2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER

JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
1. Presidential immunity - The President of the Philippines is entitled to
immunity from suit subject the following conditions: (1) the immunity has been
asserted (1) during the period of his incumbency and tenure; and (2) the act
constituting the crime is committed in the performance of his duties.
In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that
the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently,
the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case
of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for
money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
Presidential immunity will assure the exercise of presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief Executive
is a job demands undivided attention (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15,
March 2, 2001).
a. President Aquino during the period of his incumbency and tenure cannot be
charged with simple negligence resulting in multiple homicides in connection with the
Mamasapano incident because of his immunity from suit. His decisions concerning
the handling of the police operation leading to the tragic event are official acts.
b. It is submitted that a Vice-President cannot invoke immunity from criminal
prosecution for plunder and corruption under RA No. 3019 on the following reasons:
(1) plunder and corruption are not his official conducts as Vice-President; (2) the job of
the Vice-President unlike the head of the executive department does not demands
undivided attention; (3) and the implementation principal penalty of imprisonment for
plunder and corruption is not inconsistent with the constitutional provision on nonremoval of impeachable officer except through impeachment proceeding since he can
function as Vice-President while serving sentence in prison.
However, accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from
office, is not implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitution, which mandates that Vice-President may be removed
from office only through an impeachment proceeding.
2. Praeter intentionem In Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015
- Accused kicked and punched the victim, who died as consequence. It appears that
their purpose is merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life
of the victim. Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof. However, they are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
praeter intentionem or lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13
(3).
Under Article 49 of RPC, if the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be
higher or lesser than that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to
commit, the court shall imposed the penalty for the crime committed or intended,
whichever is lesser, to be applied in its maximum period.
Article 49 of RPC should only apply where the crime committed is different from
that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
personae), and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem).
3. Creating in the mind a sense of danger - If a person in committing threat,
murder, rape or robbery creates in the mind of the victim an immediate sense of
danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself,
the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
result (US vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921; People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L27097, January 17, 1975; People vs. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997;
People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969).
4. No frustrated theft In Canceran vs. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01,
2015 - Accused is charged in the Information with frustrated theft. Evidence shows
that the crime is consummated theft because the accused had gain possession over
the goods although he failed to bring them out of the grocery. However, he cannot be
convicted of consummated theft since the allegations in Information do not charged
him with consummated theft. It avers that the crime was not produced. He cannot be
convicted of frustrated theft since this crime has no frustrated stage. Performing all
acts of execution, and that is, unlawful taking, produces the felony in its
consummated stage. Without unlawful taking, the offense could only be attempted
theft. The accused was convicted of attempted theft, which is necessarily included in
the charge of frustrated theft.
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the
penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of
"asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or
carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015);
5. Unlawful aggression - The act of pulling "something" out cannot constitute
unlawful aggression (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 197546, March 23, 2015).
6. Involuntary commitment and placement of child - Under Section 20-A
and 20-B of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630, a child who is above 12 years of age
up to 15 years of age shall be deemed a neglected child under PD No. 603 and be
mandatorily placed in a youth care facility or Bahay Pag-asa in the following
instances:
a. If the child commits parricide, murder, infanticide, rape, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide or rape, robbery with homicide or
rape, destructive arson, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or
raped or offenses involving dangerous drugs punishable by more than 12 years
of imprisonment. A petition for involuntarily commitment and placement shall
be filed by social worker in court.
b. If the child commits an offense for the second time or oftener, he was
previously subjected to a community-based intervention program and his best
interest requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or Bahay Pagasa. The childs parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for
the voluntary commitment of the child. However, if the child has no parents or
guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written authorization for
voluntary commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
immediately filed social worker in court. But the child may be subjected to
intensive intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and
development officer instead of involuntary commitment and placement.
Bahay Pag-asa is also called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support
Center.
7. Mitigating circumstance in possession of loose firearm - RPC is not
generally applicable to malum prohibitum. However, when a special law, which is
a malum prohibitum, adopts the nomenclature of the penalties in RPC, the latter law
shall apply. RA No. 10591, which punishes illegal possession of loose firearm, has
adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalties in RPC. Hence, Article 64 of RPC
shall apply in imposing the penalty for illegal possession of loose firearm. Thus,
mitigating circumstance such as confession can be appreciated for purpose of applying
the penalty for illegal possession of loose firearm in its minimum period in accordance
with Article 64 (see: Jacaban vs. People, GR No. 184355, March 23, 2015).
8. Special aggravating circumstance of exploitation of children - Under
Section 20-C of RA No. 9344 as amended by RA 10365, the penalty prescribed by law
for the crime committed shall be imposed in its maximum period if in the commission
of such crime the accused makes use, takes advantage of, or profits from the use of
children. This provision covers also a person who abuses his/her authority over the
child or takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child with abuse of confidence
and shall induce, threaten or instigate the commission of the crime.
Exploitation of children for the commission of crimes is a special aggravating
circumstance. Hence, the penalty for the crime committed shall be imposed in its
maximum period regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstances.
9. Status offense Status Offenses refers to offenses which discriminate only
against a child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for committing similar acts
(Section 3 of RA No. 9344). A child in conflict with the law shall not be punished for
committing s status offense. Under Section 57 of RA No. 9344, any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
Section 57-A of RA No. 9344 as amended by RA 10630, local ordinances
enacted concerning juvenile status offenses shall be for the protection of children. No
penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be
brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be
released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances.
The child shall also be recorded as a child at risk and not as a child in conflict
with the law. The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as
counselling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education seminars.
This local ordinances concerning juvenile status offenses include curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, smoking, drinking, disorderly conduct,
public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing.

