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c 2006 SAGEPublications,
London,ThousandOaks,CAand
of Contemporary
Journal
History
Copyright
New Delhi,Vol41(2),305-324. ISSN0022-0094.
DOI:10.I 177/0022009406062072
CatherineMerridale
306
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
army.5 Red Army soldiers, the victors, remain shadowy. This article, which
draws on research for a larger social history of the Red Army in the second
world war,6 will explore two specific aspects of culture and combat motivation
in the Red Army. First, it will investigate the reasons for our relative ignorance
about Red Army troops. Having established these boundaries, many of which
suggest problems common to all writing about combat motivation, the article
will then ask the specific question: why did Ivan fight?
When it comes to research, one problem, historically, has been the weight of
prejudice. As long as Stalin was an ally against Hitler, Red Army troops were
heroes to the English-speaking world, albeit heroes little understood. From the
1950s, however, as the Cold War encouraged stereotyping and suspicion, a
new Ivan, the slant-eyed, stone-faced military automaton, took over in imagination. This Ivan was inhuman, even emotionless, but he remained a formidable soldier. The victory at Stalingrad - and the triumph that followed in
Berlin - sustained an image of invincible troops that only the most recent
wars, and notably Chechnya, have managed to tarnish.
Whatever damage the disasters in Afghanistan and Chechnya may have
caused to Soviet military reputations, however, the image of second world war
Soviet riflemen remains so powerful that the question of human motivation
seems almost superfluous in their case. These men were forced to fight, the
argument can run; in the few cases where coercion was not needed it was
because the victims of dictatorship had never exercised much choice. At the
same time, a similarly two-dimensional image, albeit a positive one, is offered
by Soviet and even post-Soviet writing about the war. In these versions, Ivan is
nothing less than a hero, a patriot. 'The people were extraordinary', a group of
Moscow-based survivors assured me. 'There is nothing else to say.' Instead of
looking at the minds and culture of Red Army soldiers, most histories from
any source have focused on the heavy price that they were forced to pay.
That price, even expressed in numerical terms, was overwhelming. No fewer
than eight million men and women in the Soviet armed forces lost their lives
during the Great Patriotic War. This figure represents just over a quarter of the
total number mobilized between 1941 and 1945.' Very few of the remainder
escaped injury, and many were wounded several times. It was not unusual for
a single battle to claim thousands of lives in a matter of hours. Survivors could
be taken prisoner; the Germans seized three million Red Army soldiers in
the first six months alone. Capture itself could amount to a death sentence,
especially for Communist Party members, political officers and ethnic Jews.
In all, the scale and cruelty of the war almost defy imagination. It is certainly
5 See Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army. Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich (New York
1992).
6 Ivan's War. The Red Army, 1939-45 (London 2005).
7 For a discussion of figures, see John Erickson's essay, 'The System and the Soldier' in P.
Addison and A. Calder (eds), Time to Kill. The Soldier's Experience of War in the West (London
1997), 235.
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Merridale:
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Merridale:
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Nothing, that is, except the temporarycalm. The poet David Samoilov,who
fought in the front line for two years, explainedthat he could never write
about this war. His poems at the time were pureescapism,sweet little songs or
folk stories composedto dodge the turmoilin his head. Later,when the war
was over, he could no longerrecollecthow it had been."
Amnesia of this variety is not a purely Russian problem.John Steinbeck,
who visitedRussiajust afterthe war, also found memorya doubtfultool after
combat. 'Whenyou wake up and think back to the thingsthat happenedthey
are alreadybecomingdreamlike',he explained.
You try to remember what it was like, and you can't quite manage it. The outlines in your
memory are vague. The next day the memory slips further, until very little is left at all ...
Men in prolonged battle are not normal men. And when afterwards they seem to be reticent,
perhaps they don't remember very well."2
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lose, but even so few wrote about fighting itself. Indeed,they even used the
censor as an excuse for their silences. 'I can't write much to you', a tank
to fight with, and when the Germanscatch up with us, our men have nothing
to escape in.' Another bleakly added a remarkthat his own words belied:
'Theymake us keep our mouthsshut.'16
Two years later, no one would write with that frankness,but not because
conditionsthemselveswere much better.The men were still living in dugouts
- 'like moles' - they still fought to exhaustion,lived on soup, and dreamed
of soap, toothbrushesand a Russianbath. 'Whenthe war is over', one man
wrote, 'I am going to take a bath everytwo weeks.' But the defeatist,enraged
languageof the early months had gone, and with it the sense that authority
was always wrong.Wartimerecruitsfound a new senseof purpose,especially
afterStalingrad.Most were trained,like factoryworkerson a productionline,
to understandone processand one kind of job precisely.17
Meanwhile,the fog
of ideologicalrhetoricthat had blurredmilitarythinkingfor so long was swept
away. Politicalofficerswere subordinatedto their militarycomrades.A new
professionalismlifted spirits in the army. War became the new norm, war
becamea job.
