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@ 2006 SAGEPublications,
London,ThousandOaks,CAand
of Contemporary
Journal
History
Copyright
New Delhi,Vol41(2),357-377. ISSN0022-0094.
DOI:10.1177/0022009406062073
AntoniusC.G.M.Robben
358
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
comparison with the 1982 Falklands war, while leaving aside the state terrorism against civilians which I have analysed extensively elsewhere.2
An analysis of the combat motivation of the Argentinian military in the
counter-insurgency and Falklands war needs to pay some attention to the
adversary's willingness to fight. The revolutionary objectives of the guerrillas
and their hatred towards the Argentinian military affected the combat motivation of the military and turned revenge into an important motivating force.
With respect to the Falklands war, the Argentinians feared the professionalism
of the British forces, and made them emphasize valour and honour in combat.
A comparison of these two wars makes it possible to disentangle context
from combat so that the willingness of Argentinian troops to enter into war is
distinguished analytically from their motivation to actually fire and fight.
Combat and context are, of course, related because troops need to be properly
inspired, trained and equipped to be able to fight. However, such preparation
quickly loses its motivational force in actual combat when other factors take
over. The context resurfaces again in between battles when combatants have
time to reflect on their harrowing ordeal and ponder whether they are still
motivated enough to get up and fight another round.
The context of the two wars consisted of the cause of war, ideology, civilian
support, type of warfare, training, weaponry and the enemy definition. These
factors framed the actual combat, understood here as 'a threatening situation
of extreme stress and uncertainty (the chaos or "fog" of battle) in which units
(combinations of soldiers, lethal equipment, and drills) under the command of
officers perform their assigned tasks by mastering their emotions'.3 Actual
combat was influenced by fear, revenge, self- and overconfidence, valour,
honour, loyalty, as well as camaraderie, unit cohesion and esprit de corps.
One strong indication of combat motivation is the soldier's willingness to
shoot at the enemy. There is no information about the firing rates of
Argentinian guerrillas and military during the counter-insurgency war. British
surveys about the Falklands war suggest that the modern trained British forces
had considerably higher firing rates than the traditionally trained Argentinian
infantrymen, while Argentinian snipers, machine-gunners, and the welltrained special forces did much better than regular soldiers.' Superior military
training and conditioning are, of course, essential to combat motivation, but
cannot explain why inferior forces still win wars, how motivation fluctuates
from one battle to the next, or what makes troops willing to enter into combat
in the first place. Firing rates need to be supplemented with qualitative
evidence about combat motivation.
The qualitative data have been extracted from interviews, diaries, letters,
reports, communications and combatant accounts. How reliable are these
2 Antonius C.G.M. Robben, Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina (Philadelphia, PA 2005).
3 Eyal Ben-Ari, Mastering Soldiers. Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military
Unit (New York 1998), 47.
4 Dave Grossman, On Killing. The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society
(Boston, MA 1996), 258.
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inArgentina
Robben:CombatMotivation,
Fearand Terror
359
sources? They cannot be taken at face value because most of them were
written between 1982 and 1986 at a time of trials against the deposed junta
commanders, hundreds of indictments against military officers accused of
human rights violations, the exhumation of mass graves and the testimonies of
torture victims. Public opinion had turned against the military, deriding them
for only being capable of torturing defenceless civilians in a dirty war, while
not being man enough to fight a real war.' Still, the preparation for both wars
can be distilled reliably from contemporary newspapers, public speeches, and
secret documents and coded communications made public during the trials.
Combat accounts are always written after the fighting has died down and are
therefore the most problematic source. They suffer inevitably from the bias of
hindsight, the suppression of shameful moments, the limitation of translating
experience into narrative, and an unbridgeable gap between the stressful chaos
of war and the tranquillity of peacetime contemplation. The consulted
Argentinian sources, including a few diaries and several interviews, were
varied enough to provide a good-enough impression about combat motivation
in both wars.
