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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (MAINTAINANCE) NO. 2666 of 2015

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

==========================================================

Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see

the judgment ?

To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the

judgment ?

YES
YES

Whether this case involves a substantial question of law

as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
order made thereunder ?

NO

NO

Circulate the Judgment to all the Judicial

Officers across the State.

==========================================================

MANJULABEN PRAKSHBHAI SARVAIYA....Applicant(s)

Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1....Respondent(s)
==========================================================

Appearance:
MS. BHAVINI H JANI, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR ANKUR Y OZA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS HANSA PUNANI, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date : 08/10/2015

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BythispetitionunderArticle227oftheConstitutionofIndia,the

petitionercallsinquestionthelegalityandvalidityoftheorderdated
30.03.2015 passed below Exhibit:6 by the learned Principal Judge,
Family Court, Bhavnagar in the Criminal Miscellaneous Application
No.124 of 2014, by which, the learned Judge was pleased to grant
interim maintenance in favour of the stepdaughter for an amount of
Rs.3,000/tobepaidbythepetitionertotherespondentNo.2,whois
thegrandfatherofthestepdaughterofthepetitioner.
2

Aninterestingquestionoflawarisesinthispetition. Whethera

minorstepdaughterisentitledtoclaimmaintenanceunderSection125
oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure,1973(forshort,theCode)fromher
stepmotheronthedemiseofthenaturalfatherofthestepdaughter.
3

Thefactsgivingrisetofilingofthispetitionmaybesummarized

asunder:
3.1

The son of the respondent No.2 herein, namely, Prakashkumar

SarvaiyamarriedwithoneAshabenManjibhaion09.02.1998andinthe
wedlock,ababygirl,namely,Jahnviwasborn.Onaccountofmarital
dispute,theypreferredaHinduMarriagePetitionNo.32of2003under
Section13oftheHinduMarriageActbeforetheCourtofthelearned2nd
JointCivilJudge(SD),Bhavnagar,fordissolutionofthemarriagewith

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consent,andpursuanttothedecreeofdivorce dated16.12.2003,the
marriage was dissolved and they both got separated. However, the
custody of minor daughter Jahnvi was taken by her father, namely,
Prakashkumar.
3.2

Afterdivorce,Prakashkumarmarriedforthesecondtimewiththe

petitionerhereinon18.12.2005accordingtotheHinduritesandrituals.
Unfortunately,on25.03.2006,thesaidPrakashkumarpassedawayand
thecustodyofJahnviremainedwiththepetitionerherein.
3.3

TherespondentNo.2,the fatherofPrakashkumar,preferredan

applicationbeingtheMiscellaneousCriminalApplicationNo.75of2008
inthe CourtoftheDistrictJudge,BhavnagarunderSection7ofthe
Guardian and Wards Act for the custody of Jahnvi. The learned
Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar was pleased to allow the said
application andhandedoverthecustodyofJahnvitotherespondent
No.2herein(thegrandfather)tillsheattainsmajority.Theresponsibility
ofherupbringingandeducation wasagreedtobeshoulderedbythe
respondentNo.2herein.
3.4

Thus,aftertheorder,referredtoabove,thecustodyofJahnviis

withtherespondentNo.2herein(parentalgrandfather).
3.5

ItappearsthattherespondentNo.2hereinfiledanapplicationon

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behalf of Jahnvi being Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.124 of

2014(Exhibit:1)beforethelearnedFamilyCourtatBhavnagarunder
Section 125 of the Code, praying for an amount of Rs.12,500/ per
monthforthemaintenanceofJahnvifromthepetitioner.Alongwiththe
saidapplication,therespondentNo.2hereinalsofiledanapplicationfor
interim maintenance (Exhibit:6) for an amount of Rs.11,000/ per
month.
3.6

ThelearnedPrincipalJudge,FamilyCourt,Bhavnagar,videorder

dated30.03.2015,partlyallowedthesaidapplicationanddirectedthe
petitionerhereintopayanamountofRs.3,000/permonthtowardsthe
interimmaintenancefrom05.06.2014.
3.7

BeingdissatisfiedwiththeorderpassedbytheCourtbelow,the

petitionerhascomeupwiththispetition.
4

Ms. Bhavini Jani, the learned advocate appearing for the

petitionersubmittedthatthelearnedJudgecommittedaseriouserrorin
passingtheimpugnedorder.ShesubmittedthatunderSection125of
the Code, a stepmother is not obliged to maintain or pay the
maintenance to her stepdaughter born in the wedlock of the first
marriageofherhusband.Ms.Janisubmittedthatwhilehandingover
thecustodyofJahnvitotherespondentintheproceedingsunderthe
GuardianandWardsAct,thelearnedJudgehadobservedthatallthe

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benefits,whichhadaccruedinfavourofthedeceasedSon,shouldbe
given tothe respondentherein,andpursuantthereto,the respondent
hadreceivedanamountofRs.23lacfromtheL.I.C.
5

Ms. Jani submitted that the Biological mother of Jahnvi is still

aliveandshehasalsosoughtforthecustodyofJahnvi.TheBiological
motherisreadyandwillingtomaintainJahnviinallrespect.Forsome
reason or the other, Jahnvi is not ready and willing to live with her
motherbyconsanguinity.
6

Ms.JaniplacedrelianceonthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtin

thecaseof KirtikantD.Vadodariavs.StateofGujaratandanother
[(1996)4SCC479],whereintheSupremeCourthastakentheview
thattheexpressionmotherinSection125(1)(d)oftheCodemeans
onlytherealornaturalmotheranddoesnotincludethestepmother.
The Supreme Court took the view that stepmother is a distinct and
separateentityandcannotbeequatedwiththenaturalmotherwhohas
givenbirthtothechild.TheSupremeCourtultimatelyruledthathaving
regardtothepurposebehindthebenevolentprovisionsofSection125,
childlessstepmotherisentitledtoclaimmaintenancefromherstepson
providedsheisawidoworherhusband,ifliving,isalsoincapableof
maintainingher.
7

Drawing analogy from the above, she submitted that if the

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provisionsofSubclause(a)to(d)ofSection125(1)arereadtogether
harmoniously, it is enviable that a stepdaughter cannot claim
maintenancefromherstepmother,afterthedemiseofthefatherunless
thereisanobligationtomaintain.Intheabsenceofanylegalobligation,
there cannot be any refusal or neglect to do it. In the case of a
unmarriedminordaughter,thereisnoobligationuponherstepmother
and,therefore,thestepdaughtercannotclaimanymaintenancefromher
stepmotherunderSection125(1)(b)oftheCode.
8

Ms.Janisubmittedthatsincemaintenanceisbeingclaimedunder

Section125oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure,itgoeswithoutsaying
thatthecaseoftherespondentNo.2mustfallwithinthefourcornerof
thesaidprovisions.ReferencetotheHinduMarriageActortotheHindu
Adoption Act, 1966, therefore, will not be appropriate, particularly,
whenthereisnoambiguityintheprovisionsofSubsection(1)ofSection
125oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure.
9

Ms.JanisubmittedthatperusaloftheSection125oftheCode

reveals that the legislative stress is on his wife, his legitimate or

illegitimate child or his father or mother. When the stress is on the
wordhis,itobviouslymeansthatitwouldincludeonlythepersonwho
procreates,begetsorbringsforthoffspring.Itwillnotincludeachildof
anotherfatherormotherofanotherperson.

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She submitted that the impugned order could be termed as a

nullity.
11

Ontheotherhand,thispetitionhasbeenopposedbyMr.Ankur

Oza,thelearnedadvocateappearingfortherespondentNo.2andMs.
HansaPunani,thelearnedAdditional PublicProsecutorappearingfor
therespondenttheStateofGujarat.Theybothsubmittedthatnoerror,
nottospeakofanyerrorlawcouldbesaidtohavebeencommittedby
theCourtbelow,warrantinganyinterferenceatthehandsofthisCourt
in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. They submitted that along with the words
legitimateorillegitimatethestepminorchildshouldbereadinunder
Subclause(b)ofSection125(1)oftheCode.
12

TheysubmittedthatthedifferentClausesofSection125(1)ofthe

Code willhave tobe readindependentlysincethey covereddifferent

areasandfields.Theexpressions usedin various the subclauses will
takeintheirambitevenaminorstepchild,ifthebiologicalfatherofthe
childhaspassedawayandsuchchildistotallyatthemercyofhisorher
stepmother.Theysubmittedthatiftheinterpretationsuggestedbythe
petitionerisaccepted,thenonthedemiseofthenaturalfather,ifthe
stepmother throws outthe minor stepchildren,then theycouldnever
claimmaintenancefromthestepmotheralthoughthestepmothermight

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haveinheritedeverythingofthebiologicalfatherofthestepchildren.
13

Havingheardthelearnedcounselappearingforthepartiesand

havinggonethroughthematerialsonrecord,theonlyquestionthatfalls
formyconsiderationiswhethertheCourtbelowcommittedanyerrorin
passingtheimpugnedorder.
14

Theissuefallingformyconsiderationshouldalsobelookedinto

keepinginmindtheHinduLaw.Ofcourse,itistruethatSection125
shouldbeconstruedstrictlyalthoughthesameisnotpenalinnature.
However,inthepeculiarfactsofthecase,Ideemitnecessarytolook
intothesame.
15