In the last phaseof the war, the problemwith the lettersis that they become
bombastic,colouredwith triumphantpropaganda.'Therehas not been a day
at the front yet like today', an engineerwrote home on 16 April 1945. 'At 4
14 A.D. Shindel' (ed.), Po obe storony fronta (Moscow 1995), 99; E.M. Snetkova, Pis'ma very,
nadezhdy, lyubvy. Pis'ma s fronta (Moscow 1999), 38.
Merridale:
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1/1/3754, 5-9.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
312
of motivation,realproblemsstart.Combatandsoldiering
do not dependon a
emotional
As
have
single
impulse. specialists
longobserved,thereis a differencebetweenthemotivethatimpelssomeoneto volunteer,
andevento remain
in a collapsingarmy,andthe specificdriveto runtowardsnear-certain
injury
or death.23
Thefirsttwo canbe describedin letters.Butthethird,likecombat
itself, is dark,violentand quicklyrepressedwhen the emergencyis over.
Perhapsthereareno easywordsfor somethingas instinctiveas an adrenalin
rush, perhapsthe complexset of impulsesthat get a personthroughare
mattersfor a confusedkindof shame.Eitherway,thebestthatletterseverdo
is mutteraboutthe inexpressible.
As a veteranofficerassuredme, if wartime
letterstalkof gloriousbattle,it is almostcertainthatthewriteris a newrecruit
or non-combatant.
Theotherproblemwithlettersis thattheywereaddressed
to a specificaudience.Manywerewrittenin a sortof dream,oftenat night,whenthe writer
founda momentto escapehis comradesand summonthe imageof his wife,
parentsor friends.Whata soldierwrotethen,oftenthroughhis exhaustion,
to the thingshe mighthavesaid (or even thought)
bore scantresemblance
the
during workingday.'It is hardto knowhow longI will remainalive',a
manwroteto hiswifeinJanuary1942.Shewasexpectingtheirfirstchild,but
he knewhe wouldneverseeit. 'Simochka',
he wrote,'whetherit is a boyor a
girl,pleasebringit up accordingto yourown beliefs.Tellit aboutme, about
yourhusbandandits father.'Therewas nothinghereaboutthe war;it was
out of place.'Youcouldn'tsaythatI'malive- no',
beyondeasydescription,
anothermanwroteto his wife anddaughter.'A deadpersonis a blindone,
andfor thatreasonthe onlythingthatinterestsme is yourlife,my onlyconcern is to rememberyou.'24
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was wonderingif the old world was worth recovering,if he could everface his
formerself.
Diaries,in general,are no morehelpfulabout fighting.It was illegalto keep
them duringthe war, but there were always compulsivewriterswhose desire
to make notes was strongerthan the fear of punishment.As a result, there
exist diariesof battle, of capture,and of the long months of waiting between
operations.Like the letters,they chart changesin morale, the rise of professionalism,the impactof propaganda,friendships,boredom,loss and hope. But
diaries do not say much about the writers' thoughts in combat. There are
two basic kinds of journal.The first is little more than an accountof action,
intended for posterity, and often breakingoff suddenly, signallingthat the
authorwas capturedor killed.This type recordsthe numberof milesmarched,
or curt detailsabout the 'Fritz',but the peoplewho kept them had no time for
sentiment.