360
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
armed strategyto gain power. This all changed in 1969. The Peronistshad
now exhausted all means (negotiations,elections, sabotage, strikes, protest
marches)to participatein the country'spolitical process. The political disenfranchisementof the Peronistmovement,worseninglabourconditions,the
curtailmentof culturalexpressionand free speech,togetherwith a world-wide
spirit of rebellion,resultedin a series of violent mass mobilizationsand the
rise of guerrillaorganizationswhose membersbelievedthat a maturingclass
consciousnesshad madeArgentinaripe for a social revolution.
The Argentinianmilitaryhad been preparingthemselvesfor this dreaded
moment. The 1959 Cuban revolution, Ernesto Guevara'sill-fated 1966-67
Bolivianadventure,the two small guerrillainsurgenciesin Argentinaand the
covert guerrillatrainingof Argentiniansin Cuba duringthe mid-1960s had
made the Argentinianmilitary wary about the chances of a revolutionary
insurgency. About a dozen Marxist and Peronist guerrilla organizations
carried out more than 1500 armed actions between 1969 and 1972. The
protestcrowdsand guerrillainsurgentsforcedthe militaryjuntato call for free
elections and allow Per6n'sreturnto power in 1973. The escalatingviolence
of the 1970s was thus not caused only by a violent confrontationof armed
forces and guerrillaorganizations,but emergedfrom a deterioratingpolitical
strugglewithin Argentiniansociety as a whole.
The Marxistand Peronistguerrillaorganizationsrefusedto demobilizeafter
the 1973 elections, trying to force PresidentPer6n to take a more radical
politicaldirection.Per6n'sdeathin July 1974 and the riseto the presidencyof
his widow Maria EstelaMartinezde Per6n were the start of an increasingly
violent confrontationbetweenright-wingPeronistdeath squadsand left-wing
Peronistguerrillaorganizationsas well as armedoperationsagainst the military by the Marxistguerrillaforces. By 1975 the Argentinianmilitaryand the
guerrillacommanderswere convincedthat the country was on the brink of
civil war. The armedforces decidedto go on the offensiveafter receivingthe
green light from the Argentiniangovernment.This counter-insurgencywar
received little open public support, even though the 1976 coup d'etat was
approvedby broad layers of a population worn down by years of political
chaos and violence.
The junta that took power on 24 March 1976 regardeda victory over the
guerrillainsurgencyas only one step in a process of national reconstruction
and cultural salvation. Determined to stamp out all nationalist political
thought and end the economicprotectionismthat in their eyes had thwarted
Argentina'sprogress,they combined a liberal free-marketideology with an
authoritarianpolitical model and a conservativeculturalagenda.The preservation of what they saw as a national cultural heritage was of considerable
ideological importance. This legacy was manifested in paternal authority,
private property, a catholic tradition and the nuclear family as a cornerstone
of society, the very characteristics of Argentinian society which the guerrillas
were allegedly wanting to abolish. According to the military, the nation was
under attack from a guerrilla force with an atheist communist ideology and
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Robben:CombatMotivation,
Fearand Terror
inArgentina
361
In 1976, the conservative Catholic Major Mohamed Ali Seineldin was asked
to instil such a fighting spirit in the Federal Police and army personnel. A more
conscious awareness of personal faith and a collective religious identity were
assumed to strengthen the willingness to sacrifice one's life in combat.
The guerrilla commanders had their own concerns about motivating their
combatants. What was religion for the military was ideology for the guerrillas.
