TheRiseofIlliberalDemocracy

By:FareedZakaria
THENEXTWAVE
The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered a problem on the eve of the September 1996
electionsinBosnia,whichweremeanttorestoreciviclifetothatravagedcountry."Supposetheelection
wasdeclaredfreeandfair,"hesaid,andthoseelectedare"racists,fascists,separatists,whoarepublicly
opposedto[peaceandreintegration].Thatisthedilemma."Indeed,itisnotjustintheformerYugoslavia,
butincreasinglyaroundtheworld.Democraticallyelectedregimes,oftenonesthathavebeenreelected
orreaffirmedthroughreferenda,areroutinelyignoringconstitutionallimitsontheirpoweranddepriving
theircitizensofbasicrightsandfreedoms.FromPerutothePalestinianAuthority,fromSierraLeoneto
Slovakia,fromPakistantothePhilippines,weseetheriseofadisturbingphenomenonininternationallife
illiberaldemocracy.
IthasbeendifficulttorecognizethisproblembecauseforalmostacenturyintheWest,democracyhas
meantliberaldemocracyapoliticalsystemmarkednotonlybyfreeandfairelections,butalsobythe
ruleoflaw,aseparationofpowers,andtheprotectionofbasiclibertiesofspeech,assembly,religion,and
property.Infact,thislatterbundleoffreedomswhatmightbetermedconstitutionalliberalismis
theoreticallydifferentandhistoricallydistinctfromdemocracy.AsthepoliticalscientistPhilippeSchmitter
haspointedout,"Liberalism,eitherasaconceptionofpoliticalliberty,orasadoctrineabouteconomic
policy,mayhavecoincidedwiththeriseofdemocracy.Butithasneverbeenimmutablyorunambiguously
linkedtoitspractice."Todaythetwostrandsofliberaldemocracy,interwovenintheWesternpolitical
fabric,arecomingapartintherestoftheworld.Democracyisflourishing;constitutionalliberalismisnot.
Today, 118 of the world's 193 countries are democratic, encompassing a majority of its people (54.8
percent,tobeexact),avastincreasefromevenadecadeago.Inthisseasonofvictory,onemighthave
expectedWesternstatesmenandintellectualstogoonefurtherthanE.M.Forsterandgivearousing
threecheersfordemocracy.Insteadthereisagrowinguneaseattherapidspreadofmultipartyelections
acrosssouthcentralEurope,Asia,Africa,andLatinAmerica,perhapsbecauseofwhathappensafterthe
elections. Popular leaders like Russia's Boris Yeltsin and Argentina's Carlos Menem bypass their
parliamentsandrulebypresidentialdecree,erodingbasicconstitutionalpractices.TheIranianparliament
electedmorefreelythanmostintheMiddleEastimposesharshrestrictionsonspeech,assembly,and
evendress,diminishingthatcountry'salreadymeagersupplyofliberty.Ethiopia'selectedgovernment
turnsitssecurityforcesonjournalistsandpoliticalopponents,doingpermanentdamagetohumanrights
(aswellashumanbeings).
Naturallythereisaspectrumofilliberaldemocracy,rangingfrommodestoffenderslikeArgentinatonear
tyrannieslikeKazakstanandBelarus,withcountrieslikeRomaniaandBangladeshinbetween.Alongmuch
ofthespectrum,electionsarerarelyasfreeandfairasintheWesttoday,buttheydoreflectthereality
ofpopularparticipationinpoliticsandsupportforthoseelected.Andtheexamplesarenotisolatedor
atypical. Freedom House's 199697 survey, Freedom in the World, has separate rankings for political
liberties and civil liberties, which correspond roughly with democracy and constitutional liberalism,
respectively.Ofthecountriesthatliebetweenconfirmeddictatorshipandconsolidateddemocracy,50
percent do better on political liberties than on civil ones. In other words, half of the "democratizing"
countriesintheworldtodayareilliberaldemocracies.

Illiberaldemocracyisagrowthindustry.Sevenyearsagoonly22percentofdemocratizingcountriescould
havebeensocategorized;fiveyearsagothatfigure hadrisento 35percent. Andtodate fewilliberal
democracies have matured into liberal democracies; if anything, they are moving toward heightened
illiberalism.Farfrombeingatemporaryortransitionalstage,itappearsthatmanycountriesaresettling
intoaformofgovernmentthatmixes asubstantial degreeofdemocracywithasubstantialdegreeof
illiberalism.Justasnationsacrosstheworldhavebecomecomfortablewithmanyvariationsofcapitalism,
theycouldwelladoptandsustainvariedformsofdemocracy.Westernliberaldemocracymightproveto
benotthefinaldestinationonthedemocraticroad,butjustoneofmanypossibleexits.
DEMOCRACYANDLIBERTY
FromthetimeofHerodotusdemocracyhasmeant,firstandforemost,theruleofthepeople.Thisview
of democracy as a process of selecting governments, articulated by scholars ranging from Alexis de
TocquevilletoJosephSchumpetertoRobertDahl,isnowwidelyusedbysocialscientists.InTheThird
Wave,SamuelP.Huntingtonexplainswhy:
Elections,open,freeandfair,aretheessenceofdemocracy,theinescapablesinequanon.Governments
producedbyelectionsmaybeinefficient,corrupt,shortsighted,
irresponsible,dominatedbyspecialinterests,andincapableofadoptingpoliciesdemandedbythepublic
good. These qualitiesmakesuchgovernments undesirablebutthey do not makethemundemocratic.