In the case of Khetramani Dasi vs. Kashinath Das, (1868) 2

BengalLawReporter15,thefatherinlawwassuedbyaHinduwidow
formaintenance.Deciding the rightofawidow formaintenance,the
CalcuttaHighCourtreferredtotheShastriclawasunder:
"Thedutyofmaintainingone'sfamilyis,however,ciearlylaiddowninthe
Dayabhaga,ChapterII,SectionXXIII,inthesewords:'
Themaintenance ofthefamilyisanindispensableobligation,asMANU
positivelydeclares.'
SirThomasStrangeinhisworkonHinduLawVol.Ipage67,says:
'Maintenancebyamanofhisdependantsis,withtheHindus,aprimary
duty.Theyholdthathemustbejust,beforeheisgenerous,hischarity
beginningathome;andthatevensacrificeismockery,iftotheinjuryof
thosewhomheisboundtomaintain.Norofhisdutyinthisrespectarehis
childrentheonlyobjects,coextensiveasitiswiththefamilywhateverbe
itscomposition,asconsistingofotherrelationsandconnexions,including

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(it may be) illegitimate offspring. It extends according to Manu and

Yajnavalkyatotheoutcast,ifnottotheadulterouswife;nottomention
suchasareexcludedfromtheinheritance,whetherthroughtheirfault,or
their misfortune; all being entitled to be maintained with food and
raiment."
Atpage21, the learned Judges have alsoreferred toasituation where
thereisnothingabsolutelyfortheHinduwidowtomaintainherselffrom
the parentsinlaw's branch by referring to the following texts from
NARADA:
"InBookIV,ChapterISectionI,Art.XIIIofCelebrooke'sDigest,arethe
followingtextsfromNARADA:
'After the death of her husband, the nearest kinsman on his side has
authorityoverawomanwhohasnoson;inregardtotheexpenditurteof
wealth, the government of herself, and her maintenance, he has full
dominion.Ifthehusband'sfamilybeextinct,orthekinsmanbeunmanly,
ordestituteofmeanstosupporther,orifthereisnoSapindas,akinsman
on the father's side shall have authority over the woman; and the
comment on this passage is : "'Kinsman on the husband's side; of his
father'sormother'sraceintheorderofproximity.'Maintenance'means
subsistence.Thus,withouthisconsent,shemaynotgiveawayanythingto
anyperson,norindulgeherselfinmattersofshape,taste,small,orthe
like, and if the means of subsistence be wanting he must provide her
maintenance.Butifthekinsmanbeunmanly(defecientinmanlycapacity
todiscriminaterightfromwrong)ordestituteofmeanstosupporther,if
there benosuch person able toprovide themeans ofsubsistence, orif
there be no SAPINDAS, then any how, determining from her own
judgmentonthemeansofpreservinglifeandduty,letherannounceher
affinityinthismode:'Iamthewifeofsuchaman'suncle;'andifthatbe
ineffectual, let her revert to her father's kindred; or in failure of this,
recoursemaybehadeventohermother'skindered"(Emphasissupplied.)
InBookIII,ChapterII,SectionII,Art.CXXII,ofColebrooke'sDigest,we
havethefollowingtextsandcomments:
"She who isdeprived ofher husband should not reside apart from her
father,mother,son,orbrother,fromherhusband'sfatherormother,or
fromhermaternaluncle;elseshebecomesinfamous.""
Aspertheabovetextsandcomments,aHinduwidowiftheparentsin
law'sbranchisunmanlyordestituteofmeanstosupportherisentitledto
bewiththefatherorthekinsmanonthefather'sside.

16

In Janki v. Nand Ram, (1889) ILR 11 All 194 (FB), a Hindu

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widowafterthedeathofherfatherinlawsuedherbrotherinlawand
herfatherinlaw'swidow.TheFullBenchoftheAllahabadHighCourt
held that the fatherinlaw was under a moral, though not legal,
obligationnotonlytomaintainhiswidoweddaughterinlawduringhis
lifetime,butalsotomakeprovisionoutofhisselfacquiredpropertyfor
hermaintenanceafterhisdeath;andthatsuchmoralobligationinthe
fatherbecamebyreasonofhisselfacquiredpropertyhavingcomeby
inheritance into the hands of his surviving son, a legal obligation
enforceable by a suit against the son and against the property in
question. While so deciding, the learned Judges at page 210 made a
referencetoapassagefromDr.GurudasBanerjee'sTagoreLawLectures,
thus:
"Wehavehithertobeenconsideringtheclaimofawidowformaintenance
against the person inheriting her husband's estate. The questio'n next
arises how far she is entitled to be maintained by the heir when her
husbandleavesnopropertyandhowfarshecanclaimmaintenancefrom
otherrelatives.TheHindusagesemphaticallyenjoinuponeverypersonthe
dutyofmaintainingthedependantmembersofhisfamily.Thefollowing
areafewofthemanytextsonthesubject:
MANU: 'The ample supportofthosewhoareentitled tomaintenance is
rewardedwithblissinheaven;buthellistheportionofthatmanwhose
familyisafflictedwithpainbyhisneglect:thereforelethimmaintainhis
familywiththeutmostcare.'
NARADA:'Eventheywhoareborn,oryetunbornandtheywhoexistin
the womb, require funds for subsistence; deprivation of the means of
subsistenceisreprehended.'
BRIHASPATI:'Amanmaygivewhatremainsafterthefoodandclothing
ofhisfamily,thegiverofmorewholeaveshisfamilynakedandunfed,
maytastehoneyatfirst,butstillafterwardsfinditpoison.'"
ThetextofMANUasaddedreads:
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"Hewhobestowsgiftsonstrangers,withaviewtoworldlyfame,whilehe
suffershisfamilytoliveindistress,thoughhehaspowertosupportthem,
toucheshislipswithhoney,butswallowspoison;suchvirtueiscounterfeit:
evenwhathedoesforthesakeofhisfuturespiritualbody,totheinjuryof
thosewhomheisfoundtomaintain,shallbringhimultimatemiseryboth
inthislifeandinthenext."
Having so quoted the texts, the Full Bench based its judgment on the
proposition:
"......undertheHindulawpurelymoralobligationsimposedbyreligious
precepts upon the father ripen into legally enforceable obligations as
againstthesonwhoinheritshisfather'sproperty."

17

In KaminiDasseev.ChandraPodeHandle,(1890)ILR17Cal

373,itisheldbytheCalcuttaHighCourtthattheprinciplethatan
heirsucceedingtothepropertytakesitforthespiritualbenefitofthe
lateproprietor,andis,therefore,underalegalobligationtomaintain
personswhomthelateproprietorwasmorallyboundtosupport,has
amplebasisintheHindulawoftheBengalSchoolandaccordingly
decreedthesuitformaintenancelaidbyawidowedbrotheragainst
herhusband'sbrothers.
18

InDeviPrasadv.GunvatiKoer,(1894)ILR22Cal410,deciding

an action brought for maintenance by a Hindu widow against the

brothersandnephewofherdeceasedhusbandafterthedeathofher
fatherinlaw,theCalcuttaHighCourtheldthattheplaintiff'shusband
hadavestedinterestintheancestralproperty,andcouldhave,even
duringhisfather'slifetime,enforcedpartitionofthatproperty,andas

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theHindulawprovidesthatthesurvivingcoparcenersshouldmaintain
the widow of a deceased coparcener, the plaintiff was entitled to
maintenance.
19

In Bai Mangal v. Bai Rukmini, (1899) ILR 23 Bom 291, the

statementoflawofMAYNEthat
"After marriage, her (meaning the daughter's) maintenance isacharge
uponherhusband'sfamily,butiftheyareunabletosupporther,shemust
beprovidedforbythe.,familyofherfather."
wasunderstoodtohavebeenoneofmonetarycharacterthanlayingdown
any general legal obligation. The learned Judge, Ranede, J., after
examining all the authorities has broadly laid down the law, as he
understood,thus:
"In fact, all the text writers appear to be in agreement on this point,
namely,thatitisonlytheunmarrieddaughterswhohavealegalclaimfor
maintenance from the husband's family. If this provision fails, and the
widowed daughter returns tolivewithherfather orbrother, there isa
moralandsocialobligation,butnotalegallyenforceablerightbywhich
hermaintenancecanbeclaimedasachargeonherfather'sestateinthe
handsofhisheirs."(page295).