The Marxist guerrilla commanders urged their cadres to study Marx, Engels,
Lenin, Mao and Giap to improve their ideological formation.'0 They also
recommended romanticized accounts from the second world war, the Cuban
revolution and the Algerian and Vietnam wars to instil a spirit of sacrifice,
unwavering belief in one's ability, fearlessness in sight of the enemy and a love
of battle. Whereas the Marxist guerrillas spoke of combat motivation in the
service of a social revolution that would lead to an inevitable victory of the
proletariat, the Peronist guerrilla commanders appealed to past glories and a
mystique of invincibility. The latter referred to the worker resistance against
7 Juan E. Corradi, The Fitful Republic. Economy, Society, and Politics in Argentina (Boulder,
CO 1985), 24-30; John Lynch, 'From Independence to National Organization' in Leslie Bethell
(ed.), Argentina since Independence (Cambridge 1993), 38-46; Oscar Oszlak, La formacion del
estado argentino (Buenos Aires 1990), 45-84; David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish
Colonization to Alfonsin (Berkeley, CA 1987), 120-6.
8 Cited in La Nacion, 14 December 1976.
9 Acdel Edgardo Vilas, 'Reflexiones sobre la guerra subversiva', Revista de la Escuela Superior
de Guerra, 54, 427 (1976), 10.
10 Boletin Interno, 72 (December 1974), 1.
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CJE (Comando en Jefe del Ej6rcito), El Eje'rcitode Hoy (Buenos Aires 1976), 43.
Ibid., 44.
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police becausethe enemieswere not foreignsoldierscarryingout theirprofessional duties, but fellow-Argentiniansbelieved to endangertheir comrades,
families and whole way of life. One officer told a capturedguerrillain late
1977: 'And what were you thinking,that we were going to do nothing while
almost everyyear of graduatesof the MilitaryAcademysufferedcasualties?'"
One police officerwas determinedto find the four guerrillaswho had assassinated his wife by booby-trappingher car. He volunteeredfor particularly
dangerousmissions,willingto risk his life in pursuitof revenge.18
Therewas also a morediffuselevel of revengecontributingto combatmotivation. This was revengefor the violenceinflictedon Argentiniansociety. The
guerrillaorganizationswere held responsiblefor destroyingthe Argentinaof
the Sundayafternoonswith family and friends,the barbecues,eveningstrolls
and holidayoutings.Therewas revengefor the permanentthreatto theirloved
ones, for the 'dirtywork' they were forcedto carryout, such as torturingand
executingcaptives.Severalofficerstold me that they had resentedcarryingout
the tasks orderedby theirsuperiors.Trainedin conventionalwarfare,they had
been obligedto fight an intelligencewar againstan invisibleenemy.
Taking into considerationthe ideological and historical motivation, the
physical and mental preparation,the patriotic and religious fervour, the
cohesion, esprit de corps and comradeship,and finally the strong feelings of
revenge,how did the Argentinianmilitaryand guerrillashold up underenemy
fire in the counter-insurgency
war of 1975-80?
The counter-insurgencywar was waged by platoons, special forces and
intelligence units from the armed and security forces against Argentinian
guerrillacombatantsorganizedin cell-type structures.Guerrillacombatants
were hunted down in search-and-destroy
missions by small units using rifles,
machine guns and hand grenades,either in the sparselypopulated Andean
foothills of Tucumainprovince or in major cities and industrialbelts. The
weaponryplayed a minor role in affectingcombat motivation,although the
superior firepower of the Argentinianmilitary was decisive in armed confrontations with guerrilla combatants. In 1976, the Argentinianguerrilla
organizationswere expectingthe army to seal off entire neighbourhoodsin
searchof combatants,as had happenedin Chile in 1973. 'But what did they
do?' asks formerPeronistguerrillaErnestoJauretche.
They launched a war technology that was totally unknown to us. They launched those
famous pickup trucks in the street, the ones that had six soldiers in the back, one of whom
operated a MAG, a MAG-30 machine gun which is something terrifying; the other five with
a FAL rifle; in front an NCO with a machine gun and grenades, and a driver. Every contact
of one of our vehicles with one of theirs was four deaths for us .... We disappeared from the
street very soon because the combat was totally uneven."'9
17
18
19
Cited in Juan Gasparini, Montoneros: Final de Cuentas (Buenos Aires 1988), 125.
