Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16574

February 28, 1964

ALIPIO N. CASILAN and PURITA GANGCAYCO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
RAYMOND TOMASSI, SANTIAGO GANGCAYCO, defendants-appellees.
Julio Siayngco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Benjamin J. Molina for defendants-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case originated in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiuan, Samar. A complaint was filed
there by the present appellants on April 12, 1950, alleging that the defendants, appellees here,
were unlawfully detaining two (2) quonset huts owned by appellants and leased by them to
appellees under a verbal contract entered into on November 1, 1949. It was further alleged that
the rental agreed upon was P400.00 a month, but that appellees had failed to pay the same from
the time the lease agreement started, notwithstanding repeated demands for such payment.
A motion to dismiss was filed by appellees on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The motion was denied by the Justice of the Peace
Court. The hearing of the case was postponed several times upon motion of appellees. The last
motion for postponement, however, was denied upon appellant's objection, and the trial
proceeded in the absence of the adverse parties, after which judgment was rendered ordering
them to vacate the premises described in the complaint and to pay the sum of P500.00 as rentals
from November 1, 1949 to March 31, 1950.
The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Samar, where the appellees filed their
answer to the complaint. In the answer of Santiago Gangcayco he alleged as special defense that
the quonset huts in question had been sold to Raymond Tomassi. In his separate answer Tomassi
raised, among his special defenses, the question of jurisdiction on the part of the Justice of the
Peace Court.
On December 27, 1950 the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order dismissing the case
on the ground that the Justice of the Peace Court had lost its jurisdiction by reason of the several
postponements granted by it and therefore the Court of First Instance did not acquire appellate
jurisdiction at all. An appeal from that order was taken to us (G.R. No. L-9320), and this Court

rendered judgment on January 31, 1956, stating that the case should have been tried on the merits
by the Court of First Instance and remaining the record for that purpose.
On May 15, 1956 the Court of First Instance again issued an order dismissing the appeal of
appellees and remanding the case in turn to the Justice of the peace Court for execution of its
judgment. From that order appellees elevated the matter to this Court by certiorari (G.R. No. L11335 and G.R. No. L-11450); and on October 30, 1958, we rendered judgment ordering the
Court of First Instance to proceed with the trial on the merits.1wph1.t
On June 23, 1959, the Court of First Instance, after conducting the trial as ordered, rendered its
decision again dismissing the complaint. this time on the ground that the Justice of the Peace
Court did not acquire original jurisdiction in view of the absence of any allegation in the
complaint that the plaintiffs, appellants here, had made demand upon the defendant's to vacate
the two huts in question. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, and upon denial thereof,
perfected the present appeal. Their prayer is that the dismissal be set aside and the court ordered
to render judgment in accordance with the oral and documentary evidence adduced during the
trial.
The issue here is whether or not original jurisdiction was acquired by the Justice of the Peace
Court, considering the allegations in the complaint. If it did acquire such jurisdiction, then the
Court of First Instance, acting as appellate court, should consider the evidence presented. On the
other hand, if the Justice of the Peace Court did not acquire jurisdiction, the only recourse for the
Court of First Instance was to issue the order of dismissal, as it did.
We have gone over the allegations of the complaint and found nothing there to the effect that a
demand had been made upon the defendants to vacate the premises in question. What allegation
there was refers to a demand for payment of the rentals agreed upon. Such allegation, according
to the consistent ruling of this Court, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Justice of the
Peace Court in an action of unlawful detainer. Thus in Canaynay vs. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. p. 36, it
was held:
The fact that it is alleged in the complaint that defendants failed to pay the rents since
after August 25, 1923, does not make unlawful defendant's withholding of possession of
the property. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's
possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises,
when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenants refusal or failure to
vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession. There is no legal obstacle for the
owner to allow a defaulting tenant to remain in the rented property one month, one year,
several years or even decades. That consent, no matter how long it may last, makes
lawful tenant's possession. Only when that consent is withdrawn and the owner demand
tenant to leave the property is the owner's right of possession asserted and the tenant's

refusal or failure to move out makes this possession unlawful, because its is violative of
the owner's preferential right of possession. (See also Robles v. San Jose, 52 O.G. 6193;
Rickards v. Gonzales, L-14939, Sept. 26, 1960.)
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs.

ECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-48448. February 20, 1984.]
CRESENCIO, MAGIN, JUANITO, SOCRATES, and IMELDA, all surnamed VELEZ,
Petitioners, v. HON. CELSO AVELINO, Presiding Judge, CFI Cebu Branch XIII, ALDING
ACEDERA, FABIANA ALLISON, RAFAEL ALQUISALAS, VICTOR ALFAFARA,
FORTUNATO BARGAYO, NATIVIDAD BAJARIAS, ELISEO BELARMA, MAURA
BELARMA, VIDAL BUSTAMANTE, MARCIAL BURGOS, MAXIMO CABAHUG,
FLORO COROCOTO, HILARIO GAVIOLA, ROSITA GARCIA, LEOPOLDO LINES,
MAGDALENA TESORO, RAMON TEJANO, PLACIDA TEJANO, JUANITA
VERGARA, and AMBROSIO VILLACES, Respondents.
E. P. Gabriel, Jr., for Petitioners.
Pedro L. Albino for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; ACCION PUBLICIANA; NATURE THEREOF AS
DIFFERENTIATED FROM FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER; CASE AT
BAR. Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion must be resolved
in the affirmative. It should be recalled that this is a case of accion publiciana, the purpose of
which is being to establish who have a better right to possess. (Bernabe, Et. Al. v. Judge Dayrit,
Et Al., G.R. No. 58399, Oct. 27, 1983). There is no allegation of forcible entry in the complaint.
Neither is it a case of unlawful detainer because the preponderance of evidence shows that the
occupancy of private respondents on the lot in question is due to the tolerance of the owners
thereof and against the latters will. Private respondents admit that they have no written contract
of lease with the petitioners not with petitioners predecessor in interest. Only Marcial Burgos
alleged that he had an oral agreement with Rodrigo Velez, all others surprisingly failed to testify
that they had such an oral agreement of lease. They likewise admit that their houses were
constructed without building permits. In the true sense of the word, respondents are squatters. As
such, their possession is by tolerance. (Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136). Although
respondents had been paying nominal rentals ranging from P4.00 to P12.00 per month for some
time, they did not thereby acquire the legal status of tenants. Squatting is unlawful and no

amount of acquiescence converts it into a lawful act. Illegal constructions constitute public
nuisance per se. They pose problems of health and sanitation. (Cf. City of Manila v. Garcia, Et
Al., 19 SCRA 413).
2. ID.; LEASE; EJECTMENT UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 20; NONPAYMENT
OF RENTAL, A GROUND THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. Even if the case were to be
decided as an ejectment case, the insistence of respondents that they are lessees and, therefore,
under the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 20 loses ground when We consider the
finding of fact that respondents had not been paying any consideration for the occupancy of their
respective premises. Said Presidential Decree No. 20 suspended ejectment when the lease is for
an indefinite period. It did not suspend ejectment on other grounds like lack of payment of the
rental stipulated.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF LESSEES WHEN OWNERS OF LOT FAIL TO COLLECT
OR REFUSE TO ACCEPT RENTALS. The failure of the owners to collect, or their refusal to
accept the rentals are not valid defenses. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides that "if the
creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the
debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due."
cral aw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEED OF OWNER/LESSOR TO REPOSSESS PROPERTY FOR HIS OWN
USE OR FOR THE USE OF ANY MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY AS A RESIDENTIAL UNIT, A
GROUND THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. The petitioners need of the premises for their own
use or for the use of any member of his family as a residential unit entitles them to the possession
of the lots in question. Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which took effect on April 10, 1979, provides as
additional ground for judicial ejectment the need of the owner/lessor to repossess his property for
his own use or for the use of any member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or
immediate member not being the owner of any other available residential unit.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Cresencio, Magin, Juanito, Socrates and Imelda, all
surnamed Velez, seeking the reversal, for grave abuse of discretion, the decision dated May 22,
1978 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII dismissing their complaint for recovery
of possession of five parcels of land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 20.
The evidence shows that the five parcels of land all located at Katipunan Street, Cebu City, then
assessed at P17,000.00 and known as Lots 5311-A-2-A, 5311-A-2-B, 5311-A-2-C, 5311-A-2-D
and 5311-A-2-F, were formerly owned by Rodrigo Velez, the father of petitioners. In an
extrajudicial partition, the said lots were adjudicated to petitioners herein on June 16, 1970. As
early as 1970, petitioners made a demand to vacate upon respondents who asked an extension of
one year but thereafter, respondents changed their minds and refused to vacate. Around the end
of 1973, petitioners again advised respondents that they needed the premises for their own use

and ordered them to vacate the premises by removing their dwelling units from the lots. Upon
their refusal, petitioners filed an ejectment case before the City Court of Cebu, which case was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-17011. On motion of respondents, the City Court dismissed the
case without prejudice in an Order dated August 3, 1974 on the ground that there exists no cause
of action, following the suspension of judicial ejectment by Presidential Decree No. 20. On July
3, 1976, petitioners made again an extrajudicial demand in a letter which required respondents to
vacate the premises within 15 days at the same time threatening them with prosecution under
Presidential Decree No. 772 for the crime of squatting. On August 5, 1976, petitioners filed the
complaint for recovery of possession of the aforesaid five parcels of land alleging that except for
Magin Velez, they have no other lot of their own and are living on other persons premises; that
respondents are not only occupying the premises but also accepting boarders and/or using the
same for commercial purposes and that several demands have been made to give way to the
needs of petitioners and their respective families but respondents maliciously, abusively and
defiantly refused to accede to petitioners lawful demands.
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In their answer, respondents admitted the ownership of the land by petitioners. But in their
special and affirmative defenses, they alleged that they have been occupying portions of the lots
by virtue of oral agreements of lease for an indefinite period, paying monthly rentals for their
respective portions ranging from P4.00 to P12.00; that the present action is barred by res judicata
and or prior judgment and that the present action, if at all there is any cause of action, is
essentially one for unlawful detainer since the last demand to vacate was made less than a year
ago.
Eight of the twenty respondents testified that they are the original occupants of the lots while two
of them, Segundo Macatol and Hilario Gaviola, claimed to have bought their houses from third
persons with the understanding that they should pay rentals to the landowner, Rodrigo Velez.
They also testified that they have been paying rentals for their respective portions ranging from
P4.00 to P12.00. In support of their claim of payment of rentals, at least six of them presented
one or two receipts dated 1973 or earlier (Exhibits 2, 2-A to 2-I) and claimed that other receipts
were lost. But all respondents admitted not having paid rentals since 1973, some reasoning out
that nobody collected and others claiming that Fabiola Velez Garganera, Rodrigo Velez
daughter, refused to accept their rentals. At least one of them, Hilario Gaviola, produced what he
claimed as a building permit but the same turned out to be a mere application.
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After the case was submitted for decision, the trial court ruled:

jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"It appearing that the defendants are lessees of the portions of the land in question wherein their
respective dwelling units are erected, personal use by the plaintiffs and/or then families of the
said land, cannot be a valid ground for judicial ejectment of the former, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 20, issued by the President on March 15, 1977." (sic, should be October 12, 1972).
(Decision of the CFI, p. 5; Rollo, p. 30).
On the ground that respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu acted with grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of his judicial functions by holding that private respondents
are lessees and, therefore, privileged to continue staying on the lots in question pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 20, the plaintiffs below brought this instant petition for certiorari.

Petitioners contend that the preponderance of evidence shows that the occupancy of private
respondents on the lots in question is due to the tolerance of the owners thereof and against the
latters will.
Conceding that respondents are lessees, petitioners claim that Presidential Decree No. 20 does
not mean that (1) they are freed from paying rentals for the lots in question; (2) they can use the
lots for commercial purposes; and (3) they can refuse to adduce evidence specifically
referring to the twelve respondents who did not testify on their behalf.
In answer to the argument of respondents that they are willing to pay rentals if petitioners send
collectors, petitioners cite Article 1256 of the Civil Code where mere willingness to pay is not
payment, thus:
jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause
to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or
sum due."
cral aw virtua1aw library

Petitioners also claim that they had presented evidence that some respondents, particularly
Natividad Bajaras, Maura Belarma and Placida Tejano, are using the premises not only as
residences but also stores while Alding Acedera is using her residence as a boarding house,
thereby removing said respondents from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 20.
Finally, petitioners invoke the equal protection rights guaranteed by the Constitution contending
that respondent Judges undue application of Presidential Decree No. 20 in spite of the
undisputed fact that petitioners have no other lot of their own and are renting other peoples
properties, except Magin Velez (who nevertheless wants to recover his property for the use of
one of his children who is married), constitutes a denial of said constitutional provision.
chanrobl es law library : red

Whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion must be resolved in the
affirmative. It should be recalled that this is a case of accion publiciana, the purpose of which is
being to establish who have a better right to possess. (Bernabe, Et. Al. v. Judge Dayrit, Et Al.,
G.R. No. 58399, Oct. 27, 1983). There is no allegation of forcible entry in the complaint. Neither
is it a case of unlawful detainer because the preponderance of evidence shows that the occupancy
of private respondents on the lot in question is due to the tolerance of the owners thereof and
against the latters will. Private respondents admit that they have no written contract of lease
with the petitioners not with petitioners predecessor in interest. Only Marcial Burgos alleged
that he had an oral agreement with Rodrigo Velez, all others surprisingly failed to testify that
they had such an oral agreement of lease. They likewise admit that their houses were constructed
without building permits. In the true sense of the word, respondents are squatters. As such, their
possession is by tolerance. (Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136). Although respondents had
been paying nominal rentals ranging from P4.00 to P12.00 per month for some time, they did not
thereby acquire the legal status of tenants. Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence
converts it into a lawful act. Illegal constructions constitute public nuisance per se. They pose
problems of health and sanitation. (Cf. City of Manila v. Garcia, Et Al., 19 SCRA 413).

Even if the case were to be decided as an ejectment case, the insistence of respondents that they
are lessees and, therefore, under the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 20 loses ground
when We consider the finding of fact that respondents had not been paying any consideration for
the occupancy of their respective premises. Said Presidential Decree No. 20 suspended ejectment
when the lease is for an indefinite period. It did not suspend ejectment on other grounds like lack
of payment of the rental stipulated.
chanrobl es virtual lawlibrary

The failure of the owners to collect, or their refusal to accept the rentals are not valid defenses.
Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides that "if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by
the consignation of the thing or sum due."
cral aw virtua1aw library

