22) Republic vs Heirs of Abrille

Facts: The original owner of the Lot 379-B-2-B under OCT no 5609 was in the name
of Francisco Villa Abrille, father of Luisa. Upon the death of Francisco, said property
was inherited by Luisa which contains an area of 525,652 sq meters under TCT no T1439. Luisa then caused the subdivision of said land into 2 lots under subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner.
Lot 379-B-2-B had an excess/enlarged area of 82,127 sq meters more than the
original area covered by TCT no T-1439. Register of Deeds registered Lot 379-B-2-B1 and issued TCT no 1886 and likewise registered Lot 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT no
1887. TCT no 1886 was cancelled by virtue of a deed of sale and TCT no T-19077
was issued to Gaudencio Consunji. Thereafter TCT no 1887 were also cancelled and
in lieu thereof several TCTs were issued. TCT 20725 was issued to Milagros Huang,
TCT 20701 to Josefino Huang, TCT 20713 to Miguel Huang, TCT 20690 in the name
of Huang Sin Sin. This is all based and upon the approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC)
Psd 71236 which contained the increase of 82,127 sq meters. The Trial court
ordered the cancellation of said TCT 20725, 20701, 20713 and TCT 20690. Appealed
to CA which was denied. Then brought to the SC for petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of TCT
20725, 20701, 20713 and TCT 20690?
Discussion: No lower court did not err. To include the increased area which is not a
registered land but formerly a river, a proceeding in registration of land title should
be filed. The area of 82,127 sq meters should be brought under the operation of the
Torrens system.
Ruling: Judgment appealed is hereby affirmed in toto
23) Grande vs Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land with an area of 3.5032 hectares
located at Barrio Ragan in the municipality of Magsaysay province of Isabela by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui. Said property is identified as
Lot No 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, its
north eastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then a gradual accretion on
the northeastern side took place by action of the current on the Cagayan River.
There was a distance of about 19,964 sq meters. 1.9964 hectares more or less has
been added to the registered area. Petitioners filed action against respondents to
quiet title to said portion formed by accretion alleging that they were in peaceful
and continuous possession of land until Sept 1948. Respondents on the other hand
claimed ownership asserting that they had been in open and continuous possession
of said portion prior to 1933. The Trial court rendered decision of ownership to
petitioners. Respondents appealed to CA. CA affirmed decision. Hence petitioners
brought action to SC.

Issue: Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because
said lot which receives it is covered by Torrens thereby making alluvial property
imprescriptible?
Discussion: No, Ownership over the accretion received by land is governed by Civil
Code and registration under Land Registration Act which does not give title to land
but confirms and protects title already possessed by owner and making it
imprescriptible. To obtain said protection, the land must be registered. But
petitioners never sought registration of land since 1934 until the present time.
Hence it was not imprescriptible and therefore subject to acquisition by 3 rd parties.
Ruling: Decision of CA is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
24) Cureg vs Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts: Private respondents except Domingo Apostol are the legal and or the forced
heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo who died in Feb 1944. Since time immemorial
and or before July 1894, the late Francisco Gerardo together with his predecessors
in interest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession under a
bonafide claim of ownership of a parcel of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel,
Cabagan, Isabela containing 2.5000 hectares. It is bounded on the north by
Cagayan River, east by a certain Domingo Guingab, south by Antonio Carniyan and
west by Sabina Mola. Said land was then declared for taxation purposes. Upon
death of Francisco, ownership and possession was succeded by his only heir,
Domingo Gerardo together with 3 legal/forced heirs, Soledad, Primo and Salud
Gerardo. Primo is survived by respondents Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza. Salud is
survived by respondent Lilia Maquinad. Respondents then sold land to corespondent Domingo. Verbal sale and conveyance was reduced in writing. Executed
a extra judicial partition. Land then showed signs of accretion of about 3 hectares
on the north. Domingo declared land and accretion for tax purposes. Private
respondents were then prevented by petitioners from cultivating land with
accretion. They mentioned that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of the land as he
revised tax declaration and increased the area to 4,584 sq meters thereby
completely eliminating the original boundary in the north of Domingo Gerardo. Trial
court in favor of Domingo Apostol as owner. Appealed to the IAC which affirmed
decision of TC.
Issue: Who owns the said subject land with accretion?
Discussion: The increase in the area of petitioners land being an accretion does not
automatically become registered land. Said portion needs to be registered under
the Torrens System for it to be imprescriptible and not subject to acquisition of 3 rd
parties.
Ruling: Petition Granted.