The second kind of diary, which includes the most revealingtexts, was
writtenby the introspectivetypes,the men who insulatedthemselvesfromwar
by keepingwads of secret scribblednotes. As a rule, these do not deal with
combat. They are about the writer'smood. 'Time is going slowly again', an
officer complainson the eve of OperationBagrationin 1944. 'The days drag
endlessly . . . . In the last while I have been feeling an acute tirednessfrom
the war.'27For men like him, combat itself would come as a relief, lifting the
preoccupationsthat impelled him to write in the first place. 'There are no
letters from home, the devil take them', the same officer wrote a few weeks
later. He had been worrying about his wife, and mutteringthat they were
headingfor a row. But thingswere changingin his world. 'In that regard',he
continued,'I can be verytolerant,becausewe'll soon be in battle,and then I'll
forget everything.'28
The testimoniesof witnesses,too, are seldomvery helpfulabout soldiersin
the field. These include the writings of political officers - the communists
who combinedin a single man the roles of priest, confessor, agitator,stool
pigeon andconveyorof news - and also the NKVD troopswho watchedover
the men at the front line. Both wrote daily reports,but neitherwas trying to
convey truth, to analyse the men. Instead, they were filling in the blanks
on notional lists, reportingthat morale was 'healthy',finding and exposing
ideologicalfoes, keepingthe red bannerin view. They had neitherthe incentive nor the trainingto discusswhat was reallygoing on in theirmen'sheads.29
27 'Frontovoi dnevnik N.F. Belova, 1941-1944' (hereafter 'Belov') in Vologda, vyp 2 (Vologda
1997), 470 and 464-5.
28 'Belov', op. cit., 473-4 (15 June 1944).
29 Regular reports on morale were filed by NKVD troops at the front line. My comments are
based on a continuous run of these, beginning on the Don Front just before Stalingrad and ending
with the occupying forces in Berlin. They are available at the Russian State Military Archive
(RGVA) in Moscow. I have also consulted a selection of similar reports from the regular army on
the Don and Belorussian Fronts in 1942 and 1944, available (with effort) at the Central Archive
of the Ministry of Defence (TsAMO) in Podolsk.
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warmed them as they rested after battle, what sustained them through
episodesof shock is anotherquestion.The momentof volunteering,and even
the last farewellsat home, were followed by just suchan interval.'You put on
a uniform',a veterantold me, 'and it is like a second skin. It is your new personality.'The processwas like losing an old self. Almostwithin a single day, a
new recruitlost not just his civilianclothesand lank civilianhair but also freedom, individuality,home comforts,home cooking and an entirelandscape,to
say nothingof familyand friends(and,for men, almostall contact,for a time,
with membersof the femalesex). Idealsalone were unlikelyto have sustained
many people through so profound a psychologicaland physical upheaval.
New kinds of motivationsoon took over, some of which reflectedthe coarser
social milieu to which each man had to adapt. A recruit'sletters home were
unlikelyto mentionthese, for letterswere a lifeline back to vanishedworlds.
But other evidence,includingreportson crime,suggeststhat what got recruits
through the first weeks was a combination of drink, comradeshipand the
comfort to be gained by stealing tiny marcheson the system, carving out a
niche,whetherthat meantpilferingfood, stealinga few hoursof illicit sleep or
arrangingto wear morecomfortable,non-regulation,boots.
These small pleasuresand little triumphswould continueto keep the men's
spiritsup throughoutthe war. So, too, did front-linehumour,though little is
known of it.37Crude, often racist, and subversivein that it puncturedthe
solemnityof patrioticwar, the men'shumouris absentfrom Sovietcollections
of front-line folklore. Lev Pushkarev,ethnographerand front-line veteran,
explainedto me that the secretpolice bannedhim from writing down men's
jokes. Ironically, the richest collections are often to be found in German
archives, where screeds of the antisemitic remarks and jibes reported by
capturedRed Armymen were cataloguedfor later use.38Censored,approved
humour featuredin the Russianpress, but the jokes that helped troops with
their daily lives went unrecorded.To some extent, the taboo arose from
the languageof the jokes itself, the patois of obscenitythat Russianscall mat,
or mother.Jokes were also intimate,things of the momentand the group of
mates that could not be shared with outsiders. Above all, however, they
reflectedthe men's real world, the one that everyonehas been turningto epic
or romanticfable eversince.
Songswerea differentmatter,andthe textsof manyfavouritessurvive.Again,
the written versionsare innocentof obscenity,a fact that Krupyanskaya,the
wartime ethnographer,later explainedwhen she revealedthat she had been
forbiddento publishthe wordsto any song that lackeda patriotictheme.39
As a
37 One respondent, the veteran ethnographer Lev Pushkarev, informed me that his own attempt
to collect his comrades' jokes at the front line had been quashed by the Special Section, the military police, who permitted songs to be recorded but not humour. On these aspects of soldiers' culture, see my Ivan's War. The Red Army, 1939-45 (London 2005), chap. 6.
