G.R. No.

L-11154

March 21, 1916

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741,
together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the
general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was
entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is
liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision,
even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur;
and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record,
are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff,
riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles
an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance,
upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing
the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right
side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the
southwestern point or from the post place there.

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he
was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the
left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that
the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of
the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his
pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope
that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture
extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as
double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the
most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby
noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and
a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the
functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf,
had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter
weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental
labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical
calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's
mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that
after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as
one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn
even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had
lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he
had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts
of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his
work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with
the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making
mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his
mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction
of the Uy Chaco building."

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during
the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the
plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated
for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital
only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months
was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We,
therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without
any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent
or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the
Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine
Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March
twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible
to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled;
and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.

Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature,
that:
SECTION 1.
E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine
Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account
of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the
Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the
former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in
favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not
previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by
the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully
into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the

Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere
for such authority, if it exists.

gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the

jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the
decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16,
1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:

In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed
by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story,
"does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in
endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive
of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing
U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20
How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred
industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the
industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of
the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system.
In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason
of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers
or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N.
C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St.
Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am.
St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the
state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is
stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely

SECTION 1.
Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town
of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts
and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling
and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of
Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill
property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of
Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the
lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said
Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now
stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how
the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity
from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of
settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a
whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit
shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of
damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the
court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the
suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If
the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so
long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so
important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in express
terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854;
8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied
upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for
negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners, are
hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring
suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent

jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice
in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising
under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not create
any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before,
but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal.,
690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)

A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court

"jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in
equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing
this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass.,
28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the
state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an
intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities
can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had,
by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for
injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be
made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants,
only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now
examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law
3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must
presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each
branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a
case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur.
Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations
which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof.
No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who
by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence,
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or
omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the
following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation
upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the
authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of
such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to
them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held
in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among
these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary
manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case,
guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the
state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special
agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence,
which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie
with the state.

That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle
set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to
private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made
by branches of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its
sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not
applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in
proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the
owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act
as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does
not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a
damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose
which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner
laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not
so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous
interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article

1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital
was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself
legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff
has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by
legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are
not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature
and not with the courts.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-55963

December 1, 1989

SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,

vs. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61045

and

NATIONAL

December 1, 1989

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant, vs. SPOUSES

JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
PARAS, J.:

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance
of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its modification with respect
to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the
reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of
this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the

resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in
the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.

G.R. No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its
position.

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government
agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an
employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by
Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the
impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to
the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later
transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.

Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case,
petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation

Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent
after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and
maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration
authorities.
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56)
instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA
before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San
Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting
from the aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which
directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death
benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads thus:
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation
Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death
of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of the deceased had
spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla;
and to pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo,
p. 132)
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial
court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation
Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-

The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the
award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally
proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in
the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Petitioners allege:

1.
The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under
paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which provides that the
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the award should
be made to each of petitioners-spouses individually and in varying amounts
depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of the same, which
should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.
2.
The decision of the trial court had made an impression that
respondent National Irrigation Administration acted with gross negligence
because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the National Irrigation
Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to give
assistance to the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of
respondent, petitioners become entitled to exemplary damages under Arts.
2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.

3.
Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of
which (20%) had been sufficiently established in the hearing of May 23,
1979.
4.
This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the
findings of the lower court upon which the disallowance of moral damages,

exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and not for the purpose
of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National
Irrigation Administration, contends thus:
1.
The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal
taken by respondent National Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals
against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The focal issue raised in
respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the question as to
whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was
negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes necessary that
before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could be
resolved, there should first be a finding of negligence on the part of
respondent's employee-driver. In this regard, the Solicitor General alleges
that the trial court decision does not categorically contain such finding.
2.
The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the
appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045) of the respondent
National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit
admission of said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper.
Inconsistent procedures are manifest because while petitioners question the
findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions of law
before this Court which posture confirms their admission of the facts.

3.
The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence
caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact which petitioners
should have brought to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period.
Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final as to the petitioners
and for this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
4.
Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and
in conformity with the law.
5.
Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary
damages by reason of the shock and subsequent illness they suffered
because of the death of their son. Respondent National Irrigation

Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages
because it is an agency of the State performing governmental functions and
driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent
who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the
liability for the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government
agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his
act.
6.
Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent
National Irrigation Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence is not an issue in
this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver of
the vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be
answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 2180 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1.
Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious
acts of special agents only.

Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions.
Thus-

2.
Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil
Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).

Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and
objectives:

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage
caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily
assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a
public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular
task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental
functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an
ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where
the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental
task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.
(Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the
government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a
service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and
particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
"proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents
within the scope of their employment.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government

exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.
Section 1 of said Act provides:
Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which
shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the
NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this
Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.

(a)

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(b)

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(c)
To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it
such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the
system and reimburse within a certain period not less than twenty-five years
cost of construction thereof; and
(d)
To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of
the above objectives.

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and

not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body
performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the
damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driveremployee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an
ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of

negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is
the negligence of supervision.
At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA
becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been
established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary
functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which,
under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its
employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the driver.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of
the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away
from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further
away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of
the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact
with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the
vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as
shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by
the investigation report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika
National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area.
Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the
point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a
high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial
and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was
then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by
their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their
normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason
that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the
supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver
observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the
situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their
destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the
diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been
established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or
take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable.
(Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810,
August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be
especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway,

and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to
be traversed constitutes negligence.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein

petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco
Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-1120

INOCENCIO
respondent.

August 31, 1948

ROSETE,

petitioner,

vs.THE

AUDITOR

GENERAL,

FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor denying the claim of
Inocencio Rosete and others against the Government in the amount of
P35,376, for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimant, which
according to the appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that came from the
contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration, ECA,
located at No. 2262 Azcarraga, due to the negligence of a certain Jose
Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon
drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said
ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in
said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of
Manila.
It is not necessary for us to pass upon the facts alleged by the appellant, but
only on the question whether, assuming them to be true, the Insular Auditor
erred in denying or dismissing the appellant's claim.
The claimant contends that the Auditor General erred in not finding that the
government agency or instrumentality known as the Emergency Control
Administration of the officers thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a

highly combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega

in Manila in violation of City Ordinances, and therefore the government is
liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, which in its pertinent part reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable
not only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for whom
another is responsible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it
properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable.
In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil., 311),
this Court held the following:
. . . Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly
it pertained to do the act performed, in which cast the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable."
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law
3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
the public service and the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we
must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each
branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a

case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and
contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur.
Civ., 24.).
xxx

xxx

xxx

"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act
as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does
not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.).
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a
damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose
which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility. Consequently,
the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the
payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to,
has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of article 1902 and
1903 of the Civil Code.' (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur.
Civ., 146.)"
There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the
Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by an special
agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control Administration did not
act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of
that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in warehouse of
the ECA, the government is not responsible for the damages caused through
such negligence.
The case of Marine Trading vs. Government, 39 Phil., 29, cited by the
appellant, is inapplicable, because the plaintiff in that case recovered under

the special provisions of articles 862, 827, 828 and 830 of the Code of
Commerce and the Philippine Marine Regulations of the Collector of
Customs, regarding collision of vessels, and not on the ground of tort in
general provided for in article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with
the Insular Auditor, and appeal by the private persons or entities from the
latter's decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any and all claims
against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims
which may be filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
On November 2, 1945, there was a fire at the ECA motor pool, 22 Azcarraga,
Manila, reducing to ashes professional and cultural books, jewelries, clothing,
furniture, silverwares, and other household equipment of Inocencio Rosete
and his family, the total value of the losses amounting to P35,376.
The building which was burned was used by the ECA (Emergency Control
Administration) as a bodega in which oil and gasoline, among others, have
been stored.

Jose Fraino was the one who started the fire by igniting his cigarette-lighter,
which he had just filled with gasoline, near a 5-gallon drum into which
gasoline was then being drained. The spark produced by the lighter set fire
on the gasoline, burning the bodega as well as the surrounding inhabited
houses, together with their contents, among which, being the properties of
claimant and his family. Jose Fraino has been prosecuted by the City Fiscal.