Independently of the foregoing, the petitioners need of the premises for their own use or for the
use of any member of his family as a residential unit entitles them to the possession of the lots in
question. Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which took effect on April 10, 1979, provides as additional
ground for judicial ejectment the need of the owner/lessor to repossess his property for his own
use or for the use of any member of his family as a residential unit, such owner or immediate
member not being the owner of any other available residential unit.
chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Even before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Presidential Decree No. 20 had been held
to be not without exception. In Ongchengco v. City Court of Zamboanga, 95 SCRA 313, this
Court ruled that "extreme necessity for personal use of the property entitles the owner to
exemption from the operation of PD 20 which suspends the provision of Article 1673 of the Civil
Code on judicial ejectment." The case of Betts v. Matias, 97 SCRA 439, reaffirmed that
"Presidential Decree No. 20 does not sanction the deprivation of a lessor of residential property
in extreme need of the leased premises for his own use of his right to terminate the lease and
recover possession of his property." Then, in Sinclair v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 318, this
Court held that "a strict and rigid compliance with Presidential Decree No. 20 is not in order, for
an exemption from its provisions is warranted for humanitarian reasons." Again, in Tan Tok Lee
v. CFI of Kaloocan City, 121 SCRA 438, this Court said that "petitioners reliance on the
provision of Presidential Decree No. 20 is not well taken. It could not have been the intention of
the said decree to deprive the owner of the rightful use of her home, more so, when petitioners
reneged on their promise to look for another house in the mistaken belief that PD 20 gave them a
preferential right over that of the owner. To deny the owner of the use and possession of her
property would be tantamount to depriving her of her constitutional right to abode." In Rantael v.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., 97 SCRA 453, this Court upheld the right of the lessor to judicially
eject the lessee on the ground not only that "expiration of period of written lease contract is
manifestly present" but also because Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which superseded P.D. 20
"buttresses the right of respondent Llave to judicially eject petitioner Rantael from the leased
premises." In Santos v. Court of Appeals and Paraguas, G.R. No. L-45071, May 30, 1983, this
Court held that "the retroactive application of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 to pending ejectment
cases is already a settled matter and may no longer be questioned. (Alejandro Melchor, Jr., etc. v.
Hon. Jose L. Morja, etc., Et Al., G.R. No. L-35256, March 17, 1983; Gutierrez v. Cantada, 90
SCRA 1; Ongchengco v. City Court of Zamboanga, 95 SCRA 313; Betts v. Matias, 97 SCRA
439). It was also held therein that "the right of the private respondents over the property which
they own in order to use the same as their residence, not being owners of any other dwelling

place, may not be denied. Such right is expressly recognized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25.
Elemental sense of justice and fairness dictates that it must be so."
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WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, dismissing the complaint of petitioners, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered in favor of petitioners, ordering respondents
to vacate the premises in question and to remove their respective constructions and/or
improvements therefrom within sixty (60) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
Ono vs. lim
Facts:
1992, Lim filed in RTC Cebu a petition for reconstitution of the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT, alleging that the same OCT was
lost during World War 2 by his mother, Luisa. This land was
located in Balamban, Cebu which was sold to Luisa by spouses Ono.
Although the deed evidencing the sale was lost, the only
legitimate son of Ono had executed a notarized document in favor
of Luisa denominated as confirmation of the sale which was duly
filed in Provincial Assessor's Office of Cebu.
Now, Spouses Ono's successors-in-interest opposed Lim's petition
contending that they had the certificate of title of the land.
Lim then converted the petition into a complaint for quieting of
title, averring that they had been in actual possession of the
property since 1973, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its
fruits and paying taxes corresponding to it.
The other party claimed that the land was never sold to Luisa,
and that the confirmation by the legitimate son was fabricated,
the signature not being authentic.
RTC ruled in favor of Lim. CA affirmed the RTC. The CA ruled that
the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a
direct attack on the title; and that the Lims' undisturbed
possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of
the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on their own title.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally
attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;

Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost

by prescription, laches, or adverse possession;
Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Ono
in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during
World War II;
Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in
favor of Luisa existed; and
Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that
confirmation of sale was genuine.
Held: Petition has no merit.
(1) Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the
title. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set
aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
(2) Prescription was not relevant. Prescription, in general, is a
mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law. However, prescription was not relevant to the
determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not
base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a
certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the
land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners
themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141964

June 30, 2006

SPOUSES EDESITO and CONSORCIA RAGASA, Petitioners,

vs.

SPOUSES GERARDO and RODRIGA ROA and the EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF

QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Edesito and Consorcia Ragasa filed a complaint1 against private respondents Gerardo and
Rodriga Roa and the public respondent ex-officio sheriff of Quezon City founded on the
following allegations:
On May 10, 1989, plaintiffs [petitioners here] entered into a contract with Oakland Development
Resources Corporation for the purchase in installments of a piece of property, with
improvements, located at No. 06, Garnet St., Prater Village II, Diliman, Q.C. covered by TCT
No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and more particularly described in a
photocopy of TCT No. 27946 [];
Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs took possession of the property covered by TCT No. 27946 of
the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and resided thereat together with their relatives who
continued to occupy the same whenever the plaintiffs would leave for Italy where they both
worked. Hence, from May of 1989 up to the present date, plaintiffs were in continuous and
notorious possession of the property covered by TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City to the exclusion of others and in the concept of an owner;
In March of 1992, plaintiffs were able to fully pay for the agreed purchase price of the property
covered by TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and accordingly, a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 12, 1992 was executed by and between Oakland Development
Resources Corporation [] and the original owners copy of TCT No. 27946 of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City accordingly turned over to them;
However, despite the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Oakland Development Resources
Corporation failed to cause the transfer of title to plaintiffs. On the part of plaintiffs, all the while
they thought that the Deed of Absolute Sale and possession of the original of the owners copy of
TCT No. 27946 of Registry of Deeds for Quezon City was more than sufficient to protect their
rights and interests over the property;
Sometime March of 1999, during one of the trips of plaintiff Consorcia Ragasa to the Philippines
from Italy, upon learning that Oakland Development Resources Corporation was no longer
functional as a corporate entity, she decided to cause the transfer of registration of TCT No.
27946 of Registry of Deeds for Quezon City herself since the vendor thereof was apparently in
no position to undertake the same;

