NEGROS STEVEDORING CO., INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DELGADO STEVEDORING
CO., INC., respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for petitioner.

(c) that Atty. Melquiades Parades, to whom the notice was referred
took no action thereon in the belief that Atty. Alcantara had already
been advised thereof.
(d) that Atty. Alcantara knew of the receipt of the notice to file brief
only upon receipt of the Notice to [sic] Dismissal of the appeal. 5

Parades, Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacruz & Paredez Law Offices for
respondents.

On 30 October 1972, the respondent Court of Appeals, in a minute resolution,

resolved to 1) grant DELGADO's motion for reconsideration, 2) set aside its
Resolution of 28 September 1972, 3) give due course to the appeal, and 4) admit
DELGADO's Brief. 6

PADILLA, J.:

NESCO then sought to have the resolution of 30 October 1972 reconsidered. On 14

November 1972, it filed a Motion for Reconsideration and To Strike Out the
Appellants (DELGADO) Brief, to which the latter filed no opposition. 7

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with preliminary

injunction to review and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Eighth
Division, * dated 30 October 1972, in CA-G.R. No. 49755-R, which set aside its own
Resolution, dated 28 September 1972, dismissing private respondent's appeal for
failure to file its appellant's brief.
On 29 May 1967, petitioner Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. (NESCO, for short) brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against private respondent Delgado
Stevedoring Co., Inc. (DELGADO, for short) for the collection of the sum of
P175,514.63, which allegedly represents losses and damages sustained by NESCO by
reason of the sinking of its barge known as NESCO Barge 109, together with
attorney's fees and costs. 1
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of NESCO. DELGADO
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The latter, through its Clerk of Court,
sent to DELGADO a Notice to File Brief, dated 15 May 1972, which was received by
the latter on 18 May 1972. 2 The reglementary period for filing appellant's Brief
lapsed, with DELGADO failing to file one; hence, the Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution, dated 28 September 1972, motu proprio dismissed the appeal. 3
On 16 October 1972, DELGADO filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said order of
dismissal, 4 to which motion, NESCO filed an opposition, dated 19 October 1972.
DELGADO's motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of its case was based
primarily on the following excuse:
Upon an inquiry made immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid
order (dismissing the appeal), it appears that:
(a) the Notice to File Brief was received on May 13, 1972.[sic]
(b) thru inadvertence, the said notice was referred to an associatate
of a (the same) law firm other than Atty. Samson S. Alcantara, who
has been handling the said case from the beginning.

On 22 November 1972, the respondent court resolved to deny NESCO's motion and
required it to file its appellee's Brief.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue raised herein by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court
gravely abused its discretion in reinstating the appeal of DELGADO, which had been
previously dismissed for failure to file appellant's Brief on time, and in admitting its
appellant's Brief.
In Ganzon v. Chavez, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, held that:
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that
had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or
discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must
be exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause.... There
must be such a showing which would call for, prompt and justify its
exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld." 9
The point then to determine is whether the delay in filing DELGADO's appellant's
Brief was due to a good and sufficient cause. The Court notes that the Notice to File
Brief was received on 18 May 1972 by a clerk in the law office of DELGADO's counsel.
Thru inadvertence, the clerk referred said notice to an associate lawyer of the law
firm, other than Atty. Samson S. Alcantara, who had been handling, from the
beginning, the case of DELGADO, Atty. Melquiades Parades, a lawyer of the same law
firm to whom the notice had been mistakenly referred, took no action on said notice
in the belief that Atty. Alcantara had already been advised of it. And it was only
thereafter that Atty. Alcantara learned of said notice, when he received the notice of
dismissal of DELGADO's appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief within the
reglementary period. 10
The excuse proffered by DELGADO's counsel cannot be considered a good and
sufficient cause or justification for the failure to file on time the appellant's Brief. It is

