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ALLEVIATING CHOKING UNDER PRESSURE USING IMAGERY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate School


of the University of Notre Dame
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by
Sabine A. Krawietz

G.A. Radvansky, Director

Graduate Program in Psychology


Notre Dame, Indiana
December 2012

ALLEVIATING CHOKING UNDER PRESSURE USING IMAGERY

Abstract
by
Sabine A. Krawietz

The main purpose of the current research was to investigate a novel approach to
prevent choking under pressure using a sensorimotor task. Choking is defined as
suboptimal performance in situations filled with performance pressure. Three main
experiments were conducted to systematically give rise to performance decrements and
to, subsequently, use imagery practice to prevent such choking. Experiment 1 served to
replicate the commonly-found interaction between direction of attention and the
cognitive demands of the task. Here, novice golfers were found to perform optimally
under skill-focused attention but suboptimally when concurrently doing an auditory
word monitoring task while the opposite pattern emerged for expert golfers.
Experiment 2a sought to establish an equally high level of performance pressure
as perceived by participants putting in scenarios induced with outcome and monitoring
pressure and a significantly higher level of perceived pressure than other participants
putting in the no pressure control condition. Experiment 2b, then, provided further
support for the recent finding of an interaction between type of pressure and the

Sabine A. Krawietz
cognitive demands of a task. Novice golfers, for which putting represents a working
memory - reliant task, exhibited choking under outcome but not under monitoring
pressure whereas the opposite trend was found for the expert group.
Finally, Experiment 3 set out to test whether imagery practice, in particular, firstand third-person imagery, affected performance as a function of skill level when
performing in a single-task (i.e., no pressure) and a pressure-filled environment.
Importantly, choking, as had been found for novices under outcome and experts under
monitoring pressure, was prevented using a brief introduction and one block practice
session of imagery practice. In particular, it was found that when novices imagined
themselves make a successful putt from a third-person perspective, their performance
no longer fell prey to the negative effects of perceived outcome pressure. In the same
vein, experts who used first-person imagery performed optimally under those
conditions of monitoring pressure that had previously been found harmful of their
putting performance.
Importantly, this research showed that choking under pressure can be prevented
through imagery practice, and is best used when matching visual imagery perspective to
the cognitive demands of the performer. These results are further discussed in light of
current theory of choking under pressure, in particular, self-focus theory and the
distraction hypothesis.

CONTENTS

FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... iv
TABLES.................................................................................................................................. v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................... vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
1.1 Choking Under Pressure ................................................................................... 4
1.1.1 Cognitive Demands ............................................................................ 5
1.1.2 Direction of Attention ........................................................................ 9
1.1.3 Type of Pressure .............................................................................. 12
1.1.4 Regulatory Focus .............................................................................. 14
1.2 Theories of Choking Under Pressure .............................................................. 17
1.2.1 Early Theories................................................................................... 17
1.2.2 Recent Theories ............................................................................... 18
1.3 Alleviating Choking Under Pressure................................................................ 20
1.3.1 Previous Research ............................................................................ 20
1.3.2 Alleviating Choking Using Imagery Practice..................................... 26
1.3.2.1 Visual Imagery Perspective ............................................... 28
1.3.2.2 Perspectives in Sports Performance ................................. 29
1.3.2.3 Perspectives in Memory and Emotional Processing ......... 33
1.4 Summation ...................................................................................................... 36
1.5 Overview of Experiments ................................................................................ 37
CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1: ATTENTION REPLICATION ................................................... 38
2.1 Method ........................................................................................................... 38
2.1.1 Participants ...................................................................................... 38
2.1.2 Materials .......................................................................................... 39
2.1.3 Procedure ......................................................................................... 40
2.1.4 Replication Criteria .......................................................................... 42
2.2 Results ............................................................................................................. 43
2.3 Discussion........................................................................................................ 45
CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2A: PRESSURE REPLICATION ................................................... 47
3.1 Method ........................................................................................................... 48
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3.1.1 Participants ...................................................................................... 48


3.1.2 Materials .......................................................................................... 48
3.1.3 Procedure ......................................................................................... 50
3.1.4 Replication Criteria .......................................................................... 55
3.2 Results ............................................................................................................. 58
3.2.1 Self-Report and Heart Rate Measures ............................................. 58
3.2.2 Putting Performance ........................................................................ 60
3.3 Discussion........................................................................................................ 62
CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 2B: EFFECTS OF PRESSURE ON PERFORMANCE ...................... 64
4.1 Method ........................................................................................................... 65
4.1.1 Participants ...................................................................................... 65
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure ................................................................. 65
4.2 Results ............................................................................................................. 66
4.2.1 Self-Report and Heart Rate Measures ............................................. 66
4.2.2 Putting Performance ........................................................................ 70
4.3 Discussion........................................................................................................ 73
CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENT 3: ALLEVIATING CHOKING THROUGH IMAGERY ..................... 76
5.1 Method ........................................................................................................... 76
5.1.1 Participants ...................................................................................... 76
5.1.2 Materials .......................................................................................... 77
5.1.3 Design............................................................................................... 79
5.1.4 Procedure ......................................................................................... 79
5.2 Results ............................................................................................................. 82
5.2.1 Self-Report and Heart Rate Measures ............................................. 82
5.2.2 Putting Performance ........................................................................ 93
5.3 Discussion...................................................................................................... 102
5.3.1 Imagery (Only)................................................................................ 102
5.3.2 Imagery under Pressure ................................................................. 105
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................. 106
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 118

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FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the mean) for difference
scores of the distance from hole measure clustered by skill level and attention
condition in Experiment 1 ..................................................................................... 44
Figure 4.1 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the mean) for difference
scores clustered by skill level and attention condition for combined data for
Experiment 2a and 2b. .......................................................................................... 72
Figure 5.1 Overview of study design of Experiment 3. ..................................................... 79
Figure 5.2 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the mean) for difference
scores clustered by skill level and imagery perspective for Experiment 3. .......... 96
Figure 5.3 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the mean) for difference
scores for novice (a) and expert (b) golfers clustered by type of pressure and
imagery for Experiment 3. .................................................................................... 99

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TABLES

Table 2.1 Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Block and Difference Scores
of Putting Data by Skill Level and Pressure Condition for Experiment 1 ............. 43
Table 3.1 Sample Size, Means, and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) of Importance,
Pressure, and State Anxiety Scores per Pressure Condition of Prior Studies ....... 54
Table 3.2 Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Block and Difference Scores
on all Measures by Pressure Condition for Experiment 2a .................................. 56
Table 3.3 Means and Standard Errors (in Parantheses) for Putting Performance by Skill
Level and Pressure Condition for Experiment 2a ................................................. 61
Table 4.1 Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Block and Difference Scores
on all Measures by Pressure Condition for Experiment 2a and 2b ...................... 68
Table 4.2 Means and Standard Errors (in Parantheses) by Skill Level and Pressure
Condition for Experiment 2a and 2b..................................................................... 71
Table 5.1 Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Block and Difference Scores
on all Measures by Pressure and Imagery Condition for Novices (Only) of
Experiment 3 ......................................................................................................... 83
Table 5.2 Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Block and Difference Scores
on all Measures by Pressure and Imagery Condition for Experts (Only) of
Experiment 3 ......................................................................................................... 87
Table 5.3 Means and Standard Errors (in Parantheses) for Block and Difference Scores by
Skill Level and Imagery Condition for Experiment 2 (No Pressure Condition Only)
and Experiment 3 (Imagery Block Only) ............................................................... 95
Table 5.4 Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Block and Difference Scores by
Skill Level and Pressure and Imagery Condition for Experiment 3 ....................... 98

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank my advisor, G.A. Radvansky, for his guidance,
understanding, patience, and most importantly, for his friendship during my doctoral
studies at Notre Dame. His mentorship was vital in providing a well-rounded teaching
and research experience consistent with my interests and career aspirations. He
encouraged me to continue my studies in difficult times and I will be forever thankful for
his support in completing this important academic step. Thank you also for your humor
on this journey throughout our lab meetings and conference visits.
I would also like to thank the Department of Psychology at Notre Dame, and
especially the members of my doctoral committee, Bradley Gibson, Jerry Haeffel, and
Jessica Payne, for their valuable input, discussions, and accessibility. You have all
inspired me to become a more thorough scientist and better person overall. I am also
grateful for having learned from and worked with enthusiastic and passionate
professors such as Jessica Payne and Scott Maxwell who I wish to be like in the future.
Finally, I wish to thank my family and dear friends who have supported me, at
times from far away, throughout my academic career in the US.

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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

The study of human performance per se has not been established in unified
form; instead, researchers, practitioners, and consultants in counseling, business, sports
psychology, and, more recently, cognitive psychology have worked largely
independently, identifying ways to develop and facilitate optimal performance while
preventing poor performance. Practitioners, consultants, and researchers have
investigated how performers can reach a mental state that allows optimal or peak
performance by helping them effectively regulate emotion (e.g., anxiety and anger
control) and attention (e.g., focus control), overcome mental blocks (e.g., stereotype
threat), and develop effective pre-performance routines, to name just a few.
The need to perform optimally is critical to numerous situations including sports
performance (e.g., tennis, ice skating, or weightlifting), public speaking (e.g., an
inspirational political speech before elections, a college professor nailing a lecture, or a
manager holding a business meeting), test taking (e.g., tests in schools and colleges or to
gain a drivers license), military, police, and rescue services (e.g., soldiers in combat, fire
fighters, or paramedics), the performing arts (e.g., acting, singing, or dancing), and
other high risk-professions such as flying airplanes or conducting surgery.

Optimal performance in skilled tasks depends on numerous factors. When asking


elite athletes what all has to be in line for them to perform well, they might answer with
sleep, nutrition, physical fitness and lack of injuries, functioning equipment, social
support and a lack of personal problems, financial security, having practiced skills
recently to have established a good feel and confidence, and having competed
recently to be used to retrieving skills in context of competition. Even when a performer
enters a critical performance well prepared and with the motivation to excel,
performance decrements can occur. The current study is concerned with what
performers can do to maintain an optimal performance level during early skill learning
processes and once the fundamental skills have been fully acquired. In particular, it will
be investigated under which circumstances performance break downs occur in
beginning and advanced skill performers and whether strategies can be taught to
prevent them.
Hence, performance under pressure is the main topic of this research.
Performance pressure is a strong desire to perform at a high level in a situation (Hardy,
Mullen, & Jones, 1996) and, therefore, depends on the perceived importance to
perform well (Baumeister, 1984). Examples of high pressure situations are a pilot
landing an airplane under difficult conditions (e.g., the 2009 U.S. Airways flight 1549
Hudson River airline landing), a surgeon operating on a heart patient, and a golfer
making a putt in a decisive moment (e.g., to win the PGA Championship). The
consequences of failing to perform optimally in pressure-filled situations can be
dramatic as in the case of losing lives when crashing airplanes or failing heart surgery.
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Thus, finding ways to prevent subotpimal performance, or choking under pressure, is


important for the successful completion of tasks laden with responsibility.
Choking is defined as poor performance in response to what an individual
perceives as an important and stress-filled situation (Beilock & Gray, 2007, p. 426). It is
less-than-average or suboptimal performance in response to perceived performance
pressure. Thus, choking differs from other types of performance decrements such as
those caused by injuries, lack of practice, recent changes in skill processes, or a longlasting performance slump, in that the sole cause for the impairment lies in the
presence of perceived performance pressure. In this sense, optimal performance would
resume once the situation was relieved of the perceived pressure. Choking is usually
accompanied by feelings of anxiety and worry, loss of attentional and emotional control,
heart racing, and palpitations. Yet, it does not occur every time pressure is perceived by
the performer, and it is the aim of current research to identify the conditions in which
choking occurs and to develop strategies to prevent it.
In recent years, several studies investigated when and why choking occurs and
made early attempts to prevent it. The aim of this research is examine how different
types of pressure affect performance on a sensorimotor task and finding a new way of
alleviating choking. In the next two sections, I first review the current literature on
choking under pressure and, then, introduce a new method (i.e., imagery practice) that
will be tested as a way to alleviate choking.

1.1 Choking Under Pressure


Prior work primarily stemming from research in cognitive and sports psychology
has revealed several patterns that make the vulnerability to choking more predictable.
In particular, I discuss several factors that have been found to systematically affect
performance under pressure. Interactions between the cognitive demands of the task
(WM-reliant vs. proceduralized) and the direction of attention (skill-focused vs. nonskill-focused) have consistently been found in a variety of studies including soccer
dribbling (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Smith & Chamberlin, 1992), golf
putting (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Masters, 1992), hockey dribbling
(Leavitt, 1979; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006), baseball batting (Gray, 2004),
mathematical problem-solving (Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2005;
Beilock & DeCaro, 2007), test taking (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Eysenck, 1979; Kahneman,
1973; Wine, 1971), intellectual reasoning (Gimmig, Huguet, Caverni, & Cury, 2006), and
category learning (Markman, Maddox, & Worthy, 2006). Another line of research
investigating direction of attention has examined the effects of focusing on the
movement of the skill (internal focus) and its movement effect (i.e., external focus) in a
variety of tasks including golf pitching (Bell & Hardy, 2009; Wulf, Lauterbach, & Toole,
1999; Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001), a balancing task on a stabilotmeter (McNevin,
Shea, & Wulf, 2003; Wulf, Hoe, & Prinz, 1998), a ski-slalom simulation task (Wulf, et al.,
1998), and volleyball and soccer (Wulf, McConnel, Gaertner, & Schwarz, 2002).
Moreover, there is preliminary evidence from category learning and key pressing
paradigms (DeCaro, Thomas, Albert, & Beilock, 2011) that the type of pressure faced in
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a critical performance situation interacts with the cognitive demands of a task in a


similar way as direction of attention does. Finally, the reward structure of the task (i.e.,
losses vs. gains) plays an important role in the fragility of choking and further interacts
with the cognitive demands of the task and the direction of attention (Grimm,
Markman, Maddox, & Baldwin, 2008; Markman, et al., 2006; Plessner, Unkelbach,
Memmert, Baltes, & Kolb, 2009; Worthy, Markman, & Maddox, 2009).
In this section on choking under pressure, I first introduce these factors and
show how they systematically influence performance: (a) the cognitive demands of the
task, (b) the direction of attention, (c) the type of pressure, and (d) the task reward
structure. Then, I review theories that try to explain how and why choking occurs,
drawing from different perspectives such as drive, behavioral, and cognitive views.
Lastly, I review currently-tested methods on preventing choking including implicit
learning, self-consciousness training, and practicing under mild anxiety.
1.1.1 Cognitive Demands
Cognitive demands of a task vary from working memory-reliant (WM-reliant) to
proceduralized tasks and can depend on a persons level of expertise (i.e., cognitive vs.
autonomous level of skill acquisition) or the nature of the task (e.g., rule-based vs.
information-based, complexity of cognitive tasks).
WM-Reliant Tasks. WM-reliant tasks are characterized by a need to monitor the
individual steps or processes used in task completion. These include actions in the early,
cognitive stage of skill acquisition (Fitts & Posner, 1967) (e.g., novice motor actions),
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altered ways of completing an action in the late, autonomous stage of skill acquisition
(e.g., changing aspects of well-learned motor action), and analytical tasks that, typically,
are not heavily proceduralized (e.g., complex arithmetic problem solving). For example,
a tennis player relies on monitoring the step-by-step processes involved in hitting a
forehand stroke during a rally. Specifically, attention needs to be paid to the speed,
direction, and slope of the incoming ball, which foot to start running with to get to the
ball, the position of the feet while hitting the ball, the back and through swing of the
racket, the angle in which the racket head makes contact with the ball, and the direction
of the follow-through.
In the beginning of skill acquisition, a novice player may consciously think about
one or more of these aspects while playing. An expert tennis player typically does not
need to pay conscious attention to the individual processes because the skill has been
automatized or proceduralized. However, if changes are made to the procedure of the
stroke, WM processes of skill execution are reengaged and the task reverts back to a
WM-reliant one. For example, if there is a change in stance from a closed to an open
one, there would be a need to adjust the movement of the racket and the rest of the
body accordingly. Furthermore, complex tasks which do not allow for the repetition of
actions or processes do not lend themselves to becoming overly proceduralized. For
example, many instances of analytical reasoning, arithmetic problem-solving, and rulebased category-learning remain of WM-reliant nature and are completed in a step-bystep fashion regardless of expertise level. That is not to say that these tasks cannot be
practiced and automatized; however, typically, people do not memorize these to the
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extent of direct retrieval. With respect to this research, golf putting represents a WMreliant task for novice golfers.
In WM-reliant tasks, skills are represented in declarative memory and require
attentional resources for successful completion. Performance is closely monitored
within working memory. As these tasks afford controlled attention, anything that
distracts or consumes attentional resources has the potential to cause performance
decrements as has been shown in dual-task paradigms ranging from sensorimotor tasks
such as golf putting (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001, Lewis & Linder, 1997) and baseball
batting (Gray, 2004) to cognitive tasks such as category learning (e.g., Markman et al.,
2006) and mathematical problem-solving (e.g., Beilock et al., 2004). In sum, these
studies have shown that when completing a WM-reliant task, people need to attend to
what they are doing, otherwise they fail.
Proceduralized Tasks. When acquiring a skill, people start out by learning the
individual processes that make up the skill. After practice, the individual parts of a skill
are combined resulting in one gross, fluent movement that is automatized or
proceduralized. For a proceduralized skill, the need to consciously use the individual
processes is reduced and a much greater emphasis is placed on the whole action. Many
tasks that people do, even on a daily basis, can be automatized such as driving a car,
washing dishes, or speaking a foreign language. For example, after automatization,
drivers do not consciously attend to where the gas, break, and clutch pedals are and at
which speed to shift up or down. With respect to this research, golf putting is a
proceduralized task for expert golfers.
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Proceduralized tasks are executed automatically and largely outside of


conscious awareness. According to the stages of skill acquisition, they fall into the final,
the autonomous stage (Fitts & Posner, 1967). In this stage, cognitive monitoring is
nearly eliminated and once a proceduralized action is initiated, it is difficult to interrupt.
In fact, explicit monitoring to the individual processes of proceduralized skills can harm
performance as has been shown in numerous studies ranging from sensorimotor (e.g.,
Beilock et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2006) to cognitive tasks (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2005;
Gimmig et al., 2006).
In terms of the neural mechanisms involved, two different memory systems have
been identified corresponding to declarative (i.e., feedback- or rule-based) and
nondeclarative (i.e., paired-associate) versions of a classification task (i.e., weather
prediction task) (Poldrack et al., 2001; Poldrack & Packard, 2003). Use of the declarative
version yielded in brain activation in the medial temporal lobe (i.e., hippocampus),
whereas use of the nondeclarative task yielded in activation in the striatum (i.e.,
caudate putamen). Interestingly, it was also found that activation in the two memory
systems was negatively correlated. This finding supports the idea that the rule-based
and paired-associate tasks activate brain areas that are, at least in part, mutually
exclusive.
The architecture of the weather prediction task with its flexibility to alter the
nature of the task is comparable to that of the categorization tasks used in studies of
choking under pressure as discussed above. Presumably, the underlying neural
processes found in the weather prediction task are similar to those initiated in category
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learning. It would seem that novice golfers for which putting represents a WM-reliant
task would show similar brain activation as the rule-based weather prediction task.
Likewise, expert golfers for which putting represents a proceduralized task may show
similar activation patterns as those of the paired-associate classification task. Along
these lines, it can be deduced that novice and expert putting activates brain areas that
are, at least in part, mutually exclusive, further suggesting that changes in instruction
(e.g., direction of attention or imagery) or in the environment (e.g., inducing pressure)
may lead to different performance outcomes.
1.1.2 Direction of Attention
Attention has been manipulated in terms of skill-focused vs. distraction (Beilock
et al., 2002, Beilock & Carr, 2001) and focusing on the movement (itself) vs. movement
effect (Bell & Hardy, 2009; McNevin, et al., 2003; Wulf, et al., 1998, 2002; Wulf,
Lauterbach, & Toole, 1999; Wulf, McNevin, &Shea, 2001; Wulf & Prinz, 2001), what has
also been coined internal and external focus.
According to the work by Beilock and her colleagues (Beilock et al., 2002, 2004;
Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007), direction of attention has been tested
with regards to skill-focus and distraction and has been found to interact consistently
with the cognitive demands of the task in a variety of tasks as discussed above. Skillfocused attention occurs when the focus of attention is on a particular aspect of skill
execution as in single-task paradigms such as attending to the inner side of ones foot
while dribbling a soccer ball or monitoring the movement of the clubhead during golf
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putting (e.g., Beilock et al.). Distraction or outcome-focused attention involves attending