El Diario del Juicio, 14 (1985), 304.
Interview with Ernesto Jauretche, 20 April 1991.
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Combat
FearandTerror
Motivation,
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Juan Jose Masi, 'Lucha contra la subversi6n', Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, 45,
(1967), 80.
CJE, El Ejercito de Hoy, op. cit., 69.
Estrella Roja, 73 (1976), 2.
Ibid., 3.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
Argentinian soldiers in the Falklands war, but it could also lead to seething
anger, hatred and a dogged determination to continue fighting.
Still, the tireless task groups gave no quarter to the hunted guerrillas.
Surviving Montoneros became completely disheartened by the abductions.
'Everything produced an impressive demoralization in the heart of the organization. One couldn't walk in the street, nobody knew where it was safe
because even your own comrades were informers.'24The Marxist guerrillas
had the same experience: 'Survivors search one another out, they meet in the
street, check certain bars and cross certain squares and specific streets at specific hours; everyone has his reference points and resorts to them driven by the
need to know, to meet each other, and talk with others about the disaster.'25
Combat in the 1975-80 counter-insurgency war did not end with capture
or surrender because of the strategic decision to use terror and torture as
short cuts to victory. The zeal to annihilate the guerrillas caused the counterinsurgency war to deteriorate into a ruthless repression that dovetailed with
the state terrorism inflicted on the civilian political opposition. The inhuman
treatment of captives was glaring and has been analysed by me elsewhere, 26
but its effect on the combat motivation of the military has never been studied.
I suspect that morale becomes difficult to maintain under such extreme conditions, if not shored up by strong Manichean convictions, continuous
demonization and dehumanizing practices.27
Surprisingly enough, both the guerrilla organizations and the Argentinian
military regarded torture as the continuation of combat in another theatre of
operations. Intelligence, rather than the conquest of territory, was the crux
of this counter-insurgency war. Torture was seen as necessary to extract
information and as a means to break the enemy's will to fight. Aware of the
brutal interrogation practices, Argentinian guerrilla commanders tried to
motivate their members to resist torture. Silence was regarded as a victory over
the enemy, and a boost to morale. An article of June 1975 entitled 'Torture is
a Combat and It Can be Won', stated: 'Torture hurts, but it is not the pain that
is unbearable but the situation and conditions in which we find ourselves.'
Suggestions were made as to how to deceive interrogators with convincing
story lines. 'One has to lie to and mislead the enemy; that is the way to fight
them.' Guerrillas were also told to feign a cardiac arrest and exaggerate their
pain to win a victory in the heart of the repressive apparatus. 'The enemy may
kill, torture and abduct us, we may see comrades fall into their hands, but that
doesn't mean that we lose the unbreakable will to win.'28
Tragically enough, such victory in the torture chambers for many captives
entailed death rather than life. Death was a liberation from suffering rather
24 Interview with Ernesto Jauretche, 20 April 1991.
25 Rolo Diez, Los compaheros (Mexico City 1987), 102.
26 Robben, op. cit., chap. 11.
27 See Peter Watson, War on the Mind. The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (New
York 1978), 36-9.
28 Evita Montonera, 3 (1975), 20, 23, 27.
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than the end of life. 'One had to endure the suffering before an enemy who
didn't give death away. The victory was to earn one's death.'29By 1976, the
torture in the military's secret detention centres had become so ferocious that
resistance was impossible, and the Montonero commanders ordered their
combatants to die fighting or swallow a cyanide capsule. However, the
Marxist guerrillas continued to believe that resistance to torture was the mark
of a true revolutionary and that the following 1974 directive was still valid:
'The high proletarian combat morale has to be demonstrated as much in the
mass struggle as on the battlefield, in the torture chamber and in prison.'30
Torture, captivity and disappearances broke the morale of the guerrilla
organizations or what was left of them. A 1979 internal report from the
Montoneros stated that about 6000 comrades had been imprisoned between
1976 and 1978: 'Only 5 per cent of this figure fell through intelligence or by
accident, the other 95 per cent were the result of direct or indirect collaboration.' The report attributed the general inability to withstand torture to the
low combat morale and lack of faith in the success of the revolutionary war.