Democracyisonepublicvirtue,nottheonlyone,andtherelationofdemocracytootherpublicvirtues
andvicescanonlybeunderstoodifdemocracyisclearlydistinguishedfromtheothercharacteristicsof
politicalsystems.
This definition also accords with the commonsense view of the term. If a country holds competitive,
multipartyelections,wecallitdemocratic.Whenpublicparticipationinpoliticsisincreased,forexample
throughtheenfranchisementofwomen,itisseenasmoredemocratic.Ofcourseelectionsmustbeopen
andfair,andthisrequiressomeprotectionsforfreedomofspeechandassembly.Buttogobeyondthis
minimalist definition and label a country democratic only if it guarantees a comprehensive catalog of
social,political,economic,andreligiousrightsturnstheworddemocracyintoabadgeofhonorrather
thanadescriptivecategory.Afterall,Swedenhasaneconomicsystemthatmanyarguecurtailsindividual
propertyrights,Franceuntilrecentlyhadastatemonopolyontelevision,andEnglandhasanestablished
religion.Buttheyareallclearlyandidentifiablydemocracies.Tohavedemocracymean,subjectively,"a
goodgovernment"rendersitanalyticallyuseless.
Constitutionalliberalism,ontheotherhand,isnotabouttheproceduresforselectinggovernment,but
rathergovernment'sgoals.Itreferstothetradition,deepinWesternhistory,thatseekstoprotectan
individual'sautonomyanddignityagainstcoercion,whateverthesourcestate,church,orsociety.The
term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain,
beginningwiththeGreeks,thatemphasizesindividualliberty.<Itisconstitutionalbecauseitrestsonthe
tradition,beginningwiththeRomans,oftheruleoflaw.ConstitutionalliberalismdevelopedinWestern
EuropeandtheUnitedStatesasadefenseoftheindividual'srighttolifeandproperty,andfreedomof
religion and speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the power of each branch of
government,equalityunderthelaw,impartialcourtsandtribunals,andseparationofchurchandstate.
ItscanonicalfiguresincludethepoetJohnMilton,thejuristWilliamBlackstone,statesmensuchasThomas
JeffersonandJamesMadison,andphilosopherssuchasThomasHobbes,JohnLocke,AdamSmith,Baron

deMontesquieu,JohnStuartMill,andIsaiahBerlin.Inalmostallofitsvariants,constitutionalliberalism
arguesthathumanbeingshavecertainnatural(or"inalienable")rightsandthatgovernmentsmustaccept
abasiclaw,limitingitsownpowers,thatsecuresthem.Thusin1215atRunnymede,England'sbarons
forcedthekingtoabidebythesettledandcustomarylawoftheland.IntheAmericancoloniestheselaws
weremadeexplicit,andin1638thetownofHartfordadoptedthefirstwrittenconstitutioninmodern
history.Inthe1970s,Westernnationscodifiedstandardsofbehaviorforregimesacrosstheglobe.The
MagnaCarta,theFundamentalOrdersofConnecticut,theAmericanConstitution,andtheHelsinkiFinal
Actareallexpressionsofconstitutionalliberalism.
THEROADTOLIBERALDEMOCRACY
Since1945Westerngovernmentshave,forthemostpart,embodiedbothdemocracyandconstitutional
liberalism.Thusitisdifficulttoimaginethetwoapart,intheformofeitherilliberaldemocracyorliberal
autocracy.Infactbothhaveexistedinthepastandpersistinthepresent.Untilthetwentiethcentury,
mostcountriesinWesternEuropewereliberalautocraciesor,atbest,semidemocracies.Thefranchise
wastightlyrestricted,andelectedlegislatureshadlittlepower.In1830GreatBritain,insomewaysthe
mostdemocraticEuropeannation,allowedbarely2percentofitspopulationtovoteforonehouseof
Parliament;thatfigureroseto7percentafter1867andreachedaround40percentinthe1880s.Onlyin
the late 1940s did most Western countries become fullfledged democracies, with universal adult
suffrage.Butonehundredyearsearlier,bythelate1840s,mostofthemhadadoptedimportantaspects
ofconstitutionalliberalismtheruleoflaw,privatepropertyrights,andincreasingly,separatedpowers
andfreespeechandassembly.Formuchofmodernhistory,whatcharacterizedgovernmentsinEurope
and North America, and differentiated them from those around the world, was not democracy but
constitutional liberalism. The "Western model" is best symbolized not by the mass plebiscite but the
impartialjudge.
TherecenthistoryofEastAsiafollowstheWesternitinerary.Afterbriefflirtationswithdemocracyafter
WorldWarII,mostEastAsianregimesturnedauthoritarian.Overtimetheymovedfromautocracyto
liberalizingautocracy,and,insomecases,towardliberalizingsemidemocracy.Mostoftheregimesin
EastAsiaremainonlysemidemocratic,withpatriarchsoronepartysystemsthatmaketheirelections
ratifications of power rather than genuine contests. But these regimes have accorded their citizens a
wideningsphereofeconomic,civil,religious,andlimitedpoliticalrights.AsintheWest,liberalizationin
East Asia has included economic liberalization, which is crucial in promoting both growth and liberal
democracy. Historically, the factors most closely associated with fullfledged liberal democracies are
capitalism, a bourgeoisie, and a high per capita GNP. Today's East Asian governments are a mix of
democracy,liberalism,capitalism,oligarchy,andcorruptionmuchlikeWesterngovernmentscirca1900.
Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to bring constitutional
liberalism.IncontrasttotheWesternandEastAsianpaths,duringthelasttwodecadesinLatinAmerica,
Africa,andpartsofAsia,dictatorshipswithlittlebackgroundinconstitutionalliberalismhavegivenway
todemocracy.Theresultsarenotencouraging.Inthewesternhemisphere,withelectionshavingbeen
heldineverycountryexceptCuba,a1993studybythescholarLarryDiamonddeterminedthat10ofthe
22principalLatinAmericancountries"havelevelsofhumanrightsabusethatareincompatiblewiththe
consolidationof[liberal]democracy."InAfrica,democratizationhasbeenextraordinarilyrapid.Withinsix
monthsin1990muchofFrancophoneAfricalifteditsbanonmultipartypolitics.Yetalthoughelections
have been held in most of the 45 subSaharan states since 1991 (18 in 1996 alone), there have been

setbacksforfreedominmanycountries.OneofAfrica'smostcarefulobservers,MichaelChege,surveyed
thewaveof democratizationanddrewthelessonthatthecontinent had"overemphasizedmultiparty
elections . . . and correspondingly neglected the basic tenets of liberal governance." In Central Asia,
elections,evenwhenreasonablyfree,asinKyrgyzstanandKazakstan,haveresultedinstrongexecutives,
weak legislatures and judiciaries, and few civil and economic liberties. In the Islamic world, from the
Palestinian Authority to Iran to Pakistan, democratization has led to an increasing role for theocratic
politics,erodinglongstandingtraditionsofsecularismandtolerance.Inmanypartsofthatworld,suchas
Tunisia,Morocco,Egypt,andsomeoftheGulfStates,wereelectionstobeheldtomorrow,theresulting
regimeswouldalmostcertainlybemoreilliberalthantheonesnowinplace.
ManyofthecountriesofCentralEurope,ontheotherhand,havemovedsuccessfullyfromcommunism
toliberaldemocracy,havinggonethroughthesamephaseofliberalizationwithoutdemocracyasother
Europeancountriesdidduringthenineteenthcentury.Indeed,theAustroHungarianempire,towhich
mostbelonged,wasaclassicliberalautocracy.EvenoutsideEurope,thepoliticalscientistMyronWeiner
detectedastrikingconnectionbetweenaconstitutionalpastandaliberaldemocraticpresent.Hepointed
outthat,asof1983,"everysinglecountryintheThirdWorldthatemergedfromcolonialrulesincethe
SecondWorldWarwithapopulationofatleastonemillion(andalmostallthesmallercoloniesaswell)
withacontinuousdemocraticexperienceisaformerBritishcolony."Britishrulemeantnotdemocracy
colonialism is by definition undemocratic but constitutional liberalism. Britain's legacy of law and
administration has proved more beneficial than France's policy of enfranchising some of its colonial
populations.
Whileliberal autocracies mayhaveexistedinthepast,canoneimagine themtoday?Untilrecently,a
smallbutpowerfulexampleflourishedofftheAsianmainlandHongKong.For156years,untilJuly1,
1997,HongKongwasruledbytheBritishCrownthroughanappointedgovernorgeneral.Until1991ithad
neverheldameaningfulelection,butitsgovernmentepitomizedconstitutionalliberalism,protectingits
citizens'basicrightsandadministeringafaircourtsystemandbureaucracy.ASeptember8,1997,editorial
ontheisland'sfutureinTheWashingtonPostwastitledominously,"UndoingHongKong'sDemocracy."
Actually,HongKonghaspreciouslittledemocracytoundo;whatithasisaframeworkofrightsandlaws.
Smallislandsmaynotholdmuchpracticalsignificanceintoday'sworld,buttheydohelponeweighthe
relativevalueofdemocracyandconstitutionalliberalism.Consider,forexample,thequestionofwhere
you would rather live, Haiti, an illiberal democracy, or Antigua, a liberal semidemocracy. Your choice
wouldprobablyrelatenottotheweather,whichispleasantinboth,buttothepoliticalclimate,whichis
not.
ABSOLUTESOVEREIGNTY
John Stuart Mill opened his classic On Liberty by noting that as countries became democratic, people
tendedtobelievethat"toomuchimportancehadbeenattachedtothelimitationofpoweritself.That..
.wasaresponseagainstrulerswhoseinterestswereopposedtothoseofthepeople."Oncethepeople
werethemselvesincharge,cautionwasunnecessary."Thenationdidnotneedtobeprotectedagainst
itsownwill."AsifconfirmingMill'sfears,considerthewordsofAlexandrLukashenkoafterbeingelected
presidentofBelaruswithanoverwhelmingmajorityinafreeelectionin1994,whenaskedaboutlimiting
hispowers:"Therewillbenodictatorship.Iamofthepeople,andIamgoingtobeforthepeople."