20

However,thesamelearnedJudge,Ranede,J.,inalatercasein

YamunaBaiv.Manubai,(1899)ILR23Bom608,expressedhisabsolute
concurrence with the law laid down by the Allahabad High Court in
Janaki'scase,(1889ILR11All194)(supra),asregardstherightofthe
widowofapredeceasedsontomaintenanceagainsttheestateofthe
deceasedfatherinlawinthehandsofhisheirs.
21

TheviewofRanede,J.,inBaiMangal'scase,(1899ILR23Bom

291) (supra), was further conditioned byAmmer Ali, J.,in Mokhoda

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Dasseev.NundoLallHaldar,(1900)ILR27Cal555,byholdingthatthe
rightofmaintenanceisagainsubjecttothesatisfactionofthefactthat
thewidowedsonlessdaughtermusthavebeenatthetimeofherfather's
deathmaintainedbyhimasadependantmemberofthefamily.
22

But,boththeviewsofRanede,J.,inBaiMangal'scase,(1899ILR

23 Bom 291) (supra), and Ameer Ali, J., in Mokhode Dassee's case,
(1900ILR27Cal555)(supra),didnotfindacceptanceofA.K.Sinha,
J., of the Calcutta High Court in Khanta Moni v. Shyam Chand. The
learnedJudgeheldthatawidoweddaughtertosustainherclaimfor
maintenanceneednotbeadestitutenorneedbeactuallymaintainedby
thefatherduringhislifetime...Allthatsheisrequiredtoprovetoget
suchmaintenance,thelearnedJudgeheld,isthatatthematerialtime
she is a destitute and she could not get any maintenance from her
husband'sfamily.
23

ThenextimportantcaseonthesubjectisthatoftheMadrasHigh

CourtinVenkatrazuv.Kotayya,(1912)23MadLJ223.Inthistheview
ofRanede,J.,inBaiMangal'scase,(1899ILR23Bom291)(supra)was
dissentedfrombyholdingthatthereisalegalobligationonthefather
andhis familytosupportadestitute daughter (though she had been
married away) if she could not get sufficient provision from her
deceased husband's family for her maintenance. The learned Judge,

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SadasivaAiyar,J.,alsonotedthataccordingtoBhattacharyaunderthe
HinduLawTextswidoweddaughtersareentitledtomaintenanceand
'justicerequiresthattheirrightshouldberecognised'.
Referring to the argument that 'by marriage she becomes member of
another family and becomes so to say, "dead" to her own family, the
learnedJudgeheld,ismerelycarryinglegalfictionstoabsurdlengths.The
learnedJudgeillustratedthisabsurditythus:
"Awifeishalfherhusband's bodybutyoucannot onthatground give
doublerationstothehusbandforhismealsandgivenonetothewife;nor
does the daughter lose her consanguineness, blood relationship to her
fatherandherrightofinheritancetohimandothersimilarrights,simply
because she becomes attached by Pinda, Gotra and Sootake to her
husband'sfamilybymarriage."
Advertingtothequestion,namely'hasnotawidoweddestitutedaughter
whosehusband'sfamilyisunabletogiveheranythinghasshenotalegal
claimonherfatherforhermaintenanceatleastwhensheliveswithhimas
amemberofhisfamily?Hasshenot,atleast,asocialandmoralclaim
againstherfatherwhichripensintoalegalrightagainsthisestateafter
hisdeathjustasinthecaseofadaughterinlawwhohasonlyasocial
andmoralclaimagainstherfatherinlawifhehasnoancestralproperty
andwhosemoralclaimbecomesalegalclaimafterhisdeath?'
thelearnedJudge,SadasivaAiyar,J.,observed:
"Theauthoritiesareallinfavouroftheexistenceofsucharightinthe
destitutemarrieddaughterexceptonedoubtfuldecisioninBaiMangalv.
Bai Rukhmini, (1899 ILR23 Bom 291), J.C. Ghose says(Hindu Law
pages295and296)"ThelawofNaradaisclear,thatwhenthehusband's
familyisindestitutecircumstances,thefather'sfamilyhastomaintaina
female. Itisdifficulttoseehowitisonlyamoralduty.....Whenthe
father'sfamilymarryagirltoapoorman...howcanitbesaidthatwhen
shebecomeshelplessonaccountoftheindigenceofthehusband'sfamily
thefather'sfamilycanturnheroutwithoutamaintenance?....According
tothestrictletteroftheHinduLawandalsoaccordingtothenatureofthe
ConstitutionofHinduSociety,itisaclearlegaldutyonthepartofthe
father's family to maintain a woman under the circumstances noted
above."
24

InMt.BholiBaiv.DwarkaDas,AIR1925Lahore32,theLahore

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HighCourtheldthatthesisterisentitledtomaintenanceagainstthe
propertiesofherdeceasedfatherinthehandsofherbrother.
25

In the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in

AmbuBaiv.SoniBai,AIR1940Madras804,thedaughterfiledasuit
againstherstepmotherforhermaintenancefromoutofthepropertyof
her father inherited by her stepmother, on the ground that she is a
widowwithnomeansandthatherhusband'sfamilyisunabletosupport
her. Considering the claim the Full Bench examined whether the
principlelaiddowninJankiv.NandRam'scase,(1889ILR11All194)
(supra)oftheAllahabadHighCourtcouldbeextendedtothecaseofa
widowed daughter, who has no means of subsistence. While so
examining,itrecalledthattheAllahabadHighCourtheldthatthefather
was under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain his
widoweddaughterinlawduringhislifetimeandtomakeprovisionout
ofhisselfacquiredpropertyforhermaintenanceafterhisdeath.This
moralobligationbecomeslegalonebyreasonofthefactthattheson
inheritstheproperty.Thebasisforthischangeofcharacterintolegal
onewasthatthesontooktheestate,notforhisownbenefitbutforthe
spiritualbenefitofhis fatherashasbeenstatedinKhetramaniDasi's
case,(18682BengalLR15)(supra).TheFullBenchalsoreferredtotwo
casesreportedbyStrange(1830Editionpages83and90)andonecase
inMacnaghten(Vol.IIpp.117and118).

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InoneofthetwocasesreportedbyStrange:
AHindulefttwowidows,awidowedsisterwhohadlivedwithhimafter
the death ofher husband, and his mother. The question was towhom
should his estate go. The answer given was that the mother must be
maintainedandsomustbethesister,ifleftdestitutebyherhusband.
Inthesecondcase:
AHindulefttwowives,hismotherandsister.Theanswerwasthatthe
motherofthedeceasedHindu,beingotherwiseunprovidedfor,sufficient
allowancemustbesetapartfromhisestateforhermaintenance,andif
thedeceased'ssisterderivednothingfromherhusband,thewidowsshould
jointlycontributetowardshersupport.
InthecasereportedinMacnaghten:
The deceased left two sons by one wife (who died before him), and a
widowandhertwodaughters.Subsequent tohisdeath,oneofthetwo
sonsdied.Therethuswere(i)asonofhisfirstwife,(ii)awidowand(iii)
twodaughtersofthewidow.Thequestiontherewasifthewidowreceived
noportionofthepropertyfromherstepson,whethersheisentitledtoany
share in the estate. The answer was that the widow was entitled to
maintenancefromherstepson;andifhertwodaughtershavenotbeen
disposedofinmarriage,theywillalsohavesomeshareoftheirfather's
wealthtodefraytheirnuptialexpenses.Shouldthey,aftermarriage,bein
want of maintenance, in consequence of their husband's inability to
supportthem,theymustbeprovidedwithfoodandraimentbytheirhalf
brother.ThisisconformabletoDayabhagaandotherauthorities.
IfthesisterofadeceasedHinduisentitledtomaintenancefromoutofhis
estate,theFullBenchheld,itisimpossibletoimagineonwhatprinciple
maintenance canbedeniedtohisdaughter.Havingalsoreferredtothe
decision ofSadastva Aiyar, J.,inVenkatrazu's case,(191223 Mad LJ
223)(supra),theFullBenchfoundnodifficultyinextendingtheprinciple
embodiedinJankiv.NandRam'scase(1889ILR11All194)(supra)to
thecaseofadaughter.TheFullBenchaccordinglyconcludedthataHindu
widow is bound tomaintain out ofher husband's estate her husband's
widoweddaughterwhenthedaughteriswithoutmeansandherhusband's
familyisunabletosupporther.

26

In Appavu Udayan v. Nallamrnal, AIR 1949 Madras 24, the

Madras High Court had to deal with the rights of daughterinlaw

againstherfatherinlawandhisestateinthehandsofhisheirs.Thereit
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isheldthatthefatherinlawisunderamoralobligationtomaintainhis
widoweddaughterinlawoutofhisselfacquiredpropertyandthaton
his death if his selfacquired property descends by inheritance to his
heirs, the moral liability of the fatherinlaw ripens into a legal one
againsthisheirs.
27

AFullBenchoftheAndhraPradeshHighCourtin T.A.Lakshmi

Narasambav.T.Sundarammaheld:
"The moral obligation of a fatherinlaw possessed of separate or self
acquiredpropertytomaintainthewidoweddaughterinlawripensintoa
legalobligationinthehandsofpersonstowhomhehaseitherbequeathed
or made a gift of his property. Under the Hindu law there is amoral
obligationonthefatherinlawtomaintainthedaughterinlawandthe
heirswhoinheritthepropertyareliabletomaintainthedependants.Itis
the duty of the Hindu heirs to provide for the bodily and mental or
spiritualneeds oftheir immediate and nearer ancestors torelieve them
from bodily and mental discomfort and to protect their souls from the
consequencesofsin.Theyshouldmaintainthedependantspfthepersons
ofpropertytheysucceeded.Merelybecausethepropertyistransferredby
giftorbywillinfavouroftheheirstheobligationisnotextinct.When
thereispropertyinthehandsoftheheirsbelongingtothedeceasedwho
hadamoraldutytoprovidemaintenance,itbecomesalegaldutyonthe
heirs.Itmakesnodifferencewhetherthepropertyisreceivedeitherbyway
ofsuccessionorbywayofgiftorwill,theprinciplebeingcommonineither
case."[SeeKotaVaraprasadaRaovs.KotaChinaVenkaiah(1992
AIR(AP)1]