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

10. Three-fold rule Article 70 of RPC is to be taken into account not in the
imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed.
This provision speaks of "service" of sentence. Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner
cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the
maximum of which is forty years (In People vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33,
December 23, 1957; Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30,
1987). Thus, the court cannot dismiss criminal cases in excess of three on the basis of
three-fold rule.
11. Light felony - Light felony is punishable except when the accused is merely
an accessory (Article 16) or when it is at the attempted or frustrated stage unless it is
a crime against property or person (Article 7).
12. Probation The probation law is not applicable to: (1) a penalty, the
maximum term of which is more than more than six years [Section 9 of PD 968]
unless it is imposed to possession or use of dangerous drugs committed by first time
minor offender [Section 70 of RA No. 9165]; (2) offense against the security of the State
such as treason, or violation of neutrality; (3) crimes against public disorder such as
rebellion, direct assault or alarm and scandal; (4) those who have previously been
convicted by final judgment of a light offense; (5) who have been once on probation
[Section 9 of PD 968] and (6) drug trafficking or pushing (Section 24 of RA No. 9165).
The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period
shall not exceed six years. When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is
made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation
shall not be less than nor to be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary
imprisonment (Section 14 of PD No. 968).
The grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. It appears then that during
the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order (Villareal
vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014).
The trial court that convicted and sentenced the accused has authority to grant
probation (Villareal vs. People, supra).
13. ISLAW The indeterminate sentence law is not applicable to: (1) treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason or misprision of treason; (2) rebellion; (3)
sedition; (3) espionage; (4) piracy; (5) habitual delinquents; (5) those who have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; (6) those who violated the terms of
conditional pardon; (7) penalty of imprisonment the maximum term of which does not
exceed one year; (8) death penalty or life-imprisonment [Section 2 of Act No. 4103) or
reclusion perpetua [RA No. 9346]; (9) use of trafficked victim [Section 11 of RA No.
9208 as amended); and (10) non-imprisonment penalty such as destierro,
disqualification or rehabilitation for use of dangerous drugs.

