3E

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 171671

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D.

MANONGSONG, CRISPIN M. EGARQUE, and
THE
HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD
DIVISION),
Respondents.

PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*

BERSAMIN,**
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*** and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 18, 2012

Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, which provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
This crime has the following essential elements:
1.
functions;

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3.
His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.[20]
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution
failed to establish the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. [21] In Uriarte v. People,[22] this Court
explained that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident

bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident
bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
[23]

As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed resolution, the second element of the crime as
charged was not sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit:
I.
The presence of the first element of this offense was not disputed. The prosecution
established that accused-movants were public officers, being then the Mayor, Municipal Engineer,
and member of the PNP, at the time alleged in the information.
II.
Anent the second element, did the act of destroying the subject fences on July 4, 2000 and
on July 6, 2000 allegedly by accused Manongsong and Egarque, without giving any notice to the
private complainant, amount to manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith as indicated in the
information?
Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are modes that are separate and distinct from each
other so that the existence of any of these two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second
element. x x x
xxxx
Manifest partiality was not present in this case. The evidence adduced did not show that
accused-movants favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant.
Eyewitness Alexander Singson categorically pointed accused Manongsong and Egarque as
the persons who destroyed/removed the second fence. Private complainant lamented that he was
not even given notice of their intent to destroy the fence. However, the same could not be
considered evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to show that the destruction was
for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self interest. In fact, the following testimonial evidence
presented by the prosecution itself showed that:
1.

Mercedita Atienza revealed that when she confronted Manongsong why

he destroyed the subject fences, the latter replied that You dont have
permit and the land is for the fishermen;

2.

Alexander Singson corroborated that Manongsong told them that they

destroyed the fence because it is a tourist spot and it is also a port for the
fishermen; and

3.

Mercedita Atienza also testified that when she asked accused Atienza
about the incident, the latter told her Masama and pinabakod mo. Alam
mo namang tourist spot ang Puerto Galera at para sa fishermens
association yan.

III.
Considering that the second element was not present, the Court deemed it proper not to
discuss the third element.[24]

RAMON A. ALBERT,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 164015

Present:

- versus -

THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION,* JJ.
Promulgated:
February 26, 2009

Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
This crime has the following essential elements:[19]
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. [20] In Uriarte v. People,[21] this Court
explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident
bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another.[22] Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
[23]
Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive
or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. [24] "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.[25]
ROLANDO E. SISON,
G.R. Nos. 170339,
Petitioner,
170398-403
Present:
- versus -

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,

PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
March 9, 2010

VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF RA 3019

Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officersIn addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. xxx. (emphasis supplied)
To be found guilty under said provision, the following elements must concur:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officers official, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.[17] (emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The only question left is whether
the third and fourth elements are likewise present. We hold that they are.
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the
prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict. [18]
Explaining what partiality, bad faith and gross negligence mean, we held:
Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of
the nature of fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far
as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. [19] (citations omitted)
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any undue
injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways by which Section
3(e) of RA 3019 may be violatedthe first, by causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or the

second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode
constitutes a distinct offense, [22] an accused may be charged under either mode or both.[23] The use of the disjunctive
or connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would
suffice for conviction.[24]
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with having given
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers. [25] Under the second mode, damage is not
required.
The word unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized [26] or without
justification or adequate reason.[27] Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit,
profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. [28] Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation
or desirability; choice or estimation above another.[29]
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or
benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact
that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers were awarded the procurement
contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government. The private
suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the transactions without
showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the government. For that, petitioner must now face the
consequences of his acts.
3G
G.R. No. 115221 March 17, 2000
JULIUS G. FROILAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
It must be remembered that in
the crime for which petitioner was charged, i.e., Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, 9
the
elements are: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
VENANCIO R. NAVA,
G.R. No. 160211
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -

PANGANIBAN, CJ, Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ

The Honorable Justices

RODOLFO G. PALATTAO,
GREGORY S. ONG, and
MA. CRISTINA G. CORTEZESTRADA as Members of the
Sandiganbayans Fourth Division, and
the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 28, 2006
To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must be clearly proven that 1) the
accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. [70]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the evidence presented
warranted a verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf of the
government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased
by the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury. Indeed, the
discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an administrative order
do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g); namely, that the contract or
transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, as seems to be stated in the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for Reconsideration. [71] Lack of public bidding alone does not
result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government
was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless,
the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the
government.[72]
If the accused is to be sent to jail, it must be because there is solid evidence to pin that person down, not
because of the omission of a procedural matter alone. Indeed, all the elements of a violation of Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove the culpability of the accused. In this case, there is a clear
showing that all the elements of the offense are present. Thus, there can be no other conclusion other than
conviction.
Conspiracy
Our ruling in Magsuci, citing our holding in Arias, should be instructive, viz.:
The Sandiganbayan predicated its conviction of [Magsuci] on its finding of conspiracy
among Magsuci, Ancla and now deceased Enriquez.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical
acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together,
however, the evidence therefore must reasonably be strong enough to show a community of
criminal design.
xxxx
Fairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the very
functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been no
intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr.
Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing
too much reliance on the official reports submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for
conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense.
Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts.