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AGUSTIN VS.

BACALAN (1985)
WHAT: A complaint for ejectment with damages
WHERE: City Court (MTC) of Cebu
FACTS:
1. Bacalan (respondent) is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by
the late Susana Agustin. Due to non-payment of rentals despite repeated demands, an
action to eject him was filed. Praintiff prayed that defendant be ordered to pay {2,300
representing arrears in rentals the corresponding retas until he actually vacates the place,
attorneys fees, expenses and costs.
2. DEFENDANT: In his answer, the defendant-appellee included a counter-claim alleging
that the present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with
malice and bad faith on the part of the plaintiff for the obvious reason that plaintiff pretty
well knows that defendant does not have any rentals in arrears due to the estate of
Susana Agustin. He stated, "That by virtue of the unwarranted and malicious filing of this
action by the plaintiff, his counterclaim includes:
P50,000 moral damages
P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damages.
P3,500.00 as attorney's fees
City Court

CFI

Dismissed counterclaim.
Ordered defendant to vacate and pay 3,887.10 backrentals and 150
attorneys fees.
Reversed City Court.
Ordered plaintiff to pay:
P10,000 moral damages
P5,000 exemplary damages
P1,000 attorneys fees

3. No appeal by plaintiff from CFI decision.


4. PLAINTIFF: filed a complaint with CFI Cebu against defendant and deputy sheriff for the
Declaration of Nullity of the CFI Decision on the ground that the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction was null and void from the beginning because:
a. It grants relief in total of P16,000 which is beyond the jurisdiction ofCity Court Cebu
Citing Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which limits the jurisdiction of the city
courts in civil cases to P10,000 as the maximum amount of the demand
5. DEFENDANT: filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff has no cause of
action and that the court has no jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a decision of another
branch of the CFI Cebu
CFI CEBU

The allegation is not a ground of an annulment of judgment.


Probably for certiorari
CA
Certified
ISSUE: WON CFI may, in appeal, award defendants counterclaim in an amount exceeding or
beyond the jurisdiction fo the court of origin.
PLAINTIFFs CONTENTION: moral damages may not properly be awarded in ejectment cases, the
only recoverable damages therein being the reasonable compensation for use and occupancy of
the premises and the legal measure of damages being the fair rental value of the property
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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

HELD: The money judgment awarded to defendant is a counterclaim. A defending party may
set up acclaim for money pr any other relief which he may have against the opposing
party in a counterclaim. And the court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary
damages as prayed for. The grant of moral damages here as a counterclaim and not as damages
for the unlawful detention of property must be upheld. The amount is another matter.
Re Nature of Counterclaim vis a vis Jurisdiction:
A court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set-off or counterclaim
in excess of its jurisdiction (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court). A
counterclaim beyond the court's jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of
defense, the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or weaken
plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief (Section 5, Rule 5,
Revised Rules of Court).
An appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals
for decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is
rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waives so
much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court;
for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable
practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of
Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking
its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable.
Nevertheless, the defendant-appellee, in the case at bar, set up his claim in excess of the
jurisdiction of the city court as a compulsory counterclaim.
In the case at bar, by presenting his claim voluntarily before the City Court of Cebu, the
defendant-appellee submitted the same to the jurisdiction of the court. He became bound
thereby. The amount of P10,000.00 being the jurisdictional amount assigned the City Court of
Cebu, whose jurisdiction the defendant-appellee has invoked, he is thereby deemed to have
waived the excess of his claim beyond P10,000.00. It is as though the defendant-appellee had
set up a counterclaim in the amount of P10,000.00 only.
ISSUE: May the Court of First Instance
then, on appeal, award defendantappellee's counterclaim beyond that
amount?

HELD: the defendant-appellee's


counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the
jurisdictional amount of the city Court
of Cebu, should be treated as having
been deemed waived. It is as though it
has never been brought before trial
court. It may not be entertained on
appeal.