to aspects other than skill execution such as in visual and auditory dual-task paradigms
(e.g., monitoring an audio recording for a target tone while putting a golf ball) (Beilock
et al.; Beilock & Carr). WM-reliant tasks require skill-focused attention for optimal
performance and are impaired when attention is disrupted (i.e., distraction or outcomefocused attention). For example, Beilock et al. showed that novices dribbled a soccer
ball worse when they had to do a secondary task than when they only had to focus on
dribbling. For novices, dribbling is WM-reliant and they need more attentional resources
to do well and their performance breaks down when attention is partially engaged in
another task.
Conversely, proceduralized tasks suffer from skill-focused attention but remain
unaffected by distraction and outcome-focused attention. In the same study, Beilock et
al. (2002) showed that expert dribblers performed better under dual-task attention and
choked under skill-focused attention. Dribbling is encoded in chunks, supporting realtime performance and is impaired when attentional monitoring and control are
imposed. Attending to the act of dribbling is not only unnecessary but hurts
performance.
The line of work by Wulf and other researches (Bell & Hardy, 2009; McNevin, et
al., 2003; Wulf & Prinz, 2001; Wulf, et al., 1998; Wulf, et al., 1999; Wulf, et al., 2001;
Wulf, et al., 2002) examined the use of an internal (movement) versus an external
(movement effect) focus of attention. An internal focus of attention involves focusing on
the movement of the body when performing a task as in how to move the hands during
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a golf putt. An external focus of attention has to do with directing attention towards the
effect these body movements have as in making the ball roll in a straight line towards
the hole. Note that anything but the body itself is included in this focus of attention
even such targets as the movement of the clubhead. This categorization is in contrast to
Beilocks skill-focused attention which would include the movement of the clubhead
under this type of attention.
The external focus of attention can be more or less distant from the body
movement. For example, Bell and Hardy (2009) had skilled golfers focus on a proximal
(i.e., movement of clubhead) or a distal (i.e., slope of flight of the ball) external focus of
attention in a golf pitching task (i.e.. golf swing with an iron club for relatively short
distance used to approach the putting green). He found that under low and high
pressure, golfers pitched closer to the target when using the distal external than the
proximal external focus of attention. Yet, both of these instructional groups performed
better than an internal focus of attention (i.e., movement of arms) group. According to
these results, the more distant the focus of attention was, the better performance
under low and high pressure. Thus, this result is consistent with the general finding of
Beilock and her colleagues findings that skill-focused attention hurts skilled
performance and directing attention away from skill execution (as in dual-task
paradigms) does not hurt such performance. With respect to skill learning, other
researchers found novices also benefited from an external focus of attention over an
internal one in a ski-slalom simulation and a balancing task (e.g., Wulf et al., 1998).

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These two lines of research suggest that what people focus on greatly affects
their success in skill learning and performance. Based on previous findings, it can be
predicted that skill-focused attention should help novices but hurt expert performance
and distraction as induced by a dual-task paradigm negatively affects novices but not
experts.
1.1.3 Type of Pressure
Pressure leads to worry and anxiety to perform well and people typically
respond by raising their level of effort (Baumeister, 1984). This increased effort is
accompanied by a redirection and perhaps even a narrowing of attention to certain
aspects of performance. Furthermore, it has been suggested that where attention is
directed depends, at least in part, on the characteristics of the perceived pressure
situation (DeCaro et al., 2011).
Support for this idea has been obtained by DeCaro et al (2011) who showed that
type of pressure interacts with the cognitive demands of a task using category learning
(Experiments 1-3) and key pressing (Experiment 4). Here, pressure was categorized into
outcome and monitoring pressure which were thought to induce skill-focused and
divided attention (or distraction), respectively. Monitoring pressure occurred when
people felt evaluated or being watched as when being video-recorded. Outcome
pressure was perceived during high stakes situations as when performance was
rewarded by monetary incentives and/or when people were paired up with an
imaginary partner (i.e., peer pressure). The results of DeCaro et al.s study indicated that
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performance on the WM-reliant task (i.e., rule-based category learning) was unaffected
when being video-recorded but compromised under outcome-focused pressure. For the
proceduralized task (i.e., information-based category learning), performance was
impaired under monitoring pressure, however, was not only maintained but enhanced
under outcome pressure.
To my knowledge, this is the first study investigating how different types of
pressure categorized as monitoring and outcome pressure affect performance. Prior
studies either used what can be called outcome-focused pressure alone (Beilock & Carr,
2001; Gray, 2004; Markman, et al., 2006), or a mixture of the elements of outcome and
monitoring pressure (Reeves, Tenenbaum, & Lidor, 2007). For example, Beilock and Carr
used monetary incentives and peer pressure and found performance decrements in golf
putting for practiced participants. Similarly, Markman et al. used the same type of
pressure in a category learning paradigm (rule-based vs. information-integration). Here,
choking occurred for the rule-based category learning task only and performance was
even enhanced for the information-integration task. Finally, Gray tested the effects of
pressure on a sensorimotor task. He had expert baseball players perform a simulated
baseball batting task in a similar pressure scenario. Contrary to the findings of the
DeCaro et al (2011) study, expert golfers exhibited performance decrements under
pressure in form of increases in mean temporal swing error (MTE). That is, the athletes
stroke became more variable and less fluid with greater inconsistencies in the timing of
hitting the ball under pressure as compared to the control condition. It is not entirely
clear why a highly proceduralized task was impaired by outcome pressure in this study.
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Finally, Reeves and his colleagues (2007) set skilled soccer players under, what
can be called, a mixed pressure scenario including elements of outcome (i.e.,
competition) and monitoring (i.e., social evaluation) pressure and confirmed choking
under pressure. While this study reflects a more naturalistic competitive environment, it
is unclear which aspect of the pressure scenario may have driven the performance
decrement under pressure. In sum, more research is needed to clearly establish the
effects different types of pressure have on performance, and this study attempts to do
that.
1.1.4 Regulatory Focus
Failure or success of performance under pressure depends not only on the
interaction between the cognitive demands of the task and whether a person focuses
on skill execution, but also on the task reward structure and how a person relates to the
structure (what is collectively called the regulatory focus match or mismatch).
Classic theories of achievement motivation (e.g., Atkinson, 1957) posit that
people should focus on positive outcomes, that is, trying to score rather than preventing
the other team to score (Weinberg & Gould, 2003). However, Higgins (1997, 1998)
suggested that the regulatory focus, or motivational orientation, (e.g., attempting to
score or preventing the other team to score) interacts with the reward structure, or the
intrinsic demands, of the task (e.g., offense or defense of a football team). Regulatory
focus is defined as either being directed towards potential gains (e.g., scoring a
touchdown or field goal), what is called a promotion focus, or towards preventing losses
14

(e.g., preventing the opposing team from scoring), what is called a prevention focus.
Similarly, a task is said to have an intrinsic propensity towards either a gains or losses
structure; that is, a task itself emphasizes making hits or approaching success (e.g.,
shooting baskets), or avoiding errors or failure (e.g., a flawless performance in figure ice
skating).
A regulatory focus match occurs when the regulatory focus fits the task reward
structure (Higgins, 2000); that is, a promotion focus is applied to a gains task (e.g.,
offense football team is trying to score) or a prevention focus to a losses task (e.g.,
defense football team is trying to prevent the other team to score). Regulatory focus
matches are associated with greater cognitive flexibility or an increased tendency to try
various strategies such as testing various rules and making qualitative changes to the
current strategy (Grimm et al., 2008). Moreover, they enhance explicit learning and are
quite effortful. Regulatory mismatches involve a persons promotion focus with a losses
task (e.g., offense football team trying to avoid interceptions or incomplete passes) or a
prevention focus with a gains task (e.g., defense football team trying to tackle players
from the opposing team and to sack the quarterback). Mismatches are associated with
enhanced nondeclarative or procedural learning and decreased cognitive flexibility.
Regulatory focus relates to the cognitive demands required, as shown by work
using a category learning paradigm (Grimm et al., 2008; Maddox, Baldwin, & Markman,
2006; Markman et al., 2006; Markman, Baldwin, & Maddox, 2005; Worthy, et al., 2009).
For example, Markman, et al. (2006) found that the effects of pressure on category
learning tasks differed as a function of the tasks cognitive demands. Specifically, people
15

learned either a rule-based (i.e., WM-reliant) or an information-based (i.e.,


proceduralized) category learning task and performance was measured under low and
high pressure conditions. As expected, and in line with previous research (e.g., DeCaro,
et al., 2011), the WM-reliant task was harmed under pressure while the proceduralized
was not. This finding is also consistent with research exploring the interaction of
cognitive task demands and pressure which posits that WM-reliant tasks require more
attentional resources and that pressure compromises those resources by inducing worry
and anxiety.
Although the underlying mechanisms are still unknown, regulatory focus
matches have been found to increase executive resources while mismatches reduce
these resources (Worthy, et al., 2009). Worthy et al. proposed that pressure does not
directly reduce working memory resources but affects a persons motivational state
which then interacts with the task reward structure. Regulatory focus matches yield a
sense of feeling right and increased engagement and confidence, while mismatches
lead to a sense of feeling wrong and increased worry and anxiety (Aaker & Lee, 2006;
Higgins, 2000).
So far, most studies of choking under pressure have used a gains task reward
structure and it has been argued that this is why only one pattern of results has
emerged (Worthy et al., 2009); that is, choking in proceduralized tasks when skill-focus
is applied and choking in WM-reliant tasks when not enough attention is paid to skill
execution. Thus, a third factor, namely, regulatory focus match, further affects the
cognitive demands of the task and direction of attention. For the purpose of this
16

research, I focus on tasks that have a gains reward structure; that is, I instruct people to
land as many putts as possible inside the hole.

1.2 Theories of Choking Under Pressure


1.2.1 Early Theories
Drive Theories. Early attempts to explain the mechanisms underlying choking
under pressure involved drive and behavioral accounts while more recently two
prominent cognitive theories emerged. Drive theories are based on the relationship
between performance and the level of arousal or drive (Easterbrook, 1959; Spence &
Spence, 1966; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). For example, the Yerkes-Dodson Law and the
Easterbrook hypothesis advocated an inverted-U function between performance and
arousal or drive, with optimal performance occurring when arousal is neither too low
nor too high, but at some happy medium. Easterbrook further explained that low and
high arousal result in changes in attention, leading to foci that are either too broad or
too narrow, respectively. While this relationship accurately describes some aspects of
observed behavior, it does have some shortcomings. For example it is unclear whether
arousal is intended to be physiological, emotional or both.
Behavioral Theories. Behavioral theories entail biomechanical processes for the
implementation of skilled motor actions. Bernstein (1967), and later Vereijken, van
Emmerik, Whiting, and Newell (1992), proposed that (human) joints can be moved in
many ways and when summing those joints that are responsible for a particular skill,
then the body can potentially be moved in innumerable ways. In this sense, researchers
17

speak of joints as having multiple degrees of freedom (df). So, to control body
movement, novices lock some joints or couple movements of multiple joints together to
freeze some of these. As a consequence, novice performance may appear stiff and
controlled. Further along in learning, after gaining a certain level of automatization,
performers begin to defreeze the df of their joints to allow for more flexible and
perhaps fluent motor movement. In procedural tasks, choking under pressure would be
displayed when skilled performer refroze the df in their joints, thereby reverting back
to novice strategies (Beilock & Gray, 2007).
Support for the freezing df account provides a study of weightlifters who
exhibited a higher cross-correlation between neck and hip joints when they
underperformed in competitive situations than when they performed during practice
(Collins, Jones, Fairweather, Doolan, & Priestley, 2001). Further support was obtained in
a computer-simulated batting (Higuchi, Imanaka, & Hatayama, 2002) and novice rock
climbing tasks (Pijpers, Oudejans, Holsheimer, & Bakker, 2003).
1.2.2 Recent Theories
Cognitive Theories. Pressure initiates a heightened feeling of importance
towards ones performance, frequently displayed as anxiety or ruminative thought
(Baumeister, 1984). A person tries to reduce such anxiety by investing more effort.
Initially, two competing theories emerged in response to disparate patterns of findings
of choking. On the one hand, it was repeatedly found that pressure impaired
performance because it led to directing attention towards skill execution which harms
18

proceduralized tasks (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2002; Gray, 2004; Jackson et
al., 2006; Masters, 1992; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Leavitt, 1979; Smith & Chamberlin,
1992). These findings led to what can be called self-focus theories which include the
explicit monitoring and conscious processing hypotheses. Proceduralized tasks run
mostly outside of working memory and are harmed during step-by-step skill monitoring
that disrupts automatized performance. Such skill-focused attention causes the
integrated control structure of these tasks to break down into smaller units, similar to
what it was like during early learning (Masters, 1992). This process leads to an overall
slowing of performance and increased opportunities for errors between the single units.
The person may believe that the extra attention towards skill execution must result in
better performance and does not anticipate that this focus turns out to be maladaptive.
On the other hand, distraction theories emerged mainly from research on test
taking and posit that pressure hurts performance because it can lead to diverting
attention away from skill execution (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Beilock et al., 2004;
Gimmig, et al., 2006; Markman, et al., 2006). WM-reliant tasks require all or most
attentional resources for successful task completion and are impaired when those
resources are compromised by distraction or ruminative thoughts as when performing
under pressure (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Lewis & Linder, 1997; Wine, 1971). Essentially,
these task-irrelevant thoughts then compete with task-relevant ones and take up
attentional resources that are needed for successful task completion, turning what was
once a single-task into a dual-task.

19

How can pressure lead to both directing attention towards and away from task
completion and lead to such disparate findings in proceduralized and WM-reliant tasks?
A recent study (DeCaro, et al., 2011) showed that pressure can originate from different
sources and, thus, can have varying effects on attention. As described above, monitoring
pressure draws attention towards skill execution and especially hurts proceduralized
task performance while distraction pressure floods the performer with thoughts of
worry and anxiety which compromises WM-reliant task performance. More research is
needed to confirm these relationships and it is one aim of this study to extent this
findings on a proceduralized task.

1.3 Alleviating Choking Under Pressure


1.3.1 Previous Research
Because choking is predictable to some extent, methods that prevent or reduce
the severity of choking can be developed. As noted earlier several factors systematically
affect performance under pressure. These factors vary in the extent to which they can
readily be manipulated. That is, cognitive demands of the task (e.g., skill level), pressure,
and the intrinsic nature of the task (e.g., gains reward structure) cannot be readily
altered as they are more or less set or fixed for a given performance event. That is not
to say that skill level does not change, it certainly does; however, this change typically
takes time and the focus of this research is to find methods to alleviate choking that can
be spontaneously and flexibly implemented to the given individuals and situational
conditions. Thus, skill level will be treated as a fixed factor here. However, one can
20

change how performers perceive and approach the more or less set situation. These
more variable factors (discussed here) include what performers focus on (e.g., skill
focus, movement effect). For example, task instructions can be phrased to draw
attention towards or away from skill execution and can induce a prevention or a
promotion focus.
Methods of alleviating choking involve matching those variables that can be
manipulated to the more or less fixed situation. For example, for WM-reliant tasks that
involve a gains reward structure, choking occurs when people do not use enough
attentional resources for skill execution. Thus, finding ways to help performers engage
most or all of their attentional resources towards skill execution and preventing
distraction will help preventing choking. In contrast, for highly proceduralized tasks
(involving a gains structure), choking has been found when attention is explicitly
directed towards skill execution. Here, finding ways to avoid such unnecessary (or extra)
skill focus and the direction of attention in conducive ways may help prevent choking.
To date, three methods have been proposed to alleviate choking: (a) implicit or
errorless learning (Masters, 1992), (b) self-consciousness training (Beilock & Carr, 2001),
and (c) practicing under mild anxiety (Oudejans & Pijpers, 2010). Implicit learning
involves teaching people how to execute a skill without explicit knowledge (i.e., implicit
learning) (Masters, 1992). Masters (1992) trained people on a golf putting task under
either explicit instructions or a dual-task paradigm (i.e., implicit learning) and then
exposed them to a high pressure scenario. While the implicit learning group improved
during high pressure, the explicit instruction group did not. However, it should be noted
21

that the implicit learning group exhibited slower learning than the explicit instruction
group before the pressure scenario as they putted with lower accuracy. Thus, a
disadvantage of implicit training may be that learning occurs more slowly and can only
be circumvented by prolonged periods of practice (Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000).
Moreover, there is a growing body of work suggesting that implicit training may prove
to be a promising avenue in preventing or reducing choking under pressure (Poolton,
Maxwell, & Masters, 2004).
Another method to alleviate choking is skill monitoring or self-consciousness
training. This method provides people with practice at dealing with feeling monitored
and/or evaluated (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Reeves et al., 2007). In Beilock and Carrs study,
people received a considerable amount of training in golf putting under one of two
training conditions, and were then exposed to a pressure situation. The baseline training
condition involved a single-task learning paradigm which involved golf putting training
only. In the second training condition, people were video-recorded and were told that
the recording would be used for subsequent analysis by experts. This self-consciousness
training condition directed attention towards skill execution during training, the
mechanism that had previously been found to cause choking under pressure in skilled
performance (e.g., Lewis & Linder, 1997). Beilock and Carr found that performance
decrements occurred in the control (no self-consciousness training) but not the selfconsciousness training condition. However, no such choking occurred now that
participants had gotten used to being monitored, showing signs of being immune to the
pressure situation.
22

It is not entirely clear why self-consciousness training alleviated the effects of


pressure on performance and several explanations can be given. One possibility is that
skill monitoring during practice helped people adapt to the otherwise detrimental
effects of skill-focus induced by pressure. In other words, dealing with skill-focus in
training helped dealing with skill-focus under pressure. Another explanation is that the
self-consciousness condition accustomed people to dealing with pressure in general, as
in a moderate amount of pressure during training prepares one to perform well in high
pressure situations (see below; Oudejans & Pijpers, 2010). More research is warranted
to resolve these possibilities.
Lastly, it has been suggested that practicing under mild anxiety can help prevent
choking under high anxiety (Mesagno, Marchant, & Morris, 2008; Oudejans & Pijpers,
2010). It may be that one aspect of the self-consciousness training used by Beilock and
Carr (2001) was to induce mild anxiety during practice. Oudejans and Pijpers (2010) had
people practice dart throwing under mild anxiety and found that people did not
experience performance decrements under high anxiety conditions while people who
practiced under no (or low) anxiety choked. Anxiety was induced by having people
throw darts from platforms in three different heights (low anxiety = .14m; mild anxiety =
1.84m; high anxiety = 3.96m) and subsequent manipulation checks in form of self-report
confirmed the heightened perception of distress with increasing height by assessing
anxiety, perceived effort, and heart rate during all phases of the experiment. The
experimental group practiced under low and mild anxiety conditions while the control
group practiced under low anxiety conditions only. The experimental groups
23

performance was maintained and choking prevented in all anxiety conditions while the
control groups performance declined in the high anxiety condition. Anxiety scores as
well as heart rate and effort gradually increased with increased height on the climbing
wall (i.e., increased induced anxiety), while performance broke down in the high anxiety
condition only for those who did not practice under mild anxiety. According to Oudejans
and Pijpers (2010), increased perceived effort led to more effective self-regulatory
activity and people faced with mild anxiety in practice were able to develop coping
strategies to deal with pressure and anxiety that helped them maintain regular
performance levels under higher pressure. Thus, the induction of mild anxiety into the
practice sessions prior to completion proves to be a promising avenue in the prevention
of choking.
While implicit learning, self-consciousness training, and practicing under mild
pressure have been shown to reduce choking in some situations, they vary in their
applicability. First, all three methods take a long time to be implemented. Implicit
learning has to do with instructions during skill acquisition, that is, the development
from novice to skilled performance. Self-consciousness training and practicing under
mild pressure both involve, at least, a few sessions of practice (i.e., 270 putts or dart
throws) prior to the critical performance. Second, these methods vary in their extent to
how flexibly they can be applied to changing situations. They all involve practicing the
skill under one set of instructions that potentially alleviate choking for one set of
circumstances. For example, self-consciousness training and training under mild anxiety
have been shown to alleviate choking for somewhat skilled performers (novices with
24

extensive practice) in one particular pressure scenario. More recently, it has been found
that the architecture of the pressure scenario can have an impact on performance and
differentially affect performers of differing skills or of tasks with differing cognitive
demands (DeCaro et al., 2011). It is yet to be determined whether or not the effects of
self-consciousness training and practice under mild anxiety will transfer to pressure
scenarios and skill levels other than the ones that have been tested so far.
Finally, the three methods vary in how easily they can be integrated into
practice. While it does not take much effort to set up a situation in which a performer
feels being evaluated or under mild pressure, finding just the right amount pressure,
that is not too much and not too little, can be challenging. People perceive situations
differently and some may be more susceptible to pressure than others. Not only do
these methods need to be tailored for each individual, they also discourage group
practice sessions. Implicit learning is not feasible in that performers need to be isolated
from explicit instruction during the entire phase of skill acquisition and it may take a
long time to acquire expertise.
The aim of the proposed research is to find a new way to alleviate choking that
can be readily and flexibly applied to differing situations and that does not take a long
time to acquire. Moreover, it will entail directing attention to stimuli that are conducive
to performance as shown by patterns in performance from previous research of choking
under pressure. Essentially, I am trying to instill a focus of attention that is conducive to
skill execution and can be matched to skill level and situational and task demands.
Specifically, the goal is to find a new way to draw attention to skill execution during
25

WM-reliant tasks and directing attention away from skill execution during
proceduralized tasks in a way that is preserved during various pressure situations.