38 For examples, see Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, RH2-2468, 6-7, 27.
39 Ya. I. Gudoshnikov, Russkie narodnye pesny i chastushki velikoi otechestevnnoi voiny
(Tambov 1997), 5.
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result, large numbers of lyrics have disappeared, although the ones that survive
suggest that the propagandists remained hard at work. Catchphrases, songs
and slogans, even when they seemed to belong to the soldiers themselves, could
interact with ideology, and sometimes it was ideology that won. Propagandists
supplied words to the jolliest tunes, they wrote slogans, and they also encouraged the use of a famous battle cry. The veterans I met were all amused by
today's confusion over that roar: 'For the Motherland! For Stalin!' Some
claimed that they had never used the phrase. 'We may have shouted something',
a member of a punishment battalion commented, 'but I doubt if it was that
polite.' The writer Vasil Bykov pointed out that officers and police spies were
usually too far behind the front line to hear what words the men shouted.40By
far the most common, as even the Germans attested, was the drawn-out and
blood-curdling 'Urrah!'. Nonetheless, frightened riflemen needed encouragement, and a collective battle cry was potent, making them feel part of a mass,
more powerful (and less vulnerable) than any group of individuals. When they
used the Stalinist battle cry, the men probably did so in much the same way as
they moved their limbs in unison rather than dragging behind. The sound, and
not the meaning, gave the words their power. But it was also through repetition
like this (and through hundreds of songs) that Stalin acquired the almost sacred
aura with which some soldiers later imbued him.
Official language and official images became important, then, partly because
they served a purpose when people sought things to say and believe in collectively. This observation ought to modify van Creveld's claim, based on
American soldiers, that ideology must be an irrelevance in soldiers' lives,
slipping away like water off a duck's back.41The ideology of patriotic war,
informally, became a part of daily life, explaining and even hallowing the
progress that Red Army soldiers made. Thousands of troops joined the
Communist Party as their faith in victory grew stronger. In other societies,
religion might have played a comparable role, but, with the exception of some
Muslims from Central Asia and some of the recruits from Poland, Western
Ukraine and Western Belorussia, there was little formal religious belief among
Soviet troops. The Komsomol had seen to that, as had the widespread anticlericalism of the 1920s. Totems and protective rituals deriving from religion
were another matter. Soviet troops were as likely to carry a dog-eared photograph or a copy of Simonov's poem 'Wait for Me' as a tin cross.
Though beliefs varied, all soldiers shared some measure of fear. The NKVD
soldier with his pistol, shooting stragglers in the back, is an abiding image of
this war.42Fear began well before a man's first battle. Many soldiers joined up
because the alternative - a labour battalion - was so much worse than army
service.43You could be worked to death on a construction site, and all the time
40 Vasil Bykov, 'Za Rodinu! Za Stalina!', Rodina, 5 (1995), 30-7.
41 M. van Creveld, Fighting Power (London 1983), 83.
42 It is the opening sequence, for example, in the recent film of Stalingrad, starring Jude Law,
Enemy at the Gates.
43 A testimonial to this - another diary - was reprinted in Rodina, 6-7 (1991) ('My - obuza,
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Violence,indeed,would soon becomean end in itself. Therewas no shortage of men in the Red Armywhose lives had been markedby state violence,
whose consciousnesswas formedin the brutalityof civil war. Germanatrocities on Sovietsoil compoundedimagesthat had been part of life for 20 years.
A kind of wild amoralityprevailedalong the front, especiallyamongthe huge
numbersconscriptedin the last year of the war. Most of these came from
regionsthat had survivednot just Germanoccupationbut also the horrorsof
Sovietinvasionback in 1939. Theserecruitshad learnedhow to survivein an
anarchic,brutal world. Many had little reason to love Stalin, let alone his
party. But vengeance,and personalsurvival,were high on theirlist of private
47
48
49
50
51
52
Knyshevskii,op.cit., 184.
RGASPI-M,33/1/360, 3-8.
RGASPI,17/125/169, 5-8.
A. Werth,Russiaat War(New York 1964; reprinted2002), 422.
This themebecamethe leitmotivof Stalin'sspeechesfrom 1 May 1944.
RH2-2688, 12.
