McDonald v. spring Valley, 120 N.E.

476, 2 ALR 1355

MARGARET McDONALD, Appellant,

vs.
THE CITY OF SPRING VALLEY, Appellee.
No. 12174.

Supreme Court of Illinois

285 Ill. 52; 120 N.E. 476; 1918 Ill. LEXIS 825; 2 A.L.R. 1359

October 21, 1918.

PRIOR HISTORY:
[***1]
APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Second District; -- heard in that court on
appeal from the Circuit Court of Bureau county; the Hon. JOE A. DAVIS, Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION: Judgment of Appellate Court reversed. Judgment of circuit court
affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, a minor by her next friend, sought review of the
order of the Appellate Court for the Second District (Illinois), which entered
judgment in favor of appellee city in the minor's suit in trespass alleging that the
city's negligence led to the loss of the third finger of her left hand.
OVERVIEW: The seven-year-old minor was injured in June of 1916 in a building
constructed by the city as a place of amusement. In March 1917, she filed a
statement in the city offices stating the time, place, and other details of her injury.
The city demurred to the minor's suit on the grounds that the minor did not comply
with Ill. Stat. p. 1663 (Hurd 1917), which required her to give notice of her injury
within six months. The jury in the trial court entered judgment for the minor, but the
appellate court reversed. On review, the court reversed the appellate court's
judgment and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court held that the
statute in question was a general statute, which was to be read in conjunction with
rules of law that had become well established. One such rule of law was the rule
that the status of a minor was recognized at law as being different than that of an
adult. Extrapolating from that reasoning, the court ruled that the notice statute was
intended to apply only to those who were mentally and physically able to
comprehend and comply with its terms.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.

McDonald v. spring Valley, 120 N.E. 476, 2 ALR 1355

FACTS: The seven-year-old minor Margaret McDonald was injured in June of 1916 in
a building constructed by the city as a place of amusement. The minor lost her third
finger in her left hand. In March 1917, with the assistance of her next friend Patrick
McDonald , she filed a statement in the city offices stating the time, place, and
other details of her injury. The minor filed a suit in trespass alleging that the city's
negligence led to the loss of the third finger of her left hand. The city demurred to
the minor's suit on the grounds that the minor did not comply with required notice
of her injury within six months. The jury in the trial court entered judgment for the
minor, but the appellate court reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant, a minor by her next friend, may sought review of
the order of the Appellate Court for the Second District (Illinois), which entered
judgment in favor of appellee city.

HELD: On review, the court reversed the appellate court's judgment and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. The court held that the statute in question was a
general statute, which was to be read in conjunction with rules of law that had
become well established. One such rule of law was the rule that the status of a
minor was recognized at law as being different than that of an adult. Extrapolating
from that reasoning, the court ruled that the notice statute was intended to apply
only to those who were mentally and physically able to comprehend and comply
with its terms.
It cannot be controverted that a minor is incapable of appointing an agent or an
attorney, and it can not be successfully contended that the statute can be complied
with by the filing of the required notice by the father, mother or some friend of the
child as next friend. While the parent of a minor is its natural guardian he cannot be
said to be the agent or attorney for the child. A child with a meritorious cause of
action but incapable of initiating any proceeding for its enforcement will not be left
to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend to enforce its rights.
The declaration disclosed that appellant was mentally and physically incapable of
giving the notice required by the statute, and she therefore did not come within the
provisions of this statute as properly construed.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit
court affirmed.