evident from the reason given by DELGADO's counsel that there was negligence not
just on the part of the receiving clerk who inadvertently handed the notice to a lawyer,
not in charge of the case, but, also in the part of the latter who did nothing to inform
the lawyer in the same law firm, handling the case, of said notice, and principally, on
the part of the lawyer handling the case who was just waiting for the notice, without
doing anything to find out whether such notice might have already been received by
the law firm.
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor is it
unavoidable. Time and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system
of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive
promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they well always be
informed of the status of their cases. The Court has also often repeated that the
negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding
upon the latter.
In the case at bar, even if we were to grant that the law firm of private respondent's
counsel had an efficient system which merely faltered in this instance, still, the
omission of the lawyer to whom the notice was inadvertently given in not informing
the lawyer concerned, in the belief that the latter had already been advised of the
notice, is gravely irresponsible and inexcusable. Considering that the lawyer to whom
the notice had been inadvertently given is an associate of the same law firm of
DELGADO's counsel, and it would not take up so much of his time if he were to
inform the lawyer concerned about an important notice, like a Notice to File Brief,
whose reglementary period starts upon receipt, then, the conduct of said lawyer, in
the case at bar, is unjustifiable. His reliance on his own belief that the lawyer
concerned had already been advised of the notice is also unfounded considering that
the copy of said notice was with him, so there was absolutely no ground for him to
presume that Atty. Alcantara had already been informed about it.
As to the lawyer who was handling the case, his complacency in waiting for the notice
despite the lapse of a period of time, without even inquiring from the clerks in the
office as to whether such notice had already been received, or by simply investigating
with the Court of Appeals as to the status of his appeal, considering that he allegedly
had the draft of his appellant's brief prepared and that he was just waiting for the
notice to file it, all suggest that the lawyer concerned failed to give the entire devotion
he owed to the interest of his client 11 and to exercise the necessary care and diligence
required of him as a member of the legal profession, to the detriment of his client. As
held in Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. Court of appeals:
The frequency of such cases which needlessly clog the court dockets
and would render meaningless the guidelines set by the Rules of
Court and jurisprudence for an orderly and expeditious procedure
in the determination of law suits, constrains us to reiterate the
Court's admonition in Juane v. Garcia[25 SCRA 801 (1968)], thus

... It is painful enough for a litigant to suffer a

setback in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if
defeat is occasioned by his attorney's failure... It

is only when some such situation comes about

that the negligent lawyer comes to realize the
grave responsibility that he has incurred to his
client and to the cause of justice. It is then that
the lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office
he solemnly declared that he "will conduct,
himself "as a lawyer accordingly to the best of his
knowledge and discretion. Too late. Experience
indeed is a good teacher. To a lawyer, though, it
could prove very expensive. 12
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient
cause which would call for, prompt and justify the reinstatement of the appeal. Hence,
the Court holds that the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
when it reinstated the appeal and admitted the appellant's Brief, despite the latter's
failure to file it on time.
WHEREFORE, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 29
December 1972 is hereby made permanent. The respondent Court of Appeals is
ordered to DISMISS the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 49755-R and to REMAND the case to
the trial court for execution.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

ERECTORS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
DANILO CRIS, respondents.

(15) calendar days, however, it can not be disputed that within said
period there were only ten (10) working days, and five (5) nonworking or legal holidays, which were as follows:
October 26, 1984--Saturday

SARMIENTO, J.:
This case should not have reached this Tribunal. It should have, in fact, been
terminated three years ago but for the petitioner's counsels who had the temerity to
cite a non-existent law with the obvious intention of delaying the proceedings if not
outrightly evading financial responsibility under the law. This actuation, indeed, is
flagrant dishonesty. We cannot let it pass.
But before we proceed, a recital of the background of the controversy is in order.
The private respondent, Danilo Cris, a contract worker as Earthworks Engineer in
Taif, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, filed the case with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) on February 27, 1984 for the illegal termination
of his contract of employment with the petitioner herein, Erectors, Inc. The petitioner,
as a defense, contended that the private respondent was estopped from questioning
the legality of his termination as he already voluntarily and freely received his
termination pay. The POEA, on September 27,1984, rendered a decision adverse to
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents
ERECTORS, INC. and SOCIETE AUXILLAIRE D'ENTERPRISES
(S.A.E.) jointly and severally, to pay the complainant, DANILO
CRIS the sum of SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SIX
DOLLARS AND SIXTY SIX CENTS ($ 7,166.6), or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, representing the
unpaid salaries for the unexpired term of complainant's contract. 1
The decision was received by the petitioner on October 25, 1984. Fifteen days later, or
on November 9 of the same year, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
with the respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The motion
which was treated as an appeal was dismissed by the NLRC "for having been filed out
of time." 2
The petitioner, through counsel, alleged that the respondent NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the case and affirmed that the motion for
reconsideration or appeal was seasonably filed explaining thus:
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that between 25 October 1984 (date of receipt of the
POEA decision) and 09 November 1984 (actual date of filing of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration), there were actually fifteen

October 27,1984--Sunday
November 1, 1984--All Saint's Day
November 3, 1984--Saturday
November 4,198--Sunday 3
xxx xxx xxx
In support of its contention, the petitioner cited two provisions allegedly of the 1984
POEA rules and procedures, specifying Rule XXIV, sec. 1, and Rule XXV, sec. 2,
thereof, which purportedly provide:
Rule XXV
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. Finality of Decision, Order or Award all decisions,
orders or award shall become final after the lapse of ten (10)
working days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties and no
appeal has been perfected within same period.
RULE XXIV
Section 1. Motion for Reconsideration. The aggrieved party may
within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision, order or
resolution of the Administration, may file for a motion for
reconsideration; otherwise, the decision shall be final and executory
(Emphasis supplied) 4
These cited rules do not exist. Nowhere in any law or rules relative to the POEA may
the above provisions be found.
The POEA was created only on May 1, 1982 by virtue of Executive Order No. 797.
Pursuant to the said Executive Order, the then Minister of Labor, Blas F. Ople
promulgated on September 5, 1983 the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Employment which took effect on January 1, 1984. These 1984 Rules were superseded
on May 21, 1985 by the POEA Rules & Regulations.

For the reason that the petitioner's appeal with the NLRC was filed on November
9,1984, the 1984 Rules should govern. And this was precisely what the petitioner
insisted upon the POEA rules obtaining in 1984 must be applied. 5 Yet therein, it is
clear that the period for perfecting an appeal or a Motion for Reconsideration is ten
(10) calendar days. The pertinent rule on the matter is found in Book VII, Rule 5, of
the 1984 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment (POEA/MOLE) to wit:
Section 1. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR APPEAL.
The aggrieved party may, within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution file a motion for
reconsideration which shall specify in detail the particular errors
and objections, otherwise the decision shall be final and executory.
Such motion for reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal as
provided in this Rule otherwise the same shall not be entertained.
The above rule is expressed in a language so simple and precise that there is no
necessity to interpret it.
Moreover, as early as 1982, this Court, in the landmark case of Vir-Jen Shipping &
Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC6 construed the ten (10) day period for filing of
appeals 7 from decisions of Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators as ten (10)
calendar days, as well as the raison d' etre for the shorter period, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
...if only because We believe that it is precisely in the interest of
labor that the law has commanded that labor cases be promptly, if
not peremptorily, disposed of. Long periods for any acts to be done
by the contending parties can be taken advantage of more by
management than by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their
favor and management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most
instances, gives the employers more opportunity not only to
prepare even ingenious defense, what with well-paid talented
lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager
resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the
latter either give up or compromise for less than what is due them.
xxx xxx xxx
The POEA rule applicable in this case is precisely in consonance with the above ruling
in that it expressed in no uncertain terms that the period for appeal is ten (10)
calendar days. For "not even the Secretary of Labor has the power to amend or alter in
any material sense whatever the law itself unequivocably specifies or fixes." 8
There is, thus, no doubt that the law mandates that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal with the NLRC is ten (10) calendar days and not ten (10)
working days.

It is, therefore, obvious that the counsels for the petitioner deliberately tried to
mislead this Court if only to suit their client's ends. On this regard, said counsels have
much explaining to do.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Resolution of the public respondent, dated December 28, 1984, AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on July 10, 1985 is hereby
LIFTED. The counsels for the petitioner are also admonished for foisting a nonexistent rule with the warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely. With triple costs against the petitioner.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO

F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to
harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he
had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint
for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting
for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the

respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other
offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint."
They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were
willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In
their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals

Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost
unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case
reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty.
Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the
performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the
aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the
reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose
on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously
neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of
Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so
that we were deduced [sic] in default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything
was in order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in
spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he
continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never
answered it after all because according to him he was a very busy
man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17,
1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of
law we lost the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of
Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and
disbarred in the practice of his profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by
his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the
court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the
complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the
Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in
the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the
Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the
merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and
Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor,
respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.
The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal
Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's
name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case
on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in
NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an
intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered
the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it
reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the
complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days
from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both
denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared
in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the exparte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to
pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00
as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but
his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and
unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants
an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in
default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's
evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial

court, 8 [he] instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect,
filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred,
dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer
"[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated
earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an
honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the
legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his
motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and
pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court
that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an
answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default
order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly
invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while
in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect
due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work"
on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes
the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a
reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its
previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to
reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because
of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did
not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of
diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such
error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even
after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no
showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he
alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a
meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not
even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of
default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's
inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer.
Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and

competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91
was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages
were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of
expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought
which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of
any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof.
Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case,
neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to
understand why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the
adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of
Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the
disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely
without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff
was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they
could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for
the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his
clients.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes

ARTEMIO
ENDAYA,
OCA, respondent.

complainant,

vs. ATTY.

WILFREDO

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The law is no brooding omnipresence in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He
must have made the statement because invariably the legal system is encountered in
human form, notably through the lawyers. For practical purposes, the lawyers not
only represent the law; they are the law.[1] With their ubiquitous presence in the social
milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The problems they create in lawyering become
public difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of
lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is simply the aesthetic term for professional
responsibility.
The case before us demonstrates once again that when a lawyer violates his
duties to his client, the courts, the legal profession and the public, he engages in
conduct which is both unethical and unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a verified Complaint[2] filed on January 12, 1993 by
complainant Artemio Endaya against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for violation of
the lawyers oath and what complainant termed as professional delinquency or
infidelity.[3] The antecedents are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case
No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo,
Batangas by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and
Dominador Hernandez against complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]
On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case
filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary
conference was conducted on January 17, 1992, which complainant and his wife
attended without counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted
that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in
the case. Continuation of the preliminary conference was set on January 31, 1992.
Thereafter, complainant sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office in
Batangas City and respondent was assigned to handle the case for the complainant
and his wife.[5]
At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as
counsel for complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer
previously filed by complainant and his wife, but his motion was denied.[6] Thereafter,
the court, presided by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties
to submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt of the
order. The court also decreed that thirty days after receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment shall be
rendered on the case.[7]
Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper, as may
be gleaned from the Decision dated March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was noted
that only the plaintiffs submitted their affidavits and position papers. [8]

Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally
on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs have no
legal capacity to sue as they are not the real party (sic) in interest, in addition to the
fact that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to
the verbal lease agreement.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas
City, Branch 1, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10,
1992, the RTC directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. [10] Once again,
respondent failed the complainant and his wife. As observed by the RTC in
its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992, respondent did not file the memorandum for
his clients, thereby prompting the court to consider the case as submitted for
decision.[12]
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the decision appealed from as it held that
plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property in dispute and as such are parties-ininterest.[13] It also found that the verbal lease agreement was on a month-to-month
basis and perforce terminable by the plaintiffs at the end of any given month upon
proper notice to the defendants.[14] It also made a finding that defendants incurred
rentals in arrears.[15] The decretal portion of the Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one
entered, to wit:
Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons
claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate and dismantle their house on the
land subject of the verbal lease agreement at their own expense. The defendants are
likewise ordered to pay the monthly rental of P25.00 from the month of January 1991
to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from
December 1991 until the defendants finally vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay attorneys fee in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.
No pronouncement as to cost.[16]
Complainant received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later,
or on October 9, 1992, complainant confronted respondent with the adverse decision
but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of
Court, however, complainant found out that respondent received his copy back
on September 14, 1992.[17]
Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed
the present administrative complaint against the respondent for professional
delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the

complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends that due to respondents inaction
he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately the case itself.[18]
In his Comment[19] dated March 17, 1993, respondent denies that he committed
professional misconduct in violation of his oath, stressing that he was not the original
counsel of complainant and his spouse.[20] He further avers that when he agreed to
represent complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main
case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended answer
because he was made to believe by the complainant that the answer was prepared by a
non-lawyer. Upon discovering that the answer was in fact the work of a lawyer,
forthwith he asked the court to relieve him as complainants counsel, but he was
denied. He adds that he agreed to file the position paper for the complainant upon the
latters undertaking to provide him with the documents which support the position
that plaintiffs are not the owners of the property in dispute. As complainant had
reneged on his promise, he claims that he deemed it more prudent not to file any
position paper as it would be a repetition of the answer. He offers the same reason for
not filing the memorandum on appeal with the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that
he fully explained his stand as regards Civil Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the
complainant.[21]
Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated May 10, 1993, complainant filed
his Reply[23] to respondents Comment wherein he merely reiterated his allegations in
the Complaint.
On July 28, 1993, this Court directed respondent to file his rejoinder within ten
days from notice of our Resolution.[24] But he failed to do so despite the lapse of a
considerable period of time. This prompted the Court to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt and to file his
rejoinder, both within ten (10) days from notice.[25]
In his Explanation[26] dated February 28, 1997, respondent admits having
received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts
that he purposely did not file a rejoinder for he believed in good faith that a rejoinder
to complainants reply is no longer necessary. [27] He professes that in electing not to
file a rejoinder he did not intend to cast disrespect upon the Court.[28]
On June 16, 1997, we referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[29]
In its Report[30] dated February 6, 2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
respondent negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one month. The
pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:
It is to be noted that after appearing at the preliminary conference before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent was never heard from again. Respondents
seeming indifference to the cause of his client, specially when the case was on appeal,
caused the defeat of herein complainant. Respondent practically abandoned
complainant in the midst of a storm. This is even more made serious of the fact that
respondent, at that time, was assigned at the Public Attorneys Office- a government
entity mandated to provide free and competent legal assistance.

A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to
deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to
present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed.
(Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)
. . . .
The facts, however, do not show that respondent employed every legal and honorable
means to advance the cause of his client. Had respondent tried his best, he could have
found some other defenses available to his client; but respondent was either too lazy
or too convinced that his client had a losing case.
. . . .
For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent
practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. As
the Court once held, A client is bound by the negligence of his lawyer. (Diaz-Duarte
vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)[31]
However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless. She
observed, viz:
Respondents allegation that complainant failed in his promise to submit the
documents to support his claim was not denied by complainant; hence, it is deemed
admitted. Complainant is not without fault; for misrepresenting that he could prove
his claim through supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had
a strong leg to stand on. A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he
himself was guilty of neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491)[32]
On April 18, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP but complainant did not appear even
once. Respondent attended five hearings, but he failed to present evidence in support
of his defense, as required by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez. This
compelled the latter to make his report on the basis of the pleadings and evidence
forwarded by the Office of the Bar Confidant.
On October 11, 2002, Commissioner Fernandez issued his Report[33] wherein he
concurred with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.
The Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyers oath not only once
but a number of times in regard to the handling of his clients cause. The repeated
violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that respondent attributes his failure to file the
required pleadings for the complainant and his wife invariably to his strong personal

belief that it was unnecessary or futile to file the pleadings. This was true with respect
to the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC level, the appeal memorandum at the
RTC level and the rejoinder at this Courts level. In the last instance, it took
respondent as long as three years, under compulsion of a show cause order at that,
only to manifest his predisposition not to file a rejoinder after all. In other words, at
the root of respondents transgressions is his seeming stubborn mindset against the
acts required of him by the courts. This intransigent attitude not only belies lack of
diligence and commitment but evinces absence of respect for the authority of this
Court and the other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every
member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and responsibilities
that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other
disciplinary action.[35]
Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of
his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients.[36] This duty is further stressed in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required
diligence in handling the case of complainant and his spouse. As found by the Office
of the Bar Confidant,[37] after appearing at the second preliminary conference before
the MCTC, respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the
complaint in this case. Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his
appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to
file an amended answer and that when he failed to obtain it because of complainants
fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel.[38] The explanation has
undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case
and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not
know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the amended
answer is a prohibited pleading.
Even assuming respondent did in fact ask to be relieved, this could not mean
that less was expected from him. Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a clients case, he
owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v.
Court of Appeals,[40] thus:
It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A
lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause make him
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.[41]
Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,[42] every case a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts if for a fee or for free. In other words, whatever the lawyers
reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or
defending it.
Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client
relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with

permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the
interest of his client [43]
Thus, when respondent was directed to file affidavits and position paper by the
MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the RTC, he had no choice but to
comply. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court
orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that (A) lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Respondents failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not
actually prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable
to them. However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.
It was respondents failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which
made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the case. As found
by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal
memorandum respondent denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting
up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19 prescribes that (A) lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law. He should exert all efforts to avail of the
remedies allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to
naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the MCTC
level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly,
his conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed in
him by his clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse in not filing the affidavits and position
paper with the MCTC and the appeal memorandum with the RTC. He claims that he
did not file the required pleadings because complainant failed to furnish him with
evidence that would substantiate complainants allegations in the answer. He argues
that absent the supporting documents, the pleadings he could have filed would just be
a repetition of the answer. However, respondent admits in his comment that
complainant furnished him with the affidavit of persons purporting to be barangay
officials attesting to an alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez, the brother of the
plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer case, that he had already bought the disputed
property.[44] This did not precipitate respondent into action despite the evidentiary
value of the affidavit, which was executed by disinterested persons. Said affidavit
could have somehow bolstered the claim of complainant and his wife which was
upheld by the MCTC that plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest. While
respondent could have thought this affidavit to be without probative value, he should
have left it to the sound judgment of the court to determine whether the affidavit
supports the assertions of his clients. That could have happened had he filed the
required position paper and annexed the affidavit thereto.
Further, notwithstanding his belief that without the supporting documents filing
the required pleadings would be a futile exercise, still respondent should have
formally and promptly manifested in court his intent not to file the pleadings to
prevent delay in the disposition of the case. [45]Specifically, the RTC would not have
waited as it did for the lapse of three months from June 5,1992, the date when
plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal memorandum, before it rendered
judgment. Had it known that respondent would not file the appeal memorandum, the
court could have decided the case much earlier.

For his failure to inform the court, respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:

Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant

about it.

Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

At this Courts level, respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced

again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply.

Respondent likewise failed to demonstrate the candor he owed his client. Canon
17 provides that (A) lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. When complainant received the
RTC decision, he talked to respondent about it.[46] However, respondent denied
knowledge of the decision despite his receipt thereof as early as September 14, 1992.
Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent
was untruthful to complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the
latter.

Respondents story projects in vivid detail his appalling indifference to his

clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his
duties as a lawyer.

On top of all these is respondents employment as a lawyer of the Public

Attorneys Office which is tasked to provide free legal assistance for indigents and
low-income persons so as to promote the rule of law in the protection of the rights of
the citizenry and the efficient and speedy administration of justice.[47] Against this
backdrop, respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his
professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig[48] lawyers in the
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service.
Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree
of diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 of the Code
provides that the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that much is demanded from those who
engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication
to his work and profession not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help
attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of
cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain respect to the legal profession.[49]
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant
attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the
case.[50] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by this Court consisted of
reprimand,[51] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[52] suspension of three
months,[53] six months,[54] and even disbarment in aggravated cases.[55]
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents failure to
live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby warranting his suspension from
the practice of law. At various stages of the unlawful detainer case, respondent was
remiss in the performance of his duty as counsel.
To reiterate, respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when
required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed
up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the
authority of the court. His stubbornness continued at the RTC, for despite an order to
file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file any. Neither did he manifest
before the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus further delaying the
proceedings. He had no misgivings about his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a
copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly.

However, we are not unmindful of some facts which extenuate respondents

misconduct. First, when complainant sought the assistance of respondent as a PAO
lawyer, he misrepresented that his answer was prepared by someone who is not a
lawyer. Second, when complainant showed respondent a copy of their answer with the
MCTC, he assured him that he had strong evidence to support the defense in the
answer that plaintiffs were no longer the owners of the property in dispute. However,
all that he could provide respondent was the affidavit of the barangay officials. Last
but not least, it is of public knowledge that the Public Attorneys Office is burdened
with a heavy caseload.
All things considered, we conclude that suspension for two (2) months from the
practice of law is the proper and just penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) months from notice, with the warning that a similar
misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
respondents personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,