'This low morale before the enemy is a common denominator, not just of the
Montoneros but of the members of all armed organizations in the country,
because they all have one thing in common: defeat.'3'
The Marxist ERP admitted defeat in mid-1977 after the death of its principal military commanders in 1976 and the flight abroad of others thereafter.
The Montoneros split between February 1979 and April 1980 when two large
groups broke with the Montonero leadership in exile.32The 1982 Falklands
war dealt the death blow, as the tiny organization split in two over the offer by
the Montonero National Leadership to supply troops to fight the British, even
though in reality they were unable to supply even one company of combatants.
The opponents argued that the military were trying to make amends for the
state terrorism and regain lost support among the Argentinian people.
Patriotism and betrayal stood diametrically opposed, leaving permanent scars
on what remained of the Montoneros.
The Falkland Islands were seized in 1833 by the UK at a time when Argentina
was embroiled in a protracted civil war. The sovereignty over the islands has
been disputed ever since. The United Nations partially acknowledged
Argentina's claim in 1966 with Resolution 2065, urging the two countries to
enter into bilateral negotiations. These talks led to the 1968 Memorandum of
Understanding in which Great Britain accepted Argentina's sovereignty over
29 Gasparini, op. cit., 149.
30 Boletin Interno, 66 (1974), 2.
31 Cited in Gasparini, op. cit., 147, 146. The figure of 6000 comrades is deceptive because the
majority consisted of political members, not combatants. Emphasis in the original.
32 Marcelo Larraquy and Roberto Caballero, Galimberti. De Per6n a Susana (Buenos Aires
2001), 316-25; Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Per6n. Argentina's Montoneros (Oxford 1982),
266-8.
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intendedto give our life for somethingvery great;for love of what is ours, for
servingthe Fatherland,for beingfaithfulto our oath and to our principles'.36
The Falklandswar was greetedwith an enthusiasmwhich had never been
displayed about the counter-insurgencywar. Large crowds populated the
Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires to cheer PresidentGaltieriand convince US
envoy AlexanderHaig and PopeJohnPaulII of the justcause.Telethonswere
held at which nationalcelebritiesdonatedtheirjewellery.Politiciansfrom left
and right spoke about a historicalvindication,and the slogan 'The Malvinas
[Falklands]are Argentinian'was shouted throughoutthe country, echoing
nostalgic sentimentsnot only about the reconquestof lost territorybut also
about restoringa deeplydividednation and recuperatinga prosperouspast.37
Similarnationalistsentimentsmovedthe Argentinianguerrillas.In 1966 one
prominentguerrillahad alreadyhijackeda planeto the FalklandIslandswhere
he had raised the Argentinianflag. Severalcommandersin exile offered to
supplytroops and initiatecontactswith the IRA to carryout attacksin Great
Eventhough one factionof the Montonerosopposedsuchassistance
Britain.38
to a brutalregimethat had killed and torturedtheircomrades,they nevertheless embracedthe historicalclaim over the islands.