1.3.2 Alleviating Choking Using Imagery Practice


If choking is caused, in part, by the maladaptive direction of attention in
response to pressure, then manipulating what a person attends to can reduce the rate
and severity of choking. If choking can occur in WM-reliant tasks when attention is
directed away or otherwise consumed by distractions, then focusing on the general
framework of task execution should lead to less choking under pressure. Similarly, if
choking can occur in proceduralized tasks when attention is directed towards the
individual steps of skill execution, then avoiding explicit monitoring should reduce
choking under pressure. Thus, the question arises of whether we can instill a certain
way of self-focus or self-evaluation that helps the performer to maintain an attentional
focus that is conducive to his or her cognitive demands?
One way of manipulating attention is through imagery practice in which one
internally simulates performing a task without externally moving. Indeed, imagery is
comparable to the actual experience of actions including the sensation of diverse senses
(i.e., visual, kinesthetic, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory) only that these occur
imaginatively (Weinberg & Gould, 2003). Along with self-talk and arousal regulation,
imagery practice has been said to be one of the most important practice methods for
the development and fine tuning of cognitive abilities in the field of sports psychology
26

(Mayer & Hermann, 2010). Yet, it has also been shown to be transferrable to other fields
such as rehabilitation, business and economy (Immenroth et al., 2008). Ultimately, the
goal of the inner rehearsal of the movement processes is to positively affect skill
execution (Mayer & Hermann). As it pertains to this research, it will be tested whether
imagery practice can lead to more efficient skill acquisition and more robust overall skill
performing under various external conditions such as outcome and monitoring pressure.
Several factors have been identified to affect the effectiveness of imagery
practice on performance such as imagery ability (Driskell, Copper, & Moran, 1994),
expectancy (Bandura, 1977), arousal level (i.e., being relaxed immediately before or
during imagery practice), and imagery contents (Mayer & Hermann, 2010). Imagery
ability plays an important role in the extent to which the practice will improve
performance and studies have identified individual differences (Morris et al., 2005) that
can be assessed via different aptitude tests such as the Revised Vividness of Movement
Imagery-2 (VMIQ-2; Roberts, Callow, Hardy, Markland, & Bringer, 2008) or the
Movement Imagery Questionnaire-Revised (MIQ-R; Hall & Martin, 1997). It has been
shown to be beneficial when performers enter a relaxed state immediately before and
during the imagery practice to be able to focus more intensively on the mental
simulation (e.g., Eberspcher, 2001). Furthermore, it has been discussed that the
presence of kinesthetic feelings during imagery increases its effectiveness (e.g., Hardy &
Callow, 1999), that positive imagery is more effective than negative or no imagery
(Beilock, Afremow, Rabe, & Carr, 2001), and that imagery is even useful in novices with
little experience performing the task (Mayer & Hermann). Finally, the visual imagery
27

perspective or vantage point has been greatly discussed with respect to its effectiveness
in skill learning and performance with yet unequivocal findings. It is the aim of this
research to, firstly, test if differences in cognitive demands may shed light on the
conditions in which first- and third- person imagery might be used best and, secondly, to
use imagery to prevent choking under pressure.

1.3.2.1 Visual Imagery Perspective


Imagery can be practiced from either a first- (or internal) or a third- (or external)
person perspective. For example, an athlete can use a first-person imagery perspective
when preparing herself for an important tennis match. She would then imagine herself
as if she was actually playing; that is, looking out from her eyes at the tennis court and
the opponent, focusing on external factors that might influence the match. As such, this
perspective most closely resembles actual experience and may be accompanied by
kinesthetic sensations, thoughts, and feelings that typically arise during actual
performance.
Conversely, a tennis player may use a third-person imagery perspective as precompetition preparation. Here, she would look at herself from another persons vantage
point and at her (own) body while she is playing the match. Therefore, the focus would
be on how she moves her body and overall appearance. This experience is similar to
that of watching another person of oneself on video. A wide range of visual angles and
distances to the actor can be manipulated, ranging from standing right in front or next
to the actor to high up from above as in a birds eye view (e.g., Callow & Ross, 2010). As
28

such, it has the potential to emphasize different aspects of the action such as the skill,
the actor, the environment, the target etc. Taking a golf putt as an example, thirdperson imagery from a frontal viewpoint may focus attention more on the skill (i.e., skillor movement-focused) whereas imaging oneself from a rear viewpoint might emphasize
the aim of the ball (i.e., outcome- or movement effect-oriented). In essence, imagery
perspectives can be used to manipulate attention and, thus, can influence the learning
and performance of skills in different ways.

1.3.2.2 Perspectives in Sports Performance


Visual imagery perspective has been a point of discussion in the sports literature
for some time. Since Mahoney and Avener (1977) reported that U.S. gymnasts who
qualified for the Olympics used an internal (i.e., first-person) visual imagery perspective
more than their less successful counterparts, the debate on the effectiveness started.
Other studies found no significant differences in the effectiveness of external (i.e., thirdperson) versus internal visual imagery practice in unskilled and skilled racquetball player
(Meyers, Cooke, Cullen, & Liles, 1979) and in practiced figure skaters performing a
senior level figure (Mumford & Hall, 1985). Finally, Ungerlinder and Golding (1991)
reported that U.S. track and field trialists who qualified for the Seoul Olympics were
found to use more external imagery than their less successful counterparts. Equivocal
findings plagued the early phase of this research; however, more clarity has been
reached since then reflected in, what can be grouped into, two main hypotheses about
the choice of visual imagery perspective in sports.
29

One group of researchers (Hardy, 1995, 1997; Hardy & Callow, 1999; White &
Hardy, 1995) argues that the type of task (open vs. closed skills) is found to be the
driving factor while another group (Mayer & Hermann, 2010; Munzert, Dltgen, &
Mllmann, 2000) suggests that the purpose of the imagery exercise decides which
perspective would be most suitable in a given situation. On the one hand, Hardy (1997)
and White and Hardy (1995) argue that task differences may influence the use of
imagery perspective. Hardy (1997) suggested that an internal perspective would be
more effective in the acquisition and performance of tasks that depend on anticipation
and perception of the situation as is the case in tennis and hockey (i.e., open skills).
Open skills are typically performed in a changing and interactive environment.
Conversely, a external perspective would facilitate the acquisition and performance of
tasks that emphasize form such as gymnastics and ice-skating (i.e., closed skills). Closed
skills are performed in relatively stable environments and are rather predictable and
often self-paced. White and Hardy argue that imagery practice should add important
information for skill execution that is typically not available to the performer during
performances. So, when people perform a task that is reliant on form (e.g., gymnastics
floor routine) then they would find information on the precision of their movements as
seen from an external viewpoint as most useful because they cannot be seen from an
internal visual perspective. It is further argued that tasks that are not complex in their
execution, are well-learned (or highly proceduralized), and/or in which the interaction
with the environment is important (e.g., slalom canoeing) and which do not rely on
technical form and, therefore, external imagery would not add much useful information
30

to the performer. However, successful execution of these tasks relies on mental


rehearsal of the precise spatial locations, environmental conditions, and timings at
which key movements are to be initiated, attributes that are said to be more easily
acquired via internal imagery.
At first, White and Hardy (1995) partially confirmed their hypothesis in that
participants exhibited superior learning in the acquisition and retention when learning
rhythmic sports gymnastics sequence using external compared to internal imagery.
However, results on a wheelchair slaloming (acting as a canoe slaloming) task were less
clear. Participants made fewer mistakes when using internal imagery but were overall
faster when using external imagery. To my knowledge, no other studies testing the
effectiveness of imagery perspective on closed sports has been conducted to this day.
Later, Hardy and Collow (1999) showed that an external visual imagery perspective led
to superior performance than an internal one in three experiments involving sports that
emphasize form (i.e., performing karate katas, gymnastics, and rock climbing). In their
first experiment, experienced karatists learned a new kata consisting of 52 separate
movements and were assigned to practice internal imagery, external imagery, or stretch
(control group) before each physical exercise of the kata. Professional judges then
scored the performances of the karatists. Those who practiced imagery from an external
perspective in conjunction with the kata obtained the highest scores on all three tested
time points, followed by the internal imagery group which, in turn, performed better
than the control group. In the second and third experiment, Hardy and Callow divided
the imagery conditions along two factors, namely, visual perspective (internal vs.
31

external) and kinesthetic feelings (presence or absence thereof). When novices learned
a simple gymnastic floor routine, external imagery proved to be more effective than
internal imagery with no effects of kinesthetic feelings (Experiment 2). In their last
experiment, an effect for imagery perspective and kinesthetic feelings emerged in that
experienced rock climbers performed difficult boulder problems best when using
external imagery and when adding kinesthetic feelings to their imagery. Thus, the
researchers confirmed that skills that heavily rely on form as defined here benefit more
from external than internal imagery practice. Golf has previously been considered to be
a sport that emphasizes form (e.g., Arvinen-Barrow, Weigand, Thomas, Hemmings, &
Walley, 2007; Craft, Magyar, Becker, & Feltz, 2003), thus, it would be expected that all
performers regardless of skill level show superior performance using external as
compared to internal imagery.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of imagery perspective has been proposed
to depend on the purpose or the goal of the practice (Mayer & Hermann, 2010; Munzert
et al., 2000). An external imagery perspective would be best suited for the learning of
movement sequences of skills, for instance, when first linking the individual steps that
make up the whole movement of a skill. As such, this type of imagery seems conducive
to the needs of unskilled performers who are in the beginnings of learning a skill. It is
less clear whether expert golfers would benefit from this type of imagery or whether
their performance might even be hurt due to a potential extra focus on skill execution.
An internal imagery perspective is said to be most helpful when performers
rehearse skill movement in kinesthetic form to preserve fluent skill execution. Typically,
32

kinesthetic feelings are not present when a person first learns a skill but they arise with
practice. Thus, it is argued that a prerequisite for the successful application of internal
imagery is that expertise has been acquired to some extent with the skill, a point with
which the first group of researchers agrees (e.g., Hardy, 1997; Hardy & Callow, 1999).
Moreover, and along the lines with the hypothesis by Hardy and his colleagues, this
group of researchers also argues that internal imagery is compatible with the learning of
situational anticipation of change in the environment. Thus, internal imagery is held
useful when performers use imagery to anticipate what an opponent might do and to
develop strategies to counter that. According to this viewpoint on imagery perspective,
it can be hypothesized that internal imagery is compatible with the potential imagery
goals of expert golfers. Conversely, novice golfers may find this type of imagery difficult
and unhelpful.

1.3.2.3 Perspectives in Memory and Emotional Processing


Memories are associated with different perspectives. In memory research, firstperson perspective memories are called field memories and third-person perspective
memories are called observer memories. Field memories are more recent, more
emotional, include more information on affective, physical, and physiological states, and
are associated with less self-awareness than observer memories which are found to be
older, more descriptive, and less affect-laden (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson &
Swanson, 1993). Furthermore, people focusing on the self rather than the event tend to
adopt an observer perspective during the retrieval of autobiographical memories (Frank
33

& Gilovich, 1989; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). Perspective in memories is strongly
related to how one sees oneself and is a main component of episodic memory retrieval.
With regard to performance under pressure, it is plausible to assume that
pressure arouses people to have emotional experiences. So, lets now consider effects
of memory perspective for negative emotional experiences. McIssac and Eich (2004)
assessed vantage point for traumatic memories (i.e., car accidents, physical and sexual
assault, war incidents, witness homicide, and witness non-fatal harm). Field memories
were mostly about the persons affective reactions, physical sensations, and
psychological states during the trauma, while observer memories included information
on the persons physical appearance, spatial relations in the event, and peripheral
details not directly related to the trauma. Paralleling findings of non-traumatic
memories, traumatic observer memories were associated with less emotion and more
description than traumatic field memories. In sum, this research in memory suggests
that, for non-pathological individuals, memories from a first-person perspective (field
memories) are more emotional and less descriptive of the context than third-person
(observer) memories.
Inconsistent with these findings is the way social phobics relate to their
environment and from which perspective they typically perceive it (Wells &
Papageorgiou, 1998, 1999). Social phobics are characterized by feeling anxious in a wide
range of social situations in that they think that others see them in some negative way.
They remember anxiety-provoking social situations primarily as observer memories
(Wells et al., 1998) which is not the case for the other phobics (e.g., agoraphobics and
34

blood/injury phobics). Here, observer memories were associated with greater negative
affect and the maintenance of such a perspective in memory may be one example of
maladaptive emotional processing. Furthermore, Wells and Papageorgiou (1999)
demonstrated that negative affect felt by social phobics can be reduced by having them
focus attention on the external environment (and away from themselves). This shift of
attention was also accompanied with a shift from observer to field perspective imagery.
Even though the current research does not deal with phobics or highly emotional
experiences that may lead to trauma, these findings suggest that a change in imagery
perspective can influence anxiety-laden situations such as when performing under
pressure.
Lastly, perspectives have been investigated in the processing of emotional
events (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). In all
of their studies, Kross and his colleagues differentiated between what they call selfimmersed (akin to first-person) and self-distanced (akin to third-person) perspective.
Overall, a self-distanced perspective was most effective in processing experiences with
general negative affect including anger (Kross, et al.) and depressive experiences (Kross
& Ayduk) and in the reduction of cardiovascular reactivity (Ayduk & Kross). For example,
Kross and his colleagues manipulated what a person focused on when thinking about an
emotional event; that is, people either concentrated on what emotions they felt
including specific feelings or sensations experienced during the event (what-focus) or on
why they experienced these emotions concentrating on the reasons and underlying
feelings (why-focus). The researchers found interactions between perspective and type
35

of focus. The most successful strategy for the processing of a negative event was a selfdistanced perspective with a why-focus, which led to a cool, reflective, cognitive
analysis and helped people to make sense of their feelings. This strategy is different
from emotional avoidance, intellectualizing, and rumination because the emotions are
faced and experienced to some degree without reactivating excessive negative affect.
Furthermore, a why-focus coupled with a self-immersed perspective led to the greatest
emotional distress. While perspective is not completely accountable for successful
emotional processing, two other studies that did not manipulate type of focus found
that the self-distances analysis was most effective in the processing of depressive
experiences over time and in the reduction of blood pressure reactivity to negative
emotions (Ayduk & Kross; Kross & Ayduk). The researchers concluded that perspective
plays an important role in the successfulness of processing negative emotions. This
conclusion gives further support to the idea that perspective can play a role in
performance under pressure and that actively changing perspective can have an
influence on the successfulness of processing negative emotions.

1.4 Summation
The current research involves finding a flexible way of reducing choking under
pressure applicable to a number of settings including sports performance, the
performing arts, and the professional world (e.g., surgeons, air traffic controllers, pilots).
Once pressure causes one to adopt an attentional focus that is harmful to performance,
it is difficult to shift attention back into a more conducive state. It may be that instilling
36

a favorable attentional focus prior to the emergence of perceived pressure will reduce
the negative consequence that can follow from it. There is initial research showing that
implicit learning, self-consciousness training, and practicing under mild pressure can be
successful approaches in reducing choking under high pressure in skilled performance
(e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992). This research is aimed at expanding recent
findings of the effects of type of pressure on performance of actors with varying skill
level (DeCaro et al., 2011) and at providing a novel approach in the prevention of
choking under pressure.

1.5 Overview of Experiments


This research consists of three main experiments all involving a golf putting task
after Beilock et al. (2002). In Experiment 1, the relationship between skill level and
direction of attention is tested in an attempt to replicate the commonly-found
interaction of these two factors. In the Experiment 2 series, type of pressure is divided
into outcome and monitoring pressure with 2a serving as a way to check the
manipulation of pressure against each other and against a no pressure control
condition. Experiment 2b follows with an analysis of the relationship of type of pressure
and skill level on putting performance to identify when choking occurs. Finally, in
Experiment 3, imagery is tested as a way to alleviate choking under pressure.

37

CHAPTER 2:
EXPERIMENT 1: ATTENTION REPLICATION

Previous research has consistently found that skilled golfers perform better
under dual-task than under skill-focused conditions when they do a familiar putting task
while the opposite pattern has been found for unskilled or novice golfers (Beilock et al.,
2002, 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2001). To begin, these findings were sought to be replicated
to establish a common ground with the findings of other research labs. Moreover, this
data will serve as source of comparison with the results of later experiments.

2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
The skilled participants (n = 22) were golfers who had at least two years of high
school or college varsity golf experience, a Professional Golfers Association (PGA)
handicap of lower of 12 or lower, and/or, at least, three years of instruction or playing
experience. The novices (n = 16) had little to no experience playing golf with no high
school or college varsity experience.

38

2.1.2 Materials
The golf putting task was done on a 2.44m x 3.66m (8 x 12 feet) artificial indoor
putting green with a stimp of 10-11. Stimp is a measure of speed of a putting green and
is determined by measuring the distance (in feet) traveled by a ball given a particular
force. A stimp of 10-11 corresponds to medium to fast speed. This speed was chosen
based on a recommendation by varsity head coach of Notre Dames golf team. Standard
golf putters and balls were used to complete the task.
Importance Rating. Participants rated on a one-item scale how important it was
for them to perform at a high level (Beilock et al., 2004). The importance scale ranged
from 1 (not at all important to me) to 7 (extremely important to me). Because
performance pressure, by definition, only occurs when people feel it is important to do
their best (Baumeister, 1984), reporting, at least, moderate task importance is a
criterion for participation in experiments exploring choking (Beilock & Gray, 2007).
Therefore, I include in the analysis only those people who respond with, at least, 3 or
higher on the importance item. The concept of importance is related to that of
perceived effort which was also assessed in other studies (e.g., Oudejans & Pijpers,
2010).
Pressure Rating. The pressure rating was also based on a one-item scale on
which participants rated how much performance pressure they felt to perform at a high
level (Beilock et al., 2004). The pressure scale ranged from 1 (very little performance
pressure) to 7 (extreme performance pressure). Even though pressure was not

39

manipulated in this experiment, the ratings will serve as a source of comparison to


those of the other experiments.
Postperformance Questionnaires. This questionnaire assesses participants golf
and other sports experiences including number of years and current frequency of
playing the sport and number of years of varsity experience.
2.1.3 Procedure
The procedure was adopted from studies by Beilock and her colleagues (Beilock
& Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2004). Participants putted from nine different locations on
the green, with three spots at three distances (140cm, 150cm, and 160cm) from the
target. Participants were asked to land as many putts as possible inside a standard size
hole (108 mm or 4.25 in diameter) while also attempting to get as close to the hole as
possible. All participants followed the same random alteration of putting from the nine
locations and took part in both attention conditions. Specifically, participants took 9-18
practice putts (i.e., one or two putts from each of the nine locations) on their own and
with the experimenter not looking at them to become familiar with the materials and
the task. Next, they performed the critical three trials of the putting task: 27 putts in a
single-task environment (of which the last 18 counted towards their baseline trial), 18
putts in the skill-focused condition, and 18 putts in the dual-task condition. Note that all
participants did the single-task condition first while the order of the attention conditions
was counterbalanced.