The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental
authority.Constitutionalliberalismisaboutthelimitationofpower,democracyaboutitsaccumulation

anduse.Forthisreason,manyeighteenthandnineteenthcenturyliberalssawindemocracyaforcethat
couldundermineliberty.JamesMadisonexplainedinTheFederalistthat"thedangerofoppression"ina
democracy came from "the majority of the community." Tocqueville warned of the "tyranny of the
majority,"writing,"Theveryessenceofdemocraticgovernmentconsistsintheabsolutesovereigntyof
themajority."
The tendencyforademocraticgovernmenttobelieveit hasabsolutesovereignty (thatis,power) can
resultinthecentralizationofauthority,oftenbyextraconstitutionalmeansandwithgrimresults.Over
thelastdecade,electedgovernmentsclaimingtorepresentthepeoplehavesteadilyencroachedonthe
powersandrightsofotherelementsinsociety,ausurpationthatisbothhorizontal(fromotherbranches
ofthenationalgovernment)andvertical(fromregionalandlocalauthoritiesaswellasprivatebusinesses
andothernongovernmentalgroups).LukashenkoandPeru'sAlbertoFujimoriareonlytheworstexamples
ofthispractice.(WhileFujimori'sactionsdisbandingthelegislatureandsuspendingtheconstitution,
amongothersmakeitdifficulttocallhisregimedemocratic,itisworthnotingthathewontwoelections
andwasextremelypopularuntilrecently.)EvenabonafidereformerlikeCarlosMenemhaspassedclose
to 300 presidential decrees in his eight years in office, about three times as many as all previous
Argentinean presidents put together, going back to 1853. Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akayev, elected with 60
percentofthevote,proposedenhancinghispowersinareferendumthatpassedeasilyin1996.Hisnew
powersincludeappointingalltopofficialsexcepttheprimeminister,althoughhecandissolveparliament
ifitturnsdownthreeofhisnomineesforthelatterpost.
Horizontalusurpation,usuallybypresidents,ismoreobvious,butverticalusurpationismorecommon.
Overthelastthreedecades,theIndiangovernmenthasroutinelydisbandedstatelegislaturesonflimsy
grounds,placingregionsunderNewDelhi'sdirectrule.Inalessdramaticbuttypicalmove,theelected
government of the Central African Republic recently ended the longstanding independence of its
universitysystem,makingitpartofthecentralstateapparatus.
UsurpationisparticularlywidespreadinLatinAmericaandthestatesoftheformerSovietUnion,perhaps
because both regions mostly have presidencies. These systems tend to produce strong leaders who
believethattheyspeakforthepeopleevenwhentheyhavebeenelectedbynomorethanaplurality.
(AsJuanLinzpointsout, SalvadorAllendewas elected totheChilean presidencyin1970withonly36
percent of the vote. In similar circumstances, a prime minister would have had to share power in a
coalition government.) Presidents appoint cabinets of cronies, rather than senior party figures,
maintaining few internal checks on their power. And when their views conflict with those of the
legislature, or even the courts, presidents tend to "go to the nation," bypassing the dreary tasks of
bargainingandcoalitionbuilding.Whilescholarsdebatethemeritsofpresidentialversusparliamentary
forms of government, usurpation can occur under either, absent welldeveloped alternate centers of
power such as strong legislatures, courts, political parties, regional governments, and independent
universities and media. Latin America actually combines presidential systems with proportional
representation,producingpopulistleadersandmultiplepartiesanunstablecombination.
ManyWesterngovernmentsandscholarshaveencouragedthecreationofstrongandcentralizedstates
intheThirdWorld.Leadersinthesecountrieshavearguedthattheyneedtheauthoritytobreakdown
feudalism,splitentrenchedcoalitions,overridevestedinterests,andbringordertochaoticsocieties.But
thisconfusestheneedforalegitimategovernmentwiththatforapowerfulone.Governmentsthatare
seen as legitimate can usually maintain order and pursue tough policies, albeit slowly, by building

coalitions.Afterall,fewclaimthatgovernmentsindevelopingcountriesshouldnothaveadequatepolice
powers;thetroublecomesfromalltheotherpolitical,social,andeconomicpowersthattheyaccumulate.
Incriseslikecivilwars,constitutionalgovernmentsmightnotbeabletoruleeffectively,butthealternative
stateswithvastsecurityapparatusesthatsuspendconstitutionalrightshasusuallyproducedneither
ordernorgoodgovernment.Moreoften,suchstateshavebecomepredatory,maintainingsomeorder
butalsoarrestingopponents,muzzlingdissent,nationalizingindustries,andconfiscatingproperty.While
anarchyhasitsdangers,thegreatestthreatstohumanlibertyandhappinessinthiscenturyhavebeen
causednotbydisorderbutbybrutallystrong,centralizedstates,likeNaziGermany,SovietRussia,and
MaoistChina.TheThirdWorldislitteredwiththebloodyhandiworkofstrongstates.