Capturedfieldpost, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv,
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preparationof infantrymen,streamedfrom the GeneralStaff.s8As the correspondent of the soldiers'paper Red Star put it that autumn:'Nothing in the
Soviet land will sustain an ignorant or unskilled leader - not personal
courage,not honoursfrom the past.' The time for 'conservatism'was over."s
Hard economicfact would underscorethe changeof mood. In the summer
of 1942, the Soviets'capacityto turn out weapons, shellsand tanks recovered
after monthsof dislocation.So many factorieshad been destroyedin the first
weeks of war that the revivalof manufacturingseemedlike a miracle.Tanks
and aeroplanessoon cameto symbolizethe Sovietrecovery,with Chelyabinsk,
the new manufacturingcentrein the Urals,earningthe nicknameTankograd.
Mass-productionacceleratedeverything.Manufactureof the world-beating
T-34 mediumtank, for instance, was adapted so that the turretscould be
stamped, not cast. Troops soon dubbed it the 'matchbox',partly becauseit
caughtfire all too readily,but also becauseT-34s pouredoff productionlines
in such prolific numbers after 1942.60Meanwhile, lend-lease military aid,
principallyfromthe USA, beganto make a crucialdifferenceto the supplyof
weapons, aeroplanesand food.61
Bettertrainingand supplywere backedup by a new emphasison hierarchy
and appearance.On 30 August 1942, a campaignbegan to get the soldiers'
boots mendedand polished, to inspect officers'uniforms,eliminatedirt, and
The men themselves were set to cobbling
drill the ranks in self-respect.62
leathersoles and sewing seams. Armiesof women scrubbedand launderedin
makeshift wash-houses near the front. 'Nina, don't worry about our uniforms', an officer wrote to his wife just before Stalingrad.'We dress better
these days than any commanderfrom the capitalist countries.'63They also
boasted new ordersto distinguishthe brave.Elevenmillion decorationswere
awardedto membersof the Soviet militarybetween 1941 and 1945. By contrast, the USAawardedonly 1,400,409.64The US army often took as long as
six monthsto processindividualawards.In Stalin'sarmy the equivalentwas
frequentlythreedays.6 Most medalsentitledtheir bearersto additionalprivileges, and some, in theory,allowedmen'sfamiliesto receiveextra food.
Front-linefriendshipswere even more vital than pride or recognition.The
literatureon wartime 'buddies'in armiesacross the world is voluminous.In
otherwars,men seemto fightout of a kind of love.66Whatevergot themto the
58 For examples, see Velikaya otechestvennaya, 2 (2), 281-3 and 318-20.
59 TsAMO, 206/298/4, 6. For more on the play, see also Werth, op. cit., 423-6.
60 Temkin, op. cit., 137; Werth, op. cit., 622.
61 See Richard Overy, Russia's War (London 1999), 195.
62 Velikaya otechestvennaya, 2 (2), 287.
63 RGASPI-M, 33/1/1454, 36.
64 Garthoff, op. cit., 249.
65 Van Creveld, op. cit., 112; RGASPI, 17/125/78, 123.
66 Among the earliest offerings are Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier. Combat and
its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ 1949); S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire. The Problem of Battle
Command in Future War (New York 1947); and Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, 'Cohesion
and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II', Public Opinion Quarterly, 12, 2 (1948).
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front in the first place, fear of disgracing themselves or of betraying their frontline companions becomes the primary motive for some soldiers' efforts. In the
Soviet case, the argument is problematical. True, Red Army policy on replacements was more thoughtful than its American equivalent at this time, for
units were withdrawn for retraining and replenishment, not filled piecemeal
with individual recruits, but the rate of turnover was so rapid that many
soldiers scarcely had the time to make close friends. At Stalingrad, average life
expectancy would drop to a mere 24 hours in the winter of 1942. Relationships were hardly sure before they shattered for ever. Some that survived were
overshadowed by the attentions of spies and informers, the dreaded ears and
eyes of SMERSh. 'The fear of SMERSh truly cemented relations at the front
for a time', Samoilov wrote. 'But in the end it corrupted our strong sense of
being a people facing invasion together.' As he added, 'We almost never knew
who the SMERSh informers were among us.'67
The veterans discount each of these points. 'It does not take long', they say.