25) Fernandez vs Tanada

Facts: Respondent Borromeo filed an application for the registration of a parcel of
land consisting of 5,897 hectares situated in Barrio Pook, Talisay Cebu which is
bounded on the north by Lot 191 owned by said applicant, east by a lot belonging to
Claudio Baller, south by the Bohol strait/seashore and west by lot 2586 owned by
applicant. He based his claim of ownership under Art 457 alleging that the land
sought to be registered was formed by accretion bordering lots which were owned
by him. March1968, petitioners opposed application alleging that the disputed area
was formed by the sea, it was the oppositors who occupied land openly and publicly
and that respondent is an alien hence he cannot acquire property in the Philippines.
The LRC ruled that petitioners have no interest over the said land and dismissed the
opposition. Said order has set aside after a MR was filed. In an order issued on Dec
1969, aforementioned order was revived and order for demolition of the 11 huts in
the premises built by petitioners. Appeal was made but was denied. Moved to
reconsider but was also denied.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in ordering the demolition of houses?
Discussion: The dismissal of the oppositions did not warrant the court to order the
demolition of the houses of petitioners. There is no decree of registration issued in
favor of Borromeo. Only after a land is duly registered and a writ of possession is
issued after due hearing can petitioners be dispossessed. In ordering said
demolition, court acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: Order is declared null and void. Preliminary injunction granted . Records are
ordered to be remanded.
26) Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co Inc vs Director of Lands
Facts: Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc., filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land of 414.5144 hectares,
more or less, situated in the barrio of Panacan, municipality of Aborlan, Province of
Palawan, and more particularly described in amended plan SC-4782-AMD. The
application relies upon section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141. The Director of Lands
opposed said application, alleging that it involves a public land covered by
appellants sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that the land was not
awarded to appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof as determined by
an appraisal committee in July, 1950; and that appellant has no valid title to be
confirmed, its possession being, not that of an owner, but, merely, that of a (sales)
applicant of a position of the public domain. The Court of First Instance of Palawan
rendered judgment sustaining the opposition of the Director of Lands and,
accordingly, dismissing the application. Hence this appeal
Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Palawan erred in finding that the appellant has no
valid title to the land as he is not the owner but merely a sales applicant?

Discussion: No, the application of the petitioner for a sales patent is an

acknowledgment that they dont own such land and such is a public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands. It was found that the petitioner filed Sales
Application No. 4782 over a parcel of public land consisting of 1,024 hectares
located at Panacan, Aborlan, Palawan. The application was given due course by the
Bureau of Lands. In Dec 1930, the petitioner requested the Director of Lands that it
be permitted to reduce the area applied for to 680 hectares because the portion it
originally applied for were squatted and claimed by other. On Nov 1933, the Director
of Lands wrote a letter to petitioner advising the latter that it had recommended to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of P18.00 per hectare for
the land. Director of Lands issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied for
consisting of 764.0683 hectares setting the date of bidding but auction sale set did
not take place because of the request of the applicant for postponement. Applicant
prayed that its Sales Application be not cancelled, in view of the demand of the
Director of Lands that the sales application be cancelled for lack of interest and that
the company may be given time to comply with the conditions required. The
applicant declared land applied for taxation purposes and also paid for the
necessary expenses for the survey and had cooperated with the Bureau of Lands
surveyor for the survey of the land. Applicant still refused to pay the price fixed as
it wants to reduce appraisal value.
It can be shown that appellant's posession of the land in question was merely that
of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of its refusal
to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. As such sales applicant,
appellant manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and that the
same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands.. It is
essential that the applicant hold the land "under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership," All of its acts prior thereto, including its real estate tax declarations,
characterized its possession of the land as that of a "sales applicant," and,
consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is not,
therefore, its owner.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

27) Director of Land Management vs Court of Appeals 205 scra 486

The Land Investigator/Bureau of Lands verified that a certain Feliciano Juco, his
grandparents or predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, exclusive, adverse,
peaceful and continuous possession of the 16 hectare land in the concept of owners
of said land for a period of twenty (20) years. Juco built a house on Lot 3 where his
family lived. He had carabaos grazing in his pasture. His brother-in-law, Gelacio de
la Cruz, owned and lived on the adjacent Lot 4. On March 1957, Nieves Naval de

Roldan caused the whole tract of land to be resurveyed as PSU-l6438. Her children
filed an application to purchase the property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was
placed in the name of Desiderio Roldan. A sales application was filed by Mariano
Roldan for Lot 3. Feliciano Juco was informed of the posting in the Municipality of
Tanay, Rizal, of Mariano Roldan's sales application for Lot 3. But having no money,
he failed to participate in the bidding. Lot 3 was purchased by Bernardina
Manalaysay. In 1963, with the help of Quirino D. Villena's , Juco was able to obtain
financial assistance from the spouses Leon and Loreta R. Lina to protest against
Mariano Roldan's acquisition of Lot 3. He promised to sell the lot to Lina later. On
July 23, 1963, a "Conditional Sale and Transfer of Right to Land" was executed by
Juco in favor of the Lina spouses. The Lina spouses fenced Lots 3 and 4 and planted
fruit trees thereon. Two years later, a Bilihang Tuluyan was executed by Juco, with
his wife's consent, in favor of Lina spouses. The document was notarized and it was
thereafter registered under Act No. 3344. Juco upon appeal to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, he was adjudged to have the preferential right to
buy the property . He was given sixty (60) days from the finality of the decision to
file his own application to purchase it which he did. Shortly thereafter, Feliciano Juco
died. Juco's wife, Pacita and their children offered to sell the property to Pompeyo
Maliwat who was told about the proceedings in the Bureau of Lands but not about
the earlier sale of the land to the Lina spouses. He verified from the records that
Feliciano Juco did have a preferential right to the property, so he bought it. He had
the deed of sale registered and he declared the land for tax purposes in his name.
He placed men on the land to take care of it.
The Maliwats then filed an application for the registration of the land in their names
under the Torrens system as they claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lot 3,
PSU-164381, with an area of 169.301 square meters, situated at Barrio Cayambay,
Tanay, Rizal. The Director of Lands opposed the said application on the ground that
the land is public land.The Minister of Agrarian Reform also opposed it on the
ground that the land is reserved for agrarian reform.
On November 8, 1972, the Lina spouses filed a motion to dismiss Maliwat's
application for registration of title on the ground that the land is covered by a
homestead application of Loreto R. Lina duly filed and recorded and that it is public
land under the administration and disposition of the Director of Lands. On April 5,
1973, they amended their opposition. They claimed that they had purchased the
land from Feliciano Juco, and that hence, the title should be registered in their
names.
Another opposition was filed by a certain Cesar N. Roldan, claiming to be the actual
occupant of the land, that the possession was given to him by the heirs of Feliciano
Juco who died while awaiting the action of the Director of Lands on his application
for a free patent; and that he filed an application for free patent in substitution of
the deceased, Feliciano Juco.Trial court rendered judgment as follows: The Court
orders and decrees the registration of the parcel of land and the registration of title

thereto in favor of the the Maliwat spouses .The Director of Lands appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals . CA affirmed decision of the trial court. Motion to
reconsider was filed by petitioners but it was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Lot No 3 as private
land by virtue of the open, continuous and exclusive occupation and cultivation of
Feliciano Juco ?
Discussion: Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Lot 3, had become private land by
virtue of the Feliciano Juco's open, continuous, and exclusive occupation and
cultivation of the land since 1939 which when transferred to Maliwat's possession
after February 1972 far exceeds the statutory thirty-year period for the conversion
of alienable public agricultural land into private property. Hence it is ruled that
alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or thru his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period
(30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and
thus becomes private land.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12601 is affirmed in toto.