How was the nation-widesupporttranslatedinto combat motivationonce
the Argentiniantroops landed on the Falklands?Officersbegan to recallthe
glorious victoriesof their regimentsin the nineteenthcenturyin an attempt
to convert the patriotismof the young recruitsinto a heightenedesprit de
corps, namely the 'feelings of pride, unity of purpose, and adherenceto an
ideal representedby the unit'.39The troops were encouragedto operateas an
organicwhole with a respectfor discipline,obedienceand the chain of command. It is understandablethat morale droppedrapidly after Britishforces
securedtheirfirst bridgeheadbecausethe Argentinianconscriptsoldierswere
poorly trainedand had not been underarmslong enoughto developa strong
esprit de corps. As one conscript observed: 'All the English soldiers had
receivedat least three years'training.And howevermuch patriotismyou put
in, you can't fightthat.'40
The combat motivation of the two Argentiniancommando companies,
which receivedwide acclaim for their excellent performance,provides an
interestingcontrastto that of the conventionalforces. The commandoswere
36 Cited in Pablo Marcos Carballo, Dios y los halcones (Buenos Aires 1983), 29-30.
37 See Rosana Guber, ^Por que Malvinas? De la causa nacional a la guerra absurda (Buenos
Aires 2001) for an excellent cultural analysis of the Falkland Islands in Argentinian national identity.
38 Interviews with Ernesto Jauretche, 4 May 1991, and Fernando Vaca Narvaja, 27 November
1990.
39 Anthony Kellett, 'Combat Motivation' in Gregory Belenky (ed.), Contemporary Studies in
Combat Psychiatry (New York 1987), 208; Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno, Comandos en acci6n. El
Ejercito en Malvinas (Buenos Aires 1986), 126; Hector Ruben Simeoni, Malvinas. Contrahistoria
(Buenos Aires 1989), 139.
40 Daniel Kon (trans.), David Bolt Associates, Los chicos de la guerra. The Boys of the War
(London 1983), 39.
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from the depots. Upon their return home, they had lost between six and fifteen
kilos and suffered from pyorrhoea, bronchitis, eczema, diarrhoea and anaemia
because of poor nutrition and hygiene, and the cold and humidity.o
The mental exhaustion of the conscripts was due to their limited training
and young age, according to Argentinian army sources: 'The English soldiers
counted on an extended period of operational training .... Their average age,
considerably higher than that of the Argentinian soldier, put them in better
condition to confront the mental pressures and physical efforts of the operations'.s1 The army report failed to mention that the Argentinian junta had left
many of its best-trained professionals on the mainland in fear of a Chilean
attack. If the lack of troop rotation, the poor equipment and the immobility of
most Argentinian troops are taken into consideration, then the drop in combat
motivation and the physical and mental exhaustion of the conscripts become
easy to understand.
Next to weaponry, the type of combat is the major difference between
conventional and counter-insurgency warfare. Much of the Falklands war
consisted of long-range attacks with missiles, bombs and artillery while closerange combat occurred only in several major infantry assaults after the
Argentinian military capabilities had been severely damaged. The effects on
the combat motivation of the warring parties were the downing of planes, the
sinking of ships and the destruction of defensive positions.
Superior enemy firepower was one of the major causes of fear in the
Falklands war. On 1 May 1982, the British air force flew a Vulcan bomber
from Ascension Island to the Falklands to attack the Port Stanley airfield
before dawn. One shocked Argentinian commando witnessed the assault from
afar: 'It was Dantesque. My heart started pounding. We thought that this was
a general attack and that they had destroyed the city: we saw a horizon, white
because of the explosions, and we heard the cannons of the anti-aircraft
guns.'52 A secret communication by the military governor of the Falkland
Islands General Mario Men6ndez complained on 16 May 1982 about the
gradual deterioration of the troops: the harsh climate and difficult terrain, the
inadequate gear and the 'feeling of impotence when one sees no reaction of
one's own against the enemy attacks . . . erodes the morale of troops, despite
ardent action from the commanders'." The troops were mentally exhausted by
intense air strikes and shelling from naval gun ships.54The Argentinian foxhole
50 Cr6nica Documental de las Malvinas, 44 (1982), 898; Italo Angel Piaggi, Ganso Verde
(Goose Green) (Buenos Aires 1986), 35, 100; Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 195; Kon, op. cit., 73;
Dalmiro Manuel Bustos, El otro frente de la guerra. Los padres de las Malvinas (Buenos Aires
1982), 94-5.