They would seek out and learn the qualities of their mates in hours, not days,
especially under pressure. Technology also dictated certain kinds of trust; for a
tank or air crew, jammed together in a confined space and destined, if one
failed, to die together, learned mutual dependence rapidly. Aside from these,
the strongest friendships were often between people from the same locality,
and the arrival of a 'countryman', someone from a man's own region, was
often the occasion for long conversations, the exchange of news. Meanwhile,
the power of front-line loyalties endured and even strengthened in the midst of
death. Blood cried for vengeance, and rendered each man's cause more sacred.
The love that soldiers felt for their fallen friends was often the strongest of all,
and some even returned after the war to marry fallen comrades' sisters or
become honorary sons in their lost buddies' homes.68
Pride, finally, grew with successive victories. In the 1930s, Soviet citizens
had learned to avoid responsibility, to follow crowds. By 1943, combatants
knew their lives depended on their training and personal skill. Those who
survived would discover a different sense of self. 'We looked in our hearts',
one writer remembered, 'and did not find slaves there.' Lads from the villages
were no longer peasants. To the people they would liberate, indeed, at least on
Russian soil, they were heroes. By 1945, such combatants would feel that they
had earned the right to comment on government policy and even to advise
their leaders. The fires of Stalingrad gave birth to a sense of citizenship that
even postwar levels of repression took several years to kill.
The new sense of self-worth came at a price. Quite apart from the millions
who died, few soldiers escaped physical injury, and many also carried psychological wounds. Far from growing confident about their manly strength, Red
Army men noted the toll that war had taken - grey hair, disfigurement, aches
67 Samoilov,Avrora,vol. 2, 1990, 67.
68 Examplesof each of these areto be foundin soldiers'lettersand memoirs.See,for example,
RGASPI-M,33/1/261, 33-8.
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and pains. 'Perhaps you will not recognize me', was a common anxiety as they
wrote to their wives, although in general women at home had aged no less
during the war. Apathy, which diarists recorded but could not explain,69was
frequently a sign of exhaustion and battle stress. Those who fell ill without a
clearly physical cause, however, were likely to find little help. Red Army
doctors gave trauma and battle stress short shrift throughout the war, and
patients who did not recover from disabling symptoms often underwent punitive tests, including simulated drowning, before they were sent for treatment.
It is estimated that about 100,000 of the Red Army's active service troops
eventually became permanent casualities of the mind, a figure so low that it
suggests that only acute mental illnesses like schizophrenia were recognized as
disabling.70
The general exhaustion of most veterans played into the hands of a regime
staffed by people who had stayed at home. 'The most painful thing', commented the nationalist writer Victor Astafev, 'was the realization that, because
we were exhausted by the war, because of the strain of the postwar years, we
were not going to be able to maintain the high level of moral development that
we had achieved during the war, and which we had created for ourselves.'71He
might have added that this high moral development was anyway a sham, since
crime, alcoholism and domestic violence would all reach record levels in the
shadow of the war. Ivan was not a superman. Some soldiers were heroes, most
made the best of war, but large numbers were wracked by memories of
violence and many never shed their brutal sense of the life and death.
In other words, Ivan was human. The Germans could not believe it, shivering in their own dugouts, but Soviet soldiers felt the cold like everyone else,
suffered when they were hungry and grieved for their dead friends. They
always had done, even when that seventeenth-century Englishman had first
observed them. The cold he noticed, that made the Germans swear and long
for Paris and Berlin, was no easier for Russians, but it was at least the cold
of home. The crucial element in almost every war in which Ivan showed the
qualities that outsiders would admire was self-defence. On his own soil, he
fought with a tenacity that invaders, so far from all that was familiar, could
only fear. It was not some exceptional national characteristic that turned Ivan
into a fighter. Eventually, again despite German beliefs, the quality of his
training played a part. But through it all, the main impulse that kept him in the
field was the emergency itself. He may explain it in more epic ways, drawn
from his culture and times, but in the end, he simply had no choice.
It takes an effort to get beyond the enduring legend of Ivan, but there is
much to find. It is not present in the ceremonial and banqueting of today's
69 'Belov', 12 December 1943, 464.
70 The figure is cited in Richard A. Gabriel, Soviet Military Psychiatry (Westport, CT 1986),
47, and compares with 36-9 per thousand in the US army at the same time. As Simon Wessely
pointed out to me, the likelihood is that Soviet doctors were recognizing adult-onset schizophrenia
in youths recruited before the symptoms appeared.
71 Cited in C. Merridale, Night of Stone (London 2000), 316.
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324
of Contemporary
Journal
HistoryVol41 No 2
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