28) Kidpales vs Baguio Mining Co 14 SCRA 913

FACTS: Petitioners sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines
in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for judgment to declare said
plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of land situated in Sitio Binanga, Barrio
of Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, Mt. Province, to annul the declarations of location of
certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels
claimed by plaintiffs, and to recover damages from the company. The complaint also
sought to enjoin the director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent
applications of the Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings erected on the
land in question demolished at the latters expense. The defendant Baguio Gold
mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925
to 1930 asked for dismissal of the action and damages.
The Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs Cayapa et al failed to
substantiate their claims of ownership and dismissed the suits. Upon appeal to the
Court of Appeals , it rendered judgment finding that the land lay within the
Cordillera Forest Reservation which was proclaimed by Governor General Stimson

and hence it formed part of the Public domain; that from 1927 to 1933, George
Icard and his son, Joseph had entered and located therein certain mining claims
then subsequently sold and transferred it to the Baguio Gold Mining Company; that
the latter had occupied the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts
required by the mining laws to entitle it to mineral patents therefor until the recent
World War II; that after the war, the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the
Philippine Legislature; that the Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the
claims by its locations, although the corresponding patents were still in process at
the Bureau of Mines; that the Baguio Gold Mining Company has acquired a superior
title to that of the plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under litigation.
Appeal was made to the CA which affirmed dismissal of action by the CFI. With this
the plaintiffs-appellants went to the SC to have their petition reviewed which the SC
declined.
ISSUE: Whether or not an applicant who was previously denied claims of ownership
in reinvindicatory action cannot file for registration of same land involved?
Discussion: Yes, If the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not
have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as
having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself. Since there can be no registration of land without applicant being
its owner, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation
declaring that the mining companys title is superior to that of appellants should be
conclusive on the question in the present case. SC ruled that the findings in the
former judgment that the mining claims were validly located and that the title of the
mining company is superior to that of appellant being the basis of the sentence of
dismissal, conclude the previous adjudication being final and rendered on the
merits, and there being an identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action in
all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land registration proceeding by the CFI
of Baguio was in order and conformable to law.
Ruling: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of these
proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants shall pay the costs.

29) Divina vs Court of Appeals

Facts: Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio
Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. The portion has an area of
TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) square meters. Berosa spouses sold the same Lot

1893 to Jose P. Gamos. Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary
owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in
Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax
Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also
had the property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio Tiotangco. Tax
Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos
name.The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on June 16,
1961 for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties contained a total area of
100,034 sq. m. This plan was approved on July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of
Lands. Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was
secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property
was 10.0034 hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice
planting and 5.9347 were thickets. Teotimo Berosa then conveyed to Vicente G.
Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B. Two years
from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos
secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as
containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated Subdivision
PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands
approval, showed that Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893B.Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for
P20,000.00. Tax Declaration No. 13768 secured by private respondent, was
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 12509. Private respondent filed an application for
registration of title to the property at the CFI of Sorsogon. The application was
amended to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of
Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.The land registration court ordered the
registration of private respondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.Pending
issuance of the final decree of registration, petitioner filed before the same court a
petition for review. He alleged that he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893
consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa ; that he was
unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondents
failure to give him notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private
respondent fraudulently misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed
portion despite her knowledge that another person had acquired the same.Private
respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long
become final and the court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of
personal notice to the petitioner of the registration proceedings did not constitute
actual fraud.
The trial court in its ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known
claimant in her application for registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation
that the lot subject of her application is not contested when in fact it was and that it
amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496. Private
respondent appealed decision before the CA. The CA reversed the trial court and
dismissed the petition. It ruled: that petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the

survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither was he a known
claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of Lot 1893 which was found by the
court a quo to be untouched and thickly planted with bigaho. There was no need to
mention in the application for registration the apprehension or claim of at least
petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn Domalaon in the application for registration, nor
to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding. There could, therefore,
have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondent-appellee.
Petioner now seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in entertaining the petition for review
pending issuance of the decree of registration?
Whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual
fraud on private respondents part when she failed to give or post notice to
petitioner of her application for registration of the contested land?
Discussion: The adjudication in a registration of a cadastral case does not become
final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of then final
decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and the one year within which it
may be revised had not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing may set aside
the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another party. In the present case, a
certification was issued by the Land Registration Commission that no final decree of
registration had yet been issued and by the order of the trial court dated September
28, 1977, it restrained the Commission from issuing such a decree. Clearly, the
tolling of the one year period has not even began. Thus, the trial court did not err
when it entertained the petition.
In the second issue, petitioners name did not appear in the survey plan as an
adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts
differed in their conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate
misrepresentation constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to
give notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in the
application for registration.
As provided by Section 15 of P.D. 1529 it requires that in the application for
registration of land titles, the application shall also state the full names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining owners if known,
and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find them. A mere
statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining
owners is not sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary.
The trial court was correct when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia GajoAnonuevo admitted that she had a conversation with petitioners cousin Elena
Dumalaon about the latters apprehension that their land may have been included
in respondents application for registration of the disputed land. The omission of