Historically,uncheckedcentralizationhasbeentheenemyofliberaldemocracy.Aspoliticalparticipation
increasedinEuropeoverthenineteenthcentury,itwasaccommodatedsmoothlyincountriessuchas
EnglandandSweden,wheremedievalassemblies,localgovernments,andregionalcouncilshadremained
strong. Countries like France and Prussia, on the other hand, where the monarchy had effectively
centralizedpower(bothhorizontallyandvertically),oftenendedupilliberalandundemocratic.Itisnota
coincidencethatintwentiethcenturySpain,thebeachheadofliberalismlayinCatalonia,forcenturiesa
doggedlyindependentandautonomousregion.InAmerica,thepresenceofarichvarietyofinstitutions
state,local,andprivatemadeitmucheasiertoaccommodatetherapidandlargeextensionsinsuffrage
that took place in the early nineteenth century. Arthur Schlesinger Sr. has documented how, during
America'sfirst50years,virtuallyeverystate,interestgroupandfactiontriedtoweakenandevenbreak
upthefederalgovernment.Morerecently,India'ssemiliberaldemocracyhassurvivedbecauseof,not
despite, its strong regions and varied languages, cultures, and even castes. The point is logical, even
tautological:pluralisminthepasthelpsensurepoliticalpluralisminthepresent.
Fifty years ago, politicians in the developing world wanted extraordinary powers to implement then
fashionable economic doctrines, like nationalization of industries. Today their successors want similar
powers to privatize those very industries. Menem's justification for his methods is that they are
desperatelyneededtoenacttougheconomicreforms.SimilarargumentsaremadebyAbdalBucaremof
EcuadorandbyFujimori.Lendinginstitutions,suchastheInternationalMonetaryFundandtheWorld
Bank,havebeensympathetictothesepleas,andthebondmarkethasbeenpositivelyexuberant.But
except in emergencies like war, illiberal means are in the long run incompatible with liberal ends.
Constitutionalgovernmentisinfactthekeytoasuccessfuleconomicreformpolicy.Theexperienceof
East Asia and Central Europe suggests that when regimes whether authoritarian, as in East Asia, or
liberaldemocratic,asinPoland,Hungary,andtheCzechRepublicprotectindividualrights,including
thoseofpropertyandcontract,andcreateaframeworkoflawandadministration,capitalismandgrowth
willfollow.Inarecentspeechatthe WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterinWashington,explaining
whatittakesforcapitalismtoflourish,FederalReservechairmanAlanGreenspanconcludedthat,"The
guidingmechanismofafreemarketeconomy...isabillofrights,enforcedbyanimpartialjudiciary"
Finally,andperhapsmoreimportant,poweraccumulatedtodogoodcanbeusedsubsequentlytodoill.
WhenFujimoridisbandedparliament,hisapprovalratingsshotuptotheirhighestever.Butrecentopinion
pollssuggestthatmostofthosewhoonceapprovedofhisactionsnowwishheweremoreconstrained.
In1993BorisYeltsinfamously(andliterally)attackedtheRussianparliament,promptedbyparliament's
ownunconstitutionalacts.Hethensuspendedtheconstitutionalcourt,dismantledthesystemoflocal
governments,andfiredseveralprovincialgovernors.FromthewarinChechnyatohiseconomicprograms,
Yeltsinhasdisplayedaroutinelackofconcernforconstitutionalproceduresandlimits.Hemaywellbea

liberaldemocratatheart,butYeltsin'sactionshavecreatedaRussiansuperpresidency.Wecanonlyhope
hissuccessorwillnotabuseit.
For centuries Western intellectuals have had a tendency to view constitutional liberalism as a quaint
exerciseinrulemaking,mereformalismthatshouldtakeabackseattobattlinglargerevilsinsociety.The
mosteloquentcounterpointtothisviewremainsanexchangeinRobertBolt'splayAManForAllSeasons.
ThefieryyoungWilliamRoper,whoyearnstobattleevil,isexasperatedbySirThomasMore'sdevotion
tothelaw.Moregentlydefendshimself.
More:Whatwouldyoudo?CutagreatroadthroughthelawtogetaftertheDevil?
Roper:I'dcuteverylawinEnglandtodothat!
More:Andwhenthelastlawwasdown,andtheDevilturnedonyouwherewouldyouhideRoper,the
lawsallbeingflat?
ETHNICCONFLICTANDWAR
On December 8, 1996, Jack Lang made a dramatic dash to Belgrade. The French celebrity politician,
formerlyministerofculture,hadbeeninspiredbythestudentdemonstrationsinvolvingtensofthousands
againstSlobodanMilosevic,amanLangandmanyWesternintellectualsheldresponsibleforthewarin
the Balkans. Lang wanted to lend his moral support to the Yugoslav opposition. The leaders of the
movementreceivedhimintheirofficesthephilosophydepartmentonlytoboothimout,declarehim
"anenemyoftheSerbs,"andorderhimtoleavethecountry.Itturnedoutthatthestudentsopposed
Milosevicnotforstartingthewar,butforfailingtowinit.
Lang's embarrassment highlights two common, and often mistaken, assumptions that the forces of
democracy are the forces of ethnic harmony and of peace. Neither is necessarily true. Mature liberal
democraciescanusuallyaccommodateethnicdivisionswithoutviolenceorterrorandliveinpeacewith
other liberal democracies. But without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of
democracyindividedsocietieshasactuallyfomentednationalism,ethnicconflict,andevenwar.Thespate
of elections held immediately after the collapse of communism were won in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslaviabynationalistseparatistsandresultedinthebreakupofthosecountries.Thiswasnotinand
ofitselfbad,sincethosecountrieshadbeenboundtogetherbyforce.Buttherapidsecessions,without
guarantees,institutions,orpoliticalpowerforthemanyminoritieslivingwithinthenewcountries,have
causedspiralsofrebellion,repression,and,inplaceslikeBosnia,Azerbaijan,andGeorgia,war.