28

A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh HighCourt in the case of

Kota Varaprasada Rao vs. Kota China Venkaiah [1992 AIR (AP)1]
observedasunder:
[22] We must before proceeding further mention that we have been
conscious that the case law mostly referred toabove relates tomatters
pertainingtotherightsofthedaughterinlawagainstherfatherinlaw
andhisestate.Thereason,still,fortheirreferenceistheunusualpaucity
ofcaselawgoverningtherightsofdaughteragainstherfather,brothers,

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etc.'for hermaintenance. Thisscantiness ofcaselawismoreduetothe

devotionalcharacterandspiritualbeliefoftheHindupopulationandalso
duetothefactthatthelawabidingnatureoftheHindushaveprecluded
brothersfromdisputingtherightofmaintenanceoftheirwidowedsister.
Moreover,theanalogyinthecaselawwithreferencetothedaughterin
lawcanbeandinfacthasbeenalsoextendedtothedestitutewidowed
daughterbytheFullBenchoftheMadrasHighCourtinAmbuBai'scase
(AIR1940Madras804)(supra).
ItisalsointerestingtonotethatMANUsays:
"Thesupportofthegroupofpersonswhoshouldbemaintained
ej.kaiks";oxZL;
istheapprovedmeansofattaining heaven,buthellistheman's
portioniftheysuffer;therefore,heshouldcarefullymaintainthem.'
(CitedinDAYABHAGA,II,23)
MANUgoesontodescribethegroupofpersonstobemaintained:
"The father, the mother, the Guru, a wife, an offspring, poor
dependentsfnuk%lekfJrk%
aguestandareligiousmendicantaredeclaredtobethegroupof
persons who are to be maintained" (cited in Sri Krishna's
commentaryontheDAYABHAGA.)
MANUfurthersays:
"Afatherisboundtomaintainhisunmarrieddaughters.Onthe
deathofthefather theyareentitled tobemaintained outofhis
estate. A daughter on marriage ceases to be a member of her
father'sfamily,andbecomesamemberofherhusband'sfamily.....
Ifsheisunabletoobtainmaintenancefromherhusband,orafter
hisdeathfromhisfamily,herfather,ifhehasgotseparateofhis
own,isunderamoral,thoughnotalegal,obligationtomaintain
her."
(MULLA'sPrinciplesofHinduLaw,9thEdn.p.584).
[23]KAMALAKARA,ascitedbyDr.Jolly,inhisVIVADATANDAVAsays:
"Itisincumbentonthesonsandgrandsonstomaintainindigent
widowsand
daughterinlaw though no wealth of the father may be in
existence."

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Accordingtohim:
"Inrealitytheclaimofthefemalefamilymembersofmaintenance
doesnotbecomeextincteitherthroughtheabsenceofassets,orin
the somewhat analogous case ofaseparation ofthe coparceners
havingtakenplace."
[24]EvenGHOSEstatesthatafemaleisentitledtobemaintainedbyher
father's
family, if her husband's family is extinct, or incapable on account of
extremepoverty,tosupporther.(PrinciplesofHinduLaw,10thEdn.Page
305).
[25] AgainaccordingtoMEDHATITHIascitedbyGHOSEatpage310,
thesonlesswidoweddaughterandgranddaughterandsistercomebackto
thefamilyofthefather.MEDHATITHI'sworkasobservedbyMAYNEis
theearliestcommentaryextantonMANUandisfrequentlyreferredtoas
ofhighauthority.
[26]SARKARexpressestheopinionthatamarrieddaughterisordinarily
to be maintained in her husband's family, but if they are unable to
maintainher,sheisentitledtobemaintainedinherfather'sfamily.(8th
Edn.p.534).
[27] Inviewofthedifferenttextscitedandthecaselawnoted,wehold
thatadestitutewidoweddaughterhasarightofmaintenanceagainsther
brothers after thedeathofherfather when shecould not getsufficient
provisionfromherdeceasedhusband'sfamilyforhermaintenance.

29

IshallnowlookintothedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinthecase

ofKirtikantD.Vadodaria(supra).Inthiscase,theappellantwasachild
of tender age when his mother expired and his father took the
respondent No.2 as his second wife from whom five sons and two
daughterswereborn.Allofthemweremajorandatleastthreeofthem
werewelltodoandcapableofmaintainingtheirdaughters.Thefather
was alsopossessedof sufficient means. The respondentNo.2 claimed
maintenancefromstepson,theappellant,livingoutallhernaturalborn

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sonsandhusbandwhowerewelltodo.TheMagistratetooktheview
thatinspiteoftherespondentNo.2beingastepmotheroftheappellant,
shehadarighttoclaimmaintenancefromtheappellantandawardeda
sumofRs.400/permonthasthemaintenanceallowance.Thisorder
wasupheldbytheCitySessionsJudgeandtheHighCourt.Thematter
reachedtotheSupremeCourt.Allowingtheappeal,theSupremeCourt
madethefollowingobservations:
10.Toresolvethecontroversy,itwouldbeappropriatetoreproducethe
relevantpartofSection125oftheCodewhichreadsasunder:

"125.Orderformaintenanceofwives,childrenandparents,
(1)IfanypersonHavingsufficientmeansneglectsorrefuses
tomaintain
(a)hiswife,unableto maintainherself,or
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether
marriedornot,unabletomaintainitself.or
(c) his legitimate ofillegitimate child (notbeing married
daughter) whohas attainedmajority, where suchchild is,by
reasonof anyphysicalor mentalabnormality orinjuryunable
tomaintainitself,or(d)hisfatherormother,unabletomaintain
himselforherself, amagistrate of the first classmay,upon
proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a
monthly allowance for themaintainsofhiswifeorsuch
child,father ormother,at such monthly rate notexceeding
fivehundredrupeesinthewhole,assuchMagistratethinksfit,
andtopaythesametosuchpersonastheMagistratemayfrom
timetotimedirect:
ProvidedthattheMagistratemyorderthefatheroraminor
femalechildreferredtoinclause(b)tomakesuchallowance,until
sheattainshermajority,iftheMagistrateissatisfiedthatthe
husbandofsuchminorfemalechild,ifMarried,isnotpossessedof
sufficientmeans.
Explanation,Forthepurposesofthischapter.

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(a)"Minor"meansapersonwho,undertheprovisionsofthe
IndianMajorityAct,1875(9of1875),isdeemednottohave
attainedhismajority:
(b)"wife"includesawomanwhohasbeendivorcedby,orhas
obtainedadivorcefrom,herhusbandandhasnotremarried.

2.Suchallowanceshallbepayablefromthedateoftheorder,
on, if so ordered, from the date of the application for
maintenance.
(3)(5) xx
xx xx

11.
Admittedly,the expressions"mother"and"stepmother"havenot
beendefined either in the Code or in the General Clauses Act. These
expressionshavealsonotbeendefinedbytheHindu Lawor theHindu
AdoptionsandMaintenanceAct,1956or byany otherLaw. Asstated
earlier. allthatthe explanation attached toSection 20 ofthe Hindu
AdoptionsandMaintenance Act,1956 provides is thattheExpression
"parent"includesachildless stepmother.Hisbeingtheposition,wehave
toresorttothedictionarymeaningandthemeaninginwhichthese
expressions are commonly understood in the popular sense . In the
PermanentEditionorWORDSANDPHRASES, VOLUME 27A, atpage
348,the
word"mother"has beengiven themeaning todenotea
womanwhohasborne achildorafemaleparent,especiallyoneofthe
humanrace.InVolume
40ofthesaidPermanentEditionofWORDS
ANDPHRASE.atpage145.theexpression"stepmother"hasbeengiven
the meaning as to be the 'wife of one's father by virtu of marriage
subsequenttothatofwhichthepersonspokenofistheoffspring.Ithas
beenfurtherstatedthata"stemmother"isarelativebyaffinityandthe
relationship continues after the death of the faster. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 5th Edition, at page 913, has given the meaning of
"mother"asawomanwhohasborneachild,afemaleparent.Further,at
page1268, themeaning of"stepmother" isstated tomean thewife of
one's father by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the
personspokenofistheoffspringSimilarly,inTHESHORTEROXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, volume II, at page 1360, the meaning of the
word"mother"isgivenasawomanwhohasgivenbirthtoachildora
femaleparent, andatpage12122,expression"stemmother"has been
assigned the meaning as The wife of one's father by a subsequent
marriage. According toWebster Dictionary(international Edition), the
expression"mother"meansafemaleparentandthatwhichwasproduced
or given birth to anyone. Thus. on a conspectus view of dictionary
meaningof thetwoexpressions"mother"and"stepmother"invarious
dictionaries,itclearlyemergesthatthereisinherentdistinctionbetween
thestatusofamotherand'stepmother'andtheyaretwodistinct