51 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, op. cit., vol. 1, 18; see also Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 37.
52 Cited in Ruiz Moreno, op. cit., 72.
53 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, Informe Oficial del Ejercito Argentino Conflicto Malvinas. Tomo
II: Abreviaturas, Anexos y Fuentes Bibliograficas (Buenos Aires 1983), vol. 2, anexos.
54 Comisi6n de Redacci6n, op. cit., vol. 1, 19; about the psychological effects of artillery
shelling, see Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London 1985), 209-11, 231-3.
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strategy made the troops feel like sitting ducks. One soldier remarked: 'I didn't
feel afraid but yes a total lack of control. At that moment I thought about
many things, as if they happened in a movie in which I was the lead actor.'"
Another soldier spoke of a roller coaster between life and death: 'There
was good morale among us. But nobody abandoned the notion of death. I was
frightened, hysterical.'"6
Fear and inferior equipment did not necessarily lead to low morale, because
many troops felt that it was their duty and honour to fight. One sergeant
declared: 'Holy smoke, I'm very scared but the Englishman must also be
afraid, and I'm going to face him!'57One infantry officer remarked that he and
his men were fighting the battle of Goose Green as if hypnotized: 'It is like a
street fight, while one hits and receives hits, one isn't aware of the pain and
seems blinded, delivering blows.'58 In the heat of battle, the men neither
experienced a sense of pain nor were aware of the consequences.
Combat motivation and fear differed between the three armed forces
because of their different commissions. One pilot was very anxious during his
flight. He sensed a dry mouth, his arms were tense and his muscles stiff, but
there was no time to be afraid because all attention was absorbed by flying his
fighter jet and engaging enemy aircraft.59The pilot was completely focused on
his mission: 'There's no room for emotions. There's no room for fear, neither
for hate nor for memories.'60The mission was to destroy the target, irrespective of the fate of other planes. 'That's what happened to me. I saw the target,
steered towards it, saw the anti-aircraft flak, and saw the boiling water. I saw
a comrade fall. I proceeded. I shot. I believe I shot well. I believe that I applied
everything they had taught me and escaped.'6'Part of this concentration has to
do with the technical and personal demands on a pilot facing single-handed
combat. As one helicopter pilot wrote in his diary on 7 May 1982: 'Under
these circumstances of repeated alarm and a few airplanes that dropped their
explosives nearby, one comes to know each person well: his lack of control,
his courage, his egoism and his heroism .... In the beginning one fears the
pain of bone splinters, of disfigurement, of bleeding to death, but later one gets
used to the explosions of the aggressors coming from behind the clouds.'62
Revenge was another motivating force in the Falklands war, although not as
strong as in the counter-insurgency war. The sinking of the 'General Belgrano'
cruiser on 2 May 1982, causing hundreds of deaths, raised much hatred
among the Argentinian forces, and helped motivate the successful attack with
Exocet missiles on the destroyer 'Sheffield' several days later. The Argentinians
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
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Argentinian officers, commandos and pilots want to leave the impression that
they were professionally well-prepared and fought bravely in the Falklands but
that the incompetent high command was responsible for the defeat. In contrast,
conscript soldiers complain about their poor training, outdated weapons, inadequate supplies and indecisive officers, while stressing their patriotism and
determination to make the best of a terrible situation.71These contradictory
renditions yield an interesting perspective on combat motivation when juxtaposed to those of the counter-insurgency war.
Military officers spoke with resentment about having had to carry out the
dirty work to save the country from communism, only to receive the scorn of
the Argentinian people and hear their commanders deny that they had given
orders to torture and disappear the captives. A sense of betrayal runs through
their accounts, leaving many veterans disillusioned about the wars they waged.