650, and 651 of the revised ordinances of Manila and Ordinance No. 1985.
On November 10, 1945, the Mayor of Manila certified that the ECA was not
granted any permit to store gasoline in its motor pool at Azcarraga where the
fire took place. The certification is corroborated by the Acting Assistant
Treasurer and of the Acting Chief of the Fire Department of Manila.
The ECA has been organized by the government for the same substantial
purposes for which the Philippine Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(PRRA) has been created by Commonwealth Act No. 716, where its
purposes are specifically stated.
Commonwealth Act No. 327 gives aggrieved parties the right to submit their
claims to the Auditor General for settlement and if dissatisfied with the latter's
decision they may appeal to the Supreme Court.
Inocencio Rosete filed his claim with the Auditor General, who on October 3,
1946, denied the claim upon the theory that, "for even granting that the
officials and employees of the former Emergency Control Administration
(ECA) were negligent, the government cannot be prejudiced by the illegal or
tortious acts of its servants".
The Auditor General failed to examine the merits of the claim in so far as the
amount thereof is concerned.
Claimant appealed to the Supreme Court against the adverse decision of the
Auditor General.
The case has been submitted for our decision since January, 1947, and
since September, 1947, claimant has filed with us from time to time urgent
motions to expedite the decision of the case.

There seems to be no dispute that the question whether the government or

the states is answerable for the damages suffered by claimant must be
decided by applying the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil
Code.
Article 1903 provides:

The storage of gasoline and other combustible and inflammable substances

requires the securing of license and permit under the provisions of Acts 649,

The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent,
but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom
properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
The provisions of the next preceding article above mentioned is as follows:
Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault
or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
The foregoing provisions present two situations:
1. When the state "acts through a special agent".
2. When an act is performed by an official "upon whom previously devolved
the duty of doing the act performed"
In the first case, the State is subject to liability for damages caused by the
special agent.
In the second case, it is the official, not the State, who is liable for damages
caused by the act he performed.
The controversy in this case is narrowed down to the question of whether or
not the ECA is the special agent mentioned in article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that it is.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code distinguishes the special agent
from the official with specific duty or duties to perform. Under the meaning of
the paragraph, the word official comprises all officials and employees of the
government who exercise duties of their respective public offices. All others
who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of
special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies.
The ECA was not a branch or office of the government, such as the
legislative bodies, the executive offices, or the tribunals. It was an agency set
up for specific purposes which were not attainable through the official
functions entrusted by law to the government or its branches.
The ECA was one of the groups of special agents created by the government
for activities ordinarily ungovernmental in character, such as the Philippine

National Bank, the National Development Company, the National Coconut

Corporation, the National Tobacco Corporation, and many other government
enterprises.
In qualifying the special agent with the adjective "special", the Civil Code
aimed at distinguishing it from the regular or ordinary agent of government,
which refers to all officers and employees in the public service. There cannot
be any dispute that all persons in the active service of the government,
regardless of department or branch, are agents of the State or of the people.
All of them are properly designated as servants of the people. Servants are
agents.
The Civil Code uses the adjective "special", because its authors could not
miss the fact that the official, mentioned in paragraph 5 of article 1903, is
also an agent.
For all the foregoing, the decision of the Auditor General, dated Oct. 3, 1946,
denying petitioner's claim should be set aside, not only because it is
supported by law, but because it is premised on the totalitarian philosophy of
the State's immunity for whatever wrong it may perpetrate.
The Auditor General should be ordered to grant appellant's claim in the
amount that may be supported by evidence, to present which, the Auditor
General shall first give opportunity to claimant.
We dissent from the majority decision, which appears to be based on a
gratuitous assumption, unsupported by fact and by law.

G.R. No. L-20322

May 29, 1968

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO R.

PALACIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
MACARIO M. OFILADA, as ex-officio Sheriff of Manila, and ILDEFONSO
ORTIZ, respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CAG.R. No. 30915), dismissing the original action for certiorari and prohibition
filed with said Court by herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, to
restrain the enforcement of a writ of execution (issued by the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 4886) on the trust fund in the
account of the Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank.

There is no controversy as to the following facts:

On April 2, 1960, Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur Civil Case No. 4886, against the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc., a corporation with principal place of business in Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or agency under the
Department of Public Works and Communications, to recover possession,
with damages, of a 958 square meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered
and occupied, at the instance of its co-defendant. For failure to appear and
answer the complaint, therein defendant Irrigation Service Unit was declared
in default.
On June 3, 1960, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that defendant
Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. By
order of June 11, 1960, this motion was denied, on the ground that the said
defendant although a mere agency of the Republic of the Philippines, is
engaged in the private business of selling irrigation pumps and construction
materials on installment plan. The Solicitor General's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on July 19, 1960. No
appeal appears to have been taken.
On January 29, 1962, the Solicitor General was served with copy of the writ
of execution issued by the court against the defendants in the abovementioned civil case; and, on February 16, 1962, an order of garnishment
was served by the Sheriff of Manila against the deposits and/or pump
irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit at the
Philippine National Bank, Manila, to cover the sum of P14,874.40.1
On March 8, 1962, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, filed with the lower court an urgent motion to lift the order of
garnishment, for the reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public

funds and exempt from attachment or execution. Upon denial of this motion,
as well as of the motion for reconsideration of said denial, the Solicitor
General commenced the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the
Court of Appeals.1vvphi1.nt
In its decision of August 21, 1962, the appellate court sustained the propriety
of the disputed garnishment-order, and dismissed the Government's petition,
on the basis of the finding by the trial court that the Irrigation Service Unit,
"formerly an office under the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources created by virtue of a 'Memorandum of Agreement on the
Irrigation Pump Program of the Philippines', signed by the Chairman of the
PHILCUSA (now NEC), Chief of the MSA Mission (now AID) and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and presently under the
Department of Public Works and Communications to which it was
transferred", is engaged in a private business of purchase and sale of
irrigation pumps and systems. Consequently, according to the Court of
Appeals, and following the ruling in the case of National Airports Corporation
vs. Teodoro, et al., L-5122, April 30, 1952 (91 Phil. 203), by thus engaging in
private business, the Government, through the Irrigation Service Unit, had
actually consented to the suit. Hence, the present petition for review filed by
the Republic of the Philippines.

The issue presented by this case is whether or not the pump irrigation
trust fund, deposited with the Philippine National Bank in the account
of the Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished to satisfy a moneyjudgment against the latter. This issue in turn calls for a determination of
the nature of said trust fund, i.e., whether it is a fund belonging to the
National Government (which was not a party to Civil Case No. 4886), as
maintained by herein petitioner, or purely the proceeds of a private venture
by the government, as claimed by the respondents.
For a better understanding of the nature, function and operation of the
Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which is necessary for the proper resolution of
the issue herein involved, it is worthwhile to recall that this office was
originally created under the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
by virtue of a Memorandum Agreement between the governments of the
Philippines and the United States, dated August 13, 1952. It was later
transferred to the Department of Public Works and Communications as an
office directly under the Office of the Secretary, "to prosecute to completion
the rehabilitation of pump systems transferred from the former Irrigation

Pump Administration of the Department of Agriculture and Natural

Resources,2 including the settlement of the obligations of said
administration." The budgetary requirements to carry out the objectives of the
project were to be financed by withdrawals from the Counterpart FundSpecial Account. (Memorandum Agreement of June, 1954.)

a and b to cover the cost of administration, technical assistance furnished by

the ISU, inspection and collection, and (e) the compensating use tax to the
Philippine Government. Interest is also payable under each contract at the
rate of six percent per annum on any unpaid balance of the total amount of
the contract.

This Counterpart Fund-Special Account referred to above was established in

the Central Bank by the Government of the Philippines and made up of
deposits in pesos commensurate with the indicated dollar cost to the
Government of the United States of economic and technical assistance made
available to the Philippines, pursuant to the Bilateral Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of April 27, 1951; of deposits accruing to it
(Philippine government) from the sale of commodities or services supplied
under the Agreement or otherwise accruing to it as a result of the import of
such commodities or service; and of any advance deposits which the
Philippine government may make in the Special Account (Sec. 1, paragraphs
2[a], [b] and [c], Annex to Memo. Agreement of April 27, 1951). Later, on the
basis of a supplemental agreement (No. 2, Counterpart Project No. 409
Pump Irrigation), the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund was established in the
Philippine National Bank, to which all authorized releases to the ISU3 from
the Counterpart Fund Special Account, to finance the peso-cost of the
Irrigation Pump Project, were transferred. This is the fund on which the
disputed writ of execution for money judgment rendered against the ISU, is
being enforced.

2. All principal and interest payments received by the ISU from farmers'
associations shall be deposited immediately in the Trust Fund. The separate
account established by the project agreement for Counterpart Project 409,
entitled "Irrigation Pump Sales Proceeds Account" is hereby abolished and
any deposits therein will be immediately transferred to the Trust Fund.