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andseparateentitiesandbothcouldnotbeassignedthesamemeaning.
Theexpression"mother" clearly means onlythe naturalmotherwho
hasgivenbirthtothechildandnottheonewhoisthewifeofone'sfather
byanothermarriage.
11.
ItmaybementionedherethatinTheGeneralClausesActthough
theexpression"father"hasbeendefinedinclause20ofSection3,out
theexpression"motherhasnotbeendefined.Theexpression"father"as
defined intheGeneralClauses Act,1656meansinthecaseofanyone
whosePersonalLawpermitsadoption,shallincludeanadoptivefather'.
Applying thesaidanalogy, at best.an adoptive mother mayalsobe
included in the expression mother but not a stepmother. As discussed
above,astepmotherisonewhoistakenasawifebythefatherofthe
childotherthantheonefromwhomtheisbornorwhohasgivenbirthto
theonefromwhom heis bornor whohas givenbirthtohim.This
clearlygoes toshow thatthewoman who givesbirthtoachildand
another woman whois takenbythefather ashisother wifearetow
distinctandseparateentitiesintheeyeofLaw
and who in common
balanceareknowandrecognizedasreal'mother'andstepmother.That
beingso,anotherwomanwhois taken as a wife by the father of the
child cannot be given the status of mother to the child born from
anotherwomanasthereisnobloodrelationbetweenthetwo.
13.
WemayalsohereusefullyrefertoanolddecisionofanDivision
BenchofBombayHighCourtinBaidayav.NathaGovindalal[(1885)9
IndianLaw Report279],itwasheldthatthe term'mata' standsfor
'janani' "genitrix", and sapatnamata "noverca". It has been further
observedinthesaiddecisionthat'mata'and'matapitrau'areSanskrit
wordswhichareusedinthetextbyManu,MitaksnaraandSalamphatta
and inboth thecases discussion proceedsonthesuppositionthatthe
primarymeaningof'mata'was'naturalmother'andthatitwasonly
insecondary andfigurativesensethatitcouldmeana"stepmother".It
is,therefore,clearthatevenundertheoldHinduLawalso,theexpression
motherwasreferableonlytothenaturalmotherwhohasgivenbirthto
thechildandnotthestepmother.Itwouldbe difficult toassumethat
thelegislaturewasunmindfulof the social fabric and thestructure
ofrelationshipinthefamilies.Theexistenceofvariouskindsofrelatives
inoursocietywasnotsomethingofwhichtheParliamentmaybesaidto
ignorantwhenitthoughttoenacttheNewCodeof 1973and forthe
firsttimenotonlytheparentswereincludedamongstthepersonsentitled
toclaimmaintenanceunderSection125 (1)(d) but even the divorced
woman hadbeen included inthe expression wife tobe entitle toclaim
maintenance,whowerenotsoincludedinSection488of
the "step
father"or"stepmother"arenotincludedintheexpression"hisfather"or
mother"occuringinclause(d)ofSection125(1)ofthecodegivingaclear
indicationofthelegislativeintent.

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14.
Inview of the above discussion itfollows that the expression
mother,inclause(d)ofsection125(1)ofCode,meansandisreferable
onlytotherealornaturalmother,whohas actuallygivenbirthtothe
child and if that be so the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in
HavabenBeline'scase(supra) thattheword'mother'occuringinclause
(d)ofSection 125(1)includes awomanwhohasthestatusofastep
mother byreason ofherlawful marriage withthe father oftheperson
soughttobemadeliableformaintenanceunderSection125. cannotbe
accepted.Thisassumptionofthemeaningoftheexpressionmotherby
legal fiction would mean some thing which is not so intended by the
legislature.ForthesamereasonstheviewtakenbytheOrissaHighCourt
inPeteiBewa's case(supra).cannotalsobeacceptedasitadoptsthe
reasoningoftheGujaratHighCourtinpreferencetoBombayHighCourt
whichtooktheviewthattheword'mother'usedinSection125(1)(d)of
theCode,willhavetobegivenitsnaturalmeaningandsoconstruedit
willmeanonlythenaturalmotherandwillnot includethestepmother,
whoincommonparlanceisadistinctandseparateentityandcannot
beequatedwithone'sownmother.TheHighCourtofAllahabadincase
ofGangaSaranVarshney(supra) was mainlyconcerned withthe
question ofjurisdiction with reference tothe place where maintenance
petitioncouldbefiledandthereisnoelaboratediscussiononthequestion
whether a stepmother would include in the expression "mother' in
Section125(1)(d)oftheCodeisthecorrectviewandthecontraryview
oftheGujaratHighCourt,OrissaHighCourtandtheAllahabadHigh
Court(supra)innotthecorrectview.
15.
Thepintincontroversybeforeushoweveriswhethera'stepmother'
canclaimmaintenance fromthestepsonornot, havingregard tothe
aimsandobjectsofSection125oftheCode. While dealing with the
ambitandscopeoftheprovisioncontainedinSection125oftheCode,it
hastobeborneinmindthatthedominantandprimaryobjectistogive
socialjusticetothewoman,childandinfirmparentsetc.andtoprevent
distitutionandvagrancybycompellingthosewhocansupport thosewho
areunabletosupportthemselvesbuthaveamoralclaimforsupport.
Theprovisionsinsection125provideaspeedyremedytothosewomen.
children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions in
Section 125areintendedtoachievethisspecialpurpose.Thedominant
purpose behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125
clearly is that thewife,child andparents shouldnot beleft ina
helplessstateofdistress,destitutionandstarvation,Havingregardtothis
socialobject theprovisionsofSection125oftheCodehavetobegiven
a liberal construction to fulfil and achieve this intention of the
Legislature. consequently, toachieve this objective, in outopinion, a
childlessstepmothermayclaimmaintenancefromherstepsonprovided
sheiswidoworherhusband,ifliving,isalsoincapableofsupporting
andmaintainingher.Theobligationofthesontomaintainhis father,
who isunabletomaintainhimself,isunquestionable,Whensheclaims

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maintenancefromhernaturalbornchildren,shedoessoinherstatusas
their'mother'.such an interpretation would beinaccord withthe
explanation attached to Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and
maintenance Act.1956 because to exclude altogether the personal Law
applicabletothepartiesfromconsiderationinmatters of maintenance
underSection125oftheCodemaynotbewhollyjustified.However,
nointentionofLegislaturecanbereadinSection125oftheCodethat
eventhoughamotherhasherrealandnaturalbornsonorsonsanda
husband capable of maintaining her,she could still proceed against her
stepsontoclaimmaintenance.Since,inthiscase wearenotconcerned
with,weexpressnoopining,onthe question of liability, if any, of the
stepsontomaintainthestepmother,outoftheinheritedfamilyestateby
thestepsonandleavethatquestiontobedecidedinanappropriatecase.
OurdiscussionisconfinedtotheobligationsunderSection125Cr.P.C.
only.
16.
In the present case, as discussed above, the "stepmother'
respondent No. 2hasgot5natural born sons whoareallmajor and
atleast3ofthemarewelltodoandcapableofmaintainingtheirmother.
Thisapart,asalreadynoticed,thehusbandofrespondentNo.2isalso
possessedofsufficientmeansandpropertybesidesthemonthlyincome
thatthederivesfromthebusinessofSnuffanablinghimtomaintainand
supporthissecondwife.yetthestepmotherrespondentNo.2preferredto
claim the maintenance only from the stepson. the appellant herein
leaving out all her natural born sons (from whom she could claim
maintenance as their mother) and husband who are well todo.Prima
facieitappearsthatrespondentNo.2proceededagainstherstepsonwith
aviewtopunishandcauseharassmenttotheappellant,whichiswholly
unjustified.Inthefactsandcircumstancesofthiscase,weareoftheview
thatrespondentNo.2isnotentitledtoclaim
any maintenance from
the stepson,appellantherein.Intheresulttheappealsucceedsandis
herebyallowed.TheimpugnedordersoftheHighCourtandtheCourts
belowaresetasideandthepetitionofrespondentNo.2formaintenanceis
dismissed,butwithoutanyordersastocosts.We,however,wishtoclarify
thatintheinterestofjusticeandto balancetheequities,theamount
already received by respondent No.2 fromtheappellantshallnotbe
refundablebyhertotheappellant.

30

Thus,theSupremeCourt,intheabovereferreddecision,heldthat

theexpressionmotherinSection125(1)(d)oftheCodewouldonly
mean real or natural mother and would not include stepmother.
According to the Supreme Court, the stepmother is a distinct and

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separateentityandcannotbeequatedwiththenaturalmotherwhohas
givenbirthtothechild.However,anadoptivemothercanbeincludedin
the expression mother. It further held that having regard to the
purpose behind the benevolent provisions of Section 125, a childless
stepmotherisentitledtoclaimmaintenancefromherstepsonprovided
sheisawidoworherhusband,ifliving,isalsoincapableofmaintaining
her.Thequestionwhetherastepsonisliabletomaintainhisstepmother
outoftheinheritedestatewaskeptopen.Whiletakingtheviewthata
biologicalmother,whensheclaimsmaintenancefromhernaturalborn
children,shedoessoinherstatusastheirmother,theSupremeCourt,
considered the explanation attached to Section 20 of the Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Supreme Court observed
thattoexcludealtogetherthepersonallawapplicabletothepartiesfrom
considerationinmattersofmaintenanceunderSection125oftheCode
maynotbewhollyjustified.TheSupremeCourtultimatelyconcluded
thatnointentionoftheLegislaturecouldbereadinSection125ofthe
Codethateventhoughamotherhasherrealandnaturalbornsonor
sonsandherhusbandcapableofmaintainingher,shecouldstillproceed
againstherstepsontoclaimmaintenance.
31

Inthecaseinhand,thefollowingfactsarenotindispute:

(1)

TheSonoftherespondentNo.2,lateShriPrakashkumarSarvaiya,

had married with Ashaben Manjibhai on 09.02.1998, and in the

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wedlock,Jahnviwasborn.Jahnvi,asontoday,isfifteenyearsold.Iam
toldthatsheisstudyingatVadodara.
(2)

On account of matrimonial dispute, the biological parents of

Jahnvi decided to dissolve the marriage, and therefore, they filed a

HinduMarriagePetitionNo.32of2003underSection13oftheHindu
Marriage Actin theCourtofthe learned2nd JointCivil Judge(SD),
Bhavnagar,fordissolutionofmarriagewithconsent.
(3)

Themarriagewasdissolvedandadecreeofdivorcewaspassedon

16.12.2003.
(4)

LatePrakashkumarthereaftermarriedwiththepetitionerherein

on18.12.2005accordingtotheHinduritesandrituals.Afterdivorce,
Jahnvi remained in the care and custody of her father late
Prakashkumar.
(5)

On25.03.2006,Prakashkumari.e.thefatherofJahnvidied.