respondent with regards to this material information prevented petitioner from

having his day in court. The trial court hence supported its conclusion that it is fraud
to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice
of a third person. Such omission is a deliberate misrepresentation constituting
fraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act
No. 496, The Land Registration Act.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment in LRC
Case No. N-147 of the then Court of First Instance, Branch II in Gubat, Sorsogon is
REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.

30) Fewkes vs Vasquez 39 SCRA 514 (1971)

Facts: On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkes, an American citizen, applied in the CFI of
Albay an application for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon. It
was alleged that Fewkes acquired by purchase from Juan G. Velasco, Jr., Brigida C.
Velasco and Trinidad G. Velasco, 2 parcels of land, referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu61470 with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less, and Lot with an area of
11,283 square meters, situated in barrio Bubulusan (Bulusan), municipality of Libon,
province of Albay; that applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and that said
properties were free from any encumbrance. Attached to the application were the
tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical
descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax
declarations on said land, and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966
and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in favor of applicant. On March
1967, it was found that the application did not contain the plans and technical
description of the parcels of land sought to be registered and the surveyor's
certificate hence the court required the applicant to submit the same. Upon
compliance, the applicant then submitted a motion praying the court that the
Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission be directed to approve
subdivision plan Psu-61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be
registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as Lot No. 21.In
its order, the court denied the motion reasoning that the application being for
registration of land, it had nothing to do with the approval of the subdivision plan.
The court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order
to include the respective postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein.
On Feb 1968, after the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing
the application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding that the properties
sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land which was
described in the plan attached to the application, and that the notice of initial
hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the

registration proceeding. Motion to reconsider was filed which was denied hence the
present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing the application?
Discussion: No,. Here the notice of hearing as published in the Official Gazette did
not contain the technical description of the 2 lots subject of proceedings but that of
the bigger lot hence the notice of hearing is defective and did not confer jurisdiction
on the Court.
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of land
is required to contain: a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name,
status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the
steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial
hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to
have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating
the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall
be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication
of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem,
it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication
and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court
Ruling: WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The dismissal of the application
here is understood to be without, prejudice to the filing of a proper application in
conformity with the legal requirements.
31) Benin v. Tuason
Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands located in the barrio of La Loma in the municipality of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from their
ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin;
that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of
land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed
the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said
parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey
by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933, Sixto Benin and
herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared
said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after
the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently
thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the
permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly
rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually served with

summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in

accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
Issue: Whether or not the failure to notify persons concerned in the registration
proceedings would constitute fraud and hence invalidate the decree?
Discussion: No, The decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and
Pascual Pili (along with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs
but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs do
not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin. The mere fact
that appellants herein were not personally notified of the registration proceedings
that resulted in a decree of registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does
not constitute in itself a case of fraud that would invalidate the decree. The
registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate as against the whole world
and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the
lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings
but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The
registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims
and liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance
of the certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal
encumbrances saved by law. In addition, there being no allegation that the
registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the registration
proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance
of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree
of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
Ruling: The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