A reading of the records and documents submitted to the Court of Appeals

will readily show that the sales of irrigation pumps to farmers by ISU are
governed by the terms of the Supplemental Agreement No. 2 to Counterpart
Project No. 409 (signed by representatives of the Philippine and U. S.
governments) hereunder copied in full:
C. Disposition of Proceeds from Payments under Contracts of Sale
1. Under the Guiding Principles of the Irrigation Pump Project, pumps are
sold to farmers' associations under conditional sales contracts. Periodic
payments to ISU by each association are required. The total payment
required under the contract is stated in the contract and is equal to the sum
of (a) the landed cost of equipment at the installation site, (b) the cost of
installation and construction including survey and design, (c) the cost of fuel
and oil financed for the first crop season, if any, (d) ten per cent of the total of

3. Whenever the total value of all deposits made to the Trust Fund from
contract principal and interest payments exceeds the value of total releases
made to the Trust Fund from the Counterpart Fund-Special Account, these
excess deposits shall be transferred from the Trust Fund to the Counter
Fund-Special Account. Such transfers shall be considered as "proceeds of
sale" and "advance deposits" as provided in Annex Section 1, (b) and (c) of
the Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America.
It was also provided therein that the payments by the farmers' associations
on conditional sales agreements specified in paragraph C-2, above, will be
considered in the preparation, and shall form part, of the ISU annual budget,
which will finance the costs of supply and equipment purchases, the
installation and construction of pump units, and the operating expenses of
ISU for which appropriated funds are not available. (Para. B-1).

It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, created to promote a specific
economic policy of said government, but also that its activity (of selling
irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not intended to earn profit
or financial gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being
collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not
convert this economic project of the government into a corporate activity. As
previously pointed out, the installment payments and interests receivable
from the farmers are to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in
furtherance of the operation of the project.

Although evidently acknowledging the nature of the Pump Irrigation Trust

Fund as a public fund, the Court of Appeals nevertheless sustained the
garnishment order, on the ground that the ISU, by engaging in the private
business of purchasing and selling irrigation pumps on installment basis, has
waived its governmental immunity and, by implication, consented to the suit.
It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the
erroneous assumption that because the State has waived its immunity, its
property and funds become liable to seizure under the legal process. This
emphatically is not the law (Merritt vs. Insular Government, 34 Phil. 311).
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power
of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the
state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for
itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution can not issue on a
judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state
property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the
satisfaction thereof. (49 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, pp. 312-320.)
Judgments against a state, in cases where it has consented to be sued,
generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in the
absence of express provision; otherwise they can not be enforced by
processes of law; and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment in
such manner as it sees fit. (59 C.J. sec. 501, p. 331; 81 C.J.S., sec. 232, p.
1343.)
It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under execution of the ISU
funds would amount to diverting them from the purpose originally
contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Bilateral Agreement, and would amount to a
disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law.
A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring
the fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it
had induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and occupy
the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from tort
and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction,
embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is
liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to
carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties
(Merritt vs. Insular Government, supra; Rosete vs. Auditor General, 81 Phil.

453). There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was
authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed
and set aside, and the order of garnishment issued by the Sheriff of Manila
on the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Irrigation Service
Unit, with the Philippine National Bank, is hereby declared null and void. The
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1
A previous order of garnishment served on the Philippine National
Bank, Naga branch, was returned unsatisfied, the trust fund in the account of
defendant having been transferred to the Philippine National Bank, Manila
office.
2
The primary purpose of this (irrigation pump) project is to extend
irrigation facilities through the installation of irrigation pumps to provide water
to communities of small farmers whose fields depend solely upon the natural
rainfall for water supply during the rainy season of the year and are left
uncultivated during the dry season. (Memo. Agreement of October 7, 1953.)
3

Irrigation Service Unit.

G.R. No. L-52179

April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs. HON.

JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO
BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO BANIA, ORJA
BANIA, AND LYDIA R. BANIA, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of
the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N.

Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of
La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case
No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et
al." dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23,
1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979
and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages
consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees
and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation
existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in
his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents Juana
Rimando-Bania, Laureano Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Montano
Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia R. Bania are heirs of the deceased
Laureano Bania Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the
aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the
Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose
Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to
the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr.
died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered
varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for
damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was
docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union,
Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a
Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner.

Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided

over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No.
107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private
respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular
employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of
cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and
the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the
proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following
questioned orders, to wit:
(1)
Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against
Bernardo Balagot.
(2)
Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing on
the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction;
(3)
Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the
grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial;
(4)
Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and
Bislig for having been filed out of time;

(5)
Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976;
(6)
Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for
decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective
memoranda despite the court's direction; and
(7)
Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross
examination.

On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion is hereunder quoted as follows:

power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)

IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered

for the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana
Rimando-Bania, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania Jr., Sor Marietta
Bania, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia B.
Bania the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the
lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Bania Sr., P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants.

The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and
failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and

Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without
prejudice to another motion which was then pending. However, respondent
judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of
time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979
providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the
matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a
higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders
and in rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal
of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the
petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the
good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
(Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that petitioner has
not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent

In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until
trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the
exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of nonsuability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10,
1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its
regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article
XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without
its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued
except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express
or implied consent.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The

standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving
liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be
passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict,
as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see
United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182
SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts,
thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when
the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies
of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore
should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their
charter provided that they can sue and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law
and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove,
if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States of America vs. Guinto,
supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on
whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs.
Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the
liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to
third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by
the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are
twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while
in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public
service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In
the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or
corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such
functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid,
pp. 605-606.)

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable

because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to
show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p.
44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that
"he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for
the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that
"the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at

the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge
of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and
deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay
monetary compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's
dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to
grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it
ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of
any liability in favor of private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Under the financing procedure of the CMP, an application of an association

for a loan is coursed through duly accredited originators, such as the
National Housing Authority (NHA), and Non-Government Organizations
(NGOs).[2]

EN BANC [G.R. No. 126557. March 6, 2001]

On August 20, 1988, the NHMFC Board issued Resolution No. 419, Series of
1988, approved the CMP.[3]

RAMON ALBERT, petitioner, vs. CELSO D. GANGAN, in his capacity as

Chairman, Commission on Audit, ROGELIO ESPIRITU, in his capacity
as Commissioner, Commission on Audit, SOFRONIO URSAL, in his
capacity as Commissioner, Commission on Audit, EMMA M. ESPINA, in
her capacity as Director, Commission on Audit, and LAKAMBINI
RAZON, in her capacity as Then Resident Auditor for National Home
Mortgage Finance Corp., respondents.

On December 19, 1988, Carlos P. Doble, then Vice President of HIGC,

issued an appraisal policy for the CMP which was concurred in by the HIGC
President, Federico Gonzales, herein petitioner, NHMFC OIC/EVP, and
HUDC Teodoro Katigbak.[4] On the same date, Doble likewise issued to
HIGC Technical Service Department personnel the Appraisal Policy for the
CMP.[5]

BUENA, J.:

On April 12, 1989, the NHMFC board issued Resolution No. 546, Series of
1989, approving the amended/expanded guidelines for CMP.[6]

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify Commission on Audit (COA)

Decision No. 2700 dated February 19, 1993, finding petitioner, then
President of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC),
liable for the amount of P36,796,711.55 covering the payment of the loan
proceeds for the lot acquired by the Alyansang Maka-Maralitang Asosasyon
at Kapatirang Organisasyon (AMAKO) which was disallowed in audit.

The facts are undisputed:

The Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council (HUDCC)
together with the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), NHMFC,
and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) formed an inter-agency
committee to conceptualize and prepare the guidelines and procedures for
the Community Mortgage Program (CMP),[1] a sub-program of the Unified
Home Lending Program (UHLP). The CMP is an innovative scheme in
mortgage financing where an undivided tract of land may be acquired by
several beneficiaries through the concept of community ownership. It was
adopted to assist residents of blighted or depressed areas to initially own the
lots they occupy, and, eventually, to build a decent house thereon to the
extent of their affordability within the concept of low-cost-home financing and
after due compensation to the landowner. The beneficiaries of the financing
shall then form or establish an association, or cooperative, duly registered
with appropriate governmental agencies and accredited with the PCUP.

On April 4,1989, the Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation

Inc., (Foundation) applied for accreditation with the NHMFC as originator of
land and housing project through a Purchase Commitment Line. The
application consists of sixteen (16) project sites situated in different parts of
the country. Among these is the AMAKO Project which was submitted for
accreditation to the NHMFC by Nelson Concepcion, President of the
Foundation. The AMAKO project refers to seventy-three (73) hectares of land
located at Sta. Catalina, Angeles City, which was offered by Severino H.
Gonzales, Jr. Construction, Co, Inc. (SHGCCI), through its shareholder,
Engineer Ceres Pajaron, to the members of AMAKO. Mr. Concepcion who
was also the concurrent head of the PCUPs Housing and Settlement
Division, delivered on September 7, 1989, to the CMP Unit then under
Mortgage Takeout Department (MROD)-HMFC the project documents of
AMAKO for pre-evaluation which were returned to the Foundation on
September 22, 1989 by the CMP unit.
On October 4, 1989, Mr. Concepcion submitted an application for Purchase
Commitment Line in the amount of P36,794,250.00, specifically for the
AMAKO project together with an Information Sheet of the Foundation, the
AMAKO project profile, and the Department of Agrarian Reform certification
dated December 4, 1988. On the same day, Mr. Generozo Cruz, Foundation
Vice President and PCUP Director, redelivered the documents to the CMP
unit to discuss the Foundations proposal on the AMAKO project.