(6)

For a period of three years thereafter, the custody of Jahnvi

remainedwiththepetitioner.
(7)

OneMiscellaneousCivil Application No.75of2008wasfiledin

the Court of the learned Principal District Judge, Bhavnagar by the

respondentNo.2hereinunderSection7oftheGuardianandWardsAct
forthecustodyofJahnvi.
(8)

The learned Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar, vide order

dated04.09.2010,waspleasedtoallowthesaidapplicationandhanded

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over the custody of Jahnvi to the respondent No.2 i.e. her parental
grandfather.
(9)

Theabovereferredeventswouldsuggestthatfrom2005onwards

till2010,Jahnviremainedwiththepetitioner.
(10) ThenaturalmotherofJahnvi,namely,AshabenManjibhaiisalive
asontoday.Sheisalsoserving.IamtoldthatAshabenManjibhaihas
alsoclaimedthecustodyofJahnvibeingthebiologicalmotherandis
readyandwillingtotakecareofJahnvi.Forsomereasonortheother,
Jahnvimaynotbereadyandwillingtolivewithhermother,namely,
Ashaben.ItisalsonotindisputethatJahnvihasnotthoughtfittoclaim
anymaintenancefromherbiologicalmother,namely,Ashaben.
(11) Jahnvihasclaimedmaintenancethroughhergrandfatheri.e.the
respondentNo.2onthepremisethatthepetitionerhadmarriedwithher
father,andatthetimeofmarriage,shehadundertakenorratheritis
presumedthatshehadundertakentheresponsibilityofJahnvi.Further,
thepetitionerhasinheritedsomeoftheassetsoflatePrakashkumar,and
therefore, the petitioner is duty bound to maintain Jahnvi, although
Jahnvimaynotbeherowndaughter.
32

Havingregardtotheabovereferredfacts,Ihavenohesitationin

comingtotheconclusionthatthepetitionershouldnotbesaddledwith
the responsibility of maintaining Jahnvi, more particularly, when the
naturalmotherofJahnvi,isverymuchaliveandisreadyandwillingto

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takecareofJahnvi.Besidesthesame,itappearsthatahugeamountof
Rs.23lacwasreceivedbytherespondentNo.2fromtheL.I.C.onthe
demiseofPrakashkumari.e.thefatherofJahnvi.
33

However, the larger issue still remains to be addressed. What

wouldhavebeenthepositioniftherewasnonetolookafterandtake
careofJahnviexceptthepetitionerbeingherstepmother.
34

For properly appreciating the larger controversy raised in this

case,ImayonceagainrefertotheprovisionsofSection125oftheCode
whichreadsasfollows:
125 (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to
maintain
(a)hiswife,unabletomaintainherself,or
(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not,
unabletomaintainitself,or
(c)hislegitimateorillegitimatechild(notbeingamarrieddaughter)who
hasattainedmajority,wheresuchchildis,byreasonofanyphysicalor
mentalabnormalityorinjuryunabletomaintainitself,or
(d)hisfatherormother,unabletomaintainhimselforherself,
aMagistrateofthefirstclassmay,uponproofofsuchneglectorrefusal,
ordersuchpersontomakeamonthlyallowanceforthemaintenanceofhis
wifeorsuchchild,fatherormother,atsuchmonthlyratenotexceeding
fivehundredrupeesinthewhole,assuchMagistratethinksfit,and10pay
thesametosuchpersonastheMagistratemayfromtimetotimedirect:
Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor
femalechildreferredtoinclause(b)tomakesuchallowance,until
she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the
husbandofsuchminorfemalechild,ifmarried,isnotpossessedof
sufficientmeans.

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Explanation:Forthepurposesofthischapter,
(a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian
Majority Act, 1875 is deemed not to have attained his majority (9 of
1875);
(b)"wife"includesawomanwhohasbeendivorcedby,orhasobtaineda
divorcefrom,herhusbandandhasnotremarried.
(2)Suchallowanceshallbepayablefromthedateoftheorder,or,ifso
ordered,fromthedateoftheapplicationformaintenance.
(3)Ifanypersonsoorderedfailswithoutsufficientcausetocomplywith
theorder,anysuchMagistratemay,foreverybreachoftheorder,issuea
warrantforlevyingtheamountdueinthemannerprovidedforlevying
fines,andmaysentence suchperson,forthewholeoranypartofeach
monthsallowanceremainingunpaidaftertheexecutionofthewarrant,to
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until
paymentifsoonermade:
Provided thatnowarrant shallbeissued fortherecoveryofany
amountdueunderthissectionunlessapplicationbemadetothe
Courttolevysuchamount withinaperiodofoneyearfromthe
dateonwhichitbecamedue:
Providedfurtherthatifsuchpersonofferstomaintainhiswifeon
conditionofherlivingwithhim,andsherefusestolivewithhim,
suchMagistratemayconsideranygroundofrefusalstatedbyher,
andmaymakeanorderunder thissectionnotwithstanding such
offer,ifheissatisfiedthatthereisjustgroundsforsodoing.
Explanation.Ifahusbandhascontractedmarriagewithanotherwoman
orkeepsamistress,itshallbeconsideredtobejustgroundforhiswife's
refusaltolivewithhim.
(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an d [allowance for the
maintenance ortheinterimmaintenance andexpensesofproceeding,as
thecasemaybe],fromherhusbandunderthissectionifsheislivingin
adultery,orif,withoutanysufficientreason,sherefusestolivewithher
husband,oriftheyarelivingseparatelybymutualconsent.
(5)Onproofthatanywifeinwhosefavouranorderhasbeenmadeunder
this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she
refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by
mutualconsent,theMagistrateshallcanceltheorder.

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Primafaciethoughsection125oftheCodecorrespondstosection

488 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure it is obvious that it has

broughtaboutmajorandsubstantialchanges.Itisfurtherclearthatthe
saiddecisioncreatesastatutoryliabilityirrespectiveofthepersonallaw
oftheparties.AsobservedbytheSupremeCourtin NanakChandv.
ChandraKishore[AIR1970SC446]thereisnoinconsistencybetween
theMaintenanceActandSection488,CriminalProcedureCode.While
dealingwiththisaspectofthematterundertheoldCodeofCriminal
Procedure,theSupremeCourtobservedasunder:
ThelearnedCounselsaysthatSec.488,CriminalProcedureCode,inso
farasitprovidesforthegrantofmaintenancetoaHindu,isinconsistent
withChapter IIIoftheMaintenance Act, andinparticular, Section 20,
which provides for maintenance to children. We are unable to see any
inconsistency between the Maintenance Act and Section 488, Criminal
ProcedureCode.Bothcanstandtogether.TheMaintenanceActisanActto
amendandcodifythelawrelatingtoadoptionsandmaintenanceamong
Hindus. The law was substantially similar before and nobody ever
suggested that Hindu Law, as in force immediately before the
commencementofthisAct,insofarasitdealtwiththemaintenanceof
children was in any way inconsistent with Section 488, Criminal
Procedure Code. The scope of the two laws is different. Section 488
providesasummaryremedyandisapplicabletoallpersonsbelongingto
allreligionsandhasnorelationshipwiththepersonallawoftheparties.
RecentlythequestioncamebeforetheAllahabadHighCourtinRamSingh
v.State,AIR1963 All355,beforetheCalcuttaHighCourtinMahabir
Agarwallav.GitaRoy,1962(2)CriLJ528(Cal),andbeforethePatna
HighCourtinNaliniRanjanv.KiranRani,AIR1965Pat442.Thethree
High Courts have, in our view, correctly come to the conclusion that
Section 4 (b) of the Maintenance Act does not repeal or affect in any
manner the provisions contained in Section 488, Criminal Procedure
Code.

