Pakistan Papers” written by
Bhutto were published by Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi in (1979) a book form entitled. “If I am
Assassinated.” Pran Chopra has written a broad introduction giving a resume of what Bhutto has brilliantly
written. Besides that Pran Chopra has given a lucid analysis of the prevailing political situation of Pakistan
under Martial Law.
52
Refer to POT, September 24, 1977.
53
“Asia World”, March 16-31, 1979.

Bhutto’s trial, since “no one was above law”. He argued that Bhutto was not
sentenced as the Prime Minister of Pakistan but as an ordinary culprit.
Right from his detention, Bhutto was aware of Zia’s adamant posture. In the last
days of his life, living in a death cell, Bhutto realized that “a revolutionary justice
would have been better” than this inhuman treatment. It is still a mystery why
the Supreme Court previously gave a split 4/3 judgment and why it
unanimously rejected Bhutto’s review petition? Obviously all this was the result
of intervention of martial law authorities. Some critics argued that 4/3 judgment
smacked of regionalism. All the four judges who favoured Bhutto’s execution
were from Punjab and three judges who favoured Bhutto’s acquittal were from
other provinces. Thus, the prolonged legal battle was an exercise of a mere eye—
wash.
Bhutto’s execution became popular as “judicial murder”. According to critics the

case was not based on substantive evidence. The entire trial was conducted on
the basis of verbal accusations and statements made by then Director-General of
the Federal Security Force, Masaud Mahmud. The Supreme Court might have
been helpless in the matter if the evidence against Bhutto were indeed fool proof.
However, there was no such evidence on record moreover; Bhutto’s execution

was not in conformity with the tenets of Islam. According to Islamic (Shariat)
laws, punishment in a murder case is awarded on the principle: “Life for life only
for the actual killer” By the Court itself it is established that Bhutto was not the
actual killer nor was he present at the spot.
A distinguished French lawyer deputed to attend the Bhutto trial on behalf of the
European Human Rights Commission, for instance, said “that the case would not
stand in French Court for even a few minutes”. The former US Attorney General,
Ramsay Clark expressed much the same view. He stated: a possible five four
split decision (in case there were a nine—member bench) in favour of acquittal
and release of the former Prime Minister was converted into a four-three split
decision in favour of conviction.”54 The military ruler suppressed the demand of
recalling the two judges of the original nine—member bench.
This perhaps had to happen in a regimented regime. Pakistan’s judiciary can not
be regarded as independent if one were to take stock of news filtering in from
beyond the frontier.
54

VII- CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is a fact now that the General has removed his potential rival from Pakistan’s
political scene and also from the earth. Zia’s designs notwithstanding, Bhutto is
likely to haunt the politics of Pakistan for years to come. Bhutto’s physical
removal seems to have created more issues and problems instead of solving
them, now and hereafter. Also, systemic stability and national integration are
definitely under strain, as is evident from the general feeling prevalent, and also
it is widely expressed, that Bhutto was made to suffer by Punjabi elite. How long
General Zia would succeed in humoring loyalist PNA supporters on the pretext
of “Islamization” are questions which can not be ignored. Political parties other
than the PNA are likely to create added troubles for Zia since they did not
compromise on Zia’s meddling with constitutional apparatus. How long the
PNA (of six parties) holds itself together now is also a pertinent question. It is to
be recalled that parties both of the PNA and outside it, were unanimous in Zia’s
anti—Bhutto move and now that Bhutto has been removed- their staying
together is not guaranteed.
In view of Zia’s renewed (March 23, 1979) declaration to hold general election on
November 17, 1979, the political situation is likely to be transformed to take new
and, very likely, imponderable, postures. With the PNA hold fast together and
with other parties outside the PNA, strive to preserve and strengthen unity and
offer a viable political alternative. At the moment, the picture is not very happy.
The so-called leftist parties are not effective. They have not renounced the label
of Islam. The so called “Islamic Marxists” are hardly equipped to bring about
revolutionary changes in Pakistan.
It is significant that in his March 23, 1979 speech, when he announced the date
for the holding of general elections, General Zia made remarks to amend the
constitution to strike a balance between the powers of the Prime Minister and
President. It might he Zia’s presumption that the next Prime Minister will be a
less influential figures as he does not expect any single party to win the elections.
In all probability, Zia would try to continue as the president of Pakistan. The
army will not agree to go to the barracks conveniently, unless it is forced to do so.
Alternatively General Zia might decide to follow the model of Bangladesh
adopted by General Zia-ur-Rahman. Thereafter he might choose to follow the
Ayubian model of “party less democracy.” That is surmised in the context of his
repeated announcement to reduce the number of political parties and his blanket
curbs on the political process. General Zia has also indicated to hold the polls to
the local bodies on nonparty basis. Or else, by the time the general elections are
held, if politicians become inconveniently voluble and assert their preference to
retain parliamentary system, General Zia might agree to conduct elections to