On October 5, 1989, the Officer-in-charge of the Credit and Collection Group,

NHMFC, recommended to petitioner the grant of an additional line in favor of
Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation, Inc., in the total amount
of P36,8000,000.00[7] approved by the NHMFC Credit Committee on
October 13, 1989 subject, however, to the approval of the NHMFC Board.
On December 14, 1989, the NHMFC, upon the recommendation of the CMP
Task Force, together with the Certification of Mortgage Examinations,[8]
issued a Letter of Guaranty in favor of SHGCCI.[9] Thereafter, the
disbursement voucher (No. 89F2-5732) was prepared by the CMP Task
Force in favor of SHGCCI.[10] Mr. Rogelio Olaguer, head of the CMP Task
Force, likewise inspected the project site and assured petitioner that the
project is above board and in accordance with the NHMFC-CMP guidelines.
With this assurance, petitioner approved the payment to the SHGCCI. Thus,
on January 4, 1990, the amount of P36,796,711.55 under Philippine National
Bank Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 362994, was released to
Engineer Severino A. Gonzales, Jr. of the SHGCCI.[11]
Sometime in June 1990, petitioner instructed the Community Mortgage
Management Office (CMMO) to conduct a routine inspection of the AMAKO
Project. Upon verification, it was discovered that the AMAKO project was
three (3) months in arrears in their amortization. As a consequence,
petitioner, sometime in July 1990, tasked the Committee on Evaluation of
Originating Institutions to investigate the originators with respect to their
compliance with corporate circulars, other rules and regulations issued by
NHMFC regarding its lending programs. One of the originators investigated
was the Foundation which was instrumental in the granting of the loan to the
AMAKO Project.[12]
On September 3, 1990, the COA Resident Auditor of NHMFC disallowed the
loan granted to the AMAKO Project for the following reasons: (a) nonsubmission of documentary requirements/non-complying or defective
documents as required under NHMFC Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and
(b) irregular/excessive expenditures per COA Circular No. 85-55A dated
September 8, 1985. The Auditor determined the following officers of NHMFC,
as personally liable, viz.: petitioner as President; Fermin T. Arzaga, OIC,
Finance, Corpan & Computer Services Group; Roger Olaguer, Head, CMP
Task Force; Vivien Noble, Deputy Head, CMP Task Force; Ernesto Salvador,
Executive Asst. CMP Task Force; Cynthia O. Alas, Div. Chief II, Budget and
Irma Fuentes, COD, CMMO.[13]

On September 18, 1990, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a lettercomplaint against his subordinate employees who appeared to be
responsible for the fraud with respect to the AMAKO loan transaction.[14]
However, said complaint was withdrawn by petitioners successor, Acting
President Florentino Mauricio, and re-filed with the Civil Service Commission
on August 5, 1991. Petitioner also filed a civil case for sum of money,
annulment, damages and attorneys fees with preliminary attachment, against
SHGCCI, AMAKO, Sapang Palay & Development Foundation, Inc., and other
persons responsible for the misrepresentation, tortious and fraudulent acts in
connection with the loan granted to AMAKO project.[15] The complaint was
subsequently amended to include Rogelio Olaguer, Ernesto S. Salvador and
Vivien Noble, who are employees of NHMFC, and Eugenio M. Cunanan, Jr.
of HIGC.[16]
On October 19, 1990, petitioner requested for the lifting of the disallowance
on the loan grant to AMAKO[17] which was denied on October 25, 1990.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration which was elevated to the COA
Corporate Audit Office pursuant to Section 65 of PD 1445.[18]
On February 19, 1993, the COA rendered Decision No. 2700, finding
petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount representing the
payment of the loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. COA disallowed the plan
payment because it found the payment irregular and an excessive
expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to Section 103 of
P.D. 1445.[19]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision was
denied on August 29, 1996 per COA Decision No. 96-484,[20] excerpts of
which reads:
xxxxxxxxx

In a motion for reconsideration dated April 6, 1993, Mr. Albert, thru Counsel,
contended that he (Mr. Albert) cannot and should not be held personally
liable for the amount of the loan as he acted only in the performance of his
official duties and that there was no clear showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence on his part.
This Commission finds the explanation or justification devoid of merit. It is
significant to note that Mr. Albert himself was the final approving authority of

the transaction in question and that the officers/employees who processed

the same were directly under his supervision. The CMP Task Force created
in his very own office provides a situation where he could have conclusively
determined the validity of a transaction involving such large amount as
P36,796,711.55.

On October 21, 1999, the Board of Directors of the NHMFC approved the
sale[22] in favor of VIVE per its Resolution No. 2998 Series of 1999.[23] The
sale was confirmed on November 18, 1999.[24]

Likewise, this Commission cannot with expediency exculpate Mr. Albert from
liability by accepting his claim of good faith and exercise of due diligence,
otherwise this principle would be rendered worthless. Good faith and
exercise of due diligence are disputable presumptions, and these
presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts constituting an
offense, as where there exists the fact that loss of government funds resulted
from official action. Besides, Section 3 (9) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law)
declares to be unlawful the act of entering, in behalf of the Government, into
contract or transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not
necessarily mean that he is the party ultimately liable in case of disallowance
of expenses for questionable transactions of his agency. Petitioner, as head
of the agency, cannot be held personally liable for the disallowance simply
because he was the final approving authority of the transaction in question
and that the officers/employees who processed the same were directly under
his supervision.[25] Though not impossible, it would be improbable for him to
check all the details and conduct physical inspection and verification of the
application of AMAKO considering the voluminous paperwork attendant to his
office. He has to rely mainly on the certifications, recommendations and
memoranda of his subordinates in approving the loan. The processing,
review and evaluation of the loan application passed through the responsible
and authorized officers of the CMP Task Force. As admitted by the Director of
the Corporate Audit Office, Emma M. Espina, the officers of the CMP Task
Force erred in discharging these assigned duties.[26] Moreover, the high
appraisal of the subject property cannot be attributed to herein petitioner
because the valuation of the said property is undertaken by the HIGC,[27] an
entity separate and distinct from the NHMFC and over which petitioner
exercises no control or supervision.

Aggrieved, petitioner now comes to this Court contending that he cannot be

held personally liable for the amount of P36,796,11.55 representing the loan
proceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COA decisions do not have
any findings that he has knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent
transaction. He claims that there is no clear showing that he acted in bad
faith, with malice, or gross negligence when he approved the loan
transaction. The approval of the loan was based on the certification of the
duly authorized officers of the Community Mortgage Program Task Force.
While the petition is pending , NHMFC filed a petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against AMAKO which was represented
by its president, Mr. Mario J. Mamawan, before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City docketed as FC Case No. 98-10.
On March 31, 1998, the property was sold at public auction with NHMFC as
the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was subsequently issued in favor of
NHMFC.[21]
The AMAKO property was then published and offered for sale three times in
April 1999, and once in May 1999, but with no bidder. The property was then
offered under the negotiated sale of rights over foreclosed property offer of
which was published in June 1999.
In response to the published offer, VIVE EAGLE LAND, INC. (VIVE) offered
to purchase the property for P40,000,000.00.

We find the petition meritorious.

We have consistently held that every person who signs or initials documents
in the course of transit through standard operating procedures does not
automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage
where he had no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his
active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive
evidence. The fact that such officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going
the rounds does not necessarily follow that the said person becomes part of
a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each
supposed conspirator must be established.[28] Thus, in Pareo vs.
Sandiganbayan[29] we held that:
It is rather apparent that under the Sandiganbayans decision, a department
secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, department
head or chief of office would be equally culpable of every crime arising from
transactions or held guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a
long line of officials or employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures

to a transaction. We cannot allow this because guilt must be premised on a

more knowing personal and deliberate participation of each individual who is
charged with others as part of a conspiracy. There must be more convincing
proof which in this case is wanting. (Underscoring Supplied)
The rationale behind this ruling is best enunciated in the early case of Arias
vs. Sandiganbayan[30] where we emphatically ruled:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too
common problems- dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple
assignments or positions, or plain incompetence- is suddenly swept into a
conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every
single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception and investigate
the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his
signature as the final approving authority.
xxxxxxxxx
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records,
inspected documents, received procedures and questioned persons. It is
doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these
things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking
for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains
important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant
about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at
the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement vouchers accuracy,
propriety and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should
examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda,
vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval
appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
(Underscoring Supplied)
Additionally, the assailed decision failed to mention petitioners direct
participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely held that petitioner be

immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance, for the
simple reason that, as the approving officer, any transaction presented to him
for approval is subject to his discretion. His reliance on the supposed review
and evaluation done by his subordinates is also discretionary on his part. The
COA concluded that whatever misrepresentation and/or abuse in the
performance of their duties made by the subordinates make petitioner, as
head of the agency, also liable, considering that these people acted on his
behalf and with his approval.[31] Such reasoning is non-sequitur.
Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,[32] which was the basis of
petitioners liability for the disallowance, expressly provides:
Sec. 103 General liability for unauthorized expenditures. expenditures of
government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be
directly responsible therefor. (Underscoring Ours)
Under the said provision, an official or employee shall be personally liable for
unauthorized expenditures if the following requisites are present, to wit: (a)
there must be an expenditure of government funds or use of government
property; (b) the expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and (c) the
official is found directly responsible therefor.
There is no evidence on record to show that petitioner had knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by some employees of the NHMFC. In fact,
petitioner immediately filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against the
subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud. He
also directed the filing of a civil case against the originator and other persons
responsible for misrepresentation. All these acts are indicative that he had no
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by certain officials or
employees of his agency. No less than Lakambini Q. Razon, State Auditor IV
of the Commission on Audit, in her letter dated January 8, 1991 to the
Director of the Corporate Audit Office, wrote that:
In the said memorandum, we informed Mr. Albert that we had considered his
participation in the AMAKO transaction, but we cannot lift his liability as head
of the Corporation pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, P.D. 1445 and
Section 32 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances. This
prompted Mr. Albert to request for reconsideration on the action taken by this
Office on the appeal submitted previously.