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
14. Special mitigating circumstance - In People vs. Takbobo, G.R. No. No.
102984, June 30, 1993 - Accused was found guilty of parricide punishable by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63, when the penalty is
composed of two indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree, no
matter how many mitigating circumstances are present. The rule on special mitigating
circumstance is found in Article 64 (5) which provides the "rules for the application of
penalties which contain three periods," meaning, divisible penalties. Article 64 (5) is
inapplicable. Thus, the rule applicable in said case is found in Article 63, and not in
Article 64.
The Takbobo principle is also applicable if the penalty prescribed by law for the
crime committed is a single indivisible penalty such as reclusion Perpetua. Applying
Article 63, the penalty of reclusion Perpetua shall be applied by the court regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed. Special mitigating circumstance under Article 64 is not applicable since
this provision governs if the penalty is divisible.
15. Complex crime of robbery by means of violence and intimidation and
robbery by using force upon thing - In Sebastian case, the Supreme Court ruled that
when the elements of both robbery by means of violence and intimidation and robbery
by using force upon thing are present, the accused shall be held liable of the former
since the controlling qualification is the violence and intimidation.
However, the penalty for robbery in inhabited house if the robber is armed is
graver than simple robbery. Hence, by hurting the victim, the offender shall be
penalized with a lighter penalty.
In People vs. Napolis, G.R. No. L-28865, February 28, 1972, the Supreme Court
En Banc expressly abandoned the Sebastian doctrine. It was held that imposing a
much lighter penalty if violence upon person is used in addition to forcible entry in
committing robbery defies logic and reason. When the elements of both robbery by
means of violence and intimidation and robbery by using force upon thing are present,
the crime is a complex one under Article 48 of said Code. Hence, the penalty for
robbery in inhabited house shall be imposed in its maximum period.
In People vs. Disney, G.R. No. L-41336, February 18, 1983, En Banc and
Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Napolis doctrine.
16. Administrative condonation - Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115
August 21, 1992 - A re-elected public official cannot be removed for administrative
offense committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of his misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against accused for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Oliveros vs. Judge Villalulz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974, En Banc
Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body
politic. The small segment of the national electorate or the electorate of a municipality
has no power to condone a crime against the the State and the entire body politic.

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to
his reelection.
On the contrary, Article 9 of RA 3019 imposes as one of the penalties in case of
conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the RPC
declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the
public offices, even if conferred by popular election.
17. Suicide Is an offender liable for rape with homicide if the victim
immediately after the rape committed suicide? Yes. Ordinarily, homicide means killing
another person. In sum, the person responsible for the death of the victim must be the
offender. But in the case of People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, the
victim himself, who jumped from boat, is responsible for his own death, and yet, the
SC convicted the accused of robbery with homicide. In other words, death caused by
the victim himself is considered as homicide, which is a component of robbery with
homicide. Hence, suicide or death caused by the victim herself can be considered as
homicide as a component of special complex crime of rape with homicide.
18. Death in a tumultuous affray - The elements of Death Caused in a
Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did
not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally (Note: If there is conspiracy, this element is not present (People
vs. Corpuz, G.R. No. L-36234 February 10, 1981); (c) that these several persons
quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that
someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased; and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
In Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015 - There was no
tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which victim died. There
were only two accused, who picked on one person and attacked him repeatedly, taking
turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion and
tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful
incident. Since accused were even identified as the ones who assaulted victim, the
latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. They are
liable for homicide.
19. Rape - In People vs. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015 - The
commission of rape can be established by circumstantial evidence even if the victim,
being the sole witness, was rendered unconscious during its commission. Accused
slapped victim and punched her in the stomach. She was rendered unconscious.
When she regained consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and felt pain in her
vagina. Accused was convicted of rape.
In rape, the "sweetheart" defense must be proven by compelling evidence: first
that the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the
alleged sexual relations. The second is as important as the first, because this Court
has held often enough that love is not a license for lust (People vs. Victoria, G.R. No.
201110, July 06, 2015).

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
For there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not
completed (People vs. Bandril, G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015).
20. Direct assault Simple assault (e.g. punching) upon an agent of a person
in authority (e.g. police officer) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes
simple resistance. The crime committed is not direct assault since intent to defy the
law and its representative at all hazard, which is an indispensable element thereof is
lacking (U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
13083, December 11, 1917; People vs. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226, November 17, 1933).
But serious assault upon agent of a person in authority while engaged in the
performance of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs. Cox, G.R. No. 1406, January
6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910).
Simple assault upon a person in authority (e.g. mayor or chief of police) while
engaged in the performance of duty constitutes qualified direct assault. Laying of
hands upon a person in authority is a qualifying circumstance in Article 148 of RPC.
The law does not distinguish between serious and simple laying of hands upon a
person in authority as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, a simple laying of hands
upon a person in authority constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R.
No. 13658, November 9, 1918).
If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of
duties at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is immaterial. Direct
assault is committed even on the assumption that the motive for the offense was a
dispute totally foreign to victims official function (Sarcepuedes vs. People, G.R. No. L3857, October 22, 1951).
The phraseology "on occasion of such performance" used in Art. 148 of the
Revised Penal Code signifies "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of
official duty even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being
discharged because the purpose of the law is to allow them to discharge their official
duties without fear of being assaulted or injured by reason thereof (People vs.
Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974). Attacking a judge on the street by reason
of past performance of duty (citing the accused in contempt) constitutes qualified
direct assault (U.S. vs. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16, 1911). But attacking a
retired judge by reason of past performance of duty is not direct assault since he is not
anymore a person in authority at the time of the assault.
BP Blg. 873, which was enacted in 1985, has amended Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code by making a lawyer a person in authority while in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance. The
intention of the lawmakers is that their status as persons in authority remains even
the assault is committed outside the court room as long as it is perpetrated by reason
of the performance of their professional duties. (see: Records of the Batasan, Volume
Four, 1984-1985).
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in authority, who is a
victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in
authority, who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect direct assault. Attacking

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who is a victim
of simple resistance, is liable for physical injuries.
22. Evasion - In evasion of service of sentence, the accused must be a
convicted prisoner and not merely a detention prisoner. In delivery of prisoner from
jail, the person, who escaped through the help of the accused, is either a detention
prisoner or convicted prisoner. In infidelity in the custody of prisoner, the person, who
escaped in connivance with or consent of or through negligence of the accusedcustodian, is either a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner.
23. Malversation - The crime of malversation of public funds has the following
elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the funds or
property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them (Mesina vs. People, G.R. No.
162489, June 17, 2015);
Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public
officer is a public officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property. The Local Government Code expanded this definition with regard to local
government officials. Section 340 of the LGC reads: Any officer of the local government
unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds
shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the
provisions of this title. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their
duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government
funds through their participation in the use or application thereof. Local government
officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature of their
functions; or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public
funds (Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015);
24. Other forms of swindling In other forms of swindling under Article 316,
(1) and (2) of RPC, offender perpetrates false representation involving real property and
act of ownership such as selling it, which causes damage to third person. In paragraph
1, the false representation pertains to ownership, while in paragraph 2 free from
encumbrance. In Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015 - The
gravamen of estafa under paragraph 2 is the disposition of legally encumbered real
property by the offender under the express representation that there is no encumbrance
thereon. The accused is not liable for this crime since he did not make an express
representation in the deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free
from any encumbrance. Neither did accused under paragraph 1 since he did not
pretend to be the lawful owner of property by a title issued in the name of her father.
The complainant is aware that the title is still in the name of the father of the accused.
25. Estafa through misappropriation - Refusal to remit rentals for properties
owned by corporation to corporate officers, who are not validly elected, does not
constitutes estafa through misappropriation (People vs. Arambulo, G.R. No. 186597,
June 17, 2015). In a prosecution for estafa through misappropriation, demand is not
necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion (People vs.
Arambulo, supra);