Re Amount of Judgment based on a counterclaim in excess of the


jurisdiction of the court of origin:
The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant on
appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the
action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the
appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its
decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation
of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been executed in the
court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original and
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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same


judicial power. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and
does not create that cause
It is a well-settled rule that when court transcends the limits prescribed for
it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications
will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or otherwise.
The nullity of such portion of the decision in question, however, is not such
as to affect the conclusions reached by the court in the main case for
ejectment.
The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the
defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over
the maximum allowable award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect.
Such being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the
plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy.

MACEDA VA CA, CEMENT CENTER, INC. (1989)


FACTS:
1. Petitioner as lessor of the disputed property. Respondent Cement Center as the contractor
2. The leased property originally belonged to the Sps. Arturo Victoria and Maxima Monserrat,
maternal aunt of the petitioner.
3. Petitioner was leasing the property from his aunt. He proposed to have it repaired and
renovated subject ot reimbursement of his expenses, to which the owners agreed. The
remodelling cost was P40,000.
4. But Maceda did not stop. In what appears to be an orgy of building, he introduced more
improvements. He constructed a new driveway, a basketball court and raised the ground
level near the creek, elevated the fence, remodelled the gate, and landscaped the lawn.
5. His aunt passed away. His aunts atty-in-fact Atty. Rustico Zapata, Sr. promised to sell the
property to him for P125,000/ But he was eventually informed that his aunt sold has sold
the property to Mrs. Gomez so he should vacate it. He refused to leave. Atty-in-fact filed a
case against him, Dismissed on plaintiffs own motion.
6. In 1974, petitioner was informed that the property has been sold to Pablo Zubiri for
145,000.Petitioner refused to vacate. Again, Atty-in-fact filed:
WHAT: Ejectment case
WHERE: Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal
7. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to retain possession of the premises until his
expenses were duly reimbursed to him.
8. In 1981, Zubiri soldthe property to Private Respondent Cement Center, Inc. Maceda was
asked to vacate. Maceda insisted that he be reimbursed for the improvements. Cement
demanded P4,000 monthly rental from April 1982. In 1984, another ejectment case was
filed with the MTC of San Juan, Rizal.
9. Maceda set up a counterclaim for P240,000.
MTC

Ordered Maceda to vacate and play CEMENT P2,000


P2,000 per month as reasonable compensation for his use of the premises
until he actually vacates,
P5,000 as attorney's fees.
Plaintiff to pay Maceda P158,000 as the value of his improvements and
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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

repairs, less his accrued rentals of P64,000 as of December 1985 and the
sum of P12,000 which he had earlier received as partial reimbursement.
RTC

CA

Set aside decision. Dismissed Cements ejectment complaint.


Ordered cement to pay Maceda P182,000 for necessary and useful
improvements.
Affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment claim.
Set aside payment to Maceda of P182,000 because MTC lacked jurisdiction
over the claim which exceeds P20,000.
The claim for reimbursement in the total amount of P240,000.00 was
alleged by private respondent by way of counterclaim in his answer. It is
clear that the amount of counterclaim, is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Under Section 33, B.P. Blg. 129, the Metropolitan
Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions where
the amount of the demand does not exceed P20,000.00 exclusive of
interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind. It goes
without saying that the Regional Trial Court has no authority to entertain
the counterclaim because it took cognizance of the case by virtue of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Considering that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the counterclaim, the decision of the Regional Trial Court on
appeal giving private respondent the right of retention is without legal
basis. Besides, the right of retention applies only to a possessor in good
faith under Article 546 of the Civil Code.

10.Maceda assails the setting aside of the money judgment of 182,000 and the rejection of
his claim to a right of retention over the leased premises.
SC HELD: MTC did not have original jurisdiction over his counterclaim as it exceeds 20,000.
Re Counterclaim amount in excess of Original Courts Jurisdiction:
The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan awarding him
P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that of the Regional Trial Court raising
the award to P182,200, were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action for sum
of money (Maceda's counterclaim for the value of his improvements is one
such action) is limited to a demand that "does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of
damages of whatever kind." (Sec. 33, (1), B.P. Blg. 129.) A counterclaim
in the municipal or city court beyond that jurisdictional limit may be
pleaded only by way of defense to weaken the plaintiffs claim, but not to
obtain affirmative relief.
Maceda is entitled onlyto the reimbursement of the initial remodelling job approved by the
owner which cost P40,000.
Maceda is ordered to pay P32,864.36 as unpaid rentals. Dismissal of counterclaim is
affirmed.
Why was the award of counterclaim not reduced to P20,000 instead of dismissing it
altogether?