Considering the reasons given and circumstances surrounding the case, we

believe that the President cannot determine the irregularities committed in
this transaction. As a matter of fact, an administrative case was filed by the
President of NHMFC against several officials of the Corporation and other
government agencies to the office of the Ombudsman on October 1, 1990. x
x x[33]
The actions taken by petitioner involved the very functions he had to
discharge in the performance of official duties. He cannot, therefore, be held
civilly liable for such acts unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice
or gross negligence.[34] Inasmuch as no evidence was presented to show
that petitioner acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the
performance of his official duty, he is presumed to have acted in the regular
performance of his official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process
that the decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law on
which the decision is based. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of
law. Facts and circumstances, as well as the whys, the whats and the hows
of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or incomplete. The
COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing
expenditures of government funds at sheer discretion. There has to be
factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was
there a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and
not solely by reason of being the head of a government agency. The COA
even mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes liability for a grossly
disadvantageous contract entered into by a government functionary. But as
to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was considered
disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts.
Consequently, respondent COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion
when it held petitioner personally liable for the subject disallowance.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent
Commission on Audit are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as
they refer to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14342

May 30, 1960

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, which

condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical
expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of petitioner, Augusto
Mercado, on a classmate, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., both pupils of the
Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. The case had originated in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding,
which dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and his father
against petitioner, father of the above-mentioned Mercado. The facts found
by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co-plaintiffappellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is
the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on
Kanlaon, Quezon City. A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may
be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On
February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled
over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek
with a piece of razor.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the
aggression. Undeniably, the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto Mercado but he
lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi.
Renato was not aware that the "pitogo" belonged to Augusto, because right
after Benedicto gave it to him, Benedicto ran away to get a basket ball with
which they could play. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the
"pitogo" belonged to Augusto. He thought it was the "pitogo" of Benedicto P.
Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato,
Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the
chain into the holes of the "pitogo". However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s
remark and he aggresively pushed the latter. The fight started then. After
Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and the latter was clutching
his stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger, Augusto seeing that

Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless position, cut him on the right check with a piece
of razor.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Although the doctor who treated Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., Antonio B. Past,
testified for plaintiffs-appellants, he did not declare as to the amount of fees
he collected from plaintiff-appellants for the treatment of Manuel, Jr. the child
was not even hospitalized for the wound. We believe that the sum of P50.00
is a fair approximation of the medical expenses incurred by plaintiffsappellants.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The damages specified in paragraphs C and D of the aforequoted portion of

plaintiffs-appellant's complaint come under the class of moral damages. The
evidence of record shows that the child suffered moral damages by reason of
the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado. Though such kind of damages
cannot be fully appreciated in terms of money, we believe that the sum of
P2,000.00 would fully compensate the child.
As second cause of action, plaintiffs-appellants pray for P5,000.00 covering
the moral damages they allegedly suffered due to their son's being wounded;
and the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees. The facts of record do not
warrant the granting of moral damages to plaintiffs-appellants Manuel
Quisumbing and Ana Pineda. "In law mental anguish is restricted, as a rule,
to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the
person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is
the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering of which
arises from a contemplation of wrong committed on the person of another.
Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental
suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering. Nor can a
parent recover for mental distress and anxiety on account of physical injury
sustained by a child or for anxiety for the safety of his child placed in peril by
the negligence of another." (15 Am. Jur. 597). Plaintiffs-appellants are not
entitled to attorney's fees, it not appearing that defendant-appellee had
wantonly disregarded their claim for damages.
In the first, second and third assignments of error, counsel for petitioner
argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent
occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the
father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held

responsible instead of the latter. This precise question was brought before
this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, 101 Phil., 843, but we held,
through Mr. Justice Bautista:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted,
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841;
See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557)
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner
rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made
liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those
of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to
the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a
situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school
during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after
school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article
2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes
father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children.
The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must,
therefore, be held to be without merit.
We next come to the claim of petitioner that the moral damages fixed at
P2,000 are excessive. We note that the wound caused to respondent was
inflicted in the course of an ordinary or common fight between boys in a
grade school. The Court of Appeals fixed the medical expenses incurred in
treating and curing the wound at P50. Said court stated that the wound did
not even require hospitalization. Neither was Mercado found guilty of any
offense nor the scar in Quisumbing's face pronounced to have caused a

deformity, unlike the case of Araneta, et al. vs. Arreglado, et al., 104 Phil.,
529; 55 Off. Gaz. (9) 1561. Petitioner's counsel argues that if death call for
P3,000 to P6,000, certainly the incised wound could cause mental pain and
suffering to the tune of P2,000.
In the decision of the Court of Appeals, said court pronounces that the child
Quisumbing suffered moral damages "by reason of the wound inflicted by
Augusto Mercado." While moral damages included physical suffering, which
must have been caused to the wounded boy Quisumbing (Art. 2217, Civil
Code), the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases
specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be
recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical injury. The only possible
circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable
would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.
It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever
presented. The offender, Augusto Mercado, was nine years old and it does
not appear that he had acted with discernment when he inflicted the physical
injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto
Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries,
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that
said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the
moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that
Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado
to get "his pitogo from Renato." This is, according to the decision appealed
from, the reason why Mercado was incensed and pushed Quisumbing who,
in turn, also pushed Mercado. It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate
cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or
negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo
from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that
none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which
authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed.
Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and the petitioner is declared exempt or free from the payment of

moral damages. The award of P50 for medical expenses, however, is hereby
affirmed. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ.,
concur.
.
G.R. No. L-29025

October 4, 1971

Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffsappellants,

vs. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V.
VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and
trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute"
(M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendantsappellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. .
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador
Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical
Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action
below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at
the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory
room of the said Institute. .
Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "(T)he defendant Antonio C.
Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action
occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; 1 the
defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the defendant Santiago
M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the
beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately
on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The facts that led to the tragic death of plaintiffs' son were thus narrated by
the trial court: "(T)he deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio
L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966,
between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate
Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At

that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon
were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face.
Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to
avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face
downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He
never regained consciousness; finally he died. The foregoing is the
substance of the testimony of Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the
incident."
The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as
testified to by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the
protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason
to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected the selfexculpatory version of defendant Daffon denying that he had inflicted any fist
blows on the deceased. .
With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police
Department who performed the autopsy re "Cause of death: shock due to
traumatic fracture of theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas and
stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage
on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of the deceased
were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant
Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 3 It held
that "(T)he act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving the deceased
strong fistblows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and
caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code." 4

The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendantsofficials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise:
... Their liabilities are based on the provisions of Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code which reads:
Art. 2180. ... .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
In the opinion of the Court, this article of the Code is not applicable to the
case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or
influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the
conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

CIVIL LAW: DAMAGES ART 2180. NEW CIVIL CODE CONSTRUED: The
clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of
the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents. In those circumstances the control or influence over the
conduct and actions of the pupil as well as the responsibilities for their sort
would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. (Ciriaco L. Mercado,
Petitioner vs. the Court of Appeals, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., et al.,
respondents, G.R. No. L-14862, May 30, 1960). 5
There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants
cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the defendant Daffon.
Judgment was therefore rendered by the trial court as follows:
1.
Sentencing the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon to pay the plaintiffs as
heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P6,000.00 for the death of
Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power,
considering that the deceased was only between sixteen and seventeen
years, and in good health when he died, and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee,
plus the costs of this action. .
2.

Absolving the other defendants. .

3.

Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit.

Plaintiffs' appeal raises the principal legal question that under the factual
findings of the trial court, which are now beyond review, the trial court erred

in absolving the defendants-school officials instead of holding them jointly

and severally liable as tortfeasors, with defendant Daffon, for the damages
awarded them as a result of their son's death. The Court finds the appeal, in
the main, to be meritorious. .