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
26. Infidelity in the custody of document - The elements of Infidelity in the
Custody of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC are: (1) The offender must be a
public officer; (2) There must be a document removed, destroyed or concealed; (3) The
document destroyed or removed must be entrusted to such public officer by reason of
his office; and (4) Damage or prejudice to the public interest or to that of a third
person must be caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of such document
(Zapanta vs. People, GR No. 192698-99, April 22, 2015).
Differences between infidelity in the custody of document and estafa under
Article 315 (3) (c) of RPC: (1) In both crimes, the offender removed, concealed or
destroyed document; (2) in infidelity of the custody of document, the offender is a
public officer entrusted with the document; while in estafa, the offender is a private
individual; (3) In estafa, intent to defraud is an element; but this is not element of
infidelity in the custody of document.
27. Anti-wiretapping law - In Mamba vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June
25, 2001, En Banc -During an NBI entrapment operation, the complainant taperecorded his conversation with two police officers, who in conspiracy with a judge were
extorting money from him in exchange of the dismissal of case illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm. The recording of private conversations without the consent of the
parties contravenes the provisions of RA No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law. The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private
communications.
28. Money laundering - Money laundering is committed by any person who,
knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to
the proceeds of any unlawful activity: (a) transacts said monetary instrument or
property; (b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said
monetary instrument or property; (c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said
monetary instrument or property; (d) attempts or conspires to commit money
laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); (e) aids, abets, assists in or
counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs
(a), (b) or (c) above; and (f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he
facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c)
above. Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that
a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so (Section 4 of RA No. 9160 as
amended by RA No. 10365).
Unlawful activity refers to any act or omission or series or combination thereof
involving or having direct relation to the following: (1) heinous crimes such as piracy,
murder, destructive arson, kidnapping for ransom, crimes involving dangerous drugs;
(2) crimes against property such as hijacking, carnapping, fencing, robbery, qualified
theft, and estafa; (3) crimes committed by public officer such as bribery and
corruption of public officers, frauds and Illegal exactions, malversation, graft and
corruption, and plunder; (4) forgeries and counterfeiting; and (5) offense under special
laws such as child pornography, photo-video voyeurism, child abuse, crimes involving
explosives and unlicensed firearm, trafficking in person, illegal recruitment, terrorism
and conspiracy to commit terrorism, and financing of terrorism and; smuggling, and
illegal gambling.

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Unlawful activity also includes violation of the Electronic Commerce Law, the
Revised Forestry Code, Fisheries Code, Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection
Act, the National Caves and Cave Resources Management Protection Act, the
Intellectual Property Code; the Securities Regulation Code; and felonies or offenses of
a similar nature that are punishable under the penal laws of other countries (Section
3 of RA No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10365).
Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money
laundering and the above-enumerated unlawful activity. The prosecution of money
laundering shall proceed independently of any proceeding relating to the unlawful
activity (Section 6 of RA No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10365).
29. Inducing public officer to commit offense or violate regulation - Under
Section 3 (a), a public officer, who persuades, induces or influences another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations or an offense
in connection with the official duties of the latter, shall be punished for corruption.
However, the deliberation in the Senate regarding the bill on anti-graft shows that the
mode of committing the crime under Section 3 (a) is persuading, inducing or
influencing a public officer by another public officer to commit an offense or to violate
rules and regulations by means of consideration, reward, payment or remuneration
(See: Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, Oct. 12, 2006).
30. Importation of dangerous drugs - In People vs. Chan Liu, G.R. No.
189272, January 21, 2015, accused were caught by police authorities on board a
speedboat carrying shabu. They were charged with importation of dangerous drugs.
However, since it was not proven that the drugs came from China or foreign country
they were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, which is necessarily included in
the charge of importation.
31. Psychological violence against women - The elements of psychological
violence against woman under Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 are: (1) The offended party
is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) The woman is either the wife or former
wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As
for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living
within or without the family abode; (3) The offender causes on the woman and/or
child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) The anguish is caused through acts of
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or
omissions (Dinamling vs. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015).
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental
or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such
acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party (Dinamling vs.
People, supra).
Neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical
violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at

2015 SUPPLEMENTAL REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused the
mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of physical violence must be
proven. Accuseds acts of publicly punching, kicking and stripping victim of her pants
and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of
psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in her public
ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress (Dinamling vs. People,
supra).
The fact that the victim is pregnant is an aggravating circumstance under
Section 6 of RA No. 9262 (Dinamling vs. People, supra).