32) Director of Lands vs Benitez et al

Facts: Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo were declared owners of a parcel of land
situated in the City of Tacloban known as Lot No. 2157 for which Original Certificate
of Title No. 17507 of the Register of Deeds of Leyte was issued to them in the
cadastral proceedings done by the Director of Lands before the CFI of Leyte during
the period of May 1925-April 1928. Said lot was bounded on the NE by a road and
contains an area of 14,548 sq.m. The decision of adjudication was rendered on
December 1932. 26 years after the adjudication of Lot 2157, Emilio Benitez and
Eulalia Brillo filed a petition for reopening of the cadastral proceedings under RA
931 claiming that through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect, a portion
of said Lot No. 2157 containing an area of 1,805 sq. m. has not been included in the

original survey for which reason they prayed that said portion be designated as Lot
No. 1 of the proposed subdivision plan, and that, after notice and hearing, it be
adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act No. 931.The court issued an order
admitting the amended petition and in a subsequent order , it ordered that copies of
the original as well as of the amended petition be furnished to the OSG, the
Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, the City Fiscal of Tacloban City, and the Register of Deeds
of the province, setting the case for hearing on October 1958. The court issued an
order granting to Emilio Benitez and Eulalia Brillo the right to claim the portion
which allegedly was not included in their original title while authorizing at the same
time a licensed surveyor to make a survey of the portion that was then being
claimed and submit a report to the Director of Lands for his approval. Court
rendered judgment declaring Emilio Benitez and his wife as the owners of the
additional portion which they claimed to be their own in their petition which this
time was declared to contain an area of 3,745 sq.m. Spouses then moved for a writ
of execution of the judgment and of possession of the additional portion of land that
had been adjudicated to them but claimants who were then occupying the portion
claimed by virtue of permits granted by the Director of lands opposed. OSG, on
behalf of the Director of Lands, filed a motion to set aside the same judgment on
the ground that said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition for lack of the requisite publication and
notice as required by law. Opposition and motion to set aside the judgment were
denied. The OSG as well as the counsel for the 62 oppositors who had adverse
claims over the portion in controversy filed their MR but was denied. Hence, the
present petition for review filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte on behalf of the
Director of Lands and of the 62 adverse claimants.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in allowing the Benitez spouses to amend their
petition to claim the additional portions of the land in which they failed to mention
in their previous petition?
Discussion: No, the right of the Benitez spouses is gleaned from RA 931 grants to a
person claiming title to a parcel of land that has been the subject of a cadastral
proceeding who at the time of the survey was in actual possession thereof but for
some justifiable reason had been unable to file his claim in the proper court during
the time limit established by law, the right to claim such land within a period of 10
years by filing the necessary petition for reopening under the provisions of the
Cadastral Act. Besides filing the petition for reopening, it is necessary that notice
thereof be given to those persons who claim an adverse interest in the land sought
to be registered, as well as the general public, by publishing such notice in two
successive issues of the Official Gazette, which shall likewise be posted in a
conspicuous place on the new land to be surveyed, as well as in the municipal
building of the city or municipality in which the same is situated.
An order of a court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it
include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is

made as a preliminary to such step. Publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the court in land registration and cadastral cases, and additional
territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication
(Philippines Manufacturing Company vs. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122). Also the right of the
claimant to have an additional portion of land registered in their name can only be
entertained if it does not refer to such land which has not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted or aiuthorized provisionally or permanently disposed of
government.
In the case at bar, it appears that the additional portion of land claimed by
respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to be entitled to it by virtue
of lease applications or permits granted to them by the Bureau of Lands. Lot 1
which was not included in the cadastral survey of Tacloban are now occupied by
squatters, who claimed that they have applied under lease applications and some
under Revocable Permits which they have been paying for many years to the
Bureau of Lands. Because of these adverse claimants there is a need that the
matter be threshed out in an appropriate action with due notice to said claimants
and to the Director of Lands from whom their title thereto is said to have emanated
under the Public Land Act.
Ruling: Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. The decision rendered by respondent
court on April 14, 1962, as well as its orders issued to implement said decision, are
hereby declared null and void and without effect. No costs.
33) Republic vs CA
Facts: On June 21,1989, PNB filed a verified petition for judicial reconstitution of OCT
No P-6666 and TCT No T-22487 on the basis of the existing owners duplicate copies
in its custody and possession as mortgagee because the originals on file in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro had been destroyed in
the fire. In an order dated June 1989, lower court set petition for hearing and
directed that the publication of the order in 2 successive issues of the OG, sending
of notice to adjoining owners and the posting thereof in the court premises and in
the municipal building of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro where the registered prop
are located. OSG then entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Fiscal of
Oriental Mindoro to appear in the case. Hearing set on Oct 30,1989 was cancelled
on motion of the PNB because it did not have yet the certificate of publication to be
presented at said hearing. The hearing was reset and was again reset on which date
the PNB presented a certificate of publication issued by Luis Avecilla, director of the
National Printing Office. But Neither the OSG nor provincial fiscal appeared at the
hearing. Lower court issued an order authorizing the branch clerk of court to receive
evidence. OSG and or provincial fiscal were again absent at the scheduled hearing
before the Commissioner. The reception of evidence proceeded nonetheless. Trial
court granted the petition for reconstitution. OSG in behalf of RP appealed to the CA
that the TC erred in proceeding & rendering judgment in the reconstitution case