1.
The lower court absolved defendants-school officials on the ground
that the provisions of Article 2180, Civil Code, which expressly hold "teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades ... liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody," are not applicable to to the case at bar, since "there is no evidence
that the accused Daffon [who inflicted the fatal fistblows] 6 lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other defendants-officials of the school. These
defendants cannot therefore be made responsible for the tort of the
defendant Daffon."
The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 7 that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so
long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the
case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go
back to their homes with their parents after school is over." This dictum had
been made in rejecting therein petitioner father's contention that his minor
son's school, Lourdes Catholic School at Kanlaon, Quezon City [which was
not a party to the case] should be held responsible, rather than him as father,
for the moral damages of P2,000.00 adjudged against him for the physical
injury inflicted by his son on a classmate. [A cut on the right cheek with a
piece of razor which costs only P50.00 by way of medical expenses to treat
and cure, since the wound left no scar.] The moral damages award was after
all set aside by the Court on the ground that none of the specific cases
provided in Article 2219, Civil Code, for awarding moral damages had been
established, petitioner's son being only nine years old and not having been
shown to have "acted with discernment" in inflicting the injuries on his
classmate. .
The dictum in Mercado was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier
case of Exconde vs. Capuno, 8 where the only issue involved as expressly

stated in the decision, was whether the therein defendant-father could be

civilly liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle
accident driven unauthorizedly and negligently by his minor son, (which issue
was resolved adversely against the father). Nevertheless, the dictum in such
earlier case that "It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution" was expressly cited and quoted in Mercado. .
2.
The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and
squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under
Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students
against fellow students on the school premises. Here, the parents of the
student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already
of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either, that the
school involved is a non-academic school, 9 the Manila Technical Institute
being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .
The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and
teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue,
respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffsappellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant
Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant
Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school
itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded
as party defendant. While plaintiffs sought to so implead it, by impleading
improperly defendant Brillantes, its former single proprietor, the lower court
found that it had been incorporated since August 2, 1962, and therefore the
school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party
defendant. Plaintiffs failed to do so, notwithstanding that Brillantes and his
co-defendants in their reply to plaintiffs' request for admission had expressly
manifested and made of record that "defendant Antonio C. Brillantes is not
the registered owner/head of the "Manila Technical Institute" which is now a
corporation and is not owned by any individual person." 10
3.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the
tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their
custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students,
in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the child." 11 This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350

and 352 of the Civil Code. 12 In the law of torts, the governing principle is
that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves
may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. .
4.
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting
opinion in Exconde, "the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903
[now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" 13 and "where
the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the
latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction." The
school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school
head and teachers under the same cited article.
5.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendantsschool officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article
2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the
cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits
the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present
decision. .
6.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-incharge of the school must therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the
quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the
death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate

death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have
been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school
premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings
of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption
from liability. .
7.
Plaintiffs-appellees' contention that the award of P6,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of their son should be increased to P12,000.00 as set
by the Court in People vs. Pantoja, 15 and observed in all death indemnity
cases thereafter is well taken. The Court, in Pantoja, after noting the decline
in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, had expressed its
"considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for
death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.00." The
Court thereby adjusted the minimum amount of "compensatory damages for
death caused by a crime or quasi-delict" as per Article 2206, Civil Code, from
the old stated minimum of P3,000.00 to P12,000.00, which amount is to be
awarded "even though there may have been mitigating circumstances"
pursuant to the express provisions of said codal article. .
8.
Plaintiffs-appellees' other claims on appeal that the lower court
should have awarded exemplary damages and imposed legal interest on the
total damages awarded, besides increasing the award of attorney's fees all
concern matters that are left by law to the discretion of the trial court and the
Court has not been shown any error or abuse in the exercise of such
discretion on the part of the trial court. 16 Decisive here is the touchstone
provision of Article 2231, Civil Code, that "In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence." No
gross negligence on the part of defendants was found by the trial court to
warrant the imposition of exemplary damages, as well as of interest and
increased attorney's fees, and the Court has not been shown in this appeal
any compelling reason to disturb such finding. .
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as
follows: .
1.
Sentencing the defendants Virgilio L. Daffon, TeodosioV. Valenton
and Santiago M. Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the

deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador

Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00
for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2.
absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .

I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify
that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility
of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils
who are minors (below the age of majority) is not in accord with the plain text
of the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following
effect: .
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. .
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. .
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company. .
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. .
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. .
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall
be applicable. .

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed
therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article expressly so
provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to
expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility
of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have
expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that
the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is
not without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly
establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with
owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom
no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer only for minors. .
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho
Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the split
among commentators on the point it issue, observes with considerable
cogency that
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se funds en
argumentos merecedores de seria ponderacion, no es facil tomar un partido.
Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos acercamos a la
de los que no estiman necesaria la menor edad del discipulo o del aprendiz;
porque si el aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no es siempre
argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible cuanto se refiere a una
misma disposicion relative a varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya
establecido important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon, puede
dudarse de la oportunidad de semajante diferencia; porque la voluntad cierta
del legislador prevalece in iure condito a cualquier otra consideracion. Por
otra parte, si bien se considera, no puede parecer extrano o absurdo el
suponer que un discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten
voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su preceptor mientras dura la
educacion. Ni parece dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los
preceptores deben, al par de los padres, responder civilmente de los daos
comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten faltos de
discernimiento.

Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635
(Spanish version), say that
635. Personas de quien responde. Si bien la responsibilidad del maestro
es originalmente una estension de la de los padres (1), el art. 1384 no
especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser menores de edad, por lo
que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun cuando sean mayores (2); pero,
la vigilancia no tendra que ser ejercida en iguales terminos. Aun respecto a
los menores variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que ternese en
ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo
o no. .
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their
authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the
latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over
pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A student over twenty-one, by
enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial
supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities, which is the
basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while
under such authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as
when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only affect the decree
of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a
factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant has
exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed in
the last paragraph of Article 2180. .
Barredo, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:

I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from
the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil.
414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" used in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed as referring to a "situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's)
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents."

I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the

size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and
non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism
of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the
schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the school
authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable
to impose the traditional disciplinary measures formerly recognized as
available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion of the offending
students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students,
merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody"
of the teachers or school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold
the latter liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if
applied as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would demand
responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and school
heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control.
Present conditions being what they are, I believe the restrictive interpretation
of the aforesaid provision enunciated in Mercado should be maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to
dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student
at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age
at the time of the tragic incident." This statement is of course in accordance
with Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." Note that for parental responsibility to
arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also
in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the) liability of school heads
and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their
pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to
reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used
in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase
"who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just
as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are
no longer minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from
liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. I find
no justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a
substitute parent liable where the real parent would be free from liability. .

Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from
the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil.
414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" used in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed as referring to a "situation
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's)
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents."
I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the
size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and
non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism
of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the
schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the school
authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable
to impose the traditional disciplinary measures formerly recognized as
available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion of the offending
students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students,
merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody"
of the teachers or school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold
the latter liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if
applied as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would demand
responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and school
heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control.
Present conditions being what they are, I believe the restrictive interpretation
of the aforesaid provision enunciated in Mercado should be maintained. .
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to
dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student
at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age
at the time of the tragic incident." This statement is of course in accordance
with Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." Note that for parental responsibility to
arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also
in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the) liability of school heads

and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their
pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to
reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used
in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase
"who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just
as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are
no longer minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from
liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. I find
no justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a
substitute parent liable where the real parent would be free from liability. .
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47745

April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR.,

NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III,
LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA
TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH
SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA,
PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his
guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the
commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the
presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These
ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate
would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972,
while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo,
ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only
seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally,
the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their
respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants
liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to
the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved .
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180
was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school
of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as
the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the
fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary
diligence in preventing the injury.

Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the
semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they claim
underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed
pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or
taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of
Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend
that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and
that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by
Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun
was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of
Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in support of
their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as
they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the
above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this
opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.

The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by
Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences of these
facts, the parties sharply disagree.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary

School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the
city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its
wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of
two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with
reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action flied against them, his father
was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article
2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.

The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that

This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June

29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party to
the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice

J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred,
dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable
Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and
(2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not
"teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A
student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the Lourdes
Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the
culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared
in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school
was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and trades.
Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this
"contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but
the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on
May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student
was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the Manila
Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer who was already of age
was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge
were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice
Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in
their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for
as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There
is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or
student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as
erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in
Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision.

This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice

J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion, that even
students already of age were covered by the provision since they were

equally in the custody of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting
with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody
interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply only to
torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only
in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent
in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school involved at bar is a
non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal
provision to academic institutions will have to await another case wherein it
may properly be raised."

This is the case.

Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has
been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article 2180;
and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the
question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which
are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending
student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis
"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice

J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:

I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial
difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision
and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic
teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a
tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the
phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art.
1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify
"teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian
and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers,
etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would
seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very
reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the
school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is
under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school
where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is
that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of
arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if
that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would
attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the
same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved
whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held
liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised
by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective
schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that
vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing
such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject

of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a
result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where
he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself
by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the
other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic
school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why
is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused
in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or nontechnical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of
imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master
who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of
their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and
so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and so came under his constant control, supervision
and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the
teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head
of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with
the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts
of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his
closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the
Court according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking
into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to
enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually

undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents

and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the
custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the
student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the
student should be within the control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not
necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the
custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the
school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that day he
has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither
should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes
notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for
completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers,
clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released
altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of
his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of
the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that the parents are
responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is
the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to

which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the
teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does
not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and
not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was committed within the
premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature,
may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the
student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself
from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable
not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that
the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable
only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for
the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the
Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head of the technical
school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice
Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be unduly
exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among
the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in the

school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be

repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that will be held
directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case
it is sought to be held answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its
head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head
or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and
instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the
maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these
measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force
to help the teacher physically enforce those rules upon the students. Ms
should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise
be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage caused by his
students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under
his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the
teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their
influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can
expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on
him is greater than on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such
dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas
submission to the teacher's influence, besides being coterminous with the
period of custody is usually enforced only because of the students' desire to
pass the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than
the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the
teacher for the tort committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age and
therefore less tractable than the minor then there should all the more be
justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long
as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury. After all, if
the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has
reached majority age and so is no longer under the former's control, there is
then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility
for the acts of the student.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following
conclusions:
1.
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding
that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his
physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of
his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
2.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics
report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that
he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened
cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required
to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student
was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was
physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established
that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On
the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised
due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part,
for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link

him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated
and returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their custody,
meaning their protective and supervisory custody.

5.
Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the
tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has
been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student
or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
custody.

Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand in loco
parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:

In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the
light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents is liable
for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in
the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on
April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss
of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are
unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief,
under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.

Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and

Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term
"teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would
limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate
charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco
parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever in
such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious

Art. 349The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:

xxx

xxx

xxx

2) Teachers and professors

xxx

xxx

xxx

4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;'

Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362.
The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or
institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not contravene the
concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves
may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. (Emphasis
supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated
of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks
only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provision, the
school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or
school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents
(Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the
school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the Civil Code, supra,
it is apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated the
classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from
"directors of trade establishments, with regard to their apprentices."

early adult years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or reactionary

group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic
matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems most unfair to
hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of
students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no
in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove the contrary of
negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the acts f bomb-throwing or
pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt them as they would other
members of the so-called-establishment.

The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to teachers and schools of

whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The provision
of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose.
The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the law with its imperfections.
However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended or
repealed.
Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice

Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a major
amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of
Art. 2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and
out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to
result in mischief and injustice.

I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term
"teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would
limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate
charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the intendment of the law.

First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts

and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and universities are no
different from students in liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices
now work in regular shops and factories and their relationship to the
employer is covered by laws governing the employment relationship and not
by laws governing the teacherstudent relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high school
students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration who are given
the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or

As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco
parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever in
such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious
acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their custody,
meaning their protective and supervisory custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand in loco
parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 349The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2) Teachers and professors

xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 2180. x x x

4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;'

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:

xxx

Art. 362.
The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or
institution....

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the Civil Code, supra,
it is apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated the
classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from
"directors of trade establishments, with regard to their apprentices."

But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not contravene the
concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of
their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:

The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily

substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves
may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. (Emphasis
supplied)

Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated
of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks
only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provision, the
school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or
school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents
(Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the
school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family.

xxx

xxx

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice
Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a major
amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code
insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of
Art. 2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a situation long gone and
out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to
result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts
and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and universities are no
different from students in liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices
now work in regular shops and factories and their relationship to the
employer is covered by laws governing the employment relationship and not
by laws governing the teacherstudent relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high school
students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration who are given
the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or
early adult years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or reactionary
group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic
matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It ,seems most unfair to
hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of
students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no
in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove the contrary of

negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the acts f bomb-throwing or

pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt them as they would other
members of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to teachers and schools of
whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The provision
of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose.
The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the law with its imperfections.
However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended or
repealed.

G.R. No. L-33722

July 29, 1988

FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,

vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36390-R entitled "Federico Ylarde, et al.
vs. Edgardo Aquino, et al.," a case which originated from the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, We are again caned upon determine the
responsibility of the principals and teachers towards their students or pupils.
In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug,
Pangasinan-Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At
that time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were
remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II.
Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by
one as early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by
himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered
eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal on
October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig
beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone
can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after

classes, private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils
to continue the digging. These four pupils Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was
one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent
Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit
throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block,
private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said
private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private
respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom
where he could get some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino
allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids,
Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any
warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able
to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the
concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in
a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained the following
injuries:
1.

Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic

region.

2.

Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.

3.

Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis

4.

Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.

5.

ntraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and urine

about 2 liters.

6.

Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis

7.

Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost

entirely separated from its neck.

REMARKS:
1.

Above were incurred by crushing injury.

2.

Prognosis very poor.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody. 3
The issue to be resolved is whether or not under the cited provisions,
both private respondents can be held liable for damages.

(Sgd.) MELQUIADES A. BRAVO

Physician on Duty.

Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against
both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is
in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde
was due to his own reckless imprudence. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower court.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article
2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused their son's
death while the complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of school
is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:
Art. 2180. x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the
death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court
of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their
students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is
only the head of the school who can be held liable. In the same case, We
explained:
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who
shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words,
teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis
'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private
respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the
school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private
respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can
be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of
the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to

take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.

However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of
private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct from
that provided for in Article 2180.

actuations were natural to a boy his age. Going back to the facts, it was not
only him but the three of them who jumped into the hole while the remaining
boy jumped on the block. From this, it is clear that he only did what any other
ten-year old child would do in the same situation.

With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there acts
and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or
negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court
did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The
degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the
person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according
to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. 5 The standard
of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. 6
Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private
respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed
to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his
pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete
stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to
remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the
huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by
any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to
level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge
stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be
able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the
excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child
Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around.
Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with
whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and
not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole
while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and
the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that
the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate
child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural
and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino.
Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the
unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the
lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which
resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless
imprudence, It should be remembered that he was only ten years old at the
time of the incident, As such, he is expected to be playful and daring. His

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as
part of their Work Education. A single glance at the picture showing the
excavation and the huge concrete block 7 would reveal a dangerous site
requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not ten-year old
grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it
otherwise when private respondent Aquino himself admitted that there were
no instructions from the principal requiring what the pupils were told to do.
Nor was there any showing that it was included in the lesson plan for their
Work Education. Even the Court of Appeals made mention of the fact that
respondent Aquino decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury
the concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore, the excavation
should not be placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and
the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that
could result in death or physical injuries.
The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably
prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation
site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an
accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple
warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious
danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present
to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils

would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his
company.
We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person
would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did.
Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have
occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of
thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the
hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED
and the questioned judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private
respondent Edagardo Aquino to pay petitioners the following:

(1)

Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00

(2)

Exemplary damages 10,000.00

(3)

Moral damages 20,000.00

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION,
petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, EDUARDO B.
CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO
B. CASTRO., respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the

decision 1 of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 7 December

1984, in AC-G.R. No. CV 69876, in so far as it affirmed the decision 2 of the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court),
which held, among others, petitioners solidarily hable with Jimmy B. Abon,
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
The relevant facts, as found by the Trial Court and adopted by reference by
the respondent Court, are:
... Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution ...
[However], it is also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself,
as its own evidence shows. Its brochure (Exh. 2) shows that BCF has a fullfledged technical-vocational department offer Communication, Broadcast and
Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and
Automotive Mechanics courses... these courses divest BCF of the nature or
character of being purely or exclusively an academic institution.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the
fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way
of accommodation to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant to
Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education
and Culture, 5 is provided by the BCF an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building.
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly
appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received
his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also
received his salary from the AFP, 8 as well as orders from Captain Roberto
C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit,
concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee
(officer) of the AFP. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy
B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit
of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading
Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa

(President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive

Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of
Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a
decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and
Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private
respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of
Napoleon Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as
actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; (2)
absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit. 13 On appeal by petitioners, the respondent
Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court. The
modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate
damages, and increasing the indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro
from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.

it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time
of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but
considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian
of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and
therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or
soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the
trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, this petition.

In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school"
cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of
his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not
include dismissal. 18 Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or
being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.