36

TheSupremeCourthadalsoanoccasiontoconsiderthescopeof

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proceedingsundersection488oftheoldCodeofCriminalProcedurein
Mst.JagirKaurv.JaswantSingh[AIRSC1521]. Inthiscontext,the
SupremeCourtobservedasfollows:
"Theproceedingsunderthissectionareinthenatureofcivilproceedings,
theremedyisasummaryoneandthepersonseekingthatremedy,aswe
havepointedout,isordinarilyahelplessperson.Sothewordsshouldbe
liberallyconstruedwithoutdoinganyvoilencetothelanguage........
To summarize: Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure
providingformaintenanceofwivesandchildrenintendstoserveasocial
purpose. Section 488 prescribes alternative forums toenable adeserted
wife or a helpless child, legitimate or illegitimate, to get urgent relief.
Proceedings under the section can be taken against the husband orthe
father,asthecasemaybe,inaplacewhereheresides,permanentlyor
temporarily,orwherehehappenstobeatthetimetheproceedingsare
initiated.

36.1 Therefore,itisquiteobviousthattheobjectoftheproceedingsis
topreventvagrancybycompellingthehusbandorthefathertosupport
hiswifeorchildunabletosupportitself.Inasensetheprovisionsare
notpenalinnature,butareonlyintendedforenforcementofaduty,a
defaultofwhichismadepenal.Itisalsoclearthatsuchaprovisionhas
beenmadetoserveasocialpurposeforprovidingaspeedyremedyina
summarymannertoapersonwhoisordinarilyhelpless.Therefore,as
observedbytheSupremeCourtinMs.JagirKaurscasethewordswill
have to be liberally construed without doing any violence to the
language,ofcoursewithinthepermissiblelimits.Itiswellsettledthata
wordwhichisnotdefinedintheAct,butwhichisawordofeveryday
usemustbeconstruedinitspopularsense.WhileconstruingaStatute,

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which is secular in nature and dealing with the matter relating to

generalpublic,theLegislatureispresumedtousethewordsusedinthe
Statute inthe popularsense as understood in commonparlanceand,
therefore,normallytheyshouldbetheirordinary,naturalandfamiliar
meaning.
37

Letmefirsttesttheargumentofthelearnedadvocateappearing

for the petitioner that the Legislature has specifically mentioned the
words his legitimate or illegitimate minor child. The question,
therefore, raised by the petitioner is whether the word his would
includeher.Accordingtothelearnedadvocate,havingregardtothe
word his even a biological mother does not seem to have been
includedwithinSection125oftheCode.
38

Clause(a)dealswiththerightofthewifewhoisunableto

maintain herself,toclaim maintenance from her husband. Clause(b)

dealswiththerightofthechildren,whoareminor,togetmaintenance
from their parents. Within the import of clause (b) even a married
daughter is included. Clause (c) deals with a disabled child who has
attainedmajority.Thebracketedportion"notbeingamarrieddaughter"
coversonlyclause(c)andnottheothersubclausesofSection125(1)of
theCode.Thisisobviousfromtheuseofspecificexpression"whether
marriedornot"insubclause(b)ofSection125(1).Thencomessub

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cause (d) which confers a right upon a father or mother unable to

maintainhimselforherselftoclaimmaintenance.Theword"person"is
notdefinedintheCode,northeexpression"his"isdefined.However,by
Section2(y)oftheCodeitislaiddownthatthewordsandexpressions
usedthereinandnotdefinedbutdefinedinthePenalCodehavethe
meaningsrespectivelyassignedtotheminthatCode.Section8ofthe
PenalCodereadsasunder:
"Gender. The pronoun 'he' and its derivatives are used of any person,
whethermaleorfemale."

38.1 Section 11 defines the word "person", which includes any

CompanyorAssociation,orbodyofpersons,whetherincorporatedor
not. The definition of the word "person" is inclusive and, therefore,
obviouslynotexhaustive.Section13(1)oftheGeneralClausesActlays
downthatinallCentralActsandRegulations,unlessthereisanything
repugnant in the subject or context, words importing the masculine
gendershallbetakentoincludefemales.Theword"person"isdefinedin
Section3(42)oftheGeneralClausesActandthedefinitionisakintothe
definitioninSection11ofthePenalCode.Further,bySection2(y)of
theCr.P.C.itisprovidedthatthewordsandexpressionsusedinthe
CodearetobeunderstoodasdefinedbythePenalCode.Therefore,itis
quiteclearthatthepronoun"he"anditsderivativesasusedinSection
125oftheCr.P.C.wouldincludeinitsimport,bothamaleorafemale.

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Intheaforesaidcontext,Imayquotewithprofitthedecisionof

the SupremeCourtinthe case of Dr.Ms.VijayaManoharArbatvs.

Kashirao Rajaram Sawai [AIR 1987 SC 1100]. The point involved
beforetheSupremeCourtwaswhethertherespondentNo.1thereinwas
entitledtoclaimmaintenancefromtheappellant,hismarrieddaughter,
underSection125(1)(d)oftheCr.P.C.TheSupremeCourtaffirming
thejudgmentoftheBombayHighCourtheldasunder:
8.
Weareunabletoacceptthiscontention.ItistruethatCl.(d)has
usedtheexpression"hisfatherormother"but,inouropinion,theuseof
the word 'his' does not exclude the parents claiming maintenance from
theirdaughter.Section2(y),Cr.P.C.providesthatwordsandexpressions
usedhereinandnotdefinedbutdefinedintheIndianPenalCodehavethe
meaningsrespectivelyassignedtotheminthatCode.S.8oftheIndian
PenalCodelaysdownthatthepronoun'he'anditsderivativesareusedfor
anypersonwhethermaleorfemale.Thus,inviewofS.8,IPCreadwithS.
2(y), Cr. P.C. the pronoun 'his' in Cl. (d) of S. 125(l), Cr. P.C. also
indicates afemale. Section 13(1) oftheGeneral Clauses Act lays down
that in all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything
repugnantinthesubjectorcontext,wordsimportingthemasculinegender
shallbetakentoincludefemales.Therefore,thepronoun'his'asusedin
Cl.(d)ofS.125(l)Cr.P.C.includesbothamaleandafemale.Inother
words, the parents will be entitled to claim maintenance against their
daughter provided, however, the other conditions a mentioned in the
sectionarefulfilled.Beforeorderingmaintenanceinfavourofafatherora
motheragainsttheirmarrieddaughter,theCourtmustbesatisfiedthat
thedaughterhassufficientmeansofherownindependentlyofthemeans
orincomeofherhusband,andthatthefatherorthemother,asthecase
maybe,isunabletomaintainhimselforherself.

40

Inthecaseof Rajathivs.C.Ganeshan[AIR1999SC2374(1)],

theSupremeCourtmadethefollowingobservationsinpara8asunder:
8.WemayalsohavealookattheprovisionsoftheHinduAdoptionsand
MaintenanceAct1956,whichprovidesformaintenancetoaHinduwife.
UnderSection18ofthisActaHinduwife,whethermarriedbeforeorafter

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thecommencementofthisAct,shallbeentitledtobemaintainedbyher
husbandduringherlifetime.Undersubsection(2)shewillbeentitledto
live separate from her husband without forfeiting her claim to
maintenance,(a)ifheisguiltyofdesertion,thatistosay,ofabandoning
herwithoutreasonablecauseandwithoutherconsentoragainstherwish,
orofwilfullyneglectingher;(b)ifhehastreatedherwithsuchcrueltyas
tocauseareasonableapprehensioninhermindthatitwillbeharmfulor
injurioustolivewithherhusband;(c)ifheissufferingfromavirulent
form of leprosy; (d) if he has any other wife living; (e) if he keeps a
concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually
resideswithaconcubineelsewhere;(f)ifhehasceasedtobeaHinduby
conversion to another religion; and (g) if there is any other cause
justifyingherlivingseparately.Undersubsection(3)aHinduwifeisnot
entitledtoseparateresidenceandmaintenancefromherhusbandifsheis
unchasteorceasestobeHindubyconversiontoanotherreligion. Itwill
beappositetokeeptheseprovisionsinviewwhileconsideringthe
petitionunderSection125oftheCode.

41

Section20(2)oftheHinduAdoptionsandMaintenancesAct1956

readsasunder:
Alegitimateorillegitimatechildmayclaimmaintenancefromhis
orherfatherormothersolongasthechildisaminor.

42

Thus,theActof1956alsomakesitveryclearthatalegitimateor

illegitimate child can claim maintenance from his or her father or

mother. Therefore, the maintenance can be claimed from the mother
also. In such circumstances, there is no difficulty in reading Section
125(1)(b)accordingly.However,thequestioninthepresentcaseiswith
regardtotherightofthestepdaughtertoclaimmaintenancefromher
stepmother.
43

ThepresentLegislationissecularinnatureandisapplicabletoall

persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the

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personallawoftheparties.TheSupremeCourthadagainanoccasionto
considerthisaspectofthematterinBhagwanDuttvs.Smt.KamlaDevi
[AIR1975SC83].Inthesaiddecisionareferencewasalsomadeto
section125ofthenewCodeandthenitwasobservedbytheSupreme
Courtasunder:
The question therefore resolves itself into the issue whether there is
anythinginSection488whichisinconsistentwithSection23oranyother
provisions oftheAct?Thismatter isnolonger resintegra.InNanak
Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal, this Court held that there is no
inconsistency between Act 78 of1956 and Section 488, Criminal P. C.
Bothcouldstandtogether.TheActof1956isanActtoamendandcodify
the lawrelating toadoption and maintenance among Hindus. The law
wassubstantiallysimilar before whenitwasnever suggested thatthere
wasanyinconsistencywithSec.488.CriminalP.C.Thescopeofthetwo
laws is different. Section 488 provides a summary remedy and is
applicabletoallpersonsbelongingtoallreligionsandhasnorelationship
withthepersonallawoftheparties.