40

Single-task condition. Participants putted without specific instructions and were


asked to simply do their best. Only the last 18 putts of this condition served as the
baseline trial. The first nine putts were not analyzed because they served as practice
putts under conditions of the experimenter measuring.
Skill-focused attention condition. The golfers were told to attend to three
aspects of a golf putt. First, to position the ball somewhere in the center between their
feet, reflecting how to position oneself around the ball. Second, to keep their putter
head square to the hole to easily position the club head in line to the hole. Finally, to
keep their head down until they finished the stroke. This instruction helps the player to
swing the club straight. These components of the swing were chosen as the basis for the
skill-focused manipulation because they reflect essential and, in part, rather basic
processes in a good golf putt (Jones, Davis, Crenshaw, Behar, & Davis, 1998).
Dual-task attention condition. The golfers did an auditory word-monitoring task
while putting. Specifically, a series of words were played over headphones and people
had to say the word vase aloud each time they heard the target word (i.e., vase).
Responses were recorded using a digital recorder and accuracy scores computed and
compared with putting performance. There were 113 filler words of up to two
presentations per word, yielding a recording length of 6:56 minutes total. Note that the
duration of 18 putts varied across participants and so did the number of items heard on
the recording (no one reached the end of the recording). When examining secondary
task performance, proportion correct was computed. Words occurred at a random time
period once within, on average, every 2.6s time interval. Target words occurred on
41

average every 3.3 words and the number of filler words between target words ranged
from zero to five. The random placement of the words within the 2.6s time interval and
the random embedding of the target word within the filler words were designed to
prevent participants from anticipating the word presentation.
Questionnaires. After each putting trial, the importance and pressure ratings
were collected. After the putting task was finished, people completed a demographics
and sports questionnaire and were thanked and debriefed.
2.1.4 Replication Criteria
Previous research (Beilock et al., 2002, 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2001) has
consistently found that experienced golfers putt more accurately under dual-task than
under skill-focused conditions whereas novices do better under skill-focused than under
dual-task conditions. Importantly, these studies have found significant interactions
between skill level and direction of attention. Thus, the criterion for replicating these
findings was to reach a significant interaction between novice and expert golfers and
the skill-focused and dual-task condition as measured by average distance hole for each
block of trials. Moreover, these findings have been confirmed when comparing the
mean values of the skill-focused and dual-task attention conditions directly (e.g., Beilock
et al., 2004; Beilock & Carr) and the difference scores between each critical condition
and the baseline performance score (DeCaro et al., 2011). The primary focus of this
study is on how performance changes from baseline to critical conditions, therefore, the

42

analyses conducted here, as well as in all upcoming experiments, focused on the


difference scores.

2.2 Results
The difference scores of the mean distance from the target were used as
measures of performance. Means, standard errors, and difference scores are provided
in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1. Difference scores for the skill-focused and dual-task
attention condition were calculated by subtracting each participants mean baseline
putting distance from that of the respective attention condition.

TABLE 2.1
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND
DIFFERENCE SCORES OF PUTTING DATA BY SKILL LEVEL AND
PRESSURE CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 1

Block
Skill Level
Novices
Experts

Difference Scores

Baseline

Skill-Focused

Dual-Task

Skill-Focused

Dual-Task

23.51 (2.69)
16.58 (1.48)

21.38 (1.91)
17.77 (2.16)

27.19 (2.40)
13.95 (1.25)

-2.13 (2.06)
1.50 (1.65)

3.81 (2.20)
-2.18 (1.08)

43

The data were first submitted to a 2 (skill level: expert vs. novice) X 2 (direction
of attention: skill-focused vs. dual-task) ANOVA on the difference score of the distance
measure. Neither the main effect for skill level nor for condition were significant, Fs < 1.
More importantly, the interaction between skill-level and condition was
significant, F(1, 72) = 7.78, MSE = 429, p = .007, suggesting that direction of attention
affected novices differently from experts. Tests of simple effects revealed that novices
putted marginally more accurately under skill-focused than under dual-task conditions,

Figure 2.1 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the
mean) for difference scores of the distance from hole measure
clustered by skill level and attention condition in Experiment 1

44

F(1, 30) = 3.90,MSE = 282, p = .063. The opposite trend was found for experts. They
putted marginally more accurately under dual-task than under skill-focused attention
conditions, F(1, 42) = 3.48, MSE = 149, p = .071.
Because the aim of this experiment is to replicate previous findings and most
studies analyzed data on the mean as opposed to the difference scores, the analyses of
this experiment were repeated using the mean scores of distance from hole (for
Experiment 1 only). First, the data were submitted to a 2 (skill level: expert vs. novice) X
2 (direction of attention: skill-focused vs. dual-task) ANOVA. The main effect for skill
level was significant, F(1, 75) = 18.33, MSE = 1312, p < .001, while the main effect for
condition was not, F < 1. Experts putted more accurately overall than novices across
conditions. More importantly, the interaction between skill-level and condition was
significant, F(1, 75) = 6.00, MSE = 430, p = .029, confirming the effect found in the
difference scores. Tests of simple effects revealed that novices putted marginally more
accurately under skill-focused than under dual-task conditions, F(1, 30) = 3.58, MSE =
270, p = .074. While the simple effect was not significant for experts, F(1, 42) = 2.33,
MSE = 160, p = .14, the data reflect the same trend as previous research.

2.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 replicated the commonly-found interaction between skill level and
direction of attention (Beilock et al., 2002, 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2001, 2005; Beilock &
DeCaro, 2007; Gimmig et al., 2006; Gray, 2004; Jackson et al., 2006; Lewis & Linder,
1997; Markman et al., 2006). Analyses were performed on difference and mean scores
45

of the critical and baseline conditions, all of which revealed that novices exhibited
superior putting performance under skill-focused and experts under dual-task attention
conditions. Now that a common ground with previous research was established, the
study of the effects of type of pressure on performance in differently skilled actors
followed.

46

CHAPTER 3:
EXPERIMENT 2A: PRESSURE REPLICATION

After having replicated previous findings, I assessed how different types of


pressure affect performance. To my knowledge, only one study (DeCaro, et al., 2011)
differentiated between two types of pressure, and that study used a category learning
paradigm. In their study, DeCaro et al. found an interaction between type of pressure
(monitoring vs. outcome pressure) and type of task (WM-reliant vs. proceduralized). In
particular, they found that choking occurred for the WM-reliant task under outcome
pressure and for the proceduralized task under monitoring pressure. Performance was
maintained when doing the WM-reliant task under monitoring pressure and improved
when doing the proceduralized task under outcome pressure. The aim of the following
two experiments (2a + 2b) was to replicate and extend these findings using a
sensorimotor task, namely, golf putting.
First, I experimented with aspects of the two pressure scenarios to make them
equally unsettling and significantly more unsettling than a non-pressure control
condition (Experiment 2a). Then, I tested the effects of type of pressure on performance
in golf putting (Experiment 2b). Contrary to Experiment 1, the critical conditions were
tested between rather than within subjects (for all upcoming experiments) because it

47

turned out to be unfeasible to instruct participants on two elaborate pressure scenarios


and remain believable. The control condition was also chosen to assess how
performance changes in the second block with respect to practice effects.

3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Thirty-six participants were assigned randomly to one of the three conditions
(monitoring pressure, the outcome pressure, or the control condition) with the
restriction of equal sample size across groups. There were six novices and six experts in
the control, five novices and seven experts in the outcome pressure, and seven novices
and 5 experts in the monitoring pressure condition.
3.1.2 Materials
The green, putters, and balls were identical to the those used in Experiment 1. In
addition to the importance and pressure ratings and the post-experimental
questionnaires used in Experiment 1, pleasantness, arousal, and controllability ratings,
trait and state anxiety inventories, and positive and negative affect scales were added.
Lastly, average and peak heart rate was measured using a standard heart rate monitor.
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1990). SAM was originally
devised as a computer program to assess affective responses to events and objects.
Later, a paper-and-pencil version was created (Bradley & Lang, 1994). The three
emotional dimensions valence, arousal, and dominance are assessed in pictorial,
48

nonverbal form with a series of five figures set on a continuum. Valence ranges from
pleasant depicted by a smiling, happy figure to unpleasant displayed by a frowning,
unhappy figure. Arousal ranges from excited depicted by a wide-eyed figure with jagged
circle in the stomach area (i.e., tension) to calm with a closed-eyed, relaxed figure.
Dominance ranges from controlled with a miniaturized manikin to in-control with a large
manikin. Responders mark an x over any of the five figures or between any two
figures. Thus, scores are recorded on a 9-point rating scale. Note that for arousal, lower
scores reflect feelings of distress and, thus, this item can be seen as negatively-phrased.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The
STAI is a widely-used measure and consists of two separate 20-item scales, a long-term
(trait) and a short-term (state) measure of anxiety. The trait form assesses how fearful,
worrisome, uneasy one generally feels by responding to items such as I am a steady
person and I have disturbing thoughts on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost
never) to 4 (almost always). The state form measures an individuals feelings at a
particular moment. Examples items are, I feel calm and I am jittery and the answer
choices range from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). The final score on both scales is
computed by reverse-scoring negatively-phrased items and, then, summing the scores
of all items. The minimum score of 20 (very low anxiety) and a maximum score of 80
(very high anxiety) can be reached.
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The
PANAS is a well-known measure in which participants are asked to rate the extent to
which a particular emotion is experienced. The 10 positive (e.g., interested or excited)
49

and 10 negative (e.g., distressed or upset) items are presented in mixed form and with a
5-point anchoring scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Subscale scores for positive and negative affect are computed by summing the
responses of the respective 10 items and, thus, range from 5 to 25 points. Reliability for
PANAS has been good, ranging from .86 to .90 and .84 to .87 for the positive and
negative subscale, respectively.
Heart rate monitor. The heart rate monitor used was the Polar FT60 training
computer (i.e., wrist watch) that was linked to the matching WearLink transmitter (i.e.,
chest strap). The chest strap was tied around the chest with elastic bands just below the
sternum of the participant and held a small plastic signal transmitter at the front. The
wrist watch was worn by the participant for the duration of the experiment due to the
small reach of the signal transmission between watch and transmitter. Average and
peak heart rate for the duration of blocks (e.g., 18 putts under pressure) was recorded
by simply starting and stopping the desired time for which these parameters would be
measured. The watch is equipped to save up to 100 such recordings; thus, heart rate
was recorded after study completion of each or several participants and did not intrude
with study administration.
3.1.3 Procedure
Participants were assigned randomly to one of the three conditions (monitoring
pressure, the outcome pressure, or the control condition) with the restriction of equal
sample size across groups. The pressure scenarios are described below. Note that
50

participants in the control condition putted under the same circumstances as in the
single-task condition.
Some self-report measures were administered before the putting area was
approached, most of which were repeated after each block of the putting task. Resting
heart rate, trait anxiety, and pre-performance scores for the SAM scale and PANAS were
collected before the start of the putting procedure. Resting heart rate was measured
when the participant was sitting and was recorded while the experimenter pretended to
test the functionality of the apparatus. To discourage participants from thinking about
potential anxiety-related aspects of the study, they were told that heart rate was
measured to control for physical exertion. The other questionnaires were jointly
collected while the participant sat in a small room.
Then, the participant was brought to the putting green located in the room next
door. The experimenter gave the participant the putter and two balls and explained the
putting task. Participants putted from the same nine locations in the same random
alteration of locations on the green as in Experiment 1. They first took 9-18 practice
putts on their own and, then, completed the putting task under the single-task
condition. Again, this block consisted of 27 putts of which only the last 18 putts counted
toward the putting baseline score. For this block of 18 putts, the experimenter turned
on the heart rate monitor which automatically measured and saved average and peak
heart rate for the duration of this period. Immediately after this putting block,
participants completed a series of questionnaires, namely, the importance and pressure
rating, the three items on the SAM scale, the state form of the STAI, and the PANAS.
51

Next, depending on the assigned condition, the experimenter described the


respective scenario (i.e., monitoring or outcome pressure condition) or asked them to
simply do their best again (i.e., control condition). Then, participants completed the
experimental putting block and the same series of questionnaires again as after
baseline. After the debriefing, participants filled out the demographic and
postexperiment questionnaires and were thanked for participation.
Monitoring pressure scenario. Participants were told that this study was done in
collaboration with the Notre Dame Physical Education department to create an
instructional golf putting video to be used for freshman college courses and to be
posted on its departmental website. A confederate acted as the Physical Education
departments golf professional who stood near and in clear sight of the participant for
the duration of the putting block while taking notes on a clipboard. Also, participants
were video-recorded by a small camera mounted on a hip-high tripod with the live video
being projected on a smartboard screen that was set right next to the putting green. As
such, participants could see themselves putt in real time on the 66-inch monitor. The
camera was set up so that participants were made aware of its presence while the
camera did not intrude with the golf putting task. Before the first putt of this series, the
experimenter conspicuously turned on the camera and selected the record button on
the smartboard screen to start the live video-recording. After the last putt, the
recording was stopped and the camera put away. Note that at the end of their
participation all participants immediately debriefed about the purpose of the scenario.
Also, to diminish any feelings of discomfort associated with the recording process,
52

participants were present and made aware of the deletion of their video during
debriefing.
Outcome pressure scenario. No confederate, camera, or tripod were present for
this condition. Participants were told that, in an attempt to motivate participants to do
their best, they would be entered in a competition with the chance of winning a gift
certificate to the ND bookstore (1st prize: $50, 2nd: prize $30, 3rd prize: $10). At this
point, a leaderboard depicting the latest update on the ranking for this competition was
shown on the smartboard which remained up for the duration of this block of putts. The
experimenter, then, explained that this study was also about teamwork and that
participants were randomly paired with each another to obtain a combined score. An
excel sheet showing the pairing procedure was then displayed on the smartboard. Team
scores were said to be computed by subtracting the average distance-from-hole score of
the pressure block (e.g., P1: 21 cm; P2: 34 cm) from the average distance-from-hole
score of the baseline block (e.g., P1: 27 cm; P2: 41 cm) for each participant (P1diff: 6 cm;
P2diff: 7 cm) and then added (Total team score: 13). Furthermore, participants were
told that their partner had already obtained a high score and was anxious to win a
prize. Note that in the end, all participants were entered in a lottery regardless of their
score to win the gift certificates.

53

TABLE 3.1
SAMPLE SIZE, MEANS, AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) OF IMPORTANCE,
PRESSURE, AND STATE ANXIETY SCORES PER PRESSURE CONDITION OF PRIOR STUDIES

Measure
Study Condition
Beilock et al. (2004)
Exp 1
Low Pressure
High Pressure
Exp 3
Low Pressure
High Pressure
Beilock & DeCaro (2007)
Exp 1
Low Pressure
High Pressure
Exp 2
Low Pressure
High Pressure
DeCaro et al. (2011)
Exp 2
Control
Outcome Pressure
Monitoring Pressure
Exp 3
Outcome Pressure
Monitoring Pressure
Exp 4
Control
Outcome Pressure
Monitoring Pressure

Importance
Rating

Pressure
Rating

State Anxiety

4.63 (.21)
5.03 (.19)

3.95 (.24)
5.08 (.21)*

32.08 (1.20)
42.68 (1.82)*

-4.12 (.32)

-4.95 (.25)

38.96 (1.70)*

48
44

4.95 (.18)b

4.93 (.22)b

49.21 (1.24)b

45
46

4.43 (.24)b

4.93 (.19)b

50.91 (1.48)b

47
43
40

4.29 (.20)
4.95 (.20)*
5.15 (.15)*

15
22

5.07 (.41)
4.96 (.51)

20
24
21

4.68 (.27)
4.96 (.28)
5.26 (.27)

36.56 (2.55)
41.71 (2.36)*
41.83 (2.55)*

40

28

a
a

a
a

Note: Only participants with scores of 4 or higher were included in the analysis and no means
b
were reported. No comparisons to low pressure group or other pressure group were made;.
*Significantly different at p < .05 to control or low pressure group.

54

3.1.4 Replication Criteria


In this study, several arousal- and affect-related self-report measures as well as
heart rate monitoring were used as indicators for feelings of pressure. Before testing the
effects of type of pressure on putting performance, the two pressure scenarios used in
this study should yield similar and significantly higher levels of stress-induced thoughts
and feelings and physiological responses as compared to a non-pressure context.
Moreover, it is useful to compare scores and group differences to those of prior studies
that used the same measures. Importance ratings, pressure ratings, and state anxiety
scores as well as sample size per study are summarized in Table 3.1 for comparison of
scores in the current study. Note that Beilock et al. (2004) and Beilock and DeCaro
(2007) used several sources of pressure including aspects of monitoring and outcome
pressure types in their high pressure condition. Moreover, in one study (Oudejans &
Pijpers, 2010), researchers increased from the no pressure control (M = 109.8, SD =
15.75), to the mild anxiety (M = 116.7, SD = 16.00) and high anxiety (M = 124.3, SD =
19.37) condition.

