Vargas v Rilloza

GR No L-1612, February 26, 1948, 80 PHIL 297

Article VIII, Section 11 Security of Tenure; temporary replacement; uninterrupted security of
tenure; to be read in conjunction with Estrada v Desierto
FACTS:
A motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of section 14 of the People's Court
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) for the following reasons, among others: (a) It provides for
qualification of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in section 6, Article
VIII of the Philippine Constitution; (b) It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme
Court who do not possess the qualifications set forth in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine
Constitution; (c) It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a
procedure other than impeachment; (d) It creates two Supreme Courts.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and in support of his
opposition submits that Power of Congress to enact section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 68 and
CA 68 does not amend the nor add to the Constitutional provisions. The law provides,
SEC. 14. Any Justice of the Supreme Court who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive
Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case
brought to that Court under section thirteen hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office
or position under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any
branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or disqualification of judges, in
Rule 126, section 1 of the Rules of Court, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability the
requisite number of Justices necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not
present, the President may designate such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First
Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as
may be necessary to sit temporarily as Justice of said Court, in order to form a quorum or until a
judgment in said case is reached.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional
HELD:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.
(a) To discover whether the above quoted section 14 of the People's Court Act is repugnant to the
constitution, one of the best tests would be to compare the operation with the same section if the
latter were to be allowed to produce its effects. It is self-evident that before the enactment of the
oft-quoted section of the People's Court Act, it was not only the power but the bounden duty of
all members of the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in all treason cases duly brought or
appealed to the Court. That power and that duty arise from the above cited sections of Article

VIII of the Constitution, namely, section 4, providing how the court shall be composed and how
it may sit, section 9, ordaining that they shall hold office during good behavior until they reach
the age of seventy years or become, incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, and the
pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions bearing on the jurisdiction, powers and
responsibilities of the Supreme Court. Competently referring to the instant case, if section 14 of
the People's Court Act had not been inserted therein, there can be no question that each and every
member of this Court would have to sit in judgment in said case.
But if said section 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court "who held any office or
position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine
Republic" would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused
herein is a person who likewise held an office or position at least under the Philippine Executive
Commission. In other words, what the constitution in this respect ordained as a power and a duty
to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the People's Court Act would prohibit them
from exercising and fulfilling what the constitution directs the section prohibits. A clearer case of
repugnancy of fundamental law can hardly be imagined.
For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the
disqualified Justice from his office for, as above demonstrated, were it not for the challenged
section 14 there would have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced
Justice and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office,
saving only proper cases or disqualification under Rule 126.
(b) In the face of the constitutional requirement (Art. VIII, section 5) that the members of the
Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, we are of the opinion that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the
Supreme Court and that the "designation" authorized in section 14 of the People's Court Act to be
made by the President of any Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or cadastral
Judge cannot possibly be a compliance with the provision requiring that appointment. An
additional disqualifying circumstance of the "designee" is the lack of confirmation by or consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Without intending the least reflection on the ability,
learning, and integrity of any such "designee", we are merely construing and applying the
fundamental law of the land. A Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or
Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the Revised Administrative Code, need not be at least forty
years of age, nor have more than ten years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines (as required by section 6 of Article VIII of the
Constitution), because under said section he need only have practiced law for a period of not less
than five years or have held during a like period within the Philippines an office requiring a
lawyer's diploma. So that it may happen that a "designee" under section 14 of the People's Court
Act, sitting as a substitute Justice of the Supreme Court in particular collaboration cases, and
participating therein in the deliberations and functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular
Justice thereof, does not possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular member of
said Court. Here again is another point of repugnancy between the challenged section and the
constitution.