despite patent lack of jurisdiction and in granting the petition despite the noncompliance of the requirements needed. CA affirmed courts order on the ground
that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of publication to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. CA held that the certification of publication issued by the
director of the national printing office certifying that the notice of petition was
actually published in the Official Gazette on Aug 21 and Aug 28,1989 constitute
prima facie evidence of the publication for purposes of conferring upon the Court
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition. OSG however argues & maintains that a
mere certificate of publication is utterly inadequate as proof of the jurisdictional fact
of publication.
Issue: Whether or not a mere certificate of publication is sufficient proof of the
jurisdictional fact of publication?
Discussion: No, The jurisdiction or authority of the Regional Trial Court to hear and
decide a petition for reconstitution of title is conferred by Republic Act No. 26. The
Act prescribes a special mode of procedure that must be followed in order that the
court may act on the petition and grant the remedy sought. These requirements and
procedure are mandatory and must strictly be complied with, otherwise, the
proceedings will be utterly void .
The jurisdictional requirement of publication of a petition for reconstitution of title,
refers to the actual publication of the notice of initial hearing of the petition in two
successive issues of the Official Gazette with the required posting and notice by
registered mail or otherwise to specified persons and its release for circulation at
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled hearing (Zuniga vs. Hon. Vecencio 153
SCRA 720). The purpose of such publication is to apprise the whole world that such
a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause
may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the
petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in whole world as party in the
case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it (Register of Deeds of
Malabon vs. RTC of Malabon, M.M. Branch 170, 181 SCRA 788).
In the case at bar, there had been no publication of the notice of the (actual)
hearing of the petition on February 21, 1990 for the notice that was published in the
Official Gazette was of the hearing that was set on October 30, 1989. Also the
notice of hearing was published less that 30 days prior to the date of hearing fixed
in the notice as required by law but the hearing was held on a different date which
has not been published at all. The purpose of publishing the date of hearing of the
petition for reconstitution of title is to enable interested parties, who read the
notice, to appear at the hearing either to oppose the petition or assert a claim to
the property in question. The purpose will be defeated if the court may actually hear
the petition on a different date from that which appeared in the published notice of
hearing. Hence in view of this defect in the petition for reconstitution, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to hear such petition.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED, the impugned decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 30036 and the order for the reconstitution of
OCT No. P-6666 and TCT No. T-22487 of the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, are hereby SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against the private
respondent.

34) Director of Lands vs Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME

FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corporation. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe five
parcels of land measuring 481,390 square meters. The possession of the Infiels over
the land dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan. The land
sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain. Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M
worth of improvements. CFI held that the ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela. CFIs decision was upheld by Intermediate Appellate Court.
Director of Lands appealed judgment of the IAC which affirmed the decision of CFI of
Isabela .

Issue: Whether or not the said land is a private land pursuant to the grant of the
government under RA 3872?
Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from
purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively?
Ruling: It was held in the case of Meralco vs Castro-Bartolome that a possession is
said to be prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon
conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a Government
Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be of the public domain and
was therefore classified as private property at the moment of the sale through the
continuous and unchallenged possession of the bona fide right to ownership from
Meralcos predecessors-interest.
In the case at bar, yes the land is private pursuant to the grant of the government
under RA 3872. The land held by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively
deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. As it already
acquired by operation of law a grant of the Government hence it already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption.
Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore,
purchased private property which was valid.

The provision barring private companies and associations from purchasing public
alienable lands in the 1973 Constitution cannot be applied retroactively. In this case,
ACME had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it
purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution
prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or
associations cannot be retroactively applied
Ruling: WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.