Parliament under a modified constitutional dispensation which has, of necessity
to ensure his position and powers.
Whatever be the course of events, eventual forum of government and

constitutional shape, the other significant question is related to the integrity and
stability of Pakistan. The most pressing issue right now is when Zia would hold
the much promised and repeatedly deferred elections. As soon earlier, if the
judiciary and the army are going to supervise elections, time alone would show
whether the former would succeed in rising above the likely role of the latter
which, in keeping with Zia’s intentions and actions hitherto, might be influenced
by the sole objective of either retaining power directly or ensuring sublet and
indirect control of the army over the politicians. The judiciary hitherto has been
captive: Would it, and could it assert itself?
Pakistan is facing a crisis of identity, what and who would hold the competing
and almost warring regions together? Is the alternative likely to be return to
electoral politics with the army waiting in the wings so to say? Or would
regional priorities assert themselves and lead to undoing efforts of national
integration. In that contingency, would the army come back?
It might be recalled that Bhutto succeeded to some extent, in assuaging the

feelings of regionalism in Punjab and Sindh. However, of late sub-nationalities,
Sindhi, Baluchi and Pustoon, are up against the Punjabi hegemony. Baluchistan
and the NWFP were, even earlier, under attack by the ruling elite. Now Sindh
had also been made the target. After Bhutto’s execution, it would be a political
folly to take Sindh for granted. Reports say that there is a lot of ferment and
perhaps even the slightest miscalculation by the army now, or by any future
rulers, would spark the tinderbox. National statesmanship alone would ensure
viability and integrity of Pakistan.
With the upsurge of Islamic orthodoxy, popular legitimacy would have to be

ensured for the single reason that even good, committed Muslims may not
support revival of outmoded fundamentalism. It is utterly incongruous for
General Zia to enforce a system if only to placate certain dogmatic elements but
that is likely neither to be accepted by the large majority of people nor be
conducive to nation-building.
If Bhutto’s execution fails to provide a strong and reliable alternative, sanctioned

by national consensus, the apprehensions regarding Pakistan’s further
dismemberment may well come true. That, by any calculation, would be a
catastrophe not necessarily confined to that country but perhaps igniting process
of destabilization in South Asia as well.

The army itself faces, right now, severe challenge to its credibility. Now that it
has set in motion train of suspicion, vendetta, judicial murder, marital high
handedness, rupture of the constitutional process and, above all- Islamic
fundamentalism, it would be a vain hope to expect normalcy to be revived
instantly, either by the army or any political regime (if it comes about). Let it not
be forgotten that Bhutto’s execution also meant that Zia’s ‘coup’ was after all, not
as bloodless as made out to be initially. Apart from the assassination of Liaquat
Ali Khan, no regime was toppled by bloody steps. Also, events and maddening
tempo of political surprises and shocks in neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan
can not be ignored. How Pakistan reacts to these situations is likely to be of vital
importance to identification of Zia’s options.
The rise and fall of Bhutto, thus, upholds a panorama of a politician who rose to
dizzy heights both at home and abroad, whose flamboyance for words and
symbols was phenomenal, who moved the common man, who earned eulogies
and bitter hostility and whose cardinal miscalculation proved to be, also his last.
Meanwhile the clock in Pakistan seems to have been put back to medieval
orthodoxy.

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Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 1

With Special Reference to Rise and Fall

SURENDRA NATH KAUSHIK

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 2

1. Bhutto’s Assumption of Political Power: An Introduction .. 4

2. Quest for Consolidation of Power: The Phase of Interim

3. The New Constitution (1973): An Experiment .. .. .. 21

4. Sectarian and Provincial Challenges: Bhutto’s Capitulation .. 30

5. Economic Scene: A Brief Survey .. .. .. .. .. 43

6. Bhutto’s Foreign Policy .. .. .. .. .. .. 55

7. The PPP And the Opposition Parties: Interactive Dilemmas .. 65

8. The March 1977 General Elections and Disenchantment .. 76

9. PNA’s Protest Movement and Bhutto’s Down Fall .. .. 88

10. Aftermath .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100

It gives me immense pleasure to place Politics In Pakistan: A Study of The Rise

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 1

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Ramakant, Professor and Director South Asia

Dr. Satish Kumar, Associate Professor of Diplomacy, School of International

I shall be failing in my duty if I do not acknowledge the valuable suggestions

I am thankful to authorities of the libraries of the Indian Council of World Affairs,

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 2

Surendra Nath Kaushik

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 3

In his shrewd and concerted style, Bhutto succeeded in maintaining himself in

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 4

Both as President and Prime Minister of Pakistan Bhutto exerted effective

Under strict Emergency regulations Bhutto exercised his authoritarianism as if

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 5

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 6

Though it is too early to delineate the manifold aspects concerning ‘Bhutto’s

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 7

The radical and socialistic pronouncements of the PPP proved to be populist

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 8

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 9

“The New Pakistan” as Bhutto termed, it was obviously facing manifold

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 10

As a dramatic political gesture, Bhutto released Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,

As far as his pronouncements went, Bhutto seethed determined to refurbish the

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 11

Throughout the interim constitution phase, Bhutto endeavored to consolidate his

On the front of socio-economic reforms Bhutto was quite vocal in his

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 12

In might be recalled that on March 1, 1972, Bhutto announced lowering of ceiling

On February 10, 1972, Bhutto’s government proclaimed a “new labour policy”,

In his enthusiasm for idealistic pronouncements, Bhutto introduced some

However, the socio-economic reform measures proved -to be neither effective

Maintaining a facade of democracy and socio-economic justice”, President

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 13

Situation in Sindh was becoming very critical. Bhutto succeeded only in

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 14

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 15

True to Pakistan’s previous experience in constitution-making, things became

(i) The nature of the executive;

Amidst mounting regional tensions in constituent provinces, Bhutto agreed to

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 16

In spite of the intra party dissensions, Bhutto ultimately succeeded in gaining

(i) In order to be valid, a motion expressing want of confidence in the

(iii) Once a motion of want of confidence is defeated, a subsequent one

(iv) For a period of 15 years or three general elections thereafter,

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 17

Bhutto seemed to be losing patience. He resorted to iron-hand methods to

Politics in Pakistan, Copyright © www.bhutto.org 18

In a series of swift moves to reassert federal authority, Bhutto imposed central