She was thus surprised to learn from the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City that on April 14,
1995, the property in question was sold by defendant Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City [a
respondent here] to defendants Sps. Roa [respondents here] as the highest bidder for the price
and consideration of P511,000.00 as shown in the Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale [].
xxx xxx xxx
The levy on attachment and the execution sale undertaken by the Ex-Officio Sheriffs Office of
Quezon City is clearly illegal there being no notice given by said individual to the occupants of
the property in question.
Furthermore, a casual perusal of the Sheriffs Deed of Sale will reveal that the execution price of
P511,000.00 is grossly inadequate to pay for real properties listed therein with fair market values
conservatively estimated at P3,000,000.00
The case was raffled to Branch 2202 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37908.
Instead of filing an answer, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds of prescription and laches. In an order3 dated February 3, 2000, the RTC granted the
motion. Characterizing the suit as an action "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff" which,
according to Article 1146 of the Civil Code,4 must be filed within four years, the RTC held that
petitioners action was barred by prescription for having been filed more than four years after the
registration of the execution sale.
Seeking a reversal of the trial courts order dismissing their complaint, petitioners proceeded
forthwith to this Court with the present petition for review on certiorari5 raising only a pure
question of law.6
We grant the petition.
The trial courts order of dismissal was predicated on the theory that the suit petitioners
commenced was an "action upon an injury to their rights" contemplated in Article 1146 of the
Civil Code. That premise was erroneous. A reading of the allegations in petitioners complaint
reveals that the action was essentially one for quieting of title to real property under Article 476
of the Civil Code which states:
Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
To make out an action to quiet title under the foregoing provision, the initiatory pleading has
only to set forth allegations showing that (1) the plaintiff has "title to real property or any interest
therein"7 and (2) the defendant claims an interest therein adverse to the plaintiffs arising from an
"instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable."8 Thus, the averments in
petitioners complaint that (1) they acquired ownership of a piece of land by tradition or delivery
as a consequence of sale and (2) private respondents subsequently purchased the same piece of
land at an allegedly void execution sale were sufficient to make out an action to quiet title under
Article 476.
This being the case, Article 1146 (which refers to actions "upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff" and "upon a quasi-delict")9 did not apply. Rather, considering petitioners allegation in
their complaint that "from May of 1989 up to the present date, plaintiffs [had been] in continuous
and notorious possession of the propertyto the exclusion of others and in the concept of
owner[s]"10 an assertion private respondents never bothered to dispute our ruling in Sapto
v. Fabiana11 should apply:
[I]t is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art.
480 of the New Civil Code)12 that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff are imprescriptible.
"The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one
who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his
grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for
this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon
the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in
his favor. He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an
action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complain[ant] when he is in
possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of another must, it seems,
invoke his remedy within the statutory period." (citations omitted)13
Accordingly, petitioners action was not subject to prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 3, 2000 order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 220, Quezon City dismissing petitioners complaint is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46345 January 30, 1990
RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAGNO DABON, VICENTA DABON, TERESITA
DABON, EUGENIA DABON, and TOMAS DABON, respondents.
Vicente P. Valera and Pedro Rosito & Jesus F. Balicanta for petitioners.
Victorino U. Montecillo for respondents.

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the order dated October 29, 1976, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 48546 entitled, "Restituto Ceniza, et
al. vs. Magno Dabon, et al.," dismissing the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing
the decision of the trial court in their favor.
On June 14, 1967, the petitioners filed against private respondents, an action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title
to Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C (being portions of Lot No. 627 with an area of approximately 5,306 square meters) situated in Casuntingan,
Mandaue, Cebu (now Mandaue City), which originally formed part of "Hacienda de Mandaue" of the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. The
Property is covered by reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10996 issued on February 8, 1939 (formerly Decree No. 694438
issued on February 27, 1934) in the name of "Vicente Dabon married to Marcela [or Marcelina] Ceniza." (pp. 7 and 19, Record on Appeal).
Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private respondents are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia
Ceniza was childless but she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza, who begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in
turn had a daughter named Marcelina (or Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of this marriage
and they are the great-great-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.
On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons, Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus
Ceniza and a certain Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children and the great-grandchildren of Manuel Ceniza.
The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon,
who were residing in the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to have the land
registered in the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions of the
land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their respective installment payments to the
Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.