Elections require that politicians compete for peoples' votes. In societies without strong traditions of
multiethnicgroupsorassimilation,itiseasiesttoorganizesupportalongracial,ethnic,orreligiouslines.
Onceanethnicgroupisinpower,ittendstoexcludeotherethnicgroups.Compromiseseemsimpossible;
one can bargain on material issues like housing, hospitals, and handouts, but how does one split the
difference on a national religion? Political competition that is so divisive can rapidly degenerate into
violence.Oppositionmovements,armedrebellions,andcoupsinAfricahaveoftenbeendirectedagainst
ethnicallybasedregimes,manyofwhichcametopowerthroughelections.Surveyingthebreakdownof
AfricanandAsiandemocraciesinthe1960s,twoscholarsconcludedthatdemocracy"issimplynotviable
inanenvironmentofintenseethnicpreferences."Recentstudies,particularlyofAfricaandCentralAsia,
haveconfirmedthispessimism.Adistinguishedexpertonethnicconflict,DonaldHorowitz,concluded,"In
thefaceofthisratherdismalaccount...oftheconcretefailuresofdemocracyindividedsocieties...

oneistemptedtothrowupone'shands.Whatisthepointofholdingelectionsifalltheydointheendis
tosubstituteaBembadominatedregimeforaNyanjaregimeinZambia,thetwoequallynarrow,ora
southernregimeforanorthernoneinBenin,neitherincorporatingtheotherhalfofthestate?"
Overthepastdecade,oneofthemostspiriteddebatesamongscholarsofinternationalrelationsconcerns
the"democraticpeace"theassertionthatnotwomoderndemocracieshavegonetowarwitheach
other.Thedebateraisesinterestingsubstantivequestions(doestheAmericanCivilWarcount?donuclear
weaponsbetterexplainthepeace?)andeventhestatisticalfindingshaveraisedinterestingdissents.(As
thescholarDavidSpiropointsout,giventhesmallnumberofbothdemocraciesandwarsoverthelast
twohundredyears,sheerchancemightexplaintheabsenceofwarbetweendemocracies.Nomemberof
hisfamilyhaseverwonthelottery,yetfewofferexplanationsforthisimpressivecorrelation.)Butevenif
the statistics are correct, what explains them? Kant, the original proponent of the democratic peace,
contendedthatindemocracies,thosewhopayforwarsthatis,thepublicmakethedecisions,sothey
areunderstandablycautious.Butthatclaimsuggeststhatdemocraciesaremorepacificthanotherstates.
Actuallytheyaremorewarlike,goingtowarmoreoftenandwithgreaterintensitythanmoststates.Itis
onlywithotherdemocraciesthatthepeaceholds.
When divining the cause behind this correlation, one thing becomes clear: the democratic peace is
actually the liberal peace. Writing in the eighteenth century, Kant believed that democracies were
tyrannical,andhespecificallyexcludedthemfromhisconceptionof"republican"governments,which
livedinazoneofpeace.Republicanism,forKant,meantaseparationofpowers,checksandbalances,the
rule of law, protection of individual rights, and some level of representation in government (though
nothing close to universal suffrage). Kant's other explanations for the "perpetual peace" between
republicsareallcloselylinkedtotheirconstitutionalandliberalcharacter:amutualrespectfortherights
ofeachother'scitizens,asystemofchecksandbalancesassuringthatnosingleleadercandraghiscountry
into war, and classical liberal economic policies most importantly, free trade which create an
interdependencethatmakeswarcostlyandcooperationuseful.MichaelDoyle,theleadingscholaronthe
subject, confirms in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism,
democracyitselfhasnopeaceinducingqualities:
Kantdistrustedunfettered,democraticmajoritarianism,andhisargumentoffersnosupportforaclaim
thatallparticipatorypolitiesdemocraciesshouldbepeaceful,eitheringeneralorbetweenfellow
democracies. Many participatory polities have been nonliberal. For two thousand years before the
modernage,popularrulewaswidelyassociatedwithaggressiveness(byThucydides)orimperialsuccess
(byMachiavelli)...Thedecisivepreferenceof[the]medianvotermightwellinclude"ethniccleansing"
againstotherdemocraticpolities.
The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies sheds light on another striking statistical
correlation.PoliticalscientistsJackSnyderandEdwardMansfieldcontend,usinganimpressivedataset,
thatoverthelast200yearsdemocratizingstateswenttowarsignificantlymoreoftenthaneitherstable
autocracies or liberal democracies. In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of
democracy often brings with it hypernationalism and warmongering. When the political system is
openedup,diversegroupswithincompatibleinterestsgainaccesstopowerandpresstheirdemands.