The combat motivation of the Falklands war cannot be understood in isolation from the counter-insurgency war. The Argentinian military by and large
disliked the repressive measures and human rights violations of the counterinsurgency war. They regarded the Falklands war as a chance to rehabilitate
their smeared reputation, and were determined to fight with valour and
honour for a just historical cause. Now they could really show their worth in a
clean, conventional war: a war in which they faced uniformed soldiers with
their sophisticated weapons, unhampered by human rights protests, no longer
burdened by the screams of hooded torture victims, away from the sordid
secret detention centres, and out into the open fields of a longed-for land that
they were promised would be theirs.
70 Cr6nica Documental de las Malvinas, 44 (1982), 896.
71 Kon, op. cit. and Turolo, op. cit. are representative of these opposite views. The former presents the conscript soldiers as victims, while the latter depicts the officers as heroes. See Rosana
Guber, De chicos a veteranos. Memorias argentinas de la guerra de Malvinas (Buenos Aires 2003)
for the differences between officers and conscripts as war veterans.
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376
of Contemporary
Journal
HistoryVol41 No 2
war is of
The fact that many officershad fought in the counter-insurgency
relevanceto the way they fought in the Falklands.Therewere repeatedassurancesthat the kelperswould not be takenhostage,that capturedBritishtroops
would be treatedaccordingto the GenevaConventions,and that therewas no
personal hatred againstthe Britishpersonnel.Even the report by Lieutenant
GeneralBenjaminRattenbach,which gave a devastatingcritiqueof President
Galtieriand the Argentinianarmedforces,emphasizedthat 'we must be proud
of the nobility with which the Argentinianforces behaved. . . by not at any
momentviolatingthe norms of war . .. such as attackingnon-combatantsor
ships and planes conductingrescuemissions.'72The contrastwith a counterinsurgencywar turnedfoul could not be greater.Whereasthe Britishforces
were fought with chivalry, 'the armed forces responded to the terrorists'
crimeswith a terrorismfar worse than the one they were combating,and after
24 March 1976 they could count on the power and impunityof an absolute
state, which they misused to abduct, torture and kill thousands of human
beings.'73
The comparisonof the Argentinianconventionaland counter-insurgency
wars yields four lessons about combat motivation.The first is that combat
motivationis not purelya mentalstate that can be maximizedthroughconditioning and realistictrainingexercises,but that it is as much a social process.
This process consists of shifting motivations influencedby both contextual
and combat-relatedfactors which are experienceddifferentlythrough time
according to the predicamentof the troops. Combat motivation fluctuates
continuouslyaccordingto the social, political and militarycircumstancesof
the war. The motivationof the militaryin 1975 was somewhatdifferentfrom
that in 1977 at the heightof the militaryrepressionand supremacy.Likewise,
the combat motivation of the Argentiniantroops landing on the Falkland
Islandson 2 April 1982 differedfrom that on 19 May 1982 when the British
securedtheir first bridgeheadat San Carlos Bay. The second lesson is that
combat motivation is affected by the type of warfare. Counter-insurgency
wars imply differentresponsibilities,combat situationsand forms of engagement than conventionalwars. The centralimportanceof intelligence-gathering
in the first and that of conqueringterritoryin the second leads to different
strategic objectives and tactical decisions. The combat motivation of the
Argentiniantroops in the Falklandswar was more directlyinfluencedby successes and failureson the battlefieldthan in the protractedcounter-insurgency
war whose developmentwas much harderto gauge. The third lesson is that
there is a differencebetweencombat motivationand the motivationto go to
war. The political and historicalcontext made conscriptseager to fight for
Argentiniansovereigntyover the FalklandIslandsbut theircombatmotivation
declined rapidly when the fighting began. This distinctionbetween context
72 Informe Rattenbach, op. cit., 309-10.
73 CONADEP, trans. Writers and Scholars International Ltd, Nunca Mds. The Report of the
Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (New York 1986), 1.
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Robben:CombatMotivation,
inArgentina
Fearand Terror
377
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