After Dabon died in 1954, his seven (7) children, named Magno, Jacinta, Tomas, Flaviana, Soledad, Teresita and Eugenia, succeeded to his
possession of a portion of the land.
On November 4, 1961, a private land surveyor, Espiritu Bunagan, on the request of Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza who jointly defrayed
the cost, divided Lot 627 into three parts, namely:
(1) Lot No. 627-A with 3,538 square meters for Marcela Ceniza;
(2) Lot No. 627-B with 884 square meters for Restituto Ceniza; and
(3) Lot No. 627-C with 834 square meters for Nemesia Ceniza-Albina, who later bequeathed her share to her brother,
Jesus Ceniza. (p. 19, Record on Appeal).
The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They
claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de
San Carlos de Cebu. In their answer to the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967, they alleged that the petitioners' right of
action had already prescribed.
Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
On August 31, 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners. Finding that there existed a co-ownership among the parties, it
ordered the private respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C in favor of the plaintiffs, Restituto and Jesus
Ceniza, respectively (p. 35, Record on Appeal).
On appeal by the defendants (now private respondents) the Court of Appeals on October 29, 1976, reversed that decision of the trial court. It
ruled that the petitioners' right of action had prescribed after the lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of the land on February 8,
1939 in Vicente Dabon's name (p. 32, Rollo).
The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The legal issue presented by the petition is whether the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the co-owner, constituted a
repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
We find merit in the petition for review.
The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between the predecessors- in-interest of both
petitioners and private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the time that they repudiated the coownership and made the repudiation known to the other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza (Cortes vs. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480).
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code providesNo prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs.
Article 1452 of the Civil Code states:
If two or more persons agree to purchase property and common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of
them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and
therefore cannot ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to the ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and

c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.

The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ co-owners have not been ousted from the land. They continue to possess their
respective shares of Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon. Restituto's house stands on his portion of the Land.
Assuming that the private respondents' rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of the land was an act of repudiation of the coownership, prescription had not yet set in when the petitioners instituted the present action for reconveyance. These circumstances were
overlooked by the Court of Appeals.
In Custodio v. Casiano 9 SCRA 841, we ruled that:
Where title to land was issued in the name of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he would act as a trustee of
his sisters, and there is no evidence that this trust relation had ever been repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a
reaction of co-ownership existed between such trustee and his sisters and the right of the successors-in-interest of said
sisters to bring the present action for recovery of their shares therein against the successors-in-interest of said trustee
cannot barred by prescription, despite the, lapse of 25 years from the date of registration of the land in the trustee's
name. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86, we affirmed the duty of the courts to shield fiduciary relations "against every manner of chicanery or
detestable design cloaked by legal technicalities" and to guard against misuse of the Torrens system "to foment betrayal in the performance
of a trust."
In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an action for reconveyance, after the defendants had repudiated the
co-ownership in 1961, had not yet run its course when the petitioners filed said action in 1967, the action was not barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE. the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the decision dated August 31, 1970 of the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. R-10030 is reinstated. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128576. August 13, 2002]
MARIANO A. VELEZ, SR. (deceased), ATTY. PURO M. VELEZ, ATTY. ALEJANDRO M.
VELEZ, ENGR. PLUTARCO M. VELEZ and SARAH VDA. DE VELEZ (for herself and her
children by the late HOMER M. VELEZ, namely PATRICIA, HAYDEE, HOMER, JR., RUBY,
FE VAL and HANAH, all surnamed VELEZ), petitioners, vs. REV. FRANCISCO DEMETRIO
(deceased), CELERINA DEMETRIO FIANZA, TARCILO DEMETRIO, LEVITA
FERNANDEZ DEMETRIO JUAN (for herself and her children), ANGELA, VALDEHUEZA
RADAZA, FELECITO RADAZA and JOSE RADAZA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 1996 in CAG.R. CV No. 30381, reversing and setting aside the decision of the then Court of First instance
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17.

The spouses Felix Radaza and Estefania Abrogar were the owners of a ten-hectare agricultural
land situated in Puntod, Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. Upon their death, ownership of the
land passed by intestate succession to their surviving children namely - Ramona, Severo,
Filomeno and Jacoba, - and grandchildren by their son, Jose, Sr. namely - Vicente, Felicito,
Rosario and Jose, Jr. On March 12, 1938, the land was registered under Original Certificate of
Title No. 7678i[1] in the names of: Severo Radaza, 1/5 share; Filomeno Radaza, 1/5 share; Jacoba
Radaza, 1/5 share; Ramona Radaza, 1/5 share; Vicente Radaza, 1/20 share; Felicito Radaza, 1/20
share; Rosario Radaza, 1/20 share; and Jose Radaza, Jr., 1/20 share.
On April 14, 1975, respondents, the surviving children of Ramona Radaza-Demetrio and Jose
Radaza, Sr., instituted a complaint for Partition of Real Estate with Damages against petitioners,
the heirs of the late Mariano Velez, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 4686 of the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17. They alleged that sometime in 1947, they
discovered that the property had been claimed and fenced in by Mariano Velez, Sr., and that they
were denied entry thereto. Due to financial reasons, it took them several years before instituting
the complaint. In the meantime, they tried earnestly to recover ownership and possession of the
land through extra-legal means.ii[2]
On the other hand, petitioners averred that the property had been partitioned among the heirs of
Felix Radaza and Estefania Abrogar; that Mariano Velez, Sr. purchased the shares of Severo
Radaza and Jacoba Radaza in 1936; that on May 30, 1947, Filomeno sold his share as well as
Ramonas share to Mariano Velez, Sr.; that the share of Jose was likewise sold to Mariano Velez,
Sr. by his wife Ciriaca Bacarro Radaza; and that since his acquisition of the property, Mariano
Velez, Sr., by himself and through his heirs, has been in open, notorious, public and
uninterrupted possession of the same in the concept of owners, and have exercised fully the
attributes of its ownership.iii[3]
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs and the Court hereby:
1.Orders the dismissal of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs;
2.