Politicalandmilitaryleaders,whoareoftenembattledremnantsoftheoldauthoritarianorder,realize
thattosucceedthattheymustrallythemassesbehindanationalcause.Theresultisinvariablyaggressive
rhetoricandpolicies,whichoftendragcountriesintoconfrontationandwar.Noteworthyexamplesrange

fromNapoleonIII'sFrance,WilhelmineGermany,andTaishoJapantothoseintoday'snewspapers,like
ArmeniaandAzerbaijanandMilosevic'sSerbia.Thedemocraticpeace,itturnsout,haslittletodowith
democracy.
THEAMERICANPATH
AnAmericanscholarrecentlytraveledtoKazakstanonaU.S.governmentsponsoredmissiontohelpthe
new parliament draft its electoral laws. His counterpart, a senior member of the Kazak parliament,
brushedasidethemanyoptionstheAmericanexpertwasoutlining,sayingemphatically,"Wewantour
parliamenttobejustlikeyourCongress."TheAmericanwashorrified,recalling,"Itriedtosaysomething
otherthanthethreewordsthathadimmediatelycomescreamingintomymind:'Noyoudon't!'"This
viewisnotunusual.Americansinthedemocracybusinesstendtoseetheirownsystemasanunwieldy
contraption that no other country should put up with. In fact, the adoption of some aspects of the
American constitutional framework could ameliorate many of the problems associated with illiberal
democracy.ThephilosophybehindtheU.S.Constitution,afearofaccumulatedpower,isasrelevanttoday
asitwasin1789.Kazakstan,asithappens,wouldbeparticularlywellservedbyastrongparliamentlike
theAmericanCongresstochecktheinsatiableappetiteofitspresident.
ItisoddthattheUnitedStatesissooftentheadvocateofelectionsandplebiscitarydemocracyabroad.
WhatisdistinctiveabouttheAmericansystemisnothowdemocraticitisbutratherhowundemocraticit
is,placingasitdoesmultipleconstraintsonelectoralmajorities.Ofitsthreebranchesofgovernment,one
arguablyparamountisheadedbynineunelectedmenandwomenwithlifetenure.ItsSenateisthe
mostunrepresentativeupperhouseintheworld,withtheloneexceptionoftheHouseofLords,whichis
powerless.(EverystatesendstwosenatorstoWashingtonregardlessofitspopulationCalifornia's30
millionpeoplehaveasmanyvotesintheSenateasArizona's3.7millionwhichmeansthatsenators
representingabout16percentofthecountrycanblockanyproposedlaw.)Similarly,inlegislaturesall
overtheUnitedStates,whatisstrikingisnotthepowerofmajoritiesbutthatofminorities.Tofurther
checknationalpower,stateandlocalgovernmentsarestrongandfiercelybattleeveryfederalintrusion
onto their turf. Private businesses and other nongovernmental groups, what Tocqueville called
intermediateassociations,makeupanotherstratumwithinsociety.
TheAmericansystemisbasedonanavowedlypessimisticconceptionofhumannature,assumingthat
peoplecannotbetrustedwithpower."Ifmenwereangels,"Madisonfamouslywrote,"nogovernment
would be necessary." The other model for democratic governance in Western history is based on the
FrenchRevolution.TheFrenchmodelplacesitsfaithinthegoodnessofhumanbeings.Oncethepeople
are the source of power, it should be unlimited so that they can create a just society. (The French
revolution,asLordActonobserved,isnotaboutthelimitationofsovereignpowerbuttheabrogationof
all intermediate powers that get in its way.) Most nonWestern countries have embraced the French
modelnotleastbecausepoliticalelitesliketheprospectofempoweringthestate,sincethatmeans
empoweringthemselvesandmosthavedescendedintoboutsofchaos,tyranny,orboth.Thisshould
havecomeasnosurprise.Afterall,sinceitsrevolutionFranceitselfhasrunthroughtwomonarchies,two
empires,oneprotofascistdictatorship,andfiverepublics.
Ofcourseculturesvary,anddifferentsocietieswillrequiredifferentframeworksofgovernment.Thisis
notapleaforthewholesaleadoptionoftheAmericanwaybutratherforamorevariegatedconception
ofliberaldemocracy,onethatemphasizesbothpartsofthatphrase.Beforenewpoliciescanbeadopted,
there lies an intellectual task of recovering the constitutional liberal tradition, central to the Western

experience and to the development of good government throughout the world. Political progress in
Westernhistoryhasbeentheresultofagrowingrecognitionoverthecenturiesthat,astheDeclaration
ofIndependenceputsit,humanbeingshave"certaininalienablerights"andthat"itistosecurethese
rights that governments are instituted." If a democracy does not preserve liberty and law, that it is a
democracyisasmallconsolation.
LIBERALIZINGFOREIGNPOLICY
AproperappreciationofconstitutionalliberalismhasavarietyofimplicationsforAmericanforeignpolicy.
First,itsuggestsacertainhumility.Whileitiseasytoimposeelectionsonacountry,itismoredifficultto
pushconstitutionalliberalismonasociety.Theprocessofgenuineliberalizationanddemocratizationis
gradualandlongterm,inwhichanelectionisonlyonestep.Withoutappropriatepreparation,itmight
evenbeafalsestep.Recognizingthis,governmentsandnongovernmentalorganizationsareincreasingly
promotingawidearrayofmeasuresdesignedtobolsterconstitutionalliberalismindevelopingcountries.