55

TABLE 3.2
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND DIFFERENCE
SCORES ON ALL MEASURES BY PRESSURE CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 2A

Outcome
Pressure

Control
Measure

Monitoring
Pressure

SE

SE

SE

Importance
1
2
DIFF

4.92
4.50
-.42

(.40)
(.40)
(.26)

5.33
6.42
1.09*

(.28)
(.23)
(.23)

4.67
5.25
.58*

(.26)
(.33)
(.23)

Pressure
1
2
DIFF

3.50
3.33
-.17

(.42)
(.31)
(.24)

3.58
5.33
1.75*

(.50)
(.43)
(.33)

3.00
4.58
1.58*

(.37)
(.36)
(.19)

2.83
2.92
2.83
-.08

(.32)
(.45)
(.42)
(.29)

2.58
3.50
3.67
.17

(.34)
(.45)
(.45)
(.59)

3.00
3.58
4.33
.75

(.41)
(.29)
(.40)
(.39)

4.92
4.50
4.92
.42

(.26)
(.26)
(.45)
(.31)

5.83
4.50
3.17
-1.33*

(.32)
(.52)
(.44)
(.36)

5.75
4.75
3.42
-1.33*

(.41)
(.43)
(.36)
(.33)

5.50
5.17
5.50
.33

(.42)
(.51)
(.44)
(.19)

5.00
5.92
6.33
.42

(.41)
(.68)
(.36)
(.60)

5.17
5.58
4.00
-1.58*

(.47)
(.51)
(.54)
(.23)

SAM
Pleasantness
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Arousal
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Controllability
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF

56

TABLE 3.2 (CONTINUED)


Outcome
Pressure

Control
Measure
STAI
Trait
State
1
2
DIFF
PANAS
Positive affect
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Negative affect
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Heart Rate
Resting HR
Average HR
1
2
DIFF
Peak HR
1
2
DIFF

Monitoring
Pressure

SE

SE

SE

35.83

(2.21)

33.08

(1.46)

36.00

(1.92)

32.08
29.58
-2.50

(2.22)
(2.02)
(1.06)

32.08
36.75
4.67*

(1.87)
(2.16)
(2.23)

33.50
40.08
6.58*

(2.22)
(2.79)
(1.80)

32.75
32.75
32.50
-.25

(1.82)
(2.34)
(2.65)
(.84)

34.25
34.08
36.58
2.50

(1.49)
(1.96)
(1.63)
(1.18)

30.92
28.67
30.00
1.33

(1.40)
(1.42)
(1.35)
(1.56)

13.83
12.00
11.33
-.67

(.75)
(.69)
(.59)
(.47)

12.50
12.08
14.33
2.25*

(.65)
(.68)
(1.22)
(.93)

12.67
12.67
15.00
2.33*

(.58)
(.96)
(1.14)
(1.10)

85.83

(6.08)

86.08

(3.35)

82.25

(3.94)

90.50
89.75
-.75

(3.89)
(3.84)
(.68)

93.00
94.67
1.67

(3.95)
(3.81)
(1.22)

85.25
88.00
2.75

(3.35)
(3.47)
(1.55)

98.42
98.25
-.17

(3.88)
(3.96)
(1.00)

102.75
104.50
1.75

(4.07)
(3.79)
(1.86)

94.25
98.75
4.50*

(3.52)
(3.82)
(1.02)

Note. 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = experimental putting block; DIFF = difference score of
experimental and baseline block; SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory;
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale; HR = heart rate;
*Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure
group

57

3.2 Results
3.2.1 Self-Report and Heart Rate Measures
Means and standard errors per block and difference scores on all measures are
summarized in Table 3.2. First, one-way ANOVAs were run on all measures difference
scores and a number of them indicated significant differences among the three pressure
conditions (i.e., control, outcome pressure, and monitoring pressure). These were
Importance ratings, F(2, 33) = 12.21, MSE = .644, p < .001, Pressure ratings, F(2, 33) =
15.58, MSE = .826, p < .001, SAM Arousal, F(2, 33) = 9.14, MSE = 1.341, p = .001, SAM
Controllability, F(2, 33) = 8.32, MSE = 1.692, p = .001, STAI state form, F(2, 33) = 7.38,
MSE = 37.290, p = .002, and PANAS negative affect, F(2, 33) = 4.24, MSE = 8.735, p
=.023. Marginally significantly different were the difference scores of average, F(2, 33) =
2.43, MSE = 16.742, p = .10, and peak heart rate, F(2, 33) = 3.03, MSE = 21.604, p = .063,
while nonsignificant differences were found for SAM Pleasantness and PANAS positive
affect, all Fs < 1.1.
Moreover, planned pairwise comparisons with Tukeys honestly significant
difference (HSD) correction followed for all measures that showed significant or
marginally significant results in difference scores for the one-way ANOVA. Difference
scores of several measures for the outcome and monitoring pressure conditions were
significantly different from the control condition but not different from each other
including Importance ratings, t(22) = 4.83, p < .001 and t(22) = 3.30, p = .006, Pressure
ratings, t(22) = 4.94, p < .001 and t(22) = 4.72, p < .001, SAM Arousal, t(22) = 3.46, p <
58

.004 for each contrast, and STAI state form, t(22) = 2.87, p = .019 and t(22) = 3.64, p =
.003, respectively. Scores for PANAS negative affect showed the same trend compared
to control with a significant difference to the outcome pressure group, t(22) = 2.49, p =
.047, and a marginally significant difference to the monitoring pressure group, t(22) =
2.42, p = .054. Furthermore, participants under monitoring pressure rated a significantly
higher decrease in SAM Controllability scores than those in the control group, t(22) =
3.61, p = .003, and those under outcome pressure, t(22) = 3.45, p = .004, with the latter
two not differing from each other, t < .1. No other comparisons between the two
pressure scenarios yielded significant differences in the difference scores, ts < 1. Finally,
heart rate difference scores were noticeably different only for the contrast of the
monitoring pressure and the control group with a marginally significant difference for
average heart rate, t(22) = 2.34, p = .063, and a significant difference for peak heart rate,
t(22) = 2.46, p = .049.
These results indicate that both scenarios elicited a similar increase in levels of
stress-induced thoughts and feelings but significantly higher levels than in the no
pressure control condition as shown by several measures such as perceptions of
performance pressure, state anxiety, and arousal. Also, when comparing the raw mean
scores of the experimental putting block of this experiment to those of prior studies, a
common trend and similar mean scores can be found especially in ratings of pressure
and state anxiety. With respect to heart rate, raw mean values as well as difference
scores were lower in this experiment than those in Oudejans and Pijpers (2010) study.
Yet, a significant trend emerged in the same direction with participants in pressure
59

scenarios showing an elevated heart rate. Overall, it can be said, that the replication
criteria of checking if the manipulation of pressure yielded the desired effect were met.
3.2.2 Putting Performance
Means and standard errors per block and difference scores on mean distance
from hole are summarized in Table 3.3. For the purpose of this experiment, analyses on
putting performance were run to explore the overall trend of the data only. Given the
additional factor of skill level in this analysis, more power is needed to detect effects
confidently, to be achieved in Experiment 2b. The data were submitted to a 2 (Skill
Level: novices vs. experts) X 3 (Type of Pressure: none vs. outcome vs. monitoring)
ANOVA on the difference scores of mean putting distance. Neither the main effect for
Skill Level, F(1, 30) = 2.30, MSE = 18.15, p = .14, nor for Type of Pressure, F < 1, was
significant but the interaction was, F(2, 30) = 6.46, MSE = 18.15, p = .005, suggesting
that type of pressure affected novices differently from experts. To understand this
interaction, each skill level was examined separately.

60

TABLE 3.3
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARANTHESES) FOR PUTTING PERFORMANCE BY
SKILL LEVEL AND PRESSURE CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 2A
Control
Measure

Outcome
Pressure

Monitoring
Pressure

SE

SE

SE

Novices
1
2
DIFF

35.83
30.50
-5.33

(2.21)
(2.85)
(1.56)

22.20
23.40
1.20

(2.67)
(4.06)
(3.06)

21.86
17.71
-4.14

(2.06)
(1.95)
(1.37)

Experts
1
2
DIFF

16.67
16.00
-.50

(2.31)
(2.30)
(1.26)

16.29
12.43
-3.86

(2.59)
(1.65)
(1.77)

20.00
22.60
2.60

(1.82)
(2.89)
(1.17)

Note. 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = experimental putting block; DIFF = difference score of experimental
and baseline block;
*

Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure
group

61

First, a one-way ANOVA on putting distance difference scores yielded a


marginally significant effect for the novice golfer group, F(15) = 2.88, MSE = 22.60, p =
.088. Planned comparisons using Tukeys HSD correction then showed a marginally
significant performance decrement in outcome pressure compared to control, t(15) =
2.27, p = .092, and an effect trending towards significance compared to monitoring
pressure, t(15) = 1.92, p = .17, with the latter two not differing from each other, t < 1.
Thus, the overall trend is in line with the predictions made by the distraction hypothesis,
in that choking under pressure occurred for novices when placed under outcome but
not under monitoring pressure.
Then, the one-way ANOVA on expert golfers difference scores of the mean
distance measure was significant, F(15) = 4.50, MSE = 13.70, p = .029. Planned multiple
comparisons using Tukeys HSD yielded a significant effect only for the outcome and
monitoring pressure contrast, t(15) = 2.98, p = .024. Also, this data was in line with selffocus theories in that experts performed better under outcome than under no pressure
conditions and worse under monitoring than under no pressure conditions. Yet, more
data will be collected in the following experiment to confirm this effect.

3.3 Discussion
Overall, the two pressure scenarios adequately induced perceived feelings of
pressure. In most of the arousal- and affect-related self-report measures, a common
trend was observed in which monitoring and outcome pressure were perceived as
similarly distressing and more distressing than no pressure, replicating findings of prior
62

studies (Beilock et al., 2004; DeCaro et al., 2011). In particular, it was observed that
importance, pressure, and arousal ratings as well as the more established state anxiety
measure of the STAI state form all showed a similarly-distressing subjective experience
of the two scenarios but higher distress than in the no pressure condition. This trend
also emerged in the average and peak heart rate measure, yet, the differences were
only marginally significant. It is yet to be clearly established whether heart rate
consistently rises as level of pressure goes up. Finally, exploratory analyses on putting
performance resulted in a trend compatible with current distraction and self-focus
theory. That is, novices performed better under monitoring than under outcome
pressure conditions and the opposite was true for expert golfers. Given the relatively
small sample size, these findings did not all reach statistical significant and more data
will be considered in Experiment 2 to more clearly detect an effect.

63

CHAPTER 4:
EXPERIMENT 2B: EFFECTS OF PRESSURE ON PERFORMANCE

Now that the outcome and monitoring pressure scenarios were established, the
close examination on putting performance followed. As shown by DeCaro and her
colleagues (2011) and the exploratory analyses of Experiment 2a, novices are expected
to show performance decrements under outcome but not under monitoring pressure
while experts are hypothesized to exhibit choking under monitoring but not under
outcome pressure. Based on recent cognitive theory of choking under pressure, WMreliant tasks are harmed when performers are distracted or engage in ruminative
thoughts (i.e., distraction theory) while highly proceduralized tasks are impaired when
extra attention is being directed towards skill execution (i.e., self-focus theory).
Again, self-report and heart rate measures accompanied the continued
assessment of perceived pressure on performance, with more distress to be expected
by participants in the pressure compared to the control conditions.

64

4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Additional ninety participants were assigned randomly to one of the three
conditions (control, outcome pressure, and the pressure monitoring condition) with the
restriction of equal sample size across conditions. There were 30 participants in each
pressure condition. Ten participants were excluded from the analysis because they did
not meet the importance rating criterion of 3 or higher on either block. Five participants
were excluded because their putts landed outside of the measurement area and three
subjects did not believe the scenario was real. Thus, a total of 72 participants were
added to Experiment 2as data, yielding a total sample size of 108 participants.
Again, participants were categorized into one of two skill levels using the same
criteria as in previous experiments. In sum, there were 21 novices and 20 experts in the
control condition, 13 novices and 19 experts in the outcome pressure condition, and 18
novices and 18 experts in the monitoring pressure condition. The heart rate monitor did
not adequately function for one participant in the control and, thus, the data was
excluded from the average and peak heart rate analyses.
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure was the same as in Experiment 2a.

65

4.2 Results
4.2.1 Self-Report and Heart Rate Measures
Means and standard errors per block for all measures are provided in Table 4.1.
As in Experiment 2a, the data of all difference scores were submitted to one-way
ANOVAs comparing scores between the three pressure conditions and the measures of
Importance rating, F(2, 106) = 12.16, MSE = .82, p < .000, Pressure ratings, F(2, 106) =
27.11, MSE = .97, p < .001, SAM Pleasantness, F(2, 106) = 5.73, MSE = 2.44, p = .004,
SAM Arousal, F(2, 106) = 13.59, MSE = 1.45, p > .001, SAM Controllability, F(2, 106) =
4.40, MSE = 1.92, p = .015, average heart rate, F(2, 105) = 4.17, MSE = 12.16, p = .018,
STAI state form, F(2, 106) = 14.34, MSE = 56.89, p < .001, and PANAS negative affect,
F(2, 106) = 7.63, MSE = 10.12, p = .001, yielded significant effects. Peak heart rate and
PANAS positive affect were not significant, all Fs < 1.
Again, multiple planned comparisons using Tukeys HSD correction were
performed on all difference scores that were significant on the one-way ANOVAs. First,
no significant differences were found for any of the difference score contrasts between
the two pressure scenarios. However, difference scores for several measures of both the
outcome and monitoring pressure conditions were significantly different from the
control condition including Importance ratings, t(106) = 4.58, p < .001 and t(106) = 3.71,
p = .001, Pressure ratings, t(106) = 6.88, p < .001 and t(106) = 5.46, p < .001, SAM
Pleasantness, t(106) = 2.66, p = .024 and t(106) = 3.07, p =.008, SAM Arousal, t(106) =
5.01, p < .001 and t(106) = 3.55, p =.002, STAI state form, t(106) = 4.55, p < .001 and
66

t(106) = 4.58, p < .001, PANAS negative affect, t(106) = 3.63, p = .001 and t(106) = 2.94, p
= .011, and average heart rate, t(105) = 2.44, p = .043 and t(106) = 2.49, p =.038,
respectively. Moreover, difference scores on SAM Controllability were significantly
higher for the no pressure as compared to the monitoring pressure condition, t(106) =
2.94, p = .011.
When analyzing the data of Experiment 2, almost all of the arousal and affectrelated measures yielded a significant effect of pressure on performance. Indicators of
perceived feelings of importance and pressure, pleasantness, arousal, state anxiety,
negative affect, and average heart rate were elevated for individuals putting in either of
the two pressure conditions as compared to the no pressure condition, while no
significant differences for those feelings were found between the pressure conditions.
Thus, it can be said that the two pressure scenarios induced comparable levels of
distress but significantly higher levels than the no pressure comparison condition.

67

TABLE 4.1
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND DIFFERENCE
SCORES ON ALL MEASURES BY PRESSURE CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 2A AND 2B
Control
Measure
Importance
1
2
DIFF
Pressure
1
2
DIFF
SAM
Pleasantness
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Arousal
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Controllability
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF

Outcome
Pressure

Monitoring
Pressure

SE

SE

SE

4.71
4.73
.02

(.17)
(.19)
(.16)

5.09
6.09
1.00a

(.20)
(.21)
(.17)

4.54
5.31
.79a

(.16)
(.19)
(.12)

3.41
3.76
.34

(.19)
(.23)
(.13)

3.22
5.16
1.94a

(.26)
(.25)
(.20)

3.07
4.64
1.57a

(.19)
(.22)
(.17)

2.80
3.49
2.98
-.51

(.18)
(.26)
(.21)
(.22)

2.97
3.28
3.75
.47a

(.17)
(.27)
(.27)
(.34)

3.17
3.39
3.97
.58a

(.24)
(.19)
(.22)
(.22)

5.17
4.51
4.66
.15

(.17)
(.20)
(.24)
(.14)

5.84
4.63
3.34
-1.28a

(.22)
(.30)
(.30)
(.25)

5.89
4.94
4.11
-.83a

(.25)
(.28)
(.30)
(.22)

5.95
5.68
5.98
.29

(.21)
(.29)
(.26)
(.22)

5.00
5.78
5.75
-.03

(.43)
(.43)
(.35)
(.31)

5.03
5.39
4.75
-.64a

(.40)
(.36)
(.34)
(.31)

68

TABLE 4.1 (CONTINUED)


Control
Measure
STAI
Trait
State
1
2
DIFF
PANAS
Positive affect
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Negative affect
Pre-performance
1
2
DIFF
Heart Rate
Resting HR
Average HR
1
2
DIFF
Peak HR
1
2
DIFF

Outcome
Pressure

Monitoring
Pressure

SE

SE

SE

35.32

(1.10)

34.38

(1.06)

38.11

(1.30)

35.49
33.49
-2.00

(1.59)
(1.48)
(1.27)

32.75
38.84
6.09a

(1.32)
(1.52)
(1.19)

34.22
40.11
5.89a

(1.37)
(1.66)
(1.26)

30.93
30.49
31.32
.78

(1.03)
(1.15)
(1.21)
(.78)

32.50
32.91
33.78
.88

(.92)
(1.33)
(1.28)
(.84)

30.69
29.22
29.53
.31

(1.00)
(1.00)
(1.03)
(.76)

13.44
13.49
12.95
-.44

(.52)
(.74)
(.64)
(.47)

13.25
12.38
14.66
2.28a

(.53)
(.61)
(.69)
(.60)

13.39
12.53
14.22
1.69a

(.46)
(.44)
(.59)
(.53)

80.98

(2.80)

85.58

(2.99)

84.00

(2.48)

91.23
91.18
-.05

(2.20)
(1.99)
(.46)

92.91
94.88
1.97a

(2.66)
(2.50)
(.63)

89.19
91.14
1.94a

(2.28)
(2.31)
(.66)

100.10
101.30
1.20

(2.19)
(1.99)
(.84)

101.69
105.03
3.03

(2.69)
(2.46)
(1.03)

98.03
101.17
3.14

(2.25)
(2.27)
(.82)

Note: 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = experimental putting block; DIFF = difference score of
experimental and baseline block; SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory;
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale; HR = heart rate;
a
b
Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure
group

69

4.2.2 Putting Performance


As for the self-report data, the putting performance data of Experiments 2a and
2b were also analyzed together and are summarized in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1. The
data were first submitted to a 2 (Skill Level: novices vs. experts) X 3 (Type of Pressure:
none vs. outcome vs. monitoring) ANOVA on difference scores. The main effect for
Condition was marginally significant, F(2, 102) = 2.94, MSE = 41.95, p = .057, the
interaction was significant, F(2, 102) = 7.00, MSE = 41.95, p = .001, while the main effect
for Skill Level was not, F(1, 102) = 1.89, MSE = 41.95, p = .172. Tests of simple effects
using Tukeys HSD correction revealed that the participants improved their putting
performance marginally significantly more in the no pressure than in the monitoring
pressure condition regardless of skill level, t(103) = 2.31, p = .059. No other simple
effects were significantly different from each other, ts < 1.
To understand the interaction, one-way ANOVAs were run separately for each
skill level group and reached a significant effect for the novice golfer group, F(2, 49) =
3.95, MSE = 53.19, p = .026. Planned comparisons using Tukeys HSD found choking for
the outcome pressure compared to control group, t(49) = 2.80, p = .020. All other
contrasts were nonsignificant, ts < 1. Therefore, novice golfers performance was
impaired when putting under outcome but not under monitoring pressure conditions.
This finding provides further support for the predictions made by the distraction
hypothesis.

70

TABLE 4.2
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARANTHESES) BY SKILL LEVEL AND PRESSURE
CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 2A AND 2B
Control
Measure
Novices
1
2
DIFF
Experts
1
2
DIFF

Outcome
Pressure

Monitoring
Pressure

SE

SE

SE

32.24
26.43
-6.05

(1.82)
(1.51)
(1.81)

24.46
25.62
1.15*

(1.18)
(1.70)
(.90)

26.89
22.89
-3.89

(1.19)
(3.22)
(3.54)

19.10
16.98
-2.15

(2.27)
(1.57)
(1.82)

16.32
12.53
-3.89

(1.87)
(1.08)
(1.65)

17.65
20.00
2.47*

(1.99)
(2.30)
(1.76)

Note. 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = experimental putting block; DIFF = difference score of
experimental and baseline block;
*Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure
group

71

Figure 4.1 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the
mean) for difference scores clustered by skill level and attention
condition for combined data for Experiment 2a and 2b.

72

Furthermore, the one-way ANOVA on the expert group data supported the
finding of Experiment 2a with a significant difference in gain scores between the three
conditions, F(2, 53) = 6.08, MSE = 31.56, p = .004. Planned analysis further confirmed
less improvement in mean putting distance from the baseline to the pressure block in
the monitoring pressure condition as compared to both the control, t(53) = 2.49, p =
.041, and outcome pressure condition, t(53) = 3.39, p = .004. Again, the outcome
pressure group did not differ significantly from control, t < 1. Thus, experts displayed
choking under more self- or skill-focused pressure conditions, further supporting selffocus theories. Although their performance improved when being placed in a
competitive and peer pressure-filled situation, this effect did not reach statistical
significance.

4.3 Discussion
In sum, the general effect of perceived pressure induced by the two pressure
scenarios as assessed by several arousal- and affect-related self-report and physiological
measures was replicated from Experiment 2a. The most consistent results between the
two pressure scenarios and the control condition were found for the Importance and
Pressure ratings, SAM Arousal and Pleasantness, the STAI state form, average heart rate,
and PANAS negative affect with significant effects for all contrasts testing whether the
pressure scenarios were perceived to be significantly more distressing than the control
condition but nonsignificantly more distressing from each other. Thus, according to the
self-report and the examination of heart rate, it can be inferred that the introduction of
73

external elements that simulate conditions found in pressure-filled situations resulted in


a significant higher level of perceived performance pressure than the no pressure
control condition.
In terms of the effect of type of pressure on performance, choking was found
when expert golfers performed under monitoring pressure conditions. This finding is in
line with self-focus theories which argue that when attention is focused on the step-bystep mechanisms of a highly proceduralized task, performance decrements occur. From
this hypothesis, it seems plausible that the environment of being video-taped, watching
the recording in real time on a large screen right next to the putting green, and being
evaluated by a golf professional may have induced an attentional focus on the self or
skill execution which impaired expert performance but left novice performance
unharmed. Moreover, expert performance was unaffected by the outcome pressure
environment, a finding also supported by current theory.
Furthermore, the unskilled golfers displayed performance decrements when
putting under outcome pressure but not under monitoring pressure conditions.
According to distraction theory, performance of WM-reliant tasks can be harmed when
attention is diverted from the individual processes of skill execution (but not when
attention is focused on these). A competitive environment, filled with monetary
incentives in which one does not want to let down a partner can induce ruminative
thought about the situation, turning what was initially a single-task into a dual-task
situation. As a consequence, performance is more vulnerable to break downs and the
likelihood for choking increases. Overall, the interaction between type of pressure and
74

skill level found in this experiment is in line with recent findings by DeCaro et al (2011)
using a category learning paradigm. Thus, this study supports and extends this
interaction using a sensorimotor task.

75

CHAPTER 5:
EXPERIMENT 3: ALLEVIATING CHOKING THROUGH IMAGERY

The purpose of Experiment 3 is two-fold. The primary aim is to find a way to


reduce choking under pressure as identified by Experiment 2 (i.e., novices under
outcome and experts under monitoring pressure) by using imagery practice. Equally
important is the investigation of whether imagery practice might hurt performance in
those instances in which it was previously left unharmed (i.e., novices under monitoring
and experts under outcome pressure). But before considering its effects on pressure,
imagery practice by itself will be tested for its effectiveness in novice and expert golfers
in a non-pressure environment. Specifically, it will be determined whether there are
differences in golfers of varying skill levels in how well they perform a putting task using
imagery practice from either a first- or third-person perspective.

5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
Sixteen participants were recruited per group (e.g., 16 participants using firstperson imagery under no pressure; see study design in Figure 3 for details). Importance
ratings of three participants did not reach the criterion of 3 or higher on every block of
76

putting trials and, thus, were excluded from further analyses. A total of 93 participants
were left including 49 novices and 44 experts who were recruited and categorized in the
same way as in prior experiments. There were 15 novices (8 first-person and 7 thirdperson imagery) and 15 experts (7 first-person and 8 third-person imagery) for the
control, 18 novices (11 first-person and 7 third-person imagery) and 16 experts (7 firstperson and 9 third-person imagery) for the outcome pressure, and 16 novices (8 firstperson and 8 third-person imagery) and 13 experts (7 first-person and 6 third-person
imagery) for the monitoring pressure condition.
Equipment failure led to the exclusion of heart rate data of 28 participants,
leaving a sample size for the heart rate analysis of 10 novices (4 first-person and 6 thirdperson imagery) and 10 experts (3 first-person and 7 third-person imagery) for the
control, 12 novices (7 first-person and 5 third-person imagery) and 13 experts (7 firstperson and 6 third-person imagery) for the outcome pressure, and 11 novices (6 firstperson and 5 third-person imagery) and 10 experts (5 first-person and 5 third-person
imagery) for the monitoring pressure condition. Data is still reported and analyses were
still run for average and peak heart rate; however, results should be interpreted with
caution.
5.1.2 Materials
The green, putters, and balls were identical to those in Experiment 1 and 2.
However, two additional questionnaires for the assessment of imagery-related
mechanism were administered.
77

Imagery Rating. Participants rated on a one-item scale how successful they


thought they were in using their assigned imagery practice. The Imagery Rating scale
was adapted from a golf putting study which manipulated instructional cues and
subsequently checked for whether the manipulation was effectively implemented by
the participant (Gucciardi & Dimmock, 2008). As the Importance and Pressure Ratings,
this scale also ranged from 1 (unsuccessful) to 7 (successful).
Revised Vividness of Movement Imagery-2 (VMIQ-2; Roberts et al., 2008). This
questionnaire assesses the ability to visually and kinesthetically imagine a variety of
movements. The 12-item VMIQ-2 which assesses imagery on three factors (i.e., internal
or first-person, external or third-person, and kinesthetic imagery) was adapted from the
original 24-item and two-factor (i.e., internal and external imagery) version (VMIQ;
Isaac, Marks, Russel, 1986). The 12 (and former 24) items measure imagery in six
different situations such as basic body movements (e.g., walking), movement with
controlling an object (e.g., kicking a ball in the air), and movements that cause
imbalance and recovery (e.g., jumping off a high wall). Participants were asked to try
their best at imaging the activities as clearly and as vividly as they could and, then, rate
the degree of clearness and vividness of their image using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (perfectly clear and vivid) to 5 (no image at all). Preliminary support for adequate
psychometric properties of the revised questionnaire has been obtained (Roberts et al.,
2008). Of particular interest in this study were generic differences in imagery ability
between novice and skilled golfers as potential covariates for the effectiveness of

78

imagery as a method to alleviate choking. Therefore, participants were asked to


complete the exercise without appointing a particular imagery perspective.
5.1.3 Design
This experiment includes three between-subjects factors (i.e., skill level, pressure
type, and imagery practice), leading to a total of twelve conditions (see Figure 6 for
study design). That is, for each skill level there was a first- and third-person imagery
group per pressure condition (i.e., none, outcome, and monitoring).

no pressure

monitoring pressure

outcome pressure

no pressure

monitoring pressure

outcome pressure

NOVICES
1st person imagery
3rd person imagery

EXPERTS
st

1 person imagery
3rd person imagery

Figure 5.1 Overview of study design of Experiment 3.


5.1.4 Procedure
Putting task. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 with the addition
of an imagery practice block of (18) putting blocks between the baseline and pressure
blocks. The same pressure scenarios were used as in Experiment 2. Participants were
instructed to engage in imagery practice before each putt (see imagery instructions
79

below). The experimenter repeated the imagery instructions before the tenth putt to
remind participants of the specific instructions and to assure that they were actually
doing the practice. Positive imagery (i.e., landing a putt inside the hole) was chosen to
control for confounding effects other types of imagery (e.g., negative imagery) have on
performance (Beilock et al., 2001).
First-person visual imagery group. Participants were instructed to imagine
themselves making a successful putt from a first-person perspective. Specifically, they
were told: You see yourself taking this putt through your own eyes, just as you would
see it as if it was actually occurring. That is, you see your arms, the putter, the ball, and
the hole in the foreground and your surroundings in the background. Id like you to
imagine taking a putt that rolls into the hole. You should see yourself swinging the club
back and through so that the ball lands inside the hole. Participants were asked to
imagine the scene before each putt and were reminded of the imagery by reading the
instructions again before the tenth putt of an 18-putt series.
Third-person visual imagery group. Participants were instructed to imagine
themselves making a successful putt from a third-person perspective. Specifically, they
were told: You see yourself taking this putt from a third-person perspective, just as you
would see it as it was actually occurring to your distant self. That is, you see yourself
from the back, with the ball behind the hole. Id like you to imagine taking a putt that
rolls into the hole. You should see yourself swinging the club back and through in a
straight line so that the ball lands inside the hole. Participants were asked to imagine

80

the scene before each putt and were reminded of the imagery by reading the
instructions again before the tenth putt of an 18-putt series.
Thus, participants started with 9-18 practice putts and 27 single-task putts
without manipulation. Again, the last 18 single-task putts served as the baseline
measure. Then, there followed 18 putts using the assigned imagery perspective and,
finally, another 18 putts using the same imagery practice under the assigned type of
pressure condition. For example, one third of the novices took 9-18 practice putts, 27
single-task putts, 18 first-person imagery putts, and 18 putts using first-person imagery
under monitoring pressure.
Self-report and heart rate measures. Again, participants were subject to
assessment before the beginning of the putting task and after each block of trials. First,
preperformance measures were taken of SAM, the STAI trait form, and the PANAS. After
the baseline block of putting blocks, Importance and Pressure ratings, the three items of
SAM, the STAI state form, and the PANAS were completed. The experimenter, who had
not mentioned imagery practice until that point, then gave a general explanation of
imagery practice and visual perspective use to the participant. Next, the participant was
given time to complete the VMIQ-2. Subsequently, the specific imagery instructions
were given to the participant and were clarified when necessary. After the imagery
putting block, participants filled out the Importance, Pressure, and Imagery ratings, the
SAM, the STAI state form, and the PANAS, which they completed after the pressure
block of putting as well. At the end of the study, participants filled out the demographic
and postexperiment questionnaire.
81

Resting heart rate as well as average and peak heart rate was recorded before
and during the putting blocks as in Experiments 1 and 2. Lastly, participants were all
thanked and debriefed.

5.2 Results
Means and standard errors per block for all measures are provided in Table 5.1
and 5.2. Again, results for self-report and heart rate measures will be presented first,
followed by the putting performance analysis with results on the imagery block and
pressure block separately. As in prior experiments, difference scores of the critical and
the baseline block of trials were analyzed.
5.2.1 Self-Report and Heart Rate Measures
Imagery block. The data were submitted to a 2 (Skill Level: novices vs. experts) X
2 (Imagery Perspective: first- vs. third-person) ANOVA on the difference scores (imagery
- baseline block) of all measures. Only the main effect for skill level of SAM
Controllability was trending towards significance, F(1, 58) = 2.30, MSE = 1.02, p = .14,
and the main effect for imagery perspective of PANAS positive affect was significant,
F(1, 58) = 10.11, MSE = 12.81, p =.002. Thus, experts perceived a slight increase of
controllability when using imagery compared to novices and both groups reported a
decrease in positive affect when using third-person compared to first-person imagery.
No other effects were significant, all Fs < 1.7.

82

TABLE 5.1
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND DIFFERENCE SCORES ON ALL MEASURES BY PRESSURE AND
IMAGERY CONDITION FOR NOVICES (ONLY) OF EXPERIMENT 3
No Pressure
Measure
83

Importance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Pressure
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Imagery
2
3

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

3.75
4.50
4.50
.75
.75

(.37)
(.46)
(.33)
(.25)
(.25)

3.71
3.71
3.43
.00
-.29

(.47)
(.42)
(.53)
(.38)
(.36)

4.09
4.27
5.18
.18
1.09

(.25)
(.33)
(.38)
(.23)
(.32)

4.29
4.43
5.57
.14
1.29

(.57)
(.42)
(.57)
(.26)
(.18)

3.63
4.00
4.38
.38
.75

(.26)
(.38)
(.38)
(.38)
(.31)

3.29
3.86
4.43
.57
1.14

(.68)
(.55)
(.48)
(.43)
(.51)

3.00
3.88
4.00
.88
1.00

(.57)
(.58)
(.50)
(.48)
(.50)

2.57
2.86
2.71
.29
.14

(.48)
(.51)
(.52)
(.42)
(.51)

3.00
3.27
4.82
.27
1.82

(.41)
(.49)
(.26)
(.47)
(.35)

2.57
3.29
4.14
.71
1.57

(.37)
(.64)
(.46)
(.47)
(.30)

3.00
3.63
4.38
.63
1.38

(.42)
(.50)
(.65)
(.32)
(.50)

3.00
3.29
4.57
.29
1.57

(.72)
(.68)
(.30)
(.47)
(.65)

4.13
3.63

(.48)
(.46)

4.57
5.29

(.37)
(.47)

4.27
4.00

(.30)
(.30)

4.29
4.57

(.61)
(.53)

4.13
3.25

(.52)
(.37)

4.14
4.57

(.46)
(.61)

TABEL 5.1 (CONTINUED)


No Pressure
Measure

84

SAM
Pleasantness
Preperformance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Arousal
Preperformance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Controllability
Preperformance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

2.88
3.63
3.63
4.00
.00
.38

(.35)
(.65)
(.53)
(.57)
(.54)
(.57)

2.14
2.43
3.00
2.14
.57
-.29

(.40)
(.30)
(.44)
(.34)
(.30)
(.29)

3.64
4.36
4.27
4.00
-.09
-.36

(.35)
(.49)
(.45)
(.60)
(.64)
(.64)

3.50
3.43
3.43
4.29
.00
.86

(.40)
(.57)
(.65)
(.68)
(.62)
(.60)

3.88
3.50
3.88
4.57
.38
1.29

(.61)
(.46)
(.55)
(.53)
(.46)
(.52)

2.86
3.71
4.57
3.29
.86
-.43

(.14)
(.71)
(.75)
(.42)
(.63)
(.65)

6.13
5.38
5.25
5.88
-.13
.50

(.72)
(.71)
(.80)
(.48)
(.58)
(.54)

6.14
4.43
5.57
5.71
1.14
1.29

(.46)
(.69)
(.57)
(.78)
(.83)
(.78)

6.45
5.00
5.73
4.55
.73
-.45

(.41)
(.30)
(.52)
(.49)
(.30)
(.49)

5.33
4.43
5.00
4.29
.57
-.14

(.76)
(.57)
(.31)
(.61)
(.75)
(.46)

6.38
4.88
4.88
4.86
.00
.00

(.72)
(.40)
(.52)
(.40)
(.33)
(.38)

5.14
4.71
4.71
5.00
.00
.29

(.46)
(.52)
(.47)
(.38)
(.38)
(.47)

5.75
5.63
5.75
5.00
.13
.63

(.62)
(.38)
(.37)
(.46)
(.23)
(.53)

5.00
5.29
4.57
5.57
-.71
.29

(.76)
(.47)
(.53)
(.43)
(.36)
(.29)

5.73
5.82
5.73
5.55
-.09
-.27

(.41)
(.38)
(.36)
(.58)
(.37)
(.36)

6.00
5.71
6.57
6.00
.86
.29

(.52)
(.26)
(.43)
(.49)
(.46)
(.64)

5.75
5.25
5.38
4.86
.13
.14

(.37)
(.45)
(.53)
(.77)
(.23)
(.40)

5.29
5.00
4.86
5.57
-.14
.57

(.64)
(.62)
(.71)
(.69)
(.46)
(.61)

TABEL 5.1 (CONTINUED)


No Pressure
Measure
STAI
Trait
State
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
85

PANAS
Positive affect
Pre-performance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Negative affect
Pre-performance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

38.00

(2.07)

33.57

(2.92)

38.45

(2.43)

38.14

(2.11)

39.00

(4.05)

41.63

(3.04)

36.13
37.50
36.88
1.38
.75

(2.84)
(2.56)
(2.53)
(2.38)
(2.56)

35.43
34.57
30.57
-.86
-4.86

(2.67)
(2.94)
(2.76)
(1.39)
(1.44)

36.27
34.09
40.64
-2.18
4.36

(2.41)
(2.85)
(2.53)
(1.84)
(2.45)

39.57
38.29
42.14
-1.29
2.57

(1.77)
(2.84)
(2.76)
(2.70)
(3.55)

36.75
39.00
44.00
2.25
7.25

(3.54)
(3.01)
(3.67)
(2.53)
(2.87)

38.88
38.50
38.38
-.38
-.50

(4.49)
(4.15)
(3.18)
(2.31)
(3.82)

25.75
26.75
28.75
23.88
2.00
-2.88

(1.31)
(1.95)
(2.25)
(2.45)
(.88)
(2.81)

29.14
29.86
26.43
29.29
-3.43
-.57

(1.08)
(2.17)
(2.74)
(3.06)
(1.57)
(1.77)

27.80
26.50
27.40
28.70
.90
2.20

(2.11)
(1.61)
(1.88)
(2.17)
(.98)
(1.34)

30.50
30.14
29.00
32.43
-1.14
2.29

(2.93)
(3.19)
(2.90)
(3.66)
(1.37)
(1.92)

25.38
27.63
23.00
22.38
-4.63
-5.30

(1.70)
(1.71)
(1.95)
(2.14)
(1.50)
(2.19)

26.25
26.88
26.50
26.63
-.38
-.25

(2.14)
(1.39)
(1.57)
(1.40)
(.73)
(.73)

13.88
12.50
12.50
12.00
.00
-.50

(.92)
(1.00)
(.80)
(.85)
(.95)
(.54)

12.57
12.29
12.43
11.00
.14
-1.29

(.37)
(.84)
(.92)
(.44)
(.80)
(.57)

12.30
12.20
11.70
14.40
-.50
2.20

(.68)
(.77)
(2.06)
(2.05)
(.56)
(1.45)

15.83
13.43
12.00
15.57
-1.43
2.14

(1.97)
(1.11)
(1.92)
(2.09)
(1.51)
(1.57)

12.63
12.75
13.88
14.25
1.13
1.50

(1.13)
(1.33)
(1.58)
(1.58)
(1.02)
(2.81)

16.63
15.13
15.88
14.38
.75
-.75

(1.90)
(2.03)
(2.20)
(.82)
(1.15)
(1.77)

TABEL 5.1 (CONTINUED)


No Pressure
Measure
VMIQ

86

Heart Rate
Resting HR
Average HR
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Peak HR
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

28.63

(4.63)

23.33

(1.52)

29.91

(1.39)

25.71

(1.63)

21.83

(1.30)

27.25

(2.39)

83.00

(4.92)

91.29

(5.15)

86.75

(5.14)

80.40

(5.57)

91.57

(5.61)

69.40

(2.73)

89.50
87.50
87.25
-2.00
-2.25

(3.52)
(3.67)
(4.05)
(1.47)
(1.84)

98.83
94.83
95.67
-4.00
-3.17

(4.48)
(4.10)
(3.69)
(.86)
(1.17)

97.75
95.88
96.25
-1.88
-1.50

(3.00)
(2.71)
(2.40)
(1.26)
(1.60)

96.60
94.80
98.80
-1.80
2.20

(5.50)
(5.46)
(7.45)
(.74)
(3.51)

106.33
101.83
105.50
-2.20
-2.20

(4.34)
(4.18)
(3.70)
(1.53)
(1.39)

85.80
85.20
82.60
-.60
-3.20

(3.57)
(3.64)
(3.33)
(2.94)
(1.88)

97.75
97.25
98.50
-.50
.75

(2.63)
(4.21)
(4.74)
(2.63)
(3.50)

109.33
104.50
105.00
-4.83
-4.33

(4.19) 104.75 (2.75) 106.20 (6.95)


(3.45) 105.50 (2.58) 108.00 (4.76)
(3.45) 106.50 (2.37) 107.33 (11.67)
(2.40)
.75
(1.87)
1.80
(2.35)
(2.45) 1.75 (1.54)
2.33
(1.45)

115.40
111.00
113.00
-2.75
-.75

(2.75)
(2.58)
(2.37)
(1.87)
(1.54)

94.80
94.50
97.25
-2.50
.25

(2.75)
(2.58)
(2.37)
(1.87)
(1.54)

Note: 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = imagery putting block; 3 = pressure block; DIFF (Imagery) = difference score of imagery and baseline block; DIFF
(Pressure) = difference score of pressure and baseline block; SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; PANAS = Positive Affect
Negative Affect Scale; HR = heart rate;
a
b
c
Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure group; Significantly different at p < .05 to control group

TABLE 5.2
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND DIFFERENCE SCORES ON ALL MEASURES BY PRESSURE AND
IMAGERY CONDITION FOR EXPERTS (ONLY) OF EXPERIMENT 3
No Pressure
Measure
87

Importance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Pressure
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Imagery
2
3

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

5.57
5.43
5.57
-.14
.00

(.37)
(.48)
(.53)
(.14)
(.22)

4.38
4.75
4.75
.38
.38

(.46)
(.45)
(.41)
(.18)
(.18)

4.57
5.00
6.29
.43
1.71

(.53)
(.62)
(.42)
(.20)
(.47)

5.22
5.56
6.11
.33
.89

(.28)
(.29)
(.46)
(.29)
(.39)

5.00
4.71
6.14
-.29
1.14

(.69)
(.61)
(.34)
(.42)
(.40)

4.17
5.17
5.33
1.00
1.17

(.70)
(.70)
(.56)
(.37)
(.31)

3.14
3.57
3.86
.43
.71

(.74)
(.78)
(74)
(.75)
(.78)

2.13
3.13
3.13
1.00
1.00

(.44)
(.61)
(.52)
(.50)
(.38)

3.57
4.29
5.57
.71
2.00

(.65)
(.68)
(.43)
(.36)
(.31)

3.44
3.67
4.44
.22
1.00

(.58)
(.58)
(.67)
(.52)
(.29)

3.14
3.29
5.14
.14
2.00

(.60)
(.64)
(.51)
(.26)
(.58)

2.33
3.67
4.50
1.33
2.17

(.56)
(.67)
(.43)
(.56)
(.75)

5.00
5.14

(.82)
(1.35)

5.13
5.25

(.99)
(.71)

5.00
4.57

(.53)
(.34)

4.89
4.67

(.47)
(.15)

4.86
5.00

(.26)
(.38)

4.00
4.67

(.26)
(.33)

TABLE 5.2 (CONTINUED)


No Pressure
Measure

88

SAM
Pleasantness
Preperformance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Arousal
Preperformance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Controllability
Preperformance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

3.29
3.43
3.29
3.86
-.14
.43

(.29)
(.75)
(.52)
(.40)
(.77)
(.53)

2.75
2.50
2.75
2.75
.25
.25

(.56)
(.33)
(.56)
(.37)
(.68)
(.49)

2.86
3.14
2.57
3.14
-.57
.00

(.34)
(.46)
(.30)
(.63)
(.30)
(.43)

2.78
3.11
3.33
3.11
.22
.00

(.15)
(.39)
(.55)
(.48)
(.47)
(.73)

2.57
3.71
3.43
3.86
-.29
.14

(.37)
(.71)
(.72)
(.34)
(.84)
(1.00)

2.33
3.50
4.00
3.83
.50
.33

(.42)
(.34)
(.37)
(.31)
(.34)
(.56)

6.71
4.86
6.57
5.86
1.71
1.00

(.52)
(.77)
(.61)
(.55)
(.92)
(.66)

5.88
5.50
5.50
5.88
.00
.38

(.69)
(.76)
(.76)
(.67)
(.57)
(.73)

6.43
5.14
5.14
3.14
.00
-2.00

(.65)
(.51)
(.51)
(.40)
(.62)
(.58)

5.56
4.67
5.00
3.67
.33
-1.00

(.78)
(.82)
(.76)
(.67)
(.55)
(.41)

5.00
4.86
5.14
4.43
.29
-.43

(.22)
(.26)
(.51)
(.43)
(.42)
(.43)

5.83
4.33
3.83
3.67
-.50
-.67

(.60)
(.21)
(.31)
(.42)
(.34)
(.49)

6.71
5.57
6.29
5.86
.71
.29

(.52)
(.57)
(.36)
(.40)
(.57)
(.52)

6.63
6.63
6.63
6.13
.00
-.50

(.68)
(.63)
(.57)
(.67)
(.19)
(.33)

5.29
4.86
6.00
5.71
1.14
.86

(.47)
(.51)
(.66)
(.52)
(.40)
(.55)

5.22
5.00
5.22
5.78
.22
.78

(.52)
(.76)
(.70)
(.70)
(.15)
(.36)

5.29
5.57
5.43
5.29
-.14
-.29

(.68)
(.43)
(.53)
(.64)
(.67)
(.92)

4.50
4.33
4.67
4.67
.33
.33

(.76)
(.42)
(.33)
(.21)
(.33)
(.56)

TABLE 5.2 (CONTINUED)


No Pressure
Measure
STAI
Trait
State
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
89

PANAS
Positive affect
Pre-performance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Negative affect
Pre-performance
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

37.86

(1.35)

35.50

(2.96)

33.57

(1.73)

40.00

(2.38)

34.86

(2.54)

36.17

(2.47)

32.29
28.86
33.57
-3.43
1.29

(4.54)
(1.35)
(3.29)
(2.38)
(2.36)

31.13
30.13
29.00
-1.00
-2.13

(2.00)
(2.39)
(2.51)
(.95)
(1.27)

30.29
28.57
35.14
-1.71
4.86

(1.92)
(2.00)
(3.26)
(1.34)
(1.82)

36.38
37.63
38.00
1.25
1.63

(2.74)
(3.05)
(2.68)
(3.19)
(1.59)

33.71
32.14
36.29
-1.57
2.57

(3.00)
(2.25)
(3.48)
(2.20)
(2.73)

35.00
37.83
36.33
2.83
1.33

(2.21)
(4.46)
(2.94)
(2.36)
(2.40)

31.00
33.57
32.00
31.00
-1.57
-2.57

(2.14)
(1.65)
(2.37)
(2.19)
(1.09)
(1.63)

32.75
33.13
31.50
27.75
-1.63
-5.38

(1.58)
(1.90)
(1.46)
(2.03)
(.87)
(2.52)

27.00
30.14
33.14
36.00
3.00
5.86

(1.80)
(2.48)
(2.58)
(2.42)
(.79)
(1.42)

31.56
33.00
30.78
35.11
-2.22
2.11

(2.43)
(3.56)
(3.32)
(3.74)
(1.16)
(1.53)

34.00
32.14
34.29
32.29
2.14
.14

(1.94)
(2.08)
(2.84)
(2.14)
(1.49)
(1.39)

30.00
30.67
30.33
30.50
-.33
-.17

(2.96)
(2.11)
(2.51)
(1.78)
(1.17)
(.95)

13.00
13.14
11.29
12.86
-1.86
-.29

(.93)
(.52)
(2.49)
(2.20)
(2.38)
(.36)

12.75
11.38
10.75
10.50
-.63
-.88

(1.33)
(.60)
(.25)
(.38)
(.50)
(.66)

11.14
11.71
11.57
13.14
-.14
1.43

(.34)
(.52)
(.84)
(.86)
(.63)
(.61)

17.78
15.11
14.11
17.56
-1.00
2.44

(2.09)
(1.88)
(1.84)
(2.64)
(1.52)
(1.91)

13.14
13.71
12.00
13.29
-1.71
-.43

(1.12)
(1.29)
(.79)
(1.09)
(1.25)
(.90)

13.83
12.67
13.50
12.67
.83
.00

(1.49)
(1.15)
(1.23)
(1.26)
(.70)
(.97)

TABLE 5.2 (CONTINUED)


No Pressure
Measure
VMIQ

90

Heart Rate
Resting HR
Average HR
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Peak HR
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

24.57

(3.29)

21.88

(3.11)

26.57

(3.31)

24.44

(2.85)

25.71

(1.94)

28.17

(2.30)

70.67

(5.36)

84.13

(4.88)

87.14

(5.26)

85.17

(3.42)

82.60

(2.11)

77.00

(6.29)

79.00
77.33
78.67
-1.67
-.33

(5.29)
(2.85)
(3.67)
(2.60)
(2.19)

97.86
94.71
93.86
-3.14
-4.00

(4.48)
(4.10)
(2.20)
(2.38)
(.36)

94.57
92.14
96.00
-2.43
1.43

(4.78) 97.50
(4.55) 96.33
(4.21) 103.60
(1.21) -1.17
(2.03) 5.00

(4.79)
(4.19)
(7.84)
(1.78)
(3.99)

92.80
89.60
89.20
-3.20
-3.60

(2.58)
(3.57)
(3.60)
(1.11)
(1.29)

89.40
86.40
85.60
-3.00
-3.80

(4.55)
(4.01)
(4.05)
(.84)
(.97)

89.33
87.33
87.33
-2.00
-2.00

(4.70)
(4.10)
(4.86)
(2.52)
(3.00)

106.43
106.00
104.43
-.43
-2.00

(2.97) 108.00 (3.41) 107.17


(2.40) 108.29 (2.38) 106.80
(2.68) 115.71 (2.48) 114.40
(1.66)
.29
(2.62) -2.80
(1.16) 7.71 (4.20) 4.80

(5.57)
(4.89)
(8.11)
(1.69)
(3.68)

101.60
97.80
100.00
-3.80
-1.60

(3.20)
(3.37)
(3.21)
(1.83)
(1.29)

97.20
96.00
96.60
-1.20
-.60

(5.00)
(3.52)
(4.46)
(2.01)
(2.77)

Note: 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = imagery putting block; 3 = pressure block; DIFF (Imagery) = difference score of imagery and baseline block; DIFF
(Pressure) = difference score of pressure and baseline block; SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; PANAS = Positive Affect
Negative Affect Scale; HR = heart rate;
a
b
c
Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure group; Significantly different at p < .05 to control group

Pressure block. The data were submitted to a 2 (Skill Level: novices vs. experts) X
2 (Imagery Perspective: first- vs. third-person) X 3 (Type of Pressure: none vs. outcome
vs. monitoring) ANOVA on the difference scores (pressure - baseline block) of all
measures. A main effect for skill level was found only for SAM Arousal, F(1, 62) = 4.10, p
= .048, with experts experiencing a greater increase in arousal overall than novices. One
main effect for imagery perspective reached significance, namely, STAI state
form, F(1, 62) = 4.86, p = .032, with people reporting greater anxiety when practicing
first- than third-person imagery.
Several measures resulted in a main effect for pressure, all of which were
followed up with planned comparisons using Tukeys HSD correction. Four measures
resulted in the same trend of data that was observed under pressure in Experiment 2;
that is, the two pressure groups leading to equally high and, at least, marginally
significantly higher indicators of distress than the control group including Importance
rating (main effect: F(2, 50) = 9.58, p < .001; none outcome contrast: t(50) = 3.80, p =
.001; none monitoring contrast: t(50) = 4.23, p < .001), Pressure rating (main effect:
F(2, 50) = 3.64, p = .033; none outcome contrast: t(50) = 2.23, p = .075; none
monitoring contrast: t(50) = 2.85, p = .017), SAM Arousal (main effect: F(2, 50) = 3.62, p
= .034; none outcome contrast: t(50) = 2.90, p = .015; none monitoring contrast:
t(50) = 2.09, p = .10), and STAI state form (main effect: F(2, 50) = 3.32, p = .044; none
outcome contrast: t(50) = 2.51, p = .040; none monitoring contrast: t(50) = 2.37, p =
.056). Taken together, the key affect- and arousal-related self report measures reflected
the same trend in perceived performance pressure as in Experiment 2, in which no
91

imagery practice was applied. Interestingly, these results suggest that imagery does not
make performers immune to sensing performance pressure.
Furthermore, another trend was reflected in the data in which the control
condition was, at least, marginally significantly different from the outcome pressure
condition which in turn was, at least, marginally significantly different from the
monitoring pressure condition including average heart rate (main effect: F(2, 50) = 8.15,
p = .001; none outcome contrast: t(50) = 3.17, p < .007; outcome monitoring
contrast: t(50) = 3.60, p = .002), and peak heart rate (main effect: F(2, 49) = 5.05, p =
.010; none outcome contrast: t(49) = 3.39, p = .004; outcome monitoring contrast:
t(49) = 2.57, p = .035), PANAS positive affect (main effect: F(2, 50) = 11.04, p < .001;
none outcome contrast: t(50) = 4.69, p < .001; outcome monitoring contrast: t(50) =
3.60, p = .002), and PANAS negative affect (main effect: F(2, 50) = 9.58, p < .001; none
outcome contrast: t(50) = 2.76, p = .022; outcome monitoring contrast: t(50) = 2.08, p
= .106).
Furthermore, several two-way interaction yielded significance including the skill
level by imagery perspective interaction for PANAS positive affect, F(1, 62) = 6.88, p =
.011, and the skill level by type of pressure interaction for the PANAS positive affect
measure, F(2, 62) = 5.95, p = .005. The imagery perspective by type of pressure
interaction for average heart rate was trending towards significance, F(1, 62) = 2.33, p =
.11, while the same interaction was marginally significant for STAI state form, F(1, 62) =
2.43, p = .098, PANAS positive affect, F(1, 62) = 3.03, p = .057, and PANAS negative
affect, F(1, 62) = 2.86, p = .067. Finally, the three-way interaction was significant for a
92

number of measures including Importance rating, F(2, 62) = 3.99, p = .025, SAM
Pleasantness, F(2, 62) = 3.47, p = .039, SAM Arousal, F(2, 62) = 2.51, p = .091, STAI state
form, F(2, 62) = 5.98, p = .005, and PANAS positive affect, F(2, 62) = 2.29, p = .11.
5.2.2 Putting Performance
Imagery block. The putting data are summarized in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2. To
begin, a 2 (Skill Level: novices vs. experts) X 2 (Imagery Perspective: first- vs. thirdperson) ANOVA was run on the difference scores of the imagery and the baseline block
of trials. The main effects for skill level and imagery perspective were not significant, Fs
< 1, but the interaction was, F(1, 80) = 8.831, MSE = 67.62, p = .004. This result suggests
that imagery is most effective when the visual perspective is altered according to the
skill level of the performer. Thus, the skill level groups were examined separately.
A one-way ANOVA revealed that novices exhibited a greater improvement in
putting performance from the baseline to the imagery block when practicing third- as
compared to first-person imagery, F(47) = 5.88, MSE = 93.13, p = .019. This finding is in
line with prior research suggesting that third-person imagery is best suited for the
learning of the individual steps of skill movement (Mayer & Hermann, 2010). Moreover,
first-person imagery might be a more demanding task for novices than third-person
imagery, leading to a performance decrement in the putting task when using the firstperson perspective but not when using third-person perspective.
For expert golfers, the one-way ANOVA yielded a trend opposed to the novices
data in that experts did better under first- than under third-person imagery, F(41) =
93

4.13, p = .049. This result is in line with Mayer and Hermanns (2010) argument that
third-person imagery helps to rehearse kinesthetic movement feelings. Furthermore,
third-person imagery somewhat impedes experts performance for reasons not yet
clearly determined. It is possible that this imagery perspective draws attention to the
self or skill execution in a way similar to skill-focused attention, and thus, disrupts the
otherwise automatic movement processes.

94

TABLE 5.3
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARANTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND DIFFERENCE
SCORES BY SKILL LEVEL AND IMAGERY CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 2 (NO PRESSURE
CONDITION ONLY) AND EXPERIMENT 3 (IMAGERY BLOCK ONLY)
Experiment 2
No Imagery
Measure

Experiment 3
1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

Novices
1
2
DIFF

30.80
24.13
-5.33

(1.82)
(1.51)
(1.81)

32.97
34.96
2.04*

(1.46)
(2.07)
(1.56)

29.46
24.89
-4.68

(1.34)
(1.66)
(1.37)

Experts
1
2
DIFF

20.14
17.39
-2.86

(2.27)
(1.57)
(1.82)

19.74
16.07
-4.27

(1.28)
(.98)
(1.20)

17.88
17.00
-.88

(1.23)
(1.41)
(1.16)

Note. 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = experimental putting block; DIFF = difference score of
experimental and baseline block;
*

Significantly different at p < .05 to no imagery group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other imagery
group

95

Figure 5.2 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the
mean) for difference scores clustered by skill level and imagery
perspective for Experiment 3.

96

Pressure block. Means and standard errors of putting performance are


summarized in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.3. To begin, the data were submitted to a 2 (Skill
Level: novices vs. experts) X 2 (Imagery Perspective: first-person vs. third-person) X 3
(Type of Pressure: none vs. outcome vs. monitoring) ANOVA on the putting distance
difference scores (i.e., pressure baseline block). Only the skill level by imagery
perspective interaction was significant, F(1, 81) = 4.38, MSE = 79.71, p = .040, all other
effects were not, all Fs < 1. Thus, as for the imagery block without pressure, novices
differed in how well they performed as a function of visual imagery perspective. Then,
each skill level group was analyzed individually.
The data of the novice golfers were submitted to a 3 (Type of Pressure: none vs.
outcome vs. monitoring) X 2 (Imagery Perspective: first-person vs. third-person) ANOVA
on the putting distance difference scores. Although novices still performed slightly
better using third- compared to first-person imagery across conditions, this difference
was no longer significant, F(1, 43) = 2.23, MSE = 117.30, p = .14, and neither was any
other effect, all Fs < 1. Thus, no differences in performance among the three pressure
conditions were found, suggesting that performance decrements, as were shown under
outcome pressure in Experiment 2, no longer occurred. Therefore and importantly,
choking was prevented through imagery.

97

TABLE 5.4
MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) FOR BLOCK AND DIFFERENCE SCORES BY SKILL LEVEL AND PRESSURE AND
IMAGERY CONDITION FOR EXPERIMENT 3
Control
1st Person
Measure

98

Novices
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)
Experts
1
2
3
DIFF (Imagery)
DIFF (Pressure)

Outcome Pressure
3rd Person

Monitoring Pressure

1st Person

3rd Person

1st Person

3rd Person

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

SE

33.54
36.95
34.70
3.41
1.15

(2.80)
(3.35)
(3.47)
(4.81)
(4.00)

30.49
27.20
25.24
-3.64
-5.20

(1.95)
(4.09)
(2.84)
(3.91)
(4.00)

32.32
31.79
25.83
-.40
-6.49

(2.37)
(4.21)
(4.28)
(3.74)
(4.17)

27.74
20.94
20.06
-6.80
-7.67

(2.66)
(2.66)
(3.17)
(1.77)
(2.13)

33.30
37.33
31.03
4.03
-2.27

(2.80)
(2.04)
(2.81)
(2.05)
(3.45)

30.08
26.32
21.31
-3.72
-8.77

(2.46)
(1.41)
(2.61)
(2.59)
(3.56)

19.90
17.71
15.29
-4.06
-4.61

(2.69)
(1.58)
(1.29)
(2.73)
(1.75)

19.41
17.49
15.92
-1.92
-3.49

(2.59)
(3.49)
(3.39)
(2.97)
(2.63)

21.71
17.58
14.22
-4.14
-7.49

(1.85)
(1.08)
(1.40)
(2.38)
(2.43)

15.06
15.64
12.91
.57
-2.15

(1.31)
(1.13)
(1.94)
(.98)
(1.71)

17.60
12.94
12.73
-4.59
-4.87

(2.08)
(1.86)
(1.39)
(1.43)
(2.89)

20.06
18.38
18.21
-1.69
-1.86

(2.19)
(2.61)
(2.57)
(1.66)
(1.73)

Note. 1 = baseline putting block; 2 = imagery putting block; 3 = pressure putting block; DIFF (Imagery) = difference score of imagery and baseline block;
DIFF (Pressure) = difference score of pressure and baseline block;
*

Significantly different at p < .05 to control group; Significantly different at p < .05 to other pressure group

(
(a)

(b)

Figure 5.3 Bar graph including error bars (standard error of the
mean) for difference scores for novice (a) and expert (b) golfers
clustered by type of pressure and imagery for Experiment 3.
99

Because I am interested in whether choking, as shown in the outcome pressure


condition of Experiment 2, could be prevented through imagery, post hoc comparisons
on the difference scores of this experiments (first- and third-person imagery combined)
imagery practice under outcome pressure and Experiment 2s outcome pressure data
were run. In fact, significantly better performance was observed for the imagery under
pressure compared to the no imagery pressure group, t(28) = 2.30, p = .029. Thus, when
novices were briefly instructed in imagery use and practiced it for one block before
performing in the outcome pressure environment, they no longer showed a
performance decrement. To look at this effect more closely, post hoc comparisons were
also run between the individual imagery conditions and Experiment 2s outcome
pressure data. For first-person imagery, the effect was only marginally significant, t(21)
= 1.75, p = .095, however, for third- person imagery it was significant, t(17) = 3.38, p =
.004. Thus, it can be more clearly inferred that third-person imagery can be used to
prevent choking under outcome pressure in novice golfers.
Moreover, it was important to find out if imagery hurt performance that was
initially unharmed for novices. Comparisons between the monitoring pressure condition
of this experiments (combined) imagery practice and Experiment 2s (no imagery)
group showed no significant differences in difference scores of the critical and baseline
blocks, t(32) = .489, p = .63. Therefore, imagery did not compromise novice performance
under monitoring pressure.
Finally, the data of the expert golfers were submitted to a 3 (Type of Pressure:
none vs. outcome vs. monitoring) X 2 (Imagery Perspective: first-person vs. third100

person) ANOVA on the putting distance difference scores. Expert golfers still performed
better using first- than third-person imagery overall, however, this effect was only
marginally significant, F(1, 38) = 2.91, MSE = 37.17, p = .096, and no other effect reached
significance, all Fs < 1. As for the novice group, no differences among the three pressure
conditions were found, suggesting that those performance decrements, as occurred in
Experiment 2, were no longer present in the current experiment. Therefore, choking
was prevented for experts through imagery, too.
For the purpose of this study, the results of this experiments imagery under
monitoring pressure condition were compared to Experiment 2s monitoring pressure
result to see whether imagery prevented choking. Indeed, the addition of imagery
practice (first- and third-person combined) resulted in better performance under
monitoring pressure compared to Experiment 2s no imagery condition, t(29) = 2.78, p =
.010. When comparing each of these imagery conditions separately to Experiment 2s
monitoring pressure data, first-person perspective resulted in a significant effect, t(23) =
2.67, p = .014, and third-person imagery in a marginally significant effect, t(22) = 1.73, p
= .098. Consequently, it can be argued that first-person imagery is best suited for the
prevention of choking under monitoring pressure in expert golfers.
As for novices, it was also important to see if imagery impaired skilled
performance under outcome pressure. No significant differences were found, t(33) =
.307, p = .76, and, therefore, imagery did not negatively affect experts under outcome
pressure.