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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

VITAL-GOZON VS CA, DR. DELA FUENTE (1992)


FACTS:
1. In 1987, EO 119 issued by Pres. Cory Aquino, reorganized various offices offices of the
ministry of Healt; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnels effected.
2. Private Respondent Dr. Alejandro dela Fuente wasthe Chief of Clinics of National Childrens
Hospital, appointed on Dec 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he was the Medical Specialist II. On
February 4, 1988, he received a notice that he would be reappointedto Medical Specialist
II.
3. Considering this is to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of
Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board.
4. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission
where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4.
5. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of
Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla,
6. CSC in August 9, 1988 upheld the promotion. It held that the demotion is void. CSC
ordered dela Fuente be retained and that he be paid back salaries
7. No MR was filed nor appeal filed to SC. The resolution became final on September 21,
1988.
8. Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of the National Childrens Hospitalwas demanded
implementation of the Resolution. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred "de la Fuente's claims to the
Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or
action. But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him of the
referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await "legal guidance from
the DOH Legal Department." On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department
bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise
compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
9. Dela Fuente asked CSC to enforce its judgment. Hoever, CSC told him to file in court a
petition for mandamus because of the belief that CSC had no coercive powers unlike a
court- to enforce its final decisions/ resolutions.
10.Dela Fuente filed:
WHAT: an action of mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction to compel Vital
and NCH to comply eith the CSC Resolution
WHERE: CA
11.He prayed among others:
a. Writ of preliminary injunction to implement the order
b. To pay him 100,000 moral damages, 20,000 exemplary damages, and 10,000
attorneys fees and litigation expenses
12.After a month, he filed with CA:
WHATL Supplemental/ Amended Petition as quo warrant aside from mandamus adding
3 respondents

CA

CSC Resolution already final. Ordered respondents to obey and


implement CSC Resolution.
Re Damages:
de la Fuente's prayer for damages founded essentially on the refusal
of Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil
Service Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a
different forum was DENIED on the ground that the "petitions (for
mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said)
claim of damages."

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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

13. Petitioner Vital-Gozun did not file and MR or an appeal.


14.Dela Fuente filed:
WHAT: Motion for Reconsideration
CONTENTION: He insisted that the Appellate Court had competence to award damages in
a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have been
proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P.
Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue such writs only 'in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three
levels of courts the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals
were conferred concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals
was given power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To
require him to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues,
To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead to
that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
15. Writ of Execution was filed and was granted.
16.CA resolved the MR of dela Fuente. Modified its decision with regard damages.
CA
(actin
g on
the
MR)

deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b)
consequently describing and treating it as a "PARTIAL DECISION," and (c)
scheduling "further proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (of
damages)," since said question "cannot be resolved by mere reference to
the pleadings." 23 This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court,
Sec. 3. Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.

ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer to
take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer/
WON CA has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil action of
mandamus. YES. It has Jurisdiction.
SOLGENs CONTENTION: SOLGEN filed a special civil action for Certiorary arguing that:
a. B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear, as a
trial court, claims for moral and exemplary damages;
b. Sec 3, Rule 65 commanding defendant to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. Is nothing more than a procedural rule
allowing joinder of causes of action. and such an award of damages is allowable
only in actions commenced in Regional Trial Courts but not in the Court of Appeals
or this Court.
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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

c. assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction over the claims for
damages, it lost the power to take cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9,
1989 had, by its own pronouncement, become final and executory;
HELD: Section 9, B.P. 129: original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
. . . Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction
Contention 1: Section 9 of BP 129 has NO explicit and specific statement regarding "actions for
moral and exemplary damages," hence, Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to
assume cognizance of claims for such damages.
HELD: The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and
exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable
that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of
damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified
jurisdiction.