The central issue in this case is whether or not petitioners can be held
solidarity hable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be

considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of
BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in
[Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was stin in the protective
and supervisory custody of the Baguio Colleges Foundation when he shot
Napoleon Castro, the respondent Court ruled that:

Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B.
Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to
leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded." 19 Apart from
negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school
when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held
liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be
working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a
school which offers both academic and technical/vocational courses cannot
be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic
program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of
BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass
upon such other issue.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far

as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act
in the killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM,
BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO
and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos

Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge
(now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against
the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos
was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school
authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President),
Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the
plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and
lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the
attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated
his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the
school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,

alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence
on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA,
are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and
thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order
dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition
before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on
10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the
respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court

primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate
court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the
old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities
on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed
and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and
significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to
changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of
progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot
be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs.
Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence, the ruling in the
Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions,
academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable
unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph
of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent
damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to
dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried
on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate
court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the aforecited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora
vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated,
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts
mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily
follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of

providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not

really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air
France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the
petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitionerairline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of
carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort
may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may
be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court
was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780),
Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to
say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would
have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the
petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the
comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In
Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger
was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to
award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that

should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.

SO ORDERED.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet,
no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding
of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently
of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the

obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a
common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is
specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called
"university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon
their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same
may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a
nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the
case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here
statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the
private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts.
Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination
from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue
proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the
petitioners.

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C.

SOLIMAN, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge
of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles City, and the
REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its President,
respondents.
Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages
against private respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as
defendants. The complaint alleged that:
. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the
campus ground and premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL
COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled student of said school
taking his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was
on said date and hour in the premises of said school performing his duties
and obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment,
supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY,
INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill,
attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38
Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained
would have caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely medical
assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles
Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may
not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the
performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months
before his wounds would be completely healed.
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued
that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student
for the reason that private respondent school was not the employer of the
security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for

any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that
Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said
paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while
security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
school.
In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge granted private
respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding that security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not an employee of the school which accordingly could not be
held liable for his acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
without success.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent
trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when he refused to apply
the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352,
of the Civil Code and granted the school's motion to dismiss.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage
inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for
one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for
whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held vicariously
responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the
agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a general
rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency
shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events,
be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by
the security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the
client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable
for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are
ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into with the security agency. There being no employeremployee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner
student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of
security guard Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or
an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the Republic
Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by
petitioner are as follows:

xxx

Art. 349.
authority:

The following persons shall exercise substitute parental

xxx

xxx

xxx

(2)

Teachers and professors;

xxx

xxx

(4)

Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices;

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable

for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding the Colleges
liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon
inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was not the
employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L.

xxx

xxx

Art. 350.
The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 352.
The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and
student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or
institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The
teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and
mind of the pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and
president of a school of arts and trades known as the "Manila Technical
Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila, responsible in damages for the death of
Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which resulted from fist blows
delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be seen
that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th
paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different
from the facts existing in the instant case.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for
damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such
substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy
Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to
petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central
Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's
claim as one based wholly and exclusively on Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
the order of the respondent trial judge was correct. Does it follow, however,
that respondent Colleges could not be held liable upon any other basis in
law, for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle
respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect of itself?
The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) v. Court of Appeals, 5 requires us to give a negative answer to that
question.
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable
where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over

whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At
the same time, however, the Court stressed that an implied contract may be
held to be established between a school which accepts students for
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other
hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet,
no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding
of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to
the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently
of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation
of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common
carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is especially

true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in

Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang
wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed
inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation
to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be
the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and place.
7

In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss
the complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court
affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the
motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that
petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are
tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute
breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was
in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of
action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent
trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should
have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting
breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent
Colleges.
In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in
order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting aside
technical considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge committed
serious error correctible by this Court in the instant case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE COURSE to the
Petition, to TREAT the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated 29 November 1983. This case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings consistent with this
Resolution.

ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and

ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners,- versus - JAYSON MIRANDA,
represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
G.R. No. 182353
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in toto the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-95-22889.
The facts, as found by the CA, follow:

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph
Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val
Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda
Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The
adviser of [Jaysons] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having
adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of
the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test
tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group
mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance,
the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit
[Jaysons] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group
mates. As a result thereof, [Jaysons] eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court,
[Jaysons] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another
surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jaysons] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which
she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from

November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least

P40,000.00.

of P26,176.35 representing [Jaysons] hospital bill until his wife could arrive
from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.

Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to [petitioners]
fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon
each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages. Also,
[Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his medical
expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed
to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages.
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation
expenses, including attorneys fees.

On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel,

wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter dated
December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini
Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
because the accident occurred by reason of [Jaysons] failure to comply with
the written procedure for the experiment and his teachers repeated warnings
and instruction that no student must face, much less look into, the opening of
the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.[3]

On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school year
1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, the class
to which [Jayson] belong[s] was conducting a science experiment under the
guidance and supervision of Tabugo, the class science teacher, about fusion
of sulphur powder and iron fillings by combining these elements in a test tube
and heating the same. Before the science experiment was conducted,
[Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written
procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the
heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient
age and discretion and completely capable of understanding the English
language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the heated
compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment
and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and
took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at that moment
spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jaysons] eyes.

Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and
thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center for treatment. At the
hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his
teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until the
compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an
eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order to
avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jaysons] discharge,
Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jaysons] father, requested SJC to advance the amount

Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jaysons father, on
Jaysons behalf, sued petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. This Court orders and holds the
[petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay [Jayson] the following amount:

1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual damages; However,

[Jayson] is ordered to reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount
of P26,176.36 representing the advances given to pay [Jaysons] initial
hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct said amount of P26,176.36
from the P77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by way of legal
compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted

to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against [petitioners].[5]
Undaunted, petitioners appealed` by certiorari to this Court, adamant that the
CA grievously erred, thus:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF JAYSONS INJURY WAS HIS OWN
ACT OF LOOKING AT THE HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE
COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO THE EXPERIMENT.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT

OF THE RULING IN THE CASE OF ST. MARYS COLLEGE V. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSONS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PEEKING INTO THE TEST TUBE WAS IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF HIS INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD
LIABLE.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO
SUPPORT THE SAME.
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO [JAYSON].
VI. THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM.[6]

We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that
petitioners were negligent since they all failed to exercise the required
reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries
to the students.
Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect
and are considered conclusive between the parties.[7] A review of such
findings by this Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious
circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference from its
factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are conclusions
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.[8] None of the foregoing exceptions which would warrant a reversal
of the assailed decision obtains in this instance.
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was his
own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to the
experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St.
Marys Academy v. Carpitanos[9] which absolved St. Marys Academy from
liability for the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned
activity, declaring that the negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident.
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the lower courts conclusions are borne out
by the records of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to
Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals,
independent of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA
quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was
the proximate cause of the latters injury. We find that the immediate cause of
the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked
into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his

injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals

independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the
mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The
court a quo correctly ruled that:
All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence
because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching
and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of
vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo
was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science experiment
although [Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No
evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was
inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was
unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the
school clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that
[petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time
the accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of the other
students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to
corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands
that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no
longer enrolled in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of
school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser
or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervision over
[petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to
insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment would
be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students.
[Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of
command responsibility because the other individual [petitioners] were under
her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual
[petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.
xxxx
The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by
[petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it
has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of

its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in
the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment
for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the
wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information
on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative
steps to avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never
been any accident in the past during the conduct of science experiments is
not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do
away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the
students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute
safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide
protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and
anticipated dangers.
Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university
itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the
liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees
is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the
insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee.[10]
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are hard pressed to disturb the
findings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically
instructed her students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not
to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off.
Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a
twelve (12)-year-old student, herein respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that
occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were
negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
bestows special parental authority on the following persons with the
corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity
or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
and caution is demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury
to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students
who conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically
goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the classfifty (50) students conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by
insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science class
not to look directly into the heated compound. Neither does our ruling in St.
Marys preclude their liability in this case.
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Marys is not in point. In that case,
respondents thereat admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the

cause of the accident was a mechanical defect and not the recklessness of
the minor, James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus:
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities,
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. x x x.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap
which happened during the science experiment was foreseeable by the
school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable
injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of
diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers, and, ultimately,
was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have
held in St. Marys, for petitioner [St. Marys Academy] to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident.[12]
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to disturb
the lower courts identical rulings thereon:
As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jaysons] injury was the
explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient intervening
cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure
that the science experiment was correctly conducted was the proximate
cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and injured not only
[Jayson] but his classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is partly responsible

for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must likewise bear the consequences of his own negligence.
[Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable only for the damages actually
caused by their negligence.
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts award of
actual and moral damages, and grant of attorneys fees. The denial of
petitioners counterclaim is also in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.