44

Therefore,itisquiteobviousthattheprovisionsofSection125as

such are neither inconsistent nor are controlled by the provisions of

Hindu Adoptions andMaintenanceAct,1956. Thus,the provisions of
Section125oftheCodewillhavetobeconstruedhavingregardtothe
phraseologyusedinthesectionitself.
45

TheSupremeCourtinthecaseof GulrajSinghvs.MotaSingh

[AIR1965SC608]hadtheoccasiontoconsidertheimportoftheword
son or daughter which occurred in the Punjab Preemption Act,
1913,asamendedbyAct10of1960.Itwascontendedthereinthatthe
expressionsonordaughtershouldbesoconstruedsoastoinclude

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illegitimatechildrenalso.Afurthercontentionwasalsoraisedbeforethe
SupremeCourtthatthePreemption Actmustbereadinconjunction
with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made a provision for
devolution of the property. Negativing this contention the Supreme
Courtobservedasunder:
We have, therefore, to ascertain whether by the expression son or
daughter only the legitimate issue of such female is comprehended or
whetherthewordsarewideenoughtoincludeillegitimatechildrenalso.
That the normal rule of construction of the words "child'', "son" or
"daughter"occurringinastatutewouldincludeonlylegitimatechildren
i.e.,borninwedlock, istooelementary,torequireauthority.Nodoubt,
theremightbeexpressprovisioninthestatuteitselftogivethesewordsa
moreextendedmeaningastoincludealsoillegitimatechildrenandS.3(j)
of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a goods
illustrationofsuchaprovision.Itmightevenbethatwithoutanexpress
provisioninthatregardthecontextmightindicatethatthewordswere
used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood
relationshipapartfromthequestionoflegitimacy.Section15withwhich
weareconcernedcontainsnoexpressprovisionandthecontext,sofarasit
goes,isnotcapableoflendinganysupporttosuchaconstruction.Inthe
first place, the words "son or daughter" occur more than once in that
Section.ItwasfairlyconcededbyMr.BishanNarainthatwherethesonor
daughterofamalevendorisreferredtoasinS.15(1),thewordsmean
onlythelegitimateissueofthevendor.Ifso,itcannotbethatinthecase
of a female vendor the words could have adifferent connotation. Even
takingthecaseofafemalevendorherself,thereisareferenceinS.15(2)
(a) (i) to the brother's son ofsuch vendor. It could hardly be open to
argumentthatabrother'sillegitimatesoniscomprehendedwithinthose
words.ThematterappearstoustobetooclearforargumentthatwhenS.
15(2)(b)(i)usesthewords"sonordaughter"itmeantonlyalegitimate
sonandalegitimatedaughterofthefemalevendor.

46

InMallappav.Shivappa[AIR1962Mys140]aquestionaroseas

to whether the term son as used in section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu

SuccessionAct,1956willincludeastepson.InthiscontextaDivision
BenchoftheMysoreHighCourtobservedasunder:

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Intheabsenceofanydefinitionorexplanationtotheeffectthattheword
'son'wouldalsoincludeastepson,thatwordshouldbegivenitsnatural
meaning;ifso,asonofadeceasedfemalewouldmeanamaleissueofthe
bodyofthatdeceasedfemale.(Itmayalsoincludeaboytakeninadoption,
who,inlaw,standsonthesamefootingasanaturalson;but,withthis
question,wearenotatpresentconcerned).Theposition,therefore,isthat
theplaintiffwhoisasonofthestepsonofthedefendantNo.4,cannot
claimtobeasonofthedeceased4thdefendant.Asthesonofastepson,
hemayhavetherighttosucceedunderSection15(1)(b)oftheHindu
SuccessionAct,astheheirofthehusbandofthedeceaseddefendantNo.4;
but,defendantNo.1beingthesonofthedeceaseddefendantNo.4,hasthe
righttosucceedunderSection15(1)(a)andwouldbethepreferential
heir.Inthe12thEditionofMulla's'PrinciplesofHinduLaw',itisstated,
with reference to S.15 of the Hindu Succession Act, at page 984, as
follows:
''A'stepson'isnotentitledas'son'toinherittohisstepmotheras
oneoftheheirsunderthisEntry.Buthecansucceedtoherproperty
asanheirofherhusbandunderEntry(b)".

47

Inmyopinion,whileconstruingSection125oftheCodealso,in

theabsenceofanydefinitionorexplanationtotheeffectthatthewords
legitimate or illegitimate child would also include a stepchild, that
wordwillhavetobegivenitsnaturalmeaningandifsoconstrued,the
legitimateorillegitimatechildwouldmeanonlyachildwhichhasbeen
givenbirthbyawomanfromwhomthemaintenanceisbeingclaimed.A
stepdaughterisnotanillegitimatechildbutadaughterofonesspouse
bornthroughanotherspouse.Section125contemplatesbloodrelation
whichgivesrisetomoralandlegalobligationtomaintainaperson.
48

Iamdealingwithastatutewhichissecularinnatureandisnot

controlled as such by the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and

Maintenance Act, 1956, although it would be apposite to keep those

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provisionsinviewwhileconsideringthepetitionunderSection125of
theCode.ThelanguageusedinSection125oftheCodeisplainand
unambiguous.ThewordslegitimateorillegitimateasusedinSection
125must,therefore,bepresumedtocarryitsplainliteralmeaninginthe
absenceofanyevidencethatitwasintendedtomeansomethingelseor
includeastepchildalso.
49

ItisnotopentothisCourttosupplytheomissionbyextendingthe

meaningofthewordofthewordslegitimateorillegitimatechildinthe
guiseofinterpretationbyanalogyorimplicationonlybecausethisCourt
feelsthatitwillbeinconformitywiththeprinciplesofsocialjusticeand
equity.
50

Intheaforesaidcontext,areferencecouldusefullybemadetothe

observationsoftheSupremeCourtin CommissionofSalesTax,Uttar
Pradesh vs. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur [AIR 1975 SC
1039].
If the legislature wi1fu11y, omits to incorporate something of an
analogouslawinasubsequentstatute,orevenifthereisacasusomissus
inastatute,thelanguageofwhichisotherwiseplainandunambiguous,
theCourtisnotcompetenttosupplytheomissionbyengraftingonitor
introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or
implication,somethingwhatitthinkstobeageneralprincipleofjustice
andequity."Todoso"(atp.65inPremNathL.Ganeshv.PremNathL.
RamNathAIR1963Punj62.PerTekChandJ.)"wouldbeentrenching
uponthepreservesofLegislature",theprimaryfunctionofacourtoflaw
beingjusdicereandnotjusdare.

51

Therefore,itisnotpossibleformetoacceptthecontentionsof
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Ms. Punani, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as Mr.

AnkurOza,thelearnedadvocateappearingfortherespondentNo.2.
52

The analogy explained by the Supreme Court in the case of

Kirtikant (supra) would apply in the present case. The children of

anotherhavenotbeenmentionedintheentireSection125oftheCr.
P.C.noranyrighthasbeenconferredonthemtoclaimmaintenance.
TherewasanenactmentintheUnitedKingdomknownastheFamily
Relations Act, which, of course, now stands repealed and substituted
withanewenactment.Theprovisionsthereinprovidedthatwherestep
parent or common law partner of someone with a child had been
standingintheroleofparent,knownasinlocoparentis,theCourtwould
order that person to pay child support, even though they were not
biologicallyrelatedtothechild.
53

However,childsupportcouldalsobeorderedwheretheperson

was found to be a parent, which was defined under the Family

RelationsActasunder:
Aparentincludes
(a)aguardianorguardianthepersonofachild,or
(b)astepparentofachildif
(i) thestepparentcontributedtothesupportandmaintenanceofthe
childforatleastoneyear,and
(ii)the proceeding under this Act by or against the stepparent is
commenced within one year after the date the stepparent last
contributedtothesupportandmaintenanceofthechild;

54

Section1(2)oftheActstatedasunder:
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(2) For the purpose of paragraph (b) of the definition of parent in

subsection(1),apersonisthestepparentofachildifthepersonanda
parentofthechild
(a)areorweremarried,or
(b)livedtogetherinamarriagelikerelationshipforaperiodofatleast2
yearsand,forthepurposesofthisAct,themarriagelikerelationshipmay
bebetweenpersonsofthesamegender.

55

Thus,theCourtcouldorderastepparenttopaychildsupportin

threecontingencies:
Thestepparent:
waseitherinamarriagelike(commonlaw)relationshipwiththechilds
parentforatleasttwoyears ORmarriedtothechildsparentforany
lengthoftime;ANDcontributedtothechildssupportormaintenancefor
at least one year; AND last contributed to the childs maintenance or
supportwithinoneyearofthedatethatthechildsupportclaimwasfiled
withthecourt.

56

However, it is for the Legislature to look into this issue in the

interest of a helpless child who is thrown out by his stepfather or

stepmotherandthereisnonetotakecareofsuchchild.
57

With the above, this petition is allowed. The impugned order

dated 30.03.2015 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court,

Bhavnagarisherebyorderedtobequashed.Ruleismadeabsolute.

(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
chandresh

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