Contention 2: Sec 3, Rule 65 in question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action
of mandamus and another for damages
HELD: is untenable. It implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do
an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of
damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly
not the case.
Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to authorize to date) rendition of judgment
in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant." 39 The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result
of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It
is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart provision.
Re Special Writs vis a vis award of Damages:
Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the
provision governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the
Rules of Court just cited, as well as the rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows that in
conferring on the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over the special civil action of
mandamus, among others, as well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, the
Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that said Court should exercise all the powers then
possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action of mandamus and
auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to the petitioner in the action in
appropriate cases.
WHAT THE HIGH COURT DISAPPROVES: undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse
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TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY
Quick recall: Estopped. Filed at City CFI Cebu. Should have filed with inferior court (MTC)
Issue of jurisdiction raised at CA, only after 15 years of litigation.
FACTS:
1. On July 19, 1948, Sps Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced against Sps
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio:
WHAT: action to recover P1,908 with legal interest
WHERE: CFI (now RTC) of Cebu
2. Writ of attachment was issued but was dissolved upon filing of a counterbond by
defndants and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
3. CFI ruled in favour of plaintiffs, issued a writ of execution. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Suretys
bond.
4. Surety granted the motion for execution. Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground
that the same was issued without the required summary hearing.
TC
CA

Denied motion to quash. Ordered Execution


Affirmed the TC orders
5. Not one of the assignment of errors to RTC decision it is obvious raises the question of
lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
6. Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year.
7. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that:
a. appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948
for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
b. that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, had already become effective,
Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest
and costs;
c. that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the
case.

Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision
and to dismiss the case.
8. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer
the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
9. CA referred the case to SC:
This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout
the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt
of this Court's adverse decision.

ISSUE: WON may validly raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction on CFI in its appeal to CA. NO!
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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

HELD: The case field before CFI Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of
the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts
in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a
month prior to the date when the action was commenced.
Re Jurisdiction conferred by law vis a vis Laches
GEN RULE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation. The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
Although the action was originally against sps Sibonghanoy, Surety became a quasi-party
Re Jurisdiction by Estoppel
Aparty may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches
LACHES, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
BASIS: The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
Re question of jurisdiction vis a vis Public Policy
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. It was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of
public policy.

After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it
is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. Moreover, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

CALIMLIM VS RAMIREZ *important


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DELA CRUZ, J. 2015

Quick Recall: NOT Estopped. Filed at CFI Pangasinan as Cadastral Court. Dismissed. Filed a Civil
Case at CFI as Regular Court re Ownership. Respondent Motion to Dismissed with CFI as Regular
Court.
FACTS:
1. A judgment for a sum of money was rendered by Municipal Court of Manila in favour of
Independent Mercantile Corp against a cetain Manuel Magali. Writ of Execution was issued.
A land was levied, registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta
Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest
and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this
title. "
2. However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was
erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described
in this title and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same.
3. Independent was granted by MTC to issue a new Title in its favour in lieu of the execution
of sum of money judgment in its favour
4. On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali,
upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed:
WHAT: a petition praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568.
WHERE: CFI Pangasinan Branch 1, sitting as a cadastral court
5. CFI dismissed the petition
6. Petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC. Instead, on
January 11, 1971, they filed:
WHAT: complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances
and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138
previously registered in the name of Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim.
WHERE: CFI of Pangasinan, now as regular court trying a civil case (as opposed to it sitting
as cadastral court
7. Private Respondent claimed to have bought the disputed land from Independent
Mercantile on 1967
8. Priv Repondents Contention: Motion to Dismiss on the ground that barred by prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations
9. CFI dismissed the civil case on the ground of Estoppel by prior judgment.