Sr.,

REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR,

JR. respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in professionalism is
a certain level of competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to the standards
of a lawyers conduct set in the Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the
hallmarks of professionalism, the lawyer charged in this case virtually abandoned his
clients cause.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S. Jardin
against respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the
latters failure to formally offer the documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the
dismissal of the case.
The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21480 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged the
services of the respondent to represent him in the case which is for the collection of
the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Four and 80/100
Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the repair of
the house of the defendants in the case.[1] The case went its course, but later despite
several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to file his
formal offer of exhibits.[2] Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued
an Order the full text of which reads as follows:
When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel
for the defendants manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the
plaintiff has not formally offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in
writing as Order (sic) by the Court.
Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given an extension
period of TEN (10) days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in
writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes, counsel for the defendants who was given a period
of Five (5) days within which to comment and/or oppose the admissibility of the said
exhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of
evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.
On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records show that Atty.
Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer of
documentary exhibits for the plaintiff and again, in the interest of justice, the Court
give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10) days within which to formally
offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of the hearing of
this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the defendant.
Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the plaintiff have (sic)
not complied with the submission of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack
of interest on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case,
upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff is

hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of ordered
WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of Atty. Reyes, this case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to further
prosecute this case.
Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the
presentation of evidence on the counter claim on the part of the defendant on June 15,
2001 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.[3]
The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to file a
verified Affidavit-Complaint[4] dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment of the
respondent with this Court, wherein he also alleged the developments which
transpired after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already terminated the services
of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the originals of
the documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent finally handed
over the documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the
complainants wife.
In a Resolution[5] dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the respondent
to comment on the complaint against him. However, the respondent failed to file his
comment despite two (2) extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved
to dispense with the filing of the respondents comment and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[6]
Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP.[7] Hence, the averments made, as well as the evidence
submitted by the complainant, are undisputed.
Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, found the respondent liable for negligence and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with the warning
that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. The salient
portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of the
Investigating Commissioner are as follows:
Complainants contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiffs Formal Offer
of Documentary Evidence is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30
March 2001 and 7 May 2001 (Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7
May 2001 (Annex 10 of complainants Affidavit) reads:
....
It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of respondent Villar to
file the Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 21480 to the prejudice of respondents client, herein complainant. Respondent
Villar has failed to offer any explanation for his failure to file the Formal Offer of
Exhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trial court to do
so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to complainant as the
latters counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits, and respondents dereliction of this duty has prejudiced the

interests of respondents client. In accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondents
obligation to take all measures to protect the interests of his client in accordance with
Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility but it was
respondent s negligence or omission which has caused damage to such interests.[8]

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved said Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN

THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondents disregard of the
resolution of this Court directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He
exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file his answer when required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies impudence and
lack of respect for the authority of this Court.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the
performance of his duties as counsel for the complainant. He was given by the trial
court several extensions of time: first, an extension of ten (10) days from February 26,
2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second, another extension of ten (10) days from
March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court noted that no
such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must also be
emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two (22) days between March
8, 2001 and March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27) days from
April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001 when the Order dismissing the case was
issued. Effectively, therefore, respondent had three (3) months and nine (9) days
within which to file the formal offer of exhibits.[9] The respondent did not bother to
give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation of his inaction.
Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence
required of every member of the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS
DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
....
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
....

....

It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent violation of his duty as a

lawyer. He committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost
learning and ability and to give entire devotion to his clients cause. His client had
relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failed
him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes
inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the respondents
mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients
interest, adversely affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession
and eroded the publics trust in the judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is
sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to the courts and his
clients.[10] This means that in relation to his duty to his clients he should put his
maximum skills and full commitment to bear in representation of their causes.
We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,[11] to wit:
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that
a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.[12]
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his

duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. [13] Every case a lawyer
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.[14] Certainly, a member of the
Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical
fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional
and unethical.
The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months. We find the recommended penalty commensurate
with the offense committed.
In Aromin v. Boncavil,[15] this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for
his failure to file a written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive.
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file
brief, which as this Court held in Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v.
Saquilabon[16] constitutes inexcusable negligence. In the Saquilabon case, the
respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon the respondents in the
cases of In Re: Atty. David Briones,[17] Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan,[18] Spouses
Rabanal v. Rabanal[19] for their failure to file the briefs of their respective clients.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality
hereof, with the WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with
even more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,

Sr.,