Declares the defendants as the absolute owners of the property in litigation;

3.
Declares the plaintiffs never again to molest nor disturb the defendants in their lawful,
peaceful and rightful ownership, possession and enjoyment of the property in litigation;
4.
On the counterclaim, orders the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay the defendants the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as attorneys fee; and
5.

Orders the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.iv[4]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the lower courts
decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one entered directing the partition of the property covered by OCT No. 7678 in the portion of 2/5
to the plaintiffs-appellants and 3/5 to the defendants-appellees. Costs against the appellees.v[5]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the appellate court.vi[6]
Hence, the instant petition for review.
The issues raised by petitioners are: whether the shares of Ramona Radaza and Jose Radaza were
sold to Mariano Velez, Sr. and whether respondents are guilty of laches.
As regards the first issue, the findings of facts by the trial court conflict with those of the Court
of Appeals. The trial court was morally convinced that the shares of Ramona Radaza and Jose
Radaza, Sr. were sold to Mariano Velez, Sr. on two different transactions and occasions. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged sale made by Ramona Radaza to Filomeno
of her 1/5 share and the subsequent sale made by Filomeno to Mariano Velez, Sr. of his share and
that of Ramonas and the sale made by Ciriaca Radaza to Mariano Velez of the shares of the heirs
of Jose Radaza, Sr., were of no force and effectvii[7] for there was no evidence presented in
support thereof. The testimonies offered by petitioners to establish the alleged transactions were
pure hearsay.
To prove the alleged sale of Ramonas share to Filomeno, petitioners capitalized on the affidavit
and testimony of Francisco, who stated that in the middle 1930s, Ramona sold her share to his
father, Filomeno, who paid Ramona three cows in consideration thereof; and that since then they
had been in exclusive possession of the said property up to the time the same was sold to
Mariano Velez, Sr. by his father. On the witness stand, Francisco testified that he returned to the
disputed land sometime in 1936 and that his father built a house inside the lot.viii[8] However, the
Court of Appeals ruled that it is improbable that he witnessed or could have had personal
knowledge of the alleged sale because he started residing on the land in question from 1930 up to
1935 and that for three years thereafter, or up to February 28, 1938, he was enlisted in the
Philippine Constabulary at Camp Kethly in Lanao. Such facts do not directly and convincingly
establish the alleged sale of the portion of Ramona Radaza to Filomeno Radaza, hence, the same
cannot be logically inferred.
As regards the shares of Jose Radaza, Sr.s children which were allegedly sold by their mother,
the Court of Appeals found nothing in the record to indicate that Ciriaca was authorized by
Vicente, Felicito, Rosario and Jose, Jr. to make the alleged sale to Mariano Velez, Sr. Petitioners
insist that Ciriaca sold her childrens shares but the pertinent documents were lost during the war.
To prove this alleged sale, petitioners again invoke Francisco Radazas statement that the wife
and heirs of Jose Radaza, Sr. sold their respective shares to the spouses Mariano Velez, Sr. and
Patricia Mercado. However, the Court of Appeals observed that even Felicito, the son of Ciriaca,
had no knowledge of the sale. With more reason, Francisco Radaza, who is a stranger to such
alleged sale, cannot have any basis in making this statement.

Another piece of evidence petitioners offered to prove the alleged sale was the testimony of
Isabelo Tabian, a former tenant of Ciriaca Radaza, who testified that Ciriaca told him, Beloy I am
going to take the land from you because there is difficulty in coming over this place and I am
afraid I might get drown(ed). I might as well sell the land to Etoy (Mariano Velez, Sr.). Tabian
further testified that he delivered the land to Ciriaca. Thereafter, Sario Echem, a tenant of
Mariano Velez, Sr., approached him asking for help in plowing the land which he was formerly
cultivating.ix[9] While the Court of Appeals did not squarely rule on the weight of Tabians
testimony, the same was likewise hearsay and cannot serve as proof of the alleged sale.
Anent the second issue, the principle of laches finds no application in this case.
Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it or declined to assert it.x[10]
Fundamentally, laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.xi[11] Concomitantly, it is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity,
will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to
do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.xii[12]
Petitioners invoke laches against the respondents for their failure to protest their occupation of
the subject land since 1947. They allege that respondents slept on their rights because it took
them twenty eight (28) years before they instituted this case.
The Court of Appeals held that laches could not have set in because the specific act of
repudiation of the co-ownership was made only on March 27, 1974, when petitioners registered
the affidavit of adverse claim executed by Mariano Velez and had the same annotated on
respondents title with respect to the 3/5 portion of the land. It held that only then did the period
of prescription start to run. However, since this case was filed on April 14, 1975 and only for a
3/5 portion thereof, then no prescription can be counted in favor of petitioners for the remaining
2/5.xiii[13]
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
The land involved was registered under the Torrens system in the name of respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest in 1938. The evidence shows that only 3/5 of the land was sold to
Mariano Velez, Sr. and the 2/5 thereof remains in the name of respondents. The land being
undivided, only the rights of the co-owners were transferred, thereby making the buyer another
co-owner of the property. It is noteworthy that petitioners did not transfer the title of the land in
their name. Instead, they merely annotated their claim over the 3/5 portion of the land. This leads
to no other conclusion but a tacit recognition that ownership over the 2/5 share of the land does
not belong to them. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that prescription does not run against
a co-owner so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Moreover, laches may not prevail against specific provision of law, since equity, which has been
defined as justice outside legality is applied in the absence of and not against statutory law or
rules of procedure.xiv[14] Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.xv[15] It is well-settled that prescription and laches can not apply to registered land
covered by the Torrens system.xvi[16] Applying the above principles, respondents being the
registered owner of the land can rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.xvii[17]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 22, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30381 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156402