ISSUE: WON CFI was correct in dismissing the civil case on the ground of prior judgment. NO!
Re Not a Case of Res Judicata
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against
the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180.
In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of
the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the
controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case presently considered.
Re Why CFI as cadastral court had no jurisdiction:

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It has been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance, acting
as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its
proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil
action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.
The issues raise by petitioners in their petition to cancel the new title refer to ownership or
title over the property covered thereby.
The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the property, and that TCT
No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not
of their own making. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is
beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.
Re Reliance to Tijam Doctrine:
GEN RULE: Jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Why laches is inapplicable in case at bar:
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the
title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered
in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to
cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke
the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of
general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile
Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without
merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was
no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties
which do not appear of record.
Upon its petition being dismissed by the CFI acting as cadastral court, the party on
January 1, 1971 or only 2 and a half years later filed the civil case.
Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to
claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have
abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time or
inexcusable negligence.
In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance
of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred
by estoppel by laches.

Re a decision as non-binding if rendered by a court who lacked jurisdiction:


It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was
taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the
attendant circumstances.
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The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon
which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted
only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with
knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of
the matter.
Re Representation with Knowledge to Apply Estoppel
The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the
same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling
which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or
proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be
prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable
judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can raise
highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same.
The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a
court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be
deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or
of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.

Re Duty of the Courts:


If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame
should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum.
Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.)
Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10)
years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)

SOLIVEN VS FASTFORMS
Quick Facts: ESTOPPED. Filed at RTC Makati City. Should have filed at MTC. Respoondent filed
MR at RTC.
FACTS:
1. May 1994, Marie Antoinette Soliven filed:
WHERE: RTC ,Br. 60 Makati City
WHAT: complaint for sum of money with damages
Againt Fastforms Philippines
2. In 1993, Fastforms through its President Dr. Eduardo Escobar obtained a loan from
petitioner of 170,000
3. Respondent issued a PDC in the amount of 175,000 (5k as interest). 3 weeks later,
petitioner was advised not to deposit the PDC.
4. Later on, despite repeated demands, respondent refused to pay its principal obligation and
interest due.
5. Petitioner prayed for the following:
P195,155.00 as actual damages;
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P200,000.00 as moral damages;


P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
6. Respondent denied giving authority to its President to secure a loan.

RTC

In favour of petitioner ordering payment of 175,000 plus 50,000 attorneys


fees

7. Fastforms then filed an MR with RTC questioning for the first time RTCs lack of jurisdiction.
ALLEGATION: since the amount of petitioners principal demand (P195,155.00) does not
exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691
8. Petitioners Contention: espondent is barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court
since it has invoked the latters jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the
complaint and actively participated in all stages of the trial.
CA

Reversed. RTC lacked jurisdiction, must have been filed in MTC, the claim
being only 195,155; respondent may assail the jurisdiction anytime even
for the first time on appeal

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction? MTC. However. Estoppel by Laches was applied.
HELD:
Re exclusive of damages of whatever kind:
Under Section 3 of RA 7691, where the amount of the demand in the complaint instituted in
Metro Manila does not exceed P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is
vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 (March 14, 1994),
(Par 2). The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages
is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only
P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this
main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount.
Re Jurisdiction by Estoppel:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule presupposes that
estoppel has not supervened. In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all
stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts
jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered
IN CASE AT BAR: private respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its
petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the
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contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by


filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in
order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have
thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court,
including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party
from challenging the courts jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for
decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.

METROMEDIA VS PASTORIN
Quick Facts: NOT estopped. Filed with LA, appealed to NLRC. Should have filed before
Voluntary Arbitrator. Metromedia raised the issue at NLRC.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Johnny Pastorin was employed as a Field Representative/ Collector of
Metromedia Times. His task was periodic collection of receivables from dealers of
petitioners mewspapres.
2. Because of tardiness, he was supposedly terminated by the petitioner company, but
because of the timely intervention of the union, the dismissal was not effected.
3. However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a magazine dealer
(Gloria de Manuel) amounting to 9,000 and when he was not able to pay the loan, he
stopped collecting the outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him to
explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no definitive explanation
for the same.
4. Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to do field work,
and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion of his suspension,
respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter communicating his refusal to
accept the transfer.
5. Petitioner filed a complaint for contructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages with
Labor Arbiter.
LA