101

5.3 Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was (a) to more generally investigate visual
perspective in imagery practice considering the performers skill level (or cognitive
demands) with the task, and (b) to test whether imagery prevents choking in those skill
level pressure type situations in which it occurred in Experiment 2.
5.3.1 Imagery (Only)
With respect to visual perspective, imagery was found most effective when
novice golfers practiced under third-person and experts under first-person. To more
closely examine if imagery practice helped or harmed performance under low anxiety
conditions, comparisons of this experiments data were made to those of Experiment 2.
Imagery across perspective conditions impeded with novice performance on the
second block when comparing its change scores to those of Experiment 2s no pressure
(no imagery) control conditions, t(68) = 2.11, p = .038. When analyzed separately, the
first-person imagery group of the novice golfers had such a high difference score that it
was significantly different from the control condition of Experiment 2, t(46) = 2.98, p =
.005, and marginally different from that experiments monitoring pressure condition,
t(46) = 1.92, p = .061. In fact, this group performed equally badly as the outcome
pressure group, t < .5, which was concluded to exhibit choking. It might be that firstperson imagery practice is so cognitively demanding for novice golfers that it uses up
the otherwise necessary attentional resources to perform the putting task alone.
Without such explicit attention directed towards putting but turned towards the
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imagery practice, performance is initially impaired. In contrast, third-person imagery did


not impact putting performance as compared to either Experiment 2s control or
monitoring pressure conditions, all ts < 1. One might speculate that third-person
imagery engages an actors attentional resources, however, in a non-harming and
perhaps conducive way to novices cognitive demands.
For the expert golfers, the opposite trend in performance with respect to visual
imagery perspective was observed. Overall, imagery did not affect performance when
comparing the imagery change scores to those of Experiment 2s expert control
condition, t < 1. First-person imagery was found to lead to greater improvement than
third-person imagery, however, it did not excel beyond the performance of Experiment
2s no imagery control group, t < 1.2. Although third-person imagery led to a smaller
performance improvement than first-person imagery, it was still statistically no worse
than Experiment 2s control or outcome pressure conditions, all ts < 1.3, but different
(though only marginally significantly) from that experiments monitoring pressure
group, t(39) = 1.805, p = .079. This result suggests that experts were not negatively
affected by imagery practice on the whole.
These findings are in line with the hypothesis based on Mayer and Hermanns
(2010) idea that first-person imagery is best when movement feelings are to be
practiced, as in expert putting, and that third-person imagery is most conducive to the
learning of the individual steps of learning a skill, as in novice putting. These findings do
not support the hypothesis that the type of skill (open vs. closed) governs the
effectiveness of visual imagery perspective on performance alone (Hardy, 1997; Hardy &
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Callow, 1999; White & Hardy, 1995). Even though golf has previously been considered to
be a closed skill sport that emphasizes form (e.g., Arvinen-Barrow et al., 2007), it could
be argued that this categorization is not entirely accurate and that it may depend on
skill level. For novices, golf certainly resembles a task in which much attention must be
paid to the technical aspects of body positioning and club movement and, thus, it
appears that form is important. However, for experts it seems less clear whether their
performance primarily depends on form or on anticipating the environment to
effectively respond to changes within it. When expert golfers putt, they certainly rely on
flawless technical execution which may already be fluent and well learned. In addition,
they also respond to the changes in the environment when reading the green as in
finding a good line of putting and applying the right amount of force on the ball to have
the good chance of making the putt.
When comparing scores of the self-report and heart rate measures, experts
reported a slightly greater gain in controllability than novices. Considering that novices
need most, if not all, of their attentional resources to complete the putting task, it is not
surprising that adding a second assignment, namely, a specific imagery practice, might
lead to a slight loss of feeling in control of the situation and worse performance than
doing the putting task alone. Experts might be more accustomed to the putting task and
their performance is typically not hurt by additional task demands. In addition, both skill
level groups equally experienced a greater decrease in positive affect when using thirdcompared to first-person imagery. It has been shown that observing oneself from an
external viewpoint can create anxiety (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Imagining oneself
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from a third person perspective might bring about similar thoughts and feelings about
oneself.
5.3.2 Imagery under Pressure
Novices and experts exhibited no performance decrements in any pressure
condition when using imagery. More importantly, choking under outcome pressure was
prevented when novices used third-person imagery and performance decrements that
initially arose under monitoring pressure no longer occurred when experts practiced
first-person imagery. In sum, imagery that matches the cognitive demands of the
performer prevented choking in those pressure scenarios that were initially shown to be
harmful.
Interestingly, participants in the pressure scenarios reported distress to the same
extent as in Experiment 2. The same trend in the self-report data was observed in that
Pressure ratings and responses on SAM arousal and the STAI state form indicated the
participants putting under outcome and monitoring pressure were equally distressed
but significantly more distressed than participants under no pressure. This finding
suggests that imagery succeeded in preserving optimal performance by providing the
performer with a solution to cope with the perceived distress rather than by altering the
perception of performance pressure.

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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSIONS

Three experiments were conducted investigating the influence of pressure and


imagery on golf putting performance on beginning and advanced golfers. Experiment 1
tested the relationship of skill level and direction of attention. This experiment
replicated the commonly-found interaction of novices performing better under skillfocused than under distraction conditions and experts superior performance under
distraction than under skill-focused attention conditions. In Experiment 2, performance
pressure was induced in form of monitoring and outcome pressure and its effect on
performers of differing skill level was tested. Experiment 2a served as a means to check
the manipulation of the outcome and monitoring pressure scenarios. A number of
affect- and arousal-related self-report and physiological measures were used to validate
that the two pressure scenarios were perceived to be equally distressing and
significantly more distressing than the no pressure control condition. The aim of
Experiment 2b was to evaluate the effects of pressure on performance and it was found
that novices exhibited choking under outcome and experts under monitoring pressure
while performance was unaffected for novices under monitoring and experts under

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outcome pressure. Finally, Experiment 3 used a new method to help alleviate


performance decrements caused by pressure.
The previously found interaction (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001; Beilock et al., 2002,
2004; Beilock & Carr, 2001, 2005; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Eysenck, 1979; Gimmig et al.,
2006; Jackson et al., 2006; Kahneman, 1973; Leavitt, 1979; Lewis & Linder, 1997;
Markman et al., 2006; Masters, 1992; Smith & Chamberlin, 1992; Wine, 1971) between
task demands and direction of attention was replicated and provided further support for
the robustness of this relationship. Novice golfers performed well under skill-focused
instructions but choked when they were forced to do a secondary task on top of putting.
Experts, on the other hand, showed no performance decrements when their attention
was divided between the putting task and the auditory task but displayed less-thanaverage performance when attending to certain aspects of skill execution.
While this interaction has been shown across a variety of tasks, the effects of
type of pressure on performance are less well established. Only one study has
systematically examined how monitoring and outcome pressure interact with the
cognitive demands of a task (DeCaro et al., 2011). More support for this hypothesis can
be found when revisiting other studies that used pressure manipulations but did not set
out to closely examine type of pressure (Beilock & Carr, 2001; Gray, 2004; Markman, et
al., 2006, Reeves et al., 2007). Monitoring pressure, stemming from the feeling of being
evaluated or watched, has been found to hurt performance on proceduralized tasks but
not WM-reliant ones, while outcome pressure, as in high stakes scenarios, seems to hurt

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WM-reliant tasks but not proceduralized ones. The current research replicated this
finding using a sensorimotor task.
In Experiment 2, monitoring pressure was induced by video-recording
participants, projecting the life feed on a 66-inch smart board screen in clear sight of the
performer right next to the putting area, and having a golf professional watch them and
take notes of their putting block. The outcome pressure scenario involved the set up of
a competition in which participants were told they had been paired up with another
participant (i.e., peer pressure) and that their combined putting score could win them a
prize (i.e., incentives). A no pressure condition served as the control group. Before
investigating the effects of pressure on performance, it was first established that the
two pressure scenarios were reported to be equally distressing but more distressing
than the control condition (Experiment 2a). Then, the putting data of 2a and 2b were
jointly analyzed and summarized under Experiment 2b.
Replicating the findings of DeCaro et al. (2011), novice golfers, for which putting
represents a WM-reliant task, exhibited choking under outcome but not under
monitoring pressure. This result is in line with predictions made by the distraction
hypothesis in that performance is impaired when thoughts of worries compromise the
otherwise needed attentional resources to do the putting task. In contrast, monitoring
pressure leads to greater skill-focus, an attentional direction proven non-harmful to
novice performance which heavily relies on explicit monitoring. Furthermore, experts
showed performance decrements under monitoring but not under outcome pressure.
This result is in line with predictions made by self-focus theory in that highly
108

proceduralized skills suffer from accessorily skill-focus but are left unharmed by
potential thoughts of worry and anxiety which have been found to arise during
competition. It should be noted that self-focus and distraction theories have been found
to make complimentary rather than contradictory predictions of choking under pressure
consisting of the match of attentional direction and the cognitive demands of a task.
Experiment 3 investigated use of imagery from first- and third person
perspective by performers of varying skill levels, first, as a pure imagery exercise and,
then, under the pressure scenarios examined in Experiment 2. First, an imagery block of
blocks was conducted to explore the effectiveness of imagery perspective on novice and
expert golfers. The findings of this study support the idea that third-person imagery is
best used when learning the individual steps of skill execution as in the early learning of
skill acquisition (e.g., novice golfers), and that first-person imagery is most suitable for
the rehearsal of kinesthetic feelings of the movement, as is important in later stages of
skill acquisition (e.g., expert golfers). This finding supports Mayer and Hermanns (2010)
hypothesis and may help resolve the still-existing controversy over the most effective
way of using visual perspective in imagery. Given that first-person imagery is typically
accompanied by kinesthetic feelings, which are acquired through practice and are
usually not present during the early stages of skill learning, it is not surprising that
novice golfers were unable to benefit from this imagery exercise. Third-person imagery
seemed much more conducive to novices cognitive demands in that they might have
used the imaging of themselves from an external vantage point as a way to practice
putting together the individual steps of the whole movement of the golf putt.
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Following the imagery block, participants were assigned to one of the three
pressure conditions and putted under no, outcome, or monitoring pressure using the
same imagery practice they had been assigned to before. The main finding was that
imagery prevented choking under pressure in both novice and expert golfers.
Previously, it had been found that novice performance was compromised when putting
under outcome pressure conditions. However, the results of Experiment 3 showed that
when novices used third-person imagery, no performance decrements occurred and
choking was prevented. Expert golfers had previously exhibited choking under
monitoring pressure which no longer occurred, especially when they used first-person
imagery.
It has been proposed (e.g., Baumeister, 1984) that pressure induces an increase
in feelings of importance to perform well followed by the performer investing more
effort in his or her performance. Yet, given the varying effects different types of
pressure can have on performance, it is conceivable to assume that what is perceived to
be important may vary as a function of the source of pressure. In this sense, being
watched and/or evaluated (as in the monitoring pressure scenario here) may raise
feelings of importance to look good and provoke concerns in the performer with
respect to how the observer or assessor may perceive the way in which the performer
executes the skill (e.g., correctness, smoothness, effectiveness) or even in a personal
way (e.g., attractiveness, intelligence). As a consequence, the performer then invests
more effort in better skill execution and/or even appearing more attractive or intelligent

110

as a person. Thus, it is plausible that sources of pressure identified as monitoring


pressure may indirectly induce skill- or self-focus and, thus, explicit monitoring.
Likewise, performing in a competitive environment in which solely ones
performance outcome (e.g., score, number of goals made, points earned) defines the
value of ones performance and, on top of that, in which another performer is
dependent upon this performance outcome (i.e., peer pressure), may give rise to a
different set of thoughts and feelings than a monitoring pressure environment, namely,
those of getting oneself to achieve a desired outcome. In this way, one focuses purely
on the goal, the effect of ones behavior (e.g., making this putt, throwing the ball inside
the basket) and not on the behavior itself (i.e., skill execution) and the performer exerts
effort to maintain his or her performance outcome (if it is already at a high level) or
improve on it (if possible). Thus, it is conceivable to assume that sources associated with
outcome pressure indirectly induce an attentional focus away from skill execution but
towards performance outcomes (or effects).
Given what is known about the cognitive demands of skills, for instance, when
comparing performers of differing skill levels (e.g., novice vs. experts golfers), it is not
surprising to find similarities in results between skill-focused attention and monitoring
pressure and dual-task attentional and outcome pressure conditions. Specifically, while
there was no direct measure of attentional focus in Experiment 2 (in which pressure was
manipulated), the pattern of results, especially the interaction of type of pressure and
skill level, suggests a common theoretical basis with that of Experiment 1, in which
direction of attention was manipulated. In Experiments 1 and 2, novices performed
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optimally under skill-focused attention and monitoring pressure but choked under dualtask or outcome pressure conditions, while experts putted well under dual-task and
outcome pressure conditions but choked under skill-focused attention and monitoring
pressure.
From this line of the current and prior research, it can be deduced that the
deciding point of whether choking occurs is in the match of the cognitive demands of
the task with the presence of explicit monitoring. Explicit monitoring as described by
self-focus theories and induced by either skill-focused attention or monitoring pressure
represents the key aspect of how choking under pressure can occur. It is necessary for
tasks which rely heavily on working memory and attentional control but it is detrimental
to tasks which are highly proceduralized or automatized. It seems as though anything
that may keep a performer from focusing on skill execution, either directly or indirectly
(e.g., dual-task attention, ruminative thought), brings about a different effect in the
performance of tasks with differing cognitive demands.
Now, the question arises, what exactly caused the lack of choking when imagery
was implemented immediately before participants were faced with the pressure
scenario? For one, the self-report data obtained in this study reveals that performers
using imagery still perceived the environment to be filled with performance pressure.
This finding implies that imagery did not cause an immunization to the sensing of
pressure, instead, it is more likely that imagery helped performers to cope with the
pressure-filled situation in a constructive way.

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But why exactly did third-person imagery help novices and first-person imagery
help experts in maintaining their performance level under pressure? Along the lines of
directing attentional focus towards or away from explicit skill monitoring, imagery
perspective can be used to provoke such skill monitoring through third-person imagery
or away from it via first-person imagery. Not only did imagery perspective seem to act in
ways that suggest that attentional focus was directed towards and away from skill
execution, but it also helped performers to maintain an optimal performance level in
face of pressure which would have otherwise led to a great likelihood of a performance
decline.
It could be argued that the additional putting block of imagery practice would
provide performers with extra practice on the putting task as compared to those in the
second experiment and that comparisons between the two experiments would
somehow favor their chances of coping with the pressure environment. However, an
additional block of single-task putting has not prevented choking in other experiments.
Moreover, participants of the second and third experiment perceived similar levels of
pressure as indicated by Pressure ratings and responses on SAM arousal and the STAI
state form. Importantly, performance under pressure was compromised when not
practicing imagery but was unaffected when practicing imagery while the perception of
pressure did not differ between the two conditions.
In the future, it would be worthwhile to further dissect monitoring as well as
outcome pressure to get at the roots of what causes choking under pressure. Because
the current pressure scenarios were made up of several elements (monitoring pressure:
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video-recording + golf professional as observer; outcome pressure: peer pressure +


incentives), it would be worthwhile to test the effects of the individual elements on
performance. Furthermore, future studies could investigate other forms of pressure and
their effect on performance. With regards to monitoring pressure, a performer can
perceive the attention as being directed towards the self (person, ego) or the skill
(movement). For example, thoughts about what one looks like (e.g., attractiveness,
body image, choice of clothing) would be more self-related and could bring about a
different effect than more skill-related thoughts such as those about what one does
(e.g., motor movement, individual technique, perceived skill level). Moreover, the
effects of type of observer could be investigated in that some characteristics (e.g.,
un/skilled, un/attractive, familiarity with the person etc.) may cause a positive and
others a negative effect on performance.
When being under outcome pressure, the focus is not on the aesthetics or the
correctness of the technique of skill movement but solely on its result (Did I make this
putt?). Other factors that might cause outcome pressure such as manipulations of
current score (i.e., being down, tied, or up) would be an interesting continuation to this
research. Why do some athletes perform badly when they are leading a match/game
while others get a boost in confidence and continue to win the match/game?
Furthermore, how do some people cope with being the favorite or the underdog of a
match/game and what are the most effective cognitive strategies to preserve optimal
performance?

114

It would also be interesting to more closely examine how different pressure


scenarios affect performers physiological responses to the individual stressors. For
instance, one could assess performers perceptions and their cortisol levels in response
to stressful situations. Studies have shown discrepancies between the perceived and
physiological (cortisol) stress responses (Stroud, Salovey, & Epel, 2002). As a
consequence, cognitive and physiological responses might also differ when performing
under stress, a state that resembles pressure. In the Experiment 2, measurements of
average and peak heart rate indicated that pressure causes increases in heart rate. In
addition, women and men have been found to differ in these responses and gender has
been shown to interact with type of task (i.e., an achievement oriented task [outcome
pressure] vs. an evaluative task [monitoring pressure]). Overall, further research should
revisit and perhaps extent the study of the physiological effects of pressure on the stress
response.
With respect to third-person imagery perspective, it would further be
worthwhile to alter angles and distances of the vantage point used to view oneself.
Changes in the location of the vantage point can influence the extent to which skillfocus, self-focus, outcome-focus can be applied. Presumably, variations in third-person
perspective are a rich continuation to the findings of the current research.
Along the same line, research on choking under pressure should also consider
the extent to which instructions are phrased in concrete of abstract manner. Practiced
skills are represented in memory in hierarchical form (Mackay, 1981, 1982). Mackay
(1982) suggests that this hierarchy is made up of the top node that represents the whole
115

behavior in an abstract (or holistic) form and multiple nodes at the bottom reflecting the
individual motor movements. For example, taking a golf putt can be broken down into
top, subordinate, and bottom nodes. At the top would be the holistic and abstract
representation of taking a golf putt which encompasses the whole action including
stance, grip, and movement. A putt can be broken down into two subordinate nodes the
backswing and the follow through. The details of these nodes can be described in terms
of simpler nodes such as moving the putter back by primarily using the shoulders,
halting, and moving the putter in a straight line forward, again using the shoulders. At
the bottom level of this hierarchy are individual hand, shoulder, head muscle
movements.
In a similar way, action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner 1987, 1989)
and the theory of construal level (Liberman & Trope, 1998) suggest that actions can be
hierarchically structured into different levels of identification or construal. These levels
range from low (concrete) levels, which center around how an action is done and
represent events in terms of specific and subordinate features, to high (abstract) levels,
which depict why it is done and are described by general and superordinate terms. For
example, the action of seeing if someone is home would mark the highest and most
abstract level, while pushing a doorbell would be lower and moving a finger be the
lowest and most concrete level. Whether an action should be construed in concrete or
abstract terms depends on the context, the task, and the performer (Vallacher &
Wegner). Novel and difficult tasks tend to be construed by lower levels as well as tasks

116

performed under pressure, while familiar, easy, and heavily automatized tasks are
identified by higher levels.
With regard to my study, novice golfers would likely benefit from lower level (or
more concrete) skill representations, for instance, focusing on the step-by-step
processes of the stroke while expert performance would be facilitated by top level (or
more abstract) skill representations. Under pressure, the prediction is less clear. For
example, Vallacher and Wegner (1987) argue that concrete construals would help the
control of action in pressure situations, regardless of level of expertise while it has been
recently found that engaging in abstract construals aided self-control processes for
prospective tasks (e.g., Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009) and, thus, might aid the control
of motor movements under pressure regardless of skill level.
Overall the domain of choking under pressure as it pertains to cognitive, sports,
and applied psychology is a promising field in shedding light on what happens when
performance breaks down and how it can be prevented. This research contributes to
the methods of alleviating choking under pressure with a strategy that can be applied to
fit the needs of the individual and situation. Imagery is a widely-used technique in the
area of skill acquisition and performance regulation and this study provides evidence
that it also helps preserve optimal performance in pressure-laden situations.

117

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