February 13, 2006

SPS. ALFREDO MENDOZA and ROSARIO F. MENDOZA, Petitioners,

vs.
MARIA CORONEL, represented by JUANITO CORONEL, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On appeal are the Court of Appeals (CAs) May 30, 2002 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157
and November 12, 2002 Resolution,2 reversing the September 17, 2001 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 458-M-2001. The RTC of
Malolos ruled that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hagonoy, Bulacan, before which
respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners, had no jurisdiction to decide the case for
failure of respondent to implead her co-owners of the disputed property, the latter being
indispensable parties to the ejectment suit.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Coronel is one of the co-owners of Lots 3250 and 3251 located at Sagrada
Familia, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioners, spouses Alfredo and Rosario Mendoza, occupied said

lots upon tolerance of respondent and her co-owners without paying any rent. When respondent
demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, the latter refused. Thus, on December 27, 2000,
respondent filed a case before the MTC of Hagonoy, Bulacan for unlawful detainer against
petitioners. The MTC ruled in favor of respondent, ordering petitioners to vacate the disputed
lots. The dispositive portion of its May 29, 2001 Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and
all those claiming rights under them:
(1) to vacate the subject premises (lots 3250 and 3251) and to surrender possession of the
same to plaintiff[;]
(2) to pay plaintiff attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00
and to pay a monthly rental of P500 from receipt of this decision until they shall have
vacated the subject premises; and
(3) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners appealed to the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan which ruled in their favor. It annulled and
set aside the appealed decision for want of jurisdiction of the MTC. It held that the co-owners of
the subject lot should have been impleaded as indispensable parties.
On appeal to the CA, respondent was successful as the appellate court reversed and set aside the
ruling of the RTC and revived the decision of the MTC dated May 29, 2001. Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this appeal.5
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in ruling that a co-owner can bring an action in ejectment without
impleading his co-owners, relying on an "Errata for pages 38-39 of Volume 280 SCRA,"
which appears to alter the original tenor of the ruling in Arcelona vs. CA that co-owners
are indispensable parties.
II. The lower court erred in not taking into account that the complaint was filed by an
attorney-in-fact authorized by only one of the co-owners to file the ejectment suit.

III. The lower court erred in allowing the petition for review despite the fact that the
certification against forum-shopping was executed by an attorney-in-fact, in violation of
the requirement that parties must personally sign the same.
The main issue in the case at bar is whether any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
The CA is correct in overruling the RTC. The latter court held that in Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals,6 we held that a co-owner cannot maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the
other co-owners, the latter being indispensable parties.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA pointed out that the RTC relied on the uncorrected
Arcelona decision. The RTC overlooked the fact that the decision has been corrected by an
"ERRATA for pages 38-39" appearing on the second leaf of volume 280 of the SCRA. Thus, the
CA held:
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in
ejectment without joining all the other co-owners.
The foregoing statement was deleted and replaced with the following:
In the past, a co-owner could not even maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the
other co-owners. . .
While Article 487 of the Civil Code now provides that "any one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment," former Chief Justice Moran also stressed that all of them are necessary and
proper parties . . .
We reiterate the Arcelona ruling that the controlling law is Article 487 of the Civil Code which
categorically states:
Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)
Article 487 is a departure from the rule laid down in the case of Palarca v. Baguisi7 which held
that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. As explained by Tolentino, the
law now allows a co-owner to bring an action for ejectment, which covers all kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
the benefit of all.8

We also reject petitioners second and third assignment of errors. Petitioners claim that Juanito
Coronel, attorney-in-fact of Maria Coronel, one of the co-owners of the lots in dispute is not
authorized to file the ejectment suit. They insist that he should have obtained the authority and
consent of all the co-owners. But since Article 487 of the Civil Code authorizes any one of the
co-owners to bring an action for ejectment and the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all, without the other co-owners actually giving consent to the suit, it follows that an attorneyin-fact of the plaintiff co-owner does not need authority from all the co-owners. He needs
authority only from the co-owner instituting the ejectment suit.
We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorneyin-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign
the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as
the representative of the plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to
the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court9 includes the representative
of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petitioners appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 30, 2002
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 67157 and November 12, 2002 Resolution, reversing the September
17, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 458-M2001 and reviving the May 29, 2001 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Hagonoy, Bulacan
in Civil Case No. 1308, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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