NLRC
CA

in favour of employee Pastorin: Respondent did not commit


insubordination or disobedience so as to warrant his transfer, and that
petitioner was not aggrieved by respondents failure to settle his obligation
with De Manuel.
Metromedia appealed to NLRC.
GROUNDS: lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter over Pastorins
complaint
Reversed LAs decision. Being a grievance issue, cognizable by the
voluntary arbitrator
Reversed NLRC, reinstated LA ruling because of estoppel:
the active participation of the party against whom the action was
brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or
quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an

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invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution


of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or
bodys jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON Metromedia is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of LA over the subject
matter of the casefor the first time only in their appeal to NLRC. NOT estopped.
HELD:
Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioners claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention that the Labor
Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our pronouncement, and
more so considering the NLRCs correct observation that jurisdiction over grievance issues, such
as the propriety of the reassignment of a union member falls under the jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator.
Again, GEN RULE: The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is
conferred by law. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a
cause of action. Where it appears that the court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the defense
may be interposed at any time, even on appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the
principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this court from taking up the question of
jurisdiction

When EXCEPTION applies: while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a partys
active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party
from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was
taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the
attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by
conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the
representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to
whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter
CASES OF JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL:
1. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy
The lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no
longer be raised for being barred by laches.

2. Martinez v. Merced:

Private respondents had at least three opportunities to raise the question of lack of
preliminary conference first, when private respondents filed a motion for extension of time
to file their position paper; second, at the time when they actually filed their position paper
in which they sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan Trial Court; and third; when they
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from
the records the position paper of private respondents, in which motion private respondents
even urged the court to sustain their position paper. And yet, in none of these instances was
the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised or even hinted at by private respondents.
In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings.

3. Ducat vs CA:
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Petitioners filing of a Manifestion and Urgent Motion to Set Parameters of Computation is


indicative of its conformity with the questioned order of the trial court referring the matter of
computation of the excess to SGV and simultaneously thereafter, the issuance of a writ of
possession. If petitioner thought that subject order was wrong, it could have taken recourse
to the Court of Appeals but petitioner did not. Instead he manifested his acquiescence in the
said order by seeking parameters before the trial court. It is now too late for petitioner to
question subject order of the trial court. Petitioner cannot be allowed to make a mockery of
judicial processes, by changing his position from one of the agreement to disagreement, to
suit his needs.

4. Centeno vs. Centeno


Involved question of jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Arbitration Board
(DARAB). The movants questioning jurisdiction had actually sought and litigated for
affirmative reliefs before the DARAB in support of a submitted counterclaim.

RULE: The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.
If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must
exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by
estoppel'
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given
theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume
an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of
estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon
the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

FIGUERA VS PEOPLE
Quick Facts: NOT estopped. Filed before the RTC. Should have filed at MTC. Issue raised at CA.
GEN RULE: The issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a
litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the
fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not
estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since
such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was charged for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
WHERE: Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.
2. On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner
3. He appealed before the CA, questioning among others, for the first time, the RTCs
jurisdiction.
CA

Denied the appeal. Estopped from questioning jurisdiction:


petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly

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attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by


laches from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction
4. SOLGENs Contention: the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively
participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.
5. PETITIONERs Contention: the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be
raised at any time even for the first time on appeal.
6. Hence, SC appeals
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground of estoppel by
laches. NOT estopped.
HELD: Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a
case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.
In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code)
was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended
by Republic Act No. 7691.12
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13
jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs).
Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed
by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the
parties.
Re Tijams Non Applicability:
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in
which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies,
laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned
or declined to assert it. Laches must be clearly present for the Doctrine of Sibonghanoy to
apply.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by
laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in
his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach.
True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by
laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to
enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due
to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.

Re Jurisdiction by Estoppel as Injustice


Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely
only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be
applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.When misapplied, the
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doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor
can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover,
estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action.

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