The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements, and
politicalparties.TheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopmentfundsindependentjudiciaries.Intheend,
however,electionstrumpeverything.Ifacountryholdselections,Washingtonandtheworldwilltolerate
agreatdealfromtheresultinggovernment,astheyhavewithYeltsin,Akayev,andMenem.Inanageof
imagesandsymbols,electionsareeasytocaptureonfilm.(Howdoyoutelevisetheruleoflaw?)Butthere
islifeafterelections,especiallyforthepeoplewholivethere.
Conversely,theabsenceoffreeandfairelectionsshould beviewedasoneflaw,notthedefinitionof
tyranny.Electionsareanimportantvirtueofgovernance,buttheyarenottheonlyvirtue.Governments
shouldbejudgedbyyardsticksrelatedtoconstitutionalliberalismaswell.Economic,civil,andreligious
libertiesareatthecoreofhumanautonomyanddignity.Ifagovernmentwithlimiteddemocracysteadily
expandsthesefreedoms,itshouldnotbebrandedadictatorship.Despitethelimitedpoliticalchoicethey
offer,countrieslikeSingapore,Malaysia,andThailandprovideabetterenvironmentforthelife,liberty,
andhappinessoftheircitizensthandoeitherdictatorshipslikeIraqandLibyaorilliberaldemocracieslike
SlovakiaorGhana.Andthepressuresofglobalcapitalismcanpushtheprocessofliberalizationforward.
Marketsandmoralscanworktogether.EvenChina,whichremainsadeeplyrepressiveregime,hasgiven
itscitizensmoreautonomyandeconomiclibertythantheyhavehadingenerations.Muchmoreneedsto
changebeforeChinacanevenbecalledaliberalizingautocracy,butthatshouldnotmaskthefactthat
muchhaschanged.
Finally,weneedtoreviveconstitutionalism.Oneeffectoftheoveremphasisonpuredemocracyisthat
littleeffortisgiventocreatingimaginativeconstitutionsfortransitionalcountries.Constitutionalism,asit
wasunderstoodbyitsgreatesteighteenthcenturyexponents,suchasMontesquieuandMadison,isa
complicatedsystemofchecksandbalancesdesignedtopreventtheaccumulationofpowerandtheabuse
of office. This is done not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which
governmentwillnotviolatethoserights.Variousgroupsmustbeincludedandempoweredbecause,as
Madisonexplained,"ambitionmustbemadetocounteractambition."Constitutionswerealsomeantto
tame the passions of the public, creating not simply democratic but also deliberative government.
Unfortunately,therichvarietyofunelectedbodies,indirectvoting,federalarrangements,andchecksand
balancesthatcharacterizedsomanyoftheformalandinformalconstitutionsofEuropearenowregarded
withsuspicion.WhatcouldbecalledtheWeimarsyndromenamedafterinterwarGermany'sbeautifully
constructedconstitution,whichfailedtoavertfascismhasmadepeopleregardconstitutionsassimply

paperworkthatcannotmakemuchdifference.(AsifanypoliticalsysteminGermanywouldhaveeasily
weatheredmilitarydefeat,socialrevolution,theGreatDepression,andhyperinflation.)Proceduresthat
inhibit direct democracy are seen as inauthentic, muzzling the voice of the people. Today around the
world we see variations on the same majoritarian theme. But the trouble with these winnertakeall
systemsisthat,inmostdemocratizingcountries,thewinnerreallydoestakeall.
DEMOCRACY'SDISCONTENTS
Weliveinademocraticage.Throughmuchofhumanhistorythedangertoanindividual'slife,libertyand
happinesscamefromtheabsolutismofmonarchies,thedogmaofchurches,theterrorofdictatorships,
andtheirongripoftotalitarianism.Dictatorsandafewstragglingtotalitarianregimesstillpersist,but
increasinglytheyareanachronismsinaworldofglobalmarkets,information,andmedia.Thereareno
longerrespectablealternativestodemocracy;itispartofthefashionableattireofmodernity.Thusthe
problemsofgovernanceinthe21stcenturywilllikelybeproblemswithindemocracy.Thismakesthem
moredifficulttohandle,wrappedastheyareinthemantleoflegitimacy.
Illiberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably
democratic.Conversely,thegreatestdangerthatilliberaldemocracyposesotherthantoitsownpeople
isthatitwilldiscreditliberaldemocracyitself,castingashadowondemocraticgovernance.Thiswould
notbeunprecedented.Everywaveofdemocracyhasbeenfollowedbysetbacksinwhichthesystemwas
seenasinadequateandnewalternativesweresoughtbyambitiousleadersandrestlessmasses.Thelast
suchperiodofdisenchantment,inEuropeduringtheinterwaryears,wasseizeduponbydemagogues,
many of whom were initially popular and even elected. Today, in the face of a spreading virus of
illiberalism, the most useful role that the international community, and most importantly the United
States,canplayisinsteadofsearchingfornewlandstodemocratizeandnewplacestoholdelections
to consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of
constitutional liberalism across the globe. Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply
inadequate,butdangerous,bringingwithittheerosionofliberty,theabuseofpower,ethnicdivisions,
and even war. Eighty years ago, Woodrow Wilson took America into the twentieth century with a
challenge,tomaketheworldsafefordemocracy.Asweapproachthenextcentury,ourtaskistomake
democracysafefortheworld.